National and Human Security Challenges Posed by Ethnic-influenced conflict in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 1980-2013

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents	Pages
Declaration	i
Dedication	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
List of Abbreviations	iv
Maps	viii
Abstract	1
Chapter 1	**2**
Introduction	**2**
1.1 Background to the Study	2
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study	4
1.2.1 Aim of the study	4
1.2.2 Objectives of the Study	5
1.3 Rationale of the Study	5
1.4 Initial Assumptions	5
1.5 Problem Statement and Research Questions	6
1.5.1 Problem Statement	6
1.5.2 Research Questions	7
1.6 Research Methodology	7
1.6.1 Qualitative Methodology	7
1.6.2 Research Design	8

UNIVERSITY OF VENDA
LIBRARY

1.7 Theoretical Framework 8

1.7.1 Triadic Conflict Structure Theory 9

1.7.2 Conflict theory 10

1.7.3 Realism 11

1.8 Literature Review 12

1.8.1 On the causes of the DRC conflict and the historical context of ethnicity in the DRC 12

1.8.2 On the influence of ethnicity in the GLR and DRC's political landscape 13

1.8.3 On human security challenges posed by ethnic-influenced conflict in the DRC 14

1.9 Significance of the Study 16

1.10 Ethical Considerations 16

1.11 Limitations of the Study 17

1.12 Structure of the Study 18

Chapter Two **19**

Historical context of the role and influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity within the DRC and the GLR **19**

2.1 Introduction 19

2.2 Understanding the Politics of Ethnicity 20

2.3 Factors that contributed to Ethnic Conflict in the GLR: The Case of the DRC 21

2.3.1 The role of Colonialism in the GLR 22

2.3.2 Independence within the GLR 26

2.4 The Historical Context of the Role and Influence of Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity in the GLR: The Relevance of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda

to Politics of the DRC 29

2.4.1 Rwanda's historical background 29

2.4.2 Burundi's historical background 33

2.4.3 Uganda's historical background 37

2.5 The historical context of the role and influence of ethnic and ethnic identity in the DRC. 41

2.5.1 The DRC's political landscape during colonialism 41

2.5.2 The DRC immediately after independence until Mobutu's regime 42

2.5.3 The DRC after 1997 until present: From Laurent Kabila to Joseph Kabila 45

2.6 Conclusion 49

Chapter Three 50

The Influence of Ethnicity within the DRC's Political Landscape with Reference to Nation Building and National Security 50

3.1 Introduction 50

3.2 The Influence of Ethnicity on the DRC's Political Landscape with Reference to Nation Building 51

3.3 The DRC's Ethnically-Influenced Political Players 54

3.3.1 The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 54

3.3.2 The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) 56

3.3.3 The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) 57

3.3.4 The Mai Mai Militia 58

3.3.5 The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) 60

3.3.6 The March 23 Movement (M23) 62

3.3.7 The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 63

3.3.8 The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 64

3.3.9 Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) 65

3.3.10 Front for National Integration (FNI) 66

3.4 The Influence of Ethnicity within the DRC's Political Landscape with Reference to National Security: The Place of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi 67

3.4.1 The influence of ethnicity in the DRC with reference to its diplomatic relations within the GLR 67

3.4.2 The DRC and Uganda's diplomatic relations 68

3.4.3 The DRC and Rwanda's diplomatic relations 70

3.4.4 The DRC and Burundi's diplomatic relations 71

3.5 The Influence of Ethnicity on the DRC's Political Power Relations 72

3.6 The Influence of Ethnicity in the DRC with Reference to its Economic Power 75

3.7 Conclusion 79

Chapter Four 80

National and Human Security Challenges Posed by Ethnic-influenced conflict in the DRC 1980-2013. 80

4.1 Introduction 80

4.2 Ethnicity during the reign of Mobutu Sese Seko 82

4.2.1 Patrimonialism 83

4.2.2 The end of the Cold War and political reforms 85

UNIVERSITY OF VENDA
LIBRARY

4.2.3 The 'Failed State' of DRC (Zaïre) and Human Security 87

4.3 Laurent Kabila and the Politics of Ethnicity: National and Human Security under his Regime 89

4.3.1 Ethnicity and human security: Repetition without difference. 89

(a) Ethnic myths as a specific feature in the political dynamics of Laurent Kabila 90

(b) Kabila's failure in halting the killing and displacement of Hutu refugees 91

(c) Intertnational Response to Human Security 92

4. 3.2 Laurent Kabila's regime 1997-2001. 93

(a) The DRC and politics of exclusion 93

(b) The Resurgence of ethnic myths: The Second Congo War. 94

(c) Conflict in the Ituri region 96

(d)The involvement of ethnic polarised groups in the conflict in Ituri 97

(e) The Ituri conflict: The resultant ethnic fears and security dilemma 98

(f) The involvement of Uganda in the politics of the Ituri region 99

(g) The response of the government to the conflict 101

4.4 The government as an accessory to ethnic violence 101

4.4.1 The ascendance of Joseph Kabila to power: national security and human security 102

4.4.2 The political context in 2001. 102

4.4.3 The politics of ethnicity in the Joseph Kabila regime. 103

4.4.4 Ethinicity as a source of insecurity in the Forces Armees de la Congo (FAC) 105

4.4.5 The 2006 National Elections 106

4.4.6 The DRC's political situation from 2006 to 2013 108

4.5 National and Human Security Challenges in the DRC, 1996-2013 109

4.5.1 The collapse of effective government administration: National Security Challenges 110

(a) The challenge of national and human security sector 110

(b) The health department 111

(c) The DRC conflict and the collapse of the education system 112

(d) The transport system 112

(e) The illegal control of mines (The mining industry) 113

(f) The collapse of the economy 114

4.5.2 Human Security Challenges in the DRC: 1996-2013 115

(a) Food Security, Poverty and Migration 116

(b) The violent abuse of women and children 118

(c) Inadequate health care, diseases and high death rate 118

4.6 Conclusion. 119

Chapter 5 121

General Conclusion and Recommendations 121

5.1 Conclusion 121

5.2 Recommendations 123

5.2.1 On Nation-building 125

5.2.2 National Security and National borders must be strengthened 126

5.2.3 Human Security must be improved 127

5.2.4 Good Relations with its neighbouring countries 128

Bibliography 129

A. Dictionaries 129

B. Books 129

C. Chapters in books 133

D. Journal Articles 135

E. Internet Materials 137

F. Conference Papers 145

G. Policy Briefs and Policy Statements 145

H. Reports 146

I. Thesis 146

J. Newspaper Articles 147

K. Electronic Media 148

L. Documentaries 148

Appendixes 149

Declaration

I, **Mmatlou Millicent-Anne Hannah Modiba**, student number **11580913**, hereby declare that this supervised research project, "National and Human Security Challenges Posed by Ethnic-influenced conflict in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 1980-2013", submitted for the requirements for Master of Arts Degree in African Studies (MAAS) at the University of Venda is my own work in design and execution and that it has never been submitted before at this or any other institution and that all the sources and material used have been cited and fully acknowledged.

Student: Mmatlou M.H. Modiba

Signature: .....

Date: .....

Dedication

I dedicate this study to my mother, Ntebatse Catherine Modiba. Your prayers, support and encouragement sustained me. I managed to prepare and complete this research project because of your unending encouragement, support and love. Mom you are my pillar of strength, without you I would not have done it. I really appreciate your support. May God bless you abundantly and give you long healthy life. Thank you.

I also dedicate this research to my son, Kamogelo M. Modiba, and my late brother Sello Benett Modiba. I also dedicate this study to my late grandmother, Neria Moshathama Modiba, the stories that you used to tell me when I was young, about Africa and its politics became useful in this research project.

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List of Abbreviations


AU	African Union
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation of Congo
AMP	Alliance of the Presidential Majority
APC	*Armee Populaire Congolaise*
BALUBAKAT	Association of the Baluba People of Katanga
CAR	Central African Republic
CEI	Independent Electoral Commissiion
CENI	Independent National Electoral Commission
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People
DP	Democratic Party
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
Ex-FAR	Former Rwandan Armed Forces
FAC	Forces Armees de la Congo
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces
FARDC	Armed Forces of Democratic Republic Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FNI	Front for National Integration
FNL	Forces of National Liberation
FPLC	*Forces Patriotigues Pour la Liberation du Congo*
FPR	*Front Patriotique Rwandanais*,
FRPI	Patriotic Force of Resistance

FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi or *Front Pour la Democratie au Burundi*
FRF	Republican Federalist Forces
GEA	German East Africa
HIV	Human Immune Virus
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
LoN	League of Nations
LRA	The Lord's Resistance Army
M23	The March 23 Movement or *Mouvement du 23- Mars*
MLC	Congolese Liberation Movement
MNC	*Mouvement National Congolais*
MONUC	United Nations Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPR	*Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution*
MRND	National Revolutionary Movement for Development
PARMEHUTU	Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus
PPRD	People's Party for Reconstruction and Development
PCRD	Conflict Reconstruction and Development Process
MONUC	United Nations Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MRND	National Revolutionary Movement for Development
M23	March 23 rebel group
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations

NRA/M	National Resistant Movement
OAU	Organisation of African Unity's
PCRD	Conflict Reconstruction and Development Process
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
RCD	*Rassemblement Congolais pour la* Democratie/ Congolese Rally for Democracy
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SANDF	South African Defence Force
UFERI	*Federalistes Republicains Independents*
UPDS	*Union pour la Democratie et le Progress Social* or Union for Democracy and Social Progress
UN	United Nations
UNC	Uganda National Congress
UNISA	University of South Africa
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
UPC	*Union des Patriot es Congolais* / Union of Congolese Patriots
UPDF	The Ugandan Peoples Defence Force
UpN	Union for the Nation
UPRONA	Union for National Progress
USA	United States of America
VIP	Very Important Person
VOA	The Voice of America

WB	World Bank
WWI	First World War
WHO	World Health Organization

Map showing Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa



Accessed at: http://images.search.yahoo.com/images/view

Map showing the DRC's neighbouring countries



Accessed at: http://images.search.yahoo.com/images/view


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Map showing countries that are involved in the DRC conflict



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
Map The Democratic Republic of Congo



SOURCE: "Map of the DRC" at

http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=DRC+Map&qpvt=DRC+Map&FORM=IGRE#view=detail&id=FCA20979B6E4FF444A032D7D2609FB6273594C24&selectedIndex=33.

Kivu Map



A half map of the DRC, showing the location of the two war-torn provinces, Nord and South Kivu, highlighted in brown and orange.

Source: www.googleimages.com

Map of Kivu



Another Map showing the Kivu provinces, Written in French as Nord Kivu (North Kivu) and Sud Kivu (South Kivu).

Source: www.googleimages.com

Abstract

The Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa comprises six countries which are Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The region is home to various ethnic groups such that it has inherited a cosmopolitan regional society with different cultures, religions and beliefs. This ethnicity diversity has for decades been a challenge to the region in the sense that it has had an influence on the politics and social fabric of the region's population. This study focused on the influence of ethnicity on conflict in the GLR of Africa with special focus on the DRC. This is because the region has for years been home to numerous coup d'états, civil wars, ethnic violence, cross-border conflicts, genocides as well as assassinations of political leaders. The DRC's post-independence era has had its fair share of negatives with unending conflict costing thousands of lives, destruction of infrastructure, socio-political instability and a weak base for economic growth. In the main the influence of ethnicity on the DRC conflict has posed serious challenges to national as well as human security and exacerbated the inability of regional leaders to find a solution for the sake of political and social stability as well as economic growth and development. It is for this reason that this study examined the national and human security challenges posed by the influence of ethnicity on the conflict in the DRC. This study has employed qualitative research method as it is based mainly on the data from disciplines in the social sciences such as History, Political Science and International Relations. The data collected was obtained from both primary sources and secondary sources. Where necessary, interviews were conducted to address the paucity of written information crucially important to achieve the objectives the study. The data from these sources was interpreted, analysed, integrated and critically presented in a narrative and descriptive manner.

Keywords: Ethnicity, national security, human security, political instability, conflict

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

The post-independence history of the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa is mostly filled with coup d'etats and ethnic conflicts that have seen indiscriminate loss of life, social and political instability as well as drastic economic decline. This is in contrast to the colonial period when the region was relatively politically and economically stable mainly because the colonial system was based on conquest and subjugation of the indigenous people (Bamou, et al, 2013: 30). During the period leading to national liberation Africans were united in purpose, irrespective of their ethnic differences, because they had a common goal of achieving independence from their European colonisers. However, this changed soon after independence, particularly after the 1960s, when ethnicity started to rear its head in various forms (Mpangala, 2004: 2). Those that were in power started to show affinity to people belonging to their own ethnic groups and marginalised those of different ethnic affiliation, even in government, thus creating a recipe for prejudice, animosity, conflict and instability. The GLR, for one, has been no exception as it has witnessed some of the most intense violence and inter- as well as intra-state conflicts, some of which were fuelled by competition for resources and political power (Bamou et al, 2013: 28; Modiba, 2014: 20). During the contemporary period, and over a period spanning twenty (20) years the region has experienced political and ethnic-influenced conflicts that have for a number of years afflicted countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, the DRC and Kenya thus threatening national as well as human security (Bamou et al, 2013: 28).

According to Shahrbanou (2009: 1) national security is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic power, diplomacy, power projection and political power. It is also an incorporate term covering both national defence and foreign relations of the country. Furthermore, the author emphasises on the other hand that human insecurity comes from the sudden loss of guarantee of access to jobs, health care, social welfare and education, amongst others. It also stems from the violation of human rights, extremism, domestic violence,

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the spread of conflicts and displacement (Shahrbanou, 2009: 1). It is these two concepts, national and human security, alongside the influence of ethnicity on conflict and instability, which form the pivotal point of this study.

The GLR is located in the central part of Africa and its name derives from the three lakes found within its proximity, which are Lakes Tanganyika (in the western border of Tanzania), Nyasa (in the south) and Victoria in the north (Mpangala, 2004: 2). The region comprises six (6) countries that surround these lakes which are the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi (former colonies of Belgium), Uganda and Kenya (colonies of Britain) as well as Tanzania, which was colonised by Germany and later by Britain, through the League of Nations (LoN) territorial mandate arrangement of 1919 (Bamou et al, 2013: 32; Mpangala, 2004: 4). Although the GLR countries generally gained their independence in the 1960s, in contrast to all the other regions of the African continent, it has experienced more conflict, indiscriminate loss of human lives, jobs and better living standards, which came as a result of ethnicity or ethnic tensions (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998: 61). The result has been that despite this region having gained independence more than fifty years ago, it is still faced with widespread political instability and underdevelopment, regardless of being endowed with vast mineral resources (Huggins et al, 2005: 2).

This part of history is a result of the fact that during colonialism, the European powers created and consolidated divisive ideologies of ethnicity, racialism, regionalism and religious antagonism. Accompanying these were artificial borders that were used to promote the divide and rule policy, thereby antagonising people who before colonialism belonged to the same ethnic groups and/or socio-political organizations (Mpangala, 2000: 8; Mpangala, 2004: 5). These changes became problematic after independence when those who had achieved political power could not determine their political destiny, especially regarding the contentious issue of nation building. As such at independence ethnicity has been one of the biggest challenges to Africa's nation building, political stability, economic and social development as well as social cohesion. Ethnicity, in particular, has influenced conflict in Rwanda between the Tutsis and Hutus, during the 1994 genocide, and post-election periods in the DRC, Burundi and Kenya (Guteirrez-Romeo, 2010: 3). It has also played such a very critical role in shaping the socio-political lives of many African people because it is the way in which people identify themselves,

whereas some have even accepted to live among, and adapt to being under particular ethnic groups (Schraeder, 2000: 138; Guteirrez-Romeo, 2010: 3).

Flowing from the above, Bamou et al (2013: 30) assert that ethnic identity is a political construct that has contributed to some countries in Africa, such as Tanzania, inheriting high ethnic diversity. This has seen them having to use the education system and redistribution of resources to develop a sense of national identity or nation building as opposed to ethnic identity (Schraeder, 2000: 138). The corollary also applies in a country like Nigeria with the highest number of ethnic groups, more than two-hundred-and fifty (250), where mother tongue has been encouraged as a medium of instruction thereby using language to encourage ethnic identity (Olowolo, 1999: 12). In ethnically diverse countries within the GLR such as Kenya, the DRC and Burundi, political parties and leaders have used ethnic affinity to mobilize voters and establish political alliances, thus leading to violent post-elections ethnic conflict cases or political instability, underdevelopment and maladministration by the governments of the day (Mpangala, 2004: 7). In recent years some countries in the region such as the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR) have experienced armed conflicts that have resulted in human displacement, making GLR one of the most unstable and unsafe places in Africa (Mpangala, 2004: 2). These conflicts are rooted in long-standing tensions over ethnic affinity and citizenship rights, which are in turn related to grievances over access to resources, particularly land, mineral and other natural resources, making ethnicity being one of the post-independent challenges in the GLR (Huggins et al, 2005: 2). This study, therefore, focuses on "National and Human Security Challenges Posed by Ethnic-influenced conflict in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa: A Case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 1980-2013".

1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study

1.2.1 Aim of the study

The aim of this study is to investigate the "National and Human Security Challenges Posed by Ethnicity in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 1980-2013".

1.2.2 Objectives of the Study

The following objectives were identified to assist the course of the study, which are:

- To discuss the historical context of the role and influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity within the GLR and the DRC;
- To investigate the influence of ethnicity on the DRC's political landscape with reference to nation building and national security;
- To examine the challenges posed by ethnicity-influenced conflict in the DRC with reference to national and human security.

1.3 Rationale of the Study

This study was inspired by the curiosity to understand the national and human security challenges posed by ethnicity in the DRC of the GLR of Africa. Flowing from this statement is the fact that existing literature on the DRC conflict is dominated by the challenges surrounding conflict resolution and peace building efforts by international organisations such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in particular. However, regardless of the these challenges to the efforts at finding solutions to, and consolidating peace, years have seen conflict continuing to flare up unabated, especially in the eastern and north-eastern part of the DRC. The study was as such influenced by the researcher's interest in the place and role of ethnicity in the long-lasting conflict in the DRC and the challenges it poses on nation building, national and human security as well as how the conflict has affected the ordinary citizen of the DRC politically as well as socio-economically.

1.4 Initial Assumptions

Ethnicity has for a number of years after independence been one of the contributors to conflict in the GLR as a whole, and the DRC in particular, resultantly affecting national and human security, thus compromising socio-political stability as well as socio-economic development.

1.5 Problem Statement and Research Questions

1.5.1 Problem Statement

The countries of Africa's GLR, especially the DRC, have for the most part of post-independence experienced instability. The DRC has a history of instability with the latest being the post-Mobutu Se se Seko's era outbreak of the conflict in 1996 to this date. The result has been that the region, and particularly the eastern part (Kivu regions) of the country, have been reported as some of the most unstable and volatile places to live in Africa, if not the world (Modiba, 2014: 21). The region's strong sense of ethnicity has also influenced conflicts, ranging from the 1986 coup d'état of Uganda as well as the genocides of Burundi and Rwanda of the years 1972 and 1994, respectively, which also had a negative impact on the people of neighbouring DRC (Kuperman, 2000: 97), as will be discussed later in the study. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, for its part, caused a spill over effect between the Hutus and the Tutsis, as the Hutus fled to the DRC and started to attack Rwandan Tutsis from the refugee camps within that country (Modiba, 2014: 21).

The complexity of the DRC conflict of 1996/7 to 2013 and the political instability resulting there from have been the subject of the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU), and later the African Union's (AU), capability or incapability to resolve the continent's political conflicts. The DRC conflict also stands out as an example since it has been going on for over seventeen (17) years with regards to the period of focus of this study (Modiba, 2014: 21). Since its outbreak the conflict has become a threat to the socio-political stability of the country's neighbours outside the GLR such as Zambia, South Africa, Botswana and Angola, among others. It is also a challenge to the human security within the SADC region, which does not come as a surprise that the region has been associated with post-independence conflict and socio-political instability as well as economic slowdown (Mpangala, 2004: 8). These socio-political and economic developments have largely been related to the random existence of and infiltration by ethnic-based rebels within the GLR (Modiba, 2014: 32). It is for this reason that the researcher was able to identify the influence of ethnicity on nation building and human security and its challenge to the socio-political stability as well as economic development in the DRC as a very important area of research. It was for this reason that the following research questions were prepared:

1.5.2 Research Questions

- What is the historical context of the role and influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity within the GLR and the DRC?
- How has ethnicity influenced the DRC's political landscape with reference to nation building and national security?
- What are the human security challenges posed by ethnic-influenced conflict in the DRC?

1.6 Research Methodology

According to Polit and Hungler (1997: 461) research methodology refers to steps, procedures and strategies used for gathering and analysing data in the course of research investigation or preparation. It is also regarded as a total strategy from the identification of the problem to the final plan of gathering and analysing data (Burns and Grové, 2001: 223). According Brynnard and Hanekom (2006: 36) research methodology necessitates a reflection on the planning, structuring and the execution of the research in order to comply with the demands of the truth, objectivity and validity. It is for this reason that the study employed the qualitative research methodology as it was found to be the most appropriate in the social sciences research, in this case "National and Human Security Challenges Posed by Ethnicity in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 1980-2013".

1.6.1 Qualitative Methodology

The study has identified the qualitative research method as the basic tool for this particular study. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 4) the qualitative method implies an emphasis on the processes and the meaning that are not vigorously examined or measured (if measured) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency. According to Burns and Grové (2001: 61) qualitative research is a systemic, subjective approach used to describe life experiences and giving meaning as well as gain insight through discovering meaning. On the other hand Babbie and Mouton (2001: 646) define qualitative research as a method that studies human action from the insider's perspective with the goal to describe and understand. As such qualitative research method is designed to reveal the target audience's range of behaviour and the perceptions that drive it with

reference to specific topics or issues (Flick, 2009: 123; Boetje, 2010: 76). In other words, according to these authors the central aims of qualitative research methods are to establish the socially constructed nature of reality, to stress the relationship between the researcher and the object of study, as well as to emphasize the value-laden nature of the inquiry. It is for this reason that the study was mainly desk-top and literature based as it has accessed information from books, journal articles, newspapers article, internet materials, theses and electronic media (radio and television). Interviews were used when collecting data where necessary based on the population sampling. Lastly, in order to present the discussion and findings of the study, the descriptive, narrative and analytical approach have been employed.

1.6.2 Research Design

Research design is the overall plan for collecting and analysing data (Polit and Hungler, 1997: 267; De Vos, 1998: 123). In support of this assertion, Burns and Grové (2001: 223) refer to the research design as the researcher's overall plan for obtaining answers to the research problem. According to De Vos (1998: 77) the research design is associated with the structural framework of the study and concerns the planning and the implementation of the study in order to reach the goals that have been set. In this regard, the data collection method is the raw material to dig out information in the form of data, which can be interpreted and refined into cold infusion (Welsman, Kruger and Metchell, 2005: 83). For the purpose of this study, the researcher has used two instruments to collect data, which are reviewing and analysing existing literature and documentaries (Monette, Sullivan and De Jong, 2008: 488).

1.7 Theoretical Framework

According to Baylis (2011: 3) theory is a simplifying device that allows one to decide which fact matters and which does not. On the other hand McGowan (2006: 28) defines theory as an ordered set of assumptions, ideas and concepts which tells us something about the world or an aspect of reality. The study employed the following theories in discussing the objectives raised: It is also a group of ideas that provides guidance to a research project (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/theoreticalframework.html#ixzz3iUhMDWjI). The following theories were identified for the purpose of this study.

1.7.1 Triadic Conflict Structure Theory

According to Michel (1981: 16) the "Triadic Conflict Structure" is an essential theory that rests on three inter-related components, namely the conflict situation, conflict attitudes and conflict behaviour. The author asserts that these three components continually interact with and mutually reinforce each other to create a varyingly cohesive web of conflict. These three different components of "triadic conflict" (conflict situation, conflict attitudes and perceptions as well as conflict behaviour) reciprocally influence each other by following a triangular format: the conflict situation influences the attitudes and the behaviour of parties; the attitudes and the behaviour in turn affect the initial conflict situation, and so on (Mitchell 1981: 54-55). Conflict attitudes are defined as common patterns of expectation, emotional orientation and perception which accompany involvement in a conflict (Masabala, 2009: 12). Conflict attitudes consider the roles of attitudes and psychological perceptions in the perpetuation and aggravation of conflict.

Flowing from this premise, the DRC conflict is characterised by the involvement of different violent and armed groups that are fighting each other and among themselves. It has also attracted other foreign armed groups that joined the war in the name of protecting their fellow ethnic groups within the region. This resonates with conflict behaviour which is defined as actions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of ensuring that opponents abandon or modify their goals (Mitchell, 1981: 29). The behaviour can be direct or indirect, violent or non-violent, self-destructive or other-destructive (Mitchel 1981: 29). The warring parties in the DRC are indirectly fighting each other through attacking ordinary citizens and the exploitation of natural resources. This has made the government of the DRC together with the assistance of South Africa and the UN peacekeepers to aggressively fight and capture some of the rebel groups such as the March 23 Rebel movement (M23) with the aim of disbanding them completely.

In this vein Mitchel (1981: 17) defines "conflict situation" as any situation where two or more social parties perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals which are underpinned by issues such as the use or ownership of resources. Added to this are the rights or control of present and/or future resources, continued existence of a party in its current form, status, prestige, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. The current conflict situation in the DRC can be said to have

become complex such that all the warring parties, the government and the rebels, are not willing to give up their goals and compromise for the sake of peace and the well-being of the country and its citizens. This has over the years, translated into actions from each side (behaviour) aimed at both achieving their individual goals as influenced by the "conflict situation". In this study "The Triadic Conflict Structure" has been used as an attempt to show how ethnicity has influenced the emergence of a situation of conflict, how it can inculcate prejudices that may instil attitudes of conflict and thus encourage the outbreak of and taking part in conflict, all these resultantly posing a challenge to nation building and national as well as human security.

1.7.2 Conflict theory

According to Grolier (1989: 178) conflict theory originated with the work of Karl Marx in the mid-1800s and suggests that human behaviour in the social context results from conflict between competing groups and individuals. According to Giddens (1993: 25) Marx understood human society in terms of conflict between social classes, notably the conflict in capitalist societies between those who owned the means of economic production, for example factory and farm owners, and those who did not: the workers or labourers. One gets to understand that different social groups have unequal power, though all groups struggle for the same limited resources. Giddens (1993: 25) further claims that conflict theory has been used to explain diverse human behaviour, such as educational practices that either sustain or challenge the *status quo* and cultural customs regarding the elderly as well as criminal behaviour. This is supported by Grolier (1989: 178) who asserts that conflict theory is a perspective that emphasizes that the social, political and material inequalities of a social group that critiques the broad socio-political system or that detract from structural functionalism and ideological conservatism. This assertion draws attention to power differentials such as class conflict and generally contrast historically dominant ideologies, making it a macro level analysis of society. In this study of the influence of ethnicity in the DRC, conflict can be viewed as the struggle for power and dominance as well as the competition for control of the natural resources among the ethnically based rebel groups as well as government and other ethnically affiliated political organizations, thereby putting nation building, national security and human security at risk.

1.7.3 Realism

According to Baylis and Smith (2006: 163) realism argues that the state is the main actor in the international system, meaning that the state plays an important role within rationality and through the state leaders or political leaders. This theory maintains that the anarchic structure of the international system and the absence of an international government make states to behave irrationally and radically to ensure the survival and protection of international interests (Dunne and Schudunt, 2011: 87). It is for this reason that the execution of foreign policy is influenced or motivated by the internal security dilemma, which explains why realism accounts for national security as the chief motivator for foreign policy formulation. Therefore, states also have the responsibility to build solid, sustainable mutual alliances based on comparative gains. On the other hand according to Keohane and Nye (1998: 114) realism is also a practice of accepting a situation as it is and being prepared to deal with it accordingly, thus representing a person or situation accurately or in a way that is true to life, meaning that realism is based on pragmatism. It, therefore, answers to survival from physical abuse, violence, persecution, or death and livelihoods such as unemployment, food insecurity and health, among others, as well to their dignity or well-being (Baylis and Smith, 2006: 163).

Therefore, in realism national and human security in the context of the DRC has usually been associated with threats to survival because the absence of national and human security instead poses a danger to the state, individuals and communities at large. Associated with this is poverty, for example, which is conceptualized as a human security threat not only because it can induce violence, and thus threatening the stability of the state, but because it is a threat to the well-being of individuals (Bamou (2013: 14). As such one understands human security, in its broadest terms, to mean freedom from want, freedom from fear and a presence of a life of dignity. This study thus attempts to show how in post-independence DRC ethnicity was made pliable by the ruling elite of the day such that it tended to be manipulated in the guise of peace, stability and national building, depending on the political climate and the political ideology of the ruling elite. Lastly, in the context of this study, realism will attempt to show that ethnicity is actually a reality that cannot be wished away at the altar of political expediency of nation building, national security and human security.

1.8 Literature Review

The study identified a few sources for the purpose of literature review in order to lay the foundation for the general discussion of the history of the GLR. As such the literature review was done *vis-à-vis* the objectives and the related research questions with as much relevance to the study based on views of selected authors:

1.8.1 On the causes of the DRC conflict and the historical context of ethnicity in the DRC

Schraeder (2000: 89) indicates that ethnicity has usually been a challenge to post-colonial African politics. Furthermore he asserts that ethnicity is likely to cause conflict and also shape the nature of conflict as many people in Africa see themselves belonging more to their ethnic groups even in the process of what is regarded as nation-building. The author argues that when people are in power they are likely to favour people of their own tribes in terms of political positions, employment, and service delivery as well as government tender contracts, thus creating patronage. In terms of Africa's GLR situation, since independence ethnicity has been seen to be one of the factors that has not only caused conflict but also perpetuated it in many instances. The leaders of the Great Lakes countries have on occasions been accused of ethnic favouritism and affiliation, thus contributing to rebellions and violent attacks against other ethnic groups. The region is a haven for many different ethnically affiliated rebel groups mostly either Tutsi- or Hutu-led, operating freely and fighting against each other (Kuperman, 2000: 97).

Mpangala (2004:18) discusses the origin of conflict and peace building in the GLR by indicating that colonialism was one of the causes of conflict that people see today. He mentions that the creation of colonial borders has resulted in ethnic based conflict were people have ended up fighting for the ownership and use of land and mineral resources. According to the author, this was because colonialism divided people or tribes that had historically and originally been living together and in the process grouped tribes of different ethnic origins together. Furthermore, the author asserts that immediately after independence this division and grouping brought incessant conflict when people started fighting for the ownership or control of land and other resources thereby jeopardising the peace, stability and freedom that they fought for.

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In addition to the above, Mpangala (2004: 15) is of the view that the post-independence period saw people starting to re-group based on ethnic affinity and thus identify themselves into "we and them" instead of one budding nation. This resulted in other people with the same ethnic affinity from across colonially-created borders getting involved in conflict in the name of protecting or assisting their own casing the conflict to straddle across the border. In essence this created a regionally contested terrain. Mpangala (2002: 15) also argues that the root causes of internal conflicts in Africa are four related conceptual issues which are identity, participation, distribution and legitimacy. In elaborating on this point, the author mentions the crisis of national governance, lack of accountability of rulers, corruption and greed, deprivation of political and economic participation coupled with abuse of human rights, poverty and exploitation.

1.8.2 On the influence of ethnicity in the GLR and DRC's political landscape

Moffet (2009: 28) explains ethnicity as the main motivator for groups or countries to be involved in the conflict of Africa's GLR. He asserts that conflict allows militias to rise up to protect their own ethnic groups or to attack others. An example given is that of foreign armies such as in Rwanda and Uganda who used such groups to terrorise civilians of other ethnic groups in the eastern province (north and south Kivu) of the DRC. This was done in the name of hunting down Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups that have nestled in the eastern Kivu province. Thus, in the case of the DRC and the GLR's political instability, ethnicity is seen as a major problem in the Kivu Province, especially due to the spill over effect from the Burundian and Rwandan genocides during the years 1972 and 1994. Things seem to have changed a bit since the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC conflict the main reason being to offer protection for their ethnic own groups. In other words their involvement was not about assisting in bringing an end to the conflict for the sake of the whole Congolese nation. The irony was that even within the DRC politicians have down the years adopted the practice of using ethnicity as a rallying point during the formation of political parties and to mobilise voters, a case in point was the 2006 democratic elections (Kabemba, 2005: 49)

1.8.3 On human security challenges posed by ethnic-influenced conflict in the DRC

Bamou (2013: 14) maintains that constant migration from within as well as across borders and the flow of refugees mean that those ethnic tensions or grievances in one place often spill over the borders into other countries or regions. The author asserts that the GLR countries generally suffer from weak state security systems and porous borders thus making it easier for conflict to spread across several countries at once. This has given rise to an expanding, multi-country zone of human and state insecurity and political instability as well as underdevelopment. The author gives an example of Burundi in relation of the violence that erupted in 1965, reaching its peak in 1972, when a Hutu rebellion that started in Tanzania spread to the south of the country (Bamou, 2013: 14). The result was a massive Hutu migration into Rwanda that further strained Hutu-Tutsi relations in that country. On the other hand, in Uganda the displaced refugees from Rwanda played an active role in the 1986 Ugandan revolution. For that reason the damages of the civil war in Uganda and Rwanda escalated and spread into the DRC and resulted in human insecurity and displacement, especially in the northern part of that country (the DRC) (Kuperman, 2000: 97).

Modiba (2014: 13) also states that ethnic tensions are generally fuelled by governments when they deliberately favoured specific ethnic groups just as it was witnessed in Rwanda during colonialism when the Belgians had a soft spot for the minority Tutsis over the majority Hutu. This created a situation of animosity between the two ethnic groups which has been a thorny issue to date. This situation continued even after independence when the Hutus, who were in power started to favour those of their group for government positions and other services above the Tutsis. This led to hostility between the two ethnic groups which led to the most famous 1994 Rwandan genocide where hundreds of lives were lost and many people displaced.

Another case in point of ethnic favouritism took place in Kenya when the newly independent government of Jomo Kenyatta started to favour the Kikuyu ethnic group over other groups as far as government positions and other service delivery components were concerned (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2007: 6; Osamba, 2001: 2). The use or misuse of ethnicity in the Kenyan political context took its toll during the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi and played a central role in creating patterns of political mobilization, resource allocation, and public service appointments,

notably to the Cabinet members and elites of Arap Moi's ethnic group. This resultantly influenced the formation of political parties along ethnic lines, thus affecting voting patterns and also turned Kenya into a "securocratic" state under Moi's dictatorship (Osamba, 2001: 2). The effects of ethnic hostility in Kenya were not necessarily similar to what happened in Rwanda, as it did not escalate into violent conflict, except for the post-2008 election period when close to one-thousand (1000) people perished.

Bujra (2002: 8) argues that countries that have dysfunctional governments are likely to have conflict or political instability, socio-economic problems and underdevelopment. In this regard the government of the DRC has generally been regarded as dysfunctional since the early years of independence and as a result has experienced conflict and demonstrations. The author also argues that there is a high risk of civil wars in countries that have abundant natural resources because politicians and/or people tend to compete for them. For its part the GLR, and the DRC in particular, is rich in mineral resources and the land in some areas is fertile, which has often influenced ethnic-based conflict as the people are always competing for the use for the land. For example, the *Karamajong* of Uganda and the *Pokot* of Kenya, on either side of the Kenya/Uganda border, have been fighting over grazing land and over cattle for more than three decades (Osamba, 2001: 10).

Some factors that contribute to conflict are competition for rich mineral deposits with the aim of controlling their exploitation. Bujra (2002: 10) says that sometimes conflict becomes ethnically based when the poor and weaker ethnic groups start to attack government properties and installations, or even attack shops and houses of the rich and middle classes. The author asserts that the struggle for national independence has also been the cause of conflict in the GLR, and the DRC in particular. The decolonisation period saw people united and working together and assisting each other in order to gain independence but the situation soon changed after independence (Schraeder, 2000: 45). Nationalist political parties in the various colonial territories were formed demanding for national independence from their colonisers but they were different in their political characteristics, some were ethnic and regionally based in formation. Burundi, Rwanda, DRC and Kenya have/had ethnic-influenced political parties. These parties

ended up causing political instability after independence when those who were in power were starting to practice ethnicity.

Wallensteen (2002: 28) outlines the causes of most internal conflicts as the build-up of internal grievances, many associated with power relations, economic interactions and social fabrics. In elaborating his point the author says that the actors are largely, but not entirely, found along the lines of historically ascribed identities. The author argues that as a result conflict becomes "ethnic" but does not include ambitions of territorially dividing the state. Looking at the Burundi case, as will be discussed later, the conflict superficially manifests itself as "ethnic" influenced but in essence it is not, and both the main protagonists (Hutus and Tutsis) are never considered in isolation.

1.9 Significance of the Study

Most of the literature on the GLR's political conflicts acknowledges the role played by international as well as regional organisations in their attempt to bring peace and stability in the region without looking into some of the perpetual and deep rooted causes of political instability, human insecurities, socio-economic problems and underdevelopment. As such the study focuses on identifying the complexities relating to ethnicity and its place in the incessant conflict in the DRC. It also looks at the areas that may assist in combating political conflict in that country that has for many years rendered the country politically destructive and socio-economically stagnant.

1.10 Ethical Considerations

Ethics are considered to deal with the belief about what is right or wrong, proper or improper, good or bad (Schumacher and McMillan, 2006: 142). Ethics mean conforming to the standard of conduct of a given group of professionals (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 520). The study is based on analysis of existing literature regarding political conflicts in the DRC and how ethnicity has influenced political conflict in that country and the GLR region, including how it has threatened human security. The study acknowledged all source material that was used when conducting the research and writing this presentation. In order to avoid plagiarism, the researcher acknowledged the sources that were consulted in data gathering such as books, newspapers, internet sources,

journals, dissertations, unpublished documents and other relevant source of data. Therefore, the researcher has adhered to the research ethics relevant to this specific study.

1.11 Limitation of the Study

The main challenge has been the inadequacy of finances resources for travelling which made it difficult, if not impossible to travel more to institutions where more valuable information could be obtained, such as embassies. This information could have proven invaluable especially given the nature of the study involved. The researcher could not travel enough if not adequately more so because there was not financial assistance in the form of bursaries The result was that the study was mainly dependent on research mainly conducted at the University of Venda where the author is registered as a student and on material from inter-library loan system. As such the study was mainly desktop in approach because mainly secondary sources in the form of books, journal articles and internet material proved invaluable. The other challenge faced by the researcher was that some if not most of the data about the GLR and the DRC conflict, in particular, are written in French because it is the dominant and official medium of communication in that region. Another limitation is that most of the documentaries about the GLR and the DRC are in French and some do not have the full information on who did the documentary and when they were shot/filmed, this becomes a problem when the researcher have to acknowledge the person who did the documentary. Due to financial constraint the study is unlikely to conduct interviews.

1.12 Structure of the Study

The study has been demarcated into the following chapters:

Chapter 01: Introduction and Background of the Study
This study entails the introduction and the background of the study, the aim and objectives of the study, research problem and the research methods that will be used while conducting this study.

Chapter 02: The historical context of the role and influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity within the DRC and the GLR.

Chapter 03: The influence of ethnicity within the DRC's political landscape with reference to nation building and national security.

Chapter 04: To examine the challenges posed by ethnicity-influenced conflict in the DRC; with reference to human security.

Chapter 05: Recommendations and Conclusion.

This chapter will entail the recommendations and conclusion of the study based on the findings of the study.

Chapter Two

The Historical Context of the Role and Influence of Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity within the GLR and the DRC

2.1 Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the historical context of the role and influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity within the GLR, and the DRC in particular. The post-independence African politics have been characterised by conflict, where in most cases it has been as a result of religious and ethnic differences. Most conflicts in Africa started immediately after independence in the 1960s but the period between the 1980s and 1990s saw an increase in conflicts in many parts of Africa (Mahafha 2009: 3; Modiba, 2014: 1). As it has already been mentioned in the previous chapter on the introduction and background, the GLR is one of the regions that have been grossly affected by unending conflict since the late 1980s. However, the most prominent period started during the 1990s and continued beyond the first decade of the 2000s (Mahafha, 2009: 20). Therefore, this would indicate that the GLR has been prone to and witnessed some of the worst conflicts on the African continent for years since independence.

Some of the conflicts have been rooted in long-standing ethnic tensions fuelled by competition for political power and citizenship rights, which in turn are related to competition for access to natural resources, particularly land which is endowed with mineral deposits (Kuperman, 2000: 94). One example of this was the 1959 Rwandan revolution, in particular, which is or was generally regarded as the starting point of most political tensions that occasionally dominate the political scene within the GLR (Kuperman, 2000: 94; Mpangala, 2004: 10). The revolution left more than a million people dead and forced a large number of Tutsi refugees to flee to neighbouring Burundi, the north-eastern parts of the DRC, Tanzania and Uganda. The early post-independence period saw the DRC emerging as one of the most promising African countries in terms of politics and economy (Hotep, 2001:3). However, the situation changed when conflict started to take its toll thus making the DRC a playground, especially during the Cold War era.

These conflict situations mainly escalated in the eastern DRC during the 1960 thus making the GLR the most affected African region in as far as conflict was concerned. This had a profound impact on the country's national and human security as well as human development (Hotep, 2001: 3; Mpangala, 2004: 10). The current study has been delimited to cover the period between 1980 and 2013 by mainly focusing on the role and influence of ethnicity on conflict in the GLR with specific reference to the DRC is discussed in this chapter.

2.2 Understanding the politics of Ethnicity

Young (1979: 107) opines that "no serious study on the political evolution of the Congo can neglect the difficult problem of "tribalism" or what may be referred to as "ethnicity". This is one of the major issues that place a question mark over the very existence of the Congolese entity". The history of the DRC reinforces the above opinion in a very interesting manner where Belgian colonial rule of the country was responsible for this deep seated intractable political reality. As typical of the general patterns of colonialism on the African continent, Belgian colonial rule was predicated on creating division among the various ethnic linguistic groups in the DRC through the manipulation of ethnic groups and reinforcing a "myth-symbol complex" that became a determinant factor in accounting for ethnic politics in the country. Ethnic conflict is a latter day phenomenon that results from the use and exploitation of myths about ethnicity and ethnic hatred. These can be illuminated in three distinct discourses in accounting for ethnic conflict: ancient hatred; manipulative leaders and economic rivalry. (Cindil, 2009:19). Furthermore Kaufman (2001:34) argues that there are three necessary preconditions for the politics of ethnicity that often result in wars: myths justifying ethnic hostility; ethnic fears and the opportunity to mobilise and fight. Belgian colonial authorities managed to create this wage by exploiting on the existing differences and comeptitions over resources in various ethnic groups for its benefit (McCalphin, 2002:35). In the process Belgium divided the DRC into six provinces,giving some more autonomy over others thus reinforcing the predominence of some ethnic groups over the other.

Thus, Shillington (1989: 356) and Alemazung (2010: 65) cement the above myth in stating that colonial masters emphasised the distinctions between the different ethnic groups, thereby

strengthening tribal differences and rivalries between these groups and preventing them from forming a united opposition against the colonisers. This colonial legacy became a specific feature of the contours of post-independence politics in the DRC where attempts to unify the state ran against ethnic and regional loyalties (William et al., 1997: 1). As a result, the struggle for the liberation of the DRC exhibited different dimensional approaches as some of the nationalist movements sought to define struggle through ethno-nationalism. An example was the Abako movement, whose leader Joseph Kasa-Vubu predicated the struggle on the political interests of the Kikongo/ Bakongo tribe and lacking a nation wide appeal. Be that as it may there was a movement whose appeal was on a national basis the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) in which Patrice Lumumba ,a nationalist otherwise incluvist leader was part of . The MNC was the only hope for an inclusive political miracle in the making of the nation-state of the Congo that was hoped would deviate the impact of etho nationalism in the future politics of the country (Meredith, 2005: 98-99). The assassination of Patrice Lumumba, and the subsequent ascension to presidency of General Mobutu Sese Seko in 1965 minimised to curb ethno-nationalist political tendencies in the DRC. The emergence of Mobutu as the President saw the mutation of ethnic politics transforming from the old traditional tribal realities to a modern day phenomena that transformed the Congo into a kleptocracy (William et al., 1997: 4). Below is a discusion on factors that contrituted to ethnic conflict in the GLR and the DRC in particular.

2.3 Factors that Contributed to Ethnic Conflict in the GLR: The Case of the DRC

According to Biro (2010: 65) conflict is caused by political disagreements, intolerance, economic related issues and the struggle for political power. This is also the case in the DRC in particular, where politicians have been seen to downplay the value of ethnic tolerance. In the same vein those in power have for many years abused and mismanaged government resources to enrich themselves and those of their ethnic groups, rather than to contribute in the development of the country and improve the lives of the majority citizens. Mpangala (2004: 120) argues that even if the source of conflict in the DRC is political and economic struggle, conflict in itself has normally taken the form of ethnicity. The contributory factors to these conflicts in the DRC are outlined in historical context in three phases which are the colonial period, the post-independence period and the contemporary era.

2.3.1 The role of colonialism in the GLR

Before colonial era, Africa was a relatively peaceful continent, despite the existence of different ethnic groups as there was relative peace, harmony, pluralism and flexibility, accompanied by reproducing entities equipped with unique unchanging cultures (Mpangala, 2004:120). The author further asserts that when scrutinizing problems and causes of ethnic conflict in Africa, for example, the conventional explanation usually relate to external factors that contribute thereto. The author adds that the polarization of ethnic communities and the outbreak of ethnic violence are a legacy of colonialism which ignored cultural and ethnic differences during the creation of what is called artificial or colonial state borders (Mpangala, 2004: 120). Ethnic division has been identified as one of the leading legacies of colonialism which one always comes across when assessing the impact of colonial powers on the African continent. According to Mahoso, (2010:27) African politics is blamed ethnic divisions and rivalry amongst the nations on the arbitrary boundaries and cultural differences created and imposed upon these peoples by the colonial masters. It is for this reason that most of the ethnic-influenced conflict that Africa has witnessed came as result of colonialism and their administrative styles.

One of the worst examples of ethnic rivalry founded by colonialism and consequential conflicts are the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda which was characterized by the attempted extermination of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu people (to be discussed below) (Kuperman, 2000: 93). The conflict in the DRC and the national and human security challenges facing the country where exacerbated by the spill-over of conflicts that took place in neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. The conflicts in those countries came as an impact of colonialism or colonial administration styles and had a spill-over effect on the countries of the region, as will be seen in the study. Flowing from the above, Mpangala (2000) emphasized that the colonial system was greatly responsible for the post-independence conflicts within, even between African neighbouring countries (Hotep, 2001: 3). The seeds of conflicts in Africa were sown under colonialism through three main aspects. Firstly, colonialism created and consolidated divisive ideologies of ethnicity, racialism, regionalism and religious antagonism (Mpangala, 2000: 15). Furthermore, Mpangala (200: 16) points out how colonialism created and invented ethnicity and promoted ethnic consciousness among the colonized people (Africans) and concludes by raising

the fact that such creations and inventions were also true with racialism, regionalism and religious antagonism.

Secondly, colonialism adopted the policy of divide and rule to create artificial borders between colonies (Kuperman, 2000: 94). They introduced those policies so that they can be able to rule and conquer African because they were (African) divided. For instance, artificial borders divided people who before colonialism were under the same socio-political organizations and jurisdictional areas. The *Wanyarwanda*[1] who before colonialism were under the Kingdom of Rwanda were separated, some fell under colonial Rwanda, while others were to belong to colonial Congo (in this case Zaïre, currently called the DRC) (Mpangala, 2000:15). Within Rwanda they were first divided by Germany and later by Belgian colonial powers who further divided the kingdom into antagonistic ethnic groups of the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa (Kuperman, 2000: 93)

Thirdly, and along similar principles, colonialism divided people in the colonies along economic lines by creating colonial division of labour on the basis of superiority and inferiority principles, an example of which is how the Belgians divided the Tutsi and Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi, respectively . The Belgians used the same colonial administrative strategies to divide and treat the Hema and Lendu in the DRC (Kuperman, 2000: 93 ; Hotep, 2001: 3; Wouter, 2007: 1) (to be discussed later in the chapter). Another colonial ideology which caused conflict in the GLR is the racist ideology which was used to justify colonial domination, oppressions and exploitation of Africans by Europeans, to divide Africans along ethnic, regional and religious lines. Colonisers divided colonies along economic lines creating division of labour that eventually led to social classes with other ethnic groups becoming more economically advanced, leading to fight over resources and divisions. This was also important at maintaining the racist ideology of dominating the colonies by the whites. Ethnic groups were also categorized into superior and inferior categories antagonism where in Rwanda and Burundi the Belgians treated the Tutsis as superior to the Hutus and Twas, thus creating ethnic animosity among these three ethnic groups more especially, between the Hutus and Tutsis. In the DRC, in Ituri region (situated in north-eastern DRC) the Hema were categorised as superior to the Lendu (and other Ethnic Groups).The Hema

[1] *Wanyarwanda* refers to Congolese Tutsis

and Tutsi were given better treatment because they were cooperating well with the Belgians administrative staffs, whereas the Hutus and Lendus were not (Hotep, 2001: 3; Magnarella, 2002: 24).

After independence, neo-colonial influences started to take precedence as a new form of extension of the same imperialist economic interests by controlling the economies of independent African states (Essack, 1997: 35). This was partly done by ensuring the establishment of puppet regimes that mainly favoured and empowered the members of their own ethnic groups. This was relatively easy to do, especially during the Cold War era, when newly established Africa states were in dire financial assistance, from either the communist or capitalist bloc, in order to implement development projects within their underdeveloped states (Essack, 1997: 35). A good example of how a neo-colonial force created conditions for post-independence conflict and instability is the DRC. Unlike other African colonies, neo-colonial interests on the DRC are part of historical root causes of the war in that country because DRC became a centre of economic attraction because of its fertile soil and its richness in minerals. The independence of DRC was greatly characterised by neo-colonial interests (Ngolet, 2011: 221: Solomon, 2003: 192). It was on the basis of this that on the eve of independence, the Belgium colonialists worked out strategies which would make their sponsored parties, as well as parties backed financially by the mining monopolies, win the elections and take over power. Most of those parties were ethnically formed, the Belgians influenced this kind of formation so that there can never be peace and stability after independence. The made this formation so that even after independence people will still be divided, there will not be any unity, which will make it easy for them to continue on exploiting and controlling the country politically and economically. This is because of the reason that few years after independence most Africans felt that they were better under the colonial rule because it was politically and economically stable (Solomon, 2003: 192).

When colonialism finally ended in 1962, Western powers could not afford to keep their hands completely off their colonies, thus, they continued to influence politics and developments in the regions where their political and economic relationship. In most cases there relations were also based on historical colonial ties which thus had a bearing on multilateral relations and engagements (Solomon, 2003: 192). It is no wonder that the coming to power of Patrice

Lumumba and his party, who were socialists, greatly frustrated the Belgian neo-colonial interests. However, soon after independence another neo-colonial force with no colonial history in Africa, capitalist US entered the fray by dangling financial aid carrot (Essack, 1997: 35). For example, between 1960 and 1963, American aid to DRC totalled $297, 649, 290 (American dollars) whilst the World Bank gave the country a loan of $21 million (American dollars) in aid with reciprocal American interests striving to take over control of Congolese economy. However, it was obvious that in order to control the economy it also became necessary for them to take over control of politics by installing a puppet regime that would toe the line (Essack, 1997: 35; Solomon, 2003: 192). Patrice Lumumba's leadership was regarded as unfriendly to the neo-colonial interests of the capitalists more so as it was socialist influenced. Neo-colonial forces, therefore, worked out the coup to overthrow and assassinate Lumumba on the 17 January 1961 and installed Mobutu sese Seko. This happened when Mobutu assumed the role of army chief-of-staff, such that in 1965 this created a platform for him to take stage a second coup. He eventually renamed the country Zaïre and became a puppet for neo-colonial interests for thirty four (34) years until he was overthrown on the 17th May 1997 (Kabemba, 2005: 43; Essack, 1997: 35). Lumumba was of the Tetela ethnic group and Mobutu was of the Ngbandi ethnic group which also motivated the tensions and his removal which led to his assassination. This was the impact of the divide and rule policy of the colonisers, where they managed to influence animosity between the Congolese and also to remove Lumumba who was a threat to their capitalism ideology (Ngolet, 2011: 221)

Ngolet (2011: 221) and Solomon (2003: 192) assert that "he who controls DRC dominates Africa. It is, therefore, no wonder that neo-colonial interests in the DRC did not end with the overthrow of Mobutu as they still wanted to continue controlling the DRC politically and economically and maintain the stronghold over the continent. They controlled Mobutu through funds they were giving him, this made them to dictate him to rule the country the way they want. It is in the same vein that since its independence in 1960, the DRC has had little peace mostly as a result of the mechanisations of the Cold War era (Essack, 1997: 20). Therefore, the current crisis in the DRC should also be examined in in terms of interests of neo-colonial forces who created conflict amongst ethnic groups just as the colonialists had aligned themselves with. This also went to the extent of easily influencing and controlling these ethnic groups, just as it

happened with the Tutsis in Rwanda and the DRC, thus leading to socio-political hostilities (Kuperman, 2000: 93).

The above also happened in other countries in the region (Ngolet, 2011: 221: Solomon, 2003: 192). For example, the motives behind the assassination of Prince Louis Rwegasore of Burundi in 1961 were not different from those of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the DRC (Mpangala, 2004: 13). Similar events spread to other countries of the GLR such as Rwanda and Uganda, thus leading to conflict and turning the region into one of the most politically unstable place in Africa. Some of these ethnic hostilities are still being witnessed currently, years after the end of colonialism on the continent thus resulting in underdevelopment in the countries because of lack national unity (Mpangala, 2004: 13). In most cases serious ethnic conflict around the GLR, and the DRC, in particular, erupted in the 1980s after countries like Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda experienced regime change orchestrated by these neo-colonial forces affiliated to the capitalist bloc or even former colonial powers (Schraeder, 2000: 139). In turn these ethnic conflicts have had a ripple effect on the region, as it has between in the case of Rwanda-DRC, Burundi-DRC and Uganda-DRC. In the same vein they have caused national and human security challenges facing these countries (Dagne, 2003: 11), with the DRC being the focus of this study. It is for this reason that a short discussion on the political history of these countries is essential before the study arrives at how it has relevance to the conflict in the DRC, which is the focus of this study.

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2.3.2 Independence within the GLR, 1959- 1980

Decolonisation is/was the process of changing from colonial rule to independent rule (Mpangala, 2004: 9). During the decolonisation process in Africa, generally all and sundry was united in purpose of the total decolonisation despite affiliation to different countries and ethnic groups (Dagne, 2003: 11). There was a shared belief of African leaders and Western observers that "the future of newly independent African countries depended on their ability to promote a unifying nationalism that transcended ethnic differences (Schraeder, 2000: 139). In other words theses disciples were downplaying the inherent destructive power of ethnicity among people, and Africans in particular. To them ethnicity had to be ignored in the interests of nation building

especially after independence, meaning that ethnicity had to be made subservient to nationalism and/or nation building.

In contrast, however, Schraeder (2000: 139) quotes one Crawford Young, a leading scholar on ethnicity who said: "If nationalism was a progressive and worthy topic, ethnicity was a retrogressive and shameful one. To dwell unduly upon it (ethnicity) was to summon forth from the societal depth demons who might subvert nationalism at its hour of triumph". This quote was a harbinger of the post-colonial period when, in order to hold on to political power "single-party regimes and military coups d'états, and authoritarian political systems" emerged and were generally dominated by one ethnic group (Schraeder, 2000: 140, 268; Mpangala, 2000: 193). In the process more often than not ethnic majority made it a point that their power was felt, especially in politics. This in turn became a threat to what had been achieved at independence when ethnicity was replaced by multi-ethnic and democratic nation-states and open the door for "ethnically inspired opposition movements and guerrilla insurgencies" (Schraeder, 2000: 140; Osamba, 2001: 3).

Dagne (2003: 11) asserts that one of the major difficulties African states have had to deal with after independence is the problem of ethnic divisions and the state conflicts resulting from ethnic rivalry. Ethnic divisions thus, contributed to the formation of parties along ethnic lines, which later contributed to the marginalization of parties which refused to be co-opted into the ruling party: consequently, ethnic division and rivalry can be seen as a major trigger and cause of conflicts on the continent (Osamba, 2001: 3; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2007:2). Ethnic groups who feel marginalized often develop feelings of revenge and hatred against those who enjoy socio-economic well-being from the resources of their states because of their affiliation to the ruler (the "owner" or "controller" of the national cake): based on clientelist politicking. The above can be said of countries of the GLR where the situation started to change after independence and thus affected the prospects of nation building. Ethnicity that was employed by colonial masters as an instrument of colonial divide and rule started to rear its head. During the struggle for independence Kenya was united despite having many ethnic groups or tribes and political parties (Osamba, 2001: 42; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2007: 18).

There were two main political parties called Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) under the leadership of Daniel Arap Moi (of minority Kalenjini tribe) and Kenya African National Union (KANU) under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta (of majority Kikuyu tribe) who later became the country's first president in 1963 (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2007: 18). After independence Kenyatta convinced Moi to merge KANU with KADU in 1964. However, when Kenyatta died in 1978 Moi took over as president from 1978 to 2002. After he took office Moi favoured people of his ethnic group or tribe (Kalenjini) and removed Kikuyu cabinet ministers and replaced them with ministers from his own Kalenjini tribe (Osamba, 2001: 40). This clearly resonates with what has been said above regarding the disregard of the "inherent and destructive power of ethnicity in the name of nation-building". Although this made Moi unpopular from the Kikuyu elites with the result that in 1982 an attempted coup d'état to oust Moi took place but failed (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2007: 18). Moi and his Kalenjini tribe dominated the Kenyan political scene and stayed in power for more than 20 (twenty) years. In essence, the acts of post-independence tribalism in Kenya made the country to witness some political instability as well as opening doors to outsiders to be able to attack Kenya and make it ungovernable (Osamba, 2001: 42).

DRC gained independence in 1960 although it was not prepared for independence because Belgium only exploited it but never developed it. The Belgians left with their administrative officers, doctors and engineers and the country was left with no one to carry or fill these positions as blacks were not allowed to be in these departments during colonialism (Harris and Reilly, 1998: 9). After independence this created conflict when those in power started to employ people based on ethnicity and not on merit. The leaders also sent people of their ethnic groups or those close to them to study abroad in order to fill those positions (Essack, 1997: 35: Kuperman, 2000: 94). This resulted in deep hatred amongst the Congolese especially those that were not enjoying the fruits of independence, an example of this deadly hatred took place in Rwanda when the Hutus started to develop a deadly hatred against the Tutsis that were the coloniser's favourites (to be discussed below and its relevance to DRC's political situation) (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2007:18: Ngolet, 2004: 4).

2.4 The Historical Context of the Role and Influence of Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity in the GLR: The Relevance of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to Politics of the DRC

As already alluded to earlier in the chapter, the African Great Lakes Region (GLR) has witnessed some of the most intense violence and protracted conflict of the last half-century, especially in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC. Below follow a discussion on the historical background of the DRC's neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda in order to lay the basis of how their internal political situations contributed to the DRC's political situation as it stands presently.

2.4.1 Rwanda's historical background

Rwanda, a former Belgian colony from 1924 to 1962, was inhabited by the Twa (BaTwa) ethnic group, forming one per cent (1%) of the total population, the Tutsi (BaTutsi) who constituted fourteen per cent (14%) with the Hutu (BaHutu) forming the remaining majority ethnic group at eighty-five per cent (85%) (Magnarella, 2002: 24). Hotep (2001: 3) asserts regardless of this, these three groups used to exist alongside each other in peace and harmony before the colonisers came. The majority of the Hutus were traditionally agricultural people while the Tutsis were cattle herders, resulting in the two ethnic groups complementing each other in relation to economic life (http://www.emileelime.tripod.com/id4.html). Between 1926 and 1959, however, the Belgians started to show favouritism towards the minority Tutsis because they were easy to be controlled and the Hutus were not easy to be exploited in terms of cheap labour. The Belgians introduced ethnic identity cards, which they used to distinguish them from the majority Hutus (Kuperman, 2000: 93). This favouritism towards the Tutsis was evident in education wherein they were afforded the opportunity to become literate, while the majority of Hutus were not, as the colonial power established mainly Catholic oriented schools for the Tutsi (Hotep, 200: 4). As a result of this situation, the minority Tutsis were also able to gradually gain political power and dominance over the majority Hutus who the Belgians treated as lesser citizens, a recipe for animosity between the two ethnic groups (Kuperman, 2000: 94; Magnarella, 2002: 26) which used "to exist alongside each other in peace and harmony before the colonisers came" Hotep (2001: 3). The final nail in the coffin was that "political power and dominance" of the minority

Tutsis over the majority Hutus made it possible for the former to dominate economically as well (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html).Even though not all Tutsis became rich the corollary being was that although the Hutus were not as rich as the Tutsis, equally not all Hutus were poor (Kuperman, 2000: 94; Magnarella, 2002: 26).

After many years of being oppressed by the Belgians and the Tutsis, in the 1950s the Hutus started to be resistive towards both, eventually forming the Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus (abbreviated as PARMEHUTU) in 1957, under the leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda (Malvern, 2006: 3). This political situation continued between 1959 and 1962 when Rwanda gained independence from Belgium on 1st July 1962, during the majority the Hutus formed the first Hutu government with Grégoire Kayibanda, as president (Magnarella, 2002: 26; Hotep, 2007: 2). Independence did not bring long-term peace and stability because in 1963 in turn the Hutus, as if in reaction to their historic experience under the Tutsis, also started to oppress the Tutsis who ended up fleeing to eastern DRC, Burundi and Uganda were they launched attacks from (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html; Hotep, 2007: 2). Most of the Tutsis who fled were those who used to be in power, the educated and the elites during the Belgian period of colonialism. The result was that by 1965 PARMEHUTU was able to consolidate its position as the only official political party in Rwanda (Melvern, 2006: 3).

Following the above, between 1960s until 1973, attacks between the Hutus and Tutsis continued until in 1973 when President Kayibanda was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by his cousin, Juvénal Habyarimana, who became the second Hutus president and dissolved PARMEHUTU (Kuperman, 2000: 95). As part of his political objective, in 1975 Habyarimana formed his own political party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), which resulted in the establishment of one-party state and the raising of "Hutu Power" ideology, which was propounded by the Hutu extremists in Rwanda (Hotep, 2007: 4). The ideology asserted that the Tutsis still intended to re-enslave the Hutus, a process which had to be resisted at all costs and encouraged Hutus to fight for their independence and dominance (Hotep, 2007: 4). Like Kayibanda before him, he also excluded the Tutsis from the government who he rejected after taking office (Magnarella, 2002: 26). As if that was not enough in response to this, in 1985 the Tutsis in exile, especially in Burundi, formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, also called

Front Patriotique Rwandanais, FPR, in French) in order to fight against social discrimination in Rwanda (http://worldnews.about.com/od/africa/f/tutsihutu.htm). It was while in exile that the Tutsis's RPF/FPR developed a close relationship with Uganda's Yoweri Mseveni who in 1986 overthrew Ugandan President Milton Obote and formed a new government (Magnarella, 2002: 26). As if to return the favour, the RPF/FPR rebels, with the support of Uganda invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, reigniting hatred against the Tutsis and starting a low-level civil war (Mahafha, 2009: 33; *The Daily Telegraph*, 2006/04/8).

As part of the programme on "Hutu Power" ideology, in 1991 the Rwandan army, under the leadership of Habyarimana, began to train and arm the militias known as *Interahamwe*[2] and *Impuzamungambi*[3] to fight against any threat from the Tutsis who he defeated after different small massacres around the country in 1959 (Kuperman 2000: 96). However, pressure from the international community, especially the USA, a close ally of former Zaïre's (now known as the DRC) President Mobutu Sese Seko, Belgium and France put pressure on Habyarimana to engage in peace negotiations with the RPF/FPR. This led to the 1992 ceasefire agreement, which made it possible for the Tutsis in exile to return to Rwanda. However, the Tutsis return to Rwanda was the regarded as a threat to "Hutu Power" ideology; hence they were attacked immediately on their return (Kuperman 2000: 98). In response to the attacks, after months of fighting, in February 1993 the RPF/FPR attacked Kigali, necessitating the holding of more peace talks between Habyarimana and the RPF/FPR, the product of which was the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on the 4th August 1993 and ending the war between the two groups (http://worldnews.about.com/od/africa/f/tutsihutu.htm). The terms of the treaty stated that President Habyarimana agreed to give the right of return for all Rwanda's refugees under a Hutu-Tutsi-led coalition democratic government to be overseen by a UN peacekeeping force deployed in Rwanda. Ironically, regardless of the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4th August 1993, no lasting peace prevailed (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2006/04/8).

The dissatisfaction with the Arusha Agreement reached its apex on 6th April 1994, when the airplane that was carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the

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[2] *Interhanwe* means those who stand together

[3] *Impuzamugambi* (sometimes *Impuza Mugambi*), which means those who have the same goal or those who have a single goal.

Hutu president of Burundi, was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, killing both presidents. This resulted in the start of the Rwandan genocide on the 7th April 1994, where thousands of Tutsis were killed (Magnarella, 2002: 26). Schraeder (200: 147) captures the situation in Rwanda thus: "In the aftermath of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana's death in a mysterious plane crash on April 6, 1994, extremists among the majority Hutu ethnic group unleashed a reign of terror against the Tutsi minority as well as against Hutu deemed sympathetic to the plight of the Tutsi". This statement explicitly paints the volatile picture that followed in Rwanda after the plane crash that killed Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart even if the chilling accounts are not detailed. These extremists were called the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*, two radical militant Hutu groups and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) which started to set up roadblocks and went from house to house, killing Tutsis. These militias were young Hutu men brainwashed by the "Hutu Power" ideology, hence the indiscriminate attacks on their fellow countrymen, the Tutsis (Kuperman, 2000: 94). Schrader (2000: 147; *The Daily Telegraph*, 2006/04/8) further indicate that at least half a million unarmed civilians were killed until the carnage was stopped by the RPF/FPR in July 1994, which invaded from Uganda, captured the capital Kigali and established a Tutsi-dominated government.

On the other hand although the RPF/FPR responded to the genocide by launching a major offensive attack to end the genocide, when the killings continued tens of thousands of Rwandans fled to Tanzania, Burundi and Zaïre (the DRC). In one day 250, 000 Rwandans, mainly Hutus fled the advances of the RPF (Magnarella, 2002: 26; *The Daily Telegraph*, 2006/04/8). The genocide may be summed up as a result of decades of ethnic prejudices, discrimination and the fear of loss of power, paving the way for the infamous 1994 event which took place during a shocking period of hundred days, between 6 April and 4th July 1994, and claimed of approximately between 800 0000 and one million people lives (Kuperman, 2000: 96; http://www.worldwithoutgenocide.org/Rwanda). In addition, it is said that after Rwanda's genocidal Hutu regime was overthrown, more than two million Hutus are thought to have fled into the DRC, fearing reprisals against them by the new, Tutsi-dominated government. Among them were many of the militiamen responsible for the genocide that quickly allied themselves with Mobutu's government and began to attack DRC's "sizeable population of ethnic Tutsis" that had lived in the country for generations (Kuperman, 2000: 96).

Whereas the Tutsi had fled the wrath of the Hutu militias, in turn the Hutu militias that were involved in the Rwandan genocide also fled to DRC were they continued to launch cross-border attacks on Rwanda from the refugee camps DRC made for them by that government. As it was the DRC government also accused the Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan governments of assisting rebel groups to inflame instability within its own borders, with Uganda being singled out because the RPF/FPR had helped Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni to overthrow Milton Obote in 1986 (Malvern, 2002: 23; Magnarella, 2002: 26). As a result, the presence of these refugee camps in the DRC attracted an attack on Hutu refugee camps by the newly formed Rwandan-Tutsi government, supported by the Zaïrian Tutsis, and Ugandan government. In turn, Rwanda's Tutsi government started to back rival militias, fighting both the Hutu militias and Congolese government troops (Malvern, 2002: 23). The Tutsi militias, allied to other local groups backed by Uganda, eventually marched on Kinshasa and overthrew Mobutu's government (Magnarella, 2002: 26; Kuperman, 2000: 96). For this reason the relevance of the Rwandan ethnic conflicts, the 1994 genocide to the war in the DRC will be discussed below in 2.4 by covering the immediate post- independence period in the DRC to the presidency of Joseph Kabila.

2.4.2 Burundi's historical background

Burundi's ethnic experience is similar to that of Rwanda mostly because the countries' populations are comprised of the same ethnic groups or tribes (Hutus, Tutsis and Twas) (Manirakiza, 2005: 46). During the colonial period, a country that is now Burundi was part of German East Africa (GEA), a colony that also included Rwanda and Tanganyika (modern day Tanzania). After Germany's defeat in First World War (WWI), the League of Nations organisation divided the German colonial territory between Britain and Belgium (Manirakiza, 2005:46). Belgium was given Rwanda and Burundi; it renamed the territory Ruanda-Urundi, and governed it through military occupation from 1916 to 1924. Ruanda-Urundi was then made a mandate of the League of Nations. In 1945, the UN transitioned the territory into a trust, and the area remained under Belgian administrative authority from 1945 until independence in 1962 (Manirakiza, 2005: 46). Both Ruanda and Urundi were dominated by the Hutus but the Tutsis were the ones that were favoured. The treatment of people and the administrative styles by the colonisers in Ruanda-Urundi were the same where Hutus were treated as lesser citizens

(Khadiagala, 2003: 216). After Burundi's independence in 1962 July 1st, the Tutsis in Burundi continued to look down upon the Hutus, creating more ethnic hostility between the two ethnic groups.

Violent ethnic conflicts in Burundi were periodic events years before the period of Burundi's achieved independence in July 1962. (Mpangala, 2004: 120; Manirakiza, 2005: 46). The Belgian administrators used existing power structures, with the cooperation of Tutsi ruling class, under a monarchy led by Mwami Mwambutsa IV, which also controlled the mostly Hutu population (Khadiagala, 2003: 216). The Belgians singled out the decision to replace all the Hutu chiefs by Tutsis (Chiefs), a decision which marked the marginalisation of the Hutus and the Tutsi domination over Hutus (Mpangala, 2004: 120). Before Independence, on January 20, 1959, Mwami Mwambutsa IV requested that the Belgian Minister of Colonies dissolve Ruanda-Urundi and create two separate states of Burundi and Rwanda. His aim was that maybe independence will bring national unity and the Tutsi will stop mistreating the Hutus. In 1959 August political parties were formed and the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) led by Prince Louis Rwagasore the son of Mwami Mwambutsa IV was the first of the parties formed (Sikenyi, 2003: 5). Mwami Mwambutsa IV's rule was short lived because in 1961 September 18 elections were held to determine the ruling party ahead of independence, this is where UPRONA won 58 of 64 seats in Parliament but on the 13th October 1961 president-elect of UPRONA, Prince Rwagasore was assassinated (Sikenyi, 2003: 5 ; http://www.kituochakatiba.org/sites/default/files/legal-resources/Burundi%20Key%20Historical%20and%20Constitutional%20Developments.pdf). Burundi got its independence and legally changed its name from Ruanda-Urundi to Burundi where Mwami Mwambutsa IV a Tutsi aristocrat was named king and Pierre Ngendandumwe (a Hutu) was named as the prime minister with both Hutus and Tutsis represented in parliament. (Sikenyi, 2013: 3).

However, in 1965 Prime Minister Ngendandumwe was assassinated leading to series of attacks of Tutsis by Hutus who accused Tutsis of killing him (Sikenyi, 2003: 5). In 1966 King Mwambutsa was deposed by his son, Prince Ntare V, who claimed the throne. On the 28th November 1966 Tutsi army captain and Prime Minister Captain Michel Micombero deposed Prince Ntare in the first successful coup. He abolished the constitutional monarchy and declared

Burundi a republic with himself as the president, creating a defacto military state (Khadiagala, 2003: 216; Sikenyi, 2003: 5).The system of political exclusion in Burundi led to the suffering of untold proportion to those excluded and resulted in many political upheavals (Khadiagala, 2003: 216). It is like the stage was set for political instability because after independence Burundi suffered armed conflict and civil war for over 40 (forty) years (Mpangala, 2004: 120; Khadiagala, 2003: 216).

Constitutional monarchy was abolished following a coup by Tutsi Prime Minister Captain Michel Micombero. This marked the beginning of a series of military and non-democratic regimes that would dominate Burundian politics for years to come (Manirakiza, 2005: 46). Like it happened in Rwanda, after independence the conflict in Burundi arose from the tensions between the mainly Hutu majority 85 % and Tutsi minority 15 % of the population (Mpangala, 2004: 120). In 1972, Burundian Hutus organised an attempted a coup in the country and carried out systematic attacks on minority ethnic Tutsis with the declared intent of annihilating the whole group. The Tutsi military regime responded with large-scale massacres targeting the majority Hutus (Manirakiza, 2005: 46). The estimates of the casualties of the conflict were put at more than 300, 000 (three-hundred thousand) lives lost, over 100, 000 (one-hundred thousand) civilians displaced, with a similar number of asylum-seekers in Zaïre, Tanzania and Rwanda (Khadiagala, 2003: 216). In reaction to this, in 1973 the Hutu government in Rwanda killed and exiled thousands of Tutsis. Just as it happened in Rwanda, the nature of Burundi's conflict was ethnic-based on the two strong ideological positions of Hutus and Tutsis. The underlying factors constituted political and socio-economic causes such that in 1988 the Hutus re-organised and conducted more attacks against Tutsis (Khadiagala, 2003: 216; http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/burundi/conflict-profile/).

On June 27 1993, Burundi held its first democratic elections during which ethnic Hutu candidate Melchior Ndadaye emerged as the president leading of a pro-Hutu government. He was the leader of the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi/"Front Pour la Democratie au Burundi" (FRODEBU) and the first Hutu head of the state. The inauguration of President Ndadaye on the 10th July 1993 was conceived to be the new beginning in Burundi's political history (http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/burundi/conflict-profile/). However,

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Ndadaye's tenure was short-lived because he was assassinated by Tutsi soldiers in October of the same year, 1993, in an attempted coup by the military aimed at toppling the democratically elected government. What followed his assassination was another round of violence which engulfed Hutus and Tutsis and also indicated that the Tutsi extremists where not willing to share power with the Hutus (Butiku, 2004: 67). The assassination also indicated the Tutsis' determination to physically eliminate the Hutus (Manirakiza, 2005: 45). It was for that reason that the Tutsi extremists used youth wings and other militant groups to instigate violence and stage revolts that took place before and after the swearing-in of the new President Cyprien Ntaryamira (Itandala, 1995: 2). Therefore, neither the news of a reported failed coup before the swearing-in of the president-elect nor Ndayaye assassination thereafter was any surprise (Salim, 2004: 89).

Further violence erupted following the assassination of the newly elected Hutu Burundi president Cyprien Ntaryamira and his Rwandan counterpart, President Juvenal Habyarimana (Manirakiza, 2005: 45; Magnarella, 2002: 26). This happened when their plane was shot down in 1994 as it was about to land in Kigali, Rwanda, setting off another wave of ethnic violence and genocides in both Burundi and Rwanda (Magnarella, 2002: 26). Many Burundians, especially the Hutus, fled the country to neighbouring Zaïre (DRC) and Uganda. Most of them formed armed groups in the DRC, and attacked their countries from there (Salim, 2004: 89). Against this backdrop, one can surmise that the source of Burundi's conflict was basically a contestation for political control of state power with ethnicity being a conveyor belt for political and economic competition on the one hand and military coups on the other hand (Vorrath, 2011: 3).

Accordingly, it is evident that whatever explanation we might have to describe the root causes, the Burundi conflict reflects its past history because since the past makes the present, so does the past and present predict the future (Hotep, 2007: 4). Ngaruko and Nkurunzinza (2000: 35) have identified three root causes of civil conflict which have characterised post-independence Burundi's history, which are the Belgian colonial policy of 'divide and rule' which racialised Hutu and Tutsi, the regionalisation of the society by Tutsi elites from the south and Rwanda's social revolution of 1959. In addition, according to Mpangala (2004: 121) the roots of the ethnic conflict in Burundi existed prior to independence in 1962 such that the similarities of social and

institutional structures of Burundi and Rwanda influenced each other. In most specific terms, the author adds that the result was that the 1959 social revolution in Rwanda also influenced subsequent tensions in Burundi (Mpangala 2004: 121). In corroboration of the above, Khadiagala (2003: 216) asserts that the Burundi crisis is rooted in conflicts over political participation and resource scarcity, compounded by regional imbalances and militarisation of the society, a situation very similar to what happened in Rwanda (Salim, 2004: 89; Magnarella, 2002: 26).

It is for this reason the relevance of the Burundian ethnic conflicts and the massacres to the war in the ethnic-influenced conflict in the DRC from the independence period to the period of Joseph Kabila will be discussed below in 2.4. However, it is equally necessary, just as it has been done with Rwanda and Burundi, to outline the historical overview of the role of ethnicity and its influence on conflict in Uganda and how it is associated with the ethnic-influenced conflict in the DRC during the period of the study.

2.4.3 Uganda's historical background

Unlike Rwanda and Burundi, Uganda used to be a British colony and gained independence on the 9th October 1962 (Atkinson, 1994: 3; Roberts, 1962: 20). During colonialism the British installed and consolidated a 'divide and rule' policy and indirectly ruled their colonies, including Uganda, through kings and the aristocracy (chiefs) (Atkinson, 1994: 3). This made the country not only to be manageable but politically as well as economically stable. Like Rwanda and Bururndi, Uganda have various ethnic groups and tribes such as the Acholi (4, 4%), Baganda (17%) and Langi (5, 6 %). The largest ethnic group in Uganda is the Baganda, at over 4 million. Eight other ethnic groups number over 1 million (Salim, 2004: 89). The pre-colonial Uganda comprised five Kingdoms which are the Buganda (17%), Bunyoro (3 %), Toro (3, 2%), Ankole (8, 0%) and Bugosa (7, 7%) groups which lived together in peace and harmony before colonialism (Atkinson, 1994: 3; Salim, 2004: 89). Ethnic division started to take place when the British began to favour the Buganda ethnic group over other groups, including the Acholi one of the popular ethnic groups. This made the Buganda to be inferior to other ethnic groups economically and politically, something that did not sit well with other ethnic groups (Salim, 2004: 89). The Acholi tribe is found on the north-western Uganda which borders the DRC, the British viewed or perceived the Acholi as "naturally lazy" and as having little to contribute to

development of the colonial economy. This was because this group was not easily exploitable in terms of cheap labour like the Buganda, this also made their region to be less developed as they were also regarded as primitive because of them holding-on to their cultures and traditional values (Atkinson, 1994: 4).

By the late 1950s, as Uganda moved towards independence, the country saw a number of political and economic reforms as a result of the anti-colonial movement. The reforms allowed the formation of co-operatives and trade unions, and witnessed the removal of some racial restrictions on trade and employment on the eve of the establishment of political parties (Roberts, 1962: 20). The first Ugandan political party, the Uganda National Congress (UNC), founded in 1952-1953, was predominantly Protestant and Buganda. The next major political development was the formation of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1956 to advance the interests of Catholics in the administration of the Buganda Kingdom. During this time the nationalist politicians wrestled with how best to address this federated historical legacy while the DP advocated a unitary state (Leys, 1967: 17; Roberts, 1962: 20).The rise of political parties and their competition for power widened division in Acholi land. The first constituency of another political party, the ethnic-Langi Luo-speaking Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), under Apollo Milton Obote (an ethnic group to which he belonged), a non-Bantu speaking north. Support in this region was often expressed in ethnic terms in the sense that while Obote was very popular among his Langi tribe, he was not initially heralded among the Acholi. Even then, the identity Obote used most was the large northern region composed of the Lwo mainly rather than his Langi ethnic group. According to Leys (1967: 17) when the UNC was formed, it was seen by its activists in Acholi as the beginning of an independence movement at a time when many Acholi were serving in the Kings African Rifles in the operation against the Mau-Mau group in Kenya that were terrorising the GLR (Makasa, 2007: 70).

As stated above in 1962 Uganda gained independence with its first government under Sir Edward Mutesa II of the Kabaka (Buganda) (Makasa, 2007: 70). Just like other former British colonies it was expected that Uganda will be political stable after independence (Leys, 1967: 18). This was because from 1962 to 1964 Uganda enjoyed relative peace and political stability although this was temporary as the country experienced extended periods of violent internal

strife resulting in massive destruction of life and property. As such, Uganda's post-independence situation was an example of a post-colonial society that was riddled with pre-independence internal conflicts, which can be compared to countries like the DRC as well as Rwanda and Burundi (Makasa, 2007: 69). Sir Mutesa II's rule ended in 1966 when Obote (then Uganda's Prime Minister) overthrew the 1962 independence Constitutional arrangements with the assistance of the army and introduced the 1967 Republican Constitution (Atkinson, 1994: 3; The Daily Monitor, 2009/03/12). The implication was that Obote had overthrown Edward Mutesa II in a 'palace coup', whereas the two leaders had initially been part of an alliance between Kabaka Yekka (a political party) and UPC political parties. From 1964 the political situation was so volatile that Uganda had become almost synonymous with political disorder, social chaos and conflict. It is this apparent tragic paradox that this work attempts to explain because Obote himself was later overthrown by his army General Idi Amin on the 25th of January 1971 (Makara, 2007: 63; Lamwaka, 1998: 139; Leys, 1967: 18). Idi Amin ruled Uganda with a dictatorship until a combined force of Tanzania and Uganda exiles forced him out in 1979 after he (Idi Amin) tried and failed to invade Tanzania (Lamwaka, 1998: 139). Until the mid-1980s, therefore, Uganda was mired in civil war and ethnic strife, and suffered under a brutal dictatorship of Amin during the 1970. Amin was later overthrown by Obote who, ironically, the former had first overthrown on the 25 January 1971, as stated above (Lamwaka, 1998: 139; Makasa, 2007: 63)

In the five years after Idi Amin's fall, Uganda was ruled by Yusuf Lule for sixty-eight (68) days and then by Godfrey Binaisa, who was later ousted by Paul Muwanga, who rigged the 1980 elections that ushered in Milton Obote's second rule. As it had become synonymous with Uganda, General Tito-Okello, a one-time army commander under Obote, later overthrew his boss (Obote) but he (Okello) was subsequently forced out of power by the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) led by Yoweri Museveni in 1986 (Makara, 2007: 56; *The Daily Monitor,* 2009/03/12). Since Uganda obtained independence the people of Acholi have had a varied political experience because in the Obote regimes (1962-1971) and (1980-1985), the Acholi dominated the rank and file in the army and also occupied a number of high-ranking military and political offices (Lamwaka, 1998: 140). This changed in 1986 with the rise to power of the NRA/M led by current President, Yoweri Museveni. Before Museveni Uganda's politics

was ethnically-influenced just like other countries in Rwanda and Burundi (Makasa, 2007: 63; Lamwaka, 1998: 139). All these changes in government and leadership involved unconstitutional means and wars, reflecting the crisis of governance that has dogged post-colonial Uganda. From the above it shows that between 1962 until 1986 Uganda had eight presidents, each toppling the other, showing that the Ugandans were not politically united such that there were no nation-building initiatives because each ethnic group was fighting for its dominance in politics (http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/FromPoliticsofWartoPoliticsofPeaceAngoma.pdf). These developments again clearly show the power and influence of ethnicity within Uganda and the other GLR countries of Rwanda and Burundi, which have equally had a bearing on the political developments in the DRC, as the study attempts to argue (Makasa, 2007: 63).

By the time President Yoweri Museveni's NRA/M took power in a coup d'etat in early 1986, the country was in ruins, with an inflation rate of over 240% and a non-existent economic infrastructure (Okello, 2007: 5). Museveni was assisted by Rwanda's Paul Kagame and Laurent Kabila (former DRC's president) to overthrow Okello. President Museveni is credited with bringing about relative stability and economic growth in Uganda (Makasa, 2007: 63). Despite efforts at reconciliation, armed opposition to his government continued for much of the 1980s and 1990s, especially in the northern part of the country with most of this armed oppositions formed along ethnic lines, the strongest armed opposition being the Lord's Resistant Army (LRA) led by John Kony (Lamwaka, 1998: 139). This group operated in the north-western Uganda which borders the DRC making it easy for it to operate in the volatile DRC. The political situation in the DRC made it easy to the LRA to operate in the DRC, terrorising people , recruiting child-soildiers and abducting girls to use the as their "brides". The LRA was not supported by the largest ethnic group in northern Uganda, the Acholi, despite being currently less represented in the government (*The Daily Monitor,* 2009/03/12).

Museveni's success evolved around his strategy was to co-opt his political opponents and, when necessary, to use military means to neutralize rebel groups just as his first government included opposition figures who had served in previous governments, including arch critics of his political party (Lamwaka, 1998: 139). In May 1996, after a long transitional period, t Museveni was elected to a five year term by a large margin because he won 74, 2% (seventy-four comma

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two per cent) of the votes cast, while his opponent, Paul Ssmogerere, a former deputy prime minister and long-time rival of the president, received 23, 7% (twenty-three comma seven per cent) (*The Daily Monitor,* 2009/03/12). The elections were learnt credibility when international observers declared them to be free and fair (*The Daily Monitor,* 2009/03/12). To consolidate his political position, Museveni held a national referendum on multiparty politics in June of 2000 where he prevailed with 90, 7% (ninety comma seven per cent) of Ugandans favouring a no party government system (*The Daily Monitor,* 2009/03/12). In this regard Museveni cunningly stated that multiparty politics would only be introduced when the no-party system has succeeded in eliminating the threat of a return to sectarian politics (Makasa, 2007: 78). Uganda experienced some ethnic conflict within its borders. Uganda didn't experience violent ethnic conflict that ended up spilling over to the DRC. It only got involved in the ethnic conflict in the DRC when it was taking the side of the Hemas against the Lendus. It also got involved in the DRC war when Yoweri Museven assisted Laurent Kabila in toppling Mobutu se se Seko (Makasa, 2007: 65). It is against the historical background of the DRC's three neighbouring countries that the influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity within the DRC is discussed below.

2.5 The Historical Context of the Role and Influence of Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity in the DRC

Before colonialism Congolese were united but colonialism brought division amongst them. The Belgians established and consolidated the issue of ethnic identity and division of labour amongst the Congolese. They came to classify themselves along ethnic lines. Ethnicity came to shape DRC's political landscape. Below follows a discussion on the influence of ethnicity during the colonial era until the Kabila junior regime.

2.5.1 The DRC's political landscape during colonialism

As indicated earlier in the study, formerly known as Zaïre, the DRC is located in Central Africa. To the north, it is bordered by the Central African Republic and Sudan, to the east, by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania while to the south it is bordered by Zambia and Angola (Mahafha, 2009: 2). The DRC's capital of Kinshasa, is located in the far western area of the country and the country covers about nine and five thousand (905, 000) square miles, with a

population of seventy-five (75) million people comprising 250 (two hundred and fifty) ethnic groups (Dagne, 2003: 4; http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/974.stm). The four largest ethnic groups are the Luba 18 % (eighteen per cent), Mongo 17 % (seventeen per cent), Bakongo 12 % (twelve per cent) and Mangbetu-Azande 10 % (ten per cent). The remaining 246 (two hundred and forty six) ethnic groups form part of the remaining 37 % (thirty seven per cent) of other small ethnic groups which includes Ngbandi, Hutu, Bemba, Batetela, Nande, Ngiti Hema, Bangala and Twa (also found in Rwanda and Burundi) (Armin, 2013: 06).

Bantu peoples form 80 % (eighty per cent) and 20 % (twenty per cent) are whites who are mostly Belgians. The DRC is the most populous Francophone country and the fourth populous in Africa (Armin, 2013: 06). Although citizens of the DRC are among the poorest in the world, having the second lowest GDP per capita globally, the country is widely considered to be the richest in the world regarding natural resources, with untapped deposits of raw minerals estimated to be worth in excess of US$ 24 trillion (Armin, 2013: 06; http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/974.stm). The DRC was colonised by Belgium during which the colonial power had pursued the policy of dividing people along ethnic and regional lines, a practice which was also applied in Rwanda and Burundi under the same colonial power (Armin, 2013: 06). The legacy of colonialism continued in post-independence DRC, when people grouped themselves together to form political parties along ethnic lines such that the status quo also influenced voting patterns and governance in the DRC (Dagne, 2003: 4). Ironically, as it was the case in other GLR countries, and elsewhere in Africa, during the struggle for independence political leaders actively discouraged the emergence of nationwide political parties. The main objective was to avoid ethnic affiliated groupings that would frustrate efforts at nation building (Armin, 2013: 06). The discussion below focuses on post-independence Zaïre, later renamed the DRC by Laurent Kabila.

2.5.2 The DRC immediately after independence until Mobutu's regime

The DRC had previously experienced its fair share of ethnically-influenced political upheavals when Patrice Lumumba (a member of small Batetela ethnic group) who was a Congolese clerk turned political leader, became the first Prime Minister of the Congo Free State (now DRC)

when the country gained independence from Belgium in 1960 (Magnarella, 2007: 23; http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/974.stm). The Congolese people had regarded Lumumba as a uniting national leader with progressive programmes for the independent development of the DRC (Mpangala, 2004: 17; http://www.cachecoins.org/zaire.htm). However, in 1961 only twelve weeks as prime minister, Lumumba was toppled by Mobutu Sese Seko of the *Ngbandi* ethnic group, who became president after the former was assassinated during the same year, thereby marking the beginning of political instability in that country. The assassination of Lumumba was part of neo-colonial strategies of disrupting unity and stability in former colonies which was followed by the ethnisisation and regionalization of politics consolidated during Mobutu's nearly 34 years of dictatorship (Kabemba, 2005: 44). In other words, the assassination and ascendancy of Mobutu to power saw an establishment of ethnic politics within the country. As if that was not enough, in 1965 Mobutu changed the country's name to the Republic of Zaïre and made it a one-party state which he ruled for 32 (thirty two) years from 1965 to 1997 (Mahafha, 2009: 1).

During his rule Mobutu became associated with rigging government elections in his favour, restricting the media from reporting freely and banned the formation of opposition political parties, labelling them as the root of political problems (Middleton, 2002: 403). This resonated very well with Museveni during his early days as Uganda's president when he held a referendum to approve a no-party system of governance, although in the case of Mobutu it was imposed on the Congolese people. The similarity, though, is that political power was concentrated in Mobutu thereby allowing him to make all political decisions by himself without any consultation (Peters and Elliot 2000: 248; http://www.cachecoins.org/zaire.htm). This led to widespread corruption within the Zaïrean government and by Mobutu, in particular, his family and allies mostly from his Ngbandi ethnic group and allowed him to enrich himself by stealing government funds and foreign aid resources that were supposed to cushion the suffering of his citizen (Weiss, 2000: 1; Peters and Elliot, 2000: 248).

Middleton (2002: 403) asserts that the misuse of government money and corruption resulted in the Congolese nation suffering from uncontrolled inflation, a large government debt and massive currency devaluations. This descended into a number of rebellions against him from other ethnic groups that felt that they excluded by Mobutu and his regime (Elliot, 2000: 248). From 1967

until mid-1980s ethnic influenced protests were carried out by different ethnic-based rebel groups. This was an indication of the colonial legacy, an example being that of Laurent Kabila of the Luba tribe, once a deputy commander in the youth wing of Lumumba's General Association of the Baluba People of Katanga (Balubakat), who in 1960 also carried out most of the rebellions under the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) (Mahafha, 2009: 2).

Laurent Kabila formed the PRP long ago in 1967, a few years after the assassination of Lumumba, and operated from the mountainous area of Fizi, Baraka, in the South Kivu Province of the DRC, west of Lake Tanganyika, and operated until 1988 when he was widely believed to be dead (Ngolet, 2011: 11; http://www.getloud.ca/....congo.history). During his disappearance from the DRC he moved to Uganda where he met Yoweri Museveni and who in turn later introduced Kabila to the current Rwandan President Paul Kagame (a former leader of Tutsi RPF) and former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, making it possible for Kabila to stay in Arusha Tanzania (http://www.amazon.com/Crisis-Congo-Rise-Laurent-Kabila/dp/1403975752). The deterioration of the socio-economic conditions within Zaïre prepared the ground for heightened political unrest in 1991, leading to Mobutu agreeing to sharing power with opposition leaders such as Etienne Tshisekedi. However, Mobutu used the army to hinder the process of power-sharing because he was not prepared to step down as president of the country, as it is typical of dictators. Even after he agreed to a power-sharing government, with the opposition, other political parties could not exist freely, thus leading to numerous rebellions that gave birth to several ethnically-aligned rebel groups (Mahafha, 2009: 2; Ngolet, 2011: 11; http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/people/mobutu-sese-seko.html#ixzz2kNmYPrXG). These turn of events laid the basis for Mobutu's demise.

2.5.3 The DRC after 1997 until present : From Laurent Kabila to Joseph Kabila

As study has discussed above, the Rwandan genocide happened in 1994, during Mobutu's dictatorship presidency of Zaïre. It was also during this time that the Rwandan genocide forced the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamungambi* into the DRC's North Kivu region's refugee camp, a province which borders Rwanda. This made it relatively easy for the two rebel groups to launch attacks on Rwanda from the DRC and also allowed the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis to spread rapidly into the DRC (Kuperman, 2000: 93; Magnarella, 2007: 23). Similarly, as already mentioned earlier in the chapter, several groups of Hutu fighting the Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi fled and settled in the eastern part of the DRC. As it turned out the political unrest in Burundi and Rwanda and the fleeing of Hutus to the DRC found the military of the DRC was unorganised, weak, poorly trained to deal with large crowds (Kuperman, 2000: 93). Equally, Mobutu's army lacked popular support as the people were fed up with president Mobutu's dictatorial government. Meanwhile Mobutu also wanted the Hutus to return and establish a government in Rwanda as they were the original natives of the country. It was for this reason that he deemed it fit to give them refuge within the DRC from where they launched attack on the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda (Magnarella, 2002: 27).

Mobutu's support of the Hutus or *Interahamwe* during that time was reminiscent of ethnicity because as a leader he was supposed to mediate the return to peace and cooperation between the Hutus and Tutsis by not taking sides. To the Rwandan government the political unrest in the DRC and the existence of ethnic-aligned rebel groups of Rwandan origin presented Kagame's government with as opportunity to stop the Hutus militias from continuing to attack their country. Significantly, the ushered in the beginning of the important relations between Laurent Kabila, Museveni and Kagame who agreed to assist each other to end the rebellions (http://www.getloud.ca/....congo.history). Kabila's rebel group, the PRP, had by this time resurfaced under a new name, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation of Congo (ADFL) after his return to DRC on 18th October 1996. A year later in 1997, with the help of Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Eritrea and the USA, Laurent Kabila succeeded in toppling Mobutu after many years of dictatorship, corruption and hardship (Ngolet, 2011: 221: Solomon, 2003: 192). Laurent Kabila resultantly took over as president of Zaïre with Mobutu Sese Seko fleeing

to Togo on the 6th May 1997 and later to Morocco where he died on the 7th September 1997 of the same year a broken man (Kabemba, 2005: 43; http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1996/09/09/1996_09_09_052_TNY_CARDS).

Laurent Kabila duly proclaimed himself president of Zaïre from the North Kivu Province, a day after Mobutu had fled Zaïre and entered into Kinshasa on 20th May 1997. He was sworn in as president on 31st May 1997, where he officially commenced his term (Middleton, 2002: 403; Kabemba, 2005: 43). Just like his predecessor, Mobutu, Kabila was quick to suspend the Constitution of the country and renamed Zaïre the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on (Solomon, 2003: 173; Kabemba, 2009: 43; Modiba, 2014: 13). Typical of new brooms, when Kabila ascended the presidency he promised the Congolese people reforms and democracy, but soon thereafter he started to show signs of dictatorship and political intolerance (Mahafha, 2009: 2). He declared that elections would not be held for two years after his ascendancy, since it would take him at least that long to restore order and unity within the country (Kabemba, 2009: 43). He also failed to end the ethnic tensions in the North and South Kivu provinces, something he had promised, such that he was accused of ethnic favouritism, corruption, mismanagement and dictatorship (Modiba, 2014: 13). This happened all the more after he banned all political parties thereby putting an end to political gatherings or meetings (Middleton, 2002: 403; Mahafha, 2009: 24, Modiba, 2014: 12).

Flowing from the above, the Congolese people, Rwanda and Uganda, who had expected a better leader in Kabila, were angered by his lack of reforms (Ngolet, 2011: 3; Middleton, 2002: 403). They all accused him of being a dictator and supporting various paramilitary groups such as the *Interahamwe* and former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR militia) that were launching attacks against his former allies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (Wolpe, 2000: 38; http://www.arsolen.wix.com/alex-r-re%23!congo). The result was that in 1998, his style of governance then brought rebellion against him by the new Congolese rebel groups such as Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), leading to war between his government and a number of rebel forces that escalated into a civil war (Ngolet, 2011: 3; Mahafha, 2009: 2) These rebel groups were made up of former Congolese soldiers, Mobutu supporters, Congolese Tutsis, Rwanda, Uganda and some Burundi government

troops who well hell-bent on toppling him (Ngolet, 2011: 3). Coupled with this was the fact that Kabila was unable to keep his promises of arresting the Hutu rebels that were attacking Rwanda from the DRC (Mahafha, 2009: 2). By this time, his former allies, Uganda and Rwanda, had turned against him and backed a new rebel group, the RCD (Mahafha, 2009: 2). The involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in the war on the side of the rebels made it to worsen and difficult to resolve because these countries were providing the rebels with military weapons and troops (McCathy, 2002: 16; Mahafha, 2009: 24). It also made it worse because it was like the continuation of the Burundi/Rwanda Hutu-Tutsi war on, the only difference being that it was being fought on DRC soil and not in Rwanda or Burundi. As a result, Kabila found new allies in Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which made possible for him to hold on in the south and west of the country (Mahafha, 2009: 5; Solomon, 2003: 193; Modiba, 2014: 13).

The reasons for the tension between Kabila and his erstwhile allies varied. Kabila accused Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda of using the DRC as a playground to fight their ethnic war with the *Interahamwe* or the Hutus (Middleton, 2002: 403; Kabemba, 2005: 44). He also accused Rwanda and Burundi of wanting to control the DRC by installing a Tutsi-led government, so that they could be able to control and arrest the Hutus that had fled from Rwanda and Burundi during the Rwandan genocide and some violence in Burundi in 1994 (Mahafha, 2009: 24; http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2010/02whokilledlaurentkabila). On the one hand, Kabila claimed that Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda had ulterior motives, especially in terms of access to resources such as water, diamonds and other minerals that were available in abundance in the DRC. On the other, Rwanda and Uganda accused Kabila of not keeping his promises of helping them to stop or arrest the DRC-Hutu rebels that had been attacking Rwanda since the outbreak of the genocide in 1994 (Ngozola-Ntalaja, 1998: 73; Modiba, 2014: 13).

The final nail to the coffin was Kabila's decision to send back Rwandan officers and troops from DRC on the 27th July 1998. Kabila's frustration as president of the DRC showed signs of being short-lived when it became clear that the Congolese had lost patience with the leader they had expected so much from (http://.wwwglobalissue.org.home.ssue.articles). Equally by sending back Rwandan troops he raised the ire of Rwanda's President Paul Kagame. During this time in July 1998 Laurent Kabila's regime was already under the threat of conflict and civil war. The

Congolese had started to demonstrate against his government while some small rebel groups were formed and prepared to fight and topple him (Mahafha, 2009: 24). The result was the outbreak of the second Congolese war that lasted for five years from 1998 to 2003, while the first Congolese war had taken place from 1996 to 1997 when Mobutu was toppled by Kabila with the assistance of his erstwhile allies: Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania (http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/87).

The second war continued until Laurent Kabila was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in his own office on the 16th January 2001 by one of his own bodyguards, while he was with his advisers (Solomon, 2003: 177; Kodi, 2008: 10). His son Joseph Kabila took office as president of the DRC and has been a president ever since until the period of the study, 2013 (Kodi, 2008: 10; Solomon, 2003: 177; Kabemba, 2005: 43). Just like his father Joseph Kabila ruled for a while by decree although he assisted in creating an environment where there could be a peaceful resolution of conflict between the government of the DRC and the opposing parties that included the different rebel groups: the MLC and RCD, among others (Kabemba, 2005: 43). As such Kabila junior agreed to have peaceful talks and agreements that were facilitated by Southern African Development Community (SADC), eventually leading to the 2003 transitional government and the subsequent 2006 democratic elections (Kabemba, 2005: 43; Mahafha, 2009: 4). The SADC's role stemmed from the realisation by the leaders of the region that the political instability in the DRC was grossly affecting the political, economic and social welfare of the entire SADC region. It was unfortunate that those involved in forging negotiations seemed not to understand the complexity or nature of the war. They concentrated on mediating peace talks, ignoring the biggest challenge to peace and stability which is ethnic difference/ division (Mahafha, 2009: 4). The peace mediators like SADC and South Africa did not understand or know that the Congolese are fighting because they are united as a country. They are still clinging on to their former coloniser's divide and rule policy, were people were divided along ethnic lines. Each and every ethnic group in the DRC want to rule, they do not vote according to merit but according ethnic favouritism.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at outlining how the political situation in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda contributed to the ethnically influenced political instability in the DRC. Although The DRC experienced a spill-over of the sever conflict situations in Rwanda and Burundi respectively, the two countries were not necessarily reciprocate victims of the conflict in the DRC during the period of study. In the same vein the politically influenced ethnic divisions that afflicted Uganda did not have a cross-over effect on the DRC. Although the 1994 Rwandan genocide is regarded as the root cause of the ethnic conflict in the DRC, the country was already divided along ethnic lines when the genocide took place, as a result of the Mobutu legacy. The genocide found the DRC's political situation in a fragile state. The army itself was weak in such a way that the government was unable to stop the attacks carried out by the refugees, such that this assisted the revolutionist agenda of Rwanda and Uganda in toppling Mobutu and replace him with Laurent Kabila. However, accepting Rwanda and Uganda's assistance in toppling Mobutu was the biggest mistake Kabila could have committed because it made these two countries to feel politically entitled in the political affairs of the DRC, as the study attempted to show. Rwanda and Uganda started to disagree on major political issues. They in turn ended up supporting rebel groups opposed Kabila's regime. The end result of this was that Kabila was assassinated by the very people who should have protected him. It is within this context that the next chapter discusses the influence of ethnicity within the DRC's political landscape, with reference to nation building and national security.

Chapter Three

The Influence of Ethnicity within the DRC's Political Landscape with Reference to Nation Building and National Security

3.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to examine the influence of ethnicity within the DRC's political landscape with reference to nation building and national security. In the process it discusses the challenges facing the people of the DRC (Congolese) as a result of lack of relative safety and security which usually affects nation building and leads to poor, if not lack of, national security. For example, the people of the DRC, more especially those in the Kivu and Ituri regions, have for years been exposed to violent and non-violent threats, thus in turn threatening national security as a result of poor relations between the government and the military (Omar, 2000: 9). Although in most cases the military is there to represent the safety of the people, it is usually within this organ of government that coup leaders in Africa have claimed to intervene on behalf of the citizens. In this regard, coup leaders may cite lack of success in as far as nation-building is concerned and economic failures as the basis of their intervention. For example, during Rwanda's coup in July 1973, Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana's accused Gregiore Kayabinda's government of increased national disunity (Dagne, 2008: 12).

Sergeant Samuel Doe's 1980 coup in Liberia was based on accusations of unequal distribution of the nation's economic resources by the Tolbert government (Omar, 2000: 9). In 1997 Laurent Kabila of the DRC also made similar claims when he overthrew Mobutu sese Seko, accusing him of unequal distribution of the nation's economic resources in 1997. However, he thereafter could not live to the expectations of the Congolese because soon thereafter he failed to protect and/or unite the citizens as a nation (Kuperman, 2000: 97; Omar, 2000: 9). In this regard, the influence of ethnicity has made the DRC to face serious national security challenges. Much of the suffering in the country can be traced to the exclusionary policies of the Congolese leaders (Mobutu, Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila). For example, the first rebellion that ousted the late dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997 broke out after his government attempted to strip the

Banyamulenge ethnic group of their nationality during the previous year. The Banyamulenge are of Rwandan Origin (Tutsi), they went to the DRC after the 1959-1961 Rwandan revolution. An ethnic clash between the Hutus and the Tutsis, the revolution saw the country transition from a Belgian colony with a Tutsi monarchy to an independent Hutu-dominated republic. They fled there and settled there, when times goes by they started to regarded themselves as part of the Congolese population, were the Congolese also regarded them as one of Congolese ethnic group. President Mobutu attempted to tr4ip them off their nationality because he was in favour of the Hutus. The rebellion, with which President Joseph Kabila continues to grapple, also began after he set out to isolate the Banyamulenge. It is, therefore, logical to argue that had the Congolese leaders treated the Banyamulenge as fellow citizens, much of the bloodshed in the DRC could have been avoided because they would have felt it necessary to protect their country and national identity. This affected DRC negatively because it opened doors for external actors to enter DRC and operate from there and in the country. It is as a result of this that the next discussion focuses on the influence of ethnicity on politics within the DRC.

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3.2 The Influence of Ethnicity on the DRC's Political Landscape with Reference to Nation Building

The issue of nation building has always been a challenge in post-colonial Africa because the colonizers created and stressed the difference amongst African people within the same nation even when these differences did not exist, in order to facilitate their domination and exploitation of a divided people. The result has been that many people see themselves belong more to their ethnic groups even in the process of what is touted as nation-building. (Schraeder, 2000: 138). The negative aspect to this has been a resident challenge to post-colonial African politics because ethnicity has most likely caused conflict and also shaped the nature of conflict. In addition to this, as it has been seen earlier in chapter two in countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi, those in power usually favour people of their own ethnic groups or tribes, in terms of political positions, employment and service delivery (Schraeder, 2000: 140).

As in many other African countries, the colonisers introduced ethnic discrimination, exclusion and militarism with the transition to independence being hasty and ill-conceived. According to

Shillington (1989: 356), the colonizers emphasized the distinctions between the different ethnic groups, thereby strengthening tribal differences and rivalries between these groups and preventing them from forming a united opposition against the colonizers. The author stresses that his became a problem after independence when Africans formed ethnically affiliated political parties. Ironically, in the past most of these ethnic groups had always lived in peace and harmony despite some customary differences that might have existed between them such as dressing, housing and religious practices. Shillington (1989: 356) further asserts that, even when these groups experienced competition and conflicts, it was for political power or economic advantage and not because they were of different tribes. In this regard Schraeder (2000: 138) stressed that this accentuated the fact that the colonial authorities not only invented ethnicity and tribalism but also manipulated and politicised it to the benefit of their colonial policies.

While delivering a speech titled "Decolonising Knowledge" at the University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, on the 12th January 2014, former South Africa's President, Thabo Mbeki, voiced concerns on tribalism, especially in South Africa. This followed reports of the composition of President Jacob Zuma's cabinet, which was mainly made of people from the KwaZulu-Natal Province dominating Zulu tribe (*Sowetan*, 2014/07/14: 4). He also lamented the fact that ministers were using what he called "tribal deployment" to fill higher government positions based on the fact that they were from the same province, asserting that tribalism was the biggest problem that the hinders development of a country and the continent. Mbeki also gave an example of Sierra Leone's two dominant political parties which were ethnic-aligned on regional lines and ended up eliminating the sense of national identity and unity amongst the people, at the same time creating division amongst the people (*Sowetan*, 2014/07/14: 4). One would, therefore, raising a concern about the historical dangers of ethnicity as it had been experienced elsewhere. As such Mbeki was also raising awareness about the similar ethnic challenges afflicting South Africa.

The DRC situation has been found to be no different because ethnicity has been seen to be one of the factors that has not only caused the conflict but perpetuated it. For example, after Laurent Kabila took office as president of the DRC, he was accused of ethnic favouritism fuelling rebellion against him by ethnically dominated rebel groups comprised of ethnic groups such as the Hema, Lendu, Tutsis, Banyamulenge, Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo, amongst others

(http:\\www.irinnews.org/report/89494/DRC_Who's_who_among_armed_groups_in_the_east). It is, therefore, a fact that ethnicity has shaped the DRC's politics and thus jeopardised the notion of nation building as a result. Besides fighting the government and to be in power, these rebel groups have also fought each other because of their ethnic differences (Dagne, 2011: 6).

The ethnic histories of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were outlined in the previous chapter. For instance, the genocide in Rwanda caused a spill over effect between the Hutus and Tutsis, as the Hutus fled to the DRC and started to attack Rwandan Tutsis from the refugee camps in the DRC (Schraeder, 2000: 147). Hence Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda claimed that they got involved in the DRC war so that they could be able to stop those ethnic-driven attacks. They also claimed that they were protecting the refugees from these attacks by sending their troops to fight against Laurent Kabila's ADFL (Kuperman, 2000: 97). The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group from Uganda also got involved in the DRC war claiming it was protecting the Tutsis that were being attacked by rebel groups (FDLR and CNDP) that were allies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. For its part, Rwanda claimed that its involvement in the DRC was mainly for border securities against its counterpart Hutus. These Hutu rebel groups were based in the refugee camps located in the North Kivu Province of the DRC, and were threatening to stage an attack against the Rwandan government in retailing (Kuperman, 2000: 97; Dagne, 2011: 6; www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Rwanda%20Factsheet.2013/10/02.6). As a result this made prospects for nation building an unattainable dream, a dream which is generally envisaged in the reconstruction and reconciliation project, especially after independence or after years of civil strife and hardship. In essence this would also defer the creation of a national identity through which the stat could unify its people thereby achieving political stability and the most sought after economic development (Shillington, 1989: 356; Kuperman, 2000: 97).

3.3 The DRC's Ethnically-Influenced Political Players

The DRC's political landscape is characterised by political parties and ethnically aligned rebel groups that have been contributing to the political instability within the country. Generally, these groups fight each other while competing for political power and control in the guise of national identity (Dagne, 2011: 5). These groups of combatants are found both within and outside the borders of the DRC, and are/were always on the rampage attacking civilians belonging to other ethnic groups, gaining temporary control over towns and settlements, although never being able to permanently subdue and control the surrounding areas (Dagne, 2011: 5; Mahafha, 2009: 3). These rebels groups are not only seen as the major causes and but also as perpetrators of the conflict within the DRC which not only involves(d) local Congolese militias but other rebel groups as well: products of the cross-border tensions between the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Rwanda (Dagne, 2011: 8). As such their involvement made the nature of the conflict to be complex as a result of their demands for the withdrawal of foreign troops from DRC, and thus postponing prospects for peace-making (eNCA2013.09.16_01:43a.m). These rebel groups, formed between 1986 and 2013, include the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Congolese Mai Mai rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the March 23 Movement (M23), among others (Dagne, 2011: 6). Below follows a discussion on each of the rebel groups involved in the DRC conflict in order to further to show how their ethnic affiliation complicated the nature of the conflict thereby making prospects for peace difficult.

3.3.1 The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was formed by Rwandan Hutus linked to the 1994 genocide and former members of President Juvénal Habyarimana's Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-FAR), the *Interahamwe* and the *Impuzamugambi* militias (both Hutus) in 2000 and started to participate in the DRC war right from its formation. (http://www.africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/democratic-forces-for-the-liberation-of-rwanda-fdlr). Following the genocide, they regrouped in the DRC to plot a return to power in Kigali after being routed by President Paul Kagame's troops in mid-July 1994. Its formation came after some

elements of the Ex-FAR and the *Interahamwe* militias were given safe haven in the eastern part of the country of the DRC by the then government of Zaire in 1994 with its top leader having been extremist Callixte Mbarushima. The group had been based in the North-Kivu Province ever since (http://www.africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/democratic-forces-for-the-liberation-of-rwanda-fdlr). The group fought alongside the Laurent Kabila's in its battle to defeat the largest Congolese rebel movement at the time, *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma* (RCD-Goma). RCD-Goma was backed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda government (Mahafha, 2009: 2). The result was that the FDLR and the DRC government's attempt to eliminate the influence of RCD-Goma in the country failed because Rwanda offered RCD-Goma assistance and guidance. This led to the conflict intensifying in the North-Kivu region between the Hutu-FDLR and the RCD in 2004 (Dagne, 2011: 9).

The FDLR manipulated its ethnic tension with the Tutsis over the control of some of the mining areas in the North Kivu area where it had gained financial support from illegal mineral trade, illegal taxation, extortion, and armed robberies that it committed in the mining area (Dagne, 2011: 6). The group's largest source of funding came from the smuggling of natural resources like wood and mineral resources, particularly gold, tin, and coltan, out of the eastern DRC. The exploitation of minerals, illegal exploitation of taxes and the funding made it easier for it to continue to fight in the DRC (http:// www.capechameleon.co.za/printed-version/issue-10/news-arena). These violent acts by the FDLR rebels intensified the nature and complexity of the war until he Mbarushima was arrested, and later assassinated by the French security in Paris in October 2010. However, his arrest did not stop the FDLR from continuing with the violent attacks in his area of control (http://www.irinnews.org/report/89494/drc-who-s-who-among-armed-groups-in-the-east).

The FDLR's inroads into the natural resources in the Nord Kivu Province made the war situation more complex and violent, as his rebel groups wanted him to be released and further complicated the nature of the conflict between the rebels and Kabila, as it became more violent and more hostile (Dagne, 2011: 6). As such this made it more difficult for the SADC peace makers to intervene or to come up with a solution that would satisfy both groups (http://vkb.isvg.org/.../Groups/Democratic_Forces_for_the_Liberation_of_Rwanda). Privy to the

complicated nature of the war, mainly due to the involvement of the FDLR, successor to Laurent as DRC's president, Joseph Kabila allowed Rwandan troops to enter the DRC in 2009. He enlisted these troops' assistance into order to track down the FDLR which he regarded as a source of instability in the region. The UN security sources estimated the number of FDLR at 3000 down from 6000 in 2009, though the numbers declined after they were out-numbered by the Rwandan, Ugandan and DRC troops. In short one can say that some of the FDLR members left the group because of defeat.

3.3.2 The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)

The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) was formed on the 5th April 1998 by Jean Pierre Bemba of the Ngwaka ethnic group. He was a son of an influential businessman under Mobutu's regime (Solomon, 2003: 194). The MLC participated in the second Congo war (1998-2003) against Laurent Kabila and also against Joseph Kabila, where it was backed by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (Solomon, 2003: 194). The rebel group's strength derived from the fact that it was supported militarily by France and the US. These countries were supporting MLC because Laurent Kabila did not want to implement democracy in the DRC and it was hard for them to carry on exploiting the country under Laurent Kabila's rule. It fought against Laurent Kabila together with the RCD until in 2001 when Laurent Kabila was assassinated. Before his assassination, Kabila was accused of ethnic favourism by other DRC's ethnic group. Other ethnic groups that felt left out started to mobilise and form their own rebel groups to fight against him. However, even after the assassination of Laurent Kabila, the MLC continued to be active, mostly clashing with the army of DRC (FARDC), and was particularly present in the Lisala area, in the Equator Province where it was based (Dagne, 2011: 4). It continued with military attacks until it was invited to peaceful negotiations by SADC, where it participated in numerous peace talks. The involvement the SADC peace talks afforded it an opportunity to transform into a political party, later participating in the 2003-2006 Transitional Government and the subsequent first democratic elections in 44 (forty-four) years, which took place in 2006 (Mahafha, 2009: 2). Its conversion into the political party did not help to bring change in the DRC as far as nation building is concerned because its members caused instability and division in the DRC because they were not satisfied with how the government is being run (Kabemba, 2005: 45).

3.3.3 The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)

The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), or *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* in French, was also formed in 1998 in the Kivu region of the DRC. Its leader was Ernest Wamba dia Wamba of the Lendu ethnic group (Solomon, 2003: 192). The RCD was formed with the assistance of Uganda and Rwanda after they grew dissatisfied with the government of Laurent Kabila (Solomon, 2003: 192). It was also based in the North Kivu region and received the backing from Rwanda because it was a pro-Tutsi rebel group. The core of the RCD was composed of former ADFL members (Kabila senior's former rebel group), including many Banyamulenge (Rwandan DRC-based Tutsis) who already tended to ally themselves with Rwanda against the anti-Tutsi forces in the region. The RCD was initially a front made up of three political tendencies: Mobutist conservative resistance, anti-Kabila AFDL resistance and democratic resistance (Kabemba, 2005: 46). It was one of the two main rebel groups fighting to overthrow Laurent Kabila when the 2nd Congo war broke out in August 1998 (Mahafha, 2009: 24). In early August 1998 the newly formed RCD led by its Ernest Wamba dia Wamba captured the town of Goma, the capital of North Kivu, and began a campaign against Kabila, who by that time was now in favour of the Hutus, marking the beginning of the 2nd Congo war (http://www.freebase.com/m/04mq_p). On the 20th May 1999 the RCD named, Emile Ilunga, a medical doctor, as its new leader after Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was ousted during a congress aimed at solving RCD's internal conflict. They were fighting for leadership positions within the group. During Ilunga's leadership RCD conflict within the group ended and they managed to forge relations with Rwanda. It ruled North Kivu as a proxy of the Rwandan Government from 1998-2003, the aim of Rwanda's involvement was to defeat the *Interahamwe* and the former ex-Far militia, that were operating from the camps in that area. (http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/congo/war.html).

Between November 1998 and May 1999 the RCD was split into two factions, with RCD-Kisangani or Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) led by the movement's former president Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. The RCD-ML was backed by some of Uganda political leaders, while the mainstream RCD-Goma initially led by the new president Emile Ilunga, had an alliance the RCD-Goma with Rwanda (Solomon, 2003: 193; http://www.freebase.com/m/04mq). The division took place because of the power struggle that

was taking place within the RCD. Attempts to end the power struggle within the RCD were not fruitful. The result was that the MLC and RCD-Kisangani/ML formed a merger in order to fight the RCD-Goma (Kabemba, 2005: 44). This increased the inter-ethnic tension between the Hema and the Lendu as the RCD-ML composed of these ethnic groups. Regardless of this, the RCD-Goma, the RCD-Kisangani/ML and the MLC continued to fight the government of Laurent Kabila and also each other until they signed the 1999 Lusaka Peace Accord in Zambia were they agreed to end fighting (Kabemba, 2005: 47 ; Mahafha, 2009: 31).

After the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord both the RCD-Goma and RCD-ML/Kisangani became political parties in 2003, and kept a low profile until they participated in the 2003-2006 Transitional Government, after being renamed the RCD-ML after having forged an alliance with MLC, as mentioned above, thus ushering some relief and relative peace that was for a long time had desired by the war-plagued and trouble-torn Congolese (Mahafha, 2009: 31 ; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/fdlr.htm). As part of the terms of the Lusaka Accord, and as a political party, the RCD-Goma was offered the position of vice president of politics, defence and security in the Transitional Government (Kabemba, 2005: 44). It also participated in the 2006 democratic elections but did not perform very well and thus was subsequently forced to dissolve. Most of the RCD-Goma members branched to other rebel groups such as the MLC that were still active in fighting the government of the DRC. (http://www.freebase.com/m/04mq_p)

3.3.4 The Mai Mai Militia

The Mai Mai militia, meaning armed community groups, was another Congolese rebel group participating in the war. It was formed during the late 1990s in DRC by Gedeon Kyungu Mutanga and operated in the North and South Kivu, DRC (Dagne, 2011: 4). It was made of combatants who refused to participate in FARDC reintegration processes, and ascribe to autochthonous beliefs, meaning they believe the land should belong to its original inhabitants. Mai Mai groups feel threatened by Rwandophone communities Hutu and Tutsi which they see as foreigners trying to take over their land and power. They are not unified under any political or racial affiliation, but all actively target civilians and U.N. peacekeeping forces in eastern Congo. They feel that the peacekeepers are there to protect the Hutus and Tutsis. They are known for

kidnapping and killing Hutu elites in north-eastern Rutshuru territory. Having joined the DRC conflict in 1999, the Mai Mai militia had no consistent, unified or articulated political demands in the war thus making it another complicated spanner in the war (http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-AA-IB1-DDR-in-the-DRC.pdf).

Its involvement was based on the need to defend their local territory (Kivu region) against other armed groups and to resist the invasion by Rwandan forces and Rwanda-affiliated DRC rebel groups such as the RCD, CNDP/M23 and FDLR. It was for this reason that it mobilised to fight against foreign occupation. It was composed of small ethnic groups of the DRC such as the Tembos, (Solomon, 2003: 192). Gedeon Kyungu Mutanga was eventually arrested in 2006 after he turned himself to the DRC police after he was suspected of orchestrating mass rape to other ethnic groups and was sentence to death in 2010. Lieutenant-Colonel Mayele and Didier Bitaki took over as the leaders after Mutanga's arrest (Dagne, 2011: 4; Solomon, 2003: 192). (http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/08/16/drcs-katanga-fighting-to-secede). However, Mayele broke away from the Mai Mai and formed his group the Mai Mai-Cheka, Bitaki was left as the leader of the 'original' Mai Mai in October 2010. The Mai Mai-Cheka's Mayele was also arrested in the North Kivu province and he has been in prison ever since (De Koning, 2010: 2)

In March 2011, 200 Mai Mai Katanga fighters entered Lubumbashi city and clashed with the government of the DRC and the UN peacekeepers during which twenty-three (23) people died. At the end though, the Mai Mai-Kata Katanga rebel group was defeated. (http://www.monusco.unmission.org/Default.aspx). Since then the Mai Mai-*Kata* Katanga has been silent but occasionally threatens to enter the Lumbumbashi city again (http://www.thinkafricapress.com/drc/suffering_out_sight_drc_unofficial). Although the Mai Mai might not succeeded in living up to its threat, during its involvement in the DRC conflict, it got into military confrontation with both the government of DRC and other rebel groups such as the M23, terrorising civilians as well as fighting peacekeeping forces, and thus did not have a definitive motivation for entering the war (http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/21/qa-jose). The result is that this makes the researcher to conclude that the Mai Mai rebel group was just a disruptive and directionless entity. Of essence, however, is that the involvement of the Mai Mai rebel group in the DRC conflict has so in many ways equally contributed in complicating the nature of the

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conflict and thus deferred the Congolese dream of building a peaceful, stable, united and prosperous nation.

3.3.5 The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)

The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a DRC-based rebel group was formed in 2006 December and became involved in the DRC war in 2007 (http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/national-congress-defense-people-cndp). Its former leader was Laurent Nkunda, a Tutsi who had been leading various rebel groups such as RCD since 2003. He was an officer in the rebel group RCD-Goma faction, in the Second Congo war of 1998 to 2002. In 2003, when the war officially ended, he joined the new integrated army of the Transitional Government between 2003 and 2006 as a colonel and was eventually promoted to a general in 2004 (http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo/armed-groups). However, soon thereafter Nkunda rejected the authority of the government and retreated with some RCD-Goma troops to the Masisi forest in North Kivu region in 2006 after the first democratic elections in 44 (forty-four) years and formed the CNDP rebel group. Its formation comes from the dissatisfaction after 2006 election outcomes and when most agreements were not being honoured (http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo/armed-groups) Together with his CNDP rebel group, Nkunda was responsible for instability in the DRC, especially in the North Kivu region, until his arrested by the Rwandan forces on January 23, 2009. His arrest came after he threatened to invade the town of Goma, the capital of North Kivu in December 2008. Following his threats, he was led into a trap after he was invited to take part in a meeting in Kigali, Rwanda on the 23rd January 2009 (Dagne, 2011: 7).

Nkunda's arrest was Rwanda's effort to end conflict in the DRC because during his time as the leader of the CNDP, it was one of the main rebel groups that was executing most of the attacks on civilians (Dagne, 2011: 7). During that period, Nkunda and the CNDP made headlines on television, radios and newspapers, for indiscriminately attacking civilians and threatening the government of DRC with violence if it did not accede to any of its demands (http://.www.getloud.ca/...type=d&file=congo_history_en_2006/10/15.1544). They demandend that power must be shared and that they must have high positions within the army. The main

motivating factor for Rwanda to arrest Nkunda was his affiliation to the Tutsi ethnic group which offered him from protection from arrested by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes. Nkunda was succeeded by Bosco Ntanganda, were the CNDP continued to terrorise people under his leadership until he surrendered at the US embassy in Rwanda in March 2013 where he was later taken to the ICC at The Hague (http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/cndp.htm).

During its involvement in the DRC conflict, the CNDP also claimed that its main objective was to protect the Congolese-Tutsis in the eastern part of the DRC and to fight the Hutu-led FDLR who they claimed occasionally attacked them (Dagne, 2011: 7). From this discussion it would appear that the involvement of the CNDP in the DRC conflict was influenced by ethnicity because the Hutu and Tutsi have always had a relationship of conflict, thus also contributing to the complexity of the conflict (http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/ex-cndp-loses-key-strongholds-voices-demands-amid-ceasefire). This prompted the DRC and Rwanda to stablish a joint military offensive against the CNDP in 2009, the result of which was the weakening of the CNDP as a cohesive rebel group. Nevertheless, the DRC-Rwanda joint military offensive did lead to the lull in the conflict as other rebel groups continued to be more violent and a threat to safety and security due to their indiscriminate actions (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/cndp.htm).

Following this, the government of the DRC recruited some of the former members of the CNDP to join the national army hoping that it would end the conflict. The integration between the army and the CNDP took place after the agreement that was signed by the government of DRC and the CNDP under the leadership of Bosco Ntanganda, on the 23rd March 2009, in the city of Goma, stating that the members of CNDP would become members of the national army of the DRC (http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/national-congress-defense-people-cndp). Significantly, the agreement brought a degree of stability for a while until the former members of CNDP broke the treaty and formed a new rebel group called M23 in April 2012 (Dagne, 2011:7 ;http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/national-congress-defense-people-cndp).

3.3.6 The March 23 Movement (M23)

The March 23 Movement or M23 (in French *Mouvement du 23- Mars*) is the newest rebel group formed on the 4th April 2012 and is based in the eastern part of DRC in the North Kivu Province. Its name derives from the event that took place on the 23rd March 2009 when the government of the DRC and Laurent Nkunda's CNDP rebel group signed the Goma Peace Treaty, and thus transforming the former rebel group into a political party The peace treaty also stated that that former militias would be integrated in to the national army of the DRC and that former members of the CNDP would join the government as a political party. (http://www.followghana.com/index.php/dr-congo-to-study-rebel-demands). However, soon thereafter, the M23 claimed that President Joseph Kabila's government did not adhere to the 23rd March 2009 agreement and that it was not fully implemented, more so as the former CNDP members were allegedly being subjected to poor conditions within the national army (http://www.rnw.nl/.../tags-africa/national-congress-defence-people-cndp).

From the above evidence, it shows that M23 was in a way the new CNDP under the guise of a new name. When it resumed its activities as a rebel movement it supported the Tutsis and appeared to have the backing of Rwanda when it later overran the town of Goma on 20th November 2012, just as the CNDP did in 2008 (eNCA, 2013/11/03). Goma is the largest city in eastern Congo and a base for many international aid agencies and the United Nations (U.N). The city of Goma is renowned for its richness in valuable mineral resources, and is also known for controlling the extremely lucrative mining industry in that region (http://www.csmonitor.com/world/africa/2012/12/06/who-are-the-rebels-in-goma-al). The M23 is/was anti- "Hutu power" rebel groups such as the FDLR and the Mai Mai. Its leaders are/were Makenga Sultani and Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero. They accused President JosphKabila of cheating during the second democratic and presidential elections of November 2011 and as such they demanded a meeting with President Kabila in order to have a platform to voice their demands as articulated in the Goma Peace Treaty (http://www.csmonitor.com/world/africa/2012/12/06/who-are-the-rebels-in-goma-al). The M23 claimed to promote, project, protect and fight for human rights, democracy and good governance although they ironically wanted to overthrow President Joseph Kabila. As such the rebels have been active in the North Kivu Province where they have been fighting government forces in the

Ruthuru and Masisi areas of the DRC (Vorrath, 2011: 7; eNCA, 2013/11/03; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/cndp.htm).

In essence the M23 rebel group has been fighting to win control of the territories that they could later agree to give up in return for guarantees that the DRC government would honour the conditions of the 23rd March 2009 peace treaty. M23 felt that controlling these naturally rich territories would give it a very strong hand in future negotiations. These desires have since proved prophetic because since then the SADC, the governments of Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC have held a number of negotiations with M23 mostly in Kigali, Rwanda and Kampala, Uganda between 2012 and 2013. The negotiations were held in an attempt to find a peaceful resolution that would satisfy both the M23 and the DRC's government on the road to peace and stability (http://www.csmonitor.com/world/africa/2012/12/06/who-are-the-rebels-in-goma-al).

Since then, from July 2013 the SADC, together with the DRC and Uganda governments, has held a number of peaceful negotiations with M23 in Uganda but the negotiations have not been fruitful. Regardless of this, M23 demanded meetings facilitated by President Yoweri Mseveni of Uganda and not by the SADC or South Africa, as they claimed that the latter were closer to the DRC's President Joseph Kabila, hence they did not expect South Africa to be impartial (Vorrath, 2011: 7). However, considering that South Africa has been the main proponent of pace negotiations in the DRC conflict, one is tempted to regard the M23's demand as delaying negotiations, peace and stability in the DRC, particularly in the Kivu provinces. In response to these demands, though, the South African Defence Force (SANDF) together with UN Peacekeeping Force set up military operations in November 2013 which led to the surrender of the M23 surrender, during which time it was reported that its leader, Sultani Makenga, had fled to Uganda to seek refuge (*Mail and Guardian,* 2013-11-08).

3.3.7 The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is a rebel group from Uganda and was formed in 1989 in Uganda by Joseph Kony who has been its leader ever since its formation (Dagne, 2011: 7). Kony claimed that his objective was the establishment of a Christian-inspired theocracy in Uganda. The LRA has also opposed the Ugandan government since Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986

after he overthrew Milton Obote. Its opposition to Museveni has since made the government of Uganda to align itself with DRC to fight the LRA (http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/21/qa-jose). Before it found its base in the eastern DRC which borders Uganda, the LRA once had military operations in several African countries such as Uganda, Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR). The aim for its existence in the DRC is not clear as they claim that they were preventing the DRC conflict from escalating to Uganda fearing that other rebel groups might flee to Uganda (Dagne, 2011: 8). As such the LRA has been active in the DRC conflict since 2008 after it started to launch violent campaigns in September 2008. A joint military operation between Uganda and the DRC attempted to exterminate the LRA in December 2008 but did not succeed in permanently dismantling it because the joint force had fewer numbers of combatants than the LRA and was neither strong enough nor fully equipped (htttp://monusco.unmission.org/Default.aspx).

Since its formation, the rebel group has primarily targeted the civilian population, especially women and children, terrorising them, raping women and girls, and abducting young boys and making them child soldiers (Dagne, 2011: 8). It has also mutilated lips and ears to terrorize the people. Between December 2007 and April 2010, it is believed that LRA might have killed 1,796 and abducted 2,377 civilians in the DRC only (http://www.irinnews.org/report/89494/drc-who-s-who-among-armed-groups-in-the-east). This campaign negatively impact the direction of the war because instead of the war coming to an end, the LRA engaged in more violent attacks on the DRC civilians as a result, proving a challenge and a test of strength and power (http:// www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/21/qa-jose). The discussion below focuses on the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the DRC conflict.

3.3.8 The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is a Muslim rebel group based in Uganda which was formed in 1998 by a sector of the Ugandan society which felt alienated after the overthrow of erstwhile president Idi Amin. It has had limited activities within Uganda and the DRC (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/201372215812878743). During the year 2010 the ADF rebels were active in the DRC in the city of Beni near the Ugandan border from

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where they claimed to be protecting its border and preventing the DRC war from escalating and spilling into Uganda. They claimed that they were being influenced to do this due to the spill over effect of the 1994 Rwandan genocide that ended up spreading instability in the DRC (Khadiagala, 2008: 18). The governments of Uganda and the DRC have had some consultations regarding the existence and impact of the ADF in the DRC war. As a result of acknowledging its impact they ended up agreeing that Uganda should remove its forces from the DRC conflict. However, this did not stop the DRC armed forces from launching Rwenzori in June 2010, a military operation, against the ADF and its allies in the city of Beni, located in the Nord Kivu Province of the DRC. According to the UN officials although the military operations were believed to have dislodged the ADF forces military operations, the ADF was reported to be recruiting and training people at its base in North Kivu and in Uganda in January 2014, in preparation to attack Uganda from the DRC. It is reported that it have more than 1200 militias (Dagne, 2011: 7; http://www.irinnews.org/report/98400/drc-based-ugandan-rebel-group-recruiting-training).

3.3.9 Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)

Congolese Popular Army (in English) is the armed wing of the group that split from RDC, Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) (Wouter, 2007: 1). They raised the army largely along ethnic lines, with Mbusa Nyamwisi initially recruiting heavily among the *Nande* people and *Tibasima* enlisting mostly youngsters of his own Hema group. This is the Hema-formulated rebel group. Just like the RCD-ML, the UPC was also backed by Uganda. The Ugandan army provided training and armed classes for hundreds of APC recruits at Nyaleke camp in the Beni and Rwampara camp in bunia. They represent the Hemas and they fight against the FNL (a rebel group that represents the Lendu). The Lendu and the Hema are enemies; they fight against each other for land and fishing rights (https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/07/07/covered-blood/ethnically-targeted-violence-northern-drc). The hostility between the two ethnic groups started during the colonial period when the Belgians started to favour the Hema over the Lendu making the Hema to be more educated and wealthier than the Lendu. The Hema were also allowed to hold senior positions in the government while the Lendu were not allowed. This made the hema to feel as important and

better than the Lendu, they started to look down upon the lendu. Traditionally the Hema are pastoralists and the Lendu agriculturalists, and before colonialism these two groups lived together in peace and harmony. The northern Hema people speak *kiLendu* language and the southern Hema speak *KiHema* language (Wouter, 2007: 5). After independence the Hema continued to look down upon the Lendu but much of the current animosity started in 1973 when the act/law to buy land they do not inhabit was passed. Most of the Hemas were using this tactics to illegally acquire land from the Lendus. The law also stated that people occupying the purchased land can move out of the land two years after it has been bought (Wouter, 2007: 2; Dagne, 2011: 7). This created conflict when people were forcefully removed from the purchased land unaware that it has been bought. This led to the outbreak of violence between these two groups in 1985, 1996 and 2002. Ever since there have been violent clashes between Hema and lendu in the Ituri region. Human right Watch have reported that under the leadership of Nyamwisi, thousands of Hemas mostly women, children and the elders have been killed by the UPC in Nyakunde, Ituri (Wouter, 2007: 2; https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/07/07/covered-blood/ethnically-targeted-violence-northern-drc).

3.3.10 Front for National Integration (FNI)

This is a Lendu political party, its leader is Floribert Njabu Ngabu. It was established by Lendu intellectuals and traditional chiefs, it claims broad support by the Lendu community in its effort to oppose the UPC (Woudenberg, 2003: 5; https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/07/07/covered-blood/ethnically-targeted-violence-northern-drc). It also aims to fight against other ethnic groups more especially the Hema ethnic group and to protect the interest of the Lendu. The Hema and the Lendu were/are fighting against each other for land and fishing rights. The Hema are pastoralists and the Lendu agriculturalists. It fights against the APC rebel group that represents the Hema. Historically there was a high degree of co-existence between these two groups and inter-marriage was common (Wouter, 2007: 2). Belgian colonial rule accentuated ethnic divisions between the two communities by trying to re-organise traditional chieftaincies into more homogeneous groups and by favouring the Hema over the Lendu (http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/north-kivu-congos-never-ending-troubled-province). The Lendu militias are reportedly being organised under the military wing of this party, which some equate with the Patriotic Force of Resistance (FRPI). FNI is supported by

Uganda as part of the FIPI coalition, it joined the Ugandan army in driving the UPC from Bunia on March 6, 2003, for which some its members were publicly thanked by Brigadier Kayihura in April. FNI has also benefited from military training and support from the RCD-ML and, through it, from Kinshasa (Woudenberg, 2003: 5).

3.4. The Influence of Ethnicity within the DRC's Political Landscape with Reference to National Security: The Place of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi

National security is very important in order to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic power, diplomacy, power projection and political power (Omar, 2000: 5). In order for the state to possess national security, it needs to possess economic security, energy security, environmental security and so forth. Despite progress in regional security, insecurity in parts of the DRC especially the eastern region continues to pose a serious threat to political stability in the Great Lakes region, hence the discussion below.

3.4.1 The influence of ethnicity in the DRC with reference to its diplomatic relations within the GLR

From the 1960s after independence the DRC had good diplomatic relations with other countries of the world as well with countries within the GLR region, especially during the 1980s, the period of the super power rivalry of the Cold War (Omar, 200: 9). During this period President Mobutu se se Seko had the support of the capitalist states of Belgium, Britain and the United States of America (USA) because of his staunch opposition to communism (Mahafha, 2009: 22). The West believed that his administration would serve as an effective counter to communist movements, especially in Southern Africa. The DRC was a powerful state in Africa and had good diplomatic relations with other African countries such as Liberia, South Africa, Ivory Coast and Ghana amongst others and also including those in the GLR (Omar, 200: 9). During the 1970s and 1980s, Mobutu was invited to visit the United States on several occasions, meeting with U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush (Shillington, 1989:356). He was very important ally of the U.S, Britain and Belgium during the Cold war period. Following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the U.S. relations with Mobutu cooled down, as he

was no longer deemed necessary. Opponents within Zaïre stepped up with demands for reform such as democracy and respect of human rights (Queyranne, 2012: 1). This atmosphere contributed to Mobutu's declaring the Third Republic in 1990, whose constitution was supposed to pave the way for democratic reform. The reforms turned out to be largely cosmetic as Mobutu continued to be in power until armed forces such as Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) forced him to flee Zaire, in 1997 (Mahafha, 2009: 23) (discussed earlier)

The DRC's relations with former Belgian colonies of Rwanda and Burundi soured in the 1990s specially as the region started to be political unstable (Khadiagala, 2008: 13). The relations between these countries became more hostile towards because of ethnic-influenced differences (between the Hutus and Tutsis) that were spreading within the region, although these countries managed to put their differences aside and decided to work together for the sake of regional stability (Mwaniki, 2009: 11). The restoration of relation came as a result of mediation efforts by SADC, United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) which received a boost largely due to facilitation by the United States of the Tripartite Plus process, a policy initiative aimed at regional stability and cooperation (Mwaniki, 2009: 11). However, the region remains politically unstable due to ethnic differences despite progress in some areas and relative stability in most regions of the four key regional participants in the cooperation process: DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

3.4.2 The DRC and Uganda's diplomatic relations

The DRC's relations with her neighbour had been seriously strained as a result of the excursion of Ugandan forces into the largely lawless eastern DRC to fight the LRA rebel group that were using the area as their safe haven and a springboard for attacks against the latter (Vorrath, 2011:7). However, the DRC upgraded its diplomatic presence with Uganda to ambassadorial level three years after its first democratic elections in 44 (forty) years with the reinstatement of full diplomatic ties between the DRC and Uganda taking place in September 2009 (Mwaniki, 2009: 11). The reinstatement of relations between the two countries was the latest development signalling a new era in the region's politics, following the DRC's recent willingness to cooperate militarily with its eastern neighbours (Mpangala, 2004: 8). These countries also exchanged ambassadors for the first in nearly 12 (twelve) years. Before this, the two countries had

maintained their embassies, but had rejected full relations until in December 2008 when the DRC permitted Ugandan forces to enter its north-eastern region to try and root out the Ugandan rebel group, the LRA. This followed the signing of signed an agreement between Uganda and DRC in Arusha, Tanzania, in September 2007, to cooperate on a wide range of issues, including the removal of the LRA from Congo (Mahafha, 2009: 63). Thereafter, in October 2007, the third-highest-ranking LRA official, Opio Makasi, surrendered to The United Nations Organisations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and was later transferred to Congolese authorities. In November 2007, the Congolese and MONUC officials in turn handed over Makasi to the Ugandan authorities, who reportedly provided him with amnesty. Of essence is that this development resonated with the numerous commitments by DRC's President Kabila to force the LRA out of DRC and thus helped cement the bilateral relations between them (Vorrath, 2011: 4). The Ugandan Minister for International Affairs Honourable Okello Henry Oryem told the electronic media broadcaster, "The Voice of America (VOA)" that the military cooperation between the two countries against the LRA rebel group late in 2008 was the turning point in two country's previously volatile relationship (The Voice of America, 14/10/2013). In this regard, Minister Oryem said that the improvement in Uganda's bilateral ties with the DRC had taken much longer than should have been the case, but appreciated a variety of factors between the two countries had finally led to the new mind-set among the region's major players (http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/burundi/conflict-profile/). Oryem (The Voice of America, 14/10/2013) added that he believed that "the change in attitude in the leadership, the change in the environment around them, the change in the international diplomacy, all contributed to the timing now for finally around last year for things to start to take a new course and new developments," (Daily Telegraph, 2008). According to Oryem (The Voice of America, 14/10/2013) the renewed relations between Uganda and the DRC had eased cross-border movement by the region's locals thus contributing to the steady rise in business and trade between the two neighbours (Vorrath, 2011: 7). This course of events brought fresh links between the two countries closely mirrors the renewal of relations between the DRC and Rwanda (Vorrath, 2011: 7; *Daily Telegraph*, 2008).

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3.4.3 The DRC and Rwanda's diplomatic relations

From 1996 onwards, the bilateral relations between the Rwanda and DRC governments played a critical role in shaping the situation in eastern DRC (Queyranne, 2012: 350). After facilitating the installation of a friendly regime in DRC after the toppling of Mobutu, Rwanda soon broke ties after the latter had accused the former of supporting Hutu militias responsible for the 1994 genocide (Mahafha, 2009: 23). This created a bitter and bloody enmity between the two countries that would endure for the next 10 (ten) years, marked by military confrontations, the pillaging of the DRC's natural resources, and the deaths of over 6 million people. However, in July 2002 Rwanda and the DRC signed a peace agreement that called for the withdrawal of 20, 000 Rwandan troops from the DRC territory. A couple of months later, the DRC completed negotiations with Uganda to end their respective hostilities (Queyranne, 2012: 350). In an unexpected twist in regional dynamics, in January 2009, Rwanda and DRC suddenly normalised their relations, becoming ostensible allies and jointly participating in military operations on the DRC soil, only weeks after being indirectly at war through the use of proxy rebels (Moffett, 2009: 25; Queyranne, 2012: 350).

This development was particularly puzzling, considering that in international relations friendly countries can often abruptly become enemies and go to war such that inversely unfriendly countries suddenly becoming allies typically takes several years (Moffett, 2009: 25 ; Khadiagala, 2008: 13). Hence it was surprising that the diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda suddenly improved over a short period of time. Therefore, the two countries fully restored their relations in July 2009, similarly to that of DRC and Uganda (Moffett, 2009: 25; Queyranne, 2012: 350). The following month on the 6th August 2009 Rwandan President Paul Kagame met with the DRC's President Joseph Kabila in the town of Goma, DRC. This was the first presidential meeting between the two countries in the past 13 (thirteen) years with the two countries having come to a disagreement in 1996 following an invasion by Rwanda into eastern DRC (Mahafha, 2009: 65). The presidents spent more than two hours in the company of each other and reviewed all issues of common interest with President Kabila referring to the meeting as "the first giant step forward" in what was referred to as an "all new era". Following this meeting, Rwanda then arrested CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda on behalf of the DRC while the DRC reciprocated this by turning its back on the FDLR (Moffett, 2009: 27).

A month after the meeting between the two presidents, they appointed ambassadors to each other's capitals for the first time in more than a decade of hostilities (Moffett, 2009: 27). The two countries even engaged in joint military operations against the Hutu rebels, FDLR, soon after the signing of an agreement of cooperation between the DRC and Ugandan forces against the LRA. The improved ties between the countries signalled good news for the region's inhabitants, where sour relations between the DRC and its eastern neighbours had exacerbated instability in the mineral-rich region for more than a decade (Mahafha 2009: 35). This was a far cry from the yesteryears when foreign on the one hand armed rebel groups had used unstable eastern Congo as their bases of operations, and on the other both Rwanda and Uganda had supported rebel movements to topple the DRC's government (Khadiagala, 2008: 13). The significance of these developments was that the region's powerful nations were showing commitment to fight against the scourge of ethnicity within its borders by replacing it with unity of purpose: regional cooperation for the sake of peace and stability.

3.4.4 The DRC and Burundi's diplomatic relations

The relations between the DRC and Burundi are regarded as having been amongst the least contentious because even though Burundian armed groups such as the Forces of National Liberation (FNL) operated in the south-Kivu province in the DRC, Burundi has not been directly involved in the DRC situation like her northern neighbour, Rwanda (Sindayigaya, 2014: 2). In contrast, Burundi maintains security cooperation with the DRC authorities, making them to be in good terms as neighbours. Flowing from this, the general structure of security cooperation between the two countries could be developed as a model for security cooperation between the DRC and the rest of her neighbours, especially Rwanda, Uganda and the CAR (http://www.insightfulquotient.com). In addition to this, Burundi hosts tens of thousands of Congolese refugees across four provinces while the DRC government has signed agreements with its neighbours to improve its security and the wider GLR region. For example, in October 2004, with significant US involvement and facilitation, the DRC joined with Rwanda and Uganda in signing a Great Lakes regional security agreement that established a "Tripartite Commission" to address issues peacefully rather than militarily. Burundi joined a year later and the expanded agreement is now known as "Tripartite Plus" (http://www.jambonews.net/en/news/20140604-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-

conflict-a-long-running-fiasco-and-its-lessons-for-regional-policy-makers/). Burundi joined "Tripartite Commission", later called "Tripartite Plus" because her armed forces were assisting in peace-keeping efforts within the DRC. Burundi's inclusion in the "Tripartite Plus" was, therefore, significant to committing to strong bilateral efforts to eliminate all therefore illegal, and more especially ethnic-aligned armed groups operating within and/or between the two countries. The utmost importance of this development was ensuring that the DRC was afforded the opportunity to re-established full diplomatic relations with her strategically important neighbours of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in 2009 (Sindayigaya, 2014:2). Therefore the study argues that the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations among the four GLR nations ; DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, through the "Tripartite Plus" opened a window of opportunity for them to prioritise nation building above the historic, retrogressive and destructive influence of ethnicity.

3.5 The Influence of Ethnicity on the DRC's Political Power Relations

Between 1980 and 1996 political power within the DRC strictly resided in the hands of dictator Mobutu sese Seko, his family and his cronies (Kabemba, 2005:45). As mentioned earlier in the discussion, Mobutu ruled the DRC according to his whim. He made decisions by himself, favoured his family, allies and people of his own ethnic group (Mahafha, 2009: 3). He also diverted and misused government funds and foreign financial aid meant for national projects for his own use. Multiparty democracy and opposition activity was prohibited as he labelled them a source of political instability (Kabemba, 2005: 45). It was only after the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide and the massacres in Burundi (discussed earlier) in 1994 that the DRC's political landscape started to witness dramatic change (Queyranne, 2012: 1). The after effects of the events in Rwanda and Burundi had a huge impact on the DRC. The influence of ethnicity on the socio-political climate within these countries started to spill over into the DRC's eastern provinces. This was due to the fact that the Hutus who fled into the country started to group themselves into militias that staged attacks against the Rwandan government in retaliation of the genocide (Kabemba, 2005: 45). The corollary was that the DRC's Tutsis known as Banyamulenge also grouped themselves and started to fight those Hutu militias based in the DRC (Mahafha, 2009: 3; Kabemba, 2005: 45). These attacks escalated into large-scale violent

conflict until the Congolese rebel group ADFL under the leadership of Laurent Kabila gained the upper hand and toppled Mobutu in May 1997 (Mpangala, 2004: 58).

Nevertheless the overthrow of Mobutu did not end the conflict but worsened the political instability within the DRC because new ethnic-based rebel groups were formed and started to fight against each other. As if that was not enough, just like Mobutu, Kabila morphed into a dictator, made political decisions by himself and banned political gatherings as well as parties. The political situation deteriorated until Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila immediately thereafter (Kabemba, 2005: 45). It was Joseph Kabila who assisted in creating an environment for outside mediators such as the UN, the SADC and the AU to intervene in the conflict, thereby bringing a degree of hope for the political situation of the country. Several peace summits and agreements mediated by SADC as mandated by the AU and were signed by the government of the DRC and some of the rebel groups involved in the conflict (Kabemba, 2005: 46). However, the exclusion of other rebel groups, notably small rebel groups became a problem later on as this prolonged the presence of armed groups in the eastern parts of the DRC, and thus became is a major source of political instability (Dagne, 2008: 12).

These ethnic-influenced rebel groups felt marginalized and often developed the feelings of revenge and hatred against the government and other rebel groups that were involved in the negotiations and eventually signed the peace treaties (Khadiagala, 2008:13). They claimed that those that signed peace treaties had sold out as they were reaping socio-economic benefits from the resources of the state because of their affiliation to the government. It is, however, worth noting that although since the transitional government of 2006 a democratic government has been established in the DRC the economy has been slowly picking up, the study argues that there cannot be a justification for triumphalist claims that the DRC is now a country in peace (Dagne, 2008: 12).

Ethnicity played a role in the boycotting of the 2006 presidential elections by the DRC's largest opposition party, the MLC, whose leader Jean Pierre Bemba belongs to the Ngwaka ethnic group (Khadiagala, 2008:13). Bemba even vowed that he would swear himself in as president of the country in December of that year. However, before he could violent clashes erupted in March 2007 between the police and Bemba's security group, where Bemba was defeated by the

government force and sought refuge in the South African embassy before opting for exile in Belgium (Mahafha 2009: 35). As such it becomes a fact that ethnic affiliation has become an even more dominating and noticeable factor for the political tensions within the DRC and among the armed groups that use it in their recruitment strategies for new members (Khadiagala, 2008: 13). Because of lack of stable and continuous governance within the DRC, ethnicity has indeed become an excuse for violence in order to gain control of assets in the politically fragile regions of North and South Kivu. In addition, the exclusion of other ethnic groups and the colonial legacy of ethnic favouritism and has become an obstacle to the road to peace, stability, human security and nation building within the country (Goldfaden, 2011: 8).

At the level of local political administration, the existence of two competing governors in North Kivu is a source of potential future conflict as administrative unification is likely to aggravate inter-ethnic conflict (Khadiagala, 2008: 14). In addition, lack of political maturity among the opposition groups, in combination with persistent patterns of regional, ethnic or other identity group discrimination, may easily leave the root causes of conflict behind in the process of looking for quick-fix resolutions, thereby contributing to a seething discontent (Khadiagala, 2008: 13). Furthermore, there is a general risk linked to peace agreements, which mainly deals with a reshaping of the balance of power and influence in the military and political realm of the conflict-ridden society (Mahafha, 2009: 63).

Flowing from the above, ethnicity has in many ways contributed a lot in how power is projected within the government of the DRC because power is highly centralised with executive power being vested in President Joseph Kabila's People's Party for Reconstruction and Development (PPRD). This was also the case during the Mobutu and Laurent Kabila regimes (Kodi, 2008: 71). Following the 2006 democratic elections, two broad alliances emerged in the five hundred (500) seats National Assembly: the Alliance of the Presidential Majority (AMP) comprising (three-hundred and thirty-two) seats and the opposition Union for the Nation (UpN) which comprised one hundred and sixteen (116) seats. The ruling party appointed the cabinet while the prime minister was elected by parliament (Kodi, 2008: 72; Gathaiga, 2012: 11). The Bi-cameral Parliament consisted of a directly elected 500 (five hundred) member National Assembly and a Senate, with the Senators elected by provincial assemblies. The judiciary only nominates

independent and the President has the power to dismiss and appoint judges (Kodi, 2008: 72). Not surprisingly, Most of the government officials who hold higher positions are of Kabila's Luba tribe and other people that are of his tribe (Goldfaden, 2011: 8). This is more evidence of the influence of ethnicity in the running of government and a potential source of political instability because other tribes, especially smaller tribes, would feel marginalised as far as higher or key government positions are concerned. In addition, this might compromise efforts at service delivery and development as the situation has a potential of those belonging to the ruling ethnic group being looked at with an eye of favouritism. In all practical terms, political power usually translates into economic power, which is the subject of the discussion below.

3.6 The Influence of Ethnicity in the DRC with Reference to its Economic Power

Besides the above discussion, ethnicity within the DRC has caused war that has resulted in the persistent violence as a result of the struggle over the control of the land which is rich in mineral resources (De Koning, 2010: 2; Goldfaden, 2011: 8). As such this has provided fertile ground for the illegal exploitation of natural wealth of the DRC and control of mineral resources by rebel groups, which use the money from illegal trade of minerals to finance the war. The result has been that about 50 % (fifty per cent) of the mines in the eastern DRC are controlled by armed groups (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo). To aggravate the situation, the DRC's neighbours of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have also been dragged into this regional conflict, because some of the rebel groups that are looting the mines are from those countries. While on the one hand these armed rebel groups entered the war on the ethnic ticket on the other they have demanded taxes, bribes or other payments for the minerals extracted from the mines (Mwaniki, 2009: 11).

From the above discussion, it becomes evident that the exploitation and control of mineral deposits by the armed rebel groups have contributed in worsening the conflict within the DRC and the GLR region in general. As if that was not enough, natural resources such as timber, ivory, coltan, cobalt as well as other commodities have played an extensive role in complicating the nature of these wars, especially the DRC conflict, which has for a number of years has had adverse effects on the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Mwaniki, 2009: 11). Ironically, not only rebel groups have been implicated in the illicit sale of minerals in order

to finance the war, the DRC's government troops and their foreign allies have also used the country's diamonds, gold, timber, ivory, coltan and cobalt to pay for their war-related expenses. The greatest concern is the fact that these resources could have been used to extricate people out of poverty (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo). The Congolese government's inability to control the entirety of its territory has allowed rebel armed forces to exploit these resources and fuel the continuous conflict in the Congo. Many of these minerals are exported to electronics companies worldwide, and rebels not only keep the profits of this illicit trade (http://www.standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc). The illegal exploitation of mineral has had a negative impact on the economy of the DRC because instead of the mines to benefit the state it is benefiting the rebels (http://www.standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc).

During its peak the DRC conflict created a situation of paralysis in as far as the government machinery was concerned thereby compromising service delivery. In the process developmental projects and other essential services such as health, water supply and education, hence putting a dent on the social development aspect. Furthermore, this had brought the country's economy to a standstill, a country that had struggle to establish democracy after years of dictatorship where people and businesses had not been paying taxes and the banking system was virtually non-existent (Mahafha, 2009: 65). The years of dictatorship, and the conflict thereafter, affected the national output and reduced government revenues, with the ripple effect of increasing the country's external debt, further compromising the social projects (http://http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152607).

In the midst of the conflict has been lack of infrastructure and the non-conducive as well as the difficult work environment brought about by the war situation curtailed the operations by foreign businesses, and thus affected investment opportunities. This affected the prospects for the creation of employment and in the process increased unemployment since 1996 when the 1st Congo war broke out (http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152607). The war period has also made the DRC one of the least developed countries in Africa regardless of being endowed in natural resources. During its heydays the DRC was one of the world's largest producers of cobalt, copper and diamond but because of the conflict it has been unable to carry on with the exploitation and production of these economically strategic minerals as they are now exploited

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the outsiders (Mwaniki, 2009: 12). This has seen the indigenes not benefiting from the mineral resources because only the rebel groups and the government have been benefiting from exploiting mineral to finance their war, thus fuelling conflict instead of reducing poverty or develop the country. The political instability and violent conflict led to the near-collapse of the country's economy and caused the annual per capita income to plummet to $120 (one hundred and twenty American dollars) in 2007, down from $380 (three hundred and eighty American dollars) during Mobutu's regime (http:// https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/conflict-minerals).

The conflict has also impacted negatively on the DRC's economy because the country used to be one of African countries whose economy was growing even though it was affected by Mobutu's regime which was renowned for corruption and nepotism (Mahafha, 2009: 59). The collapse of the DRC's economy also impacted negatively on some African countries, especially those within the SADC region, which have witnessed an increase in the number of Congolese migrating to their countries (Shekhawat, 2009: 13). The Congolese survive on hand-work, like cutting trees for firewood, furniture and other wooden goods which they in turn sell. But because of the war they have been unable to conduct der businesses for the most part of the war. More so, life has been very difficult for the man on the street, the poverty-stricken and the rural population to cultivate as it is not safe anymore due to the indiscriminate presence of rebels who have occupied most of the fields to use them as their bases. The country that is very fertile and good for agricultural production has been torn apart by the conflict fuelled by ethnic differences among the Congolese, making them to be unable to contribute to the economy (http://http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152607/).

As it has been mentioned above, like most former colonies the DRC has experienced exploitation of natural resources and the practice remains to date (Kodi, 2008: 71; Mahafha, 2009: 22; De Koning, 2010: 5) however, argue that the legality of the exploitation of minerals in the DRC is becoming simply a matter of contracts according awarded by the government. The international debate around the exploitation of natural resources focuses primarily on the companies and investors, as well as on the historical legacy of Mobutu. The authors furthermore argue that many of the people who illegally exploited natural resources in the different regions of the DRC

are now part of the government such that the same processes of exploitation have become 'legal' (De Koning, 2010: 5). Contracts that were illegal yesterday are today considered legal simply because they are signed in Kinshasa. As a result of the unregulated mining and the exploitation of minerals, some of the government officials are giving mining rights to some mining companies from outside the DRC while they also benefit there from (Kodi, 2008: 71).

Flowing from the above, there continues to be a lack of transparency about who has signed contracts and who the stakeholders are, more so because small-scale artisanal miners are at the mercy of bigger players, with no guarantee that the product would be sold at the right price or that the profits would remain in the country (Mahafha, 2009: 65). As such there is a need to ensure that the profits are invested in local trade and livelihoods. However, given the lack of regulatory systems and transparency, how could one ensure that local communities benefit or whether the money actually enters the fiscal system? An example is o the current practice of restructuring companies which also legalises extraction just as it happened when a mining company was set up to mine cobalt and copper from the remnants of other companies (Kodi, 2008: 71). The DRC government used to own just 5% (five per cent) of the mining company and sought investment from the World Bank (WB) and the South African government to enable extraction of minerals, and yet gaining very little from the venture (Kodi, 2008: 71). The involvement of South Africa and WB in the DRC mining sector made the rebel groups to undermine peace talks and agreements that were being facilitated by South Africa and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Adding to the predicament has been the fact that the DRC government does not appear to regard the mining problems in the east as a pressing concern. The mining code has not been applied to the East and the World Bank has yet to move beyond its focus on big companies to look at the problems of the informal mining sector. For example, the informal diamond mining has been penalised by the Kimberley Process[4] due to monopolisation by the companies which have obtained certificates (Goldfaden, 2011: 8). If the current process is taken to its logical conclusion, the small-scale artisanal mining sector is likely to disappear altogether (De Koning,

[4] The "Kimberley Process" was established in 2003 by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 to ensure that diamond purchases were not financing violence by rebel movements and their allies seeking to undermine legitimate governments

2010: 2). Whilst progress has been made in the forming of a first unified brigade of the new integrated national army, and whilst international humanitarian agencies have had more secure access to the population in almost all areas, the predominant reality on the ground in the east is that millions of people still live in constant fear and are subjected to pillage, rape and arbitrary extortion by a multiplicity of armed factions and militias (Tar, 2010: 85).

The insecurity in the daily lives of ordinary people can be described in to two main factors. The first is the maintenance of an armed belligerent capacity by a number of the parties to the transitional government. This is exemplified by the apparently parallel military chains of command emanating from the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency respectively, and also by the continued autonomy of a number of the warlord fiefdoms in the Kivus (Wolpe, 2008: 139). The second major cause of widespread insecurity is the continued presence of foreign militias, principally the Rwandan *Interahamwe*/FDLR. This has had the dual consequence of disrupting the stability in the east, and of provoking cross border tensions with Rwanda, namely the incursions of Rwandan army forces into both Burundi and DRC. There needs to be more effective and accelerated movement on the demobilisation and integration of national Congolese forces, and a more concerted effort to accelerate the repatriation of foreign forces (Kay, 2013: 1).

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter examined the influence of ethnicity within DRC's political landscape with reference to nation building and national security. It also looked at how the proximity of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi influenced the internal politics within the DRC, especially in terms of ethnic politics. In addition, this chapter outlined that most of the DRC political parties and armed groups are ethnically formulated meaning that political powers is centred in one group resulting in the outbreak of conflict when those that are not in the government feels unrepresented. The influence of ethnicity in the DRC politics is influencing the formation of new rebel groups and how they are causing instability in the country. The influence of ethnicity and lack of national unity is affecting national security in the DRC making external armed groups and external political players to exploit its minerals and use the DRC as they play ground thereby undermining the security of the people.

Chapter Four

National and Human Security Challenges Posed by Ethnic-influenced Conflict in the DRC, 1980-2013

4.1 Introduction

The essence of this chapter is to put an emphasis on the facets of the politics of ethnicity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 1980 and 2013. Kaufman's theory of symbolic politics of ethnicity states that the manipulation of the myths of the symbols of ethnic group often results in ethnic conflicts (Kaufman, 2001: 35). The first part of the chapter focuses on how the allocation of resources and accumulation in a client-patron relationship became a specific feature of President Mobutu's national politics to forge a unitary state between 1965 and 1997. As a result what emerges is the primary interest is how ethnicity informed Mobutu's geo-politics that gave rise to elitism (Kaufman, 2001: 35). Surprisingly, the same ethnic myths against those perceived as foreigners by the Mobutu regime led to the armed rebellion under his successor, later saw the removal of President Mobutu and his successor, Laurent Desire Kabila, from power. This was because the ascension to office of Kabila saw the resurgence of the traditional features of ethnic myths that lay the foundation of politics of ethnicity (Cindil, 2009: 19). These traditional features gave rise to the politics of exclusion of other ethnic groups, bred political frustration and armed rebellion, resulting in a massive human security challenge. Since then politics of ethnicity has been a confluence of the dynamics of the political landscape in the DRC.

Young (1979: 107) opines that "no serious study on the political evolution of the Congo can neglect the difficult problem of 'tribalism' or what may be referred to as 'ethnicity'. According to the author this is one of the major issues that place a question mark over the very existence of the Congolese entity". The history of the DRC reinforces the above opinion in a very interesting manner where Belgian colonial rule of the country was responsible for this deep seated intractable political reality. As typical of the general patterns of colonialism on the African continent, and elsewhere, Belgian colonial rule was predicated on creating division among the

various ethnic linguistic groups in the DRC through the manipulation of ethnic groups. In addition this reinforced a 'myth-symbol complex' that became a determinant factor in accounting for ethnic politics in the country (McCalphin, 2002: 35). It is for this reason that ethnic conflict is a latter day phenomenon that results from the use and exploitation of myths about ethnicity and ethnic hatred which can be illuminated in three distinct discourses in accounting for ethnic conflict: ancient hatred, manipulative leaders and economic rivalry (Cindil, 2009: 19). In corroboration, Kaufman (2001: 34) argues that there are three necessary preconditions for the politics of ethnicity that often result in wars: myths justifying ethnic hostility, ethnic fears and the opportunity to mobilise and fight. The above assertions are supported by McCalphin (2002: 35) who says that Belgian colonial authorities managed to create this wedge by exploiting the existing differences and competition over resources in various ethnic groups for its benefit. It was within this context the Belgian colonial regime divided the DRC into six provinces, giving some more autonomy over others and thus reinforcing the predominence of some ethnic groups over the others (McCalphin, 2002: 35).

Shillington (1989: 356) and Alemazung (2010: 65) cement the above by stating that the Belgian colonial masters emphasised the distinctions between the different ethnic groups, thereby strengthening tribal differences and rivalries between these DRC ethnic groups, thus preventing them from forming a united opposition against the colonisers. This colonial legacy became a specific feature of the contours of post-independence politics in the DRC where attempts to unify the state ran against ethnic and regional loyalties (William et. al., 1997: 1). As a result, the struggle for the liberation of the DRC exhibited different dimensional approaches as some of the nationalist movements sought to define the struggle through ethno-nationalism. An example was the *Abako* movement (a political party) (McCalphin, 2002: 35), whose leader Joseph Kasa-Vubu predicated the struggle on the political interests of the Kikongo/Bakongo tribe thus lacking a nation wide appeal.

Be that as it may there was a movement whose appeal was on a national basis the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) or the Congolese National Movement which Patrice Lumumba, a nationalist otherwise incluvist leader, was part of. The MNC was the only hope for an inclusive political miracle in the making of the nation-state of the Congo that was hoped would deviate the

impact of etho-nationalism in the future politics of the country (Meredith, 2005: 98-99). However, the assassination of Lumumba and the subsequent ascension to presidency of General Mobutu in 1965, frustrated attempts to curb post-colonial ethno-nationalist political tendencies in the DRC. The ascendancy of Mobutu as president of the DRC saw the mutation of ethnic politics transforming from the old traditional tribal realities to a modern day phenomenon that transformed the country into a kleptocracy (Williame, et al., 1997:4).

4.2 Ethnicity during the Reign of Mobutu Sese Seko

Blaut (1987: 1) asserts that the national question means "how the fight for political sovereignty is to be carried out and what role it should play in the larger struggle for social justice". It is in the light of this that ethnicity and its role during the reign of Mobutu is discussed under this section. During the Mobutu era the fight for the struggle for the DRC (then Zaïre) did not cultivate a sense of belonging on a national level as sub ethnic-loyalties transcended, and became part of, the post-independence DRC political dynamics (Hesselbein, 2007: 21). Hardly a month after independence, in June 1960, the country degenerated into a quagmire of mutiny and secession as a result of nationalist leaders who failed to articulate the national question but predicated the futute of the DRC along ethnic realities. A week after independence the army mutinied, followed by the political declaration of the Katanga region under Moise Tshombe (a political leader at the time), South Kasai under the leadership of Kalonji and Kivu under the leadership of Kashamura (Cindil, 2009: 16). This in itself is a clear exampl of how ethnicity posed a serious challenge to efforts at nation building, national security and human safety, typical of a country that was divided along ethnic lines as a rsult of years of Belgian colonialism.

Flowing from the above, the ascension to power of Mobutu was against the backdrop ethno-nationalism created and promoted by Belgian colonialism and thus became as a specific feature of the political landscape of the DRC. Aggravating the situation was the fact that the country's nationalist leaders lacked a broad political vision because their projects were predominantly predicated on looting resources within their constituencies. In this way, these leaders were able the resources to consolidate their political power, a similar journey travelled by Mobutu as he exploited the country's multi-ethnic character, and the resultant division, for his own benefit

(Afoaku, 1997: 124). The vacuum created by nationalist leaders as they failed to articulate the national question saw the Mobutu regime morphing into a one party system by concentrating state power in his *Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution* (MPR) or Popular Movement of the Revolution thereby giving rise to what was later to be known as Mobutism (Young and Turner, 1985: 396). According to Young and Turner, 1985: 149) as the programme for the de-ethinicisation of politics in the country, Mobutism was made possible in three spheres: the suppression of institutional arenas where ethnicity could be mobilised; exclusion of ethnic partonage within the state; and the prohibition of cultural ideologies). It is from this premise that the next paragraph discusses the challenge of patrimonialism within Mobutu's DRC.

4.2.1 Patrimonialism

Patrimonialism is a system in which high political office is offered in return for loyalty to the incumbent regime. As such the patrimonialism is generally characterised by the emergence of a powerful and resourceful elite at the echelons of power who eventually turn a unitary state into a kleptocracy, as it happened in the DRC during Mobutu's era. In the same vein, Mobutu introduced a system of patronage in a bid to contain ethno-nationalist politics known as patrimonialism (Afoaku, 1997:124). To this end the specific political features of the landcsape in the DRC were characterised by a client-patron relationship[5] where Mobutu managed to buy loyalty from various elite ethnic leaders with material and political concessions in return for consolidation and expansion of his stay in power (Cindil, 2009: 8).

The result was that various elite nationalist leaders whose political vision was predicated on looting, accumulating presonal wealth and greediness enabled Mobutu to exploit these through patrimonialism and extend his stay in power. Not surprisingly, the survival of Mobutu's political career was necessitated by a constant reshuffling, intimidation and dismissal of these political elites. Young and Turner (1985: 396) aver that this political gimmick was successful in weakening state institutions and in the process consolidated etho-nationalist politics and patronage. Furthermore, the routinely dismissal and reshuffling of elites was aimed at accomodating those Congolese awating outside the portals of power. This was because during

[5] Client-patron relationship is the system organized by people of power, who build and keep the loyalty of people of more humble position. Both patrons and clients regard the link between them as a personal attachment similar to the bond of affection holding members of a family or kin group together.

that period ethnicity mutated from the traditional tribal realities to a modern political phenomenon that revolved around the allocation of scarce resources of power (Williame, et. al., 1997: 1). In other words it satnds to reason from this discussion that the leaders focused more on themselves than the nationalist question.

Mobutu's ascendancy to power was as much what was desired as he was a client of Western capitalism, in the ideological rivalry of the Cold War between the United States of America-led (US) capitalism and the Soviet Union's-led (USSR) communism (Meredith 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 144). As a result, for a considerable number of years the US and France, in particular, had been sustaining the autocratic and predatory Mobutu regime through financial and military aid to crush ethno-nationalist movements within the country (Williame, et. al., 1997: 1). However, the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent advent of liberal refoms, saw the decline of the DRC as a value client state of the West's capitalism and the emergence of formidable political opponents to the Mobutu regime (Afoaku, 1997: 129). In response to this Mobutu sought to curb the DRC's vulnerability as a result of international isolation by reinforcing the system of patrimonialism which had sustained him the th years (Afoaku, 1997: 129).

Mobutu vehemently continued to exploit ethnic differences within the emeging opposition camps, collectivelly known as the Sacred Union. The formation of the Union resulted in Mobutu appointing one Entienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, a leader of Kasai based *Union pour la Democratie et le Progress Social* (UPDS) as Prime Minister in September 1991 (Kasai District is located in the Kasai-Occidental province, south-west of the DRC) (Meredith 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 144). Knowing that Tshisekedi was a Luba from eastern Kasia, and a formidable opponent, Mobutu sowed division within the Luba people by using other Luba politicians as his allies and create anti-Luba sentiments aming the other Congolese (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1994: 10). It was therefore not surprising that Tshisekedi was sacked barely after a month and replaced with his staunch opponent Nguza Karl-i-Bond, a Katangese and leader of the *Federalistes Republicains Independents* (UFERI) (French, 1997: 3; Afoaku, 1997; 130). The decision to appoint Karl-i-Bond led to Tshisekedi's expulsion from the Union, leading to a bloody confrontation between his Lunda ethnic supporters and Tshikedi's Luba Kasai's supporters

(Meredith 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 144). From this end one concludes that this further threw the nationalist question and security further into disarray.

4.2.2 Political Reforms that Followed the End of the Cold War

As noted above the end of the Cold War and the global wave of liberal political reforms saw the perpetual existence of the Mobutu regime threatened. The introduction of multi-party politics and political reforms in the DRC saw the emergence of the Sacred Union, a movement that advocated for the repeal of Mobutist laws and legal provisions that were not in the interest of the nation (Mamdani 2001: 245). Amongst perculiar issues raised by the Union was the question of citizenship that mirrored serious ethinic and human security connotations. According to Mamdani (2001: 245) the resolution of the Union's Sovereign National Conferernce (SNC) of 1991 on citizenship assumed an inter-ethnic character where the majority of the Congolese saw themselves as an indigenous majority that had been thretatened by an non-indigenous minority Wanyarwanda[6] group. The question of citizenship had been part of Mobutu's insatiable pursuit for a predatory regime and the total consolidation of power in then Zaïre (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999:5). The impact of Mobutu's efforts are well documented in the previous paragraphs above.

In this regard, in a bid to consolidate power through neutralising nativism to the bottom portals of power, in 1972 Mobutu issued a decree which politically recognised the people of Rwandan origin, the Wanyarwanda as citizens of the republic (Mamdani, 2001: 243). The decree saw the rise of these foreign natives in political and economic strength, subsequently using this advantage to acquire land and favours from indigenous chiefs in the Kivu region. Subsequently, the general peception amongst the natives was that the Tutsi minority from Rwanda were exerting a considerable degree of influence on the Mobutu regime, particulary his Tutsi Chief-of-staff, Bisengimana Rwema (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 5). The situation was aggravated by the General Property Law of 1973, that saw the state transfer settler controlled land to Congolese citizines of which fifty-eight percent of the Wanyarwanda became beneficiaries. This resulted in the congolese hating and becoming violent on the Wanyarwanda, where homes were vandalised and hundreds of people were killed.However, as his power continued to wane Mobutu attempted to ensure survival of his regime through political acumen when he applied the 1981 law on

[6] *Wanyarwanda* [6] are the Congolese-Tutsi of Rwandan Origin.

citizenship as a justification to expell the Wanyarwanda from the republic (Hesselbein, 2007: 40). Unfortunately, the Mobutu regime did not fare any better in trying to circumvent these xenophobic attacks because this was a state sponsored terrorism that was enscapsulated in a xenophobic campaign by authorities in the Kivu region (Hesselbein, 2007: 40).

In retaliation, later in 1991 the Sovereign National Conference adopted the reformed 1981 Citizenship Law as a determinant factor for the future of these foreign natives. The 1981 Citizenship Law stated that only those persons from Rwanda who could demonstrate an ancestral connection to the population residing in the territory then demarcated as DRC in 1885 would qualify to be the citizens of DRC (Hesselbein, 2007: 40; Cindil, 2009: 30). Thus, the conference subsequently excluded a number of ethnic-aligned elite leaders. The Mobutu regime responded by mobilising and embarking on a campaign that assumed an ethnic cleansing character. In North-Kivu Region, between 1992 and 1993, the enduring myths and images of the Banyamulenge as foreigners continued to resonate with most ethnic groups such as the Mai Mai militias (Cindil, 2009: 30). Subesequently the regime managed to flare tensions high between the Wanyarwanda and the Mai Mai militia in a successful attempt to exploit them and gain political leverage. This conflict inevitably led to the mass slaughter of Banyamulenge with an estimated number of 5000 (five thousand) and 300 000 (three hundred thousand) displaced (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1994: 10). This hostility threatened the national security when External armed groups from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi started to enter the country in defence of the Wanyarwanda. Human security became threatened, people lost their home due to vandalisation leading to displacement, jobs were lost and food security became a problem (Mahafha, 200: 69). The logical conclusion is that this further put a damper on hopes for a nationalist goal: nation-building, national and human security as confirmed in the next paragraph.

Following the above, in September 1996, the then South Kivu Deputy-Governor Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji demanded in a radio broadcast that if the Tutsi of Rwandan origin did not leave the DRC within a week they would be exterminated (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 5-6). The result was an implosion of a humanitarian catastrophe where violence and civil strife ensued between the indigenous (the Bahunde and the Banyanga) against the non-indigenous (Hesselbein, 2007: 40). In intervening in the violence, the army units known as the *Garde Civile* (Civil Guard) began

living off the local population because of lack of resources further creating a drawback to national and human security. As a result of the poor civilian and military relations it is estimated that the conflict in the Eastern part of the country claimed ten to twenty thousand lives whilst some 200 000 (two hundred thousand) Bahunde, Tutsi and Hutu were displaced (Hesselbein, 2007: 40; Mamdani, 2001: 253). The bulk of the persecuted Tutsi later became part of the rebel forces of Laurent Kabila who overthrew the Mobutu regime in 1997. The impact was that the Laurent Kabila's regime was shortlived as he was assassinated in January 2001, Kabila accepted the Tutsis (Rwanda)'s assistance to overthrow Mobutu in exchange of him arresting much saught after the *Interahamwe*. However, when he failed to do so Rwanda turned against him, leading to his assasination and ascension of the presidency by his son.

An event which was followed by the emergence of numerous ethnic-based rebel groups which spread across the DRC and unleashed a reign of terror on innocent civilians (Kabemba, 2005: 44; Mahafha, 2009: 22 ; Modiba, 2014: 28). The coup had an negative impact in the DRC's (as mentioned in previous chapters), his toppling brought instability in the country. National and human security became fragile and weak, became the army was weak, armed forces (including foreign ones) started to operate freely without the fear of being arrested, the country became ungovernable and unsafe leading to the collapse of some government departments and human security weakened. People had thought that the removal of Mobutu will bring positive change but it did not do so leavin innocent civilians being affected the most. Kabila had thought that he will be able to govern DRC and that Rwanda and Uganda will leave DRC after the toppling of Mobutu (Mahafha, 2009: 79).

4.2.3 The 'Failed State' of DRC (Zaïre) and Human Security

Zartman (1995: 5) opines that state collapse can be defined as encompassing specific patterns, particulary when the state is paralysed as laws are not made, order is not preserved and societal cohesion is not enhanced. Furthermore, the author states that as a symbol of identity, the state loses its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social actions. As if in support of Zartman, Taras and Ganguly (2015: 211) assert that as a defined territory the state is no longer assured security and that as the authoritative political institution, it would have lost its legitimacy and this legitimacy would be up for grabs. Resultantly the DRC state befits the above

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narrative. The failure of the DRC republic can be located in a multi-faceted consideration that primarily range from the implosion of the economy in the late 1970s and the withdrawal of Western aid in the aftermath of the Cold War (Trautman, 2013: 38).

The end of the Cold War saw the waning relevance of President Mobutu's power against a backdrop of a failed political and economic enviroment that translated the DRC into a failed state. What aggravated the situation was the 1994 Rwandan genocide (discussed in Chapter 2) that claimed the lives of 800 000 (eight hundred thousand) Tutsis at the mercy of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and an organ of Hutu called *Interahamwe* (Meredith, 2005: 253). When the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the Hutu government in July 1994 there was a huge refugee flow comprising at least one million Hutus into eastern DRC's NordKivu region (Trautman, 2013: 38). This exodus was believed to constitute a bulk of *genocidaires* of the FAR and the *Interahamwe* perpetrators of the genocide. The influx of these foreign natives into the eastern part of the DRC saw unprecedented outbreaks of diseases such as Ebola, Cholera and Polio that threatened human security and social security with an estimated death between of 20 000 to 50 000 (twenty to fifty thousand) (Trefon, 2004: 71; Modiba, 2014: 37). This put another damper on efforts to achieve that evasive dream of nation building that is a foundation to national and human security.

Not only did the situation exhibit serious health concerns for the refugees and the natives of the DRC, the influx of these refugees heralded the militarisation of the eastern part of the country where the former Hutu extremists had crossed into the country with weapons, to continue the war effort against the newly established government in Rwanda (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 3). The foreigners with provisions from the Mobutu regime managed to establish an administration in the Kivu region with headquaters at Lac Vert. This was made possible because of prior relations between President Mobutu and President Juvenile Habyarimana of Rwanda before his assasination in 1994 (Trautman, 2013: 38). Furthermore the presence of these extremists disrupted the traditional ethnic setting of the region that had been home to the Banyamulenge, who were Congolese Tutsis (Trefon, 2004: 71).

As a result, the influx of the Hutu extremists exacerbated ethnic friction between them and the Tutsis, thus becoming an epicenter for ethinic related conflicts, where these Hutu extremists went on a launch to slaughter Tutsi citizens and residents of the DRC (Orogun, 2002: 29). The DRC became ungovernable overnight with the increasing activities of Hutu extremists where the Mobutu regime chose to ignore the former's clandstine activities. These armed militias went on from terrorising the Banyarwanda to other locals, mainly the Hunde and Nyanga in Masisi, whom they forcibly took land from (Hotep 2002: 18 ;Kuperman, 2009: 93) . The result was that the eastern parts of the DRC became ungovernable owing due high numbers of displaced people, deaths and civil unrest. This situation threatened to have a spill over effect in neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda whose governments became weary of the national and human insecurity concerns in the DRC and the failure of the Mobutu regime to circumvent such during its reign (Meredith 2005: 531).

4.3 Laurent Kabila and the Politics of Ethnicity: National and Human Security under his Regime

During Laurent Kabila's regime, DRC saw a rise ethnic division and ethnicity as the main motivater of armed groups to be formed and taking part in the war. The support of Rwanda in the toppling and the alliance Laurent Kabila with Interahamwe after the toppling motivated other ethnic groups to form their own rebel groups and take part in the war.

4.3.1 Ethnicity and human security: Repetition without difference.

On May 17 1997, when the Allied Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) under the leadership of laurent Kabila ended the 32 (thrity-two) year predatory regime of Mobutu, the general feeling in the DRC was a beginning of a new political landscape (Ngolet, 2011: 3). Conventional wisdom of the time was that the end of the Cold War had wrought new dimensions in specific features determining the state. Paramount amongst these features were issues relating to human security and good governance in which the Mobutu regime had fared dismally in that regard (Ngolet, 2011: 3). Meanwhile, the international community and regional neighbours of the DRC had become weary of the failure of the Mobutu regime in handling the Eastern DRC question. In addition, when the regime became partakers of the xenophibic attacks on the Tutsi

minority and at the allowed the eastern region to degenerate into lethary as a result of the banditry of Hutu extremists result ininternational alarm (Meredith 2005: 531, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 3). Subsequently, the invasion of the country by the AFDL was an important milestone in the normalisation of the political landscape of the DRC and hope for a new dawn accompanied by nation building, national and human security.

(a) Ethnic myths as a specific feature in the political dynamics of Laurent Kabila

Young (1979: 107) opines that "no serious study on the political evolution of the Congo can neglect the difficult problem of 'tribalism' or what may be referred to as 'ethnicity'. This is one of the major issues that raise a question mark over the very existence of the Congolese entity. True to the present author's sentiments were the features in the political dynamics of Laurent Kabila's DRC (Young, 1979: 107). Existing literature has exhausted the reasons accounting for the downfall of the Mobutu regime and the subsequent ascendance to power of Laurent Kabila (Cindil, 2009: 39; Ngolet, 2011: 3; Carayannis and Weiss, 2003: 259-260)

However, as Young (1979: 107) states above, it is important to underline how Laurent Kabila and the AFDL managed to exploit the ethnic myths and fears that were prevalent within the Banyamulenge as foreigners who faced imminent extermination and expulsion by the former Hutu militias from Rwanda and the Mobutu regime (Cindil, 2009: 39). Kabila managed to capitalise on these political symbolisms to his own advantage as the discussion below shows. It also important to state that following his fall out with the Banyamulenge, and Kabila furthered his political acumen in reinforcing these myths and fears within the people of the DRC through the politics of demonization. Kabila was successful in demonising the Congolese Tutsi as foreigners and land thieves who wanted foreign countries such as Rwanda and Uganda as forces of occupation as shall be discussed in the chapter below (Cindil, 2009: 39). These were the same tactics that were employed by his predecessor Mobutu. To this end, one is bound to say that signs expectations of a new dawn were already dying in the incubation stage.

Flowing from the above the 'march' to free the DRC by the ADFL was chielfy motivated by the politics of ethnicity that seemed to transcend beyond the failure of the Mobutu regime, to

encompass transnational appeals in cultivating Ugandan and Rwandan interests as accessoried to the 'march' (Kabemba, 2005: 45). The march to "free" the Congo from Mobutu's rule was backed by Rwanda and Uganda whose prerogative were national security concerns, as discussed in previous chapters. Rwanda's primary interest was to end the ring of ex-Hutu FAR soldiers and *Interahamwe* militias that threatened the Tutsi government in Kigali (Meredith, 2005: 534). Furthermore, Uganda's objective was to remove Mobutu from his dictatorship since who for a long time he had been aiding rogue militias such as the LRA in destabilising the country (Carayannis and Weiss, 2003: 259-260). However, it was unforseen that when Kabila's ADFL forces began their march on DRC soil one of the disastrous crisis in the world was about to unfold (Meredith , 2005: 534). The harbinger was there for everyone to see since the march was marred by recruitment of child soldiers, the *kadongo*[7], who were reduced to targeting an estimated 500 000 (five hunred and thousand) Hutu refugees desperate for sanctuary (Carayannis and Weiss, 2003: 259-260). Overnight the army for the liberation of the DRC had degenerated into a lethargy, the prerogative of whichwas predicated on the politics of ethnicity rather than the political liberation of the country (Meredith , 2005: 534). It is from this premise that Kabila's promise for a liberated and democratic DRC was doomed to slide into a maze where they would forlong time remain a pipedream for the majority Congolese.

(b) Kabila's failure in halting the killing and displacement of Hutu refugees

To support the above, facts on the ground were that a large constituency of the AFDL army, the Banyamulenge and Rwandan Tutsi were systematically killing Hutu refugees who were fleeing the east of the country into numerous places in the western and central parts of the country (Ngolet, 2011: 3). In this regard a trail of death began to emerge, in camps in the Kivu provinces, stretching to the Equator and Katanga provinces, as most Hutu refugees were rounded in camps Conclusively, therefore, the second Congo war was as a result of Kabila's lack of political skills in halting systematic killings stemming from ethno based politics that were captured by the AFDL, where they were shot and sometime finished off with knives Ngolet (2011: 3). True to what this author assrets, Kabila's ascendence to power had been at the behest of Rwandan Tutsis and the Banyamulenge whose animosity with the Hutu had prompted a rebellion against the

[7] *Kadongo*- A word for child soldiers

Mobutu regime. As a result the march on Kinshasa in 1997 was aimed at punishing the Mobutu regime for providing safe haven to the Hutu and systematically contain Hutu influence in the main stream politics of the country (Meredith , 2005: 534). The end result was the inevitable massacre of the Hutu under Kabila's watch in settlements such as Mbandaka where over 2000 (two thousand) Hutus were killed. It is, therefore, not surprising that Kabila was indecisive to protect the Hutu, since he was in a position of power as president because he was a benefactor of the Tutsi and Banyamulenge domestic policy in the DRC. Predictably, the only thing he did was to shift the blame on Rwanda's foreign policy in the country at the time. It is therefore not surprising that the Kabila government tried by all means to block the investigations by the UN into the killings and human insecurity of the Hutu (Ngolet 2011: 3). The reasons for this blockade lay in the importance of the Banyamulenge and the Tutsi to his survival and that of his regime against the threats of the ex Mobutu remnants.

(c) Intertnational Response to Human Security

The response of the international community e to the invasion of the DRC by the AFDL and the subsequent human insecurity caused was divided. The UN and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was silent on the invasion that descended on the country was deemed as a rebellion and not targetted ethnic cleansing even by the international media (Carayannis and Weiss, 2003: 261). Be that as it may, the French government, through Foreign Minister Herve Charette, lamented the situaution to be "perhaps the most disastrous humanitarian crisis the world has seen" (Meredith, 2005: 534). The statement was an insight into the French's foreign policy in the GLR which was predicated on ethnic politics with its unwavering support for the Hutu and, during the Cold War, the dictator as well as ethnic cleanser, Mobutu. The international community, particulary France, was slow to act in the wake of a genocide in Rwanda because of France's role as an accessory to the crime, having trained the genocidal machine, *Interahamwe* (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 3). Thus the targeted slaughter of Hutu ethnic people by the AFDL prompted France to emphasis on the catastrophe as a pretext for military intervention in a bid to save the Mobutu regime from being removed from power (Kabemba, 2005:45 ; Mahafha, 2009: 33). It is against this background that it is necessary to understand how ethnicity has been an important factor in shaping the politics of the GLR, and the DRC in particular, as this was a determinant factor in the execution of France's foreign policy.

4.3.2 Laurent Kabila's regime 1997-2001

This objective of the discussion of the DRC under the Laurent Kabila regime is to examine the influence of ethnicity in the country's political landscape. It will also cover national and human security challenges facing the DRC due to manipulated ethnic differences that fuelled conflict. It also aims to outline the impact of ethnic-influenced conflict in the country. This emanates from the premise that ethnicity has made the DRC face serious national and human security challenges to date. Human security lays emphasis on the security of the people, while recognising the importance of state security and the government. Poor civil-military relations, the politics of exclusion, a weak civil society and the problem of failed state all represent the challenges of human security under the regime of Laurent Kabila (Omar, 2000:9). Human security is the combination of threats associated with war, genocide and the displacement of populations.

(a) The DRC and politics of exclusion

Authors Meredith (2005: 537), Ngolet (2011: 3) as well as Carayannis and Weiss (2003: 261) are of the view that Kabila was a politician who assumed power without any political skills to govern the country and as a result did not have any political vision for the country. Resultantly Kabila went from elevating the hopes of the people of the DRC to a fervored pitch, but only to dash them with similar political features of the former Mobutu regime. In buttressing this fact on the 10th of September 1998, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) (a political party), an inevitable result of Kabila's misrule, published a document accusing the Kabila regime of all sorts of political misdeeds, in the city of Goma in the DRC (RCD, 1999: 35). Accordingly, Kabila was accused of narrowing the political space in the country through the politics of ethnic exclusion and as a client of the Tutsi and Banyamulenge, who were believed to be directing the affairs of the country (Meredith, 2005: 537).

The growing resentment in the country that eventually led to what is termed the Second Congo War had its roots in the domestic politics the Kabila regime exercised. For example, in 1997 Kabila announced the banning of all political parties and political activities in the province of Kisangani (Meredith, 2005: 537). Furthermore, he announced the formation of the transitional

government which was aimed at reflecting the dawn of a democratic new state. However, Kabila went on to narrow the political space in the country by stating that the new government would not include politicians and members of the previous Mobutu regime (Meredith, 2005: 537). This political decision meant excluding formidabble figures such as Etienne Tshisekedi of the UPDS in the future of the DRC politics. This flew in the face of the objective of a transitional which is formed on the premise of a new dawn which pivoted around reconciliation, unity and a democratic dispensation.

Furthermore, Kabila went on a campaign of consolidating his political power through partimonalism, typical of Mobutu's political acumen before him (Kabemba, 2005: 45). In the same fashion Kabila's regime became an ethnocratic state where the Banyamulenge, Tutsi and the Lubakat, his ethnic tribe, became influential in the portals of power (Ngolet, 2011: 11), again reminiscent of Mobutu's days. To shed light on this the army chief of staff, James Kabarebe was a Rwandan Tutsi who was deputised by Joseph Kabila, the son of the Kabila. The person in charge of the exterior security of the army, Colonel Albert Moleka, was a Lubakat and a close relative of Kabila, whilst the police was headed by Celestin Kifwa from Katanga. The Presidential Security Guard comprising of 6000 (six thousand) forces that were Lubakat, was headed by Celestin Kifwa's son Ango Ango (RCD ,1999: 36; Meredith, 2005: 538; Ngolet, 2011: 13). From this short discussion it becomes evident that Kabilawastravelling the samepath that led to the fall of his predecessor sincebot put paid to the prospects of reconciliation, nation building, national and human security.

(b) The resurgence of ethnic myths: The Second Congo War

The above discussion points to a central feature: ethnicity was very influential in the political landcsape of the DRC since the invasion by the AFDL, the removal of Mobutu and the ascendence of Laurent Kabila to the echelons of power in Kinshahsa in 1997. The constituency of the AFDL primarily consisted of elements that had been pushed outside the portals of the political, economic and social landscape of the DRC as a result of ethinicity (Autesserre, 2010: 145). Even though each entity that made up the AFDL alliance had a common anti-Mobutu discourse, the alliance in reality was not united . Each of the entities had its own agenda,

especially the Banyamulenge and the Tutsi. An example can be drawn from the status of the Tutsi and Banyamulenge in the eastern part of the country, who under the Mobutu regime wre excluded and thus decided to form the bulk of the AFDL forces to secure a place in the post-Mobutu DRC, as it happened (ICG, 1999: 4; Inside Story: 2015/10/11). As stated above, the Kabila regime constituted largely of foreign nationals, the Banyamulenge and the Tutsi of Rwandan, something that did not sit well with the rest of the ethnic groups in the country. As a result the exclusion of these foreign ethnic groups was seen as politics of ethnic marginalisation and a threat to citizenship. Thus these groups went on to create the RCD, drawing sympathy from ethnic groups that had been purged by the Laurent Kabila regime and in th process posed further challenges to the questionof national and human security (Cindil, 2009: 36).

Through out the country ethnicity became the prinicple paradigm with which the Congolese used to explain the wars and thus inculcated ethnic prejudices amongst the citizenry. The Congolese blamed the Banyamulenge for trying to turn the country into a third republic of Uganda and Rwanda. In response to this the Kabila regime embarked on the crudest mission to mobilise the Congolese people to rally behind its project of thwarting the threat of the Banyamulenge in a war that was seen as the 'Banyamulenge war' (Autesserre, 2010: 145). This intensified campaign against the Tutsi was typical of that of the Mobutu era. On the 27th of July 1998 at the exploitation of the circumstances, Laurent Kabila expelled all foreigners in the army and at the same time saught sanctuary and military assistence by forming an alliance with the *Interahamwe* in his quest to defeat the Tutsi rebel groups (Cindil, 2009: 36).

The Banyamulenge war waged by Kabila led to the Congolese Tutsi uprising in the east of the country on the 2nd of August 1998, resulting in the massacre, torture and imprisonment of the Tutsi militias: the pretext to which the Rwanda and Uganda's invasion of the DRC was predicated on (Kabemba, 2005: 45). Be that as it may, the Kabila regime continued waging its campaign of expoiting myths in the politics of ethnicity against the symbolic expression of the Tutsi, to increase the moral of military activities among locals. This was well captured by the *New York Times, French* (1998: 1) which asserted that Kabila "turned out thousands of volunteers in recent days for what he says will be a 'long and popular war' against a Rwandan-backed rebellion". Thus, the rise of the Banyamulenge and the subsequent formation of the RCD

was guided by ethnic fears and tensions. They feared that since Laurent Kabila has now formed alliance wit the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* they are not safe anymore hence forming RCD. Below follows a discussion on the conflict that followed Kabila's removal of Rwandan Tutsis in the army and how it inflamed the Banyamulenge war.

(c) The conflict in the Ituri region

The conflict that broke out in the Ituri region in 1999, was part of the larger Second Congo War that broke out in 1998. Ituri region is located in the north-eastern part of the DRC and borders the North Kivu region, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Garreton, 2006: 13). The conflict mirrored various specific features such as the involvement of local polarised ethnic groups such as the Hema and Lendu; the presence and activities of Uganda as an accesory to the crime; the failure of the Congolese state to halt foreign intervention in the country's internal affairs and the inevitable death toll resulting from the afore-mentioned features of the conflict (Reyntjens, 2001: 312; Garreton, 2006: 14). In this regard, Ituri ended up being described as the bloodiest corner of the country, where armed groups committed crimes against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian and human rights on a massive scale (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 1).

To corroborate this, Garreton (2006: 13-14) further accounts for the conflict in this troubled region in an effort to understand the origin, nature and perhaps the involvement of Uganda as an accessory to human insecurity in that region. The author adds that the Ituri region is home to four major ethnic groups, the Bantus (Babira), the Nilotes (Alur and Hemas) originally from Uganda, the Sudanese Lendus and the Twa of Rwanda and Burundi (Kaufman, 2001: 36). This regional ethnic constituency is said to be the basis of the conflict and human insecurity in the region as expressed by a team of Ugandan legal experts at the International Court of Justice: "the DRC... distorts the historical context of the Hema-Lendu conflict. The truth of the matter is that the conflict between the Lendu and the Hema peoples is deeply rooted, predates the current conflict, and is intimately entwined with issues of distribution of political and economic powers between them" (Garreton, 2006: 13-14). It is therefore important to underline that the fact that the emergence of armed militia was made possible because of the existing dichotomy between these ethnic groups as shall be discussed below.

(d) The involvement of polarised ethnic groups in the Ituri conflict

Enerst Wamba dia Wamba and his *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD) led the DRC war that broke out in 1998 against the government of President Laurent Kabila (Kaufman, 2001: 36). Conventional wisdom and divisions within the RCD would later attest to the fact that ethnicity is a strong determinant in shaping the politics within the DRC. In the Ituri region the relations between armed militias and ethnic groups, particulary the Lendu and Hema, became a specific feature of politics (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5). In 1999, the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation* (RCD-ML) was formed as a splinter group of the original RCD and subsequently moved from Kisangani to Bunia city in Ituri region in the Orientale province (eastern part of the DRC). Furthermore, a rift developed between the RCD-ML leader Enerst Wamba dia Wamba and Mbusa Nyamwisi (a member of RCD-ML who later formed Forces for Renewal Political party) who sought to oust the former in political contestation that lasted for a year (Kaufman, 2001: 36). The contestation was equeally predicated on ethnic politics, were both parties sought to win the loyalties of ethnic groups in the Ituri region. As such, Wamba dia Wamba sought to win the loyalty of the Lendu against Nyamwisi who had the support of the Hema.

Nyamwisi eventually triumphed, and thus was elevated to the echelons of power in the RCD-ML and the Ituri Province. The triumph of Nyamwisi, of Nande origin, saw the return of Mobutu's political acumen at play within one ethnic side against the other for the consolidation of political power and control (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 4). Nyamwisi began to foster ties with his former advesaries, the Lendu, in the process distancing himself from the Hema. These developments saw the appoinment of a Jean-Pierre Molondo Lompondo, an outsider, as governor of Ituri and leader of the RCD-ML forces (Garreton 2006: 13-14). This domestic policy had the effect of limiting the power of the Hema because the leader of the RCD-ML forces, Thomas Lubanga, was Hema and had been a kingpin in ensuring Nyamwisi triumph against Wamba dia Wamba. The latest rift which was also influenced by the politics of ethnicity, led to dissatisfication amongst the Hema, the subsequent assassination of Nyamwisi's bodyguard and the emergence of factionalised militias within the RCD-ML. The result was that the situation implanted ethnic fear, security dilemma and eventually conflict in Ituri.

(e) The Ituri conflict: The resultant ethnic fears and security dilemma

The differences that existed between the Hema and Lendu need to be amplified with the aid of the theoretical explanation of Kaufman's theory of ethnic fears as an impetus to conflict, which (2001: 32) argues that apart from myths and perceptions of ethnic groups of each other there must also exist certain ethic fears and opportunities in which to mobilise and fight. Futhermore, in dissecting the conflict in the Ituri between Lubanga and Nyamwisi forces, the author predicates this on what is referred to as an ethnic security dilemma. Ethnic security dilemma is a situation where either of the two hostile groups who are willing to confront each other employ radical threatening brinkmanship methods to "pursue its own security defined as dominance" resulting in war (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 4).

Based on the above, as the conflict between the Hema and Lendu became more bitter, each group turned to propaganda and ethnic myths to justify its cause. This resulted in cultivating the fear that there was a strong connection among the Lendu, *Interahamwe* and the Uganda rebels which were in the process of perpetrating a genocide of the magnitude of the one that took place in 1994 in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 18). Furthermore, Nyamwisi's actions, which resulted in fostering close ties with the Lendu at the expense of the Hema, cultivated some sense of fear in the latter that the Hema's security as an ethnic group was threatened in the Ituri province. On the other hand, the Lendu sought to establish and maintain their security in the region through aligning themselves with the RCD-ML a situation that led to more security dilemma for the two opposed groups (Kaufman, 2001: 36).

As a result, *Armee Populaire Congolaise* (APC) emerged in support of Nyamwisi against the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) which supported Lubanga (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5). The rift between the APC and the UPC as well as the emergence of factionalised militias drew support from ethnic groups, and thus resulting in a war that claimed thousands of lives. The fighting pitted Lubanga, who drew support from the locally-based Hema against Nyamwisi, of Lendu origin (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 4). On the 8th of August 2002 the UPC forces attacked Ndoromo training camp in Bunia with an estimated 1200 (one thousand two hundred) Lendu combatants. The fighting resulted in the displacement of many Lendu families, with the

result that attacks from both sides killed innocent civilians of either Lendu or Hema ethnic groups in neighbourhoods such as Mudzi Pela, Saio and Rwambudzi (Kaufman, 2001: 36 ; Reyntjens, 2001: 312). The study looks at this as an example of a violent event that saw innocent people losing their lives, the meager livelihoods and property, thus translating into threat to human security.

(f) The involvement of Uganda in the politics of the Ituri region

The presence of Uganda in the DRC has been variously described as either meddling in the affairs of the DRC or Uganda painted as an accessory to the war crimes within the country (Danssaert and Thomas, 2005: 7). It is for this reason that the military involvement of Kampala has to be looked at as fuelling ethnic politics, thus subsequently escalating human insecurity in the Northern eastern part of the country. The presence of Uganda has been referred to as military commercialism and was thus shooting down the argument by authorities from Kampala that it was a peacemaker in the region (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 6). Military commercialism is described as a situation where a powerful state deploys the military in a conflict ridden country, either in support of a government or opposition in exchange for access to resources (Dietrich, 2000: 48). In this case the military involvement of Uganda was seen as providing political and military support to local militias although in the process it constitituted a grave violation of international law (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 2). Thus the activities of Uganda dovetailed into the satellization of the eastern parts of the DRC, the Ituri Province, in a bid to control rich mineral resources such as gold (Danssaert and Thomas, 2005: 6). Furthermore, these activities have seen Ugandan labelled as enterprenures of insecurity where the instability and state decay of the DRC is more profitable than peace and security (Reyntjens, 2001: 312). Conflict made it easy for Uganda to exploit DRC's mineral resources. Uganda trained and supplied the rebels with armament in exchange of minerals.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and insecurity in the DRC attested to the fact that: "The Ugandan occupation of the Ituri region has led to conflict between the Bahema (of Ugandan origin) and the Balendu, who have been in the region longer. With support from the Ugandan soldiers, the authorities appointed by them and RCD/ML, the Bahema, have seized land from the Balendu who have no support. Except for some incidents in 1911, 1923 and 1955, these

two ethnic groups had lived without major difficulties for nearly three centuries", (UN Special Rapporteur, 2000: 5). The revelations by the "Rapporteur" was an indication of the ochestrated violent activities of Uganda in the sovereign DRC, which resulted in creating a satellite state in Ituri, translating into a state within a state, and military commercialism, which amounted to the looting of the resources of another state theorugh undiplomatic means. This was so because Uganda was involved in the training of ethnic based militias, shaping the politics of the region.

Flowing from the above it becomes evident that the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) manipulated existing ethnic differences in the region of Ituri, especially between the Lendu and Hema. Evidence brought forward was that securocrats at the elechons of the UPDF, namely one General James Kazini and Colonels Anthony Kyakabale and Joseph Arocha assisted in training different Hema militia while Colonel Peter Karim was responsible for arming Lendu militias (Danssaert and Thomas, 2005: 7). The training and arming of these militias saw the Uganda forces encouraging the Hema to grab land from the Lendu, this inevitably resulted in a clash between the two ethnic tribes and a loss of nearly 10 000 (ten thousand) lives and the displacement of approximately 50 000 (fifty thousand) people (Garreton, 2006: 15). As mentioned above Uganda saw the hostility between the Lendu and Hema as an opportunity for it to profit.

Apart from arming ethnic militia, Uganda was actively involved in shaping the politics of Ituri, as a kingpin in the fall out between Wamba dia Wamba and Nyamwisi, that saw the victory of the latter and his ascendence to the portals of power in the RCD-ML (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 6). Furthermore, Uganda intervened in the local adminstration of the region in establishing a neo-province, Kibali-Ituri in 1999, subsequently dismssing governors such as Jean-Pierre Molondo Lompondo, and appointing puppets of Kampala. It is believed that on the 9th of August 1999 the Ugandan army killed 45 (forty-five) civilians in attacks on the residences of Governor Lompondo, resulting in him and other officials fleeing (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 5). Even after the departure of the governor, the Ugandan Army's ally, the UPC, continued with a series of attacks, killing the Lendu, Nande and Bira civilians. Resultantly, the region of Ituri became a quagmire of violence fuelled by the presence of Uganda as an army of occupation and a looting state. Throughout its presence in the DRC, Uganda never admitted any wrongdoing, to

UNIVERSITY OF VENDA

the violation of international law or as an accessory to the crime (Reyntjens, 2001: 312). Uganda was perpectuating the war leading to innocentcent civillians suffering more. On the contrary the Ugandan army justified its presence in the DRC as aimed at maintaining peace that would be compromised with its departure. As a result on the 15th April 2003, Ugandan Army Brigadier Kale Kayihura lamented that: "There are indicators of possible genocide if the UPDF leaves the area without an effective peace-keeping force and administartion. The savage killings in Drodro area in the Orientale province are a reminder to the international community to stop genocide before it reaches arlarming levels". Some of the killings took place in hospitals were civilian had gone to get some medical help (Garreton, 2006: 15).

(g) The response of the government to the conflict

The conflict in the Ituri region came at a time when the Kinshasa government and its state institutions had dismally failed to decisively and effectively deal with the imapct of the conflict on ordinary Congolese as well as enhance societal cohesion, as a symbol of national identity (Dietrich, 2000: 48). The situation led to the random emergence of armed militias concentrated in the eastern part of the country. Furthermore, as a result of this political and institutional vacuum the sovereignty of the country was severely compromised with the activities of Uganda as an accesory to the crimes, thus in the process compromising national and human security. In essence th crux of the matter was that the Kinshasa government had failed to assure national and human security in the easstern part of the country (Taras and Ganguly, 2015: 212). The result was that armed militias such as the RCD-ML and the Mai Mai had managaed to create a state within state in the Ituri, a political reality that came at a cost and loss of human life.

4.4 The Government as an Accessory to Ethnic violence

Cindil (2009: 38) maintains that ethnic fears between two opposed groups dictate the mobilisation of these groups to fight for the attainment of incompatible goals that are referred to as security. Thus, the fear of extinction and competiton for resources between the Hema and Lendu created a security dilemma in the region of Ituri that saw the government of the DRC supplying the RCD-ML's APC and the Lendu and Ngiti with weapons as well as training against the growing influence of Lubanga's UPC (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 9). The government was

trying to use major ethnic groups like the Lendu to fight off other small ethnic groups. the government thought that it will also help in removing Uganda's in the region.

4.4.1 The ascendance of Joseph Kabila to power: national security and human security

Following the assassination of Laurent Kabila on the 16th of January 2001, he was succeeded by Joseph Kabila, his son, as president of the DRC by default (Hesselbein, 2007: 43). Joseph Kabila's abrupt rise to the protals of power was against the background that the country was de facto split into three vast territories: the Ugandan aligned territory, the Rwandan aligned territory and the Government controlled territory (Hesselbein, 2007: 43). After more than 32 (thirty-two) years of mismanagement by the Mobutu regime, the first Congo War of 1996 and the war of 1997 almost wiped out any existing institutions of governance and as a result, the country was unable to offer any type of security to its citizens (Reyntijens, 1999: 248). The result was that security dilemma became the order of the day as the country descended into warlordism that swept across the country. Warlordism led to the creation of numerous shadow states within the metropolitan state of the DRC, especially in the eastern part of the country (Hesselbein, 2007: 43). Amidst all this, the economy implored and resulted in an informal economy that was characterised by the taxation on the local people by armed rebel groups who were plundering the vast mineral resources of the country (Reyntijens, 1999: 248).

4.4.2 The political context in 2001

The assassination and the subsequent exit of Laurent Kabila from the political scene of the DRC and the ascendance of Joseph Kabila to power came at a time when the international community, particulary USA, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were convinced that Kabila the senior was the cause of the problem, as he supposedly provided safe haven for the *genocidaires*, the Hutu militia (Kabemba and Kibasomba, 2003: 2). Before his assassination a medition or peace talks were held under the leadership of South africa. The Lusaka Peace Accord, signed on the 10th of July 1999 by Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe (the major foreign actors in the crisis within the DRC), aimed at finding an immediate resolution to the conflict, was viewed by the Kabila regime as undermining its legitimacy and elevating the status of the rebels to that of the DRC government (Reyntjens, 2001: 314). The basis of Kabila's regime was that the

Rwandan Tutsis and the Banyamulenge, who formed the bulk of the rebel groups had orchestrated the war in an effort to balkanise the country and its resources (De Koning, 2010: 5). As a result, the possibility of an Inter-Congolese dialogue envisaged to bring all the parties to the conflict together was subsequently stalled by the views the Kabila regime on the rebels (Kabemba, 2005: 47).

On January 26 2001, Joseph Kabila made his first major speech as president which was seen as a careful construction designed to accommodate all belligerent forces that were part of the DRC conflict (Reyntjens, 2001: 314). The young president went from pledging the withdrawal of foreign troops yet in the same vein acknowledging his foreign allies Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for their role in as such insisted on an all inclusive dialogue and the respect for human rights and freedoms. He also reiterated the support for the UN Observers' Missions in the DRC and lastly the total liberation of the country (Kabemba and Kibasomba, 2003: 2). In as much as the speech was an all inclusive and a promise of a new political dispensation in the DRC, the legacy of the Mobutu regime, the nature of the Laurent Kabila regime and the impact of the civil war had deeply entrenched itself in the political and, of course, social life of the country such that it was difficult to imagine an overnight constructed road to a reconciliatory and an inclusive DRC (Reyntjens, 2001: 314).

4.4.3 The politics of ethnicity in the Joseph Kabila regime

Flowing from the discussions from the previous chapters, this section argues that as a result of King Leopold II's colonial policies that amplified ethinc identity, a determinant factor in inter-ethnic relations of various ethnic groups within the DRC, its became a hallmark in the Mobutu and both Kabilas regimes. The Belgian colonial rule saw the introduction of patrimonalism as a divide and rule tactic which saw Belgium prioritising some groups at the expense of the others in a bid to exploit the natural wealth of the DRC for th benefit of the colonial regime (Cindil, 2009: 25). The result was that this became a legacy in the Mobutu and Kabilas' regimes, respectively, where ethnicity mutated from the traditional realities to a modern phenomenon that evolved around the accumulation of scarce resources by those in positions of power (Reyntjens, 2001: 314). However, as a result, the beginning of the inter-Congolese diaolgue, as a follow up to the

Lusaka Peace Agreement, and other talks that aimed at creating a sustainable political enviroment, saw the birth of a transitional government on the 30th of June 2003 (Wolters, 2004: 2). The government constituted elements from the Kabila regime, the Rwandan backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) and the Ugandan backed MLC (Hale, 2009: 24). However, with the inception of the transitional government, important issues that would otherwise enable the normalisation of the political economic and social situation in the country, were severely stalled (Wolters, 2004: 2). Important issues such as reforming and creating a national army, the appointment of governors, a constitution and the application of the rule of law, were marred by deep seated suspcions which emanated from ethnic myths and ideological differences (Wolters, 2004: 2).

Therefore, it would be fair to argue further that the *Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie* or People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) of President Joseph Kabila did not fare any better in creating a sustainable political environment within the DRC. Henchmen from the previous Laurent Kabila regime seemed uninterested in forming a transitional government with armed rebels such as the RCD-G (Dietrich, 2000: 48). For example, key figures such as Augustine Mwanke, a Balubakat, former governor of Katanga and Minister for Security from both Kabila regimes was dissatisfied with having to share power with former rebel movements (BBC Online News, 2002: 1). In the same vein other key powerful figures such as Samba Kaputo, the presidential adviser to President Joseph Kabila on security and Evariste Boshab the president's chief of staff (under President Joseph Kabila) were also resistant to sharing power with their adversaries (http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v16n3p09.htm). This resulted in this group creating parallel structures which allowed them to continue to exert different influences over the tripartite alliance. As a result, this spelled doom to the objectives and significance of the transitional government that ordinary Congolese desperately needed to ensure the establishment of an atmosphere of national building as well as national and human security. It is in this context that the challenge of ethnicity affinity that faced Kabila's government during the formation process of the transitional Congolese armed forces is discussed below.

4.4.4 Ethinicity as a source of insecurity within the Forces Armees de la Congo (FAC)

As part of the transitional process, the reintegration and formation of the national army mainly forces from the tripartite alliance of RCD-G, MLC and the pre-transitional Joseph Kabila's government were considered based on what was referred to as nation-wide consensus (Hale, 2009: 24). The main aim of the transitional government was to address issues related to the security dilemma in various constituencies across the country in which the belligernt leaders of these forces were still in control. However, the legacy of ethnic exclusion and patrimonialism of Mobutu's and the two Kabilas' regimes as well as the impact of the civil war were deeply entenched in the country's political situation on the ground such that efforts to integrate forces from diverse ideological and political backgrounds could not easily transcend into a single unitary armed force (Wolters, 2004: 2). Central to the heart of this inability to integrate the national army was the national question in the eastern DRC. Regarding the future of the Banyamulenge and the Tutsi Congolese, the eastern DRC national question had become a banner on which politics within the country were predicated on. In other words, in the absence of reconciliation and putting the national question before ethnic interests such could not be achieved. Unfortunately, the bulk of the FAC constituted forces of the former rebel forces of RCD-G and MLC, that were the perpetrators of the rebellion against the Laurent Kabila regime in 1997 (http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v16n3p09.htm). Therefore, conventional wisdom dictated that they would remained loyal to the political character of the eastern part of the country than to the Kinshasa government.

Thus, the appointment of military commanders for the country's eleven military zones which the tripartite alliance was negotiating extensively revolved around retaining commanders loyal to each group in order to continue controlling their respective constituencies (Dietrich, 2000: 48). For example the appointment of General Prosper Nabiolwa, a former officer in the Mobutu army, in Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, did not sit well with the Tutsis and the Banyamulenge who felt that the appointment of a member of the Mobutu regime created a security dilemma. The argument advanced by the Tutsis and Banyamulenge was that their perpetual existence relied on the fact that the regime had embarked on a project aimed at exterminating them (Wolters, 2004: 2). As a result, when General Nabiolwa attempted to disarm Major Ilunga Kasongo who he had arrested after it was discovered that he had stashed an arms cache, it did not sit well with the

RCD-G. The former rebel group quiclky threatened to pull out of the tripartite alliance if Major Kasongo was not released and thus putting the transitional arrangement into disarray. Consequentially, fearing this eventual threat President Kabila inevitably allowed the return of Major Kasongo to Bukavu. This led to serious clashes between General Nabiolwa and his second in command, Colonel Mutebutsi. This situation led to the death of a number of civilians in the city (Hale, 2009: 24).

Flowing from the above, therefore, it should be evident that the eastern DRC question dominated the DRC's since the politics of ethnicity was a source of the militarisation of politics and the subsequent clashes between armed forces that eventually led to massive human insecurity Wolters, 2004: 3). To aggravate the situation, the legacy of the two previous regimes before the transitional government had succeeded in enthrenching ethnic tensions, security dilemmas and mistrust such that it was evident that fault lines would outlive the transitional government. As if that was not enough, in May 2003 dissident troops led by the outlaw General Laurent Nkunda joined forces with Colonel Mutebusi to capture the town of Bukavu (Wolters, 2004: 3).

General Nkunda argued that the move, to join forces and subsequently capture the town of Bukavu, was to prevent atriocities against the Banyamulenge from being committed by government forces (Wolters, 2004: 2). In contrast, however, the attack on the city led to the eventual loss of the lives of more than 100 (hundred) and the displacement of several thousand people in a war between the government and Nkunda forces (Wolters, 2004: 2). It is, therefore, important to understand the reaction of the government which reacted by deploying a force of more than 10 000 (ten thousand) under General Obed Wabasira and issuing warrants of arrest for Nkunda and Mutebisi. However, what was problematic was that some revelations were of the opinion that General Obed was in a dilemma because his loyalty to the government was questionable. This implied that General Obed himself was closely involved in the rebellion and that he rallied his troops to Nkunda (Wolters, 2004: 3).

4.4.5 The 2006 National Elections

Regardless of the tragedy of the Mobutu regime and the violent last years of the DRC history under the two Kabilas, the transitional government, along with the Independent Electoral

Commissiion (CEI) organised the first credible national elections in forty years in 2006 (Hale, 2009: 30). Ngoy-Kangoy (2007: 219-220) is of the opinion that the DRC electorate is known for its ambiguous and paradoxical behaviour where ethnicity plays a determining role in the choice of leader. Thus the time for elections was a moment of rift between the history of the country and its present, in which the question of ethnic identity always lingers and is expressed in different ways. Resultantly, the outcome of the elections illuminated an important feature in the history of the country. The RCD and its leader at the time Azarias Ruberwa, widely seen as allies of foreign countries, especially during the Rwandan aggression in the 1998 war, suffered a huge defeat in the 2006 elections, only managing to garner 15 (fifteen) seats in the national assembly (Ngoy-Kangoy 2007: 227). In contrast, Kabila garnered 58, 05 % (fifty-eight comma zero five percent) of the votes against Jean Pierre Bemba's 41, 95% (forty-one comma ninety-five percent). In this context, it is important to note that the number of votes were determined by whether the area was under government control or the occupation by armed militias (Ngoy-Kangoy 2007: 227).

However, Carayannis (2008: 12) opines that during the first round voting process, ordinary Congolese voted overwhelmingly against those who ruled them during the war because in the eastern DRC, for example, they went against the RCD and MLC authorities whereas in the West, Congolese voted against Kabila. The explanation can be found in the historic ethnic myths andsecurity dilemma that became a permanent feature in the political dynamics of the country. Most DRC citizens had come to view the war as a Banyamulenge war against the foreigners, the Congolese Tutsis, because they felt that they were in a grand coalition with Rwanda and Uganda in trying to balkanise the state (Carayannis 2008: 12). Regardless of this, the decision by Kabila to form a transitional government with the RCD-G and MLC was regarded as a betrayal of unimaginable proportions while the people of the eastern DRC, the Banyamulenge, felt betrayed by their rebel leaders. The main reason for this mistrust was because they had formed a transitional government with a former regime that sought to exterminate them from within the country (Ngoy-Kangoy, 2007: 231). Furthermore, the rift between the west and east was a factor that accounted for the outcome of the elections. The choices of the voters in 2006 national elections were essentially based on ethnic identity and alliance. The dichotomy between the Swahili-speaking east and the Lingala-speaking west was evident where in Kinshasa voting

patterns against leaders from the Eastern DRC were evident in 1960 for Lumumba and in 2006's Kabila (Ngoy-Kangoy, 2007: 231).

4.4.6 The DRC's political situation from 2006 to 2013

The election of Joseph Kabila to presidency in 2006 saw the emergence of the Third Republic in the DRC. The Third Republic was characterised by a shrinking political space witin the country (Hale, 2009: 29). The opposition, especially the supporters of Bemba and the MLC, were systematically intimidated and harrased by state security agents (Carayannis, 2008: 13). In 2007, for example, members of the religious sect, *Bundu dia Kongo*, protested against the appointment of a pro-Kabila governor in the Bas District. The protest was met with deadly force by the government's security sector and this led to the Bas DRC massacres (Ngoy-Kangoy, 2007: 231). These were followed by the government's decision to demobilise and demilitarise the former vice-presidents of the militias and th passing of other repressive laws aimed at weakening opposition factions in the country. The end result was that there were regular confrontations between the government and the oposition especially Bemba's MLC (Gil, 2012: 2).

As an act of consolidating his political power as president of the DRC, Kabila was re-elected in the late 2011 polls with 48, 95% (forty-eight comma nine five). However, there were rejections of the election results of 2001 from parts of the international community, especially the Euopean Union (EU), who claimed that the elections were not credible and in reflective of the will of the Congolse (Gil, 2012: 2). Amidst this loss of international legitimacy, Kabila changed policies, especially in the eastern DRC, and announced his intentions to arrest the renegade General Bosco Ntaganda who was wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2006. Kabila had previously considered General Ntaganda as an important part of the peace process in the country (Hale, 2009: 115). General Ntaganda had managed to integrate his forces, the CNDP, into the DRC's national army so as to halt the ethnic polarised national army in a historic 23 March 2009 agreement between the government and the rebel group. Furthermore, the parliamentary elections of 2011 that were hoped to bring the CNDP into politics were declared nulled-and-void in Masisi, a CNDP stronghold. This eventualy led to the defection of General Ntaganda and the formation of the M23 rebels, who were quick to take control of the Rutshuru

District in North Kivu, which was unfortunately later marred by summary executions, rapes and forced recruitments of the civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2012: 1).

4.5 National and Human Security Challenges in the DRC, 1996-2013

National Security deals with traditional concepts of security, which focus on defending borders from external military threats and attack (Gil, 2012: 2). National security is, therefore, a concept that the government, along with parliament, should protect the state and its citizens against all kinds of national crises through a variety of power projections, such as political power, diplomacy, economic power, military might, and so on (Ngoy-Kangoy 2007: 227). In the case of the DRC the war has had a negative impact politically, economically, socially and in terms of national and human security. The constant movement of militias and the unpredictability of their actions have had a devastating impact on the overall population of the DRC and the government. It has also resulted in many deaths as it has been reported in 2012 that it has claimed more than 5, 4 million (four comma five million) lives since it began in 1996 (Gil, 2012: 2).

The hot spot of the conflict was, and remains, mainly the eastern part of the country, where a range of militant groups and local militias, Congolese and foreign rebels, as well as and the DRC army have been involved in military competition for control of the mineral rich area in order to finance the war on either side of the spectrum (http//www.globalissues.org/article/84). Accompanying this is the fact that each has been using ethnic myths to entrench ethnic prejudices and patrimonialism with central objective of exclusion within an atmosphere of national and human insecurity. Ethnic exclusion and patrimoliasim were used as vehicles in the quest for natural resources and minerals, and thus self-enrichment (Gil, 2012: 2). In addition, the war resulted in the breakdown in the rule of law which promoted the mass movement of people from one place to another and thus fuelling ethnic-based human rights abuses in the absence of national and human security (http//www.globalissues.org/article/84). This section of chapter four discusses the national and human security challenges that descended on the DRC in the due to years of ethnic-influenced conflict that polarised the nation socio-politically.

4.5.1 The collapse of effective government administration: National Security Challenges

(a) The challenge of national and human security sector

The long drawn conflict in the DRC resulted in the governments being unable to function properly especially since basic security systems collapsed after the war broke out in 1996 (Mahafha, 2009: 78). The collapse of the defence and security departments opened doors for foreign rebel groups to easily penetrate and render the country's borders insecure and rebel controlled as people entered the country as they pleased. Down the years the DRC's weak security system made it possible for rebel groups and foreign armed militias to operate freely in the country without any fear of being arrested, prosecuted and jailed (Shekhawat, 2009: 8). These groups terrorised civilians of other ethnic groups and incited violent ethnic tensions that made the country uncontrollable and unsafe, the result being lack of national and human has also security: a recipe for the outbreak of more violence between the rebels and government on the one hand as well as between rebel groups themselves (Shekhawat, 2009: 8).

The collapse of state security has resulted in government soldiers concentrating on fighting the rebels than to protect the citizens (http://standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc/). Amidst all these, the Congolese National Police (PNC) could not do enough to protect the civilians as they were not well equipped or even physically and mentally trained. The state security and defence had been rendered weak in a way that children abducted from school and refugee camps have been turned into combatants, guards, porters and miners. In essence this means that armed groups in parts of DRC have become a major source of instability, thus posing serious human and human security challenges despite efforts by the government, the SADC, the AU and the international community, in particular the UN, to end the war (Shekhawat, 2009: 13). It is not surprising that most Congolese citizen have little faith in the in the police system and defence ministry to protect them. Instead ordinary citizens fear the police, the army and armed groups as they claim that instead of offering them protection, the police and the soldiers have been the source terrorism and harassment meanwhile demanding bribes and illegal tax (http://standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc/). As a result ordinary Congolese consider these arms of government as the worst offenders who they rather avoid when in need of protection and instead seek protection from armed groups. Ironically, institutions such as churches and human

rights organisations have been the ones that most Congolese consider when in need of safety security (Ahere, 2012: 2).

(b) The health department

The health department was not spared collapse since the infrastructure that was already in tatters before the outbreak of the Second Congo war in 1998 was further rendered to be shambles. The DRC's health system reflects a lack of investment because no investor would feel comfortable to invest in a politically unstable and highly insecure country ravaged by years of conflict (Ahere, 2012: 2;). With war economy taking priority the health care of the population has been neglected as a result, leaving the impoverished nation it in the hands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide these services to the people. Notably, the World Health Organization (WHO) has for years during the war been actively engaged in providing health services: providing supplies of medicines and offering clean up services in sites where diseases may be prevalent (Mahafha, 2009: 79). In addition, the supply of medicine and medical equipment became difficult to transport because trucks carrying them became victims of robbery by rebels (Ahere, 2012: 2).

To aggravate the health situation many health facilities were turned into white elephants because nurses and doctors have fled the country in search of better working conditions (Shekhawat, 2009: 13). Some hospitals and clinics became victims of vandalism or being deliberately destroyed by the rebels in order to spite President Joseph Kabila, and sow fear and insecurity to threaten and intimidate civilians. In areas like Masisi, Ituri, Kivu, some health infrastructure has been destroyed by the rebels that are terrorising the civilians (Shekhawat, 2009: 13). The constant outbreak of epidemic diseases further put enormous strains on the health system. UN agencies reported that over 70 % (seventy per cent) of the people of the DRC could not have access to formal health care either because of the inability to for services due to poverty or because they were unable to access the facilities as they were usually too far to reach because those nearby have been destroyed (http://www.globalissues.org/article/87/the-democratic-republic-of-congo). It is, therefore, not surprising that the health services are being carried out by NGOs like The Red Cross and Doctors without Borders (Shekhawat, 2009: 13)

(c) The DRC conflict and the collapse of the education system

The education system has also been affected negatively in other areas especially in Ituri, the Kivus amongst other region as schools has closed as a result of the war. DRC's education system is being faced with the lack of teachers as they have left DRC in search of better working conditions and also running from the instability and the unsafe living conditions in the DRC (Mahafha, 2009: 86; Children of Congo: 2015/10/11). Children are forced to stop going to school due to the lack of teachers, some are abducted from schools and their homes where they are transformed into child soldiers, girls are made sex slaves and some are used as miners. As a result of the civil war, over 5.2 million children in the country receive no education. Education has dropped and is being carried out by few humanitarian organisations (http://standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc/).

(d) The transport system

The transport system also became a victim of years of conflict as it was also negatively affected. Like many countries the DRC relies on road and rail transport to ferry its economic commodities. The war has affected the quality of the transport system because it has become impossible if not dangerous to transport goods as roads and railways are not in a good condition and there has always been due to lack of funds to construct, let alone maintain them (Ahere, 2012: 2). In some rebel controlled areas it has become difficult to use road and rail because of the high number of trains and trucks that have been hijacked down the years. To aggravate the situation the government of DRC is became a victim also e of being banned from using air transport (http://standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc/).

In addition to the above all air carriers certified by the DRC suffered restrictions from landing on EU-affiliated airports due to inadequate safety standards. The implication of this was that this hampered the all-important transportation of industrial produce and other important economic commodities (http://standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc/). As if that was not enough, this has also left the DRC unable to effectively transport food, medicine, stationery and other goods crucial for the welfare for the citizen. To aggravate the already crumbled health system, the unavailability of transport has resulted in the shortage of medicines and medical equipment in

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clinics and hospitals, especially in war-torn areas, and as a result posing other security challenges on top of rebels that have usually been marauding the once safe and stable areas (http://standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc/).

(e) The illegal control of mines (The mining industry)

Down the years of war and political instability, the situation has provided fertile ground for the illegal exploitation of natural wealth of the DRC by the various rebels in order to finance the war. The situation has created a climate of free for all especially in the war ravaged, but mineral rich north-eastern part of the country war, and resulted in the persistent violence fuelled by the struggle over the control of mineral resources by rebel groups (De Koning, 2010: 2; Guns For Hire: 2015/08/21). About 50 % (fifty per cent) of the mines in the eastern DRC are controlled by armed groups (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo). This situation has been dragged all of the DRC's neighbours into a regional conflict, both for ethnic affiliation and financial resources, because some of the rebel groups looting the mines originate from the DRC's neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Uganda. These armed groups demand illegal taxes, bribes or other payments for the minerals extracted from the mines and in turn sell the minerals illegally and use the money to buy armaments (Mwaniki, 2009: 11).

This exploitation of minerals has contributed in worsening the nature of conflict. Other natural resources such as timber and commodities such as diamond have also played a role in motivating these wars because of their characteristics. Ironically government troops and their foreign allies have also been partners in crime because they also used the country's diamond, gold, timber, ivory, coltan and cobalt to pay for their war-related expenses, thereby equally using them to fuel conflict. Therefore, this logically means that the government has also been involved in depleting the resources of the country, harming the economy and instead of getting people out of poverty (www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo). As such, the inability of the government of the DRC to control the entirety of its territory has allowed rebel armed forces to exploit these resources and fuel the continuous conflict in the DRC, which has seen much suffering afflicting the masses on the ground. Multi-national companies are also to blame because many of these minerals are exported to electronics companies worldwide to help boost their output (http://www.standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc).

(f) The collapse of the economy

It is evident from the above discussion that a lot in the DRC left much to be desired because the conflict has resulted in the government being unable to function properly and the economy suffering a serious dent, if bringing it to a standstill. Heartrending is the fact that when the international community was somewhat optimistic that the 2006 elections would eventually extract the country from 44 (forty-four) years of dictatorship and hardship, the economy still suffered were people and businesses were not paying taxes within a virtually absent banking system (Mahafha, 2009: 65). As a result, national output and government revenues have been reduced by the on-going conflicts and created a situation where the DRC's external debts increased drastically (http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152607).

Lack of infrastructure as it has been destroyed by the war as well as the non-conducive and difficult work environment have also curtailed the all-important operations by foreign businesses. This has seriously dented investor confidence in the DRC thereby further weakening the strength of the currency and the economy alike (Shekhawat, 2009: 10; Congo war From All Sides: 2015/10/13). It is common cause that in an atmosphere of an unhealthy economy, unemployment will increase, as it has happened in the DRC since 1996 when the 1st Congo war broke out. The employment rate of the DRC has dropped because of the war, the 1998-2002 war left 60 % (sixty per cent) of the DRC population unemployed because of the withdrawal of investors from the country (Kingdom and Knight, 2006: 3). The weakening of the currency has also resulted in loss of jobs thus increasing unemployment.

The war has caused homelessness for the people of the DRC as their homes have been vandalised by the rebels. This has also exacerbated poverty, causing people to migrate from one area to another within the country. Lack of national and human security has resulted in many Congolese leaving the country and going to the neighbouring states, leaving children and the elders behind. Some people have moved from the DRC to the neighbouring countries like Uganda, Angola, Zambia, Burundi and other SADC countries, especially South Africa (http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152607/).

The DRC was once regarded as one of the world's largest producers of cobalt, copper and diamond. However, because of the prolonged conflict it has been unable to carry on with production and thus opening minerals for exploitation by outsiders (Mahafha, 2009: 59). The results have been that indigenes have not been benefiting from the revenue accrued from the exploitation of mineral resources whereas only the rebel groups and the government have. As such the political instability and violent conflict has led to the near-collapse of the economy within the DRC. It has caused the annual per capita income to plummet to $120 in recent years (down from $380 during Mobutu's regime) (De Koning, 2010: 2; http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/conflict-minerals).

Most investors have stopped doing business in the DRC because of the war, something that has impacted heavily on both the manufacturing and mining industry. The situation is aggravated by the fact that most of the mines are controlled by the rebels from the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda that are supported by some external interests that use ethnicity to fuel the war because the war is of benefit to them than peace (Mwaniki, 2009: 11). The collapse of the DRC's economy has also impacted negatively on some neighbouring African countries especially countries that have either been trading with the DRC or have invested in the country, member states of the SADC region, which have witnessed the rise of Congolese migrating to their countries (Shekhawat, 2009: 13; http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/conflict-minerals).

4.5.2 Human Security Challenges in the DRC: 1996-2013

Human Security is a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised (Mutheiwana, 2005: 37). Human security is the combination of threats associated with war, genocide, and the displacement of populations. At a minimum, human security means freedom from violence, danger and from the fear of violence and the enjoyment of civil rights from the parameters of the law of the country, meaning that human security is concerned with the security of the individuals (Mahafha, 2009: 75). The United Nations Development Programme first drew global attention to the concept in its 1994 "*Human Development Report*" (HDR, 1994: 23). The report's broad definition of human security encompasses everything that constitutes freedom from want and freedom from fear. The HDR argues that things that are considered as human

security issues are things that affronts to human dignity, threats to livelihoods, and other harms, those things are hunger, disease, pollution and violence (De Koning, 2010: 2). Human security includes key areas such the availability of food, health care services, housing and access to clean water and sanitation, employment opportunities (De Koning, 2010: 2). Given this definitions, the years of violent conflict has made the DRC to rapidly descend into a failing state that cannot provide for its populace and in the process fail to ensure national and human security for the ordinary citizen. This is the subject of the subtopics below.

(a) Food Security, Poverty and Migration

The conflict in the DRC has left many people homeless such as in the Ituri region where there are lots of vandalised buildings across the town of Kindu, with most of the buildings full of bullet holes, testimony of the devastation the Congolese people are faced with (Mahafha, 2009: 63: A World Of Conflict: 2015/10/10). The conflict situation in the DRC has fuelled extreme poverty with the majority of people in the DRC, more especially in the rural areas, surviving on one meal a day. To aggravate the situation, as indicated above the high rate of unemployment has increased the suffering due to poverty such that the majority of those at the receiving end are children and the elderly people (Shekhawat, 2009: 10; Chidren Of Congo: 2015/10/11). Therefore this poses a human security challenge of lack of homes and constant availability of food. Most importantly, like in many developing countries, people in the DRC rely on agriculture for survival. However, the conflict between ethnic and rebel groups have made it difficult for the ordinary Congolese to practise agriculture due to the absence of safety and security because of the number of marauding bands of militias. As such, there is also a decline in agricultural production, trade and food availability as conditions become unsafe to carry out such activities and transport is disrupted (Mahafha, 2009: 78 ; Children of Congo: 2015/10/11).

From the above it becomes evident that the instability in rural DRC has resulted in the breakdown of food production, which translates into food scarcity and thus leading to food insecurity (Mahafha, 2009: 78; De Koning, 2010: 2). In turn, this situation brought uncontrollable starvation and famine, leading to deaths. About forty 40 (forty) million rural Congolese depend on the forest, cultivation and shops for their food, income, energy, shelter, medicine and cultural needs. They cut trees to make woods for firewood to cook. They also use

it to make furniture and other wooden goods which they sell to put food on their tables (Modiba, 2014: 85). The war has made it difficult for them to cultivate as it is not safe anymore and ethnic groups are always terrorising each other. Some of the food stocks are burned by the armed groups because most of the fields are occupied by the rebels that use them as their bases as one of the most fertile countries is being torn apart by this endless conflict. (http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152607/). On the one hand the war has also resulted in hunger as shops have closed due the looting by rebels and the unsafe environment whereas on the other, in the rural areas, shops are closing because there is no more food to sell due to the lack of food transportation (Shekhawat, 2009: 12).

As discussed earlier in the study, the collapse of the government administrative machinery had adverse impact on agricultural production and water reticulation delivery services. This in turn had effects on food security and the availability of clean running water, thus causing people to drink unclean water, the result of was that this caused diseases such as diarrhoea, ebola and malnutrition (Mahafha, 2009: 69). This was exacerbated by the ailing health care system which was unable to provide health care services to those affected and in turn resulted in high death rates. Out of frustration and utter despondency people migrated to other countries in Africa, more especially SADC countries. South Africa is one of the SADC countries that have witnessed an increase in the number of migrants from DRC as most Africa people regard the country as beacon of hope although this also has had an impact on receiving communities and countries, South Africa included. The Refugee International reporting that more than 450, 000 (four hundred and fifty thousand) Congolese have fled to the neighbouring countries to seek safety. To avoid conflict and abduction by the rebels, refugees and displaced rural populations avoid major roads and move into the forests and protected areas, where they are less likely to encounter rebels (Shekhawat, 2009: 12). Some of the people that have fled the DRC are the educated ones and academics who have been migrating to other countries in search of greener pastures as life in the DRC is unbearable in some areas (http://www.standcanada.org/conflict-region/the-drc). As Shekhawat (2009: 10) rightly points out, the burden placed on the infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and sanitation facilities has been difficult to bear.

(b) The violent abuse of women and children

The conflict situation in the DRC has made life more unbearable for women and children with rape being used as weapon in the conflict (Shekhawat, 2009: 10). It is currently argued that the eastern DRC is the most dangerous place in the world to be a female. Apart from getting killed and injured, hundreds of thousands of women and girls are raped and tortured every day in DRC (Mahafha, 2009: 77). The rapes committed are mainly being carried out by the rebels more especially FDLR and the Mai Mai that rape women from other ethnic groups, although the Congolese army has also been implicated. The local health clinics in the North and South Kivu and few in the Ituri region have estimated that about 40 (forty) women were being raped daily in each of these regions (http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/3; Children of Congo: 2015/10/11).

There are also reports of the high rate of pregnancy that came as a result of rapes. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) report published in 2005, there are 40, 000 (forty thousands) survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, an alarming figure (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2667421). Some children are abandoned when their mothers are running for safety. Some women and children are raped in front of their family members or communities. Some boys are forced into child soldiers, where they are forced to kill, harass and beat people for nothing. Those that run away face difficulties of being bitten by snakes and other insects in the bushes (Chidren of Congo: 2015/10/11). Some male civilians join the militias because the want to protect people of their villages that are being harassed and killed by other groups. They join the militias with the aim to avenge. Some male civilians are forced to rape their own daughters, mothers or sisters at a gunpoint by the rebels (Shekhawat, 2009: 10). The FDLR are primarily known for raiding villages and refugee camps of the internally displaced persons (IDP's) in the eastern DRC, committing wicked acts such as mass rape, murder and the forced recruitments of child soldiers of rebel groups. They are forced to drop out of schools which also result in the high rate of illiteracy (Shekhawat, 2009: 13).

(c) Inadequate health care, diseases and high death rate

Sources show that the estimates of war-related deaths in the eastern regions of the DRC range from 3, 3 million to 4, 5 million (three million and three hundred thousand to four million and

five hundred thousand) casualties, which is an alarming figure that has afflicted the poor (http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/3). Since the war started there have been increases in the death rate, with more than 5, 4 million (five million and four hundred thousand) deaths reported as a result of killings, starvation and drinking unclean water. Although the DRC is blessed with six big rivers it is unable to provide clean water to most of its citizens. Only 15 % (fifteen per cent) of the DRC population have access to clean running water regardless (Mahafha, 2009: 84; Children of Congo: 2015/10/11). Among the diseases that are causing the deaths in DRC are waterborne malaria, diarrhoea and Ebola that is found in the river, which is caused by dead bodies that are thrown into the rivers. (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2667421/).

The UN in March 2005 described the crisis in Eastern DRC, as the "world's worst humanitarian crisis". In the years between 2000 and 2004, it was estimated that 3.9 million (three million and nine hundred thousand) people had died since 1998 (Shekhawat, 2009: 11; http:// http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/3). About 10 % (ten per cent) of all the deaths were due to violence and 90 % (ninety per cent) were due to diseases like malaria, HIV/Aids, pneumonia and malnutrition. In January 2008 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) again estimated that since 1998 5, 4 million (five million and four hundred thousand) people died from war-related causes including HIV/Aids, malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and malnutrition. They also reported that as many as 45, 000 (forty-five thousand) people die every day from these causes. High deaths rate have continued to increase between August 1998 and April 2007, and 500,000 (five hundred thousand) people die every month due to lack of medication and health care services. Most of the people that are dying are children and elderly people (Shekhawat, 2009: 11).

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter covered national and human security challenges facing the DRC due to the country's ethnic influenced division/differences and conflict. This resulted in the challenges to nation-building and thus led to the formation of ethnic-influence armed groups. Armed groups have been committing war crimes indiscriminately, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law proportions on a massive scale,

but still remain unpunished because of the dysfunctional rule of law in the country. Lack of national unity, patriotism, the competition for political power by ethnically aligned groups and political players have been identified as the motivators for the DRC's ethnic conflict. The chapter also identified that ordinary civilian were the ones that generally bore the brunt of the political and socio-economic instability in the DRC, this being the indicator of national and human securities challenges facing the country

Chapter 5

General Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

The main focus of this study was to investigate the place of ethnicity in the place of nation building, with reference to relation of national and human security within the GLR, especially within the DRC during the period 1980 to 2013. The study argues that Belgian colonial policies influenced ethnic attitudes, prejudices and thus fuelled ethnic divisions and tensions. Years later these ethnic tendencies and practices became the root cause of the ethnic conflict and laid the basis for national and human security challenges facing the DRC today. The divide and rule policy and the exploitation of labour based on ethnic favouritism also perpetuated ethnic divisions which many years after end of colonialism the DRC is still embroiled in unending conflict to date. The on-going ethnic conflict in that country is an indication that the colonial legacy of ethnic division still lives on and is hampering the much needed political stability and socio-economic development. Exacerbating these political and socio-economic conditions has been ethnicity has also been at the heart of the formation of armed rebel group. This is a clear indication of the fact that the country is polarised along ethnic lines instead of political leaders and the government striving for nation building, national and human security.

Instead the DRC has been faced with political and economic challenges which have degenerated into lack of nation building, national and human security challenges. The nature of the war in that country has become too complex and has involved too many ethnically based political parties and armed groups that are making it difficult to find a lasting resolution. More complex is the fact that the ethnic factor has acquired a regional character because of the spill-over from the DRC into the neighbouring states of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and vice versa, thereby not only further threatening national and human security, but also rendering it non-existent for the most part of the duration of the war. Most of the warring groups use ethnicity as the motivator to drum up support and get involved in a war, whereas the bottom-line is the competition for resources and political power. More complex is the fact that some of the rebel groups have down

the years not only been waging war against the government but each other: this being character of wars that are fuelled competition for natural resources and political power. The study also revealed that the eastern part of the DRC, Kivu and Ituri regions were the most unstable and bloodiest places to live in Africa, if not the whole world. It is also mostly unsafe a place for a women, children and the elderly to exist. Women have for a long time been victims of rape, children have been abducted indiscriminately and men are forced to rape women or witness the rape of their wives by armed militias. In general, civilians are the ones that suffer the most as rebel groups use them as cannon fodder for their ethnic animosities: all these as a result of lack of national building which is the product ethnically influenced conflict.

Ethnic differences and divisions, fighting and the illegal exploitation of minerals has been identified as one of the aspects that are perpetuating the war in the region and the country, in particular, making it more and more difficult to resolve due to the impact they have in influencing the war. This has made the mineral resources to play a significant role in financing the conflict, hampering security control and opening easy access to natural resources. The government and the rebel groups alike have equally depended on the financial resources accrued from the sale of minerals to finance the war. In the main the rebel groups have benefitted mostly from the illegal sale of these mineral resources or their exchange thereof for military ware. The result has been communities and forests have paid the price of the never-ending conflict as it is no longer safe to reside in the affected areas or practice agriculture, this being another challenge to national and human security.

The spill-over effect of the Rwanda genocide of 1994 has also had a hand in actually fuelling the divisions that had already shown warning signs that African leaders and the international community downplayed for years after decolonisation. In the Ituri region, for example, the Hemas and the Lendus had already enemies fighting for land and positions in the government. In addition the Land Act passed in 1972 also made the situation between the Hemas and the Lendus worse as they fought more for land and in turn traditional leaders having the power to sell land for their own benefit.

The threat by the Mobutu regime to strip the Banyamulenge ethnic group of their citizenship also became part of the equation of the war. What made things worse was the fact that Mobutu accommodated the Hutu refugees in the camps within the Kivu region. The Hutus started to attack Rwanda and the Banyamulenge from the camps while the Mobutu government did nothing to end the attack as he was sympathetic to the Hutus. This fragile situation made it possible for Laurent Kabila to enter the DRC from exile and topple Mobutu with the help of Rwanda and Uganda. These two countries helped him hoping that he would help end the attacks of the Tutsis and the Banyamulenge by the Hutus that were operating from the camps in the Kivu region and in the forests in the eastern DRC. This has, however, proved to be unachievable.

However, Laurent Kabila's rule was short-lived as he was accused of ethnic favouritism as well as supporting the *Interahamwe* and the ex-FAR (Hutus) soon after ascending the presidency. This led to his assassination by one of his bodyguards in January of 2001. His son Joseph Kabila took over as president and has been president of the country since 2001. Amidst the conflict situation he has been able, under the auspices of the SADC, to hold two democratic elections in 2006 and 2011, respectively, which he won. Regardless of these five year periodic elections, lasting resolution to the war for the much needed political stability and socio-economic development has proved evasive for both Kabila and the SADC leadership and the region as the conflict continues raging. Numerous peace agreements have been signed but remained unhonoured. In addition, more armed groups were formed from within ethnic groups that felt that they were not being fully represented in the government. Some were formed with the support of Rwanda and Uganda in order to fight the Hutus and to use these groups to perpetuate instability so that they can exploit DRC's mineral resources. The irony about this instability is that Rwanda and Burundi use the war situation and economy to exploit the minerals for their benefit.

5.2 Recommendations

The study recommends that he DRC's political players need to think about the well-being of the country and its people. Joseph Kabila, together with other DRC key political players, must learn from the successful transitions of some of the SADC region's countries such South Africa, Mozambique (although the Mozambican government is currently embroiled with Renamo in

UNIVERSITY OF VENDA

conflict) and Namibia in order to establish peace and stability as well as consolidate independence, democracy and socio-economic development in that country (Gathaiga, 2012: 15). The DRC government must also accept that it is significant to adopt progressive ideas and rich compromises for the welfare of those who matter most, the majority of the citizens who put them in power through the ballot box. In the same vein it is noble to adapt to the pressing situations that will bring lasting peace while not over compromising. The DRC must also learn from its other neighbours such as Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania that it is possible to have and consolidate nation building in a country that has many ethnic groups and live in relative harmony. All these countries once experienced the colonial policy of divide and rule, political instability and the struggle for power. In order for complete democratic governance to be established, all Congolese citizens, from the peasants to the elite groups must equally be involved in the creation of a new society which espouses nation building (Gathaiga, 2012: 15). The government must do away with ethnic tendencies and myths, tribalism and corruption as well as the impunity, which makes the political leaders to only care for themselves and those of their ethnic alliances (Mpangala, 2004: 54). The study has shown that these tendencies have inflicted enormous harm to the political, social and economic welfare of the country and its people.

The above issues will be worthless if the government machinery itself is dysfunctional, weak, corrupt, is driven by nepotism and patronage. Therefore it is of utmost significance that government administration is brought relatively accepted standards of accountability and transparency. In the same vein other government institutions that serve as watchdogs will need an effective partnership with government so as to project and promote the rule of law. This will go a long way in strengthening the role of the Congolese government, non-governmental and religious institutions and civilian authorities in exercising effective jurisdiction over the mine operations and thus help reduce the indiscriminate flow of funds from beneficiation to fund armed groups (Gathaiga, 2012: 15).

Flowing from the above the international community can play a role in ensuring that a more equitable proportion of revenues from eastern DRC's abundant natural resources are retained locally for the sake of socio-economic and infrastructure development. Resources from

diamonds, gold, coltan and other minerals should fund conflict resolution initiatives that can help create a climate for investment in conflict-affected communities, improving access to clean running water, education and health services as well as agricultural support, thus improving the quality of life of ordinary citizens. In short, these efforts will alleviate poverty and suffering and, by reducing fighting over limited resources, strengthen incentives for peace.

5.2.1 On nation-building

In order to consolidate its position, the power wielders exclude others from fully participating in national politics. In the process, the ruling elite have enhanced the welfare of its followers at the expense of the others so that their support can be relied on if military campaign becomes necessary. The attempts of disadvantaged groups to reverse unjust conditions often have met with harsh responses. Kabila and his government must work hard to improve governance at local level by doing away with tribalism, ethnicity and its exclusive nature, favouratism and impunity (Gathaiga, 2012: 15). Fighting impunity is an essential condition to restore the trust of ordinary citizens in areas of security and law enforcement bodies, as well to judiciary and state institutions. The rule of law must be upheld since the elites and political leaders commit crimes but get acquitted. This has brought division within the nation when the people see that they are not protected under the law, hence making them to resort to revenge and violence (Mpangala, 2004: 54; Athanasiou, 2007: 75). Political leaders and traditional leaders must work together for the benefit of the country by bringing the Congolese nation together and form associations that work together with the government to bring the –government-community partnership together.

The government of the DRC can use institutions such as church bodies, schools and the media to spread awareness on the place nation-building and national unity within a state. They must use these institutions to bring unity among the Congolese regardless of ethnic affiliation. Traditional leaders of all different tribes must be engaged in creating awareness and promoting nation-building. They must be encouraged to participate in peace talks that aim at ending ethnic attitudes and prejudices. The role of traditional leaders cannot be downplayed as they are the custodians of norms, customs and traditions of their communities such that they must transform into symbols of communal existence of sharing and caring. History has shown that ethnic communities normally listen more to their traditional leaders than their political leaders who they

regard as corrupt, divisive and uncaring. The corollary is also the case and can bring chaos and suffering, leading to unwarranted violence, a good example being the xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa in April 2015 after the King Goodwill Zwelithini of the Zulu nation had made remarks that eventually perpetuated xenophobic violence within the KwaZulu-Natal Province. In the same vein the attacks ended after the king had called his people hem to stop the attacks on foreign nationals (http://www.citizen.co.za/360606/zwelithini-calls-for-a-halt-on-xenophobic-attacks/). This one event is an example that rural people, in particular and who form the majority of the citizenry, do listen to their traditional leaders, hence this formula could be employed as part of the solution to the DRC's ethnic influenced conflict.

5.2.2 National Security and National borders must be strengthened

National security is insufficient to guarantee people's security and of course the state is the primary provider of security. The primary solution to the ethnic-influenced conflict in the DRC is to strengthen the state security. This will prevent the proliferation of arms and the presence of illegally armed groups or rebels to operate freely and threaten the political stability of the country (http://www.hsrcpress.co.za). The country must physically, technically, tactically and psychologically train its personnel as well as increase their salary because low salaries in the most result lack of commitment, despondency, poor results and corruption. The DRC government must also stop relying on the international community and the regional body. The strengthening of the state security would go a long way in improving the economic development machinery and thus yield the fruits of socio-economic and political stability as well as development, as this will reduce for the rebels to exploit DRC's mineral resources.

The economy of the DRC relies mainly on the mining industry and the majority of those mines are controlled by the rebels, with some of them being proxies of other countries, including Rwanda and Uganda. This is because the DRC's conflict will not see the end of day if there are still external powerful forces that still want to enrich themselves from DRC's mineral resources. The external forces always oppose DRC's internal efforts to end conflict, by funding the rebels with military weapons. The illegal exploitation of minerals is one of the reasons for the perpetuation of conflict in the DRC as the rebels always oppose any solution that other political

players sign. Strengthening state security and training the army would help eradicate all illegal armed groups that are operating in and causing instability in the DRC. The army must be paid well so that they do not have to organize lootings and harass the local population who strive to feed themselves and their families.

The government of the DRC and all the other parties involved in the government must reinvent DRC's political economy through the creation of institutional utilisation resources which would ensure the equitable distribution of services across the provinces. This means that the government of the DRC has to put national interest before external interest, something that has never been the case since independence (http://www.hsrcpress.co.za). While natural resources are a potential foundation for the post-conflict reconstruction and development, they are also strong conflicting interests between different groups and actors at different levels of the society hence the recipe for competition. The government of the DRC must make it a point that the mines are totally controlled and regulated properly by law and that they benefit the country and its citizens.

5.2.3 Human Security must be improved

The guarantee for human rights and fundamental freedoms is the main challenge of the application of the human security concept. Human Rights abuses have occurred at such a high scale that extreme poverty appears like an ordinary challenge, even though both problems are quite closely related in an obvious manner. Human Rights are vital to human security (Athanasiou, 2007: 75). Security policies must be integrated more closely with strategies for promoting human rights, democracy and development. The DRC has frequently been called "the worst place in the world to be a woman." The DRC must work on improving the livelihoods of women and men equally, and combining gender justice with social justice above all, and functioning social welfare, health and justice systems that are true, thus ensuring lasting change for women, men and children who call Goma and North Kivu their home. Increased efforts in the DRC must focus not only on the primary prevention of violence, but on ensuring long term support for women and men survivors of violence, and on reducing the stigma directed against rape survivors.

The DRC must rebuild economic relationships between communities torn apart by violence and work on job creation strategies which would help in curbing poverty and violence. The appointment of employment must be done on merit and not influenced by ethnicity. Dialogue between communities must be implemented and in order to consolidate the dialogue between the communities, inter-communal development programmes should be put in place. Agricultural community organisations and associated non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could set up agricultural cooperatives of farmers that would promote the interests of both communities. The level of food shortage in the DRC is very high such that the government must work with traditional leaders and kings to promote agricultural activities. As such the country must also improve its water and sanitation programmes because despite international efforts to improve the DRC's situation, the situation on the ground alarmingly serious.

5.2.4 Good relations with its neighbouring countries

The DRC must engage with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda in a strategy that can promote mutually beneficial economic gains across social, ethnic and geographic divides. Tensions among actors in all three countries have undermined regional stability and thus promote regional ethnic conflict. The international community must incentivize collaboration and dialogue in the GLR, within the four countries in particular, at all levels, which are community, provincial, national and regional. The DRC and her neighbours must improve their diplomatic relations as this will help in curbing violence within the region. If they have good relations Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi would find it hard to support armed groups in the DRC. Before the outbreak of conflict in the DRC in 1997, the country was having good relations with her neighbours, however questionable because the government of Mobutu provided refugee camps for the Rwandese (Hutus). Mobutu assisted because he was having good relations with former leaders of Rwanda for the wrong reasons if human rights and security is anything to go by. In the absence of this, the GLR, the DRC and her neighbours would have experienced good relations such that most of the conflict situations that involved armed militias would have found no place to date.

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
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APPENDIXES

Appendix 01



President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic Of Congo

Source: Joseph Kabila at
http://www.bing.com/search?q=joseph+kabila&form=MSNH&mkt=en-za&x=39&y=27

Appendix 02



Former South African President Nelson Mandela with Former Presidents of the DRC Mobutu Se se Seko and Laurent Kabila at the first mediation meeting on the 4th May 1997.

Source: www.googlepictures.com

Appendix 03



Former leader of MLC, Jean Pierre Bemba

Source: www.googlepictures.com

Appendix 04



Former Leader of the CNDP and M23, Bosco Ntanganda

Source: www.googlepictures.com


Appendix 05



Former leader of CNDP Laurent Nkunda

Source: www.newsofrwanda.com/featured1/17422/rwan


Appendix 06



M23 Leader Sultani Makenga

Source: http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/3/27/1364407741454/Sultani-Makenga-008.jpg

Appendix 07



Leader of UDPS, Etienne Tshisekedi

Source: www.googlepictures.com


Appendix 08



Presidents of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, Uganda, Yoweri Museveni and Democratic Republic of Congo, Joseph Kabila

Source: www.googlepictures.com

Appendix 09



Presidents of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza

Source: http://images.search.yahoo.com/images/view