

# A Qualitative Review of the Recurrence of Xenophobic Violence and their Effects on South Africa's Role in International Diplomacy

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**Abstract:** The recurring xenophobic violence in South Africa has become a horrific problem that continues to affect the country's international diplomacy in the region and its international relations with other states. Migrants continue to encounter xenophobic violence almost every year, and a number of them live in fear of their lives. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the debate by examining the causal factors of xenophobic violence and their broader effects on South Africa's role in international diplomacy. The attitude of denialism from the side of political leaders, failure to offer quality and good services to the people, and the people experiencing a general sense of deprivation were found to be main causal factors of xenophobic violence. It was found that xenophobic violence defeats the country's diplomacy in exporting human rights protection as the prerequisite for good governance that leads to peace and security to African states. The violence ruins South Africa's African renaissance and Panafricanism diplomacy, and the peacebuilding and democracy diplomacy when dealing with African states. The violence was also found to thwart the country's economic diplomacy in the region and affects the country's involvement in the South-South diplomacy. To reach the findings, the paper adopted a qualitative research method design and used the relative deprivation theory.

**Keywords:** Denialism, International diplomacy, Violence, Xenophobic violence

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## 1. Introduction

The problem of the recurring xenophobic violence directed at migrants, and its effect on South Africa's role and image in international diplomacy has not received adequate academic attention. The literature on governance, political science and international migration law is lacking with regard to attaining an understanding of the causal factors that influence the reoccurrence of xenophobic violence in South Africa. It is not clear whether this violence reoccurs because of the failure of the government to establish a strong migration policy that would control migrants and their businesses in the country. It is also not clear whether this violence reoccurs due to the behaviour and attitudes of the locals towards foreigners and migrants. It is further premature to argue that this violence reoccur due to the behaviour and attitudes towards the locals or nationals. The blame for this recurrence of xenophobic violence should be shared between government officials, scholars and peace activists. This paper aims to contribute to the debate by examining the broader effects of xenophobia on South Africa's role in international diplomacy. It proceeds as follows: The paper first presents definitions of relevant concepts and proceeds with a

review of the literature to demonstrate the state of confusion and the existing gaps in the literature related to addressing the causal factors that lead to xenophobic violence. The literature review also discusses the role of migrants in economic development and growth, and the impact of xenophobic violence on migration and cooperation diplomacy. The article then presents a theoretical framework to demonstrate the reasons and factors that lead to xenophobic violence in South Africa. The last section consists of a conclusion.

## 2. Definitions of Terms

### 2.1 Xenophobia

The term 'xenophobia', as "a fear of strangers", is derived from the Greek words 'xenos', meaning stranger or foreigner and 'phobos', meaning fear (Evans & Newnham, 1998:583). Scholars have stated that the word involves the negative social representations and practices that discriminate against immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and migrants (Rydgren, 2004; Roemer & Van der Straeten, 2007). The concept is used to describe a fear or dislike of foreigners, or of people significantly different from oneself, mostly in the context of visibly

differentiated minorities (Shisana, 2008). From a law perspective, Xenophobia has been referred to as "a crime against humanity that involves aspects such as dislike, fear, distrust or intolerance of foreigners, often expressed in terms of hostilities towards the outsiders" (Evans & Newnham, 1998:583). Nel (2005:241) presents it as a "hate crime, defined as the extreme expression of prejudice through violent criminal acts committed against people, property, or even organisations, either because of the group to which they belong or with which they identify".

## 2.2 International Diplomacy

The term 'diplomacy' has been conceptualised as "a mechanism designed to establish and maintain networks and relationships among traditional and new actors in the pursuit of shared interdependent goals" (Diamond & MacDonald, 1996). Der Derian (2009:10) defines diplomacy as "a mediation between estranged individuals, groups or entities". Mediation involves a dialogue and conversation that promotes healthy relationship among actors. This therefore makes diplomacy a major tool through which state and non-state actors communicate with each other and transmit their messages to solve complex relations and to maintain friendships (Berridge & James, 2003:70). In other words, international diplomacy enables state and non-state actors to nurture healthy and constructive relations among themselves, and serves as the tool they use to address misbehaving actors. The article adopts both definitions because they present diplomacy as an established means of influencing decisions and the behaviour of other actors through dialogue, mediation, negotiations, and other non-violent measures.

## 3. Theoretical Framework

This article adopted the relative deprivation theory to achieve an understanding of the root and causal factors of xenophobic violence and their effects on South Africa's international diplomacy with other actors. Smith and Pettigrew (2015:2) maintain that "relative deprivation means a judgment that one is worse off compared to some standard accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment". Furthermore, social scientists use the theory to predict "people's willingness to join protests, individual achievement and deviance, intergroup attitudes, and physical and mental health" (Smith & Pettigrew, 2015:2). Smith and Pettigrew (2015:3) argue that a feeling

of deprivation postulates a subjective situation that affects people's emotions, cognitions and behavior. Adler, Epel, Catellazzo & Ickovics (2000) have presented that the deprivation theory explains various phenomena ranging from poor physical health, psychological disorders, conflict and violence in society. The government's failure to provide quality services to the people, excluding them from public participation, and slow responses to their problems may make people feel deprived, hence, sparking violence and conflicts. Desai (2015) found that xenophobic attacks are an absolute expression of the locals protesting for service delivery in South Africa (Desai, 2015). Karamoko and Jain (2011) noted that the fact that locals run to the shops and property owned by migrants to loot their goods is a clear indication of a population deprived of quality services. This therefore makes migrants vulnerable, and when locals are facing the type of deprivation caused by the lack of quality services, they then turn to blame the migrants. In this way, migrants face wrath and violence resulting from the locals' frustrations and psychological emotions. It is then obvious that to argue that people who feel deprived of their fundamental rights and/or anything, which touches the core of their well-being, they become aggressive and violent. As such, the theory helps to explain the occurrence and reoccurrences of xenophobia because of its close link with violent behaviour. It also has links with psychological problems and the attitudes of the people. This makes the theory significant in terms of understanding the factors behind the violence against migrants. When people feel deprived of their rights, income, services and anything else that they perceive to belong to them, they tend to become violent. The feeling of deprivation makes people believe that they do not have what they deserve to have; what follows is the development of anger and resentment that leads to violent behaviour.

## 4. Why the Recurrence of Xenophobic Violence?

The issue of the government failing to provide adequate services to citizens dates back to the time of apartheid. It is important to note that both during apartheid and after apartheid there were occurrences of xenophobic violence against migrants. As argued in the theoretical framework section, these recurrences are caused by the feeling of deprivation. According to Dixon (2017), the advent and establishment of democracy in 1994 did not bring

an end to xenophobia, instead the occurrences of it immensely increased. For example, in 2015, another nationwide spike in xenophobic violence against immigrants in general, prompted a number of foreign governments to begin repatriating their citizens (Dixon, 2017). Scholars have presented that xenophobic violence in South Africa has received much attention but its fundamental causal factors have remained poorly understood (Tevera, 2013; Misago, 2016; Steinberg, 2018; Gordon, 2020).

There have been debates concerning the responses and associated ways of speaking about xenophobia by national, provincial and municipal governments (Hiropoulos, 2020). However, due to the failure to understand the causal factors leading to xenophobic violence, any responses advanced by the government to address the violence, have instead exacerbated it. For example, between March 2019 and March 2020, "Xenophobic violence reoccurred and during this violence, mobs of angry rioters throughout South Africa attacked and harassed non-nationals, blaming them for unemployment, crime, and neglect by the government, among other things" (Human Rights Watch Report, 2020:4).

#### **4.1 Causal Factors of Xenophobic Violence**

The beliefs and attitudes related to xenophobia are mostly formed by deprivation that results from the drawing of inferences about individuals on the basis of the image of the social group or category of which the individual is a part. It is inseparable from psychological trauma, violence and physical abuse. Its perpetrators treat their victims with physical and verbal abuse.

##### **4.1.1 South Africa's History of Segregation**

The laws made during apartheid were deliberate laws that caused division between people, and migrants were specifically considered as outsiders (Crush & Tevera, 2010:5-6). In the past, South African townships were divided based along tribal lines. Many townships in Gauteng were divided into Zulu sections and Sotho sections. These past segregations that were imposed by the apartheid system made South Africans look at themselves along tribal lines. At some point they became a source of prejudice, generalisation and dislike of one another. They injected a sense of superiority against one another based on language. Crush & Tevera (2010:5-6) argued that "a common and hurtful insult thrown at foreigners is the label kwerekwere, a derogatory

and slang word used by Black South Africans to mean foreigner".

##### **4.1.2 South Africa's History of Violence**

According to research conducted by Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020:7), the legacy of apartheid contributes to xenophobic violence, and participants hold the view that this legacy taught many South Africans to achieve their desires by violent means. During the struggle against apartheid, South Africa witnessed violence that was directed towards the system of apartheid. The country also witnessed political violence among the different political parties that left many people dead (Masikane et al., 2020:8). This history created a culture of violence and intolerance among the citizens of the country. Since xenophobia is a violent act, its existence should not be a surprise, especially the type of xenophobia that occurred in 2008 (Crush & Tevera, 2010:7).

##### **4.1.3 Lack of Service Delivery**

Crush and Tevera (2010:7) explained that "Xenophobia is triggered by hatred of foreigners or it was the failure of the government in supporting its people escape poverty by providing resources and employment opportunities". A survey by Masikane et al. (2020:7) indicated that inadequate infrastructure provision leads to a large number of people having to compete for the scarce infrastructure, which ignites a lot of anger. Masikane et al.'s (2020:7) study further found that the participants in the survey blamed local government's weaknesses in micro-township politics for fuelling xenophobia. According to Crush and Tevera (2010:7-8) as well as Gumede (2015), South Africa is more unequal today than it was in 1994 at the end of the apartheid era. About 60% to 70% of the population live in squalid conditions, and a lot of the violence that occurs is directed at the migrants in those spaces on a daily basis (Human Rights Watch, 2020:6). A large number of people staying in informal settlements where poverty levels are high, creates fertile ground for violent attacks and all manner of other social ills (Masikane et al., 2020:8). The underlying factors, which are poverty and violence, are directed towards foreigners on the pretext that they commit crimes and take away jobs meant for South Africans (Odiaka, 2017:46). In addition, Tshishonga (2015:164) asserts that "the influx of asylum seekers and refugees places a strain on already scarce resources such as employment, housing, and municipal services". This fuels tension between refugees and locals, sometimes leading to xenophobic attacks.

#### **4.1.4 Spirit and Attitude of Denialism**

The public not only approve of these violent attacks on migrants, but try to imitate them when police campaigns fail (Dodson, 1998:82-9). It is important to note that neither xenophobic violence nor xenophobia has been taken seriously by the government. Many political leaders continue to deny the existence of xenophobia and the violence directed at migrants. Crush (2002:41-42) noted that "the attacks are indeed criminal activities such as robberies under the guise of xenophobia". Crush (2014:10) goes further to say that "South Africa can only really be considered a xenophobic nation when all sections of society engage in violence against migrants and refugees". This attitude of denialism has had an impact on the government's responses to address the violence. The denialism attitude is the main factor that leads to the recurrence of xenophobic violence in South Africa. The attitude is mostly found among political leaders in the government, who then pass it on to the youth. The post-apartheid democratic regime, instead of addressing the factors leading to the outbreak of xenophobia, continues to deny its existence, calling it instead, a criminal act. For example, Danso and McDonald (2000:14) argue that "the former President Thabo Mbeki publically stated in an address to commemorate the victims of the attacks, he had never met a xenophobic South African and anyone who called South Africans xenophobic was himself guilty of xenophobia".

Crush and Ramachandran (2014:10-11) further state that "political leaders hold the view that none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia". In 2010, for example, the then Minister of Police characterised violence against migrants as "crimes of opportunity where criminal or anti-social elements take advantage of the situation to engage in such misdeeds" (Danso & McDonald, 2000:14). These scholars further maintain that political leaders in South Africa have said that people who talk about xenophobia and Afrophobia, they are talking about semantics, and attacks on foreigners and their properties is crime disguised as xenophobia (Danso & McDonald, 2000). Other politicians argue that xenophobia does not exist in South Africa, and many acts of violence are merely crime cases (Mattes, Crush & Richmond, 2000:6-25). Similarly, some scholars have argued that "the looting, displacement and killing of foreign nationals in South Africa should not be viewed as

xenophobic attacks, but opportunistic criminal acts that have the potential to undermine the unity and cohesiveness of our communities" (Kynoch, Ulicki, Cekwane, Mohapi, Mohapi, Phakisi & Seithleko, 2001:1-44).

The failure to acknowledge the attacks as xenophobia had led to a denialism attitude, which has become a barrier to addressing the issues of xenophobia in the country. Moreover, xenophobia denialism has weakened the responses used to address the attacks. Of course, in order to address something, one must first of all accept that it exists, and then measures to address it must be put in place. It is in this light that xenophobia denialism was found as one of the major causal factors leading to the recurrence of xenophobic attacks on foreigners, year in and year out. Hence, the recurrence of xenophobic violence is an expression of the attitude of denialism, and the failure to establish measures that can help address it from the root up.

#### **4.1.5 Institutions as Causal Factor of Xenophobia**

According to the Citizens Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI, 2009:1), the racial segregation and isolation under apartheid created fertile ground for xenophobia in several ways. It is argued that "apartheid created racialised notions of identity and worth, which encouraged black South Africans to see themselves not only as inferior to whites, but also as separate from the rest of the continent" (CRAI, 2009:1). Apartheid also "institutionalised separation and compartmentalisation of various populations as a means of governance and discouraged integration or contact between groups, and institutionalised violence as a means of communicating grievances and achieving political ends" (CRAI, 2009:1). Apartheid thus served as "an antecedent to contemporary socio-political configurations and approaches to mobility and outsiders" (CRAI, 2009:2).

#### **4.1.6 Native Mind-Sets Towards Foreigners and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes**

Harris (2001:70) suggested that "Xenophobic violence produced mind-sets witnessed in present day South Africa, in that the oppression of more especially the black national during the apartheid regime caused some to be close-minded, to mistrust and remain suspicious of foreigners". As Landau (2011) noted, citizens regularly echo long-standing state discourses generally blaming foreigners and migrants for many of the country's socio-economic ills. As in official discourses, many of these popular

beliefs and perceptions centre on crime, illegality and "the image of a subtle invasion of South African territory" (Vigneswaran, 2007:144). They also centre on what is perceived to be 'illegitimate' competition for scarce resources and opportunities, including jobs, businesses, houses, social services and women.

In addition, references in the press to overwhelming 'floods' of foreigners entering the country, heighten the existing fears and defensive attitudes, specifically in the absence of reliable statistics or any credible basis for measuring the true scale of immigration (Crush & Williams, 2001). The careless use of the word 'illegal' in reference to immigrants lends credence to the criminalisation of foreigners who, in many cases, are undocumented due to administrative delays, rather than criminal intent (Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015:23-24). This is a particularly dangerous form of stereotyping, as the label 'illegal' legitimises police abuses and community 'justice' by positioning the migrant as a criminal deserving of punishment (Misago et al., 2015:23-24).

## **5. Role of Migrants in Economic Development and Growth**

In recent decades, immigration has been increasingly associated with economic prosperity in the host country. More interesting, there is a growing body of evidence that diversity and immigration drive economic prosperity, as well as reflecting it (Alesina, Harnoss & Rapoport, 2016:120). Azam and Gubert (2006) argued that migration is a decision that impacts the welfare of the household, the home community, and in the end, the whole economy in various ways. This is done through incomes from remittances that alleviate poverty. Besides pure monetary gains, migration and remittances allow for higher investment in health care and education. However, whilst migration has a somewhat positive impact to the country of origin, it also impacts the receiving country. For instance, according to Pitt (2018:29-30) and the OECD (2014), migration workers make important contributions to the labour market in both high- and low-skilled occupations. Migrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in individual benefits. Gagnon (2014) argued that migration has both direct and indirect effects on economic growth. Migration expands the workforce not only by increasing the size of the population but also by changing the age pyramid of receiving countries.

Migrants are mostly the young, energetic and economically active age groups, compared with the natives, and therefore, contribute to reduce dependency ratios. Migrants arrive with skills and abilities, and so supplement the stock of human capital of the host country. Scholars argued that immigrants contribute to boosting research and innovation, as well as increasing technological progress (Nathan, 2014:1-4; Hunt, 2010).

Hunt (2017) argues that migration can improve the domestic human capital by increasing the incentives among the local population to complete their education. The welfare gain for the destination country is because of the fact that immigration increases the supply of labour, which increases employment, production, and thus, GDP (gross domestic product) (Ortega & Peri, 2009). Ratha, Mohapatra and Scheja (2011:11) argue that immigration increases the productivity of the receiving economies through the contribution that migrants make to innovation. Pitt (2018:47) further notes that immigration generates innovation in an economy and increases the number of highly educated workers. Furthermore, immigrants increase productivity in that they free up the local workforce to move to higher productivity occupations. There is a clear connection between economic development and the growth resulting from migrants' skills and information technology innovation.

## **6. Xenophobic Violence as Violations of Migrants' Rights**

Odiaka (2017:60) notes that xenophobia leads to non-citizens being denied of their rights and access to justice which are guaranteed in domestic and international law. The overarching international instrument for the protection of human rights remains the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) with its ancillary treaties, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) among others. Since these instruments apply to all human beings, they apply to both citizens and non-citizens alike, irrespective of where the person comes from, and they safeguard everyone from arbitrary arrest and detention, arbitrary killing, torture and inhumane treatment. Migrants' rights to proper documentation is in most cases strained due to burdensome issues and complicated procedures. Most often applicants have

to travel long distances at a great cost, to queue for prolonged periods of time to obtain renewed permits. The offices for renewal are inaccessible and place added financial burden on them, over and above their needs for basic survival (Hovhannisyan, Baum, Ogude & Sarkar, 2018:29).

Immigrants who are vulnerable to xenophobic violence by locals are denied their right to access basic services, such as health care. In support of this, Mabera (2017:29) and Mudzanani (2016:339) state that "African foreigners and refugees in South Africa are regarded as people who compete for essential resources such as housing, health care and education intended for local citizens". Hickel (2014:106) confirms that "residents hold the perception that they have not long been given the chance to enjoy their newfound freedom and democratic rights, before having to share the fruits of democracy with non-nationals who flooded the country post-apartheid". Hovhannisyan et al. (2018:23) concur that "refugees and asylum seekers are unable to open bank accounts due to their lack of relevant documentation". Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni (2011:138) argue that the perpetration of xenophobic acts not only affects the social spheres of society but also comprises a core attribute of human rights' violations. In terms of human rights' violations, the aspect of death and displacement of people are of crucial concern. This is because the immediate outcome of violence following such humanitarian crises comes with consequences, such as shortages of shelter, food, medical care and sanitation in crudely constructed temporary accommodation, such as in police stations, churches and even petrol stations. Xenophobic violence also works against the dictates of Articles five and nine of the UDHR Laws (Ilesanmi, 2008:280-281).

## **7. Effects of Xenophobic Violence on South Africa's Role in International Diplomacy**

Xenophobic violence continues to affect South Africa's standing in international relations and global governance, as well as its ambitions in Africa and the world.

### **7.1 Effects on Exporting Democracy and Peacebuilding to Other States**

Xenophobic violence has an immense effect on South Africa's ambition of exporting democracy

and peacebuilding to other African states that face conflicts. Unfortunately, the endemic recurrence of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa has been variously labelled as the "dark side of democracy" (Crush, 1997:51-59), a "new pathology apartheid vertigo" (Rogerson, 1997:62-64), and evidence of the "demonic" nature of South African society (Reitzes & Crawhall, 1998:64-70). This brings about contradictions, as the prevailing xenophobic violence has caused South Africa to be labelled as a country with dark democracy. This is because South Africa is exporting democracy to others, while at home, foreigners and migrants are being denied their freedom; and yet freedom for all, and rights for all are the values of democracy.

### **7.2 Effects on Human Rights Protection as an Essential Ingredient for Peace and Security Diplomacy**

South Africa's goal has been to export the tenets of human rights' protection to other African states, as a precondition for achieving sustainable peace in their countries. South African, being a country that has a history of serious human rights violations, has set up itself as an example for other states in Africa. However, xenophobia that manifests as a kind of violation of migrants and migrants' rights, contradicts this ambition. There is strong evidence that 'outsiders', which can be regarded as a group that includes non-nationals, domestic migrants and others living and working in South Africa, face discrimination. This comes at the hands of citizens, government officials, the police, and private organisations contracted to manage and provide services, whether to promote urban development or manage detention and deportation processes.

Shillinger (2009:17) describes South Africa as a "constant architect of Africa's new peace and security architecture". In the post-apartheid era, South Africa has been involved in various peacekeeping, as well as preventative diplomacy and mediation efforts on the African continent (Pfister, 2006:31). Examples of these include Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The country has remained involved in Burundi, the DRC and South Sudan through peacekeeping and Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) activities (Hendricks & Lucey, 2013). Migrants still face difficulties in accessing employment, accommodation, banking services, and health care, along with extortion, targeted corruption, arbitrary arrest,

detention and deportation (Landau et al., 2004; Crush, 2008). While arrest, detention and deportation are fundamental components of the country's immigration regime, research over the last two decades suggests that such practices are carried out in ways that are not only highly prejudicial, but often extend well beyond legal limits (Amit, 2010).

Xenophobic violence, in particular, has become a longstanding feature in post-apartheid South Africa. Since 1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, attacked, or killed because of their status as migrants (Landau & Haithar, 2007; Landau, 2011). During this period, what might be termed xenophobic violence has increased across townships and informal settlements, although, in the absence of centralised and standardised recording mechanisms, it is possible that it is also just being noticed and reported on more (Murray, 2003; Landau & Haithar, 2007; Landau, 2011). Johwa (2008:12) alerted that "Xenophobia against other Africans is currently on the rise and must be nipped in the bud". Johwa also argued that all anti-xenophobia responses have had minimal effects.

### **7.3 Lack of Good Governance**

Good governance has been an issue of concern in the post-apartheid era. Studies have determined that the violence is generally caused by the failure to govern and control migration flows, poor border control, poor service delivery, poverty, unemployment, corruption and/or the rising prices of basic commodities (Landau & Misago, 2009). Moreover, the failure of governance in townships has been triggering xenophobic violence. Misago (2011) argued that the recurrence of xenophobic violence in May 2008 was rooted in the micro-politics of township and informal settlement life. Violence against migrants is, in most cases, organised and led by local groups and individuals attempting to claim or consolidate power and authority to further political and economic interests (Misago, 2011).

Violence against migrants is just "politics by other means" and its instrumental motives are located in local political economy and micro-political processes (Misago, 2011). It is the product of a failed good governance for the people (Choane et al., 2011:130). It is also both nationalist and localised politics rather than an inevitable outcome of multi-ethnic or multi-national diversity amidst social and economic marginalisation" (Misago et

al., 2015:24). It is clear that the failure of the government to deliver quality and proper services to the citizens causes resentment and unhappiness among the population. Social protests including xenophobia are triggered by poor governance and distribution of basic needs to sustain livelihood result from a lack of service delivery by government officials" (Choane et al., 2011:133). Poor governance has become "factors that increase unemployment, poverty and homelessness, especially in poor black communities due to aggressive competition for jobs and housing for natives" (Harvey, 2008:9). The prevalence disparity in "wealth distribution has created a significant gap between the rich and the poor, thus building up resentment and frustration in ordinary citizens, especially in the blacks" (Burns, 2008:120). It also includes "the insecurity and annoyance over the unsatisfactory and inadequate rate of service delivery and consultation in general, and over housing conditions and administration most pointedly" (HSRC, 2008:6). Choane et al. (2011:133) argued that "such sentiments therefore lead to various forms of violence, among which are the xenophobic hostilities against migrants, especially black immigrants".

The acute xenophobic situation in South Africa, especially with regard to the insufficient service delivery, has really been the responsibility of the government. This is because the hostilities, as outlined by the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) (2008:6) are the expression of citizens' frustration over the slow pace of service delivery, consultation, housing provision and administration, in particular, as well as the corruption and insolence of government officials, especially in the Police Service and in the Department of Home Affairs. The inefficient service delivery system, which has triggered the socio-economic conflicts in South Africa, has exposed the government's inability to dutifully serve the people (Webb, 2008:6).

### **7.4 Effects on African Renaissance Diplomacy Agenda**

South Africa's ambition in the post-apartheid era has been to propagate to the rest of Africa the African Renaissance doctrine as the prerequisite for solving African problems in an African way. This ambition started during Mandela's presidency and was put forward by Mbeki's presidency. Kunze (2016) explained that the African Renaissance is the concept that African people and nations will overcome the current challenges confronting the

continent and achieve cultural, scientific, and economic renewal. In addition, Gumede (2015) said that the African renaissance doctrine calls for action that strengthens programme for the renewal of the African continent.

South Africa's diplomacy understands the African Renaissance to be a concept that implies a revival of an Africa of hope and prosperity, with a positive vision of Africa as a peaceful continent. Furthermore, Chakale and Olifile (2018:175) declared that South Africa's efforts regarding the African Renaissance is a call for Africans to embrace the democratic and market-orientated factors that attract foreign traders and investors, as well as ensuring "the return of thousands of talented Africans and billions of flight capital now in safe havens abroad".

South Africa also seeks to encourage all Africans to confront the harsh realities on our continent and to take greater responsibility for reversing them (Chakale & Olifile, 2018:175). Stremlau (1999) argued that South Africa advancing the African Renaissance is a call to all Africans to solve their problems, and to position the continent in the global order, on the basis of advancing peace and prosperity throughout Africa and enhancing Africa's influence in world affairs. However, this ambition has been affected and thwarted by the recurrence of the xenophobic violence in the country directed at migrants. This violence has mostly targeted fellow Africans, while the country in her diplomatic relationships with African states, has been propagating and championing the African Renaissance. Therefore, this ambition is affected and presents more contradictions, and corrupts South Africa's call for an African Renaissance, while the same Africans are hunted to death and their rights not protected in the country.

### **7.5 Effects on South-South Cooperation Diplomacy**

South Africa has centred much of its post-apartheid foreign policy formulation on a commitment to human rights and to Africa's development (Alden & Le Pere, 2006:52). This commitment has been visible in the prominent role that South Africa has played in the area of peace and security on the continent. Pretoria has contributed more towards development (Lucey & Gida, 2014). South Africa's membership of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) increases its influence and enables it to

advance African interests more effectively. With the launch of South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), which is meant to coordinate South Africa's outgoing development cooperation, South Africa has the opportunity to streamline its development cooperation in terms of its peacebuilding and PCRD activities (Kok, 2014:12).

Alden & Le Pere (2006:57) argued that "Southern Africa, Africa and the South" have been described as forming "the regional axes of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy". The ambition of being active internationally, and playing a key role in solving issues confronting the global world has been a feature of the South Africa's international diplomacy foreign policy. In this regard, South Africa contributes towards the transformation of the global system of governance from being power-based to a rules-based system in a just and equitable global order (South African Government, 2011:7). However, this ambition has been affected by the recurrences of xenophobic violence against migrants.

### **7.6 Effects on Economic Diplomacy in the Region**

South Africa supports the trend of likeminded countries forming 'groupings outside the formal multilateral structures' to address issues affecting the international community. The White Paper lists the G-20, Basic, Major Economies Forum, BRICS and IBSA as examples of such groupings (South African Government, 2011:24). As a country, South Africa strongly supports multilateralism as a response to managing globalisation and the "deepening interdependence of national economies" (South African Government, 2011:24). In this regard, South Africa has committed to participate actively in BRICS, "whose members are reshaping the global economic and political order" (South African Government, 2011:26). The identity of South Africa within IBSA and BRICS, and its adherence to the principles of solidarity, non-interference and mutual benefit, are very important. As South Africa becomes increasingly ambitious and plays an ever-growing role, both on the continent and globally, it has to ensure that it holds on to its identity and to its initial post-apartheid foreign policy principles (Kok, 2014:12).

## **8. Conclusion and Recommendations**

The article explained that the recurrence of xenophobic violence against foreigners and the failure

to institute adequate responses to address the violence, continue to affect South Africa's reputation in the region and her international relations. It was found that xenophobic violence will ruin the image of the country abroad and have immense repercussions on the country's conduct in terms of international diplomacy with other states. Various studies have found that the violence thwarts all the country's efforts in exporting its agenda to other African states. The agenda of peace, democracy and protection of human rights as the prerequisite for sustainable peace and development lose value, as the country is seen not to protect the rights of migrants.

Xenophobic violence harms the relationships between South Africa and other states in Africa, and beyond. The ambition of becoming an economic hegemony in the region and Africa is also affected, as the country needs to understand the role of migrants in promoting economic growth and in the application of economic diplomacy. The country's Panafricanism and African Renaissance diplomacy for African states are also affected by the recurrence of xenophobic violence. Moreover, the failure to govern migrations and to protect the rights of migrants defeat the country's diplomacy and ambitions, and scars the country's image in the international society.

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