



**ROLE OF SADC'S PEACE KEEPING MISSION: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE LESOTHO CONFLICT**

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
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## DECLARATION

I, Vhangani Thambulo John, student at the University of Venda hereby declare that the dissertation for the degree of Master of International Relations at the University of Venda, hereby submitted by me, has not been previously submitted for a degree at this or any another institution and that this is my own work in design and execution. All reference materials contained therein have been duly acknowledged.

Signature:  Date: 15/12/2015

## ABSTRACT

The overall aim of the study is **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT** SADC's peace keeping mission: A case study of South Africa in the Lesotho conflict. The researcher used the Realist paradigm of international relations to refute South Africa's realist claim that the

Research is not a simple task to perform without the assistance, guidance and inspiration from others. A lot of people have contributed in various forms and I would sincerely like to thank all them. Special mention is due to my supervisor, professor, R.R. Molapo for his professional guidance. My wife, Tshenu, my daughters, Anzani and Phodzo, my twin sons, Mudinda and Murunwa for their inspiration. My mom, Mukondeleli, my siblings: Rich, Thidziambi and Gideon. A special thanks goes to my friends and colleagues at Ratshikwekwete and Nzwelule schools, and also the Typist and editor, Ms. Matombo Avhakholwi.

South Africa to attack another state. The study used qualitative techniques for data collection and analysis. Qualitative techniques were mostly used in that they provided the researcher with an understanding to investigate the role of SADC's peace keeping mission: A case study of South Africa in the Lesotho conflict. Both primary and secondary data were used for analysis in the study. Secondary data were obtained from government publications, other publications, and reports. In this context, the researcher argue that South Africa appear to have used the intervention, as a realist foreign policy tool, to pursue its strategic and economic interests, especially without authorization from the UN, the AU and the SADC.

## ABSTRACT

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The overall aim of the study is to investigate the role of SADC's peace keeping mission: A case study of South Africa in the Lesotho conflict. The researcher used the Realist paradigm of international relations to refute South Africa's rationalist claim that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) sanctioned the armed intervention, and that it was aimed at promoting democracy and stability. Realists interpret world politics as a struggle for power and survival in the anarchic world. The report therefore seeks to (a) determine the reasons for military intervention and the extent to which it was conducted on humanitarian grounds; (b) investigate the degree to which the intervention by the South African state was encouraged by national interests; and (c) determine the nature of involvement by the SADC, African Union (AU) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the 1998 intervention, to allow South Africa to attack another state. The study used qualitative techniques for data collection and analysis. Qualitative techniques were mostly used in that they provided the researcher with an understanding to investigate the role of SADC's peace keeping mission: A case study of South Africa in the Lesotho conflict. Both primary and secondary data were used for analysis in the study. Secondary data were obtained from government publications, other publications, and reports. In this context, the researcher argue that South Africa appear to have used the intervention, as a realist foreign policy tool, to pursue its strategic and economic interests, especially without authorization from the UN, the AU and the SADC.

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.1 Introduction

South Africa's peacekeeping role emerged within the context of a changed landscape in Africa. The colonial legacy, the struggles against colonial rule, and its subsequent replacement with post-colonial governments shadowed by a global Cold War in the early 1990's. This was replaced by a myriad of internal conflicts which continue until today. These internal conflicts manifest themselves in violent armed rebellion between governments and opposition or militia groups. These internal conflicts are generally characterised by armed groups built around the issue of identity.

In a number of countries these identities existed harmoniously within the context of indigenous forms of social organisation. Colonial rule, however, sought to accentuate these differences between identity groups within a country by recognising some groups as superior to others, thereby creating rivalry based on stereotypes that categorised people as inferior and superior. In the cases of Burundi and Rwanda minority groups were categorised as superior and used by their colonial masters to dominate and rule over the majority granting onto them the power to subjugate the majority. These categorisations became, over time, entrenched social formations that prevail today and account for the protracted nature of conflict within the socio-political landscape.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the changing nature of international politics and subsequent conflicts, being mostly intra-state, as well as increasing demands for peacekeeping during the 1990s, have put a huge burden on the capabilities and resources of not only the United Nations (UN), but also participating countries. The unprecedented demand for peacekeepers was complicated by the changing role they would have to play. Peacekeepers were not expected to intervene in hostile conflicts, which is a non-consensual function for them to fulfil. Humanitarian peacekeeping refers to monitoring and protecting of human rights and security and the alleviation of human suffering in South Africa. It is commonly known that UN peacekeepers failed in many instances to meet these daunting challenges, especially in Africa where the scope and intensity of violence during the 1990s were great. According to the Special Report on peacekeeping in Africa the continent was plagued by 16 armed conflicts in 1999 alone (Docking 2001:1). Seven of these armed conflicts each reflected battle-related deaths of more than a 1 000 people.

### 1.2 Background of the study

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent introduction of democracy in South Africa after many years of apartheid changed the political thinking in Southern Africa as a whole. The former Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference

(SADCC) member countries abandoned their old policy of isolation towards Pretoria, and embraced South Africa into the regional fold. This was underpinned by the move to transform SADCC into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 as South Africa was preparing for its first multiracial elections. SADC differs from its predecessor in that it goes beyond just economic co-operation to a higher level of economic integration and security co-operation in the region.

Political changes in South Africa also brought an end to cross-border military confrontations between Pretoria and its neighbours, thereby bringing all countries in the region together in a way never seen before. However, this does not mean that the region is now going to live in complete bliss. Instead it has awakened SADC to internal problems within individual countries which could be a threat to regional security. It has also helped the region come to terms with the economic and security needs of the post apartheid and post Cold War era such as the need to strengthen regional ties through economic development and the development of a regional peacekeeping capacity to deal with threats to regional peace and security.

The profound increase in the frequency of civil wars throughout the world and the resultant need for the United Nations (UN) to intervene have compelled the world body to call upon regional organisations to assist in preserving world peace by resolving local conflicts before they become a threat to international peace. Hence the emergence of regional peacekeeping initiatives in the SADC region and many other regions throughout the world. Peace support operations entail a range of activities including peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and peace-enforcement.

These categories are not mutually exclusive, and the distinctions between them are often unclear (Cilliers et al, 1995). As Goulding points out, peacekeeping as a conflict management technique has been developed mainly by the UN to help manage and resolve armed conflicts among nations. Nevertheless, this does not have an established definition of peacekeeping (Goulding 1993: 452).

The International Peacekeeping Academy defines peacekeeping as, "The prevention, containment, moderation or termination of hostilities between states through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally using multilateral forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain order" (Mackinelay, 1989: 1). International peacekeeping can usefully be understood in two categories, namely traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping. Under traditional peacekeeping, operations of unarmed or lightly armed forces are stationed between warring factions to police cease-fires while political settlements monitoring of buffer zones to include such activities as post war state-building, organising and monitoring elections (Doyle et al. 1997).

The distinction between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations is clear in theory but it has proven difficult to maintain in practice. Peacekeepers have fallen

into the trap of shifting from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement on a number of occasions. Somalia, Liberia, Les and Bosnia are just a few such cases. As Thakur argues, once peacekeepers take sides in a conflict they lose their political usefulness as mechanisms of confidence building between warring factions (Thakur 1987). Preventive deployment normally consists of civilians and/or military forces being deployed to avert a crisis. Preventive diplomacy is diplomacy which is specifically directed towards conflict resolution (Annan, 1997: 58).

For preventive diplomacy to be effective an elaborate early warning system and confidence building measures need to be in place. Following from this, preventive deployment of observers and/or peacekeeping troops may be necessary in some cases to support diplomatic initiatives. Peace-enforcement involves using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. A peace enforcement operation does not require consent from a host state because it is an act of war (Utunnu, 1995). Peace-enforcement operations range from low-level military missions to protect buffer zones, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance among other things, to fully fledged enforcement action to roll back aggression (Doyle, 1997) are negotiated. Multidimensional peacekeeping on the other hand goes beyond the policing and

### 1.3 Statement of the problem

South Africa's peacekeeping role emerged within the context of a changed landscape in Africa. The colonial legacy, the struggles against colonial rule, and its subsequent replacement with post colonial governments shadowed by a global Cold War ended in the early 1990's. This was replaced by a myriad of internal conflicts which continue until today. These internal conflicts manifest themselves in violent armed rebellion between governments and opposition or militia groups. International peacekeeping has gained a high profile in international relations and more so, in the post-cold war era. The profound increase in the occurrence of civil wars globally and the consequent high demand for the UN to intervene has compelled the world body to delegate its peacekeeping powers to regional organisations. SADC is one of many regional organisations around the world which are faced with the challenge of developing peacekeeping capacities to resolve local conflicts. This study investigated the microcosmic level peace operations that failed because of practical factors ranging from operational inadequacies to inconsistencies in the rules of engagement, poor soldier discipline, poor installation security, inadequate intelligence and training, as well as inadequate negotiation skills in Lesotho to South Africa

## 1.4 Research Aim

The overall aim of the study is to investigate the role of SADC's peace keeping mission: In the Lesotho conflict in this investigation the study sees the role of SADC and SA in the resolution of the conflict.

## 1.5 Research Objectives

- To provide an analysis of South Africa's role in peacekeeping in Lesotho and to identify South Africa's national interest in Lesotho
- To investigate the challenges that confronted South Africa's peacekeeping mission
- To examine the decision-making processes that led to the deployment of South African peacekeepers to Lesotho
- To measure whether the current South African policy expectations for peace missions adequately addressed the peacekeeping need in Lesotho

## 1.6 Research Questions

- What is the role of South Africa's in peacekeeping in Lesotho?
- What are the challenges that confronted South Africa's peacekeeping mission?
- What are the decision-making processes that led to the deployment of South African peacekeepers to Lesotho?
- What are the current South African policy expectations for peace missions adequately addressed the peacekeeping need in Lesotho?

## 1.7 Limitation of the study

Funds are a limiting factor as the study required a lot of funds for travelling, typing, binding and photocopying. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, some people felt uncomfortable to answer research questions because they were not sure where the information will be taken to.

## 1.8 Significance of the study

The study's significance lies in the fact that it will contribute to the range of policy options available to the South African government in its quest to play a constructive role on the African continent. The findings of this research will help clarify regional and international conceptions on South Africa-Africa relations. The study will help to clarify the conceptual controversy surrounding South Africa's role on the continent and to settle the issue whether South Africa should be epitomised as a partner.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the prospects of peacekeeping in Lesotho, with specific reference to South Africa's involvement in these initiatives. The

perception of a decision to be involved despite a great demand on the new democracy to address socio-economic disparities between the traditionally disadvantaged and advantaged sectors of the population were caused by apartheid will be critically discussed. The clash between this demand and the need to be involved in regional peacekeeping initiatives has triggered a fierce debate between those who resent greater involvement and those who advocate it.

## 1.9 Definition of the terms

**Peacekeeping-** mission as the activity of keeping peace by military forces when two hostile groups or nations are fighting.

**Permissive environment** refers to the breakdown of law and order, socioeconomic

**Xenophobia** refers to negative attitudes and violent actions against foreigners in South Africa.

**Illegal immigrant** refers to people in a country other than their country of origin without official documentation.

**Apartheid is** a racist political policy in south Africa demanding segregation of the nation`s whites and non-white people.

**Coup de tat** is a sudden attempt by a small group of people to take over the government through violence

**Corruption is** a dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery and it destroys people's trust in the person or group.

**Constitutional reform** it is alteration of the constitution, whether a modification, deletion or election.

**Judicial reforms** is the complete or partial political reforms of a country's judiciary and it is done as part of wider reform of the country's political system or a legal reform.

**Facilitator** someone who engage in the activity of facilitation as he/she helps a group of people to understand their common objectives to achieve the objectives.

**Tension of reference is** the scope and limitation of an activity or area of knowledge that is used for a project, meeting or negotiations.

**Multilateral approach** means involving more than two groups or countries.

**Parliamentary election** is an election to select member of a national parliament

**Commission of inquiry** refers to individuals employed during conciliation to investigate the facts of a particular dispute and submit a report stating the facts and proposing terms for the resolution of the differences.

**Military intervention** is the use of armed forces in operations that were intended to resolve the conflict once and for all

**Foreign policy** it is government's strategy in dealing with other nations

**Realistic foreign policy** orchestrated attempted by one or many people to address serious problem

**Cold war state** of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda and other measures short of warfare especially between America and soviet black

**Economic integration** process in which two or more states in a more broadly defined, geographical area reduce a range of trade barriers to advance or protect a set of economic goals.

**Realism** the quality of a person who understand what is real and possible in a particular situation.

**Conflict resolution** a process of resolving disputes or disagreement in a minor that promotes and protects the human rights of all parties concerned.

**National security** it is a concept that a government along with its parliament should protect the state and its citizens against all kind of national crises through a variety of power projections such as political power, diplomacy, economic power, military might and so on.

**Qualitative method** it is primarily exploratory research which is used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions and motivation. It also help to develop ideas or hypothesis.

**Conflict** is the state of tension or hostility that exist between or among groups , o parties that want to achieve their incompatible goals at the same time. In this report conflict refers to Lesotho political parties that were in coalition government or against the coalition government.

**Constitution** refers to the body of fundamental principles or established precedents according to which a state or organization is governed.

**Coalition government** is a cabinet of a parliamentary governments in which several political parties cooperate reducing the dominance of any one party within that coalition.

**Bilateral relation** refers to an agreement that involves two countries, two groups or two people.

**Good governance** refers to use of legitimate political authority and the exercise of control over a society and the efficient management of its resources for social and economic development.

**Negotiations** refers to the way in which an agreement or compromise is reached through discussions.

**Reconciliation** means the restoration of friendly relations between political parties or different groups of people.

**Refugee** is a person who has been forced to leave his/her country in order to escape war, persecution or natural disaster.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction

Regional organisations throughout the world are under increasing pressure from the United Nations (UN) and the traditional peacekeeping countries to take responsibility for managing and resolving conflicts in their regions. This chapter discusses the viability of the Southern African region developing a peacekeeping capacity. This will be achieved by looking at the historical background against which the region has attempted to achieve unity in dealing with security concerns. An overview of the historical development and prospects of peacekeeping by Africans in Africa will also be taken into account. Furthermore, the motives behind South Africa's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives will be analysed in relation to its national interests in the region. Finally, the problems that confront the region as it moves towards a collaborative approach towards regional security will be examined.

### 2.2 South Africa's contribution in peacekeeping missions

It appears South Africa learnt a valuable lesson from its contested military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. Since 2000, South Africa has played an active role in peacekeeping missions in the continent, whether as part of the AU and or the UN. The country has deployed its troops and military observers in many places, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Comoros, Sudan and Central African Republic as well as in Nepal.

The expertise and experience of the South African army in peacekeeping missions would prove very critical in the effectiveness of the SADC Brigade. The dominant and central role that South Africa plays in the SADC region on security and related matters cannot be simply ignored. The military strength of the apartheid regime was outlined earlier on. The post-apartheid government has moved quickly to improve relations with its neighbouring states. It also engages other states with greater caution, especially after the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho. It is undeniable that the country's hegemonic status, from its massive economic weight and power, will always drive any strategic peace and security moves in the region. South Africa accounts for more than eighty per cent of the GDP of the SADC. This economic strength permits it to participate in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in the region and in the continent. Docking T: 2001 applauds South Africa's new peacemaking and peacekeeping role by stating that: In a short decade and a half, the country has gone from being the most destabilizing force in Africa to being its most active peacemaker.

It appears that South Africa's political and economic stability are vital for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping missions in the sub-region and in Africa as a whole.

The main point of concern, however, is that the institutions responsible for Africa's security architecture are weak, lacking financial and logistical means. They depend on foreign funds to carry out AU missions in the troubled spots across the continent. For instance, the Sout Africa peacekeeping mission in Darfur between 2000 and 2007 was financed, almost entirely, through donated funds. [www.un.org/facts.shtm](http://www.un.org/facts.shtm). This over reliance on external donors makes the AU's peace and security missions not viable and unsustainable in the long run. However, this situation is unlikely to improve soon as many of the African states remain fragmented and politically weak. The positive developments in the area of peace and security in Africa pertain to South Africa's participation in the United Nations Security Council. Nigeria and Gabon are also non-permanent members of the UNSC.

In the past, the UNSC has done little or nothing to increase the capacity of African regional organizations as well as to collaborate effectively with them. However, it was hoped that South Africa's increased role in world affairs, and in the UNSC, would build a strong case for the credible involvement of the UNSC in Africa. The events unfolding in Libya certainly prove that the issues of political stability in Africa have a long way to go. External influence by the world's powerful states in African issues undermines the development of a viable continental security and peacekeeping infrastructure.

### **2.3. Reasons for the 1998 Military Deployment in Lesotho**

The background is that Lesotho had seven (07) coups since the 1970s. Previous together with Botswana and Mozambique had been asked by the Southern Development Community (SADC) to attend to the problem of the 1994 coups in Lesotho. Likoti (2006)

The latest crisis was due to the results of the elections held in Lesotho in May 1998. The results revealed that the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LDC) obtained seventy nine (79) of a possible eighty (80) seats. Opposition parties demonstrated and raised objections. After SADC had intervened, it was agreed that a commission of inquiry should be held into the election. The commission was headed by retired South African Judge Pius Langa. The commission was given only two weeks to deal with the election matter. Makoa (1999)

The results of the commission revealed that there were some irregularities, but it was difficult to prove that the government was responsible for those irregularities. The situation turned worse when the rebel soldiers of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) removed the entire command structure of the army. On the other hand protesters started to confiscate government cars and threatened ministers. This was regarded as coup since the legitimate government had been forcefully removed. However, South Africa insisted that they had been asked to intervene. Nwangi (2007).

The following weak points were identified.

- South Africa had no clear national security policy i.e. the order for a military intervention came as a surprise.
- There was too little time for a proper planning cycle in the absence of a contingency plan.
- There was too little time for deployment drills.
- There had been a lack of cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs.
- There was no briefing by the Defence Secretariat before the operation.
- Experts had all the training but lacked experience in the operations.
- There was limited intelligence liaison
- Lack of air photographs that were essential for the operation
- A minimal flow of central intelligence
- There was no time for force preparation
- There was no financial support available
- The participating units were not combat ready
- Backloading of weapons
- SA army was reserves depleted due to budgetary restrictions
- Limited reserves on rational packs
- Units arrived unprepared.
- Lack of external communication, visitors, interfered with time for commanding.
- Lack of media liaison.
- Intelligence available was outdated.

(<http://www.mil.za/secretariat/boleas/boleas.htm> accessed 13/10/2015).

#### **2.4. Lesotho: Lessons and Challenges after a SADC Intervention, 1998**

Since its independence in 1966, Lesotho a small state with a peculiar geopolitical position and features of structural dependence in relation to South Africa has had to exercise its self-determination and sovereignty within this constraining environment. In this context, Lesotho has faced and continues to face dilemmas of economic and political survival. In determining their survival options, small states have to accept the following given features:

International economic dynamics, particularly in this era of globalisation, do not recognise the greater relative exposure of small states to exogenous economic dynamics which they have a limited capacity to influence, even though these determine economic survival options for small open economies.

The regionalisation process, where states in a sub-region form regional blocs for co-operation and integration has necessitated the creation of supranational frameworks like SADC where countries become stakeholders in the development

and security concerns of their neighbours. In essence, given the imperatives of regionalism, the question for small states is no longer whether they should take part in regionalism, but what kind of regionalism best suits them. The major challenge facing these regional institutions is to manage the legacies of dependence and countervail the hegemonic tendencies of big states in the economic and security spheres. Likoti (2006)

As small states that are, by definition, generally reliant in security and military terms, their capacity to exercise their sovereignty and assert their interests is dependent on a general environment of support and solidarity at the regional and sub regional levels. In order to safeguard their vital strategic interests, these states are obliged to become members of regionalised interstate defence and security frameworks. Increasingly, these states are collaborating in enhancing their collective capacity to undertake joint peacekeeping exercises. The critical insight from the determinants identified above is that exogenous factors play a predominant role in determining the economic and political survival options of small states both at the global and sub-regional levels.

In light of the contextual factors identified above, the focus falls below on the specific features of Lesotho which have rendered it open to external intervention. It is generally accepted that small states are susceptible to risks and threats, both from internal and external sources. Such states have a relatively lower threshold than larger states, given the interaction between size and vulnerability. As a concept, vulnerability is determined by the interaction of identified, crucial factors that determine the survival capabilities of a given small state. The following aspects of vulnerability can be identified for Lesotho:

- Physical and environmental vulnerability, i.e. carrying capacity limits due to land scarcity, over-stocking, population pressure, meagre resources and limited livelihood choices;
- Economic dependence on a dominant neighbour and asymmetrical relationships;
- Geopolitical vulnerability due to the status of being landlocked in relation to a dominant neighbour; and
- Weak state institutions and political processes due to legacies of authoritarian and military rule these weak or soft institutions lack the capacity to manage and contain the pressure and stress of transition to a multiparty democracy and the virulent political contestation between rival parties. Chingorom Nakanas (2009).

The characteristics outlined above provided the environment that made the transition to multiparty democracy and the consolidation of this fragile democracy so problematic in Lesotho in the period 1993 to 1998. This period

was characterised by chronic political instability, failure to manage the process of demilitarisation and civil military relations effectively, as well as intraparty conflicts and political party fragmentation. The role, functions and legitimacy of the electoral management system were severely tested. Hence, from this perspective, the 1998 political crisis over the administration and outcome of the election was the most violent manifestation of a multifaceted political crisis with deep socio-economic roots in a stressed socio-political environment.

**In general, the key elements of this crisis can be outlined as follows:**

- intense rivalry between élite-dominated political parties over access to state power and state resources within a worsening environment of poverty, unemployment and limited economic options;
- structural youth unemployment and social/political exclusions of the youth, except when they are mobilised for short-term ends by belligerent political parties; and
- An electoral system that gives unfair advantage to a dominant party in terms of the 'first-past-the-post' system. (winners-takes all election)

The factors outlined above combined to create a volatile situation and a political crisis in the context of protests by aggrieved opposition parties over the 1998 elections. The situation of chaos and anarchy that ensued precipitated the SADC intervention in August and September 1998.

## **2.5. Devolution of responsibility**

The benefits and constraints of regional organisations' involvement in peace operations can be analysed on two levels. Firstly, seen from the perspective of a cash-strapped UN, regional organisations offer the benefit of alleviating financial problems for the world body by assuming some of its peacekeeping responsibilities. Politically, such a devolution of responsibility for action threatens to undermine UN guidance and control, and thus, in the process, the impartiality and legitimacy of the UN. It could also further undermine the already parlous state of UN finances, should the UN look towards the region to carry at least some of the burden itself - which seems inevitable. As a result, if a country such as South Africa, Botswana or Zimbabwe was directly contributing to the peacekeeping activities of a regional organisation such as SADC or the OAU, it could readily complain that it is carrying an extra burden in addition to its assessments for UN peacekeeping. Ncube M. (1991)

Secondly, whereas peacekeeping missions during the Cold War-era were exclusively UN affairs, the UN has recently come to share responsibilities in the

field with regional organisations, such as the CIS, (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Georgia, and with a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in former Yugoslavia. Although a regional organisation such as NATO has greater operational force coherence than any multinational UN force, this does not hold true in Africa and neither within SADC, where there is little prospect of doctrinal, command and equipment coherence in the short to medium term, despite the laudatory rhetorical commitments to this objective made by the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) in Southern Africa.

A further complication arises in cases where the UN hands over authority and jurisdiction to a non-UN multilateral force, as happened in Somalia (from the UN Organisation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to the UN Transitional Authority (UNITAF), or where the UN takes over authority and jurisdiction from such a force (as happened in Haiti). Nupend (2004). These arrangements have not only complicated the role of the UN, but also that of peace keepers in general - a development exacerbated by the increased civilianisation of peacekeeping. This occurred largely as a result of the growth of UN involvement in second-generation peacekeeping: in situations where the humanitarian assistance and nation-building responsibilities of the UN have expanded dramatically in response to the collapse of normal state institutions. Chingono M & Nakasa S. (2009)

The most important, and potentially most dangerous development, however, is that the use of a regional organisation in peacekeeping operations could lead to the loss of control over an operation by the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General. While authority to establish a force rests solely on the sovereign powers of the overarching organ, e.g. the UN, authority to deploy is derived, in part, from the consent of the host country. The principle of consent and request by the host country is essential for the establishment of a peace support operation in any sovereign territory, except when the mandate of the responsible international organisation indicates otherwise, or where there is effectively no host government to which the UN can turn - as was the case in Somalia. (Amusa: 2010).

Regional organisation, on the other hand, could also be constrained by the UN resolutions which provided its mandate to such an extent, that it is not able to operate successfully. Resolution requirements specifying modes of operation and principles of impartiality sometimes diminish the ability of a regional organisation to be effective and, as a consequence, tarnish its reputation. This is particularly salient, given the limited resources that may be made available by the UN in a region such as Southern Africa, or that are available in the region itself. Deconing: (1998).

## 2.6 Historical background

The liberation struggle against apartheid in South Africa affected neighbouring countries very profoundly. For instance, to countries such as Mozambique and Angola the cost of this liberation struggle was crushing, and almost paralysed the economic machinery of these countries. In an attempt to stop the neighbouring countries from harbouring South African refugees who fled apartheid, the South African government used proxy forces which claimed to be fighting for legitimate political rights in their respective countries. Likoti (2006)

It supported the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). These surrogate armies were South Africaed not only to track down the South African guerrilla forces fighting apartheid, but also to destroy these countries' social and economic infrastructure. Not only did Pretoria defend the apartheid system by force but it displayed a readiness and penchant for invading neighbouring countries. There were several direct attacks on a number of these countries by the South African Defence Force (SADF). For instance, the SADF raided Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, on the 9th of December 1982, killing forty two people of whom ten were Lesotho nationals (Makoa, 1994). Angola and Mozambique bore the greatest brunt of the Republic's destabilization policy, with the former experiencing a full blown war with the SADF from 1977 to 1978. However, the end of this war did not mean the end of Pretoria's military involvement in Angola. "Between 1981 and 1985 the SADF carried out two hundred and thirty airborne raids, ninety strafing missions, seventy four ground attacks and four naval landings in Angola" (Ncube, 1991: 62). The Mozambican railway lines and the mining industry upon which the country's economy depends were destroyed by MNR and the SADF. The twenty year civil war in this country which was fuelled by the destabilisation policy shattered the country's economy. The greater part of the fertile agricultural land in Mozambique cannot be utilised to date because of land mines which were planted during the war.

## 2.7. Foreign assistance

A thorny issue implicit in the regional initiatives towards a fully developed collaborative security regime is that it will be difficult for Southern Africa to sustain a substantial peacekeeping capacity without assistance from outside the region and the continent. The (SOUTH AFRICA) and France have expressed interest in helping African countries in this regard. The British have already assisted with R400 000 for the joint peacekeeping exercise in Zimbabwe in 1997 (Hartnack, 1997). The (SOUTH AFRICA) ambassador to South Africa has made it clear that his country is prepared to help (Joseph, 1997). At the same time, the ambassador and his compatriots are at pains to point out how modest their country's interest is in Africa.

There is nothing inherently wrong with a country trying to help others overcome their problems, but the fact that a pursuit of national interest by nation states is the main driving force behind foreign policies makes one sceptical of foreign assistance. It is however true that peacekeeping requires forces which are detached from the conflicts they are dealing with to avoid bias, as pointed out above. Thus South Africa, foreign support is one of the salient features of peacekeeping. But former colonial masters and countries such as the SOUTH AFRICA involvement in the region is suspect because of their history of colonisation and their hegemonic tendencies in Africa in particular and in the South in general. It is arguable therefore that foreign assistance in this respect has got nothing to do with the principle of impartiality in peacekeeping because these countries do not send their troops but provide financial and logistical support to the region. Their assistance is very important, nevertheless.

This debate relates to a very important question of the independence of African countries to control their peacekeeping initiatives and to deploy peacekeeping troops where and when they see fit. The danger is that foreign assistance might lead to African peacekeepers being "remote-controlled" from where the money comes. Thus South Africa, African peacekeepers will be easily cajoled into pursuing hidden agendas for the donor countries, as happened in the OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad in 1981. Unfortunately, Southern African countries are caught between a rock and a hard place because they desperately need foreign assistance in this regard.

## **2.8 From destabilisation to co-operation**

What happens in South Africa with regard to political and military developments can have significant consequences for the Southern African region as a whole because South Africa holds the regional balance of power as was evident from the destabilisation policy. Because of the recent history of destabilisation in the region, security defined in military terms was of great importance.

However, now that the apartheid system has been dismantled in South Africa, the countries of the region have changed their perception of security from accumulating weaponry to co-operation in regional security matters through peacekeeping initiatives. Thus South Africa more than ever before, countries of the region are united under one organisation, SADC. It is against this backdrop of war and turmoil in Southern Africa therefore, that the region has embarked on building a peacekeeping capacity and integrating the region through economic development so as to avoid a repetition of the destruction that was caused by the destabilisation policy. The experience that most of the Southern African countries gained from the former South African Democratic of Congo with regard to co-operation is of crucial importance in the new era. The Republic's smooth political transition from the apartheid system to the new political dispensation and the country's subsequent joining of SADC in 1994 has complemented the spirit of regional co-operation that

was established through SADCC in the 1980s. This unity has come at the right time; especially with regard to the new phase that international peacekeeping by the UN has entered as will be seen below. (Ngoma, 2005)

UN peacekeeping has grown into a big and very important institution in international relations. The increasing demand for UN peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance around the world has put pressure on the world body (Groenewald, 1995: 7). The organisation has been confronted by political problems, which have resulted in extreme financial crisis related to peacekeeping (Monnakgotla, 1996: 9). For example, unpaid arrears to troop contributing countries stood at over SOUTH AFRICA \$800 million in 1992, while the cost of approved peacekeeping operations were estimated at SOUTH AFRICA \$3,5 billion. What makes matters even worse is the fact that member states increasingly fail to contribute financially to the UN peace support operations. From the 30th of June 1994 unpaid assessments for UN peacekeeping operations exceeded SOUTH AFRICA \$2,1 billion (Gumbi, 1995: 42).

There is only one mechanism through which the UN can exert pressure on its members to pay, and this is a two year suspension of voting rights in the General Assembly as provided by Article 19 of the UN Charter. This has compelled the UN to delegate its peacekeeping powers to regional organisations such as the OAU and SADC to assist in maintaining international peace and security by taking the initiative to procure peaceful settlements to local disputes within their regions. This has to be done in consultation with the UN Security Council. The UN financial crisis is coupled with "peacekeeping fatigue" on the part of the traditional troop contributing nations to UN peace support operations. (Docking, 2001)

This changed attitude has resulted in a direct call for African regional organisations to work towards preventing and managing conflicts which originally would be left for the UN to deal with. This has very serious amplifications for SADC as are gional organisation in Southern Africa and for South Africa in particular as a country that is capable in all respects, of providing leadership in the region. However, whether or not South Africa will play this role greatly depends on whether or not South Africa perceives itself as having interests in playing a leadership role in this way. The national interests of South Africa have clashed with those of neighbouring countries in the past. This conditioned the security calculus South Africa negatively in the region (Booth, 1995). The Government of National Unity (GNU) has shown interest in working towards a fully developed regional security regime. For instance, it acknowledges in the *White Paper on Defence* that the country has a common destiny with the region. Thus South Africa, "Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South Africa's long-term security interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC states" (*White Paper on Defence*, chapter 4).

## 2.9. Realism in international relations

In its most basic outline, the Realist picture of the world begins with a pessimistic view of human nature. Realists assume that "evil is inevitably a part of all of South Africa which no social arrangement can eradicate: men and women are not perfectible" (Smith, 1986: 1). Realism places heavy emphasis on the state as the primary actor in international relations because no structure of power or authority stands above it to mediate conflicts. The international system is perceived as anarchic because of the absence of an order-enforcing power, and this, Realism assumes, leads countries to define their interests in terms of their power relative to others, and fear for their security (Smith, 1986).

As Solomon points out, Realism's central proposition is that the acquisition of power is proper, rational and an inevitable goal of foreign policy (Solomon 1996: 3). Thus South Africa, states pursue foreign policies which maximise their interests in relation to their power capabilities. However, the national interests of different countries clash at times. In such cases the interests of a more powerful country will prevail because it has the power to influence the behaviour of others without necessarily becoming involved in a physical confrontation.

The United States' cancellation of Egypt's SOUTH AFRICA \$7 billion arms debt in exchange for its co-operation with the coalition fighting Iraq in the Gulf war in 1990 is a good example of this (Hey, 1995). Realism acknowledges the anarchic nature of the international system, and proposes the balance of power system as a technique to keep conflict under control. Balance of power is a system in which stability and order are brought about by the manipulation of alliances between states (Solomon, 1996: 4). This system has a deterrent effect on possible aggressors, and thus South Africa, prevents or at least minimises the occurrence of conflict in international relations. Following from the assumption that the international environment is anarchic, Realists argue that international conditions compel states to defend their interests because, as Forde notes, no power prevents a resort to arms whenever states find it advantageous, and no power protects the victims of aggression except the victims themselves (Solomon 1993: 63). In the Realist view the state has responsibility over people under its care.

This interpretation firmly establishes the state as the object of security in international relations. Classical Realism defines security in political and military terms because it maintains that the survival of the state in the hostile, anarchic international environment is the most important thing in international relations. Hobbes (1998) argues that the fact that the international system may be at peace at times does not make any difference because international harmony may be broken at any time and thereby threaten the existence of those countries which continue to

behave morally . It is due to these conditions therefore, that Realists believe that countries are forced to conquer other countries in self-defence.

As Machiavelli writes: Though war may seem remote at any given moment it is inevitable because threats are always forming on the horizon. A state faces only two choices: fighting at its own initiative or awaiting attack at a moment favoured by the opponent (Machiavelli 1952: 43). This is the only way for classical Realists in which states can respond rationally to the hostile international environment.

## 2.10 History of peacekeeping in Africa

The UN has carried out many peacekeeping operations in Africa. The first one of them was the 1956 First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) in Egypt, which was assigned to settle the dispute between Britain and France, and Egypt over President Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The second UN peacekeeping mission in Africa was in the Congo in 1960. This was in response to political problems that arose after independence. There was no regional organisation in Africa when these operations started because many of the African countries were still colonies. So, the subsequent formation of the OAU in 1963 brought hope that peace on the continent would be provided by Africans themselves. However, as May et al.(1997) point out, this has remained an unfulfilled ambition.

The OAU has mostly remained passive due to lack of cohesion within the organisation. It has dealt with conflicts on an ad hoc basis at the preventive diplomacy level. For example, it dealt with boundary disputes between Algeria and Morocco, and Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. It also mediated in interstate conflicts including those between Ghana and Guinea, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Furthermore, it contributed in attempts at peace settlement of internal conflicts such as the Nigerian civil war of 1967 - 1970; the civil war in the Congo in 1960 - 1962 after the withdrawal of the UN forces, and in Burundi in 1995 (Nhara, 1995: 103).

The OAU has carried out only one significant peacekeeping operation so far, and this was in 1981 during the civil war in Chad. A peacekeeping force named Inter-African Force (IAF) was dispatched to Chad in 1981. This move was widely applauded on the continent, especially because the idea that Africa should take the lead in resolving its conflicts has been an African dream since the inception of the OAU (May 1997: 2). Nevertheless, the operation was not very successful. Countries which contributed troops for this mission were accused of having hidden agendas and therefore, furthering their own interests.

For instance, Zaire was accused of being a SOUTH AFRICA proxy, while Senegal was sponsored by France and thus was said to be serving French interests. The third party was Nigeria which was believed to have interests of its own as Chad's biggest neighbour. The UN continues to play an active role in peacekeeping in

The following weak points were identified:

- South Africa had no clear national security policy i.e. the order for a military intervention came as a surprise.
- There was too little time for a proper planning cycle in the absence of a contingency plan.
- There was too little time for deployment drills.
- There had been a lack of cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs.
- There was no briefing by the Defence Secretariat before the operation.
- Experts had all the training but lacked experience in the operations.
- There was limited intelligence liaison
- Lack of air photographs that were essential for the operation
- A minimal flow of central intelligence
- There was no time for force preparation
- There was no financial support available
- The participating units were not combat ready
- Backloading of weapons
- SA army was reserves depleted due to budgetary restrictions
- Limited reserves on rational packs
- Units arrived unprepared.
- Lack of external communication, visitors, interfered with time for commanding.
- Lack of media liaison.
- Intelligence available was outdated.

(<http://www.mil.za/secretariat/boleas/boleas.htm> accessed 13/10/2015).

#### **2.4. Lesotho: Lessons and Challenges after a SADC Intervention, 1998**

Since its independence in 1966, Lesotho a small state with a peculiar geopolitical position and features of structural dependence in relation to South Africa has had to exercise its self-determination and sovereignty within this constraining environment. In this context, Lesotho has faced and continues to face dilemmas of economic and political survival. In determining their survival options, small states have to accept the following given features:

International economic dynamics, particularly in this era of globalisation, do not recognise the greater relative exposure of small states to exogenous economic dynamics which they have a limited capacity to influence, even though these determine economic survival options for small open economies.

The regionalisation process, where states in a sub-region form regional blocs for co-operation and integration has necessitated the creation of supranational frameworks like SADC where countries become stakeholders in the development

Africa, because of the financial and logistical problems that impede the OAU from fulfilling this obligation effectively. In the 1990s alone the UN has carried out six peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. Only two of these operations succeeded those in Namibia and Mozambique. Somalia and Rwanda were declared complete failures. The main reason for failure, especially in Rwanda, was that the UN Security Council took too long to assemble troops from the member states. The massacre in Rwanda began in April 1994 and went on until July. But it took the expanded UN peacekeeping force until February 1995 to fully deploy its troops (Anyidoho, 1995: 90). Needless to say, the force arrived too late, and its effectiveness was lost as a result. This inability to respond quickly is one of the major weaknesses of the UN.

In spite of Africa's poor track record in keeping its own peace, the UN's own weaknesses and financial problems as indicated earlier, and the increasing reluctance by the traditional peacekeeping troop contributing countries to UN peace support operations have compelled the UN to exert more pressure on regional and sub-regional organisations such as the OAU, ECOWAS and SADC to maintain regional peace and security by taking the initiative to procure the peaceful settlement of local disputes within their regions. ECOWAS was the first sub-regional organisation on the continent, to respond to this call by assembling and deploying a peacekeeping force in Liberia in 1990 amid divisions between its member states. Formed in 1975, ECOWAS is comprised of sixteen countries, namely, Nigeria, Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Cameroon, Benin, Guinea and Guinea Bissau. (Stott. 2002:89).

Most of these countries were colonies of Britain and France. This colonial legacy of Francophone-Anglophone division makes difficult the smooth functioning of ECOWAS (Asante, 1989). For instance, most of the Francophone members of ECOWAS do not approve of Nigeria as a regional power, because, for them it is an Anglophone country that threatens the French power in the region. However, ECOWAS was the first regional organisation in Africa to formalise a mechanism for conflict resolution in the region in 1980. Its defence protocol provides for a collective security arrangement in West Africa. ECOWAS invoked this security arrangement in 1990 and formed and deployed a peacekeeping force, ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in response to the Liberian civil war. (Da Costa, 1990). ECOMOG encountered problems of lack of impartiality, an unclear mandate and a lack of unity of purpose among its members.

Nevertheless, this was a noble endeavour and the first of its kind on the continent. ECOWAS' experiences in Liberia will most certainly provide valuable lessons for SADC in its efforts at developing a regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa. SADC was formed in 1980 by nine countries namely, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland with Namibia joining in 1990 as the tenth member. Its primary objective was to reduce the

economic dependency of these countries on apartheid South Africa with a view to isolating it, while promoting development among them. However, SADCC had very limited success in this regard; in fact, it actually increased its members' dependency on foreign donors (Newson, 1989).

Nevertheless, as Couriers argues "despite the criticism, SADCC has been a qualified success in one important respect: Of all its contributions to regional development, the great has been the forging of a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among the countries and peoples of the region" (1996: 18). Indeed, SADCC represented a positive intervention to end apartheid in South Africa. It was a great attempt towards concerted diplomacy. Despite their economic and military weaknesses relative to the Republic, the SADCC countries enjoyed a unity of purpose which was lacking in other regional organisations. This unity of purpose would later be crucial for SADC's attempts at peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy in the region as will be argued in the following pages.

### **2.11 Protocol on regional security in Southern Africa**

The institutional framework for peacekeeping in Southern Africa is provided by SADC's Organ for politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (commonly known as the Organ), and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (Cilliers & Malan, 1996). The protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation states that member states are convinced that the Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional framework in which they can coordinate their policies and activities in the areas of politics and security.

It further stipulates as the functions of the Organ among others, "to promote peace-making and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security; and to develop a collective security capacity for responding to external threats, and regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region or elsewhere on the continent" (Protocol: 1996: 3). Article five of the protocol provides for the formation of two committees, namely, the Minutes of Foreign Affairs Committee (MFAC) and the SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) for the smooth implementation of the protocol. The protocol is very impressive on paper, but the main question is whether SADC has the capacity to put it to work. An argument that is usually put forward for regional organisations is that they are well situated to monitor conflict situations in their regions and thus better placed than the far removed UN to perform this function.

Regional organisations, it is argued, can respond faster than the world body to crisis situations within their regions. However, the problem that regional organisations frequently encounter is that they lack the financial means to undertake peacekeeping operations. Besides, they tend to lack the necessary impartiality that is required for effective peacekeeping, because their proximity to the flash-points renders them

interested in the conflict and potentially biased as a result. This often leads peacekeepers to shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. A good example is what happened to ECOMOG in the Liberian civil war.

Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which was the strongest of the three warring factions in the conflict did not approve of the operation. It argued that Nigeria was not impartial because it favoured the Liberian government. But Ecology was deployed in Monrovia nevertheless. As a result, the peacekeepers had to fight the NPFL to create a buffer zone. The other faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) took advantage of the situation and fought Taylor's NPFL alongside ECOMOG (Da Costa, 1991). SADC is not immune to these problems. Thus, it faces a great challenge of translating its security protocol into practice amid big problems of lack of funds, possible lack of impartiality and inadequate resources.

## 2.12. Realism redefined

A more subtle criticism of Realism is that the paradigm falls short of explaining the dynamics of global interactions characterised by complex interdependence because it concentrates on states as individual actors. In this way it fails to encompass the broader setting of the international system which plays an important role in influencing the behaviour of states as units (Jenris, 1988: 319). In response to this limitation Neo-Realism has broadened the horizons of Realism. Neo-Realists explain co-operation between states in terms of national self-interest. And more importantly, contrary to classical Realism, Neo-Realists focus more on the structural features of the international system rather than on its component units (Waltz, 1979).

The concept of structure in this view refers to the hierarchical ordering of the system in which power capabilities are the major determinants of positions on the hierarchy. For Waltz international structure is the ordering principle underlying the units relate to, and are functionally different from each other. He perceives states to be both units of the international system and the foundation of its structure (1979). On the other hand many of the basic assumptions of classical Realism are retained, for example, power and anarchy remain central analytical concepts (Solomon, 1996: 4). Neo-Realism responds to the criticisms levelled against Realism by showing that at times the structure of the international system affects the foreign policy behaviour of countries regardless of their power and status. International institutions such as the UN and regional organisations are significant in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states because they provide for an exchange of information and help define areas of common interest. (Waltz, 1979).

However, they can also constrain the foreign policy objectives of countries. For instance, powerful countries may not always achieve their foreign policy goals if they fail to influence other countries to support their points of view in international

regimes. The fact that five nuclear weapons countries, namely the SOUTH AFRICA, Britain, Russia, China and France were compelled to agree to reduce their nuclear stockpiles by small powers at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conference in 1996 is a case in point. This demonstrates that even the most powerful countries can be forced to compromise on their foreign policy goals because of the international structure which compels them to co-operate with other states instead of forcing their way through. This to some extent gives all states in international relations a chance to express their national interests regardless of their power. Thus, in multilateral organisations even the weak countries do not just co-operate for the sake of it. They co-operate when it is in their national interest to do so, especially because in most cases they are in the majority.

### 2.13 South Africa in Southern Africa: An Inquiry

South Africa rejoined the international community after the historic democratic elections of April 1994 from a high moral position because of its peaceful transition to democracy. As indicated above, the South Africa was admitted to SADC in the same year. This move has brought great hope because all the countries in the region are now united under one regional organisation. And more importantly, they acknowledge the status of the South Africa as a regional power. Because of its strong military and economic position in the region, the South Africa is under pressure from the region and the international community as a whole to play a leading role in developing regional institutions necessary for peacekeeping.

The South African government for its part has made it clear that it will only take part in operations that have been sanctioned by SADC. Thus, South Africa like all other members of SADC works within the regional security framework provided by the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. This gesture of co operation is significant in that it marks the important distinction between the present government's policy towards the region and its predecessor's policy of confrontation. South Africa is also a member of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution which was formed in 1994 (Mills, Shaw & Couriers, 1995). South Africa is expected by the international community in general and the Southern African region in particular to assume leadership in the region.

South Africa was caught between a rock and a hard place in that, because of its history of destabilisation it has to be careful not to frighten its neighbour's with hegemonic tendencies. However, being the most powerful country in the region it also needed to balance those concerns with the need to assume the responsibilities which flow from this position. It is understandable therefore, why South Africa has so far chosen to adopt a cautious foreign policy towards the region. But it will not be able to hide behind its history for long. As Malan (1998) points out, because of its overwhelming military and economic power relative to its neighbours, South Africa has a strong international voice and can exert a decisive influence on the destiny of

the region (1998). However, the idea that South Africa should play a leading role in regional peacekeeping initiatives is not shared by all. There are those who argue that the country cannot engage in expensive regional operations before addressing social and economic issues internally, such as the need to narrow the gap between the traditionally disadvantaged and advantaged sectors of the South African population. This comes out very clearly in the disappointment that was expressed by In a Perlman, the founder and former director of South Africa's "Operation Hunger", when she said; It is ... unfortunate that the first government democratically elected by all South Africans; the first government which one hoped had been elected to serve all our people, should be looking beyond our borders before it deals with the plight of our own wretched part of the earth (Sunday Times, Sunday, June 1994: 19) Those who resent the country's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives also point out that South Africa has its own domestic peacekeeping problems to attend to.

The violence stricken province of KwaZulu-Natal is often the example used in support of this view. This school of thought compels one to ask whether South Africa participation in regional peacekeeping is of any short or long term benefit to its people. Does South Africa engage in regional peacekeeping initiatives because it equates it with good international citizenship and national prestige or because there are concrete benefits to be had? To answer this question the chapter will now look at the motives for the country's involvement in regional affairs, keeping in mind that foreign policy is driven by national interest as pointed out in the preceding chapter. Realists argue that a good and rational foreign policy is one that serves national interests (Morgenthau, 1966). Following from this logic, if the Republic's foreign policy towards the region in relation to peacekeeping is good, it must be serving an important national purpose.

As an integral part of the Southern African region the country automatically interacts with neighbouring countries. This inevitably leads to the formulation of a foreign policy to monitor and influence the pattern of interaction, be it at political, economic, social, defence or cultural level. The interaction between South Africa and the region can be traced as far back as the inception of the nation state in the region. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), is the oldest economic arrangement in the region which was formed to coordinate trade between South Africa and its neighbours, namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and later, Namibia (BLNS) (Newson, 1989). Because of the historically lopsided trading relationships between South Africa and these countries, South Africa benefits more from them than they do from it. For instance, in 1995 the country exported R16 532 994 worth of goods to these countries and imported goods worth R3 226 597, thereby generating a trade surplus of R13 306 397 (McGowan, 1997). This trading pattern does not only apply to the South Africa-BLNS relations, it is also the case with regard to the whole of the SADC region. Davies shows that the Southern African region is the most important part of Africa to South Africa. He points to the fact that in 1995 SADC countries

purchased 89, 5% of South Africa's exports to Africa and the country made a trade surplus of R21 524 million (MacGowan 1997: 4).

Clearly, the Southern African region provides an important market for South African manufactured goods. Furthermore, contrary to its trade with the developed western countries, the country achieves a trade surplus when trading with the region. For instance, United States, Germany and Japan imported R26.2 billion worth of goods from South Africa and exported R49.4 billion worth of goods, leaving South Africa with a negative balance of trade of R23,2 billion (McGowan, 1997). It goes without saying therefore, that South Africa needs to protect its market in the region from disturbances that could be South Africa by war within or between states in Southern Africa. Southern Africa does not only provide a market for South African products, it is also increasingly becoming an important site for the Republic's investments in minerals, tourism, and low-cost-labour-intensive manufacturing. (Malan: 1998:8)

The country has mining/mineral exploration, banking, hotels/resorts and in South Africa tries in almost all the other eleven SADC. Member countries (McGowan, 1997), and these are South Africa a few of the country's investments in these countries. For example, "South Africa's giant mining South Africa are expected to spend up to SOUTH AFRICA \$100 million in 1997 in mineral exploration in the rest of Africa" (Laxton, 1997: 1). There are also resources that South Africa needs from the neighbouring countries. So, besides, being markets and sites for investment, these countries are also suppliers or potential suppliers of such resources as water and agricultural products. As Conley observes, "increasing demands in the Gauteng area have required the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme whereby water will be rerouted under gravity from dams in the upper reaches of the Senqu River to the Vaal Dam catchment" (Conley 1996: 28). This water project, together with two big hydro-electric power schemes on Lake Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, will also supply electricity to the region. These are not the only schemes that will supply South Africa with water. There are two other big dams which are being built in Namibia which will also supply water to the country. It is imperative therefore, that the country guarantees the safe flow of this precious South Africa resource at all times by playing a leadership role in regional peacekeeping initiatives to prevent any form of disturbance. Several hundreds of South African farmers have moved to Mozambique and Uganda in the past year, ostensibly to help rejuvenate these countries' ailing economies. (Haysom, 1998:6)

This was done under the May 1996 agreement between the South African government, the host governments and the farmers. These farmers have already taken over eight million hectares of farmland in Mozambique. So far five, hundred farmers have settled in the Niassa province, the most fertile in Mozambique (ILRIG, 1997:14). A question that automatically comes to and is, why would South Africa care so much as to dispatch people to the region whose expertise and equipment could be South Africa to make the Reconstruction and Development Programme

(RDP) a success at home? The main reason behind this move is that South Africa has realised that there is a great potential in these countries. With its population estimated at 37, 859 000, (Central Statistics, June 1997) South Africa is by far the most population of South Africa country in the region, and South Africa of its fast growing population and high rate of urbanisation, South Africa will need to import agricultural products from these countries in the near future. It has therefore sent its farmers to develop this potential.

Security is one of the most important aspects of international relations and it is also crucial for economic and social development. Lack of it could result in the destruction of all the achievements of a nation, be it lack of military security or otherwise. Despite the loose talk about military security being relegated to the periphery of the foreign policy agenda, it is still a very important factor in determining countries' influence in international relations. (Barbara, 1998)

Economic and military leverage remain the most important factors in determining the direction of decision making and the ability to implement decisions in multilateral fora. Of course other aspects of security are also important. For example, if a country is not equipped to deal with such problems as the AIDS or Ebola South Africa it means that economically productive people will die, and thereby reduce its chances of development. Besides, development resources would have to be diverted to address this problem, and thus cause more socio-economic problems such as unemployment, crime and ultimately political instability. As indicated in the preceding chapter, security as a holistic phenomenon that includes political, social, economic, and environmental issues. Implies security solutions which transcend national boundaries. (Cillier, 1996:36)

This means that co-operation between all countries in the region is important for them to be able to deal with security problems effectively. As Cilliers points out, "South Africa shares more than a thousand kilometres of porous, unguarded, sometimes even unmarked borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho, allowing easy transit for illegal immigrants, drugs, arms and stolen vehicles" (1996: 192). If South Africa, for instance, decides not to work together with other countries in the region in this regard, it would still encounter problems from the spill-over effects which are manifest in refugees, illegal immigrants, proliferation of small arms and the transmission of deadly diseases such as Aids through the interaction of individuals.

This serves to demonstrate that South Africa or any other country in the region cannot close its eyes to the problems of the region. The country's" ... destiny is intertwined with that of the region" (Cilliers, 1996: 194), South Africa anything that happens in the region will affect South Africa in one way or another. In Gumbi's words "South Africa cannot be an island of prosperity in a region of poverty" (Cilliers1996: 36).The contribution that South Africa is making towards regional

development in this regard is very important, especially because South Africa, given its own developmental challenges, South Africa cannot become a financial donor to the region. As Evans argues "South Africa's contribution should be viewed as that of a country with the potential to take the lead in promoting regional co-operation, peace and development" (1995: 197).

At the political level the country has so far been involved in regional institution building, in preventive diplomacy exercises in the Lesotho crises of 1994, and in Mozambique in 1995. As a new participant in regional and international affairs South Africa has not gone beyond preventive diplomacy, which is the first stage of conflict resolution, but it is actively involved in regional peacekeeping initiatives such as institution building and participation in joint peacekeeping exercises. For instance, the country was actively involved in the establishment of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) in 1995 as a primary mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution in the region (Mills: 1995). It also took part in the formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in 1996. The regional security agreement provides for the development of a collaborative security regime in which countries will earmark troops for regional peacekeeping within their armies.

The first step towards the realisation of this goal was taken early in 1997 when the Organ organised a three week peacekeeping exercise, "Operation Blue Eagle" in Zimbabwe (Hartnack, 1997). 8 countries including South Africa sent their contingents which will henceforth be on standby in their respective armies to be called upon for peacekeeping operations. It is encouraging that the region is taking bold steps towards developing a regional peacekeeping capacity. However, funding for this initiative presents the region with a big problem.

In fact, this is the central issue in the minimalist-maximalist debate in South Africa with regard to the country's involvement in regional peacekeeping initiatives. The problem is worsened by the fact that most of the countries in the region which are expected to contribute towards peacekeeping are some of the poorest countries in the world. For example, the total combined GNP of the ten members of the former SADCC in 1992 was SOUTH AFRICA \$28 billion, and that of South Africa was SOUTH AFRICA \$106 billion (Cilliers, 1996). The problem with this is that insisting on financial contributions to regional peacekeeping initiatives from these countries might force them to divert resources away from socio-economic development and thereby, exacerbate social and political problems at home. The other problem in relation to peacekeeping is that countries are signatories to too many organisations and are therefore expected to contribute financially to all of them. This spreads their resources thinly and makes them less effective. For instance; South Africa contributes R1, 8 million per year to SADC, it is the second largest financial contributor to the OAU, and contributes R60 million annually to the UN (Malan, 1996). If South Africa takes the lead in the region as advocated by many, it will have

to devote more resources than what it currently contributes to these organisations. Besides spreading resources thinly, this can also result in negative public opinion towards peacekeeping because South Africa social welfare is likely to be compromised.

#### **2.14. The minimalists and maximalists: a debate**

Scholars of Southern African politics such as Booth (1995) and Vale (1994), who have been influenced by the Realist school of thought, argue that there were benefits for South Africa participating in regional peacekeeping. While many analysts in and around the region agree with it, the suggestion has been met with mixed feelings in the country itself. There are two main approaches or points of view in relation to this suggestion. The first, which may be termed the "minimalist" view, is premised on the assertion that the domestic imperatives of reconstruction and development should supersede all regional engagements (Marias, 1994: 30).

Proponents of this view further contend that South Africa should focus on solving her own economic problems since resource limitations do not allow her to engage in costly regional endeavours (Mills, 1994: 231). Contrary to the minimalist tendency, the "maximalist" approach assumes that South Africa occupies a position of power within the Southern African region, and therefore, should assume there are possibilities that flow from this position (Keet, 1993: 5). These responsibilities include providing leadership in the areas of security and economic co-operation in the region. One of the assumptions of Realism is that states are unitary rational actors engaged in the pursuit of national interests (Gilpin, 1982).

However, as pointed out above this rationality and the self-help system do not prevent states from collaborating when cooperation is in their best interest. This applies to the Southern African region where it is advantage of South Africa for countries to co-operate as members of a subordinate international system in pursuit of their national self-interests. Immediately after taking office in 1994, the Government of National Unity (GNU) enunciated a policy towards the region which saw South Africa more as a champion of regional development than as a recipient of its fruits (Booth, 1995). This has provoked heated debate around the country with regard to how much the country should be involved in regional affairs. The maximalist tendency notwithstanding, the government has indicated very strongly that a democratic South Africa should explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions. It should resist all pressure to become a regional power and, instead, should seek to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in the region based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence (Booth :1995). However, it would not be easy for South Africa, as an undisputed de facto regional power in all respects to down-play its dominance.

South Africa commands the region by every conventional indicator. For instance, it has a domestic defence industry, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) with assets of approximately R4 billion (nearly SOUTH AFRICA\$ 1.1 billion) (Reichard, 1995: 249). Furthermore, Cilliers shows that, In 1992, South Africa exported some R17, 35 billion (SOUTH AFRICA \$4, 42bn) worth of goods to its neighbours, but imported only R4, 12 billion (SOUTH AFRICA \$1, 14bn) from them; it has 23000 of Southern Africa's 42 000 kilometres of railway lines; 58 000 of 87 000kilometres of paved roads and over 5, 1 million of the region's six million motorvehicles; and it creates 75% of sub-Equatorial Africa's total electricity capacity.

The total combined Gross National Product (GNP) of the ten members of the former SADCC namely, Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia was SOUTH AFRICA \$28 billion in 1992, and that of South Africa was SOUTH AFRICA \$106 billion. Given its towering dominance as the figures show, South Africa has the capability of making significant contributions towards the establishment of a regional security regime in Southern Africa. (Reichardt1995: 195).

## 2.15. Conclusion

National interest remains one of the most important factors in determining the Republic's foreign policy behaviour towards the Southern African region. Much as some scholars dismiss it as inadequate, Realism is still a very important paradigm in international relations. It is applied by decision-makers and by analysts alike in defining and interpreting the foreign policies of nation states. The minimalist-maximalist debate in South Africa informs the foreign policy line that the country will adopt towards the region with regard to the leadership role that is envisaged for the by the international community and the region. It is the contention of this thesis that South Africa's greater involvement and resource commitment to the region need not be seen as an act of naïve benevolence as some in the minimalist camp seem to believe. Instead it is possible to argue for such involvement from a straightforward Realist perspective.

The signing of the SADC protocol on regional security by the member-states in 1996 was an important step towards a collaborative approach to regional security. The subsequent peacekeeping exercise which took place in Zimbabwe further underpins the region's commitment to establish standby peacekeeping forces within armies of the SADC countries which can be called upon at short notice in the region. However, peacekeeping is an expensive endeavour that requires resources and equipment which the region does not have. Financial problems have forced the region to seek foreign assistance even though it leads to compromises on sovereignty in decision-making with regard to deployment of peacekeepers.

There are benefits to be had if South Africa participates in regional peacekeeping initiatives, but the cost of participation and especially, of playing a leadership role will most certainly be high. This presents *the* country and the region with a dilemma, because, much as it is expensive, participation is inevitable, for, it is the only way to ensure regional security. The building of a comprehensive regional security regime is a long process, of which the Southern African region is only at the beginning. Economic development is of crucial importance for the region to be able to engage in this long and tedious process of developing a peacekeeping capacity, because peacekeeping is not only about putting a peacekeeping force together. For instance, peacekeepers need equipment, food supply, remuneration and staying power in peacekeeping missions. It goes without saying therefore, that the whole process of peacekeeping should be predicated on a strong economic base. Besides, it is arguable that economic development in the SADC member-states can to a certain extent reduce threats to peace and security in the region. It is for these reasons therefore, that the next chapter explores economic development as a component of security and an important factor for peacekeeping initiatives in Southern Africa.

## CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the method that will be used to conduct the study, as well as the preparation involved. It begins with brief descriptions of the study design, followed by descriptions of the population, study setting and sampling. Next, the direct study is described, followed by the methods of data collection, and method of data analysis. The ethical considerations are described in the last part of the chapter.

### 3.2 The research Design

The concept research design implies the overall plan of a research study (Hopkins & Antes, 1990: 456). A similar reference of this concept is that of Kerlinger (1986: 27) who defined research design as a plan and structure of investigation. Bless and Smith (1995: 63) views a research design as the planning of any scientific research from the first to the last step. These views are also endorsed by other researchers such as Babbie (1998: 89) and Bogdan & Biklen (1992: 58). Mouton (2001: 55) also described a research design as a plan or blueprint of how one intends to conduct research. The study is qualitative since it involves the explanation of terms and concepts, attained via a literature review.

### 3.3 Research Methodology

The methodology focuses on the research process and the kind of tools and procedures to be used (Mouton, 2001: 56). Glass and McKay (1999: 11) refer to methodology as doing research according to a particular process. This study will be use qualitative research paradigms. The use of more than one paradigm is further meant to combine appropriate research perspectives and methods that are suitable for taking into account as many different aspects of a problem as possible.

#### 3.3.1 Qualitative Method

Wimmer and Dominick (1988: 44-45), state that qualitative research describes or analyses a phenomenon without specifically measuring variables. No statistical analysis is involved in qualitative research although the data might be expressed numerically. In contrast, qualitative research is typically used to answer questions about the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and understanding the phenomena from the participant's point of view of constructivist or post positivist approach

Qualitative research deals mainly with un-measurable features of research (Barnes 1992: 108). According to Rudestam and Newton (1992: 31), qualitative studies imply

the data are in the form of words. This programme is useful in those categories concerning the understanding of human phenomenon and for investigating the role of SADC's peacekeeping mission: A case study of South Africa and Lesotho's bilateral relation.

### 3.4 Population of the Study

The population of this research will a group of people about whom this research wanted to draw conclusion (Babbie, 1998). Not all the members of the population were studied, only those who were selected by means of purposive sampling were involved. The target population of the present research comprised government departments which controlling population of South Africa like resident, SADC, Police Service and Statistics and Lesotho migrants will be the part of the study.

### 3.5 Sampling

A sample according to De Vos *et al* (2005:194) comprises of elements of the population considered for actual inclusion in the study. Samples are drawn because researchers want to understand the population from which they are drawn and to explain facets of the population. A combination of non-probability sampling processes will be employed in the study in the form of snowball, purposive and accidental sampling. These sampling processes are chosen because they are less complicated and more economical in terms of time and expense (Welman *et al* 2005:68).

### 3.6 Sampling Methods

According to McMillan and Schumacher (2001: 169), the nature of the sampling procedure used in a particular study is usually described by one or more adjectives, such as random sampling, convenience sampling or stratified sampling. This describes the technique used to form the sample. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001: 218), in non-probability sampling, the researcher has no way of forecasting or guaranteeing that each element of the population will be presented in the sample. Furthermore, some members of the population have little or no chance of being sampled. The selected type for this research was therefore the purposive or purposeful sampling. Purposive sampling has been selected for this research. It is appropriate for the research problem for this study.

### 3.7 Data Collection Methods

As noted by Mouton (2002: 156), data collection subsists in the use of a variety of methods and techniques of data collection in a single study. Schulze (2002b: 14) maintains that data should meet the requirements of a qualitative research design or

a design consisting of a combination of these approaches. The data collection methods in this study combined these two approaches. In an effort to acquire different facets of the same problem (symbolic reality) of the participants (Berg 1995: 4) and obtain more valid results in the research, the following methods were used to collect data: document analysis and literature analysis.

### 3.7.1 Literature and Data Review

In conducting this research, numero South Africa sources have been consulted. These sources have been useful in the process of accumulating data on the subjects of foreign policy in general, SADC mission on peacemaking in Lesotho, South Africa's foreign policy in particular, South Africa's role in Africa, and as main objective to determine whether South Africa is an African partner. Sources are categorised as follows:

- *Primary sources.* Sources from which one has extracted raw (unanalysed) information include government publications such as the *SA Yearbook 2008/09: Foreign Relations* (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 242-278), *South African Foreign Policy: DiscSouth AfricasionDocument* (SAGI, 2008: Internet), *Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa* (ANC, 1994: Internet), and others. Such sources are used to discuss South Africa's external policies and role as prescribed by the South African government per se.
- *Secondary sources.* Several analytical sources scrutinising South Africa's continental role are also consulted. These works are produced mostly by the foreign policy scholars and commentators listed below. Hill (2003), RSouth Africasett and Starr (1996), Keohane (1984), Morgenthau (1978), Gilpin (2001), Frankel (1963), Kegley (1995), and Holsti (1995) all remain the classic scholars of all time. In these sources, they embark on general foreign policy analysis under a broader ambit of Political Science and International Relations. Owing to the fact that these scholars affiliate with differing schools of thought based on differing assumptions, they do not agree on the definition of the concept "hegemon" and its implications. They also differ greatly in terms of their views on foreign policy analysis, formulation and implementation. Schoeman (2007), Alden and Soko (2005), Landsberg (2006a), Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2002), and Prys (2007; 2009) analyse South Africa's foreign policy-making and implementation in Africa and beyond, arguing that the ANC-led government has been confronted with both micro- and macro-policy challenges. They present analyses on South Africa-Africa foreign policy transition from 1994 well into the 2000s, its successes and failures, acknowledging the exerted efforts and developments thus far in many areas of development.

### **3.8 Data of Analysis**

Data will be sorted, coded, organised and indexed in a manner that will make it easier for the researcher to interpret and understand. Text will be summarised by checking key themes, phrases or passages that will be used in a more detailed analysis. The process will be guided by the original aim of the study (Payne & Payne 2004: 36 - 40; Mason 1996: 106 – 109). The study is qualitative since it involves the explanation of terms and concepts, attained via a literature review. It is also deductive in approach, commencing with a critical, conceptual analysis of the term “foreign policy” and related terms. It progresses from a general description to specific and focused analyses of role of the SADC on the peace making in Lesotho; South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and implementation, in an attempt to answer the question whether South Africa is a partner. The study also descriptively analyses the relationship between South Africa and other African countries through an “inside-out” approach. It discusses South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and implementation both by governmental and non-governmental actors at national level, and eventually analysing its role beyond its borders, the continent and further afield. It is also based on a literature study aimed at working towards explanations why South Africa, among many other policy choices available to it, prioritised human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. Mason :1996.

### **3.9 Ethical Consideration**

In the context of research, according to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, (2000: 130), ethics refers to the appropriateness of your behaviour in relation to the rights of those who become the subject of your work, or are affected by it. Most ethical issues in research fall into one of four categories namely, protection from harm, informed consent, right to privacy, and honesty with professional colleagues (Leedy &Ormrod, 2001: 107-108):

#### **3.9.1 Protection from harm**

In cases where the nature of a study involved creating a small amount of psychological discomfort, participants, would know about it ahead of time, and any necessary debriefing or counselling provided immediately after their participation.

#### **3.9.2 Informed consent**

Participants were told in advance about the nature of the study to be conducted, and were given the choice to withdraw from the study at any time, as participation in a study should be strictly voluntary. It was suggested that an informed consent form that describes the nature of research as well the nature of the required participation be presented to participants in a research study.

### 3.9.3 Right to privacy

The research project respected participants' right to privacy. In general, a researcher kept the nature and quality of participants' performance strictly confidential.

### 3.9.4 Honesty with professional colleagues

Researchers should report their findings in a complete and honest fashion, without misrepresenting what they have done or intentionally misleading others as to the nature of their findings. Under no circumstances should a researcher fabricate data to support a particular conclusion, no matter how seemingly 'noble' that conclusion may be.

### 3.10 Conclusion

This chapter has covered all issues concerning overall research methodology adopted, population identification, sampling procedures and units of analysis, the means of access to study sites and methods for data collection and analysis. The issue of how data were collected and analysed were dealt with in this chapter. The next chapter deals with the interpretation and analysis of the collected data.

## CHAPTER 4

### SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO IN 1998

#### 4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out to discuss and analyse the motives and or causes of the military intervention in Lesotho by South Africa, and later supported by Botswana, in 1998. The 1998 Lesotho elections will be discussed. The mutiny by the Lesotho defence force will receive attention. The issue of whether South Africa should have sent its troops or not shall be highlighted. The reason for military intervention and to investigate the perception that the intervention was not done with the knowledge of Southern African Development community (SADC), the African Union (UN) and the United Nations security council (UNSC). Also of vital importance is that it is widely believed that South Africa's military intervention was due to South Africa's strategic and economic interests on Lesotho. (Mwangi : 2007)

Also important is that South Africa's role in conflict Prevention and Peace keeping records in the 1990s in the SADC region and the African continent will be assessed and evaluated. My point here is that South Africa should not have allowed itself to be involved in the internal affairs of a vulnerable country like Lesotho. This is because the Lesotho military intervention coincided with the escalation of political problems in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). DRC became a member of SADC Since 1997. South Africa's involvement in Lesotho in support of the ruling party was because it wanted to pursue its realistic interests (Mokoa: 1999)

#### 4.2. THE 1998 LESOTHO ELECTIONS

Lesotho had periods of constitutional rule, namely between 1996 and 1970 as well as between 1993 and 2007. Democratic elections took place in 1993 and were won by Basotholand Congress party (BCP). Of more interest was that in 1998, 2003 and 2007, the elections were held once more of particular interest for this discussion, is the 1998 elections (Matlosak: 1998: 6 – 10)

Furthermore, it is important to highlight that throughout the 1990's, politics in Lesotho, were deeply affected by economic difficulties relating to the decline of the gold mining industry in South Africa. This state of affairs affected most Basotho migrants who were working in South African mines, hence the declining remittances to Lesotho by Basotho Migrant labor.

(Seho: 1999: 11- 13)

Related to the above is the fact that the lead up to general elections in 1998 was marked by in fighting among leaders of the BCP, in 1997, intra-party disputes over

leadership roles resulted in the formation of a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) under Ntsu Mokhehle. Mokhehle succeeded in taking the majority of the BCP rank and files into the LCD. The LCD won an overwhelming victory in the 1998 election. It won 79 of the 80 available seats for the National Parliament. The Basotho National Party (BNP) only one seat, although overall, it gained 24, 5 percent of the vote. Also important is that Mokhehle could not lead the party due to illness and was ultimately replaced by Pakalitha Mosisili as its leader (<http://cs.Nal./s Mofana / Langa report Ltm>)

Also of vital importance is that both the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) protested the results of the elections. On the side of the BCP, the protests were mainly caused by formation of the LCD. The BNP Strongly felt that it was denied adequate representation in the National Assembly due to Lesotho's "First past the post" election system. In other words the BNP was of the view that proportional representation was the best option. Following the disputed victory by the LCD, the Lesotho government and the opposition parties requested South Africa to assist settle the disputes. The disputing parties appeared committed to whatever outcome to arise from South Africa's mediation effort. South Africa invited Botswana and Zimbabwe to form a Mediation team under the leadership of the South Africa High Court judge, Justice Pius Langa, to avert the election results. ([www.idea.int/dchs vol12 sec33 pdf](http://www.idea.int/dchs vol12 sec33 pdf))

Of paramount importance is the fact that a South Africa constitutional court judge and other international election observers ruled that, notwithstanding irregularities, the 1998 elections were valid. However, opposition groups were able to demonstrate considerable support for their challenge to the legitimacy of the elections. Beginning in August 1998, nearly two months of civil unrest over alleged election irregularities, resulted in significant economic disruption and damage to the commercial infrastructure. The protests largely impacted on the normal functioning of the country's administration. ([www.org > Home > Parline](http://www.org > Home > Parline))

In view of the disputed 1998 elections in Lesotho, one would strongly argue that the Langa Commission report was not provided to the ordinary people of Lesotho. As a result people raised suspicion that the commission was siding with the government. Also important was that suggested that the report of the commission was falsified in favour of the ruling party (LCD). Predictably, the delays in rumour created tension and anxiety in Lesotho. ([www.e;ectionpassportcom/.../ Lesotho](http://www.e;ectionpassportcom/.../ Lesotho))

#### **4.3. Mutiny by the Lesotho Defence Force [LDF]**

All the speculation and rumours about the outcomes of the Langa Commission report laid good ground for army mutiny within the Lesotho defence Force. This mutiny occurred in army's barracks in Maseru from 10 to 16 September 1998. Very critical

was the fact that the security forces were divided in their support for the new government. The country's tense situation escalated into political crisis. ([www.esothoithoili.com/review](http://www.esothoithoili.com/review))

The opposition supporters assembled at the monarch's palace to determine the king's intervention in the political stalemate. The army chief instructed that teargas be used to disperse demonstrating crowds. However, this act put the country further into crisis as a contingent of troops aimed their ammunition at fellow soldiers who then rescinded. The division within the army was apparent. There were fears that conflict can arise between the factions of the army.

At the same time, there were serious concerns that the continued protests by the opposition parties could worsen the situation. ([www.timelive.co.za/sundaytimes/stn](http://www.timelive.co.za/sundaytimes/stn))

The situation was getting out of hand and government was no longer in control of the country and civic disorder engulfed the streets of the capital and "gun-wielding opposition supporters effectively took over the capital. Civil servants were prevented from getting to work, hijacking of vehicles, looting, and the closing down of Radio Lesotho and private radio stations confirmed that the opposition had taken control. ([www.publiceyenews.com/site/2015/08/...](http://www.publiceyenews.com/site/2015/08/)).

The arrest of Major General Masakeng by junior officers was also a clear indication that lawlessness prevailed in Lesotho. South Africa as the only neighbor did not want the situation in Lesotho to deteriorate further. This was proven when its defence Minister, Joe Modise visited Maseru and thereafter negotiated for the release of detained senior officers and Senior LDF officers. However, it is important to indicate that Modise's efforts to create peace in the country did not bear fruits. This was evident when the coalition of opposition parties, the soldiers and elements of the police worked together to paralyse the effective functioning of government. The above scenario resulted into the military intervention by South Africa and later the Botswana. Troops were deployed. ([www.academia.edu/1330315/South Africa...](http://www.academia.edu/1330315/South_Africa...))

#### **4.4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO**

The issue of whether the 1998 military intervention by Pretoria was legitimate or not will be discussed at a later state. Of Paramount importance is that the first South African democratically elected. President Nelson Mandela authorized the deployment of 700 South African troops to Lesotho on 22 September 1998. The main aim was to quell the rioting and maintain order. The occupation lasted for seven months from September 1998 to May 1999. ([www.operationsparnet.com/DATA/Document](http://www.operationsparnet.com/DATA/Document))

On the other hand it should be noted that the situation for Lesotho's opposition parties was a precarious one since they knew that "it was inconceivable that, South Africa itself would ignore serious political instability in a state located in the midst of its own territory, The government looked at the actions of warring parties in Lesotho

to be threatening South African Security. As indicated earlier, the muting by the soldiers necessitated the direct involvement of South Africa's defence Minister Modise. (. Sabinet.co.za / webx/access...)

It was also evident that there were signs that anarchy was about to set in the Kingdom, as the government was quickly losing grips of power. The reason for South Africa's intervention, was as a result of the warring parties that failed to agree and the prime Minister had no other alternative, but sought the intervention from South Africa and SADC. The intervention aimed at disarming the dissents and to create a stable environment, to secure border posts, the Lesotho defence force basis, the Lesotho Radio broadcasting station, the embassies, the Royal Palace, the Airport bases as well as Katse dam. (www.worldpolitics review.com / trend)

#### 4.5. MEDIA REACTION

As far as media reports were concerned, the operation in Lesotho tarnished Sotho Africa's peacemaker's image. The media also proclaimed that only five people were killed and that not even a single window was broken. The deployment of almost 700 troops was also described as invasion, incursion, or intervention. This means that the media was free to give its own interpretation. (mg.co.za/article/1998.25.sandfs....)

Also critical was the fact that the picture created by the media contingent to the international. Community was that the South Africa had a history of being cruel and arrogant towards the mountain Kingdom. Meaning that the new South Africa is every bit as arrogant towards tem as the arrogant South Africa was the read damage had already been done even here at home. (www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/201...)

In addition the South Africa forces were perceived as dangerously under strength because of poor intelligence about the level of resistance anticipated. The other weakness which the Medea picked was that the South African troops failed to secure the capital as the troops were tied, up in a protracted battle with Mutineers, giving opposition supporters the opportunity to plunder, lout and burn the city centre.

Another reporter gave the view that SA should have gone in Lesotho with enough force to

Keep casualties to a minimum and prevent the wide spread resting that has destroyed the Maseru centre. As already been highlighted, the operation was clearly bungled due to poor intelligence about the likely level of resistance, in experience, and talk of Co-ordination with the Botswana forces which arrived a day later. (www.ajo.info/.../71530).

It soon became clear that the media played a critical role in respect to the operation. The media's reporting could have been inaccurate or biased due to lack of accurate

information on that the issue of communication and Media-Liaison should not be taken for granted in the near future.

#### 4.6. UNILATERAL ACTION: FAILURE TO OBTAIN AUTHORIZATION

It is critical to indicate that the actions of Lesotho's Prime Minister attracted controversy inside the Kingdom because it was discovered that the king was not consulted, as required by the constitution of Lesotho. Also important is that the actions of South Africa supported by Botswana and appeared to have failed to obtain prior authorization: ([www.issafrica.org/..//AnylysisSADCh.html](http://www.issafrica.org/..//AnylysisSADCh.html))

This was evident when in August 1998, when Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia decided to take part in an intervention operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Then decision was based on requests from President Laurent Kabila for military assistance against advancing rebel forces. Still the undertaking was not organized under SADC auspices, although it received retroactive endorsement from SADC. ([www.osisa.org / sites / default / files/ s...](http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/s...))

In addition, South Africa emphasized the need for a peaceful solution and declined to send troops. The South African decision proved to be a wise one, Since Rwanda and Uganda decided to engage in the conflict in Support of the rebel movement. On the other hand Chad and Uganda decided to fight on the side of Kabila. It had been widely reported that Zimbabwe's engagement in the fight was to promote its business interests in the Congo. Similarly, it had been reported that Angola's interest was to prevent the Angola rebel force, the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from the DRC as a rear-base ([www.sade.int /sade. Secretariat/ insti....](http://www.sade.int/sade.Secretariat/insti...))

The gist of the matter is that in September 1998, Shortly after Kabila's request for assistance, South Africa and Botswana opted to intervene in Lesotho in a bid to assist Lesotho in restoring law and order following the election – related unrest. The intervention was immediately questioned as some observers claimed that the operation went beyond existence in international Law. South Africa is said to have intervened because of its interests in Lesotho. ([www.sad.Int / Files / 6313. / 5 293 / 95 38 / R](http://www.sad.Int / Files / 6313. / 5 293 / 95 38 / R))

The other point worth Mentioning is the fact that during the intervention in 1998, South Africa was still competing with Zimbabwe to influence the region. I therefore assume that the two countries were competing for leadership in the region. South Africa was" not only fearful of losing its hegemonic stat South Africa in the region, but control of Lesotho's precious source, water".

However, the question was whether the military intervention was permissible in terms of the SADC'S 1996 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (PPDSC)

Of critical importance, in 1996, the SADC member states concluded security protocol agreement, which created the important Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Co-operation (PPDSC). Broadly speaking, the structure of the PPDSC was created in such a way that it would make it flexible and responsive to regional problems that might arise. The PPDSC was established in line with chapter V 111, Art. 52 of the UN charter to deal with threats between member states. However, the regional security architecture did not take off as anticipated due to power squabbles between South Africa and Zimbabwe, to be praised, at the time of the DRC and Lesotho conflicts the PPDSC was currently suspended. It means that South Africa had no legal basis to justifying military its intervention in Lesotho. Unfortunately, no SADC summit was called to confirm and ratify he intervention. The main reason for not convening the summit was that South Africa believed that International system is uncertain, untrustworthy and unreliable. ([www.sad.int/ ... / 705](http://www.sad.int/.../705))

#### 4.7. PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA

Article 5 (2) of the Consultative Act of the African Union provides for establishment of the Protocol in peace and Security (PSC). This structure was formulated as a “ Collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate nearly and efficient response to conflict and crisis in Africa” The South Africa PSC Protocol allows for the creation of an African standby Force (ASF) , which would comprise five regional brigades in each of the five regions of Africa. The SADC is one of these regions, together with the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) PI South Africa Egypt, the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African states (ECCAS), the Economic community of West African states (ECOWAS), [www.sade.Into/ ....705. /](http://www.sade.Into/...705/)

Linked to the above is that in Africa’s Southern region it is important force note that both the UN and SADC lack credibility since they do not act within the ambits of both SADC and the UN. The reason for South Africa to deploy its troops was to protect its strategic interests in Lesotho. The same<sup>51</sup> can be said about Zimbabwe, it decided to deploy its army in the DRC to pursue and promote is selfish interests there.

AS alluded earlier, the emphasis here is that SADC and its member states are very, weak in all respects” South Africa on the other hand is too strong and a result used it strength to bully its little brother (Lesotho), Hence existing UN SC measures should have been applied when dealing, with the deteriorating security situation in Lesotho. ([www.sadc.int/...244/](http://www.sadc.int/...244/))

#### 4.8. SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN LESOTHO

It is of paramount importance to indicate that South Africa does have strong interests in protecting thriving expat business community that operate fast across the border in Lesotho. To be specific, South Africa is really interested in its banks and retail. In addition, South African companies have set up operations in Lesotho where the risks of strikes are significantly lower than here in South Africa. This means that it is safer and more convenient to do business in Lesotho since there are no, companies can easily export their wares back into South Africa which is working to the advantage of South African business. ([www.gov.za](http://www.gov.za))

Linked to the above is the fact that Lesotho as a smaller country with limited resources entirely depends on South Africa for its survival. For instance, most of the Basotho people work in the South African mines and some as domestic workers. This means that imports cheap labour from Lesotho, hence its unauthorized military invasion

In addition, there is regular passenger service between the two countries since 1990. Vital is that Freight trains carry cement, maize, fuel and freight containers. All these facilities are owned by the government, but leased to the Lesotho African rail company, Spoornet, South African Rail Company's Spoornet South which was the railway's operator. This implies that South Africa's. Intervention was also influenced by South Africa business and economic interest in Lesotho, Lastly, the Basotho People entirely depend on South Africa as their only neighbor. ([www.southafrica.diplo.de/vertreTung](http://www.southafrica.diplo.de/vertreTung))

#### 4.9. THE LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT (L H WP)

The apartheid and democratic governments of South Africa are equally blamed for applying both the military and economic coercion in order to get water from the mountain Kingdom. The apartheid South Africa gave decisive assistance to a successful military that toppled Lesotho's government under the leadership of Leabua Jonathan. This occurred on January 20, 1996. The only scape goat reason was that the Lesotho government under Leabua had been harbouring the African National Congress (ANC) guerillas.

The real issue was that Pretoria sought greater access to Lesotho's water supply. The critical issue was that South Africa could not reach an agreement with Lesotho for water rights. Of utmost importance is that within Months of Coup, the two governments agreed to the Highland water project.

The post-1994 South African government's water interest has not changed. This is because South Africa receives less rainfall per year as compared to Lesotho which receives more rainfall per year. The Lesotho Highlands project is an ongoing water supply project with a Hydropower component developed in partnership between the

government of Lesotho and South Africa. Of critical importance is that the purpose of the project is to provide Lesotho with a source of income in exchange for water in the central Gauteng province where the majority of industrial and mining occurs in South African. Also warring is that the project was not intended to address water supply problems, but paying royalties meaning that the rural Lesotho people continue to travel long distances to fetch water. (<https://www.quora.com/why-is-Lesotho-not-a-part-of-south-Africa>.)

What is more important is that the water project reinforces the unequal relationship between Lesotho and South Africa. On the same Vein, the water agreement offered Lesotho Marginal improvements in infrastructure, a handful of hydroelectric plants, and a modest infusion of foreign capital.

In as far as South Africa's intervention is concerned; its interests in Lesotho appear to be directly linked to water resources.

#### 4.10. CONCLUSION

The military intervention in Lesotho by South Africa and SADC was questionable on two grounds. From a realistic Perspective, South Africa invaded Lesotho to protect its water infrastructure, business and economic interests. Above all, the intervention was not authorized by SADC, AU and UNSC. South Africa took advantage of the smaller Country, the Kingdom of Lesotho also critical is that South Africa seems to have learnt from the mistakes made in Lesotho.

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## CHAPTER 5

### SADC MEDIATION ROLE IN THE 2015 LESOTHO'S CRISIS.

#### 5.1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter highlighted the fact that South African and Botswana's military intervention in the 1998 Lesotho Crisis was not sanctioned by relevant bodies such as SADC, the AU and the UN's Security Council. Furthermore, South Africa's intervention was motivated by its national interests in Lesotho. During the intervention, South Africa committed some serious blunders and one hopes that she has learnt some Lessons that would not be repeated in the 2015 mediation process. Furthermore, it is necessary to point that South Africa's involvement in the 2015 Lesotho Crisis is totally deferent from the previous one. A South African mediation effort is being conducted through multilateral approach and under the auspices of SADC and it is also in consistent with the South African was the chair of the SADC's organ of politics, defence and Security cooperation. As earlier alluded to, South Africa remains historically, culturally, socially and geographically linked to the Kingdom of Lesotho. ([www.mews24. Com/Africa/news/Lesotho](http://www.mews24.Com/Africa/news/Lesotho)).

It is therefore indeed necessary to indicate that the current chapter will attempt to highlight the causes of the crisis which warranted the involvement of SADC as a regional body. Challenges and problems which the mediation team of experiences will also be dealt with in this chapter

#### 5.2. POLITICAL TENSIONS

It is imperative to indicate that Lesotho never had what one could call a thriving democracy since it continues to experience violent elections, votes rigging and assassination of political opponents. This has a negative impact on the prospect of the economic development, peace and security of the tiny Kingdom.

The recent political tension was as a result of the fact that in June 2014, Tom Thabane, their Prime Minister suspended parliament, after political wrangling in the ruling all Basotho Congress- Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) – Basotho National party (BNP) coalition threatened to collapse the alliance. (Africa check, org/ Facts sheets / Fact shee.)

Linked to the above is the fact that that Prime Minister Thabane was able to circumvent a vote of no Confidence in Parliament and as a result the LCD under 1 Mosisili, the Deputy Prime Minister, who threatened to withdraw from the alliance, citing Thabane's unilateral decision making style. Mosisili also indicated that he would rather joint the DC. At that time, the LCD had 26 Parliamentary Seats, together with the DC 48 Seats, would have given the new alliance majority in the 120

Seat Lesotho National Assembly. This Scenario would eventually oust Thabane and the formation of a new government. This was possible as the electoral system allowed floor-crossing. This means that the Lesotho electoral laws need to be reformed to Safeguard the interest of all Basotho people. Again this simply means that parties have identified loop holes in the electoral laws and they continue to manipulate them for the sake of their narrow selfish interests.

Key is the fact that Thabane was accused of using anti-corruption drive to carry out a witch hunt against members of the Previsions government with whom he politically differ. Again, South Africa closely monitored developments in Lesotho with keen interest. Pretoria's main concern was with regard to an increased military activity in the country, and the possible constitutional change of government (ace project.org.)

The other bone of contention between Thabane and Metsing, the Deputy Prime Minister was with regard to government gazette legal notice number 64 which Thane used subsequently relieved Tlali Kamoli, Metsing loyalist, from his position as head of the armed forces.

Vital is the fact that the same government gazette was used to appoint Thabane's loyalist, Lieutenant General Maaparankoe Mahao. This move led to discontent from the Lesotho congress of Democracy, led by Metsing over the way Thabane handled the issue of Kamoli's removal. The other consequence of the removal of Kamoli was the open confrontation between army loyal to Kamoli, and Police Force, loyal to Thabane, obviously, there was no likely hood of the attainment of peace, security and stability if the army or the police who ought to be neutral are political and are partisan.

The other pertinent issue is that Thabane had in the past nine month's suspended parliament in view of the fact that a parliamentary, vote of no confidence against him was imminent. As a result of Thabane's blunders, Metsing had orchestrated the actions led by Kamoli to compel him to lift the suspension of parliament. (wwwsabc.co.za/news)

### 5.3. ALLEGATIONS OF COUP DETAT

Thabane, the Prime Minister of Lesotho claimed that the army had staged a military coup. Residents and government officials also reported that they heard gun fire in the Lesotho's Capital of Maseru. Thabane's allegation were feel by the fact that the military was the one responsible and that they were no longer taking instructions from him as supposed to be because he was the commander in chief. (wwwsabc.co.za/news)

In addition, it was reported that the military had occupied the headquarters of the police and they surrounded the Premier's residence. However, the military denied a coup allegations indicating that they only acted on reports that the police were planning to arm, political factions ahead of an anti-government demonstration planned for the following 30<sup>TH</sup> August 2014. In fact they claim that they disarmed the police to avoid bloodshed.

What is of critically importance is that Thabane fled to South Africa so that he could be protected since the situation was volatile. Analysts and diplomats have indicated that the reason for the Lesotho situation to be out of hand was that the police force was mostly loyal to Thabane. On the other hand, the army was loyal to the Deputy Prime Minister, Mothetjoa Metsing, who led the coalition partner Lesotho congress for Democracy. The issue here was that the writing was on the wall for Thabane who was out favour. ([www.enca.com](http://www.enca.com) / Lesotho-Prime –minister). This is confirmed by the reports that the troops surrounded his residence and attacked key police installation and disarming the policy officers.

As earlier alluded to, Thabane only returned on 07<sup>th</sup> October 2015 to the Kingdom only after the regional Mediators (SADC) brokered a deal to cease the country's political crisis. The other issue that made him comfortable was after his Newly-appointed army Chief General Maparankoe Mahao who also fled to South Africa assured him that security measures were in place. ([www.oil.za/news/africa/thabane](http://www.oil.za/news/africa/thabane))

Following reports about the attempted military coup, it is critical to note that the next day, Metsing assumed responsibility for running the government. This was a clear indication that Thabane had lost total control of government and the country. The South African police who were deployed there returned the situation to normality as Lesotho police were ordered to return to work after being told to return to stop work by troops. Soldiers also returned to barracks. ([www.sssafrica.org/155---today](http://www.sssafrica.org/155---today))

As always expected, the South African government has noted with grave concern the unusual movement of the Basotho defence force in the capital Maseru. Pretoria has strongly indicated that it would nor time to tolerate the unconstitutional change of government in the region and also in the continent. Similarly, the AU warned Leaders in the Lesotho coalition administration that the organization has Zero tolerance for the forceful removal of governments on the continent. AU Deputy, Chairperson Erastus Mwencha indicated that the organization is Monitoring the happenings in the Kingdom with keen interests (News. Xinhua net.com >Home > Africa).

## 5.4. THE MEDIATION PROCESS

The issue of military coup made it possible for SADC Troika meeting to be called. The meeting was presided over by President Jacob Zuma, in his capacity as chairperson of the SADC organ of politics, Defense and also attended by the “new” coalition government parties, Thabane his Deputy, and sports minister, Maseribane. The parties present at the meeting, including SADC acknowledged that the political and Security situation had indeed deteriorated. As a result immediate intervention and support from SADC was seriously necessary.

SADC opted for a political dialogue. SADC did not want to repeat the mistakes committed during the 1998 mission. This means that SADC and South Africa in particular drew some valuable lessons from the 1998 intervention. Instead, South Africa fielded a contingent of the South African Police Service (SAPS).

Furthermore, it is essential to indicate that the SADC emergency meeting resolved that the coalition parties should re-commit to the Windhoek Declaration which required the parties to work together to restore political normality, stability, law and order and remove the parliament provocation. All parties to the emergency meeting also agreed that “a road map” with clear time line on how to remove parliament. The SADC Prorogation be developed delegation also committee that a SADC facilitator will be appointed in order to implement the agreed roadmap. Of critical importance was the deployment of an observer team from the organ.

The following were identified challenges because of the volatile environment in the capital, Maseru: Public Security, the refusal of Kamoli to relinquish his chief of army position, the Maseru’s police force which remained in Flux and security around Thabane.

The other recurring problem was that of the perception that Thabane had close and special” relationship with President Zuma. The suspicion was that the Lesotho leader strongly felt that South Africa as the one leading the SADC team could take sides. The Lesotho coalition leaders stressed that the appointed SADC team should be seen as depoliticized and partisan. ([www.sabc.co.za/news/a/186156804alec...](http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/186156804alec...)).

Key among the identified challenges was the fact that the road map was mostly focusing on the three coalition partners, ignoring the role of small parties not represented in parliament. The civil society, churches youth movements, the king and others need to be included in the political roadmap. ([www.defenceweb.co.za / index.php %3f op...](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php%3fop...))

The issue of contestation of power immediately after every election in Lesotho also needs special attention. All the leaders accepted that the issue of coalitions is not assisting anyone since the election system fails to produce an absolute winner. The

issue of extensive political interference by the Security cluster was identified as a thorny issue and it needs to be addressed. The related issue is the appointment of commanders of the army and the police. The main issue is that they are politicised and partisan tool. ([www.Sarde.Net/en/Southern – African](http://www.Sarde.Net/en/Southern – African))

### 5.5. Security related issues

Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African Deputy President, had been elected as SADC Facilitator to help facilitate that the Basotho people hold elections that are free, fair and credible. Key among issues to be given adequate attention include Security issues that manifest themselves through tensions, lack of trust and cooperation between the Lesotho Defense Force and the Lesotho mounted police Service, Indeed, discussions with affected senior officers in the Lesotho defence Force Lientent General Kamoli, Commissioner Khothatso Maapagrankeo Mahao took place. ([www.thePresidency.Gov.za/pebble.as---](http://www.thePresidency.Gov.za/pebble.as---))

Additionally the meeting also took a critical decision with regard to the role of Deputy Commander of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS). It was emphasized that they would be action in the capacity of commanders in the interim. Also critical was the signing of the Maseru Accord which also stressed the importance of promoting harmonious relationship between the members of the Lesotho Defence Force and the Lesotho Mounted Police Force. Parties to the Maseru Accord also confirmed their commitment to prevent and discourage hostilities or confrontations between and arming themselves. Cherty among other things was that they were ready to defend the constitution of Lesotho and to subject themselves to the political leadership of Lesotho.

Lastly, they showed commitment to respect the work of the SADC Facilitation team. ([www.News24.Com/South Africa / News](http://www.News24.Com/South Africa / News)).

### 5.6. FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT

It is safe to indicate that SADC Facilitation team has managed to bring about some political stability by advancing elections Planned for 2017 to February 2015. The discussion to have earlier election was prompted by the fact that parliament was suspended for almost nine (09) months and there was lack of peace, Security and stability in the Lesotho Kingdom. Other than that is that the Lesotho constitution which allows floor crossing to take place and this created Problems to the functionality and effectiveness of the government. SADC has therefore, concluded that the coalition is unsustainable and leaders of Lesotho were the South Africa advised to bring forth the election date. It was also agreed that King Letsie III would announce the election date ([www.bbc.com / news/ world](http://www.bbc.com / news/ world))

It is key to indicate that opposition parties formed a coalition after beating Thomas Thabane in snap elections at bringing stability following an unsuccessful coup.

Former Deputy Prime Minister (Premier) Pakalitha Mosisili's DCP picked up the most number of the seats, but Fell short of an outright majority and then teamed up with smaller opposition groups to form a coalition government. On the other hand, Thabane's party came second with 46 seats and Mosisili's party with 47, Seats. This meant that Thabane party is the official opposition.

After the results, political analysts have warned that Lesotho's political instability was far from over. This is mainly because Mosisili, who is now at the helm had been party to the Lesotho's problems since 1998. It appears he had not Learnt from the mistakes from the previous problems. For instance: the way how he handles security issues between the army and police will be critical in deciding if this new government will be stable or not. The South African led-SADC team had also indicated that there is a dire need for laws and policies governing coalition governments in Lesotho. ([www.Polity.org.za/article/SADC](http://www.Polity.org.za/article/SADC))

Additionally, Lesotho needs institutional reforms which clearly articulate the role of Police and the role of the army as well as the role of the opposition parties. The main challenge is that the coalition government would need a two thirds majority in order to amend the constitution, which is unlikely given the strong opposition they will face from the outgoing Prime Minister, Thabane. At the same time Lesotho voters are hoping that politicians will put their personal differences aside and focus on creating employment for the youth. They also hope development should be the first priority rather than personal interests and ambitions. This means that politicians should break away from a cycle of political-intolerance. ([www.enca.com/South Africa](http://www.enca.com/South Africa))

## 5.7. NEW ROUND OF VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL CRISIS

It is disturbing to learn that the tiny nation of Lesotho is threatening to erupt into violence again, less than a year after former Prime Minister exiled himself in South Africa. The brutal killing of former army chief, Lieutent Mahao in front of his family is a course of grave concern. The feuding and tensions between the police and army have not stopped even after SADC had done what it could. It is widely believed that Mahao's, killing had been orchestrated by general Kamoli who always defend boy Mahao and the sacked Thabane. ([www.Voanews.com / ---/ 2845855htc](http://www.Voanews.com/---/2845855htc))

The brutal killing of Mahao had sparred Thabane and Maseribane of the BNP and also leader of the opposition to flee to South Africa. Maseribanealso alleged that they were running from I – General Kamoli's orders that they be arrested or be assassinated.

Again, it fundamentally important to indicate that the Kamoli issue is posing insecurity dilemma for the Mediation team. Some analysts also have a view that Ramaphosa should take the blame for Security crisis after spearheading early election. They strongly insist that the biggest problem was security and not politics.

More so, it is an open secret that all politicians that came to power sought allegiance from the army. They think that they cannot do anything without the backup from the army, this has led to a politicized army and the only solution is to depoliticize the army.

Furthermore, it is imperative to indicate that the security issue has been an outstanding one and the facilitation team never addressed it properly. The other unresolved issues which are serious include the issue of the defence force succession, the issue of the arrest of Special Forces members that of Mahao. ([www.Voanews.com/---/2845855.html](http://www.Voanews.com/---/2845855.html))

As earlier alluded to, previous attempt by the SADC facilitation team have failed to make meaningful headway. It also failed to act more decisively and forcefully to resolve the political and security issues. It appears that those who are alleged to have been responsible for the 2014 coup, namely Metsing and Kamoli are directly or indirectly benefiting ([www.dailymaverck.co.za/article/201---](http://www.dailymaverck.co.za/article/201---))

## 5.8. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

The commission of inquiry was set after Maparankoe Mahao who was aligned allegedly with Thabane, was allegedly shot and killed by members of the LDF. The commission's term of reference include the circumstances around the assassination of Mahao. The issue of lack of stability and security. Meaning that it had already been established that Lesotho experiences challenges with regard to its constitution and the security structure. Hence continuous military take over and lack of sustainable security. South Africa has been tasked with the responsibility of providing pathologists which will investigate the death of Mahoa, ([www.nwe24.com/Africa/news/Lesotho--](http://www.nwe24.com/Africa/news/Lesotho--))

Furthermore, it becomes apparent to indicate that the political parties Leaders in Lesotho lack political will to implement whatever possible solution the SADC facilitation team comes with. What they are good at is a blaming game which does not assist in having the country move forward. For instance, the Lesotho High Court granted Lesotho defence Force, Lt. Colonel Tefo Hashati an intern order not to appear before the SADC commission of inquiry until his application to nullify the commission is finalised. The only intention is to see the commission collapse because its Findings will obviously point fingers at them. Hence they want the inquiry to be brought for a review and set aside as hill and void. It is an open secret that Kamoli and LDF are responsible for the cold-blooded killing of Mahao. ([www.enca.com/South-Africa./tom-](http://www.enca.com/South-Africa./tom-))

Furthermore, Seshele Balane, who is the commander of the intelligence service is colliding with Metsing to further frustrate the commission's mandate is to look at the lawfulness of removal from office of Lieutenant General Mahao through legal Notice

60 of 2015 as commander of LDF and the simultaneous appointment through the same notice of Tlali Kamoli as LDF Commander. Also important is that they question the reason of having the setting and hearing of evidence in South Africa. They claim that the constitution of the two countries are not the same and as a result the Findings should not be considered as legally binding (View, Xinhua net. Com > Home > Africa.)

Linked to the above is that Mosisili had internationally delayed to publish the legal notice with regard to the establishment of the commission of inquiry. He also a court martial of suspected Lesotho Defense Force mutineers who were alleged to have acted in cahoots with commander Mahao to overthrow and picul commander of Lesotho Defence Force led by Kamoli, after he refused to step down. The crux of the matter here in that Mosisili is running a Parallel curial court with a clear and deliberates aim of frustrating and dishonoring the SADC Commission. (M9.co. @ / article / 2015 – 09 – 23 army – a) from the onset, Kamoli threatened not to cooperate with the inquiry on matters related to the mating. The other frustrating issue is that it appears the commission of the report will not be tabled in court as the internal Lesotho Act empowers him not to table it. There is also a deliberate intention to black out any aspect of the commission's report. This is a clear indication that the Lesotho government is not taking the commission from the onset seriously. This was also evident when Deputy Prime Minister Metsing twice postponed his testimony claiming that he was busy. All these dirty tricks are occurring even though SADC Double Troika of SADC Confirmed the mandate and the terms of reference of the commission. The Botswana Judge who is Mphaphi Phumaphi presiding over the commission passionately urged the government, Political leaders and all stakeholders to respect the work of the commission. (SA news.Gov.za).

Lastly, it appears the SADC Mediation team will never find any binding solution to the political and security problems engulfing Lesotho. This is because Prime Minister Mosisili, his Deputy Metsing do not even trust Deputy President Ramaphosa's mediation efforts and are resistant to any long-lasting Proposals that South Africa and SADC put on the table ([http://m9.co.za/article/2015 – 07 – 02 – Lesotho – gives – Sa-the cold-shoulder.](http://m9.co.za/article/2015-07-02-Lesotho-gives-Sa-the-cold-shoulder))

## 5.9. CONCLUSION

The only difference between the 1998 intervention and the 2015 mediation process is that the 1998 one mission was not well-coordinated and that it was not authorized by the relevant regional, continental and global organizations namely: SADC, AU and the United. It is clear that the principal Lesson that South Africa Learnt was that it should not just deploy without making the necessary arrangements. Hence, the killing of many South African Soldiers by a small country likes Lesotho.

The 2015 SADC mission seems to have failed since all the parties involved are not ready to compromise their position. They are only ready to pursue, promote and advance their Personal gain and narrow selfish interests at the expense of Basotho People. The issue of political stability and convince development are interrelated hence, they are not seriously taken into consideration by party leaders. It appears they do not have the necessary will to promote and develop Lesotho. ([www.publicenews.com/site/201509/...](http://www.publicenews.com/site/201509/))

Furthermore, the coalition government system cannot bring about changes that will benefit the people. There is a dire need for the electoral system to be changed. One just hope that the delegation that was sent to South Africa on a Learning mission will eventually implement its findings. South Africa is one of countries that a county like Lesotho can learn a lot from. The issue of culture, historical links as well as the Geographic landscape will make it easier for them to implement lessons learnt from South Africa. The party leaders should learn to compromised and forgive each other. ([www.gov.za/speech/minister-jeff...](http://www.gov.za/speech/minister-jeff...))

Lesotho Party leaders should learn to compromise and forgive each other. Maybe they should copy from South Africa as to how the Truth and Reconciliation Process assisted the country to be united as one people. The Lesotho leaders should honour agreements such as the Maseru Declaration for the sake of progress and People's development and advancement. Hence peace, stability and prosperity. SADC should come with strategies that will enforce decisions that will ultimately benefit the Lesotho should be responsive to the desire needs of people. Lastly they should honour decisions from SADC, AU and UN.

## CHAPTER 6

# RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

## 6.1 INTRODUCTION

The chapter has mainly summarized the findings of both the 1998 military intervention and the 2015 mediation mission led by South Africa in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The report makes recommendation on what SADC, South and Lesotho in future peace keeping mission in Lesotho and elsewhere.

### 6.2.1. 1998 MILITARY INTERVENTION

#### Findings

The study revealed that South Africa claimed that it was asked by SADC to intervene, but evidence suggests that the Basotho government appealed to South Africa to rescue it since it was civil unrest. The situation gets out of hand and tiny kingdom offer the disputed election. South Africa came into the picture after government indicated that here was a coup d'e' tat.

It became clear that the democratic government under President Nelson Mandela lacked experience and expertise for peace making mission. Firstly, South Africa lacked National security policy to guide it on what to do when it was supposed to deploy troops for peace keeping mission. The Lesotho situation did not require deployment of troops, but a political solution. The Lesotho problem needed persuasion and a negotiated resolution instead of military deployment. The military force or police force was only essential to prevent further anarchy.

Furthermore, the legal requirements had not been met, for instance SADC arrested 34 protesters and looters without power to arrest them. This is a clear indication that South Africa was ill-prepared for the intervention. The issue of lack of coordination, inadequate performed funding exposed the South African military

In addition, the Lesotho deployment was not planned and it also lacked required basic things like military intelligence. The army relied on outdated intelligence reports that contributed to serious sunders that casted it clearly. The force was also reported to be to week to handle the situation. This resulted in the army losing credibility as there were more casualties that reported. Some of the issues include relying on outdated aerial photographs and worn out equipment.

The other serious blunder include the fact that the media reported as it wished because most operations were done were done in full view of media. The media

manipulated the situation that public consumed. Everything as told from the point of view of the media people. There was in fact lack of telecommunication and no one was updating the public on behalf of South Africa government.

### 6.2.3. 1998 MILITARY INTERVENTION

#### Recommendations

Regions or sub regional organizations like SADC should clearly provide for guideline with regard to military response to internal conflicts. There is a clear need for a shared responsibility the UN and continent stakeholders for effective management of conflict in Africa. Also important is that peaceful intervention like the Lesotho one, require high degree of coordination between various contributing nations and bodies. The issue of clear objectives, demands as well as rules of engagement are pivotal. South Africa should never engage in any operation if is not under the ambits of relevant bodies like SADC, AU and UN in order for it not to be perceived as being bully to a small countries like Lesotho.

Future intervention will require South Africa to have first considered critical and fundamental issues such as National Security policy, military intelligence, and military preparedness, adequate logistical and operational preparedness

In a nutshell, one would strongly recommend that cabinet should first consider whether to approve or disapprove military deployment. Department such as the foreign affairs should be brought to the party as a matter of principles. The political parties in Lesotho must be responsible enough and publicity condemn violence at all cost. Instead they must promote tolerance and abide by democratic principles. They should also help police to investigate violence and assist police in arresting perpetrators of violence. Also critical is that parties must reframe from intolerance behavior and establish effective lines of communication between and among themselves.

Lastly police and the army should uphold their constitution and honor the codes of conduct of their institution. They must be accountable to the need to reframe from favoring parties and perform

## 6.3 SADC MEDIATION ROLE IN THE 2015 LESOTHO CRISIS.

### 6.3.1 Findings

It is disturbing to learn that Lesotho's poverty rate is so high to such an extent that some observers call it a "forth world country". It is again unfortunate that it rate as a country which has one of the highest HIV rates in the world and the life expecting is years. One of the reason why the situation is bad is because the Lesotho kingdom is ranked 23<sup>rd</sup> for coup forecasting. The coups negatively impact on the ordinary Basotho people who continue to feel the pain, human, misery, lack of effective democratic governance and it also risks the country's wealth. Lastly, the coups makes the country several times more likely to have such attempts [afrisider.com/61635/Lesotho-may]

Additionally, the political leaders that ascended political leadership and ultimately government positions have done so to accumulate personal wealth at the expense of ordinary Basotho people. All of the use government resources to campaign for the next election instead of using their position in government to try and secure recognition and more seats at the next elections. Instead they engage in corruption and nepotism which is responsible for weakening the state unless corruption is rooted out, the people of Lesotho will continue to suffer.

The other critical problem is that political leaders continue to personalize political issues to such an extent that they are not ready to compromise for the benefit of all the Basotho people. Lack of political will continue to drag any possible solution which the SADC facilitation team might come with.

Furthermore, it is important for all political parties, large or small, to abide by the agreements which have been put forward by the SADC. There must be consensus amongst political leaders of Lesotho. The delaying tactics that they employ when resolution reached do not advantage certain leaders does not assist in any way.

Related to the above is the fact that the coalition government that came into power are not sustainable since they do not produce an absolute winner. The issue of floor-crossing is only advantaging the individual parties and not the government. The coalition is vulnerable to political blackmail since small parties are kingmakers during elections. This is because there is no legal instrument that protect coalition government nor prevents floor – crossing.

The security sector is also critical in the sense that sustainable development cannot take place unless there is peace and security. The Lesotho government should deal with entrenched in the police service and the military. The two instrument have been politicized to an extent that they are divided on the basic of political parties and political leaders. They are not accountable to the constitution of the country and the

people of Lesotho. They do not assist in the maintenance of peace and public order hence they are politically linked. The deployment of commander in the police and army has not been assisting the country, but certain individuals who want to remain in power for their own personal goals.

Lastly, the facilitation effects of SADC have proven to be ineffective because the prime minister and his clique are not ready to honor and respect processes. The commissions of inquiry have been challenged because the prime minister and the other leader are directly implicated unless SADC processes and its recommendation are respected by stakeholders, the situation in Lesotho will never be addressed.

### **6.3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Lesotho politicians should consider the interest of ordinary people who voted them to power. They need to cooperate to find a lasting solution in the national interests. Ordinary people are not interested on who comes to power their genuine interest is on service delivery, electricity, education, employment opportunity, peace and security.

Depoliticization of the security sector and the measure of accountability, reconciliation and unity for a common purpose is what the ordinary Basotho people are yearning for. This is possible if the political parties give SADC facilitation team a chance to negotiate and mediate. The finding of SADC must be implemented without fear of favor

The security cluster should be re-looked or retrained so that it can be more accountable and be more professional to the electorate and the executive democracy and rules of law must be the order of the day. The laws and legislation should also be able to deal with those who are responsible for causing the crisis. There should also be provision of punitive measure for those who intentionally undermine the rules and laws of country the country clearly needs institutional reforms that clearly articulate the role of police and the role of police and army as well as the role of opposition in parliament. In order to deal with the weakness of coalition government, the SADC facilitation team together with all stakeholder should come up with the electoral system that will be credible and also deal with floor-crossing. They must also find a solution on how to amend the constitution to address pitfall of coalition.

In addition, the SADC team together with all stakeholders should ensure that there is rule of law and good governance. They should decisively deal with the issue of corruption. Legislations system and mechanism should be put on place to address corruption and related issues. Lesotho leaders learn from SADC countries like Botswana and South Africa on how they have been able to deal with issues like


corruption. This means that political action should respect those system and not to manipulate them. The Lesotho voter's hope is that politicians should put their personal difference aside and focus on creating employment and develop the country.

The issue of public opinion has been lacking in Lesotho. Political leaders continue to implement issues that they have not been mandated by the ordinary people. It is therefore important that the parties consult the electorate on how they want their country to look like moving forward. Stakeholders like the monarch small parties' youth, churches, traditional leaders and headers, civil society business, people, media, political analysts etc be given an opportunity to give their opinion on how they want their country to look like. Both of them should collectively work for a common goal and common vision. Common vision and common policy issues will thus assist the country in moving forward.

There is also a dire need for all Basotho people to review their collective identity and their dependency on South Africa. Maybe another option would be forming South Africa as one of its province. This is so because is a land locked country as it entire depends upon South Africa. There is a need for all Basotho people to be engaged in a national dialogue that should whether the option of becoming part of South Africa is a good option or not.

### 6.3.3. CONCLUSION

South Africa and SADC have tried their best in ensuring that Lesotho's political security and economic challenge are resolved. It remains to be seen as a deep sense of patriotism or not. Lesotho should as a matter of agency makes peace work. This can only be possible if influential leaders are more committee, more responsible and influential. Lesotho urgently need tangible commitment to support a process that strengthens institutional political leaders need to find amicable solution to their challenges and stop the blaming game. SADC can only be successful in its facilitation efforts only if the stakeholders show a sense of greater maturity, willingness and extreme commitment. Otherwise the situation will move from bad to worse and ordinary people will continue to suffer.



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