

**Probing Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa: The case of
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

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Declaration

I, Binyam Agegn Yitay, hereby declare that the thesis for the doctoral degree at the University of Venda, hereby submitted by me, has not previously been submitted for a degree at this or any other university, and that it is my own work in design and execution and that all reference materials contained therein has been duly acknowledged.

Signature.....

Date

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Abbreviations

ADB	African Development Bank
AMISOM	Africa Mission in Somalia
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel–Saharan States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Network
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EAC	East African Community
EASBB	East African Standby Brigade
ECOMOG	Economic Community of Western African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Front
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

IGASOM	IGAD Involvement in Somalia
IMSU	IGAD Mediation Supporting Unit
IBF	IGAD Business Forum
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
ICSF	IGAD Civil Society Forum
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDDRSI	IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability initiative
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IPF	IGAD Partner Forum
IRAPP	IGAD Regional HIV & AIDS Partnership Programme
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Programme
KANU	Kenyan African National Union
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	South African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SBF	Standby Force
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
TA	Tripartite Agreement
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
USAFRICOM	US-Africa Command

Abstract

In the Horn of Africa, it is often presumed that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) provides an institutional framework for regional integration. IGAD was established in 1986 and its member states include, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. However, the organisation continues to have many set-backs in its quest for an integrated Horn of Africa. Therefore, this study probed the challenges of regional integration in the Horn of Africa. The study closely examined the regional integration efforts of IGAD and its role and aggregate performance in the sub-region's search for alternative strategies for sustainable socio-economic development and self-reliance through regional integration. The aim of the study was to investigate mechanisms that might contribute towards the socio-economic growth of IGAD member states. This study adopted a qualitative research approach in the collection of data. The research established the following: That member states of IGAD are not trusting each other and most of them compete over who is more powerful than the other. This competition continues to worsen the already slow integration process. Terrorism in this part of the world continues to hamper progress. In most instances, this phenomenon is tackled harshly, thus leading to more terroristic activities. Participants are of the opinion that this scourge needs a counter ideological stance where people can be educated about the evils of fundamentalism.

Key Words: Regional Integration, IGAD, New Regionalism Theory,

Integration, Economic growth.

Chapter One

1.1. Background of the study

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1986. It succeeded the earlier Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), a supranational body founded by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, with a focus on development and environmental control. IGAD's main objective is to promote regional integration and accelerate development in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea joined the organisation in 1993, after it seceded from Ethiopia, while South Sudan became the eighth member state of IGAD after it gained independence from the then Sudan in 2011.

The challenges of socio-economic development, abject poverty, autocratic regimes and highly unstable regions such as the Horn of Africa seem to be enormous and so leave one to muse on the possibility of success or otherwise in realising such an ideal. This study does dissect the challenges and prospects of regional integration in the Horn of Africa. Over the three decades, the Horn of African States strived to attain sustainable development (socio- economic and even political) and self-reliance through regional integration.

IGAD was established as a practical approach to confront the socio-economic dilemma of the sub-region that is devastatingly entangled in excruciating poverty, under-development, drought, civil war and foreign dependency. In addition, IGAD has strongly recognised the development and expansion of the regional

market as the cornerstone of its comprehensive development strategy. As clearly demonstrated in the preamble of the IGAD Charter, it pursues comprehensive cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit with the view to achieve regional integration.

Firstly, IGAD had planned to form a free trade area in 2012 by undertaking a progressive removal of all custom duties and other charges of similar effect on imports and exports between member states, as well as all quota and quantitative restrictions and other administrative impediments on trade between member states within the sub-region, as enshrined under Article 7 (a) of IGAD's Charter. However, the deadline for creating free trade area passed without achieving its goal.

Secondly, IGAD's intention was to gradually evolve into a customs union that would eventually change into a common market, with the eventual elimination of all obstacles to free mobility of factors of production (people and capital) between member states, while at the same time, maintaining common external tariff structure in the trade transaction with countries outside the union. Finally, in the preamble of Article 7(b) of the IGAD Charter the organisation sought to cap its efforts by attaining a complete economic union through the harmonisation of agricultural, industrial, transport and communication, energy and infrastructural development as well as common economic and monetary policies between member states.

Having been established in 1986, member states of IGAD expected that the success of the organisation would significantly improve their seeming complicated socio-economic and even political problems of underdevelopment,

famine, poverty and external dependency. Yet, more than thirty years after its formation, IGAD has essentially remained somewhat a “lame duck”, without any meaningful impact apart from providing an employment hub for a number of civil servants and the extravagant ceremonies of its summits (McDonald, 2005).

This study probes the emerging role of IGAD at the core of the search for sustainable development strategy in the Horn of Africa. It analyses IGAD and its performance in relation to the overwhelming underlying challenges before and after its formation. The study, therefore, articulates the emerging role and consequently failure of IGAD in the search for sustainable development, self-reliance and stability through regional integration.

1.2. Statement of the problem

In the IGAD region, progress in the various aspects of regional integration has been hampered by lack of resources (both financial and human), squat execution of treaty obligations, and the inability to prevent and resolve conflicts, just to mention the core obstacles.

These are challenges of regional integration that exacerbate poverty, debt burden, arbitrary use of power, ethnic politics, pastoral conflicts, prevalence of HIV/AIDS, poor economic performance, lack of political commitment, absence of well-established infrastructures, poor communication and transaction, institutional and structural inefficiency, political instability and terrorism, all of which hinder the performance of IGAD.

From its inception IGAD relied heavily on the financial and technical assistance from the Western countries and their institutions. This resulted in an increasing

dependence of IGAD member states on donor or Western countries. In terms of the economy, Abdi and Adem (2013) argue that there is no material basis for exchange as almost all member states are producers of similar primary products; and trade among countries in the Horn of Africa is insignificant (at about 5%). The levels of industrialisation are low, thus, limiting comparative advantage (African Development Bank, 2012).

In addition, labour and capital movement in all regions of Africa in response to economic incentives have remained very small. These limited trade links among member states of IGAD restrict the foundation on which regional integration scheme between them have been based.

Duplication of membership is another constraint to the achievement of regional integration. For example, some IGAD member states such as Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan are also members of the Arab League, which has incompatible interests with the aspirations of some member states. South Sudan has also lodged an application to become a member of the Arab League. Moreover, Kenya and Uganda have become members of the revived former East African Economic Community.

Coinciding of membership also creates overlapping of projects since each independent organisation has its own regional plans. Sometimes it is difficult to sort out the overlapping membership problem and it looks like Spaghetti bowl (Draper, et al., 2007; ECA, 2006). Coordination of programmes is a mandatory component of integration in such cases. COMESA, IGAD, and EAC have established inter-region coordination committees in order to avoid overlapping of programmes.

However, coinciding membership is likely to continue. South Sudan declared its independence in 2011. It is a member of IGAD and it has also lodged membership application to the Arab League. The Tripartite Agreement between COMESA, IGAD and EAC was signed not to avoid overlapping membership rather it strives to coordinate the activities of the three organisations. It can be argued that member states are comfortable to uphold multi membership.

The reason to be a member of more than one regional organisation could be a short-term strategy in a specific agenda that meets with the national policy. Member states that join COMESA have pure economic interests because COMESA strictly deals with trade and commerce between countries. Some countries given political and strategic factors as a reason to join more than one regional organisations (ECA, 2006).

IGAD member states are also members of COMESA and CEN-SAD. All IGAD states are also members of COMESA, with the exception of Somalia. Membership of CEN-SAD includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya and Sudan.

In addition, the political conditions in the sub-region are not favourable to the creation of possible cooperation for the use of resources for mutual interest. Relations among states are marked by mistrust, suspicion and uncertainty and there is no single country in the Horn of Africa that has not been affected by conflict (Kidane, 2013). In terms of human rights the region is one of the worst record holder in the views of global human rights groups.

1.3. Aim of the study

The purpose of this study is to probe mechanisms through which the IGAD regional integration programmes could be achieved and which might contribute towards the socio-economic growth of IGAD countries.

1.4. Objectives of the study

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- Explore the core socio-economic and political challenges that hamper the regional integration agenda of the IGAD region;
- Investigate the appropriate measures that could be taken by IGAD to remedy the situation,
- Describe whether appropriate actions address IGAD's organisational challenges in integrating the region; and
- Probe the best practices that IGAD might take aboard from other regional groupings within or outside Africa.

1.5 . The research questions

The following asterisks indicate the pertinent research questions of the study:

- What are the socio-economic and political challenges that hamper regional integration process in the IGAD region?
- What appropriate measures could IGAD take to integrating the Horn of Africa?
- Can these measures address the organisational challenges of IGAD in integrating the Horn of Africa?

- Which best practices might IGAD take aboard from other regional blocs both in Africa and outside the continent?

1.6. Significance of the study

IGAD is one of the regional organisations that faces problems in attaining their objectives, which include regional integration. Few scholars have researched on regional integration of the Horn of Africa. In addition, the works of these scholars mainly focus on the economic aspects of the integration. Therefore, there is a need to probe the regional integration of the region from different perspectives.

Thus, conducting a study of this nature, which aims at finding out the socio-economic and political reasons for the encounters of regional integration in the Horn of Africa and making suggestions to overcome the challenges for effective integration will be important for the following reasons:

- The study may provide IGAD officials and other stakeholders (such as the state, civic societies, private companies, etc.) with a useful picture of the major challenges and provide some suggestions to overcome them, so as to contribute towards the drafting of policies that may contribute towards the socio-economic development of IGAD member states;
- The findings of this study may also be used as a source of information for those who are interested in conducting research on the integration scheme in the IGAD region and other integration schemes in developing countries; and
- It is hoped that this study will help expand the body of knowledge on the subject under discussion.

1.7. Definitions of terms

Integration. According to Haas (1961); integration is defined as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.

According to the Black's Law Dictionary, it is a process in which neighbouring states enter into an agreement in order to upgrade cooperation through common institutions and rules. The objectives of the agreement could range from economic to political to environmental, although it has typically taken the form of a political economic initiative where commercial interests are the focus for achieving broader socio-political and security objectives, as defined by national governments. In this study, integration means the endeavours of IGAD countries to bring socio, economic, political development and self-reliance through harmonisation of their policies.

Regional integration could take different forms and the most common of these are:

- **Free Trade Area** – formed when member states of regional organisations allow the free transactions of trade among them but it enables them to promote their respective trade policies (e.g. NAFTA). In the context of this study, free trade means the transaction of unrestricted trade among the eight IGAD countries.
- **Customs Unions** – occur when nations transform their free trade area

status to impose common external tariffs on products of non-member states. This study defines customs unions as developing uniform tariff against the products and services of states that located outside the IGAD region.

- **Common Markets** – these markets were formed when member states of a regional organisation agree to allow free movement of peoples and capital through their boundary (e.g. EU). According to this study, Common markets are the likely integration of IGAD where the peoples of Horn of Africa will travel across the region freely. They could be able to establish residency and business in any of the eight countries of IGAD. At minimum IGAD has to ratify the protocol on free movement of people.
- **Economic Union** – refers to the case where member countries use the same monetary and fiscal policies. This study defines Economic Union as the harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies of the IGAD members that require the establishment of IGAD reserve bank.
- **Political Union**– this stands for the extreme stage of regional integration where two or more member states unite to form a sovereign nation (e.g. the unification of East and West Germany). Political Union in this study stands for the final stage of the IGAD integration process where the eight countries become a united, competent, self-reliant, country in terms of socio-economic, political, military instances.

1.8. Conclusion

This chapter introduces the study and also shows the background of IGAD which was incepted in 1986 with the aim of integrating the Horn of Africa. The chapter explores the failure of IGAD to establish free trade and other stages of regional integration. This failure is attributed to lack of capacity, resources, reluctance to execute regional treaties and inability to resolve conflicts among member states of the organisation.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Frameworks & Brief History of Member States of IGAD

2.1. Introduction

This chapter looks at how integration can be achieved in the Horn of Africa and the role that IGAD can play in this regard. The chapter also highlights the role that the IGAD can play in bringing about unity amongst members of the organisation, and the theoretical framework that guided the study.

2.2. Regional integration

It is not an easy task to define regional integration. Social scientists like Giddens (1993) perceived integration as the primary principle of social behavior. For Louis and Murray (2015), the basis of integration is sharing of a homeland, common history, language, and culture. However, the contention of Louis and Murray may not be the hallmarks for regional integration since certain countries in South East Asia have succeeded without having common history and even a culture. Political will and people to people relation of the integrated countries become the most important prerequisite for effective regional integration. Independent nations come together in unison in order to be strong to halt either hegemony states or, ideology.

In addition, Sousa (2013) stated that nations that feared to be forcibly absorbed by larger states have united in order to avoid security, economy, political and social

threats. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for instance, was established in the 1980s in order to fight the spread of communism in the region, while SADC was founded partially to fight against the influence of apartheid South Africa in the region. Besides, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a new wave of regional integration and the process became once again at the top of the policy agenda in both developed and developing countries.

Interest in regionalism has been revived partly in response to globalisation (Urry, 2007). All over the world, the pace of regionalism has accelerated and the division of the world into three trading blocs based on Europe, the America and East Asia has become a serious possibility. This presents challenges, as well as dangers and possibilities of serious economic, financial and market losses to Africa (Medhane, 2004).It further accentuates the socio-economic crisis of Africa and its increasing marginalisation in the international economy.

In this regard, Mandel (1970) argued that regional integration is the collective efforts of capitalist nations to exploit the poor. According to Mandel, technological developments and international competition forced the world capitalist countries to forge regional blocs in order to be competitive at international level. However, Mandel's contention may not be necessarily factual. Mandel's approach overemphasises economic regional integration, which is only one of the components of regional integration. According to the new regionalism approach, the explanation of inter-state cooperation is not limited to economic activities. Rather, it incorporates social, political, security and environmental concerns.

Mandel's Marxist approach was more practical during the cold war era, where capital accumulation served as a tool for exploitation of the poor at international and domestic level. In the era of globalisation nations unite in order to be competitive at the international market; to protect their common security threat (such as terrorism); and environmental hazards (for instance drought is a common natural hazard that occurs in the Horn of Africa). This was the reason for the establishment of IGAD. Thirdly, regional integration testified to be one of the means of empowering the people (of member states) by bringing them out of the cycle of poverty as demonstrated in South East Asia where the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) addressed the socio-economic challenges of the region that eventually led them to be the emerging global competing region.

Economic theories do not provide a satisfactory explanation of regional integration. This is because, economic theories (either free market or Marxist approach) assume that regional integration is a result of political decisions so that scholars should only need to scrutinize the welfare consequences of the regional organisation (Passi, 2009). Hitherto, the success of a regional integration scheme should not only be evaluated in terms of economic advancement. Rather it should strive to bring about sustainable peace and security, tolerance among the peoples of an integrated region, conservation of natural resources, promotion of human development (e.g. access to education, health, employment, empowerment and promoting poverty reduction strategies), promotion of human rights, promotion of good governance, and the advancement of the region's recognition and influence at the global level.

In addition, regional integration can and should play a greater role in addressing issues such as democratic participation, respect for basic rights, education, social security and poverty reduction (Robert, 2004). The extent to which a region incorporates them into its regional integration scheme is an indication not only of its commitment to these ideals but also of its potential to realise a fairer distribution of integration's benefits to its citizens.

For Romero (2008), the social dimension of integration brings solidarity and social cohesion among member states of a regional body. Social dimension of integration favours social integration through both the protection of minorities and guaranteeing an improved access to basic services such as education and health. According to the European Consensus on development policy document (2005), social dimension is one of the three pillars of sustainable development. It embraces employment, social and environmental policies.

For Deacon et al (2007), there should be regional policies for effective assertion of social dimension (including employment and decent work, health, regulation of services, water, electricity, social protection, higher education and research, housing, migration, disaster prevention, management and mitigation, conflict prevention, human rights and empowerment of social groups) in a regional integration agenda. Regional social policies represent an extension of national social policies, and should be consistent with national social policy objectives.

Economists often prefer the term “economic integration” or “regional economic integration”, while lawyers and social scientists would exclude the economic focus and refer to the term as “integration” or “regional integration” (Capannelli et al, 2009). However, these distinctions are no longer decisive due to the

flexibility of the term and its ability to include all elements, although the study of one specific area is possible without diverting the fundamental principles of regional integration.

Regional integration covers the full range of public sector activity including not only the coordination of economic policies, but also regional security, human rights, education, health, election observation mission, research, technology and natural resource management (e.g trans boundary rivers, wild life). Regional economic integration is a subset of possible regional integration (Sally, 2011). Varynen (2003) also supports the argument that regional integration is a multidimensional process (i.e. economic, cultural and environmental). Regional integration, thus, should be viewed as a holistic approach rather than a pure economic matter. The degree of regional integration depends upon the willingness and commitment of independent sovereign states to share their socio-economic and political power.

Haas (1964), concludes that as the process of integration proceeds it is assumed that interests will be redefined in terms of regional rather than a purely national orientation.

In addition, there is a question about why states pursue regional integration. Historically, newly-independent states pursue integration regionally or with former colonies or with the world superpowers and this unison is referred to as 'management of independence', where new states used integration as a means to international recognition or declaring being sovereign or as an instrument for

settling disputes with former colonial powers or neighbouring countries or world superpowers. In fact, regional integration should be done voluntarily by sovereign states otherwise if coercion applies in the integration process, it would be considered as imperialism (Biswarao, 2005).

Nevertheless, the independence of regional projects often raises questions since most regional projects of developing countries were carried out with the financial support of western blocs such as European Union (Redie Bereketeab, 2013). For instance, the founding documents of IGAD were first developed by experts outside of Africa (Molla, 2002). The result has been the increasing dependency on donor countries.

The Minimum Integration Plan (MIP) of IGAD has been developed with the cooperation of ECA. The MIP has the objectives of:

- removal of tariff to trade;
- removal of non-tariff barriers;
- removal of physical barriers to regional integration;
- implementation of common policies (in trade, health, education, foreign policy, defence etc).

Other partners collaborated with IGAD in developing seminars, training, workshop, thematic studies, assessment strategy documents (such as the food security strategy) and policies (e.g. the gender policy of IGAD).

Some scholars like Ramzan (2016) argue that taking Europe as a model for regional integration for developing regions like Africa is wrong, let alone taking financial support from European Union; accordingly, Ramzan noted that Africa is

unique and taking Europe as a model is quite worthy but much of the rigorous and important mark of regional integration was designed with the more advanced Europe in mind. On the other hand, Fredrik (2015) argued that Africa's problem is not unique. Even the more advanced or rich countries witnessed the same problems when they started on the path of development. “Africa is rich but poor”. Africa has its own way of life, method of production, dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions that conform to the values, cultures and the psychological makeup of its people. Africa, thus, should have its own regional integration strategy.

Secondly, states form integration for the sake of socio-economic interaction that involves measures not only to ensure economic stability but also on issues of peace and security, health, education, research, and military activities. This cooperation is commonly referred to as management of interdependence. In other words, as Peter (2012) articulates, regional organisations can foster security communities by promoting cooperation, establishing norms of behavior and serving as sites of socialisation and learning.

Various social science scholars forward the benefits of being integrated. For Terrie and Alan (2005), regional integration was implemented to enhance the interest of individual countries in the policies of regional partners towards ensuring mutual commitment and attainment of convergence principles. Regional integration allows greater coordination of national economic policies thereby enabling countries to pool together their small economies into larger markets to benefit from economies of scale. This is true especially in Africa where the small size of states road blocked their capacity to industrialise effectively (African

Development Bank, 2012). Terrie and Alan (2005) also observed that member countries of a regional organisation enjoy the benefits of stronger regulatory and judicial systems, rationalised payment facilities and relaxed restrictions on capital transactions and investment flows and a shared or common economic infrastructure.

In addition, Estrada (2009) documented that regional integration creates reciprocal benefits by enthroning a peaceful environment which in turn works as insurance against any form of disputes among member states. Dion (2004) further recognised that regional integration impacts growth through inter-regional technology diffusion as knowledge spillovers, originating from leading countries to disadvantaged nations.

However, there is a debate between opponents of regional integration and the proponents. According to Koutrakos (2013), regional integration enhances internal and international dynamics that enhance global interdependence through political alliances, and marginalisation of developing countries in the socio-economic sphere. On the other hand, Estrada (2009) argues that regional integration may contribute to international frictions between competing blocs through creating multiple legal frameworks and various dispute settlement mechanisms as well as absorbing other multilateral arrangements.

Regional integration endorses interdependence between different blocs and it will also be the cornerstone of continental union or common market; however, in order for regional integration to run smoothly (with other regional or multilateral


arrangements) the respective policy of the regional organisation would be outward looking and members of a given regional arrangement should avoid becoming membership of more than one regional bloc, which eventually leads to overlapping of membership. A coinciding membership remains one of the major problems of regional integration in Africa where of the 53 African countries, 26 are members of two regional communities, and 20 are members of three; 1 country (Democratic Republic of Congo) belongs to four; only 6 countries maintain membership in just one regional organisation (ECA,2006).

However, due to overlapping membership, partners of some IGAD members consider it as a political group than a development partner of regional integration (IGAD, 2010). Many programmes of IGAD are also run by COMESA. Thus, partners considered the money to be given for IGAD as duplication. The lack of rationalisation among different regional blocs creates confusion among development partners. Partners are usually having the tendency to fund peace and security activities of the organisation than any other programmes. If one looks at the funding graph of IGAD, it will be easy to notice the disparities of the funds between peace and other regional projects.

In addition, the new regionalism approach tends to interconnect regional and multilateral blocs through the active involvement of non-state actors, which manifest themselves in different stages of the regional integration process (Hettne, 2010). This implies that political or socio-economic groups should get the opportunity to influence the decision making process of the regional supra-organisation if they felt that their position is not sufficiently represented by the national government. If they are allowed to sway the decision-making power, it

will eventually lead to fraternal interrelationship among non-state actors of the region.

Figure 2.1. The Spaghetti Bowl of overlapping membership among IGAD countries



On the other hand, regionalism may be seen as one of the rare instruments that prevents the effects of globalisation. If individual states no longer have the effective capacity to regulate, in the face of uncontrolled movements of human and capital resources, then regionalism may be seen as a means to regain some

control over global market forces and to counter the more negative consequences of globalisation (Woodward, 2013).

Nonetheless, beyond trade and tariffs, regional integration should be conceived of as a dialectical unity of social, economic and political processes (Slocum & Langenhove, 2004). If regional integration has economic purpose only, the role of the regional scheme in most cases has nothing to do other than creating infrastructures where commodities exchange at a reasonable price. In this regard, exchanges and markets are set up to facilitate movements of goods and peoples, and special attention is paid for tariff matters.

In addition to this, member state countries should strive to act closely on the basis of:

(a) What type of regional integration or cooperation would achieve specific objectives?

(b) How should the integration or cooperation scheme be designed, structured and implemented?

(c) What would be its proper scope and coverage? They should also commit human and material resources as well as adequate time to the above basic questions and realise their integrated identity (Abdi & Seid, 2013). This study, thus, uses the preceding outlook of regional integration as a background to study the challenges and prospects of the process of regionalism in the Horn of Africa.

Literature concerning IGAD hugely focus on the economic integration of the region. A study conducted by Molla (2002) addresses the issue of the IGAD

regional economic integration by emphasising the economic dependency status of the countries of the sub-region. According to him, dependence on external funding, debt, aid, and the SAPs were identified as the main obstacles for regional economic integration in the Horn of Africa.

According to Redie (2013), the need for regional integration in the Horn of Africa relies on a mechanism for resolving resource driven conflicts between pastoralists of the Horn of Africa. This conflict occurs due to scarce resources such as water and grazing land. De Waal (2005) noted tyranny, lack of transparency, arbitrary use of state power, and overemphasis on state-to-state relationship than people to people, as the reasons why regional integration lags in the Horn of Africa. According to De Waal one of the preconditions for regional economic integration is democratic governance.

In addition, Nomvete (2009) stressed the importance of hegemony state for successful regional integration in the Horn of Africa. Hegemony refers to the existence of at least one big or powerful state in a region, which is imbued with either socio-economic or political power or popularity in the international arena.

For Kidane (2013) the political dimension of a region should be sought as the prerequisite for successful regional integration. According to Hansson, nations would better integrate if they follow similar political ideologies. Yet, this assumption relies on wrong logic because if one looks at the success of South East Asian countries, they have different political trends: China for instance follows a communist free market ideology while South Korea is a liberal democratic country and Japan promotes mixed administration of indigenous

governances and western democracies. This clearly demonstrates that political ideology has not necessarily become the challenge of regional integration.

In 1991, African Heads of States and Governments signed the Abuja Treaty on the establishment of a Pan-African Economic Community by the year 2025, as a response to the changing international economic relations. This has led to renewed interest within Africa in revitalising and saving regional groupings along with favorable internal political changes within the continent. For example, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was transformed into the COMESA in 1994 with a view of attaining, among other things, sustainable growth and development of the member states by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures.

The SADCC was similarly transformed in 1992 into the SADC with the objective of attaining a higher level of cooperation that would enable the countries of the region to address problems of national development, and cope with the challenges posed by a changing, and increasingly complex, regional and global environment more effectively (Markakis, 2011).

In the Horn of Africa, ambitious interest in uplifting and reviving regional organisations resulted in the transformation of Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1996 into Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); with a view of attaining, among other things, the promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, inter-regional trade and development of improved communication

infrastructure in order to enable the region to interact and compete in the global economy, which eventually leading to regional integration.

Peace is a significant matter for the residents of the Horn of Africa. The region has become the central place of training and home for various terrorist organisations, including Al Qaeda and Al-Shabab. Bin Laden himself once lived in Sudan. In 2013 Al-Shabab kept the Westgate Mall (Kenya) under hostage, which resulted in the death of innocent people (Kenyans and foreigners, who came mainly from Western countries as tourists) and material damage. During the 2010 World Cup finals, the same terrorist organisation claimed responsibility for the death of 17 people in Uganda. In addition, Al-Shabab has made incidental attack on 11 April 2015 at Garissa University and killed 147 Kenyans (Sudan Tribune, 2015). Al-Shabab is working tirelessly to establish a radical Islamic state in Somalia and frequently intimidates the region with threats of destabilisation.

Religions as a means of controlling states power is not a new phenomenon. There were the Jacobins in France that indorsed for the origins of terrorism in 13th c. other terrorist that justify their acts as religiously correct include Irish Republican Army, National Organisation of Cypriote Fighters, Muslim National Front in Algeria (Victoria, 2011).

The Religious radicals often try to use religious cause to uphold political power. There is also different version of a religion. Islam teaching, for instance, is divided into Sunni and Shiite, but radicals deny the existence of different

teachings of Islam. The tendency of radical Islam is linked with the Islamic sect of Wahhabism.

Wahhabism is spreading across the world and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the most proponent of this doctrine. The kingdom renders huge fund for wahhabists to build their school, mosques and publication of extremist teachings that influence the young sections of the society.

According to Dawit (2016), Wahhabism asserted a strict interpretation of Islam, condemned other interpretations and innovations and it saw western values and civilization as abhorrently evil. It advocates the reduction of heterogeneous civilization into a monolithic religious culture.

In the Horn of Africa, the affiliation of Wahhabism is proved with the rise of Al-Shabab and its entire connection with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The main similarities of Islam radicalisms are their conservative interpretation of the Holy Koran. According to this, there must be one religion and people must believe uniformly. Radicalism is also promoted the uncompromising of modernisation and the execution of non-believers and even moderate Muslims. Fundamentalist do not compromise or accommodate the existence of other religions and sects of Islam. According to the US state Department (2009), Al-Shabab beheaded two Shi Muslim clerics in a place called Balad in March 2009.

Defeating groups like Al-Shabab is not easy since they have ideology at the centre of their radicalisation (Rondos, 2016). Some returnees from the group blamed brutality of security forces led them to join Al-shabab (Institute for security studies, 2015). According to Ben (2016) countries that contribute their

troops to keep the peace and security of Somalia have an economic interest. They do not want to defeat Al-Shabab rather they will be continued to be peace keepers and profited with the trading of charcoal and sugar from Somalia that taxed by Al-Shabab. The inability of the central government to defeat Al-Shabab makes the people of Somalia to support Al-Shabab. In addition, in order to trick the attention of security forces Al-Shabab's recruitment wing (Al-Hijra), shifted its target to children and women (IGAD & Sahan Foundation, 2016).

The IGAD region's proximity to conflict-ridden Middle East makes it to be vulnerable for the spread of radicalisation. In addition, the Somalia crises aggravated the rise of radicalism. Somalia has become a playground for foreign fighters, foreign ideologies and narratives that completely clash with the objective of Islam.

The use of force as a mechanism to prevent the dissemination of extremism is not effective. Extremists usually survive where there is conflict and collapsed states. The Syrian civil war gives extremists the opportunity to gain popularity at the expense of the life of the Syrian and the destruction of this historic country gives the citizens the reason to flee to neighbouring countries such as Turkey.

The governments of Somalia and Kenya have to step up to the plate in the fight against extremism as these are some of the top countries that produced Moslemic radicalism. Member states have to create a mechanism to defend their people from terrorist attacks. In order to collectively prevent terrorism, member states have to harmonise their peace and security policies. IGAD convention on mutual legal assistance and extradition could be taken as a step forward to challenge

terrorist attacks. Ethiopia and Djibouti had already incorporated the convention to their domestic law.

However, there is a criticism among scholars (Kwindaetl, 2015; Stremlau, 2011) against the abuse of the implementation of the convention. Human rights organisations frequently condemn member states for using the convention as a tool to silence journalists, opposition members and other dissenting opinion (Open source center, 2011).

Terrorism is a controversial term to define. Currently there are 73 definitions of terrorism. All these definitions look the motivation of terrorists as the starting point of their analyses. A person who is regarded as terrorist may be another person's freedom fighter. A group that is designated as a terrorist by a government might be supported by the majority of the people. However, there are attacks that target the civilian population should be condemned by all of humanity.

In the IGAD region, terrorism has had multi-faceted effects. The failed state of Somalia could not maintain peace due to terrorist groups. Al-Shabab is the main terrorist organisation in the country. Kenya is also a frequent target of terrorism. Terrorism affects the country in two ways. First, it destabilises the country's peace and security. It claims the lives and property of nations. People will go around through anxiety and they become suspicious of everyone. Second, it affects the country's stunning tourism industry. Kenya with its adventures, safari and the port city of Mombasa attracts millions of tourists per year.

However, after the bombing of the US embassy in Kenya in the year 1998 shows a decline in tourist flow (ECA, 2013). Ethiopia frequently accuses her neighbour Eritrea of backing up of Al-shabab. IGAD countries have to focus on the causes and solutions of terrorism in the region. For Atin and William (2007) the roots of terrorism are more of an economic factor including lack of employment, disparities of living standard and extreme poverty.

Harmonisation of terrorism laws is difficult. Terrorism is a sensitive issue and it affects the region's states to quite different degrees. IGAD as an organisation that lacks the mechanism of monitoring and imposing sanctions, it is unlikely to trespass the sovereignty of member states. The failure of IGAD starts from this. According to regime theory, states will better fast track the integration process, if they would give a certain portion of their power to a regional organisation that could monitor activities as well as sanction a state that disobeys the regional laws (Krasner, 1983). It is undeniable that IGAD countries are not ready to empower the organisation via forgoing their sovereignty.

Regime theory, thus, illustrated one of the reasons of ineffective performance of IGAD. The AU has promoted the principle of non-interference that barred the organisation from addressing the domestic problems of member states. IGAD is the replica of the AU that it strongly defends the principle of non-interference. The emphasis on states as the only actor in international relations is an old approach.

The Horn of Africa is notorious for the Darfur crisis that only ended after twenty years of destruction, including a genocide that killed over 2 million South

Sudanese (CIA, 2016). This resulted in the splitting of Sudan into two sovereign countries.

The lack of peace and security is related with the regime of undemocratic culture and lack of democratic institutions that deal with disputes through discussion and round-table negotiations. The existence of toothless democratic institutions remains the cause of use of force as a mechanism to address disputes and conflicts. Recently, it would have been observed that member states are pushing for the promotion of democratic practices.

In 2010, IGAD sent the first election observation mission delegates to Sudan as per the invitation of the Sudanese government. In addition, in the recent election of Kenya, IGAD attained as observatory body. According to research conducted by Harris (2014), a democratic country that promotes civil liberties is likely to ensure its food security.

On the other hand, the IGAD region is dependent on outside partners to address domestic ferocity. In the 2008 post-election violence of Kenya, it was the US-led negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition that calmed down the electoral dispute. The violence was between the supporters of the ruling and opposition party that alleged an election scam. In 2005, there was post-election violence in Ethiopia that ended up with the killing, arrest of opposition leaders, supporters, journalists and civic societies. The negotiations between the opposition and the ruling party were led by the European Union. The same is true in the Ugandan post-election violence.

The problem of Sudan is far from over. The two Sudan regions (North and South) contested the fertile land of *Abiye* and the tension between the South Sudan government and the rebels (the government calls them ‘factions’) remains high, though they have been involved in a series of negotiations led by IGAD. In 2017, the South Sudan affairs become so complicated due to negotiations that exclude Rick Machar, who is the former deputy president of the world’s youngest nation.

In all eight member states, there are rebel groups that have different objectives. Some of them want to overthrow the government and others want to cede and establish their own state. As history and experience show, the fighting by rebels or insurgent groups could not be stopped unless they are losing or winning the war. If they win, they will become the government. If they lose, they will assimilate with other insurgency groups or they will continue the war under scattered and weak leadership. The current governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, South Sudan and Somalia were once insurgent groups. Moreover, there are frequent cross-border conflicts among nomadic pastoralists over pasture land and water. Peace and security, therefore, overrides the economic integration agenda of the region.

The proliferation of light weapons and small arms in the region is also aggravating causes of lack of peace and security. Weapons are easily accessible especially in the pastoralist community. In 2013, thousands of people lost their lives in Jonglei, South Sudan that authorities associated the problem with the accessibility of small arms and light weapons.

The process of integration requires sustainable peace and security. The trading activities on port areas could be hampered by maritime insecurity. The lack of

security will make the movement of people, goods, service and capital extremely difficult. Terrorists will confiscate or demolish commodities that have been transported to regional markets and consumption. Armed trafficking has serious impact on deterioration of human dignity and the accumulation of social capital. Human trafficking will result in orphanage, slavery and prostitution.

Through human trafficking, refugees have lost their morality, identity and most of them betrayed (robbed) by illegal traffickers. On their way to the destined country, the refugees suffer from lack of shelter, food and at the worst level they are end up dead since they are travelling in unsafe routes. The death is often caused by wild animals, insurgent groups, and the risk of getting injured while they are under police custody. So that, caution has to be made when IGAD allowed free movement of people because human traffickers might manipulate the right to movement, establish business and residency.

Migration in and out of Horn of Africa is the other feature of the IGAD region. Migration could be forced or voluntary that made with pulling factors such as employment. Migration is also related with free movement of people, labour, health, human trafficking. Due to persistent conflict in the region, refugees crises is one of the key challenges of integration. The destination of refugees could be neighbouring country or countries situated outside the region such as Middle East, Europe, North America, Australia, and South Africa. In most cases the refugees use illegal routes and traffickers to reach their destination (Schroder, 2015). Migration is also considered as means of survival where a family send its breadwinner to abroad in anticipating the remittance and financial support. Migration is also result in brain drain where qualified refugees leave their country

in search of a better opportunities in other countries. 43% of Kenya's migrants are college graduates (Marchand et al, 2016).

Human trafficking is a source of substantial financial gain. The route that stretches from Kenya to South Africa bring an annual income of 40 million dollar for smugglers most. This route is run by Somalis, Ethiopians, Kenyans, and Tanzanians smugglers. However, the refugees that choose to travel in this route faces numerous problems including "rough handling, abandonment, confinement, beatings, sexual attacks, lack of food and water, lack of medical care" (Horwood, 2009). The Kenya to South Africa route involves corrupted border officials, bribed visa officers, police, truck drivers, and various brokers.

On the other hand, the route from Sudan to Italy is also dangerous and difficult. This journey may cost more than \$7,000 (Marchand etl, 2016). The route is started, for instance, from Ethiopia to Sudan where smugglers managed to connect with another trafficker. Then, from Sudan into Southern Libya to Coastal Libya. Finally, in order to enter Italy the refugees use boats and a journey than takes about a week. The Northern migration route stretch from Sudan, Egypt to Sinai to Israel. The other route is towards East where refugees from the IGAD region transit either from Djibouti or Somalia into Yemen, then Saudi Arabia and other oil rich countries. The refugees of this route includes women, children and elderly person. Abuse, sexual exploitation, drowning to the sea is the usual challenges faced by migrants while using the Eastern route. Currently, Yemen is engaged in civil wars.

In recent years refugees start to arrive in Ethiopia from Eritrea. In 2013, a civil war broke out in South Sudan that resulted in forced migration. Ethiopia hosts

large number of South Sudanese refugees. Eritreans are also migrated into Sudan in order to escape a tyrannical government and national military service. In Eritrea a person who is above 18 years old should take a mandatory military service. Djibouti is also a hub for refugees of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. Ethiopia hosts the largest registered refugees in Africa, there are about 740,000 refugee population (Research & Evidence Facility, 2017).

Thus, one could understand that sustainable peace will result in economic development whereas a conflict-driven environment perpetuates the cycle of poverty. ISSP is a division of IGAD that deals with transnational security threat that emasculates the integration process. The Mediation Support Team (MST) of IGAD use preventive diplomacy as a means of conflict resolution between two warring parties. Preventive diplomacy refers to the mechanisms that likely prevent the occurrence of conflict between states. The effectiveness of MST to resolve conflicts, however, has problems such as independence from undue influence of external actors and inadequate budget for its activities which aggravated its limitations.

Piracy is the other challenge of the peace efforts. The Somalia pirates are notorious for their plunder on the seas. According to the National Security Council of US (2008), a single piracy attack not only jeopardises the life and safety of seafarers, it rather affects the interests of numerous countries, including the flag state of the vessel, various states of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal states, owners states' and cargo destination and transshipment states. The Horn of Africa is a springboard to the Middle East and it is one of the busy sea traffics that transported numerous commodities, where oil

is the major one. The pirates of Somalia are heavily armed, and determined, they can manage to shift their strategy of kidnapping and looting. IGAD is dealing with organised crime with the support of its partners.

The Spillover effect is the term frequently cited by regional integration school of thought. It denotes the starting of cooperation among states in specific sector (e.g. peace) but later such cooperation become boosting to other areas of cooperation and integration programme.

The spillover effect could be applicable in the context of Somalia piracy and the broadening activities that aim to maintain peace and security, democratic governance and rule of law not only in the shores but in the mainland Somalia. On the other hand, piracy has the spillover effect over other organised and transnational crime. It needs concreted efforts of member states and IGAD partners to address the piracy of the region that has multi-faced impact on the right to life, liberty, property, and commerce.

IGAD made utmost efforts to involve elders, civic societies, warring factions, international institutions (e.g. AU) interested countries and others in the peace process. However, others argue that IGAD's peace process is donor-led and influenced by external actors (Gerald, 2012). The Horn of African has more than hundred ethnic groups. Some of this ethnic groups are few in number and are considered as minority. Since they might be ousted from the peace process, there is a need to make the peace process inclusive. The opinion of elders, chiefs, clan leaders have to be included in any kind of conflict resolution.

Modern means of conflict resolution might not be fit to the psychological makeup of those minorities. Traditional modes of peace settlement are the most preferable especially in pastoralist communities. Cattle rustling, raiding and stealing is common in border areas. In those communities, cattle have priceless values. Cattle are the means of survival, food, milk, dowry and collaterals to borrow something. The extent of wealth is measured by the number of cattle. Water and grazing land is scarce in these areas that violence is inevitable while the pastoralists compete over these resources.

Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) as a branch of IGAD tries to prevent cattle-related conflicts among pastoralist communities. It has field researchers that record the day-to-day activities in the border areas of member states. CEWARN also renders education, cultural and entertainment activities to create friendly relationship among pastoralists of member states.

Cultural factors are one of the most contributing aspects that instigate conflict among pastoralists. The price of dowry is expensive in most communities of the region. The bride has to toil to acquire adequate number of cattle to marry his beloved one. Inability to bring the cattle on the deadline will result in losing his bride. Due to such kind of shame, the man engages to cattle rustling that results in clashes between the two communities. They are thinking collectively; they do not end up with punishing the perpetrator rather to the community to which he belongs. The problem is aggravated since the communities are heavily armed with modern weapons that they bought from the informal or black market.

In such cases of intra-community conflict, member states should not try to stop the clash through tear gas, the police, court judgment and imprisonment. The all sizes fit all concept does not apply. Member states have to consult with the elders and community leaders, as well as women to settle the matter. Regional integration is not just harmonisation of policies among member states rather it also involves the recognition of social, cultural and psychological make-up of traditional societies.

On the other hand, the new regionalism approach will not overlook the political scenario of member states of IGAD. Despite the fact that Uganda and South Sudan recently agreed to make efforts to improve relations, there are accusations and threats from both sides. The relation between Ethiopia and Eritrea became sour after the 1998 war, which claimed the lives of 100,000 people from both sides (International Crises Group, 2013). Eritrea and Sudan were not in good terms for a long period. Also, Somalia is still without a central government since 1991. South Sudan is the leading country in the world to allocate 70% of its budget to military expenditures: Misallocating financial and human resources to war efforts rather than to useful production activities leads to the poorest economic performance in this region (ECA, 2002).

According to the World Bank study (2014), regional integration agreements can promote regional peace and ultimately lead to political union. Similarly, increased trade reduces the likelihood of conflict: doubling trade between two countries lowers the risk of conflict between them by about 17% (ECA, 2006). IGAD thus should facilitate the harmonisation of policy, in order to bring sustainable peace, security and socio-economic development in the region.

Human development, for instance, is the other main issue that IGAD should prioritise. The Horn of Africa is also one of the regions severely affected by HIV/AIDS; over 4 million people are living with the Virus (Economic Intelligence report, 2015). In Uganda and Kenya alone HIV/AIDS claims the life of more than 120,000 thousand people annually (CIA world fact book, 2016). HIV/AIDS is one of the most devastating health problems of the region. IGAD is one of the regions that face excessive mortality rate of HIV/AIDS. The problem is persistent especially in border areas. Due to this, IGAD is instrumental in completing the first phase of HIV Illumination Project that results in establishing 48 health centres, 34 hot spots in the region.

The project is mainly addressing people that reside in border areas. The reason is that border areas are too far to include under the national health system. There is a continuous neglect of minorities that live-in border areas. In border areas, there are nomads, refugees, returnees that are vulnerable to HIV due to numerous reasons including lack of education, lack of HIV protection methods, inaccessibility of health centres and health professionals. IGAD members have adopted Protocol on Harmonising treatment of HIV/AIDS in cross border area. This could be seen as one step towards harmonisation of health policy in the region. This cooperation has to spill over to other health problems such as malaria, water borne diseases, and tuberculosis.

In addition, the IGAD Regional HIV/AIDS Programme (IRAPP) would be a helpful instrument, if it could be implement well. According to the IGAD Secretariat report (2009), IRAPP aims to improve access to HIV/AIDS services for cross border marginalised populations and surrounding host communities as

well as enable the scaling up of the provision of services by establishing a common approach to support these populations in the IGAD member states.

The issue of free movement of people has to link with the HIV infection. The dissemination of HIV is commonly associated with mobility of travelers, cross-border traders and truck drivers. Population mobility has negative consequences on HIV prevalence. Mobile children and women are the most disadvantageous for being victims of HIV/AIDS since they will be at risk of having unsafe sex through with consent or violence. The result will be to have orphans that are deprived access to basic needs, education, health services and their bright future will be blurred. Integration is the promotion of socio-economic development in a given region and the free movement of people, their health conditions are at the centre of sustainable development.

According to Gerald (2012), a fundamental principle for sustainable development is that human wellbeing that is health, wealth and quality of life of people is part of and linked to the diversity, productivity and quality of the ecosystem of the region.

On the other hand, South Sudan is the leading country in the world for maternal mortality. Somalia is sustainably maintaining its third place (among the world countries) for infant and maternal mortality rate. Eritrea allocates only 2.6 of its GDP for health expenditure. South Sudan is the world's leading country in allocating more than 11% of its GDP to military expenditures. Disparity in literacy is wide: 80% of the total population of Kenya is literate while in Ethiopia 60% of the population is illiterate (Economic intelligence report, 2015).

Integration is about people. Integration strives to change the living standard of the ordinary people. In order to achieve this target people shall be allowed to move across borders of members states. Free movement of people is a human rights issue, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) entitled everyone the right to movement. The Agreement establishing IGAD under Article 13 (A) urge member states to:

- Facilitate free movement and right of residence of their nationals in the region,
- Promote social and cultural exchanges as an effective means of consolidating regional cooperation and understanding.

However, political will necessitates the realisation of free movement of people. IGAD has developed and adopted migration policy. In order to execute this policy, regional secretary for forced, displaced and mixed migration has been established. In addition, there is a regional protocol that promotes free movement of people. Yet, member states are tepid to implement the protocol. The implementation of the protocol, however, will take time to execute. It needs the compromise of legal machineries of all member states that includes border controlling laws, visa regulation etc.

After passing these stages, the IGAD secretariat should bring the matter to the Assembly of Heads of States for ratification. Lack of political will illustrated in the annual report of IGAD that always show outstanding budget contribution of member states to the Secretariat. These arrears also weaken IGAD's financial capacity. In other words, the problem of political will of member states also contributes to the financial incapacity of IGAD.

IGAD has mainly been involved in the study phases of a project. The implementation phase is up to member states. In terms of actual construction, IGAD does not take part. The same is true for schooling, health centre development and other social service projects. It is the national government duty and responsibility to implement the social development aspect as per their policies. Despite these challenges, IGAD is facilitating constructing numerous infrastructure.

Infrastructure refers to transport, energy and communication. Infrastructure is one of the main drivers of integration. The problems of infrastructure are associated mainly with low budgetary allocations. Construction of an infrastructure is not adequate; it needs periodic maintenance and rehabilitation. In order to make infrastructure development, there is high demand of finance. Yet, the budgetary allocation in the region is limited. In addition, civil war and bureaucratic government policies have become the barriers of the region's infrastructure development. For instance, it is difficult to build or rehabilitate the Somalia infrastructure, due to the concern of security. In some cases, the available infrastructure is demolished by insurgent groups just to discredit the achievement of the central government.

The issue of visa is not only the problem of the region rather it is one of the challenges of integration of Africa. There are only five countries that provide either free visa or visa on arrival for Africans. These are Comoros, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda and Seychelles. Africa is open to the rest of the world but remains closed to Africans (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014).

In order to enhance regional integration, there is a demand of uninterrupted flow of regional traffic. According to Gerald (2012) transport costs in Africa are 136 higher than other regions of the world. This is actually one of the problems of achieving a free trade area. Reducing transport cost thus would generate fivefold an increase in trade among African countries.

In the IGAD region, the costs of transport have been increased due to lack of harmonisation of transport policies. For instance, the COMESA Yellow card is implemented in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. This Yellow card is an insurance that enable to cover third party liabilities as well as to cover the medical expenses of the driver and on board passengers during accident. IGAD thus has to import such experiences from other regions in order to enhance the development, maintenance and implementation of an effective, uncostly and safe transportation system.

IGAD is mainly engaging in the task of connectivity; i.e physical connectivity through different modes of transportation is the main task of IGAD. So far IGAD has carried out 5 000 km regional connectivity works. The 500 km road connectivity is extended to link:

- Addis Ababa–Nairobi-Kampala-Juba;
- Addis Ababa–Djibouti;
- Addis Ababa–Juba-Kampala;
- Addis Ababa–Berbera.

The roads and the connectivity is done by member states. There is a problem of neglecting the infrastructure development, as member states allocate very little GDP to the sector. Compared with other regional blocs, IGAD stood in second place next to the SADC in the infrastructure development sector (Rupa & Vivien, 2011). In fact, the role of infrastructure in speed up integration process is paramount. In my opinion the infrastructure is the second priority sector of IGAD. Indeed, peace is the most primary area of focus.

In addition, IGAD is also instrumental in connecting 2000km (lines of power) in the energy sector. These include:

- Ethiopia–Djibouti (300 km),
- Ethiopia–Sudan (321km),
- Ethiopia–Kenya (1100km, which is an ongoing project),
- Sudan–Eritrea (200km).

The average ticket price ranges between 200-300 for short distance and 600-800 for long distance flights within the IGAD region (ECA, 2013). The region's railway system is characterised by old age locomotives, poor government policies, weak institutional or managerial systems (IGAD, 2008). However, despite the existence of the railway transportation system, road transport is the most preferred by the region travelers even to mobilise too bulky commodities.

Table 2.1. The status of free movement of people among member states of IGAD

Border	Free movement status	Reason
Djibouti-Ethiopia	No	Visa requirement
Djibouti-Eritrea	No	Unresolved border issue
Ethiopia-Kenya	Yes	Bilateral agreement
Ethiopia-Eritrea	No	Border closed due to conflict
Ethiopia-Sudan	No	Visa requirement
Ethiopia-South Sudan	No	Visa requirement
Ethiopia- Somalia	No	Visa requirement
Eritrea-Sudan	No	Visa requirement
Somalia-Kenya	Limited	concern of terrorism
Somali-Djibouti	No	Visa requirement
South Sudan-Kenya	Yes	Bilateral agreement
South Sudan-Sudan	No	Unresolved border issue
South Sudan-Uganda	No	Visa requirement
Uganda-Kenya	Yes	Protocol of EAC

IGAD is a facilitator to uphold regional coastline connectivity through undersea cables. In fact, the ICT connectivity covers not only the IGAD region rather the whole of East Africa. The line goes through Mombasa, Djibouti up to Port Sudan. This ICT project targeted countries with ports only. This means the three landlocked countries of IGAD – Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda could not benefit. However, there is a plan to integrate the landlocked countries, especially they will be included in the internet exchange point project.

Here, it could be argued that having a landlocked country will be a problem in adopting uniform regional policy. Since landlocked countries are far from markets and access to ports, the trading activity become expensive and it will discourage comparative advantage in the trade sector.

Regional policy has already been developed and adopted on transport, ICT, measures to control the quality of inter-regional roads, as well as a three one stop border have been designed. This arrangement has been developed between Ethiopia-Kenya; Uganda-South Sudan and Ethiopia- Sudan.

On the other hand, in terms of human rights the region has one of the worst records in the eyes of human rights groups. The terrorist group, the LRA, led by an ICC fugitive, Joseph Kony is responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, abduction, rape and recruitment of child soldiers who have been brainwashed to the extent that they even kill their family members without reservation. The two unpopular regimes in Eritrea and Ethiopia are ranked first and second respectively in the jailing of journalists. This undermines dissent and the freedom of expression. In Djibouti, the minority regime coerced the majority Somalis to participate in their political schemes. In Somalia, the terrorist group Al-Shabab has imposed sharia law (though it is unofficial). In so doing, it undermined the fundamental human rights of Somalian residents, especially those of women. In Sudan, a group called *Janjaweed* was responsible for frequent attacks against civilians who live around Darfur.

In such cases, it is expected that IGAD has to intervene whenever there is a grave violation of human rights in member states. IGAD should also take good practices from blocs such as the SADC that have adopted the Social Charter,

protecting fundamental rights, freedom of association and collective bargaining, health and safety, as well as equality for women, persons with disabilities and older persons.

Human rights activists or institutions accused states of the suppressing of media to silence opposition parties and journalists (CPJ, 2016). Due to lack of press freedom, journalists who are dare to write and report the truth are usually end up behind bars and at the same time the region's journalists and bloggers are recently start to won series of journalism award. According to human rights institution report, the IGAD region is notorious for violation of rights and privileges. The governments are too undemocratic to respect press freedom and speech. The governments thought that strong media is a threat to the sustainability of their power.

After the Arab spring which flare up in 2011, nations alarmed with the power of media. The HRW have listed Eritrea and Ethiopia as the worst defenders of journalism and they are ranking at the top in jailing journalists. In Eritrea, there is no free press at all. It seems as if there is sabotage against the upgrading of ICT. The dissemination of ICT will result in costs of censorship, jamming of the media and other modes of communications.

The spillover effects of power sector could be illustrated as follows: Ethiopia as a source of the longest river in the world (Nile) has huge potential to electricity power. Djibouti and Sudan secured their electricity power from Ethiopia. Even Kenya and South Sudan have a plan to demand electric power, once the Great Renaissance Dam (GERD) of Ethiopia, which is under construction has been done. What makes this paradoxical is that the mainland of Ethiopia is suffering

from power shortage. It seems as if the government of Ethiopia is ambitious to get regional recognition and it probably paves the way to be crowned as a hegemon state.

If a government becomes more transparent and accountable to the public, the regional integration process will likely be smooth. In the Horn of Africa, integration should not only be about negotiations or decisions of the heads of states; rather it should also involve other non-state actors such as civic societies, business persons, academics and other stakeholders that will influence the decisions of IGAD. The new regionalism method of study, then, promotes inclusive approach where all stakeholders of the Horn of Africa will have privilege to express their concerns.

As Balassa (1961) remarked African regional integration is characterised by many processes but few outcomes. This implies that despite abundant declarations, measures, policy statements, political commitments, and intra-national institutional configurations, there is little advancement in forwarding clear and breakthrough guidelines for policy makers and researchers (Layen, 2006). Through adoption of the new regionalism approach for regional integration, initiatives of IGAD, pressure groups (such as NGOs) will alert the deadlines of the projects, and monitor the state over the implementation or compliance of protocols and different agreed instruments.

In addition, the new regionalism approach will facilitate the people-to-people transactions. Regional integration is also about empowering the residents of a certain geographic area economically, politically and socially. Nonetheless, in most cases the regional integration blocs neglect the most important aspect of the

arrangement i.e. interconnecting people of member states. The regional blocs emphasise mainly the relationship between state officials. Such an approach is entirely flawed, especially for diversified peoples of Africa. People of the Horn of Africa should know each other very well in order to develop a sense of unity, harmony, trust and cooperation. When people mix with each other, there will be interactions of cultures, languages, and skills; such kind of people-centered transactions will pave the way for free movement of people and capital across the border securely and in a friendly manner.

The IGAD Business Forum could serve as a facilitator of people-to-people transaction. It could help the informal economy to be transformed into official and recorded that ensures the safety and rights of the traders. Informal trade may include trade in arms. There is a principle called war economy. War has its own activities. In Somalia, there is illegal trade of charcoal and sugar. However, it is a very big business that supported numerous family. It is because of the conflict in the country that made the families to run the business. If there were stability in Somalia, the charcoal and sugar industry fall under the formal hands of the government or private company.

In addition, scholars like Wallace (1990) categorise integration into formal and informal integration. The formal integration refers to the integration that made through formal arrangements with the states while informal integration is done by individuals of the member states (Rosamond, 2000).

Regarding people-to-people relations, the informal sector should form part of the scheme. Regional treaties, objectives, plans and programmes hardly mention the economy of the informal sector. However, an effective regional integration should embrace all sections of the society. Research (ECA, 2006) illustrates that two thirds of African families are beneficiaries of the informal sector, either as operators or those who indirectly receive the sector's services.

If such trade was captured by official records, intra-African trade (that accounts only 10%) would likely be much greater (Economic Intelligence report, 2015). However, IGAD has the tendency to discourage the informal sector. It should develop guidelines to regulate the informal sector that carried out mostly with vulnerable groups such as female-headed households and the poor in general. The informal trade in Africa accounts for 43% of the total GDP (Economic Intelligence report, 2015). It is almost equivalent to the formal trade. The majority cross-border trade of IGAD has operated informally and the traders are usually escaping formal regulations and duty payments imposed by the government (Gerald, 2012).

2.2.1. The presence of super powers influencing politics in the Horn of Africa

The global power play in the in the IGAD region started in the pre-colonial era especially in the Horn of Africa. The French, Britain and Italian government bent

on imposing their economic, military, political and even religious influence in the region. These colonial countries are responsible for the destruction of the traditional beliefs, the role of elders in conflict resolution and in general they have been actively engaged in supporting cultural structures that open the door for ethnic and religious conflicts. The problem of Somalia dates to the colonial era where the then superpowers partitioned the country into French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia land. In 1970s the Ogaden war that was fought between Ethiopia and Somalia was aggravated with the involvement of US and Soviet Union (The Financial times, 2016).

In 2002, the US established an anti- terrorist brigade called Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which was stationed in Djibouti. CJTF-HOA is combating terrorist groups in Kenya, Somalia and Yemen as well. It can be argued that the intervention of the international community could lessen conflict in this region. However, permanent intervention will undermine the role of indigenous and regional conflict resolution systems. External intervention must be time bound. With the blessing of US, Ethiopia's invaded Somalia in 2005, where it resulted in humanitarian crises, the deaths of thousands of civilians and displacement of millions of people (Redie, 2013).

Currently, the Horn of Africa has become a playground for France, USA, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate (UAE), South Korea, Turkey, Italy, and Spain. Camp Lemmonier of Djibouti is America's only permanent military base in Africa. It hosts 4, 500 troops to conduct anti terrorist operations against Al-Qaeda (in Yemen) and Al-Shabab of Somalia. Recently, US extended its

operations in Nigeria against Boko Haram, ISIS in Libya and the Lord Resistance Army of Uganda. Djibouti also experienced the presence of France's largest military force. The only Japanese base abroad is located in Djibouti. EU's anti-piracy naval force, which includes Spanish and German soldiers, has a base in Djibouti. The presence of super military powers in Djibouti earned the country the label "Oasis in a bad neighbourhood" (The Irish Times, 2016). In Somalia the presence and influence of Turkey is growing. Turkey is building schools, roads, hospitals, and other investments in Somalia. Turkey is also agreed with Somalia on anti-pirates operation. It will protect ships from being destroyed and hijackings of ship personnel for ransom.

On the other hand, the UN is involved in the maintenance of peace and security in the region. The UN has sent peace keeping troops. United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOS), United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS), United Nations Missions for Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) were the eminent peace keeping missions in the region. African Union is also instrumental in maintaining peace in Somalia with its mission- AMISOM. Based on its foreign policy, European Union also supports projects that could bring development in the region. The projects could range from infrastructure development to military intervention.

2.2.2. The role of Al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa

Al-Qaeda's role in the Horn of Africa dates back to 1991 when the group leader Bin Laden lived in Sudan. He lived in the country until 1996. During his stay in Sudan, he was busy conducting operations using Somalia as a base. He tried a

bungled assassination against President Mubarak, who was later dethroned in the Arab spring. After the US imposed sanctions on Sudan, He left the country to Afghanistan (US central command, 2007).

Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri repeatedly called Somalia people to rise against the “infidels” (US central command, 2007; Al-Jazeera, 2008). Al-Shabab leaders sympathized with Bin Laden. In 2009, the ex-leader of Al-Shabab broadcasted a video message that confirmed his loyalty to Bin Laden.

After the death of Bin Laden, Al-Shabab’s allegiance to Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who is Bin Laden’s successor, went viral in the media outlets, including the social media that became the latest means of communication for recruiting potential jihadists as far as North America.

Al-Qaeda affiliated organisations such as Al-Shabab are notorious for attacking humanitarian workers. In some cases, they not only intercepted aid trucks rather they also kidnaped and abused and expelled these workers. Somalia is, therefore, become a very difficult failed state for humanitarian delivery organisations.

Al-Qaeda uses the Horn of Africa for two main purposes. First, it uses it as a base to train its recruits, to raise funds for its terrorist activities. Secondly, it also uses the Horn of Africa as a launching pad for its military activities. Somalia as a failed state hosted a number of terrorist organisations including Al-Qaeda.

The three Presidents of the United States of America, President Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump adopted a policy that targets Somalia. The main reason for this policy is the group’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda and its attack on US interest in Horn of Africa. Indeed, it was the support of Al-Qaeda that facilitated

the failure of operation Black Hawk Down and withdrawal of American troops from Somalia. Al-Qaeda was trained by the Somali Army. Based on this training, the terrorists were able to crush US helicopters in the street of Mogadishu

Al-Qaeda also established a strong relations with war lords of Somalia and religious organisations as well. Al-Qaeda is responsible for training a number of Al-Shabab soldiers and the then UIC leaders in its Afghanistan terrorist camp.

2.2.3. The role of US in the Horn of Africa

During the cold war period, the United States of America (US) supported any movement that opposed communist regimes of the IGAD region. This resulted in the downfall of communist countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia. The US played a role in bringing the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and Sudan into power. The perception of the IGAD countries towards US is different. In general, there are two point of view on the US. First, some countries perceived the US as a hypocrite that talks about good governance, human rights but is equally engaged with the violation of human rights and the supporting of undemocratic administrations.

The US foreign policy in the Horn of Africa revolves around the protection of US interest in the region. This include embassies, citizens, businesses, ship trafficking etc. The major concern of US is security threat posed by terrorist groups of the region, such as Al-Shabab, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and

their affiliated organisations that include Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram (Nick, 2015). In 2014, the US conducted 674 military activities across Africa. These operations are conducted by the US-AFRICOM. Since its establishment in 2008, the number of AFRICOM's operations increased. The US signed counter terrorism agreements with the IGAD countries to enable her to stay in the region until 2050. The US and Djibouti agreed with the presence of the former until 2044 (Nick, 2015). This agreement has the implication of prolonged war on terrorism that will affect the socio economic sustainability of the region.

The modern war on terror started with the bombing of the New York twin towers on 11 September 2001. In retaliation of the attack, the US destroyed terrorists and their affiliated groups around the world. Horn of Africa become the centre for transit, breeding and training of the so-called terrorists. Al-Shabab is the major actor that the US state department listed as a terrorist organisation

2.3. Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa lies at the Eastern part of Africa. At the North, the Gulf of Eden borders the region while Indian Ocean is found at the East part of the region. The square mile of the Horn of Africa is about 5.2 million sq. km that it is about 17% of Africa's landmass. The aggregate population of the region is estimated to be 228, 101,899 that constitutes about 25 percent of the entire population of Africa. Even in the fauna arena the Horn of Africa has abundant resources where it is shelter for over 220 species of mammals. Endemic animals of the region such as antelope, Grevy's Zebra, Ibex and Bushbuck. In this regard the Simen mountain of Ethiopia is renowned of its wide range of wildlife like, the wolf, Gelda baboons, and vultures, just to mention a few.

In terms of plant life, the Horn of Africa has various native plant species. The region constitutes Bankouale palm, Erica grass, cucumber trees, heather, Eucalyptus, which is came from Australia by King Menelik of Ethiopia. St. Johns' Wort (small yellow flower). Further, there are various plants which are used as ingredients for traditional herbalists. On the other hand, the region is among the largest producer and consumer of 'Chat', which is a stimulant crop widely chewed in the Horn of Africa and Middle East countries. 'Chat' or 'khat' is banned in North America, European Union and even in China as it categorised under Narcotic drugs.

In addition, Kenya is endowed with Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya, which are the first and second tallest mountains in Africa respectively. Ras Dashen Mountain, which is the fourth tallest mountain of Africa, is also found in Northern Ethiopia. The tip of Ras Dashen remains snow-capped throughout the year. Moreover, the Dallol Depression, which is the world's lowest land scape below sea level is located in the region.

Lake Victoria (Uganda) is the source of the Nile basin, which is the longest river in the world. The Great Rift Valley that stretches from Turkey to Mozambique passes through the Horn of Africa. The existence of the Great Rift Valley resulted in the formation of high mountains.

Ethiopia in particular has hydropower potential while oil is found in almost all states of the region. However, the region lacks legal and institutional mechanisms for trans boundary resource management (Nanni, 2016).

Furthermore, the Horn of Africa has abundant and diversified cultural life of indigenous peoples. It is the region where various ethnicities, languages and religious practices coexisted. The Massai (Kenya), and the Hamars (Ethiopia) could be mentioned as peoples with their own culture of clothing, eating, and wedding celebrations. The region has got over 100 nationalities with their own language and ways of life. In Ethiopia alone there are 84 languages spoken and there are more than 100 dialectics (Mike et al., 2004). Oromifa, Swahili, Amharic, English and Arabic are the most spoken languages of the region. HIV/AIDS remains the major health problem of the region. Thus, it is one of the regions that experienced excessive mortality rate as a result of HIV/AIDS. Other common diseases of the region include malaria, water bone diseases, hepatitis, and schistosomiasis.

The Horn of Africa is a strategic region that could serve as a bridge to the Middle East and Asia. Colonial powers, even the super powers during the cold war sought to control the region. The strategic importance of the region has both economic and military implications. The existence of significant ports such as Assab, Berbera, Mombasa, Port Sudan and Djibouti makes the region the centre of economic activities. The US-led campaign against global terrorism used the region as a base not only to combat 'local' terrorist groups like Al Shabab, rather to attack lords of terrorism such as Al Qaeda across the Middle East. According to the US Command in Africa (AFRICOM), Camp Lemonnier (in Djibouti) is the most significant US base in Africa.

In addition, the US government has a military warehousing facility at Mombasa, and Kenya. According to Nick Turse (2015), the US even has clandestine or

access locations at least in 34 countries of Africa that includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Other African countries where the US has access point include Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Senegal, the Seychelles, Algeria, Botswana, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Zambia.

Only two IGAD member states do not have US military presence: Eritrea and Sudan. In relation to this, the East Africa standby force is now ready to make military operations that are carried out under the command of the African Union. AU has prompted all regions of Africa to prepare a standby brigade.

The Horn of Africa is one of the most unstable and conflicting regions in the world. Civil wars, movements of rebels and undue intervention of tyrannical systems resulted in disastrous bloodshed for decades. The Civil war in Sudan claimed over 2 million lives. The situation is often referred to as the 'Darfur Crises' where the international community witnessed child soldiering, sex slaves, environmental degradation and above all the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirms the execution of genocide and crimes against humanity. As a result of this top government officials including the current North Sudan president Al Bashir got the arrest warrant from ICC. The famous rock band called Green Day also dedicated a song in titled "Working Class Hero" for the victims of Darfur.

This disastrous civil war, though it resulted in independence of South Sudan, its legacy still survives where factions and rebel groups roam freely and with impunity. On the other hand, the 1998 Ethio-Eritrea war concluded with the loss of 100,000 souls in a two-year span (El-Affendi, 2009).

In Africa politics is the major driver of integration (Draper et al., 2007). Lack of cooperation is the other main critical challenge of IGAD. According to Rondos (2016), this is a region of loosely controlled frontiers often populated by marginalised communities that straddle boundaries and become proxies in the politics between countries of the region. There is, therefore, a link between internal politics and regional integration.

Some member states relation is tense. The optimal currency theory insists that using common currency encourages mobility of capital and labour. The theory also states that common currency minimizes regional inequality in taxes and increases the supply of public goods with the potential for fiscal spillover across national borders. The 1998 war between the Ethiopia and Eritrea radically changed their relationship. The war cost the countries a lot in terms of human life, material and financially. Both countries have lost the opportunity to mutual prosperity. The MIP stated that despite of antagonism, there is a positive commitment towards IGAD as an institution (IGAD, 2010).

In addition, Uganda has been fighting with a rebel group (for several years until today) called Lord Resistance Army (LRA), which labelled itself as a 'radical Christian Group guided by the Ten Commandments'. LRA, led by Joseph Kony, is reportedly notorious for engaging in child soldiering who make themselves ready to war after brain washing therapy. After the independence of France, Djibouti, experienced civil war in 1976 (Assefa, 2003). Kenya, though has not hosted country wide and prolonged war, is a nation struggling for genuine democratic and peaceful transition. The post 2007 election was characterised by ethnic conflicts between the supporters of the two Presidential candidates

Moi Kibaki and Raila Odinga. The failed state index is topped by Somalia which could not establish a strong centralised and credible state since 1991. This is due to the disintegration of state power among different clans and lords who control the fragmented regions of the country.

However, the case of Somalia is still a confusing one and it disproves the theory of ethnic politicians that argue that ethnicity is a major cause of unrest. Yet, Somali is an unstable failed state with a common national, ethnic and religious identity. The root causes of the conflict in the Horn of Africa could be the existence of governments that lost credibility from the majority of people. The imposition of a religion against the will of the people, the use of ethnicity and tribalism as a political playing card, and the ambition to secede from motherland and establish an independent state could be another rationale for the escalation of conflict in the region. The imposition of religion against the will of people resulted in the Sudan civil war where the North Sudan which is predominately Muslim follower and Christian dominated Southern Sudan. It became the beginning of the decades of crises.

These problems that hamper the peaceful coexistence of the population of the Horn of Africa could be addressed through rendering IGAD a sharp mandate to monitor the peace and security of the region. This toothless supranational institution could not generate a solution for the problems of member states. IGAD as a strong regional organisation could facilitate the development of democratisation, national reconciliation, promotion of secular governance, separation of political administration from ethnicity, promotion of peaceful coexistence among neighbouring countries.

The region is one of the unpredictable parts of the world and is busy dealing with emerging occasions. The recent civil war in South Sudan could be an illustrative example. IGAD with the support of the international facilitated peace agreement between the two factions i.e. President Salva Kir and Rick Machar. However, after a few months war broke out again. Consequently, IGAD is expected to shift its direction on re-mediation of the warring factions. Currently, the South Sudan issue could be regarded as priority of IGAD. The dynamic nature of the region is the problem not only on financial mobilisation rather it accounts its share for the slower integration process.

In addition, IGAD's strategy documents do not clearly stipulate the approach and timeline of the regional integration process. IGAD documents usually prefer the word "cooperation" than integration. This trend makes the partners to not taking the IGAD regional integration process as serious as other blocs. Even if one looks at regional cooperation as a substitute to regional integration, the mandate of IGAD on this area is limited and requires the reform of the IGAD basic documents including the Agreement that Establishing IGAD, which is considered as the constitutive Act of the organisation.

When one looks deeper into the IGAD documents, there are phrases like "the secretariat instructed by head of state to do..."; "the heads of states directed the Secretariat..."; "the summit ordered the Secretariat to promote ...". This is the manifestation of IGAD's role as a sheer agent of the Heads of States. It clearly shows the limited mandate of IGAD to design and operate its own regional agenda.

IGAD is exercising its mandate as per the instruction of the Assemble of Heads of States. The IGAD secretariat means an agent or working for member states. IGAD could not formulate its own project or agenda. The decision making of IGAD, in fact, is top-to-bottom. The top hierarchy is dominated by Heads of States that make the ultimate decisions. Such hierarchy contributes to lack of prompt decision making. As the Horn of Africa has experienced dynamic events periodically, it requires speedy decision making to address the problems at grass root level. This decision-making ability is hampered by IGAD's highly vertical

Integration has different stages and it is not an end itself, it is a process. The first stage of integration is referred to as preferential trade area. FTA is the second stage of integration. FTA is the case where states collectively remove trade restrictions in their region. FTA, however, does not involve harmonisation of policies. FTA theory was introduced in the 18th century by Adam Smith and David Ricardo (Fekadu, 2010).

Figure 2.2. The vertical hierarchy of IGAD



Currently, the NAFTA is the well-developed FTA in the world. The FTA's assumption is to specialise in producing and exporting a single commodity. Comparative advantage will be to the benefit of those FTA states. It implied that since countries have produced cost saving commodities, they will be benefiting through producing one product again and again and sending it to the world market. This is because each country of the FTA produced a single commodity and since there is no regional competitor, the world will buy from a single nation.

The attainment of FTA in the IGAD will benefit states of the region since they have the potential to produce a single commodity that enhances their cost effectiveness and competitiveness in the world market. Kenya and Ethiopia are competing for their coffee production in the international level. Uganda and Sudan compete for cotton. Chat is produced in Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan,

Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. However, if there is FTA arrangement, these inter-regional competitions will be avoided since states will be specialised in one product.

When one compares IGAD with other African regions, it is lagging behind in terms of the regional integration process. They had already achieved FTA but not IGAD. The year 2012 was the deadline to the achievement of FTA in the region but IGAD failed to meet its objectives. In order to create FTA complimentary institutions should be in existence. These institutions such as regional court, bank, etc, are absent in the IGAD region. The third stage of regional integration is Customs Union (CU). Under the arrangement of CU, member states are expected to harmonise their policies with the exception of their fiscal and monetary policies. IGAD is still struggling to harmonise policies and developing new policies. CU enables members to act collectively towards outsider countries. CU will be instrumental to member states to get joint policy in trade, health, education, etc. In the sphere of trade, CU makes collective trade relationship on other countries and in the same time member states will impose same tariff on the goods and service of other countries. Policy coordination is the pre-requisite of CU.

The harmonisation of policies is not a new invention, it could be a duplicate from other regions of the world whether it is in Africa, Latin America or Asia. It is just a matter of importing good integration practices from other blocs. However, the harmonisation of policy needs strong political commitment. Integration needs the socialisation of leaders of member states. In the Arab league, heads of states just

meet without an agenda to know each other well enough. Integration could be regarded as a venue of socialisation.

In the IGAD region, the harmonisation of policies is also hampered by the disparities in the socio- economic and political settings of member states. Harmonisation involves the convergence of national policies, programmes, procedures and regulation. In order to deal with harmonisation educational level, health service, military composition of member states should be taken into account. In order to address the problem of socio-economic disparities, IGAD member states have to trade and negotiate in the global level as a region not individually. Unity is power. In the trading sector, if states are committed to facilitate the flow of vehicles across their border, the transportation policies of members have to be harmonised. The driver license policies of the region have to be uniform; the maximum load on the bridges are not the same currently that there is a need to harmonise; the maximum velocity of cars is not uniform across the region. Heartfelt commitment and adequate resource allocation is at the center of harmonisation of policies in the region.

At last, it is important to assess the history, current situation and likely future of IGAD member countries. In doing so, one can grasp the need for IGAD as coordinator of integration among the countries. It will also enable one to know which sectors should be priority areas and which socio-economic and political scenes IGAD is expected to intervene in so as to smoothen the road to a unified, strong, recognised and competitive Horn of Africa. It is in light of the above that we now turn on the member states of the IGAD so as to help the reader to

understand the intricacies involved in getting the organisation to play the role of a uniting force in the Horn of Africa.

Djibouti

Historical writings revealed the existence of Land of Punt in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti is considered as the ultimate location of the Land of Punt. The People of the Land of Punt have been engaged in trade relationship with Egyptians and their wealth included gold, ivory, animal skins, cattle, and ebony.

During the 9th century, the Kingdom of Adal, often known as Adal Sultanate used Djibouti as the base after it controlled a wider part of the country. The kingdom of Ifat, which is a Muslim chieftaincy that tried to expand Islam territories in the Horn of Africa, also used Djibouti as its base to expand throughout the Horn of Africa. Djibouti became instrumental in controlling the highlands of Ethiopia. Certain Historians like Pankhurst (2001) argue that the previous name of Djibouti is Tadjoura.

Djibouti was colonised by Egypt with the indirect command of Great Britain. In 1884, when the Egyptians withdrew from Djibouti, troops of France were deployed to control the country. In 1894, France declared the establishment of French Somaliland, which is the name given to Djibouti. France thus became the colonial master of Djibouti until 1967. The French used both force and peaceful means to colonise the tiny country. As a peaceful means it was purchased and various treaties with indigenous administrators were signed.

Figure 2.3. Member states of IGAD



Source: The official web site of IGAD

In 1897, Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia and France agreed on two terms of conditions. First, the Emperor agreed to render a portion of land that will be ruled by France for the following 99 years. In addition, the Emperor agreed to the demarcation of the territory of Djibouti. Second, the two parties agreed to construct the Ethio-Djibouti railway that connects Djibouti and Ethiopia. The railway began in 1897 and was completed in 1917. During the Second World War the country was handed over to pro-Italian French administrators for about six years. After the defeat of Mussolini's fascist Italy, the French recaptured its former colony. (Pankhurst, 2001).

The culture, identity and religion of Somalia and Djibouti is similar. Due to this fact, the first referendum of 1958 offered Djibouti to join the Republic of Somalia or to remain with France. However, due to the scam, threat, and the existence of European settlers the referendum resulted in favour of France. The second referendum was held in 19 March 1967. The French used their power to deport Somalis, importation of the Afar peoples from Ethiopia, and to turn the results of the referendum in their favour. Djibouti constitutes the Somalis and the Afars who preferred the status quo while the former desperately needed to declare their independence from the French administration. When the results of the referendum were announced, it triggered public unrest, where violence broke out, resulting in a number of deaths (Hamilton, 2017).

The international community condemned the French for the civil unrest and the deaths. In fact, the United Nations asked the French to declare the independence of Djibouti immediately after the Second World War. The French refused. On 27 June, 1977 a third referendum was held to overwhelmingly vote for the

independence of Djibouti. Hassan Gould Aptidon was to become the country's first president (Ibid, 2017).

However, President Aptidon was authoritarian and installed a one-party system. Aptidon served the country as a president for 22 years and he resigned at the age of 83 in 1999. During 1991, a civil war broke out between the government and the Afar rebel group called FRUD (Front for Unity and Democracy). The civil war ended in 2001 with the signing of the peace accord between the government and the rebel groups in Paris. In 1999, the nation conducted the first multi-party presidential elections in the history of the country where Ismail Omar Guelleh become the president. He was also re-elected to a second term in 2005 and he amended the constitution to run for the third term. He started his third term in 2011.

Currently, Djibouti is a republic, which is bordered by Somalia to the South East, Eritrea and the Red Sea to the North West, Ethiopia to the West and South, and the Gulf of Eden and Yemen to the North East. The climate of Djibouti is characterised as desert, torrid, and dry. The nation faces shortage of water, desertification, endangering of species and inadequate arable land. The saltiest lake in the world, Lake Assal, is found in Djibouti. The total population of the country is estimated at 810,179 and 94% of it is Muslim. The rest is Christian. Ethnically the Somali nationals dominate the country. They are close to 60%, while the Afar people make up 35%. The French, Arabs, Ethiopian and Italians share the 5% of the total population. French and Arabic are official languages, while Somali and Afar are also spoken.

In April 2010, the Constitution of Djibouti was revised and the country was able to constitute a multi-party system, stipulating the limit of presidential term, and abolishing death penalty (World Trade Organisation, 2014). The economy of Djibouti heavily depends on its Port, which serves as transit for local and international transactions and it also serves as refueling depot. The manufacturing sector of Djibouti is very low. Rainfall is so scant that it is limiting the crop production to small quantities of fruits and vegetables. The service industry is the backbone of the country and represents nearly 80% of the total economic activities. Currently, Djibouti hosts only 19,000 Somalians as refugees. In 2002, it expelled all refugees within 48 hours (most of whom originated from IGAD member states).

On September 2016, a human rights organisation called One World revealed the existence of over 90,000 men, women, and children from Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea transit Djibouti as voluntary and often undocumented economic migrants in route to Yemen and other locations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia (One world, 2016). Djibouti become a hub for forced labour and sex trafficking against children. According to the one world report, the reaction of the government of Djibouti in this regard is insufficient (One world, 2016).

Due to its strategic significance, Djibouti is a passage for Europe, Middle East and Asia, where the powerful states of the world are competing to control the nation. The country has military presence of France and the United States. In addition, Djibouti is a haven to foreign military bases, including the US-Africa Command (USAFRICOM), US Naval force, Japan, China and India's army. The presence of US is attached to the fight against global terrorism.

Since 2002, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was declared the country as its headquarter. The first Chinese base outside China is located in Djibouti was opened in 2017. Djibouti and Saudi Arabia is also agreed on opening of the Saudi military base in the tiny Muslim nation. Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Yemen civil war dictates the country to strengthen regional security. Saudi Arabia would like to combat Houthi rebels of the Yemen. However, Djibouti refused the establishment of Russia base in her territory. According to the government of Djibouti (2017), it is a strategy to avoid proxy war and the presence of two super powers. Moreover, Djibouti has been serving as the headquarters of IGAD since its inception in 1986 (IGAD, 1995).

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa bordering Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and Somalia. The climate of Ethiopia could be expressed as tropical monsoon with wide topographic- induced variation. Though the climate is suitable for crop production, the country is hit by famine frequently (Gill, 2010).

Agriculture is central to the economy while coffee is a major export crop. Other export crops include chat, gold, leather products, live animals, oil seeds and flower. In recent years, the country attracted foreign investors in the agricultural sector which also brought another challenge to the country – land grabbing. According to the Ethiopian constitution land belongs to the state and the willing buyer and the willing Seller principle could not be realised (Article 40(3) of the FDRE Constitution, 1994).

Ethiopia is one of the fastest economy growing in the world yet per capita income is among the lowest in the world (African Development Bank, 2016). In recent years, the nation has been engaging in construction of electricity plant projects, which includes the controversial \$5 billion Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt does not welcome the construction of the dam due to the anxiety of reducing of the density of the Blue Nile water flow towards her.

Regional integration is best achieved if there is an acceptable infrastructure. However, the communication sector also needs to be upgraded. Ethiopia is the most populated landlocked country of the world. Because of this, it has been using the port of Djibouti and Berbera for huge sum. It is paying Djibouti 3 million dollars per day (Yakob, 2014).

Erta Ale is an active volcano with frequent lava flows in recent years that attracts geographers. Ethiopia is assumed as cradle of humanity with the discovery of a fossil called Lucy or *Dinqnesh* at Hadar in 1974 (Judy, 2008). Lake Tana is the source of Blue Nile, which is the world's longest river. James Bruce, a Scottish traveler, is the first person that proved Ethiopia as the source of Nile (Bruce, 1790). With nearly 97 million populations, the nation is the second most populous in Africa. According to the 2007 census, Ethiopian Orthodox Christians are estimated to be 44%, while 34% of the total population is Muslim. Other religions include: Protestant 19 %, traditional 3%, Catholic 0.7% and other 0.6% (CIA world fact book, 2016).

The Habesha people, who lived in the Ethiopian Highlands, are the pioneers to found the first Ethiopian Empire called Damat. The Empire was called Abyssinia. Then, the Sabeans were the first kingdom to rise to power (OguEji, 2007). The capital of Sabeans was Yeha. Later, in the first century AD the Aksumite Kingdom started to rule the country. The Kingdom annexed the Red Sea, Yemen, and Meroe. The capital of the Kingdom was Aksum (Munro-Hay, 1989). King Ezana helped to spread Christianity. Having converted into Christianity, King Ezana built a series of churches and monasteries in association with his brother.

However, the Axumite kingdom lost its power with the emergence of powerful groups of Islam, and Jews, which was led by Judith Gudit (Pankhurst, 2001). Then the Zagwe Dynasty began to rule the country. The Dynasty set up its capital in Roha or Addefa. Mara Takle Haymanot was responsible for the founding of the Zagwe Dynasty. The Kings of the Zagwe Dynasty were devoted Christians and they built various rock hewn churches. In particular King Lalibela is praised for his architectural wisdom. His legacy is still surviving, where flocks of tourists are still visiting his rock hewn churches (Cruickshank, 2005).

In 1270, the last King of the Zagwe Dynasty was defeated by Yikuno Amlak, who founded the Solomonic Dynasty. The Dynasty has no fixed capital, since it engaged in a series of wars in numerous locations. In 1529, the Muslim Adal Sultanate that was supported by the Ottoman Turkey was invaded by the Ethiopian empire. The Adals were led by Imam Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi (Gragh Ahmed means “the left handed”). The Solomonic Dynasty with the military assistance of the Portuguese defeated the Sultanate of Adal.

Meanwhile, the Oromo people were able to move into the highlands, they conquered the remains of the Adal Sultanate and pushed deep into Ethiopia. After the defeat of the Adal Sultan, the Portuguese influence was becoming stronger. In 1632, King Susenyos converted into Catholicism. He declared catholic as the national religion of the country. The nation was predominately Orthodox Christian, and it began to protest the declaration to become catholic. However, large scale civil war was broke out and the King tried to crush the protestors (Wallis, 2014).

King Fasiledes, the son of Emperor Susenyos, was able to restore the stability of the country. He expelled all the Catholics from the country and started to promote the closed-door policy, where no foreign national was permitted to enter the country. In 1632, King Fasiledes established Gondar as the capital of Ethiopia (Hable-Selassie, 1972). He built a series of churches, bridges and most importantly castles, which still remain one of the tourist destinations of the Horn of Africa. A period of peace and prosperity prevailed in the country until it was split apart by warlords in the 18th century. This warlord period is infamously known as the *ZemeneMesafint* (Tamrat, 1987).

In 1855, Ethiopia was reunified by Emperor Tewodros II, who defeated the warlords one after the other. The rise of Emperor Tewodros heralded the beginning of modern history of Ethiopia. Emperor Tewodros was renowned for his ambition of modernising the country. In 1896, Ethiopia, under the leadership of Emperor Menelik II defeated the Italians at the battle of Adwa. In 1930, Tafari Makonnen, was crowned as Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia (Bahru, 2002).

In 1935, the Italians invaded Ethiopia, this time they came with heavy machine guns and used typically modern military weapons (including chemical weapons). However, the use of chemical weapons is in contravention of the Geneva Protocol of 1922. When compared to the Italian, the Ethiopian army was too traditional. The Italians thus conquered the urban areas of the country for the subsequent five years until they were defeated by the joint forces of allied powers (especially Britain troops) and Ethiopian patriots in 1941. Emperor Haile Selassie who had fled to Britain regained his throne. In 1961, the bodyguard of the Emperor made an attempt to overthrow him. However, the coup failed (Ibid, 2002).

In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by a military junta called Dergue. In the same year Lucy was discovered in Hadar. The Dergue regime has been responsible for torturing and killing of thousands of opposition members. The countrywide anti- opposition campaign, which is called Red Terror survived as the notorious history of Ethiopia.

In 1984, a tragic famine killed 1 million people (Gill, 2010). In 1991, the rebels, who were fighting against the Dergue regime for 17 years took power. In 1992, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia to be the seventh member state of IGAD. The current state power is held with the coalition of four political parties, though practically the Tigray Liberation Front (TPLF) has the ultimate power in running the country. The government promoted the ideology of revolutionary democracy. It seems like the mixture of free market and socialism. Revolutionary democracy encourages the undue interference of the state on the economy, the promotion of uni-party, leaving narrow spaces for the opposition and private media, which

subsequently enabled the ruling party to stay in power and strengthen its monopoly on every sphere of life (Kalkidan & Tesfalem, 2016).

The ruling party, the Ethiopians Revolutionary Democratic Party Front (EPRDF) is continually condemned for violation of dissenting opinion, silencing opposition parties, civic societies, and the private media. It is infamous for its human rights handling, which is guaranteed national and international bill of rights. In 2005, immediately aftermath of country's general election, the government deployed special armed forces to shoot for kill against unarmed peaceful protestors where more than 200 people died (Ibid, 2016).

Several Ethiopian civilians, opposition figures, journalists, and bloggers are suffering behind bars without any charges. According to Human Rights Watch, Ethiopians security forces do not only violate the human rights of fellow Ethiopians; rather they are crossed over the border to destabilise the civilians of Somalia in March – April 2007 at the Battle of Mogadishu.

The Ethio-Eritrean war broke in 1998 which claimed the lives of 100,000 people (CIA world fact book, 2016). Ethiopia and the neighbouring Eritrea started using common currency as well as free trade for six years. However, both do not agree on the terms of the free trade area. This led to Eritrea using its own currency. This case motivated scholars to raise questions on whether regional integration can pose instability in certain cases or not (El-Affendi, 2009).

Even though the border war with Eritrea clinched with the Algiers peace accord in 2000, the threat of waging a war is still revealed by both countries. The decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) could not address

the problem. Peace and security analysts often used the term “No peace, No War” to express the situation of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The unfriendly relationship between the two countries could be demonstrated as one of the challenges of regional integration in the Horn of Africa (Gerald, 2012).

Eritrea

Eritrea is another strategic country of the Horn of Africa. It is bordering the Red Sea, which is transshipment of Africa to Middle East. Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan are neighboring countries of Eritrea. The country is facing recurrent drought and desertification. Historically, Eritrea is used to be a war front for both external colonial ambitions. Moreover, the country is engaged in a series of internal civil wars (Wallis, 2014).

Eritrea does constitute the Tigrinya, which makes up 55% of the 6.3 million of the total population, followed by Tigre with 30% percent. Others ethnic groups include Saho, Kunama, Rashaida, Bieln, Afar, Beni Amir, and Nera. The country has three official languages: Arabic, English and Tigrinya. Other unofficial languages include Tigre, Kunama, and Afar (CIA world fact book, 2016).

The majority of the people of Eritrea are devoted Coptic Christians. The nation has various historical churches, monasteries and spiritual schools, which were established thousands of years ago. The policy of the Eritrean government does not tolerate practice of the Jehovah Witnesses. However, the government policy on Islam is better. The legal system of the country is mixed with Islamic law, where sharia courts entertain the cases of Muslim marriage, inheritance and

family. Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia and Eritrea, could be a good example for coexistence of Muslims and Christians for centuries (Erich, 2010).

Eritrea's economy is dependent on the service sector, while a large portion of the population engaged in subsistence agricultural sector. The unpredictable rainfall coupled with mandatory national military service are factors that hamper the development of the agriculture sector. In most cases, Eritrea could not satisfy the needs of his people, it is often compelling to buy grain from IGAD and other countries. In other words, food security is one of the main problems of the country.

However, the mining potential of the country is promising. But, if Eritrea could deal with chronic drought, restrictive economic policies, international sanctions, high military expenditure, and problems of social development such as illiteracy and low skills, it will improve the quality life of the people. The government policy is a command economy. The media sector is monopolised by the government. Private ownership of any form of media is prohibited by law. The mobile cellular distribution is one of the lowest in the world, which has the ratio of five per 100 persons (CIA world fact book, 2016).

Eritrea is the oldest country of the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia and both of them were cited in the Old Testament, which was written 3,000 years ago. Eritrea's former nomenclature was Bahire Negash and Eritrea was part of the Ethiopian province. The Kingdom of Axum that existed in the fifth century in the northern Ethiopia is a proud history that both countries share. In the 16th century the Ottoman Turks annexed Red Sea and port of Massawa. The opening of Suez Canal in 1869 required a port in the Mediterranean Sea. In other words, colonial

powers especially Italy became ambitious to control the Horn of Africa; thus the Italians through a company known as Rubattino purchased a small portion of land from local chiefs of Asseb. In 1882, the ownership of Asseb was transferred to the Italian state. In 1885, the Italian armed forces succeeded in controlling Asseb and Massawa (Bahru, 2002).

Then, the Italians occupied Eritrea without much difficulty since Emperor Yohannes was engaged in a war with Sudan, where he was killed. Menelik was crowned as Emperor of Ethiopia. In 1889, in the treaty of Wuchale, Menelik agreed to the presence of Italians in Eritrea. Later, the Wuchale treaty became the cause of the battle of Adwa. This is due to the imperialist tactic of Italy which makes article 19 of the treaty to bear incongruities between the Amharic and Italian versions (Wallis, 2014).

The Wuchale treaty became an immediate cause for the war that broke out between Italy and Ethiopia. On 1 March 1896, in Adwa, the Italian colonial forces experienced a humiliating defeat. The victory of Adwa was to become a model for other colonial resistant movements throughout Africa that bear hope of fighting and winning against a colonial country.

After they were defeated at the battle of Adwa, the Italians started to retreat towards Eritrea, which became their final footstep. Emperor Menelik could not drive away the Italians from Eritrea, this was due to the outbreak of a cattle plague called *kifu Ken*; literally it means days of suffering. In addition, the 1996 Addis Ababa Treaty, which was entered between Ethiopia and Italy confirmed the full independence of Ethiopia and the presence of Italian forces in Eritrea (Bahru, 2002).

The Italians secured the occupation of Eritrea until it gained independence in 1941. In 1952, the United Nations made a resolution that established Eritrea as an autonomous region within the Ethiopian federation. In 1962, Eritrea's union with her motherland Ethiopia resulted in the formation of rebel groups, who refused the unification. Two rebel groups, notably ELF and EPLF, fought the Ethiopian government for about 30 years with full financial support of Arab countries in Africa and the Middle East. Eritrea is closely tie with Arab nations continues until today to secure the IGAD nation an observer status in the Arab league. Arabic is also one of the official languages of Eritrea (Omer, 2009).

In 1991, EPLF gained control of the capital city of the province Asmara by defeating government forces. In 1993, a referendum took place to decide the fate of Eritrea. Eritrea voted for independence. Among other things, Ethiopia lost the port of Assab and became a landlocked country.

Eritrea is the only IGAD country without a multi-party system, free press and civic societies. After independence, i.e. in 1993, People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) held power as a transitional government and remained in power for 21 years. In addition, the only and the most recent election of the country was held in 1993. Unsatisfied with the government of Eritrea, various groups started armed insurgency, including the Eritrean Islamic Jihadist Movement, which has an official connection with Al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2002).

Political migrants of Eritrea were entitled with swift asylum in any country, since the despotic nature of the government is recognised worldwide. Large numbers of Eritrean youths are compelled to flee their country in order to avoid compulsory military training.

On the other hand, Eritrea became a haven to various armed opposition groups that unseated the neighbouring countries. Moreover, the United Nations accused Eritrea of supporting terrorist groups of Somalia. The accusation gives the UN Security Council authority to impose various military and economic sanctions (UN, 2009).

Further, Eritrea is not a good friend to neighbouring countries. So far it has fought with Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Yemen. Especially the 1998 war with Ethiopia resulted in heavy casualties: it left 100, 000 peoples dead, thousands displaced and thousands became prisoners of war. Badme is the contested area that led the two countries to the warfront. Before the outbreak of the war between the two countries, trade transaction reach at its pick, which lead them to avoid customs duty at their border. In 2016, Eritrea allowed the United Arab Emirate to open military base in her soil. Eritrea is also become part of the Gulf coalition (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) against the Houti rebels who controlled the capital of Yemen Sana (Al-monitor, 2016).

Kenya

Kenya is the largest East African economy. It could be said that Kenya is the most stable country of IGAD where it has established harmony between neighbouring countries as well as less than 2% of its GDP which goes to military expenditure. In 2005, the mediation role of Kenya brought a smooth secession of Sudan and South Sudan. Kenya is also a host country for regular flow of refugees of Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda (Kanare, 2016).

The highlands of Kenya are well known for one of the most successful agricultural production in Africa that includes tea, coffee, corn, wheat, sugarcane, fruit, vegetables; dairy products, beef, fish, pork, poultry and eggs. The nation also exports agricultural and petroleum productions, most grippingly the highest export partner of the country is Uganda, which is a member of IGAD. One of the objectives of regional integration is to facilitate trade ship among member states.

According to the CIA report for July 2014, corruption and low infrastructure, especially the paved road, remain the major challenges of the nation's economy. In addition, the 2013 West Gate Mall hostage by a terrorist group Al Shabab reduced Kenya's tourism turnover. On the other hand, the communication sector of the country is instrumental to facilitate Kenya's socio economic linking since the ratio of mobile cellphone usage has become over 65 per 100 persons (CIA world fact book, 2016). The telecom industry is monopolised by the government but there are various companies to provide the mobile cellphone sector (Malack, et al, 2015).

Moreover, Kenya has achieved remarkably in the broadcasting media service where privately-owned Television and radio stations are available. There are more than 10,000 bloggers. The government of Kenya is committed to protect freedom of press, which is highly violated in other IGAD member states.

The Masai and the Kikuyu are the two main tribes of Kenya. The Kikuyu outnumber the Masai, yet the latter dominated the country in 18th century. The Kikuyu were farmers that possessed the lion share of the country's land until Britain declared a new policy in 1920. On the other hand, the Masai economy is based on cattle rearing and trading (Ernestia, 2002).

In 1895, Britain started to colonise Kenya after it had confirmed the annexation of Uganda. The British East Africa Company paved the way for the British expansion throughout the country. During the period 1895-1920, the nomenclature of Kenya became an East African Protectorate. During the early years of the colonisation, European origin farmers, most of whom came from South Africa, started to settle in the temperate areas of Kenya. The region was fertile though it did not have adequate inhabitants for commercial farming. Then African forced labour was legalised until it was subrogated in the 1920s (Robert, 1985).

Dissatisfied with the policy of Britain, the Kenyans' commenced their protest in 1904. The struggle against the new settlers reached its peak in 1920 when a legislation was passed to assure the land ownership of the European originated farmers and eventually allowed the dispossession of African farmers. The main victims of this policy were the Kikuyu clans whose economy was based on Agriculture.

Regarding political rights, the white settlers were entitled to elect members of the parliament, while the Indians had the right to vote, they were protesting against the offer of only two seats in the parliament in 1920. However, in 1927 the Indians attained the privilege of five seats in the parliament. The Indians were, first, came as the labor force of the new settlers, however, later they became more powerful than the indigenous peoples (Ibid, 1985).

In 1921, the East Africa Association was established to claim political rights and particularly to recover disposed land of the Kikuyu clan. In 1925, Britain disbanded the organisation, yet the youths of Kikuyu under the committed

leadership of Jomo Kenyatta continued their struggle. Kenyatta, through strong civil resistance, demanded political reforms and land rights. The response for the struggle happened gradually until the legislative Council of Nairobi included a Black member in 1944.

In 1951, the number of legislative representation reached 8 but it was far too little to stop the rise of a military group called Mau Mau. In October 1952, the Mau Mau freedom fighters started their operation by assassination of a few Europeans and large numbers of Kikuyu whom they suspected of collaborating with the colonialists. Subsequent to the unrest, the colonialists declared a state of emergency. Jomo Kenyatta, the general secretary of the East Africa Association, was arrested for seven years until 1961. The violence, the massacre and the guerrilla war of the Mau Mau rebellion was concluded in 1956. In 1960, the Kenyans were entitled to have majority seats in the parliament as per the agreement of the London peace conference (CIA world fact book, 2016).

In 1960, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) was established and Jomo Kenyatta became its first president. In May 1963 KANU won the majority of parliament seats while the country declared independence in December 1963. Kenyatta was praised for leading the country in an impartial way where he rendered governmental power for different ethnic groups of Kenya. He promoted the same policy towards the European settlers. Kenyatta left a legacy of a stable country, which became one of the economically advanced countries in Africa (David, 1982).

In 1978, Jomo Kenyatta died leaving his throne to Daniel Arap Moi who continued the legacy of the former president in free market system, promoting a

policy of open foreign investment. However, the era of Moi has been criticised for absence of a multi-party system, ethnic conflict between Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribes and widespread corruption. The 1992 election was condemned for a scam, which gave Moi presidency and majority for KANU. The same story was reported during the December 1997 election. In December 2002, President Moi stepped down after he lost the election to Mwai Kibaki who represented the strong opposition party NARC to claim the presidential seat (Encyclopedia, 2017).

The post-2008 election violence of Kenya could not be compared to any political crises of the country. The violence was caused by Moi Kibaki's reelection with the opposition party accusing him of vote rigging. The violence which went on for two months claimed the life of 1,500 people. The African Union sponsored mediations led by Kofi Annan. The former UN Secretary General succeeded in signing a power sharing agreement. According to the agreement Moi Kibaki became president while the opposition leader Odinga was sworn as prime minister (Badejo, 2006).

A recent election was held on 4 March 2013 where Uhuru Kenyatta was elected and sworn in as president on 09 April 2013. However, the trauma of the post-2008 election is still surviving since the ICC charged Uhuru Kenyatta for crimes against humanity. IGAD thus has two heads of state who would likely be brought before the ICC. The other head of state is President Al Bashir who receive arrest warrant for his allegedly involvement of the Darfur crises, particularly for his command of the army to commit genocide against peoples of Southern Sudan. President Uhuru Kenyatta was heading to ICC and after one day of hearing he

able to come back home. In 2016, the court withdrawn his case due to lack of evidence (ICC, 2016).

However, reports suggested that President Uhuru Kenyatta, as his late father, is charismatic among the peoples of Kenya. His official Twitter account has almost 2 million followers who receive daily updates about his government (Twitter, 2017).

The African Union heads of States were so swift to bring a proposal to mass withdrawal from ICC which they complained of targeting African leaders. ICC is ‘racist’ as they call it. The ICC, so far, entertain eight cases of both incumbent and in office African officials. Such an attitude of African leaders has been criticised by many commentators including Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu:

“African leaders behind the move to extract the continent from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are effectively seeking a license to kill, maim and oppress their people without consequences. They are saying that African leaders should not allow the interests of the people to get in the way of their personal ambitions. Being held to account interferes with their ability to act with impunity to achieve their objectives. Those who get in their way – their victims – should remain faceless and voiceless...” (Cape Times, 2013).

In 2016, three African countries have been withdrawal from ICC, these include Burundi, Gambia and South Africa. In 2017, Kenya made its presidential election, unsatisfied with the result the opposition contestant Raila Odinga

brought the case to court. The Supreme Court made decision in favor of Odinga. Re-election will be held in sixty days period.

South Sudan

South Sudan is one of the newly formed states of the world. It only gained independence on July 2011. It is situated in East Central Africa. Sudan and South Sudan divided their territory based on the 1 January 1956 alignment. Yet, the demarcation is still not effective, it is pending the negotiations of the two countries. Especially, the status of the disputed area known as Abyei is not decided yet, and is still in the negotiation table led by IGAD. The boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty is unclear in the "Ilemi Triangle," which Kenya has administered since colonial times. South Sudan is bordered by the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. Like Ethiopia South Sudan became landlocked after independence from the Sudan. The climate of the country was characterised as hot with seasonal rainfall, which is heaviest in the upland areas of the South and diminishes to the north (CIA world fact book, 2016).

The Sudd is one of the wettest areas of the world. It is a backbone of the country's economy that benefits from the flow of White Nile for Agriculture and wild animals. The highest geographic feature of the country is Kinyeti with 3,187m. The Dinka ethnic group comprises almost 36% of the 12 million of the total population. Other ethnic groups comprises of Nuer, Shilluk, Azande, Bari,

Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, Ndogo, Byiri, Lndi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango, Dungotona, and Acholi. English is the official language while Arabic, Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande and Shilluk are also spoken. Most surprisingly the nation has two forms of religion the predominant Christian and animist (Johnson, 2016).

South Sudan's economy is based on subsistence agriculture that provides both career and living for the vast majority of the population. If properly managed, the country is endowed with one of the most productive agricultural areas in the continent with fertile soils and abundant water supplies. The industry and infrastructure of the country are not well functioning due to decades of civil war. Nowadays, the livestock sector has been supported by up to 20 million cattle. The cattle raiders of South Sudan, and other nations of the Horn of Africa, frequently clash with the pastoralists of Central Africa Republic over grazing land and water. Similar pastoralist violence has occurred in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Ugandan border (Pavanello, 2009).

One of the specialised units of IGAD is known as CEWARN, which is responsible for rendering early warning and response for pastoral conflicts. Even in the overall potential of natural resources the country could be a hub of the Horn of Africa with available richness of hydropower, fertile agricultural land, gold, diamonds, petroleum, hardwoods, limestone, iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica and silver. However, the nation depends on imports of goods, services and capital from Uganda, Kenya and Sudan (CIA world fact book, 2016).

Oil exporting is done through two pipelines for neighboring Sudan. It generates 98% of the revenue. In 2010, South Sudan was able to export half a million barrels of crude oil per day, which is reduced time to time. However, it still has the potential of 3.75 barrels of crude oil. In the region, South Sudan is the only country that export crude oil. Nevertheless, South Sudan is number one in the world for spending nearly 11% of its GDP on military expenditures (Ibid, 2016).

On 15 December 2013 conflict between the government forces and another government faction made the country to experience another year of insecurity and anxiety. This conflict coupled with the reduction of oil export are exacerbating the impoverishment of the country (e.g. increment of inflation, hampering the export of crude oil) and food insecurity. The conflict that erupt on December 2013 results in displacing of one million people. The fighting in Abyei, inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle, attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army rise the number of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) into 1.5 million. Women and girls of the internally displaced are vulnerable to forced labor and sexual exploitation in urban centres (Johnson, 2010).

The country's economy is hampered by absence of diversified economy, poverty, macro-economic instability, disorganised financial management and tax collection. The communication industry, for instance, the television broadcasting is monopolised by the state. However, there are various privately owned FM radio stations.

Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is the ruling party of South Sudan, which is now breeding a faction that fights against the government since December 2013. In the new transitional constitution of the country, the age 18 is

provided as a figure for minimum age of both compulsory and voluntary military service. In March 2012, the government signed an agreement with the United Nations to discharge all child soldiers within SPLA. However, in the same year UNICEF reported the existence of child soldiers in the army, which means a contravention of international child conventions, the African protocol on the rights and welfare of the child, the transitional constitution of the country and the pact, which was signed between the government and UN in 2012 (UNICEF, 2012). Currently, there are 17,000 child soldiers engaged as the country could not get out of cycle of conflict. (UNICEF, 2016).

In the early 20th century, Anglo-Christian missionaries converted a large number of the population into Christianity, in a region which once was Muslim-dominated because of the occupation of Egypt in 1874. Due to this, two blocks were formed: The Arab North and the black Christians in the South. In 1953, Anglo- Egyptian rule over the Sudan ended when the Sudan became a self-governance country. After the self-governance was achievement people in the South revolted against the northern central government for two reasons (Johnson, 2010).

First, the government tried to impose Islamic and Arabic culture on the South people; second, the government could not keep its promise to opt for the autonomy of the Southerners. Meanwhile Sudan proclaimed its full independence in 1956 and the civil war was broke out for 16 years until the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in 1972 to form the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region.

In 1983, President Gaafir Mohamed Nimeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Treaty to declare Sudan as Islamic state ruled by sharia law. What followed was the

establishment of SPLA by south Sudanese to gain independence that fought the government for more than two decades, which is the longest running civil war in Africa. During these years, the central government of Sudan committed crimes against humanity and genocide against the people of southern Sudan (University for peace, 2004).

In 2002, a ceasefire was made between the government and the SPLA, negotiations had been done where the government agreed on power sharing and vowed to organise a referendum to South Sudan people on whether to proclaim self-determination or stay with the north Sudan. In 2005, the civil war officially ended with the signing of a peace accord. The agreement includes economic and political terms. Accordingly, half of Sudan's oil wealth would be rendered to the South whereas the political terms included the making of self-determination or referendum in 2011. The peace accord was signed by John Garang on behalf SPLA, who was killed in a helicopter crash after two weeks of the signing of the pact. The death of John Garang was instigate riot in the country where 100 people were killed in Khartoum. The sworn of SalvaKir, who is the deputy of Garang, calm the situation (Ibid, 2004).

In July 2009, The Hague international tribunal decided that the Abyei region, an oil rich area, will be retained by the South whereas Heglig oil field was given to the North Sudan. The North did not accept the decision of the tribunal and later the two Sudans were fighting on laying claims of Abyei. Although the fighting is over the fate of Abyei was unknown, the two countries are still engaged in negotiations over the region.

On 9 January 2011, 98.8% of voters of the referendum opted for independence from the North and in July 2011 the Republic of Sudan declared its independence. In 2012, President Salva Kir dismissed his cabinet and Riek Machar under the guise of corruption. However, others saw the move as a consolidation of power by the president. A semi- civil war was broke out following the dismissal of the cabinet (Oluoch, 2013).

In December 2013, tense fighting took place between government troops and rebels loyal to Machar, who was charged by the president as a coup leader. Later, the rebels controlled key towns and economic hubs. The causality of the short period of the civil war was high and 10,000 people were killed. It should be noted that the civil war become a source of violence between Dinka and Neur ethnic groups that supports President SalvaKiir and the dismissed deputy president Machar respectively. This indicates that ethnicity is one of the problems of peace and security of the Horn of Africa (Hamilton, 2017).

After a series of negotiations, mediated by the African Union and IGAD, the government and the rebel groups signed a peace agreement in May 2016 in Addis Ababa. However, the relationship between the government and the faction is still hostile. Conflict is still going on in different parts of the country.

Sudan

Sudan is another member of IGAD that borders the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and South Sudan. Unlike its neighbouring South Sudan, Sudan is not a landlocked country, which has the large Port of Sudan. The climate is hot and dry, arid desert with its rainy season varying from

region to region. Drought is one of the problems of the country. Sudan is dominated by the Nile basin and its exotic rivers (Mason, 2003).

The Sudanese Arabs make up 70% of the total population of nearly 36 million. The Fur, Beja, Nuba, Fallata share the rest of the percentage. English and Arabic are the official languages of the Sudan while the Nubian, Ta Bedawie and Fur are included as other languages. Sunni Muslims have the largest followers in the country while a small Christian Minority also exists (Maluil, 2012).

Sudan's economy is hampered by political upheavals. According to the International Crises Group, between the years of 1983- 2005 nearly 3 million people displaced from the country. Currently, 600,000 Sudanese people are refugees in other countries. On the other hand, Sudan is also a destination for numerous kinds of refugees either as a place of settlement or as a transit hub, particularly, Sudan hosts refugees of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. The longest civil war and the secession of South Sudan compelled the nation to lose three quarters of its oil production (Johnson, 2010; University for Peace, 2004).

Sudan is the world's largest gum Arabic producer. Agriculture is the source of employment for the 80% labour force. However, agriculture is in subsistence level, which cannot deliver half of the Sudanese people from poverty. The agriculture productions include cotton, peanuts, sorghum, millet, wheat, gum Arabic, sugarcane, cassava, mangoes, papaya, bananas, sweet potatoes, sesame seeds, sheep and other livestock (CIA world fact book, 2016).

In fact, Sudan's economy has flourished with the rising of oil production, high oil prices and paramount inflows of foreign direct investment. However, the secession of South Sudan, inflation, conflicts in the Southern Kordofan and Darfur affected the country. The broadcasting sector (TV and radio) is open for private ownership provided that they should reflect the government policies (Ibid, 2016).

The border of Sudan is full of disputes in every corner. In the border of the Central African Republic, there is persistent pastoralist clash of the two countries over grazing land and water. In the border line with Chad, banditry and civil riots are the main challenges. Due to this in 2010 the two countries established a joint border monitoring force to mitigate the menace (Mohammed, 2016).

There is a rebel group in the Eastern part of Sudan and the Sudan has accused Eritrea for supporting this group. The Sudan-South Sudan dispute over Abyei is not yet concluded, it is still in the stage of negotiation process. The effects of the war on the country's economy, infrastructure and the psycho-physical makeup of the citizens is well known to newsmakers and the international community (UNICEF, 2016).

Child soldiering is an unacceptable practice both legally and morally, however, Sudan is exploiting infant soldiers. Internally, Sudan is pressurised with inter-tribal clashes, the persistent conflict in the Darfur region and fighting with the rebel groups, especially in the South-Sudan border. Sudan thus should invest most on the peace and security of its people and sovereignty, IGAD as a mediator is expected to create conducive space for negotiations vis a vis other mechanisms

to make Khartoum peaceful and a competitive partner of the Horn of Africa once again.

Sudan is an Arabic word and it means blacks. In 3100 BC the Egyptian Pharaohs did have an ambition to control up to the source of the Nile. The Egyptians were travelling through boats and they were able to reach the present-day city of Aswan, formerly known as Ussuan. Time after time, the Egyptians were settled in the Aswan area. In 1500 BC, the Egyptians expanded their occupation of the present Sudan up to the region of the modern place of Merowe. The place was conquered by the Egyptians. Accordingly, the Egyptians were given the name Cush to the areas that existed between Aswan and Merowe. Later, the present-day Sudan has become known as Nubia (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).

In the 16th century BC, the Pharaohs of Egypt started to build their temple and put their boundary flags in the present-day Sudan or 'Cush' as they call it. Especially a Pharaoh by the name Thutmose I pushed further South to put its inscription in Abu Hamad than any other ruler of Egypt. Meanwhile there was a local dynasty Cushite dynasty, which was established some time before 8th century BC. The capital city of the Cushite Dynasty was Napata, around the modern-day Merowe. The dynasty has the same customs and beliefs and lifestyle of the Egyptians. It seems that King Kashata, the king of Cush, has been willingly accepted as a ruler by the Egyptian people after he conquered them in the 8th century (Ibid, 2015).

On the other hand, in 719 BC, King Piye, the successor of King Kashata, and his brother King Shabaka, who succeeded Piye, extended the expansion of their father to conquer provinces of Thebes and Memphis. King Shabaka and his troops were welcome by the Egyptian since they did promote the faith in the

oracle. However, the rise of powerful peoples across the Middle East changed the scenario.

The Kingdom of Assyria became a powerful conqueror that annexed many tiny states including cities of Palestine and Phoenicia. When the subjects of the Middle East started a region-wide civil riot against the Assyrian rule, Shabaka sent an Egyptian army under the leadership of his nephew Shebitku and he suffered a heavy defeat (Holt & Daly, 2000).

In 663 BC, the Assyrian king Esarhaddon controlled Memphis, which is the treasury hub of Egypt that was plundered by the conquerors. Then, the Cushitic dynasty attempted to control Memphis again, however, the Assyrian kingdom opened its second campaign to defeat and recapture the city again. The year 656 BC was believed to be the end of the Cushitic dynasty. However, certain scholars argued that the dynasty lives in the Sudan (Merowe) and it does leave its legacy in the pyramids of Egypt (Ibid, 2000).

The Sudan was a target of the conquer ship of powerful kingdoms notably Persians, Greeks, Romans and the neighbouring Aksum from Ethiopia. During this time of annexation, the separation of Egyptian and the Sudanese culture materialised, the culture was almost the same for long periods of time. Such occupation of the Nubia (the Sudan) brought the mixing of cultures, language and most of all religions (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015)

The neighbours of Nubia Egypt and Ethiopia were converted into Christianity by the Byzantine Empire and a Greek monk known as Frumentius respectively. In 543 BC, King Dongola of the Nubia converted to Christianity (Paul, 1971).

Nevertheless, the expansion of Islam in North Africa dissolved the Christians of Egypt into few numbers. Nubia however, became an exception for the expansion of the Islam due to a treaty agreed in 652 BC. According to the agreement, Nubians agreed to submit 400 slaves annually to Islam conquerors. The treaty survived for more than 600 hundred years until it was abrogated by the Sultans of Egypt in 1315, which eventually placed a Muslim ruler in the Kingdom of Dongola (Holt & Daly, 2000).

After this time the Sudan was administered by regents from Egypt until 1821. In this year, an aggressive ruler of Ottoman Turkey Mohammed Ali conquered the joint area of Blue and White Niles called Khartoum which in Arabic means elephant's trunk. Khartoum became a capital city for Egyptian rule in Sudan. In 1896, Khedive Ismail, the grandson of Mohammed Ali, ordered Samuel Baker to occupy the Southern Sudan. In those days, Egypt commenced to claim more territories beyond the Sudan. Nevertheless, the ambition of Khedive Ismail and the annexing of the military leader Samuel Baker were not smoothly achieved; since Khedive Ismail abolished the slave trading for formal commerce and his inclination to western ways of administration were considered to be a threat for the devoted Muslims of the Sudan (CIA world fact book, 2016).

In 1881, a religious leader Mohammed Ahmed called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Sudan. He was arrested and later escaped with the help of his disciples. In 1883, Mahdi defeated a series of Egyptian troops to capture various key towns of the Sudan. On 26 January 1883, the Mahdists controlled Khartoum and killed Egyptian forces. The Mahdi troops preferred Omdurman as their

capital. In 1885, Mahdi died and was succeeded by Khalifa Abdullahi ibn Mohammed.

In 1889, Khalifa made an aggression against Ethiopia. In 1898, Herbert Kitchener defeated Khalifa and controlled the country under dual administration of Anglo-Egyptian forces. However, just after two weeks of the defeat of Khalifa, the French became a threat for the forces of Britain and Egypt. The confrontation of France and Anglo-Egyptian is known as the Fashoda Incident (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).

Egypt demanded that Britain govern Sudan but the latter was opposed to the demand. In 1924, an anti-British civil riot erupted in the Sudan. The Egyptians killed a British general in the civil riot. Britain responded by evacuating Egyptian forces from the Sudan and it started to administer the nation alone until a peace treaty was signed in 1936.

In 1951, King Farouk promoted himself as ruler of a United Kingdom of Egypt and the Sudan. In 1952, King Farouk was overthrown via a coup by army officers led by Nagib, who recognised the right to self-determination to the Sudanese people. In 1955, violence erupted in the Southern Sudan and resulted in many deaths. The cause of the protest was the imposition of Islamic culture against Southern Sudan, whose population are non-Muslim majorities.

Between 1958-1964, Sudan was ruled by a military regime. In 1965, the regime of the military junta managed to end the reign of the Muslim government. In 1969, a coup brought Colonel Gaafar Mohammed el-Nimeri to the throne, who established a unitary party of the Sudanese Socialist Party. Colonel Nimeri

became popular in the socialist bloc countries and he is credited to end a 17-year long civil war that held in the Southern Province by signing the Addis Ababa treaty in 1972. The treaty approved the autonomy of Southern Sudan. Nevertheless, in 1983, Nimeri broke his vow to bring back South Sudan under the Khartoum central government. In addition, he declared strict, punitive Islamic legal system as the governing law of the nation (Maluli, 2012; Johnson, 2010).

The action of Nimeri invited rebellion in the South Sudan. In 1985, he was dethroned in a bloodless coup by his chief of staff. An election was held but not effective enough to end the crises of the country. Thus, the country's military force once again intervened by way of coup, which was organised by Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir. In 1996, Bashir secured his presidency while his party won 400 seats in the national assembly, which is the only party approved to run on the election (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).

However, this transition did not bring bright times for the country. Sudan started to be administered by Muslim Fundamentalists, human rights violations become the order of the day, independent judiciary and the press became the nightmare of the Sudan people. Bin Laden was sheltered in Sudan for short period of time through back up of the Muslim Fundamentalists.

This situation forced the Southerners to start an armed struggle in order to regain their autonomous administration rights as per the Addis Ababa treaty. This time Southerners did not express their grievances via individual action rather they established an organised military organ – the SPLA. The fight between the Sudan

army and SPLA were labeled as a holy war that Arab Mujahedeen of different countries flocked to confront the Southerners *Kafirs or* infidels (Maluli, 2012).

This civil war became the longest of Africa that took more than two decades and resulted in millions of deaths, refugees and displaced peoples. In 1998, the government and SPLA agreed to conduct a referendum while the Bashir's administration approved the existence of political parties. In 1999, however, these premature democratisation measures took a U-turn when president Bashir declared a three-month state of emergency just two days before the parliament could vote on a proposal to limit the president's mandate.

Meanwhile, the eyes of the world were focused on Sudan especially in Darfur where government troops committed physical and psychological offense on the residents. The Darfur crises brought an arrest warrant for Al Bashir from the ICC. In 2004, the government and SPLA agreed a ceasefire as well as to organise a referendum in 2011.

In 2016, the Darfur crises continued. According to Amnesty international (2016), the Sudan government used chemical weapons against the civilian population of Darfur. It killed and injured dozens of people. The government admitted the armed clash against Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).

In 2011, the Southerners overwhelmingly voted to make South Sudan the 53th member state of the Africa Union. The two Sudan, however, could not reach an agreement on the status of Abeyi, which is an oil-rich country, situated adjacent to the two nations. IGAD, thus, was expected to play a mediatory role for

resolving the contested claim as peace and security remain as one of the pillars of sustainable regional integration.

Somalia

It is one of the most strategic countries of the IGAD member states since it is the transit to Bab el Mandeb, the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Somalia is bordered by the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Somalia also borders the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Somalia is a deserted country that should conserve natural resources. Its lowest geographic point lies in the Indian Ocean, while its highest point known as Shimbiris with 2, 416m. Somalia as other member states of IGAD suffers from frequent famine (Pavenello, 2006).

Somalia is frequently cited as an example of a failed state, where the current transitional government has struggled to form a Federal Republic. There is no opposition party or group in Somalia rather there are sub-clans both as supporter and opposition of the Transitional Government. Somalia has nearly 11 million population all of which are Sunni Muslims. However, this is an estimation derived from the 1975 census of Somali Government. Currently, population census become difficult due to the existence of large number of nomad population and peoples wander here and there due to sustainable warfare and famine (CIA world fact book, 2016).

The current Transitional Federal Charter stated that Sunni Islam is the official religion of Somalia. Somalia and Arabic are the official languages under the Transitional Federal Charter while Italian and English are other spoken languages. Somalia peoples are also existed in Djibouti, Ethiopia (Ogaden) and

Kenya (North East Province). The Somali ethnic group comprises 85% of the total population while Bantu and other non-Somali makes up 15%. The country is among the top three countries of the world in maternal and infant mortality. The life expectancy rate of the nation is also low, at approximately 52 years of age (World Health Organisation, 2016).

Somalia uses mixed legal systems of civil law, Islamic law and customary law, which is known as Xeer. Customary norms and clan elders have important social values in the country. The inaugural House of the People in September 2012 was appointed by clan elders. It should be noted also that most regions of Somalia preferred traditional forms of conflict resolutions where elders give the ultimate resolution (Renders, 2007).

The absence of effective central government reflects in the economy of the country where it maintains an informal economy that hugely relies on livestock, money transfer and telecommunications. Like other IGAD member states, the agriculture sector accounts for 40% of the country's GDP and the lion's share of export revenue. The main export items of Somalia include livestock, hides, fish, charcoal and banana where half of these export items go to United Arab Emirates (UAE). The livestock production is originating from the nomads and semi-pastoralists, whose livelihood depends on the rearing of cattle, sheep and goat. The imports of the country include sugar, sorghum, corn, chat and machined goods. The neighbouring countries of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Indian comprises almost half of the ratio of the total import goods (Economy watch, 2016).

The absence of effective centralised government also makes the industrial sector to be shrunk where the factories have been looted and the machines sold for making machine guns. If one needs to know the place where the lowest international call rates in Africa are found, it is Somalia. Due to the state of anarchy and the civil war, the telecommunication sector was handled by private individuals or firms who provide wireless services in most major cities. The public telecommunication sector is totally out of order. The informal banking sector handling up to \$1.6 billion that principally make money transfers in the country. The inflation rate of the country is not well recorded as business entities print their own money. The government lacks the capacity to collect domestic revenues (World Bank, 2016).

In recent years, small-scale business have flourished in the capital city Mogadishu (such as hotels, gas stations, supermarkets) and the flights between Europe (from Istanbul to Mogadishu) and Somali resumed since the collapse of the national government in 1991. The principal challenge for making business is insecurity. When the country become stable, the energy sector should be reinstated at most urgency. Currently the people of Somalia are using fossil fuels for producing electricity, while the country could generate hydroelectric power by using the ports of Berbera and Kismaayo (Ibid, 2016).

On the other hand, the broadcasting sector involves both the government and private media in the TV and radio stations. In Mogadishu alone, there are 10 private FM radio stations, and 1 governmental radio (Radio Mogadishu). As the national government lacks effectiveness, the statistical information of the country lacks periodical updates and accuracy in most cases. The study of international

organisations in most case involves the Statistics of Somaliland and Punt Land, who declare their autonomous administration despite their lack of recognition of the international community, including the UN (CIA world fact book, 2016).

Peace and security remains the main agenda of the international and regional organisations towards Somalia. The African Union has sent its peacekeeping force AMISOM in an effort to restore peace vis a vis supporting the transitional government armed forces. The number of pirates attacks is reduced but it is still unfinished business since the Somali pirates extend their operation across to Mozambique (in South), vicinity of Maldives (in Eastern part) and Strait of Hormuz (Northeast ward). In 2014 the number of hijackings decreased to 14 from 28 in 2011. As the country was worn out with civil war and famine the number of displaced people reached 1.1 million; while the statistics of refugees is hardly unavailable, however one could note that it is in millions since Somalia people have migrated all over the world (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).

Somalia is a very ancient country where people have inhabited the area since the Paleolithic era. Somalia is one of the countries that are believed to be the locations of the ancient Land of Punt. Somalia was one of the trade centres during the ancient period. In the medieval ages, there were powerful kingdoms of Somali including the Sultanate of Ajuran, Adal, Warsangali and Geledi. The cultures of prehistory (Stone Age) peoples of Doian and Hargesian flourished in the country. In the regions of Northern Somalia, particularly in Dhambalin, Las Khorey and Elaayo, there are cave paintings, of real and mythical animals (e.g. camel), pyramidal structures, stone walls, tombs, ruins that have been found by archeologists date back to 2,500 years (Musau, 2013).

Moreover, there are historical records that show the civilization and commercial relationship of the Somalia with the rest of ancient peoples of Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, Phoenicians, Chinese and Romans through the ports of Somalia. During the Medieval period, Islam penetrated to the Horn of Africa or Land of Berbers, through maritime sailors and traders. The spread of Islam was facilitated since the leaders such as the Sultanate of Mogadishu, Adal, Warsangali either converted or inherited and accepted the principles from their ancestors. Once the leaders are promoting the religion of Islam, it could be imagined the ease of spreading among the subjects (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).

On the other hand, Mogadishu was a trading centre for Egyptians, Syrians, Swahili merchants (who came from Mombasa and Malindi), Kilwa, Jewish, Malacca, China, Hindu, Pate (South East African merchants). Somalia was provided textiles, grain, wood, Giraffe, Zebra to their Africa and Asia trade partners while they imported cloth, ceramic, gold, fruit and other commodities. The Portuguese controlled the ports of Merca and Barawa until they were defeated by the joint forces of Somali and Omani forces in 1660. The Dynasties of Gobroon, Gerad and Bariwere among the most influential and powerful administrators in the history of Somalia. Sultan Yusuf Mohammed Ibrahim and his son Sultan Ahmed Yusuf not only controlled Somalia but also got tributes from Omani administrators. They had also external relations with Yemeni and Wituland Sultans (Ogueji, 2007).

The rise of the Dervish leader Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, in the late 19thc, attracted huge popularity in the Horn of Africa. The capital of the Dervish was Taleh. Especially Hassan won the support of Islamic countries for rising as

protector of the nation and the religion. The Sudan, Ottoman Empire and various Islamic states were given their material (mainly weapons) support to the effective administration and sovereignty of Somalia. Hassan was also able to resist the British colonial forces effectively where he defeated the latter four times. Hassan used strict forms and application of Sharia law. However, in 1920, the British air force bombarded the Dervishes and it took Somalia as its protectorate as the Dervish state collapsed (Abdiwahab, 2014).

In 1924, Italy became ambitious to control Somalia through abrogating the treaties signed with the local Sultans. De Vecchi, the governor of Italy in the region, ordered the disarmament of the Sultans of Hobyo and Majeerteen, which made the two rival Sultanates to form a united front against Italy. On 15 November 1925, the joint sultan forces defeated the Italy army. However, the Italians brought more troops from Eritrea and they changed their strategy to buy loyalists in order to create distrust among Somalians. This became too efficient and weakened the resistance movement. On 26 December 1925, Italian troops regained their colonies (Lehman & Omar, 2003).

However, the Sultanates continued to resist Italy and they were defeated in different confrontations. In 1927, the Italians under the governor of De Vecchi managed to cut the arms and ammunition supplies of the Sultanates. In January 1927, the Italians began to attack intensively, by the end of the 1927 Italians were completely in control of the Sultanates (Abdiwahab, 2014).

The history of Somalia extends to thousands of years with its commerce interaction and civilization with countries of Gulf of Eden and neighboring nations such as the Axum kingdom in Ethiopia (Marcus, 1994). Somalia was

frequently visited by foreigners since it is adjacent to the Indian Ocean and was transit for traders who come in and out from India. During 1839, the importance of Somali increased when Britain annexed the Gulf of Eden, which required the colonial armed forces to satisfy their basic needs, especially meat. The closest local source of meat became Somali coast (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).

Meanwhile, France and Italy set up their own stations in northern Somali. Great Britain, France and Italy became contestant colonial powers over the control of Somalia. The French took French Somaliland or Djibouti while the Italians secured Asseb in Eritrea. In the 1880s, British, on the other hand, took control of ports of Zeila and Berbera under a series of treaties with the chieftains over protecting the area. The area that was occupied by Britain became known as British Somaliland. The Italians also made a treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar to settle in Southern Somalia. The Italians, however, could not resist the occupation of Ethiopia in the Somali, after their defeat in the battle of Adwa, in 1996 (Abdiwahab, 2014).

In 1897-98, the colonial powers agreed on the fate of Somali where Ethiopia secured Ogaden that made the Somalia region to incorporate with Ethiopia permanently. Ethiopia was also granted the Southern tip of British Somaliland known as Haud. In 1936, Italian fascist forces made an aggression against Ethiopia and they succeeded in the occupation of Ogaden. This time, a Somalia national called Mohammed ibn Abdullah led an uprising against the British administration in British Somaliland. Subsequently, Britain was engaged two

decades to suppress the revolution of Mohammed ibn Abdullah (CIA world fact book, 2016).

Italians started to exercise enthusiastic policy to develop and encompass their imperial ambitions. The Italians formed Italian East Africa through combining French and British Somaliland, Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia. However, the situation was so tense where conflicts broke out throughout the region that were led by guerrilla fighters of Somalia. In 1941, British recaptured the British Somaliland while French and Ethiopia reclaimed French Somaliland and OgadenHaud respectively (Bahru, 2002).

The scramble was based on the tripartite treaty concluded in 1897. In 1950, the UN granted Italy a trust ship status to administer Somalia on the condition that it will facilitate independence within 10 years. In 1960, Somali declared its independence, which was formed with the merging of the Italian and British Somaliland. The French Somaliland (Djibouti) had to await another more years to gain independence, in 1977 (Hamilton, 2017).

After independence, Somali held the first election in 1969 where the Somali Youth League (SYL) won the majority vote. The government, however, started to exercise an authoritarian system, which led to the assassination of the president Mohammed Egal by a policeman. Commander-in-chief of the army Siad Barre took power. Siad Barre introduced a brutal Marxist dictatorship system through aligning with the Soviet Union. This step, however, was a huge mistake to the state of Somalia where the people were strongly loyal to their clan, which was undermined by the Siad Barre administration (Renders, 2007).

Barre tested scientific socialism with mixing of Islamic doctrines, nationalising industries and land, suspending the Constitution, the Supreme Court and disbanding the parliament. However, the Barre regime was hugely credited for raising the number of literate peoples of Somalia. Barre had tight relations with Arab countries, thus, in 1974 Somalia became a member of the Arab League. Seid Barre had strong interest in consolidating the Somalia lands in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya (Bahru, 2002).

In 1977 he confronted Ethiopia, which was experiencing political unrest due to the overthrowing of Haile Selassie, and he proceeded to capture the Ogaden region, even the troops were able to enter to the hinterland of Harar. In 1978, the geo-politics were changed dramatically as the Soviet Union opted to support the Ethiopia armed force in the campaign against Somalia. The Somalia troops were, thus, forced to leave the area it controlled due to the joint attack of Ethiopia and Cuba armies as well as the use of machine guns by the Soviet Union (Ibid, 2002).

The crises of Somalia not only resulted in the loss of Ogaden but it also aggravated the internal political problems. Hence, different clans and guerrilla insurgents started to rebel against the repressive regime of Barre. In 1980, the various military movements changed into full scale civil war. In 1991, Seid Barre was overthrown and became one of the many warlords of the nation. In the same year, a warlord that controlled the former British Somaliland declared independence by forming unrecognised nation – Republic of Somaliland (British Council, 1945).

After the civil war and the chaos Somalia was stricken by famine in 1992. The UN sent 35, 000 troops to calm the situation and to make the humanitarian process as smooth as it can. This campaign was known as Operation Restore Hope. In March 1994, Europe and US forces withdrew from the country since the situation had become uncontrollable or by their own phrases “the levels of the casualties are unacceptable”. The US soldiers were, especially, beaten to death by the Somalia civil people that compelled the US to leave the country. Operation Black Hawk Down had failed (Renders, 2007).

In 1994, Somalia capital Mogadishu split among the two most powerful warlords. Both claimed themselves as the president of Somalia. The UN peacekeeping force made several urban battles in Mogadishu, the most notable one is the battle of Mogadishu where US forces opened intensive attack in an attempt to capture the charismatic faction leader - Mohamed Farah Aidid (Abdiwahab, 2014).

In 1995, the UN forces evacuated from the coast of Somalia with the help of international armada. The only exception to the chaos and civil war-torn nation of Somalia is the republic of Somaliland that elected their president in 1997 but failed to get international recognition. The situation in Somalia was becoming worse with each passing day. In 2000, a transitional government was formed to facilitate the creation of the new Somalia. Thus, on 10 October 2004 the Transitional Federal Parliament was constituted and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed elected as President of the Transitional Government (Ibid, 2014).

In 2006, Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) declared not only the establishment of Islamic state of Somalia through swift imposition of Sharia law, rather it became a threat for neighbouring countries. The UIC is labelled as a terrorist group by the US and its allies with close connections with Al Qaeda. The US, therefore, backed the Ethiopian and African Union forces to invade southern Somalia. In January 2007, the Ethiopian forces evacuated the UIC insurgents from Mogadishu, thus, the president of the transitional government entered Somalia on 8 January 2007 from its temporary headquarters in Baidoa, which was the first centralised government since the collapse of the nation in 1991 (CIA world fact book, 2016).

After UIC another strong and popular group was formed – Al-Shabab, which is responsible for carrying out different terrorist attacks, including the West Gate Mall hostage in the capital of Nairobi Kenya in 2013. According to Al-Shabab the attacking was in retaliation for the entering of Kenyan troops in Somalia (Peter, 2013).

In October 2004, Kenya, under the full support of IGAD, played a vital role for the peace process that ended up with the election of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president of the transitional government. Between 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabab has gained insurmountable victory over the Ethiopian defense force and it was able to control key towns and ports (Ibid, 2013).

In January 2009, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia while the African Union peacekeeping forces remained to support the troops of the transitional

government that made several attempts to be an effective government of the nation through dismantling war lords and Al-Shabaab. Despite the attacks of Al-Shabab continued, the Somalia people elected their new president on February 2017.

Uganda

Uganda is situated in East-Central Africa, West of Kenya and East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uganda's border countries include Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan and Tanzania. It is a landlocked country. The climate of Uganda is characterised as rainy throughout the year with the exception of a few months. Compared to other member states of IGAD, Uganda is agriculturally fertile land where there are 10% of permanent crops (Paranello, 2006).

The lowest place of Uganda is Lake Albert while Margherita peak on Mount Stanley is the highest geographic site of the country. Uganda has many lakes (e.g. Lake Victoria, Lake Alberta) and rivers that are suitable for fishing, navigation, hydroelectric power and sea animals. However, like Kenya, the country has experienced widespread poaching (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016).

The ethnic groups of Uganda include Baganda, Banyankole, Basoga, Bakiga, Iteso, Langi, Acholi, Bagisu, Lugbara, Bunyoro. English is the official national language of the country, Ganda, Swahili, Arabic are other most common languages of the nation. The Roman Catholic and Protestant each has followers of 42% of the total population, while Muslims make up 12% and other religions account for nearly 4% (UNDP, 2015).

The population of Uganda is steadily growing where the birth rate of the nation has climbed to the third place among the world nations. Uganda is a country which was once the champion of HIV/AIDS but it has been able to reduce the spread of the disease with a coordinating task of the government, civic societies and the international humanitarian organizations. Today, even if there exists superfluous mortality due to HIV/AIDS, Uganda is the tenth country of the world with the existence of the virus among adults (Ibid, 2015).

The constitution of the Republic of Uganda has been amended several times. The 2005 amendment is the latest one, in the same year a referendum was held in order to decide on the transition of the country into a multi-party system. Previous to 2005, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party headed by the current head of state Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power since 1986, was the sole party of the nation (Karugire, 1980).

Currently, Uganda has eight political parties. The LRA, which is headed by Joseph Kony, is a threat to the stability of the nation and it is also active in the guerilla warfare. LRA is pursuing shelter in southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the other hand, Uganda has also sheltered refugees of the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda, just to mention a few since there are refugees of other counties who are small in number (UNHCR,2015).

Agriculture is the backbone of Uganda's economy; it amounts to 82% of the total industries output. The agriculture production of Uganda includes coffee, tea, cotton, sugar, tobacco, cassava, potatoes, corn, millet, pulses, flowers, beef, goat, milk and poultry. The livestock sub-sector has experienced cattle raids and inter-

communal conflicts over water, and pasture land. Uganda's topography is suitable for agricultural production due to the availability of fertile soils and regular rainfall. The export commodities of the nation depend on agricultural products such as coffee, fish, tea, cotton and flowers. The lion shares of the export revenue generated from coffee (CIA world fact book, 2016).

The main exporting countries of Uganda include Kenya, Rwanda, UAE, Democratic Republic of Congo, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. On the other hand, the country's import commodities include capital equipment, vehicles, petroleum, medical supplies and cereals. Kenya, UAE, China, India, South Africa and Japan are referred to as the principal import partners of the country. Uganda has considerable natural resources including copper, gold, cobalt, hydropower, limestone, salt and oil, which was discovered recently and it will be extracted in the next few years (Mason, 2003).

Uganda has passed through a series of reforms that help the economic growth of the country. The economy of the country is hampered by instability in the South Sudan because Sudan is one of the exporting partner of the country, high energy costs, lack of adequate transportation, and corruption. However, the upcoming oil industry is expected to boost the country's economy (Ibid, 2003).

The communication sector of the country is characterised as mobile cellular increment but the number of the main line is still in a lower level. In the broadcasting media, Uganda has achieved outstandingly where in and around Kampala, there are 150 radio and 35 TV stations available. The government policy towards privatising the broadcasting sector is encouraging, and has been open since the 1990s (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016).

The history of Uganda is mostly associated with the modern history of the kingdom of Buganda, which was established in the mid-19th century. Other kingdoms in the country during the 19th century include Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro. In the 1840s Arab merchants arrived in Uganda in search of slaves and ivory. Then Great Britain explorers, notably Speke and Stanley, in 1862 and 1875 respectively arrived in the country (Matin & Robin, 2007).

It is surprising that Uganda was not recognized and hardly the target of any colonial country, rather Zanzibar became a more contested nation where Britain and Germany disputed each other. In 1886, Kenya fell under Britain and it recognised the existence of Kingdom of Buganda at the border of Northern Kenya (Robert, 1985).

As the British colonial lord Rhodes occupied Southern Africa, the interest of Britain over East Africa reduced. Instead of controlling the East Africa directly, it preferred to set up the British East Africa Company in 1888. The caretaking mandate given to the company included the administration of Buganda kingdom. Germany sent her missionary to Kampala and convinced King Kabaka to sign an agreement that confirmed the protectorate of Germany to his kingdom. The acceptance of Germany by King Kabaka made the confrontation of Britain and Germany inevitable. However, the British lord Salisbury brought an impressive proposal to Germany. According to the proposal, Britain was agreed to hand the administration of Heligoland to Germany while Britain secured the recognition of protectorate of Zanzibar, Uganda and Eutoria (David, 1982).

In 1900, King Kabaka and Harry Johnston on behalf of Britain signed the Buganda Agreement where the latter agreed to recognise the Kabaka kingdom

(Buganda). In turn, the agreement ensured the British protectorate status over the region. In addition, Johnston made another agreement with kingdoms of Toro (in 1900) and Ankole (in 1901) that tightened the protectorate status of Britain in East Africa, particularly in Uganda and Kenya (Karugire, 1980).

The successors of Harry Johnston did not agree on the status and the strategies of how to administer Uganda. However, Britain continued to indirectly colonise the country through Uganda's decentralised monarchs, notably the Kingdom of Buganda, Toro and Ankole. In other words, Britain created a Ugandan with minor governances that were comfortable with their disunity of the larger Uganda, which was one of the main challenges for the nation when it achieved independence in 1962 (Ibid, 1980).

Uganda People's Congress (UPC), headed by Obote, facilitated the post-independence constitution of the nation, which allowed the king to become ceremonial head of state. Accordingly, Mutesa II became president and head of state in 1962 until he was shortly disposed by the Obote forces led by the commander-in-chief of the army Idi Amin in 1966. Subsequently, Obote declared the abolishment of the kingdom monarchy in the country and he started to lead the country by silencing opposition groups (Mittleman, 1975).

However, in 1971, Obote was overthrown by a coup lead by Idi Amin. The new leader of Uganda, Idi Amin, become infamous for numerous problems of the country. Idi Amin was responsible for expulsion of active middle class Asian origin Ugandans making the economy lame, invading of the neighbouring Tanzania and above all he committed a massacre against half a million of Ugandans. In April 1979, Idi Amin was toppled by the joint forces of Tanzania

and Obote, who were exiled in Tanzania. Idi Amin fled to Saudi Arabia (Karugire, 1980).

After the fall of Idi Amin, there were two exiled forces potentially to be the next leaders of Uganda. However, in 1980, General Tito Okello staged a coup and backed up Obote to be the leader of the country. The Obote regime also become repressive, and was responsible for ethnic massacres and demolishing of factions. In 1985, the general (Tito Okello) who brought Obote to the presidency power intervened to send back Obote into exile in Zambia. The power contest between Obote and Okello brought a good opportunity for the guerrilla (known as National Resistance Army) leader Yoweri Museveni to come to power in 1986. Yoweri Museveni's administration has been praised for its achievement in the economic growth, rule of law, educational and health infrastructures (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016).

In 2005, Uganda lifted the 19 years ban against the existence of opposition political parties. For long periods of time, the government was reluctant to allow a multi-party system. In 2013, Uganda was both praised and criticised over the passing of legislation that make homosexuality a crime that will punishable by life imprisonment (Associated Press, 2013; Walker, 2014).

2.4. Theoretical Framework

This study is grounded on the New Regionalism Theory (NRT) that firmly advocates the involvement of all concerned and interested stakeholders or state and non-state actors in the regional integration process. Thinking of regional organisations as trading companies is a typical assumption of the old regionalism

approach. Under NRT, regional organisations are not responsible for more than simply reducing tariffs to member states.

Regional organisations have numerous and wide mandate including monitoring and sanctioning. Sovereignty is also limited in certain cases. The UN is the one that monitors the exercise of sovereignty. Sovereignty of states will be curtailed if they committed serious and grave crimes like genocide, slavery, aggression, ethnic cleansing etc.

On the other hand, the region has experienced frequent civil wars in the last twenty years. Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda have experienced long periods of civil wars, while Kenya suffered from nationwide civil riots after the controversial 2007 elections, where the main opposition party accused the ruling party of rigging the results of the election.

Basically, there are two categorised thoughts of regional integration: The traditional (old) and new regionalism theories. However, when we label theories old and new, it does not mean they are obsolete rather it connotes that their relevance become diminished due to the developments that occur in the international relations and political arena, such as the emergence of globalisation and the end of the cold war etc. (Rosamond, 2000).

2.4.1. The traditional regional integration theory

These theories emerged after the Second World War and it is more of the reflection of the cold war era. One of the most notable of the old integration theory is the neo-functionalism approach that contends the interconnection of political and economic systems of nations will lead them to possible outcomes of

integration. Moreover, according to the traditional theory nations will best integrated if there is sustainable economic cooperation, it will tighten the political relations of state; since states become “friends” due to the continuous economic and political cooperation, the probability of waging war against each other will be minimal.

This theory overemphasises the role of nation states or heads of governments in the creation of an integrated region. In fact, the foremost actor of traditional regionalism is nation state.

According to Hettne (2010) the traditional regionalism theory is narrow (for instance nations were associated for security matter as witnessed in the NATO and Warsaw Pact cooperation) and strategic and has taken the hegemonic nature of world superpowers instruction as its roadmap. In addition, the traditional regional theory hardly makes nations to be successful in integrating their region since it purports nations not to surrender their sovereignty to a regional organisation, which coordinates the integration process.

Moreover, the traditional regionalism theory relies on state to follow a vertical decision making where hegemonic superpower (uni-polar) vetoes the strategy of the bloc rather than facilitating horizontal approach of states-to-states relationship. On top of this, the traditional theory made states to invest a few inputs towards the regional agenda but at the same they expected large gains. In other words, it maintains nations to retain their national interest at the expense of the regional integration programme (Layne, 2006).

The failure of IGAD in establishing an integrated Horn of Africa is also associated with the limitations of the traditional theory. First, IGAD member states lack commitment and political will to strengthen the regional organisation; rather they would prefer to be strong sovereign nations or they compete with each other to be powerful states in the region. IGAD states are also reluctant to surrender certain portions of their sovereignty for the common good of the region.

In addition, IGAD states would like to be a strategic ally of the world's powerful states than developing strong partnerships among themselves. Moreover, member states of IGAD would not have the readiness to decentralise the power of the organisation for different actors (such as the civic societies) rather it seems as if the heads of states acted as the sole provider of better future for the peoples of the Horn of Africa.

2.4.2. The new regionalism theory

Bjorn Hettne is the theorist who introduced the new regionalism theory. According to him, New Regionalism theory is a multidimensional form of integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects (Hettne, 2010).

The recent developments of the political and international relations resulted in the reformulation of the old regional theory. The end of the cold war, the emergence of globalisation and the formation of WTO as a facilitator of international trade become the main reasons for the evolution of the new regionalism theory. The new regionalism theory connotes the multi-dimensional purpose of regional integration where regionalism is being pursued on a much larger scale to include

not only economic purposes but also social, political, environmental and cultural objectives. The new regionalism theory promotes the outward-looking approach of regional integration.

This implies that nations could not live in a vacuum that they should understand and cooperate given the existence of the global world. Any form of cooperation, harmonisation of regional policies and coordination should be in line with the standards of the international community at large. Unlike the old regionalism theory, the new approach is inclusive, open and involves various actors in the different stage of the regionalisation process. The new regionalism theory purports interdependence of the state and non-state actors for the achievement of a regional integration agenda.

Moreover, the new regionalism theory contends that the regional policies should be initiated by the member states themselves than to be an imposition of a hegemonic state outside the region. The new regionalism theory thus promotes horizontal application of regional decision making unlike the old one, which follows a vertical mode of initiation of programmes and decision making process. In addition to this, since the new regionalism theory relies on open socio-economic process, market based and competitive principles, it is highly likely to support peace, democracy, competitive and recognised region on the international level.

In general, the new regionalism theory supports the assumptions that the state is not the only actor in the regional integration process, successful integration process demands the diffusion of political power from the centralised state towards regional communities, and the effectiveness of regionalisation process

requires consideration of what's going on locally and internationally (Laursen, 2008). Interestingly, the new regionalism theory supports informal, open and holistic regionalisation that it assumes the informal socio-economic and political relationship of different actors including, civic societies, business persons, multi-national corporations, religious figures and clan leaders.

The NRT is relevant to investigate the state of regional integration in the Horn of Africa. The promotion of informal modes of trans-boundary under the new integration theory is specifically important since most socio-economic connections in the IGAD region is done through the informal channels.

The informal trade among the private individuals, for instance, is paramount though it is unrecorded and neglected by IGAD member states to offer adequate subsidy and a safe route. According to Rondos (2016) the informal sector estimate puts IGAD Member State informal activity at approximately 40 percent of GDP. Much of the informal trade across borders in the region reportedly involves essential foodstuffs, khat, livestock and basic requirements such as medicines, clothing and fuel.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter made an attempt to show the available scientific literatures, theoretical frameworks of regional integration in general fashion. In addition, the preceding chapter attempted to give an introductory insight about both the Horn of Africa and the respective IGAD member states.

The Horn of Africa is the home of different types of animal and plant life. It is also one of the ancient regions of the world. In terms of topography, the region has got highest landscapes like Mount Kilimanjaro, Ras Dashen while the world's lowest point Dallol Depression also existed in the Afar region. The hydro natural resource of the Horn of Africa includes Lake Victoria, White and Blue Nile. Sea

ports of Mombasa, Asseb, Berbera, Djibouti, and Hargessa are another variable that facilitate the socio-economic transactions of the region.

Since the Horn of Africa is a strategic region or since it is a transit centre towards the Middle East and Europe, it is the area often contested by super powers from cold war until those days. The region is suffering from different forms of violence or conflicts, which includes civil war, pastoral conflicts over water and grazing land, terrorism, piracy and hostage, armed struggle of guerrilla groups.

A careful assessment of IGAD member states indicates that they have common socio-economic and political challenges. Socially, the IGAD member states are characterised as illiterate, poverty stricken, refugee breeding, and low infrastructure areas. Politically, the IGAD member states are suffering from repressive governance, maladministration, human rights violations (including genocide, crimes against humanity), arbitrary use of force and the like.

The economic status of IGAD member states is quite perplexing. While the GDP rate is amongst the lowest countries in the world, countries like Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia score high points of economic growth. The international organisations such as IMF have given the label “one of the fastest growing economy in the world” for those countries. All the 8 IGAD member states suffer from successive famine and desertification. In 2017, millions of people affected with drought.

IGAD, thus, is expected to embrace its programme or objectives to focus mainly on mitigation of different forms of conflicts, ensuring food security and early warning response mechanism over famine and drought, advisory role over the

poverty reduction policies of member states. IGAD member states should also ratify the regional and global environmental legislations that are concerned with over desertification, land degradation, pollution, poaching, overgrazing, and animal welfare. In addition, investing on infrastructures, health facilities, schools, promoting rule of law and human rights should be the other mission for IGAD and member states.

Chapter Three

Research Design

3.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the research design and methodology. That is; it outlines the various tools that were used to conduct the study. A research design is referred to as an overall plan of the study which includes the study sample, techniques to be used and how the data is collected as well as interpreted and presented (Creswell, 2014). Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to show that a relationship between the research questions and the data collected emerged

clearly and the steps according to which the data was gathered is also well articulated.

3.2. Methodology: Definition

Research methodology refers to the actual technique or tool that is used by the researcher to generate research data. It denotes the totality of how the researcher undertakes the research. It also includes the research approach that will be used to probe and explore a given population. Basically, there are two broad kinds of research methodologies; these are quantitative and qualitative research methodology (Ibid, 2014).

Quantitative research method usually applies when studying a natural phenomenon. Quantitative method is deductive or tests theory. But qualitative methods result in generation of theory since they are inductive. In most cases, quantitative research methods tend to use numerical models, laboratory testing and survey methods.

Qualitative research methods involve data in the form of words, pictures, descriptions or narratives, rather than numbers and counts (Bernard, 2008). The qualitative method helps to understand the experiences and attitudes of a given community or region or sub region or population or portion of population and it tries to answer questions about the “what”, “how” or “why” of a phenomenon rather than “how many” or “how much”, which are answered by quantitative methods (Brikci & Judith, 2007).

Furthermore, qualitative research methodology tends to rely on words as data (such as the words of participants in an interview or written data from a

document); rather than seeking to develop specific hypothesis, qualitative research seeks to explain the meaning of a phenomenon through exploring the ways in which individuals understand their worlds.

Flexibility is another feature of qualitative methodology. When interview is being conducted, for instance, qualitative methods often ask “open-ended” questions that are not necessarily phrased in the same way with each interviewee. Based on open-ended questions, research participants are free to respond in their own words and these responses tend to be more complex than simply a “yes” or “no” answer (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). In qualitative research the relationship between the researcher and the participant is often less formal than in quantitative research.

In addition, qualitative research renders participants the opportunity to respond in a more elaborate and detailed way, while the researcher has the opportunity to respond and ask immediately to what participants say by creating subsequent questions based on the information provided by the participants. For instance, if we want to know readers’ assessment of this thesis, we might ask them open questions as: “What is your overall impression of this thesis?” Readers may give a precise answer such as “it’s great” or “it’s boring”.

In qualitative inquiry, we have the ability to follow up subsequent probe, like “what do you think about it?” or “what in particular did you or did you not like?”. In doing so, we can obtain more detail about the reader’s perceptions of the research document, which ultimately creates data that are rich and deep. On the other hand, fixed methods of data collection, such as fill in the number, tick the

box, close the opportunity to detailed and in-depth observation of a study (Marshall, 2003).

In the context of this study, a qualitative research approach has been embodied upon so as for instance to conserve time. Sampling is the most important part of qualitative research methodology. Research, as any other day- to-day activities, has got its own limitations. Time is perhaps the most important variable of a research study, even if it were possible, it is not necessary to collect data from each and every stakeholder of a region or community under study rather only a sample of a region or community is selected for any given study. There are three most common sampling methods used in qualitative research:

- a. Purposive sampling – refers to the case where participants are categorised according to pre-selected criteria relevant to a particular study. This means that participants are selected because they are likely to generate useful data for the project.
- b. Quota sampling – where the researcher decides while designing the study how many people different or similar to include as participants. The criteria the researcher chooses allows him to focus on people he believes would be most likely to have experience and exposure on the research topic. Until it meets the prescribed quota, the researcher looks for people who fit the criteria.
- c. Snow-ball sampling or chain referral sampling – refers to participants or informants with whom contact has already been made, and can use their social networks to refer the researcher to other people who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study.

Snow-ball sampling is often used to find and recruit “hidden populations” who are not easily accessible to the researcher through other sampling strategies (Brikci & Judith, 2007). This research used both purposive and snowball sampling to gather data pertaining to the topic.

3.3. Methods of the study

The methodology of this study was qualitative as alluded to earlier. The researcher used books, scholarly articles, journals, and conference papers, analysis of IGAD documents, data and reports. In addition, seasonal reports and documents of different organisations (such as UN specialised agencies, African Union) were used as secondary sources of the study. The researcher also used electronic resources (e.g. online dictionaries, journals, and e-books).

Interview is one of the most common important methods used to generate information on a specific project. A research document is expected to include the size and the selection criteria of the interviewees.

Based on this, the researcher also conducted interviews with IGAD officials. IGAD has different specialised agencies and thus the researcher conducted the interviews with officials that have familiarity with their own respective mandate designated to them by IGAD. The main target group of the interviews were officials and experts of the IGAD Secretariat. In addition, IGAD has specialised agencies such as:

- The IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), which head office is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
- IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) is mandated to alert and prevent member states from emergency drought. IDDRSI's head office is situated in the capital city of the Republic of Djibouti,
- IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and livestock Development is another specialised agency which has two offices: one in Kenya and the other in Djibouti,
- The Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) is responsible for the alerting of the occurrence of regional conflict. Its headquarters is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The researcher travelled to Djibouti to collect the necessary data. The interviews with the officials of IGAD secretariat were essential in that these had the potential of facilitating a roadmap towards regional integration in the horn of Africa.

The researcher used a tape recorder during data collection. The respondents give the interview with their full consent and the researcher told them that the recorded information would be deleted once it is transcribed. The data were collected in the headquarters of IGAD, Djibouti and Addis Ababa where the peace and security branch of the organisation is located. The data were collected between April 18-June 10, 2016.

3.3.1. Measures to ensure trustworthiness

The researcher sought consent from all the participants interviewed and all the information acquired was kept confidentially at all cost. In truth value, the

informants were allowed to be flexible in the engagement of this study. Where there was a need from the informants to ask for clarity, they were permitted to do so. Transparency as part of the Batho Pele principles was applied though the real names of the informants were not disclosed at all for fear of intimidation and victimization. The researcher was by no means, tried to influence the informants in any way whatsoever. An independent coder was sought to evaluate this study as a matter of consistency. A copy of the final research study was given to the University of Venda and to all relevant informants per request.

3.3.2. Sampling

According to Maree (2007) refers to the process used to select a portion of the population for study. A sample comprises of elements or subset of the population considered for actual inclusion in the study, or it can be viewed as a subset of measurements drawn from a population in which we are interested (Gabor & Grinnell, 2007). It is also defined as a group of elements drawn from the population that is considered to be the representative of the population and which is studied in order to acquire some knowledge about the entire knowledge, (Bless et al, 2006).

In this study the researcher used non-probability sampling because it's a type used in qualitative research which deals with getting the in-depth information about the problem studied. In the non probability sampling each unit in a sampling frame does not have an equal chance of being selected for a particular study, Gravetter and Forzano (2003). This procedure does not make use of a

random selection of population elements, and each unit/ elements in the population does not have the same probability to be selected in the study sample but only individuals who possess participate in the study.

Purposive/ judgmental sampling is the subtype which is to be used since the researcher only targets people who possess the characteristics that she wants which are the females who has already being victims of poverty.

3.3.3. Data collection method

Data collection is a process of drawing out basic material of research from the subject of research (Blanche, 2006). Data collection techniques are strategies that are used to gather information from subject or participants of the study. In collecting the data for this study, the researcher used interviews.

Face to face interviews were conducted with each participant. The participants are informed before the interview that participation is voluntary and that they can withdraw at any time they wish to. Interviews are conducted in their homes as a familiar environment is important for the participants to feel comfortable during the interview. The researcher has a list of pre-determined questions to be covered. This type of interview will allow the researcher to ask probing questions as well as to make follow-up and ask for clarity whenever needed. Semi structured interviews allows the participant to freely express themselves and is suitable for such a sensitive study. Each interview will last for approximately an hour as this is typical of a semi structured interview. Interviews are to be taken two times per household in order for the researcher to get in-depth information for the case study.

Notes will also be jotted down. This will help the interviewer to formulate new questions or to return to a point for clarification. The content and process of the interview is noted. Process of the interview includes reading in-between lines on what the participant has said and noting how the participant talked and behaves during the interview.

3.3.4. Data analysis

De Vos (2005) and Durrheim and Kelly (2006) agree that in qualitative study there is no specific point where data collection stops and analysis begins - it is not a linear process. Currutheers (2007) suggested that findings are generated and systematically built as successive pieces of data. Analysis takes place throughout the data collection process as the researcher looks into relationships, impressions, commonalities and patterns while they are still on the field (Currutheers, 2007). In analyzing data, reflective activities should be included in the form. This provides means of accountability and guides the process (Mertens, 2005).

Interpretive analysis of data is adopted in this research. The purpose of an interpretive analysis is to produce thick description which can be defined as thorough description of the characteristic , process, transaction and the context that constitute the phenomenon being studied , the language as well as an account of the researcher's role in the construction of this description (Terre Blanche et al, 2006).

3.3.5. Ethical considerations

Ethics are concerns, dilemmas and conflicts that arise in the process of conducting a research. They define what is or is not legitimate to do or what

moral procedures are all about (Neumann, 2011). According to Babbie & Mouton (2001), ethics in research refers to a general obligation for researchers to conduct their craft in a socially responsive and responsible manner. It is crucial that the researcher integrates ethics in their research in order to avoid harm to the participants as well as to ensure that the respondents take part in the research with full awareness of the purpose, risks and benefits of the research. Ethical considerations come into play when the respondents are recruited, during the intervention and in the release of the results obtained.

3.3.6. Informed consent

Informed consent means that subjects are made aware of the type of information you want from them, why the information is being sought, what purpose it will be put to, how they are expected to participate in the study and how it will directly or indirectly affect them (Creswell,2016). The researcher should obtain the necessary permission from the respondents after they were thoroughly and truthfully informed about the purpose of the interview and the investigation. Before the interview the researcher first explained to the respondents the need for the research.

The researcher informed the respondents that participation is voluntary and that they can withdraw from the study at whatsoever time they wanted to withdraw from the research. The respondents were also told about the purpose of the study, risks, benefits and that information shared would be kept confidential and that they will remain anonymous.

The researchers' aim of equipping the respondents with adequate information was to enable them to make an informed decision that is being fully aware of what they are getting themselves into. Singleton, Straights, & Straits (1993) acknowledge that participation should be voluntary and that respondents are free to withdraw from the study at any time. After thoroughly explaining to them what their participation encompassed they were then each asked to sign informed consent papers.

3.3.7. Confidentiality

According to Creswell (2016) confidentiality means that information may have names attached to it, but the researcher holds in confidence or keeps it secret from the public. Whilst Bless et al (2006) says confidentiality means the information provided by participants particularly sensitive and personal information should be protected and not made available to anyone other than the researcher.

The researcher maintained confidentiality by not divulging information shared by the participants unless they agreed that the information be shared with someone else.

3.3.8. Anonymity

Neuman (2001) refers to anonymity as ethical protection that participants remain nameless; their identity is protected from disclosure and remains nameless; their identity is protected from disclosure and remains unknown. According to

Singleton, Straits and Straits (1993) the researcher can maintain anonymity by removing names, and other identifying information from the data as soon as possible, by not disclosing individual identities in any report of the study and by not divulging the information to persons or organizations requesting it without the research participants permission.

The researcher did not use the respondent's real names so that people cannot identify a given response with a given respondent. When participants become aware that their real names are not going to be used it enables them to express themselves freely without fear.

3.3.9. Avoidance of harm

This means never injure the people being studied regardless of whether they volunteer for the study or not (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). For the purpose of the study the researcher ensured that the participants are not harmed physically, psychologically or emotionally. If harm was realized the participants would be removed from the study and if counselling was needed they would get immediate attention.

Neuman (1994) acknowledges that indeed social research can harm a research subject in several ways: physical harm, psychological harm, legal harm and harm to a person's career or income. In the study the researcher avoided inflicting anxiety and psychological discomfort by asking questions in an appropriate manner as well as not judging the respondents. The researcher was patient with the respondents when they narrated their knowledge about the IGAD.

The central theme of the interview included:

- the recent developments of the IGAD regional integration agenda;
- the attitudes of the respective member states on the integration process;
- the achievement of IGAD concerning the integration process;
- the observation and enforcement of regional policies, frameworks, protocols and treaties by the respective countries;
- the constraints faced by IGAD in the regional integration effort; and
- the likely solutions for integrating the horn of Africa through addressing the organisational challenges of IGAD.

In general, the researcher questioned the respondents about the role, failure and prospects of IGAD in integrating the Horn of Africa countries. The interviews thus were focused on the objectives, benefits and challenges of regional integration in the Horn of Africa followed by the investigation of the organisational challenges of IGAD and the main socio-economic and political problems that hamper the region to be integrated.

3.4. Structure of IGAD

IGAD as a regional supranational organization has structures designed to carry out its aims and objectives. It also has the following four main organs:

- I. An Assembly of Heads of State and Government,
- II. A Council of Ministers,

III. A Committee of Ambassadors,

IV. A Secretariat.

I. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government

This is the supreme organ of IGAD. The Assembly meets at least once a year and at any time upon the request of any of the Member states upon agreement of the majority of its members (see Article 9(3) of the Agreement Establishing IGAD, 1995). The decisions of the Assembly are reached by consensus. (Ibid, Article 9(4), 1995). The functions of the Assembly include, making policy, direct and control the function of the Organisation, determining, giving and monitoring guidelines and programmes of cooperation, especially on conflict prevention, management and resolution.

II. Council of Ministers

The council of ministries is the forum of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one Minister who is designated by each member state. The responsibilities of the Council is to promote peace and security in the region and the monitoring of political and security affairs which include conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as post conflict peace building (Ibid, Article 10(2),1995).

In accordance with Article 10(4) of the Agreement that helped in the creation of IGAD, the Council meets twice a year and at any time at the request of any of the member states upon the agreement of the majority of its members.

III. The Committee of Ambassadors

The Committee of Ambassadors comprises members who were seconded by various countries to serve in the organisation. This Committee is accountable to

the Council. The Committee holds meetings whenever necessary. It also renders advisory and guidelines to the Executive Secretary of IGAD (Ibid Article 11(2), 1995).

IV. The Secretariat

The Secretariat is the executive body of IGAD. It is headed by an Executive Secretary to be appointed by the Assembly for a term of four years renewable once and have its own staff and assisted by experts and technicians made available to it by member states. The functions of the Secretariat are to prepare surveys, studies, information and guidelines on legal, political, economic, social, cultural and technical matters of common concern to, and essential for broadening and deepening coordinate development programmes and projects (Ibid, Article 12 (2), 1995).

Moreover, the Secretariat has the responsibility to initiate, identify and coordinate development programmes and projects. It also assists the policy organ in their work relating to political and humanitarian affairs.

The Secretariat has three divisions, these are:

- i. The Division of Agriculture and Environment,
- ii. The Division of Economic Cooperation and Social Development - this division has three other programmes or sector to be focused:
 - Trade, Industry and Tourism;
 - Transport and Communications;
 - Health and Social Development.

- iii. The Division of Peace and Security – has the following sub divisions:
- Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN),
 - IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) – has four pillars:
 - Counter Terrorism Pillar (CT),
 - Transnational Organized Crime (TOC),
 - Maritime Security (MS),
 - Security Institutions Capacity Building (SICB);
 - Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT),
 - IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC) – an independent organ.

V. The Executive Secretary

The executive secretary is the chief executive officer of the organization. Its responsibilities include initiating measures aimed at promoting the objectives of IGAD. The Executive Secretary also coordinates with member states to ensure conformity and harmony with agreed policies, programmes and projects (Ibid, Article 13, 1995).

Even if IGAD has good organisational structure, its achievements so far are not satisfactory. The Assembly of IGAD, for instance, is responsible for mediating and resolving regional conflicts. However, IGAD could not discard the name of Somalia from the failed state index. The conflict in South Sudan continues due to IGAD's incapacity to mediate the central government and the rebels. The Assembly could not stop Ethiopia and Eritrea for making a bloody battle that killed 100000 people and resulting in displacement.

The Council of Ministers is also responsible, among other things, for monitoring and enhancing humanitarian activities. However, the Council has blindfolded for people of the region that need emergency food relief. Sometime the Council would try to hide the drought from the international community, let alone initiate its own humanitarian activities.

In addition, the Committee of Ambassadors has the mandate to harmonise or interpret regional policies; yet the Committee has not been taking measures while member states pursue policies that prioritise their self-interests than regional common good. The Secretariat is the executive body of IGAD that has the ultimate mandate to realise decisions taken by the Assembly, the Council and the Committee of Ambassadors.

The Secretariat is entitled to implement the economic, social, cultural, political and legal policies of the organisation. In other words, it is entrusted to promote regional integration through harmonising policies designed by IGAD. Nevertheless, the Secretariat is mainly busy with implementing short-term policies to address immediate challenges of the region than realising long-term strategies that foster regional cooperation, fraternity, and sustainability.

As Sub-divisions of IGAD, ICPAT have become instrumental in silencing opposition parties and private press that are critical of governments. ICPAT like organs become mechanisms for tyrannical governments to secure funds from western countries (such as USA) and sustain their regimes against the will of the region. Terrorism initiatives create a fertile ground for fundamental groups and the increment of terrorism incidents as well as open the door for violating rule of law, human rights and dignity.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter endeavored to show the intricacies involved in applying both the quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. It also indicates the importance of each methodology in relation to the topic that one is researching. In particular, the chapter highlights the procedures that the researcher followed in

the process of collecting data, and also narrates the organogram of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development so as to help in the understanding of the programs of the organization and it also indicates the place where the research was conducted.

Chapter Four

Data Presentation and Analysis

4.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the findings that emerged from the data. It also discusses the themes that emerged from the interviews relating to regional integration in the IGAD region. The main purpose of this study is to probe mechanisms through which the IGAD regional integration programmes could be achieved and how these mechanisms could contribute towards the socio-economic growth of IGAD countries.

Specific objectives of the study are as follows:

1. Explore the core socioeconomic and political challenges that hamper the regional integration agenda of IGAD,
2. Investigate the appropriate measures that could be taken by IGAD to remedy the situation and describe whether these actions address the organizational challenges of IGAD's regional integration endeavors,
3. Probe the best practices that IGAD might take from other regional groupings within or outside Africa.

In order to meet these objectives, the researcher interviewed IGAD officials in Addis Ababa and Djibouti. The researcher followed research ethics procedures and the interview was made with unreserved consent of the interviewees. The Headquarters of IGAD is in Djibouti while its peace and security branch is located in Addis Ababa. The interviews were conducted with five officers of IGAD. These officers have immense knowledge on the IGAD regional integration

process. They are high profile individuals and were selected by the researcher for their potential to provide the requisite information.

Table 4.1. Biographic data of respondents.

Name	Age	Qualification	Position in IGAD	Country
Andrew	38	MA: economics	Director: Division of economic cooperation and social development	Uganda
Hussein	49	MSc: IT, Diploma In library science	Director: Information, documentation and knowledge management division	Djibouti
Johannes	54	MA: economics	Head: Transport and communications	Sudan
Kendrick	45	MA: Infrastructure development	Director: Infrastructure development division	Kenya
Trevor	48	MA: conflict resolution	Director: Security Sector Programme (ISSP)	Ethiopia

The data were captured between the time of April 18 to June 10, 2016 in Djibouti and Addis Ababa. After analyzing of the data, the following themes and sub-themes as shown in Table 4.2 below emerged:

Table 4.2. Emerging Themes

Main themes	Sub themes
4.1. Factors related to Capacity building within IGAD	4.1.1. Financial capacity 4.2.2. Dependency on donor funds
4.2. Lack of feasible infrastructure in the region	
4.3. Harmonisation of policies	4.3.1. Bilateral agreements
4.4. Challenges of free movement of people	4.4.1. One stop border post 4.4.2. People to people interaction
4.5. Effects of political factors on regional integration	4.5.1. Lack of political will and commitment 4.5.2. Coinciding membership
4.6. Lack of peace and security	4.6.1. Terrorism

4.2. Factors related to capacity

Capacity refers to the ability of achieving projects with adequate human and financial means.

In this regard, Andrew (Participant 1) stated the following:

“IGAD has the potential of becoming one of the best organizations in Africa should it adhere to all its policies that it has adopted since its inception.”

Kendrick (participant 2) also supported the views of Andrew and said that IGAD had capacity challenges associated with the structure. The structure of IGAD has never changed since its inception. It is so archaic that it hinders the organisation from moving forward. In line with this, Dan (2010) wrote that the secretariat’s ability is highly restricted by a top down decision making structure. The Assembly of the Heads of state is the ultimate decision making organ and this hinders a participatory method of decision making.

Kendrick continued by saying that the organization does not have a clear programme on how to deal with disasters such as drought in the Horn of Africa. In this vein, Abdi & Seid (2013) indicated that member state countries should strive to act closely based on what type of regional integration or cooperation would achieve specific objectives of the organization.

In addition, Kendrick said that:

“Subsequent trainings have been offered. Project management, monitoring and evaluation training is given to project officers. Gender and conflict workshops are also organised. But it seems as if these trainings do not yield any results.”

Trevor (participant 3) agreed with Andrew and Kendrick by stating that IGAD had capacity challenges but it is not something that is related to lack of knowledge and skills among IGAD officers. In certain areas, it needs specialists and professionals while it also needs resources.

In addition, Andrew bolstered his argument by saying that:

“We have quite a lot of capacity building programmes that are supported by our partners. But I can never say that we have adequate resources. IGAD needs improvement. If you have the adequate capacity, the implementation of the policies will be easier.”

Hussien (Participant 4) also supported other respondents by saying the following:

“We cannot talk about IGAD in isolation. This organisation represents member states. If it fails, it means all of the states are failing. So the capacity of IGAD should not be limited to the Secretariat. It is also within the mandate of member states to make sure that it delivers. This is their organisation. Member states failed to compliment staff even when there was a serious need to address conflicts and other forms of disasters. The ultimate mandate of IGAD lies at the top of its hierarchy – i.e. the summit or the Assembly. So the capacity problem is caused by the member states that give IGAD narrow mandates and inadequate capacity. The actual implementation of all IGAD projects is done by member states.”

Johannes (Participant 5) also acknowledges the capacity challenges of IGAD. According to him, the capacity problem of IGAD might be serious but not critical. He further said that there is a way out if member states can look for a solution. He expanded his argument with the following sentiments:

“Sometimes you might have heard a lot of generalized statements about lack of capacity in the organization. But when people are criticizing they just look at the weaknesses. They do not look at the strengths. So sometimes those statements are

not balanced because one could not say that you are not doing well rather he must point out the areas that you are weak at.”

Johannes further said that IGAD has the capacity to address these problems but it is also the responsibility of member states.

4.2.1. Financial capacity

All the respondents stated that the financial capacity of IGAD is at its lowest. Kendrick said that in terms of financial capacity, there are challenges. Johannes said that *“IGAD is financially weak. Financial weakness hampers the ability of implementing its policies. Johannes further said that lack of an IGAD Development Bank worsens the situation. IGAD needs to have its own resources rather than depend on donors or partners. Member states of IGAD are only paying the salaries of IGAD officials. The real programs are run by donor funds. So each partner has their own agenda. So if it really wants to move forward, IGAD must have its own resources. In a nutshell, IGAD has to develop its own development bank.”*

Financial incapacity of IGAD, according to Hussien, leads to a narrow agenda that does not address the overall needs of the member states.

4.2.2. Dependency on donor’s funds

All the respondents mentioned that dependency on donor funds is not a problem and there is no influence by donor countries. According to Trevor:

“Donor countries express their interest and their focus. You cannot use that money beyond their commitment earmark. For instance, Japan gave us USD\$750 Million to counter terrorism in Somalia. Japan’s interest is Somalia, IGAD cannot use that money to develop Kenya or Uganda. In the aid politics, there is no free lunch. In fact, they might not twist your hand and say to you, do this and don’t do that. However, one way or another they impose their interest.”

Hussien said that, IGAD is dependent on partner funding, explaining that;

“In the 20th century, it is a fact that developing states are dependent on developed countries to secure funds for both national and regional projects. It is also a fact that if you do not have the capacity to buy a car, you may borrow money from the bank or other sources. I think all the issues of regional integration are controlled by national interest. Member states have their own interest.” Hussein said that even if we depend on donors, we have to bargain in order not to lose our integrity.

Kendrick also supported Hussein’s view. He said that dependency on donor countries is not influencing the regional process of IGAD. Kendrick thinks that having funds from external donors is not a problem in the first place and it does not bring any influence on the proposed projects. *“If a project is relevant to the citizen and if you have the ability to borrow by all means borrow and do it. There are a lot of people saying that it is not good to rely too much on foreign funding. However, regional projects are capital intensive, if you do not have the resources, it is wise to get these somewhere else. The benefits outweigh whatever*

costs that means there is no problem on the foreign aid IGAD depends on. If there is capability of getting funds, it is better to limit the conditions and scope of the donating country”, said Kendrick.

In addition, all respondents said that IGAD has development partners. There is also an IGAD Partner Forum (IPF) that constitutes the donor countries of IGAD. IPF is established to facilitate the flow of funds from partners to IGAD’s projects. So far, the member states appear not to be funding a lot of regional projects of IGAD. Instead, there is over-reliance on funds from developed countries.

Johannes agreed with the other respondents that dependency on donor funding is inevitable due to lack of regional financial institutions. According to him, the challenge of dependency could not be alleviated until IGAD is able to establish a development bank. According to Trevor and Hussien, the partners of IGAD are also benefiting in one way or another when they allocate funds for projects.

4.3. Lack of feasible infrastructure

Infrastructure includes the construction of roads, railways, ports, power and communication facilities. In this regard, Johannes said that IGAD is presently making road connectivity that measures about 5 000km. According to Johannes, IGAD is a facilitator for making the projects. In addition, IGAD is instrumental in making energy (power), telecom, and railway connectivity.

Hussien supported Johannes’s view by saying that, *“in terms of connection, we are connecting capital cities with ports, which is the first step towards*

development. We have the main road connection but it needs sub-roads because integration is about the entire people not just connecting the capitals.”

According to Kendrick, IGAD facilitates the interconnection of trans-African Highway number 4, which links Cape Town and Cairo. The missing link of this Highway was in Kenya between the borders of Siweru and Moyale in Ethiopia. This missing link is expected to be completed at the end of 2016. For a region to be connected, people should be able to move as well as goods. For all practical purposes infrastructure is one of the main drivers of the integration process.

Andrew and Trevor supported the notion that infrastructure is one of the key drivers of integration. Both said that there are infrastructure challenges for IGAD to speed up its integration process. In the aviation industry; there is no network among airlines of the region. The only airlines that fly across the region are Ethiopian and Kenyan airways. At least those airlines connect the capital cities of certain member states. Hussien and Trevor said that the region's airways are not enough to cover the whole region and the price of airfare is too high. In line with this, Gerald (2012) also observed the high cost of transport in the region which is associated with lack of harmonisation of transport policies.

In relation to the cost of developing infrastructure, Johannes said that it is quite expensive. Johannes added that it was expensive to communicate especially across borders. The calling rate of the region is quite expensive. According to Johannes, there are two kinds of regional integration challenges in the IGAD region, these are physical and non-physical barriers.

Andrew agreed with Johannes and stated that:

“Sometimes it is easier to call the USA or UK than to communicate with the next door member states. Why I would have easier access to communicate with the outside world than with my own people still confuses me to date.”

Physical barriers refer to solid road blocks of regional integration. The majority of respondents said that physical barriers refer to infrastructure such as road, railway, and airways. The non-physical ones were identified as visas, immigration regulations and policies in general. In order to address the problems of non-physical barriers, political will and commitment are the two prerequisites. The regional integration process in general has tariff and non-tariff barriers. The imposition of heavy tariffs on goods that pass through member states is the main challenge for the promotion of FTA in the region.

Trevor agreed with the others on the main challenges of IGAD in advancing connectivity projects. He said that *“we need more projects on connectivity of roads. With the addition of the problem of donor fatigue due to duplicated projects in the South-Eastern Africa region, the infrastructure projects suffer from lack of sustainable financial contributions.”*

Hussein agreed with Trevor that in infrastructure connectivity, roads were being rehabilitated and undergoing maintenance. These roads will have to be regulated within the law. When constructing a road, according to Kendrick, there must be quality control. In addition, there must be maintenance. Lack of routine maintenance is exacerbating the poor state of infrastructure in the region. Routine maintenance includes even mundane issues such as cutting the grass, opening the caravan and mending the boreholes.

Johannes agreed with Kendrick's opinions. He said that when an infrastructure is designed, there should be some pre-determined costs, including the cost of renewing. If there is a failure to maintain projects, their sustainability can therefore not be guaranteed. Lack of adequate maintenance resources remains the challenge of infrastructure development in the region.

All the respondents said that the involvement of the private companies in the infrastructure sector is so limited. According to the respondents, when it comes to regional projects, companies mainly involve themselves as contractors or consultants. Private companies are only involved in the power construction sector, telecommunication and the development of ports. Due to the very fast remittances, private companies are often involved in the telecommunication business sector. If you look at the telecom industry, you will notice that there are a number of private companies in the region. In Kenya, the telecommunication sector is dominated by the private sector. In Uganda, it is the same. The initial capital of the telecom industry is not so high and the remittance is higher and faster. The private industry is a business driven system.

All respondents agree that, on roads connectivity, IGAD does not involve private companies. The road tender is mainly given to government companies because infrastructure is very expensive. Road, railway and other related constructions can only be serviced through the funds of the governments which are member states. Private companies are profit-oriented. They have difficulties in funding road projects. Infrastructure is capital intensive because of this. IGAD prefers government companies than private ones.

4.4. Harmonisation of policies

One of the most vital elements of the integration process is harmonization of policies. In response to this, Kendrick said that the harmonization of policies poses a lot of challenges. IGAD had some meetings among transport ministers of member states regarding harmonising of vehicle carrier policies and licensing. It must be noted that the IGAD secretariat can only make recommendations at a technical level regarding policy changes pertaining to the harmonisation of, for instance, vehicle policies. The ultimate decision on harmonisation of policies and their enactment lies with the summit of heads of states.

Kendrick agreed that the process is quite tedious and difficult. Recommendations continue to be made to ease the burden that the IGAD faces regarding the above problem. Also, it should be noted that it takes time before recommendations are addressed. Making policy out of these recommendations involves another tedious process which takes time.

Trevor stated that the harmonisation of policies is difficult to implement in the region. IGAD could not force states to harmonise their laws because of the principle of sovereignty. The most difficult barrier in harmonization of laws is sovereignty. States have to surrender their sovereignty to empower IGAD with policy making. In line with this, Krasner (1983) contended that harmonisation of policies could be implemented only if states are ready to relinquish certain portions of their sovereignty.

IGAD is also working with Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia to draft policies which are user-friendly. Gradually, this cooperation will upgrade to harmonisation of other policies. At least for now, there is a platform and framework to go about implementing these policy recommendations. IGAD is

also in the process to establish regional platforms for regional issues to address and resist, the emerging and evolving problems of the region.

Hussien agreed with the other participants that the attainment of harmonisation of laws in the region was still a long way off. He said that:

“If you take the ICT, it is too costly, bringing these to our side must have been quite a lot of investment. The bottom line is usually profit for those companies that brought those technologies. Even delivering the IC for the people of the region is a problem let alone harmonising ICT policies. This is because, we have a lot of legacies, ideology, technology or thinking that we continue to contend with in this day and age. And these do not help us to get to where we want to go as IGAD. States also have also shown some dislike of some of the features of technology. Do you stop some using skype to talk to relatives or business partners? Some states fear that certain information available to the citizenry may be politically insensitive and may result in some form of the “Arab spring” which caught Egypt by surprise. There is quite a lot of harmonising to be done.”

4.4.1. Bilateral agreement

Hussien believes that regional integration takes time as it needs a lot of negotiations. The IGAD region has different nations that have diversified interest, but they still rely on each other. Ethiopia and Djibouti, for instance, rely heavily

on each other for survival. Most of the food from Djibouti comes from Ethiopia and some commodities are also from Djibouti. There are so many Somalia businessmen in Kenya while there are Ethiopian and Ugandan business persons in Djibouti. Some industries in the South Sudan are predominately owned by Eritrean investors.

Kendrick supported Hussein's view that the bilateral agreements of member states in various sectors are flourishing. *"It seems that a lot of negotiations and work has been done bilaterally. However, IGAD lacks the capacity to regulate and rationalize bilateral agreements so that they become regional"*, said Kendrick.

Andrew agreed with Kendrick and Hussien that member states should be able to sign bilateral agreements in order to expedite regional development.

Johannes also supported the views of the other respondents by saying the following:

"I told you that infrastructure is one of the main drivers of integration. We are doing very well in terms of connectivity. Our members are doing a commendable job bilaterally."

Trevor also supported the view of Johannes as follows:

“Ethiopia and Djibouti are the greatest trading partners. These countries are trading with their neighbours and they have a lot of bilateral arrangements and are working together. For me this is one of the giant steps towards integration. If you check Sudan and Ethiopia, you will also find that the two countries are working together. Kenya and Ethiopia are also working together as well as Kenya and Uganda and Kenya and South Sudan. What I can tell you is that even Ethiopia and Somaliland have found the urge to work together.”

4.5. Challenges of free movement of people

For Trevor, the movement of people is limited due to a tense relationship between IGAD member states. He added that in the Sudan-Uganda, there is no free movement of people because of the rivalry between the two, resulting in the closure of the border since the 1998 war. The Sudan-South Sudan border does not entertain free movement of people because of territorial claim and the unresolved issues. The Kenya-Somalia border is not that much suitable for the free movement of people because of the threat of terrorist attacks.

Kendrick supported Trevor’s view that the integration process should enable the movement of people and goods as smooth as possible. Andrew also said that in the IGAD region, movement of people is difficult.

Johannes agreed with Andrew and Kendrick by articulating that:

“We have to develop the protocol of free movement of people. If heads of governments pass this protocol, it will have a lot of use. After the approval of the

protocol, it gives people of the region the right to establish residency and business.”

Hussien said that a lot of work has to be done to enhance the movement of people. The people of IGAD have to interact within the region. This is the starting point of future integration. As a citizen of the IGAD region, there should be minimum problems to move from one member states to another one, and at least visas should be issued on arrivals.

In a nutshell, all respondents agree that the movement of people should be allowed for legal, formal or informal, economic or political as well as social or environmental reasons.

According to the respondents, IGAD should also be on the lookout for trafficking activities. Thus far, there are three routes of the trafficking “industry”, namely,

1. Europe – that crosses Sudan, Libya, Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea;
2. Middle East – via Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland to Yemen and Saudi Arabia;
3. South Africa – this is a dangerous route that people were forced to cross six countries to reach their destination. Most Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalis are travelling through this route.

Johannes said that people still prefer illegal routes to migrate. In 2014, many Ethiopians were chased from Saudi Arabia and most of them went back using

illegal routes and traffickers. Most of the trafficked are fascinated by the good economic prospects in foreign countries.

Andrew further lamented that *“We do not need a visa to visit our intertwined countries. Our movement is hampered by the strict requirement of visa and these strict procedures are discouraging people from doing business amongst themselves.”*

4.5.1. One-stop border post

Andrew explained the principle as follows:

“One-stop border posts essentially means when you are travelling from one side of the border with or without goods. Once you clear your documents at border one for instance, you do not have to do the same at border two. These documents should be able to be captured electronically. The migration officer at the other side of the border should just check the documents and make an entry stamp.”

Trevor supported the views of the other respondents by saying that modern equipment like scanners can help in the screening of trucks without offloading all those shipments. Trevor further explained that:

Information can come to border officers before the people and trucks arrive.

Kendrick also supported the principle of one stop border post. He said that:

“For people to be integrated, they need to move from one place to another to trade. For that to happen, you have to have the necessary infrastructure.”

All the respondents are in agreement that the border areas are HIV hot spots. In this regard, the respondents said that IGAD has a regional HIV/AIDS programme that focuses on cross border population that migrate a lot. These are the truck drivers, refugees and cross border traders. In support of the respondents Gerald (2012) indicates that, a fundamental principle for sustainable development is that human being. Wellbeing that is health, wealth and quality of life of people is part of and linked to the diversity, productivity and quality of the ecosystem of the region.

4.5.2. People-to-people interaction

Slocum and Langenhove (2004) indicated that beyond trade and tariffs, regional integration should be conceived of as a dialectical unity of social, economic and political processes.” The New Regionalism Theory also stated that integration process should involve non-state actors including the people (Hettne, 2010). It results in the diffusion of political power from centralised state to other actors such as the people themselves (Laursen, 2008). It is in this vein that Hussein stressed that IGAD should normalize and harmonies border polices of member countries so that border towns can share resources especially that people along the borders are the same in terms of culture, race and lineage. Hussein further said the following: *“The relationship is already there. Even in the economic sphere, unregulated commerce is conducted in border areas.”*

Andrew agreed with Hussien that member states have to strengthen the interaction between people. In the border area, there is an informal socio-

economic interaction between people of two or more countries. Andrew added that the border area might be divided by boundaries but residents of the area have blood relationship. They get married to each other. *“In some areas, you have so much migration of people because of the nomadic lifestyle where they stay during winter and move to the other area later”*, indicated Andrew.

The other feature of people-to-people interaction is informal trade. All the respondents said that, if one goes to the borders people are the same on both sides. They trade between each other but this trade is unrecorded and registered by member states. Kendrick added that Moyale is a border town between Kenya and Ethiopia. People of Kenya work and sleep in Moyale. They move around, go to the cattle market on the Ethiopian side and buy whatever they want. In fact, such kind of common market will reduce conflict among pastoralist communities. According to the study conducted by the World Bank (2014) and ECA (2006) frequent and increasing trades will reduce conflicts by about 17%.

Hussien agreed with Kendrick that if one goes to Kenya and Uganda, there are two border towns on either side. These are Marba border and Bsiya. In fact, some people even farm on both sides. In terms of cross-border trade, the informal transaction is already there. There is a lot of trade but this trade is not formal but informal. Here, the boundaries are artificial and separate family members. For example, one may have relatives on the other side of the border.

4.6. Effects of political factors on regional integration

4.6.1. Lack of political will

According to Johannes, political will and financial means are the key drivers of integration of which without them one cannot talk about integration. Johannes added that once the political will is there the other drivers will follow. In support of this Kidane (2013) stated that political setting is the foremost component for the success of integration process. In addition, Draper et, al. (2007) indicated that in Africa politics is the major driver of integration.

The majority of the respondents agreed that political will and other drivers of integration are pillars of a region. They are connected to each other. Member states must harmonize their developmental policies. The harmonization of policies has been done everywhere from Latin America, Europe, EAC etc. Andrew added that the systems have already been developed, provided that member states render their political will or agree on the matter. They are the ones responsible for signing the agreements and not the Secretariat. Biswaro (2005) also support this view that nations could only integrate with their free will rather than coercion. This contention was raised by Haas (1964) that states has to redefine their national interest to regional perspectives based on their will.

Kendrick said that the decision of summits should be implemented by member states. Making deliberations in the annual meetings is not sufficient. However, for regional integration to be a reality the meetings should be coupled with implementation and political will. The ratification of protocols demands political will from each member state.

Trevor indicated that there was lack of cooperation among member states due to the tense relationship each state had with the other. He added that the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not cordial at the moment. Similarly, the relation

between Eritrea and Djibouti is not healthy. The South Sudan and Sudan relation is not good since they did not have clearly demarcated borders. There is tension between Sudan and Uganda because of previous political squabbles.

For Hussien, IGAD is just a secretariat that implements decisions of member states and the commitment of member states determined the achievements of the secretariat. Hence, when one mentioned the problems of political will and commitment, it directly reflected on the heads of states. These are the main actors of the integration process.

Johannes also agreed with the other respondents that the protocol for free movement of people had been adopted. The protocol promotes the right of establishing business, work, education (e.g. Universities). But heads of states are the ones that should ratify the protocol. In line with what Johannes said, Layne (2006) further stressed that despite abundant declarations, measures, policy statements, political commitments, and intra-national institutional configurations, there is little advancement in forwarding clear and breakthrough guidelines for policy makers and researchers.

Andrew supported the views of other respondents that member states lack trust for each other and the integration process. Due to lack of trust member states are not willing to do tasks that benefit the entire region. Instead of rendering political will and commitment for the regional project, member states prefer to construct roads that will connect them with a “trustworthy neighbour” country. The road between Ethiopia and Sudan was constructed through bilateral agreement between the two countries. The interconnection has been done by the countries. This shows that if member states are committed, they will facilitate the

integration process. In supporting this view, Layne (2006) stated that member states have to forego their national interest for regional common good.

Besides, member states are also competing to get the status of hegemonic state. According to Trevor, Ethiopia and Kenya behave like the hegemonic states of the region. For Trevor:

“The term hegemonic is difficult to understand. In ECOWAS, Nigeria is a hegemonic state, it has political influence, big economy and strong military. In the SADC region, South Africa can be classified as the hegemonic state due to its vibrant economy. If you look within the IGAD perspective, Ethiopia looks like a hegemonic country. Ethiopia’s fastest growing economy makes her more viable to become a hegemonic power. Ethiopia has political influence and a strong military. Besides, the population of Ethiopia is by far large and greater than the sum of Kenya and Uganda. Population by itself is power. Kenya is another emerging hegemonic power because of her good economic standing, except that the country is mired in corruption scandals. I am therefore pessimistic about the political will of the member states when it comes to the amelioration of hegemonic power in the region”.

Andrew agreed with Trevor noting that lack of hegemonic power in the region could be one of the challenges of regional integration. He added that states of the region are not in good standing to nominate the region’s hegemonic state, but Ethiopia will be a hegemonic state since geographically it is situated at the centre of the IGAD region and shares a border with all IGAD members except Uganda. This is supported by Nomvete (2009) when he stated that there must be at least one big or powerful state in a region, which is imbued with either socio-economic

or political power or popularity in the international arena. Ethiopia as the location of African Union headquarter could regard as popular state in the international community.

Johannes supported Andrew and Trevor's views noting that Kenya could be a hegemonic power of the region. However, the country has been targeted by terrorists leaving Ethiopia as the most stable country in the region, hence placing Ethiopia in a better position to become the hegemonic state of the region.

4.6.2. Coinciding membership

Trevor noted overlapping membership is a problem. Kenya and Uganda are member states of EAC. All member states except Somalia are members of COMESA. Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia are members of CEN-SAD. Trevor noted that, dual accountability and dual membership affects member states' ability to attain their priority and commitment. This contention is also supported by Estrada (2009) when he indicated that regional integration may contribute to international frictions between competing blocs through creating multiple legal frameworks and various dispute settlement mechanisms as well as absorbing other multilateral arrangements.

Johannes agreed with Trevor's and Estrada's view that overlapping membership makes member states to be uncommitted. The most problematic consequence of coinciding membership was that it brings overlapping programs. Previously there was an Inter- Regional Coordination Committee that gave recommendations on projects of building a road. According to Johannes, although there was a tender

for overlapping programs, it lacked coordination among different RECs of the South Eastern Africa including SADC, COMESA, EAC, IOC and IGAD.

Andrew and Hussein bolstered the views of the other respondents by saying that the Tripartite Agreement (TA) is just a political agenda that has nothing to do with the reality. In the beginning one has to finish what he is doing in the IGAD region. Jumping from one configuration to another is meaningless. The TA is an agreement between COMESA, SADC and EAC where they agreed to work in the infrastructure projects. But practically, all the three organisations did their own projects without engaging IGAD. A study conducted by IGAD (2011) also confirm that due to overlapping projects, donor countries considered the organisation as political group because many projects of IGAD is also run by COMESA. Indeed, overlapping of regional projects create confusion on donor countries and development partners. It creates paradox on which project should get funded.

4.7. Lack of peace and security

All the respondents said that the best achievement of IGAD lies in the peace and security sector. Hussien said that, IGAD achieved quite a lot of mediation and peace security tasks. However, its achievement in the Sudan and Somalia peace process is still far from over. In relation to this Peter (2012) enunciated that integration will lead to not only on economic unity but also cooperation in the peace and security sector. Redie (2013) also stated that regional integration in the region could serve as a resolving mechanisms for pastoralist conflict over grazing land and water. A sound regional policy could reduce socio economic problems.

In light of the above, Trevor said that:

“Even though IGAD has been grappling with extraordinary circumstances, the IGAD mediation process is successful so far. Both the Sudan and Somalia peace processes are effective. In Somalia at least the federal government is established. It is a success story. The impending Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between South Sudan and Sudan is also a success story of IGAD. In addition, the peace accord between President Salva Kir and Rick Machar is also a success story. But the problem is that there remains an emergent conflict that borders on religiosity.”

Andrew also agreed with Trevor by saying the following:

“I think those extraordinary issues are spoiling the achievements of IGAD. However, if you look at the issue of peace and security, IGAD has been able to establish the Sudan peace process. When Sudan separated with South Sudan, IGAD is the one that midwifed the process. IGAD has been working with Somalia including the rebel groups. With limited resources, IGAD is doing well in the peace and security sector. This clearly shows despite whatever happens, we are on the right track. Even if people from outside might not agree, we have a good record especially in the peace and security sector.”

The majority of respondents said that the IGAD region was notorious for frequent conflicts and wars. According to the World Bank report (2013), since 2005-2011, there were a series of attacks by pirates and warlords in the region. As a result of that, Euro naval forces and many actors were drawn to the offshore of Somalia to protect European interests. Because of this intervention since 2011, piracy

declined. Indeed, this trend of piracy in Somalia and the weak political system makes the country to be one of the weakest in the horn of Africa (World Bank, 2013).

Johannes, also a participant, said the following: *“Eritrea also suspended its membership from IGAD. We don’t know when it intends to come back. It is part of the consequence of the Ethio-Eritrea border war. South Sudan is part of IGAD but suddenly war broke out in its mainland, right in the capital city called Juba. The Eritrean government captured parts of Djibouti. Somalia is also a failed state for the last 25 years. On the overall, things are not well in this part of the world.”*

Kendrick also reflected on the views of Andrew and Johannes. He said that:

“Member states are more committed with conflict resolution efforts. If one looks at the meetings held by member states for Somalia and South Sudan, you will find that there have been many. South Sudan now is committed to peace. The same is true about Somalia. Stopping internecine conflicts means a lot to the development of the region.”

Hussien also agreed with Kendrick that organised transnational crimes affect the socio-economic development of the region. Hussien added that arms trafficking, money laundering, insurgent groups, and terrorism were the main security challenges of the region which compromised the integration process. Money laundering was affecting the financial integration of the region while insurgent groups were involved in the demolition of regional infrastructure in order to unseat the central government.

For Hussien, one cannot control the insurgent movement unless the incumbent forces win or lose. He said that one has to know the reality. In Ethiopia, there were civil wars for more than three decades. There was mediation and discussion but it did not bring any solution. Finally, the one who won the battle came to power.

Trevor supported Hussien's view that the Sudanese civil war is the longest one in Africa. Many mediations were conducted but neither of the parties agreed to cease their warfare. At last the civil war came to an end with the secession of South Sudan.

The majority of respondents believe that IGAD's engagement with the media is quite limited. This is due to the different policies of member states towards the media. The respondents also worry about the growing negative impact of social media. The Information Resource and Communication Centre of IGAD is responsible for liaising with the media. It is faced with challenges. Johannes and Kendrick emphasised the need for inclusiveness in IGAD's mediation process. Accordingly, IGAD's peace process is an inclusive one as it involves civil societies, elders, warring factions, international institutions (Such as African Union), interested countries, and IGAD partners.

Hussien supported this view and said that:

"IGAD is neutral in the mediation process. In the CPA, IGAD was mediating the South Sudan and Sudan. It was mediating as a neutral partner. CPA is too vital to bring relative peace in Southern Sudan."

4.7.1. Terrorism

Andrew noted that terrorism is one of the major challenges of regional integration. The frequent attacks such as in Kenya affects the country in many ways. It affects the country's stability and its cost of life, the cost of finance as well as the tourism industry. This was witnessed by the recent attacks by Al Shabab on the 11 April 2015 at Garissa University where almost 147 Kenyans were killed (Sudan Tribune, 2015). The same is true about other countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti which are embroiled in terrorist activities. Andrew emphasised that even profiling and labelling has its negative impact on socio-economic development. After 9/11, travelling to US or Europe with a Muslim name was not easy.

Hussien added that the same is true for peaceful Somalis who want to travel across the IGAD region and also to the United States of America since President Trump was sworn into the oval office. They are interrogated and watched out by immigration officers. Even if a religion could serve as a pretext to mobilize people to engage in terrorist activities, it will be a bad deduction to associate all sects of Islam with terrorism.

In supporting Hussein, Victoria (2011) maintains that religion as a means of controlling state power is not a new phenomenon. She indicates that there were the Jacobins in France that indorsed for the origins of terrorism in the 13th century. Other terrorists that justify their acts as religiously correct include Irish Republican Army, National Organisation of Cypriote Fighters, Muslim National Front in Algeria. In line with this, the majority of respondents believed that

terrorism and radical Islam have a nexus relationship. Kendrick said the following in this regard:

“Radical Islam is a problem. Definitely Radicalisation is a challenge. This is because of our proximity to the Middle East conflict centre. This proximity makes us highly vulnerable. In addition, the Somalia crises aggravated the problem of radical Islam. Somalia became a theatre for foreign fighters, foreign ideology and narratives that are beyond the doctrine of Islam.” This is in line with Dawit (2016), who indicated that Wahhabism, which is also part of the radical Islam, is a problem in the region in that it does not tolerate other forms of religion. He further stated that Wahhabism observes a strict interpretation of Islam, condemned other interpretations and innovations and it saw Western values and civilization as abhorrently evil. Dawit’s assertion was also made true by the US state department’s report about the beheading of two Muslim clerics from Shi sect in Somalia (US state Department, 2009).

The use of force to defeat terrorist groups like Al-Shabab is not working. The best way is to study the root causes of terrorism. According to a study conducted by Institute for security studies (2015), the brutality of security forces within IGAD is mentioned as the reason instigating the citizens to join terrorist groups. Atin and Willian (2007) also argue that economic factors in this region are the root causes of terrorism. Furthermore, poverty might lead the unsatisfied youth to join terrorist groups.

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter presents the opinion of the respondents. Most of them revealed that IGAD lacks financial capacity, unclear programmes and a static structure that hampers the secretariat to work effectively. It was also revealed that regional projects are depending on donor countries since IGAD lacks financial institutions that could develop its own source of funding. Presently, IGAD is engaging the member states in building roads that could connect all the countries in the horn of Africa. Unfortunately, there is a slow progress in this regard as many of these countries are reluctant to participate in this worthy programme. The infrastructure in most of these countries is not adequate to fully and quickly transport goods and people. The involvement of the private sector in helping IGAD is also limited. Lack of harmonization of policies is another challenge that the IGAD is battling with. Instead of thinking and acting regionally, member states prefer to engage in bilateral agreements with countries of their own. According to the respondents, free movement of people is hampered by a tense relationship among member states. Respondents further said that strict visa regulations and inadequate infrastructure are also discouraging people to move, work and trade. Even though IGAD does not encourage people to people interaction, informal trade along the borders continue to take place. According to the respondents, political will is the key for integration. The lack of political will could be manifested in the overlapping of membership. The region is notorious for subsequent conflicts.

Peace in the region could be one of the recipes to bring harmony and stability in the region.

Chapter Five

Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1. Introduction

This chapter brings together issues that have emerged from the findings. The findings are elaborated in line with the objectives and research questions of the study. These are then related with the literature and the content of the research. The main purpose of this study is to probe mechanisms through which the IGAD regional integration programmes could be achieved and how they could contribute towards the socio-economic growth of IGAD member states.

Based on the findings drawn from the interviews, this chapter will make some deductions and recommendations about the integration process of the IGAD region. The recommendations will add to the body of knowledge on the current regional integration literature. In addition, the recommendations will benefit IGAD officers to enhance their regional integration performance. The recommendations will also be an opening point of research for scholars or

researchers who are interested in conducting a study about integration in the IGAD region.

5.2. Remedies that could be applicable in addressing social, economic and political challenges of IGAD

In relation to socio-economic and political challenges of IGAD, the findings of the study listed lack of capacity, lack of feasible infrastructure, lack of harmonisation of policies, impediments of free movement of people, lack of political will and commitment and lack of peace and security as the major challenges of the IGAD as a region and as an organisation. This portion of the study will briefly discuss the solutions and recommendations that likely address the problems of integration in the IGAD region.

5.2.1. Lack of capacity

Capacity refers to the ability to perform or achieve a certain task at its best level. IGAD is suffering from financial capacity. IGAD could not implement its own projects due to financial incapacity. In order to address the challenge of financial capacity, IGAD has to establish its own development bank. The IGAD Development Bank will serve as a mechanism to raise more funds for the integration programs. In addition, the establishment of IGAD Road Fund could be

another institution that will address these financial problems. In particular, this will alleviate budgetary problems of the infrastructure sector.

IGAD should also establish a regional bank. The establishment of the bank will partially address the financial problems through enhancing savings. This bank will also facilitate a regional financial flow. The regional Bank will also address money laundering and financing of terrorism activities in the region (Tuemay & Cockayne, 2012). In other words, the bank will reduce the threats of both security and development. Furthermore, IGAD could also organise consultative meetings and investment fora, mechanisms of lobbying international initiatives (Such as G8, NEPAD, MDGs). IGAD could also use development banks, bilateral and multilateral agreement as a legal ground to secure financial support in the form of loans, donations as well as logistic and expertise.

IGAD could use legally binding instruments to raise funds. The ACP/ EU Cotonou Agreement obliged the EU to support the development projects of African countries, including the IGAD member states. In addition, IGAD has to make its relationship with the private sector to use them as sources of fund. The IGAD Business Forum (IBF) could play the role of private sector in the region. National Chambers of commerce and industry could be the other private actors that could raise funds for the IGAD.

In addition, the civic society of the region will improve the capacity of IGAD in expertise and finance. Civic societies of the region play a vital role, especially in the Somalia peace process. Civic societies have extensive experience in their various fields. They also know the multi-dimensional problems of the region. Civic societies are also believed to be impartial for every stakeholder, they could

easily get recognition among different sections of the society. The IGAD Civil Society Forum (ICSF) that was established in July 2003 could serve as the turning point to harmonise civic societies of the region. If IGAD could apply strategies of raising funds as mentioned above, it will execute projects without the influence of outsiders such as donor countries.

The other capacity challenge of the IGAD is related with the structure of the organisation. The structure renders IGAD with limited power to achieve its regional integration agenda. The problem of limited mandate of the organisation requires the broadening of IAGD's power through reforming the charter of the organisation. Furthermore, once the IGAD's constitution has been reformed, there must be adequate financial means and expertise in order to exercise the renewed mandate, responsibilities and authorities.

Capacity is also associated with human resource competence to accomplish a certain task. In this regard, IGAD should continue to offer training and capacity building courses to its employees, officers and consultants.

5.2.2. Lack of feasible infrastructure

In April 2016, the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) launched a regional integration index of Africa. According to the index, the Horn of Africa was characterised as a region that has low levels of regional infrastructure. Lack of infrastructure remains one of the challenges of regional integration in the Horn of Africa. Infrastructure includes roads, railways, telecommunication, energy, the development of ports etc.

IGAD is focused on integrating its activities through road connectivity. The infrastructure policy of IGAD is connecting capital cities with ports. However, it should not be limited to connecting capital cities to ports, since integration is about people. The road connectivity should also consider connecting people of member states with the other member states. The construction of any infrastructure is expensive, thus, IGAD should look for ways of securing funds. The establishment of IGAD Road Fund (IRF) will address the problem. The IRF will enhance the sustainability of financial resources. This is because currently, there is a problem of “donor fatigue” due to overlapping projects across Africa. The donors are disappointed with replicate regional projects, so that, they are reluctant to fund projects. Hence, self-reliance through mechanisms such as IRF will sustain the financial sources of the region and it will boost more infrastructure projects. In addition to IRF, the establishment of IGAD Development Bank will enable the organisation to lend money wherever it deems fit.

Infrastructure also needs routine maintenance. Lack of routine maintenance is aggrieving the state of infrastructure in the region. The sustainability of any project depends on its routine maintenance. IGAD should not only construct infrastructure rather it should take into account the mechanisms of maintenance. However, in order to conduct routine maintenance, there must be reserved funds. The financial capacity of the IGAD and the failure to attain infrastructure are not separate issues rather they are intertwined problems of the region.

The involvement of the private sector in the infrastructure development is too limited. In order to overcome financial capacity challenges, IGAD has to offer

some projects to the private companies. In most cases, the private companies are working in a competitive manner. Since, they are concerned about their reputation and brand, they are prone to produce quality results. IGAD should involve private companies and it should not always label the private sector as profit-oriented.

In addition, IGAD has to design special mechanisms to develop infrastructure to landlocked members. Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda are landlocked countries of IGAD. Since these countries are far from sea outlets and the market, export trade is difficult. Transportation costs are high within landlocked countries. Constructing new infrastructure (such as dry ports, railways, road upgrading and maintenance) has to be done especially in landlocked countries just to give provisional solutions for the import and export trade. Gerald (2012) argues that these have to use modern technology in order to fast track their trade flows.

Infrastructure development has to go together with smooth administrative process. Visa regulation, immigration and custom clearance, check point barriers have to be stopped in order to facilitate the flow of goods and persons. Furthermore, road connections have to be coupled with effective port administration. In order to boost the tourism industry, the flight industry has to become effective. Airports have to be renovated. Member states have to encourage private investment in the flight industry in order to fill the gap created by national airlines. Private companies should also encourage flying across the region for business purposes.

The communication sector, especially the ICT policies of member states, have to be revisited. At maximum level member states have to gradually harmonise their ICT policies. The 21st century is an era of information. ICT has the lions share role in accelerating economic growth and human development. ICT has become more than a means of communication. It is the sector that speeds up innovations that enhances quality of life. It is also one of the sectors that attracts foreign direct investment. IGAD has to realise its ICT policies to improve people-to-people communications, and lifestyle of the region. The ICT policy of the region will back up the food security initiatives of the region by providing the farmer, meteorologists and researchers accurate weather data.

5.2.3. Lack of harmonization of policies

Harmonisation of policies has to do with the drivers of integration. The health policy will be harmonised in order to make the migration policy homogeneously applicable across the region. In the same way, the right to establish business necessitates the harmonisation of labour and investment policies of member states.

The IGAD region is one of the areas that experience disparities of income among the population, hence, in order to create an egalitarian society and to avoid exploitation of the ordinary people by “BIG MEN”, the labour policies of members have to harmonise to attain social justice.

In order to address the problem of socio-economic disparities, IGAD member states have to trade and negotiate in the global level as a region not individually. Unity is strength. In line with this, Woodward (2013) said that regional

integration could serve as a shield to protect members from the undue consequences of globalisation. In the trading sector, if states are committed to facilitate the flow of vehicles across their border, the transportation policy of members have to be harmonised. The driver's license policy of the region has to be uniform; the maximum load on the bridges are not the same currently and there is a need to harmonise all these differences. The maximum velocity of cars is not uniform across the region.

In some cases, harmonisation of policies could be signed by heads of states but practically it may not be achieved. The process of implementation might take a long time. But harmonisation of policies is not just about signing a protocol. Each member state should also look at the implications. The problem arises with the mandates of IGAD. Currently, IGAD is an agent of heads of states that does not have the power to take decisions outside of the mandate of the member states. Since integration is a process; states have to surrender their sovereignty, gradually, to empower IGAD with policy making.

Harmonisation of policies is done bilaterally among member states. It seems that a lot of negotiations and work has been done bilaterally to harmonise policies. IGAD lacks the capacity to regulate and rationalise bilateral agreements so that they will result in regional policies adopted by all member states. Bilateral relations could be a springboard to other regional agreements, IGAD has to move towards harmonisation of not only policies but bilateral agreements as well.

5.2.4. Inhibitions of free movement of people

In the IGAD region movement of people is hampered for different reasons. Tense relationship among member states has made the movement of people too limited. States have to improve their relationship in order to facilitate movement of people. The boundaries of member states have to be lined based on international law and it has to be demarcated by neutral organ that could not be biased for the disputant members. The boundary problem of Ethiopia and Eritrea; Djibouti and Eritrea; Sudan and South Sudan has to be demarcated as per the international law and with the involvement of stakeholders. Members have to establish joint terrorist combat forces in order to defend their territory from infiltrated by terrorists.

In addition, administrative and travelling procedures might hamper free movement of people. In order to address, undue administrative procedures in the border or air ports, member states have to develop protocol of free movement of people. The protocol will not only facilitate free movement of people rather it will empower people the right to establish business and residency. Strict border migration procedures have to be abolished since these procedures are discouraging movement of people. Check points have to be limited and IGAD has to speed up the implementation of one stop border strategy that will save time for travellers, tourists and traders.

In September 2016, Kenya and Somalia were set for free visa agreement. Kenya's bold step despite the security problem of Somalia should be an example for other member states. Border officials have to give up labelling the identity of a person without credible evidence. A person should not be labelled as a "terrorist" or a "member of rebel groups" since it belongs to a certain ethnic group.

Human development is one of the pillars of any regional integration agenda. In the IGAD region, human trafficking, among other things, is recognised as one of the challenges of human development. People migrate in search of better economic opportunities but since they cannot migrate legally, they will be victims of traffickers. IGAD has to adopt measures that will punish smugglers, which in some cases involves government officials (Horwood, 2015). There must be a regional anti-human trafficking unit that will oversee the movement of people from one border to the other. Member states have to commit to the implementation of the Khartoum Process that aims to block human trafficking of migrants from the Horn of Africa to Europe. This Khartoum Process or agreement came into effect as of November 2014 between Italy, France, Germany, UK, Malta, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Since the border management is poor, member states have to support this effort to improve the management capacity. This could be done by rendering frequent trainings to border officials.

In addition, the border wars between member states have to be resolved to make the movement of people, goods and capital a reality.

In addition to promoting free movement of people, IGAD has to facilitate interaction of people of the region. IGAD should not only focus on inter-government relations rather it should also pay attention to people-to-people interaction. IGAD has to acknowledge the existence of diversified people, culture, and language speakers in the region. Integration is all about changing the lives of ordinary citizens through promoting socio-economic interaction among them.

IGAD has to formalise interaction of people in the region. It should facilitate loans to small business entities and issue travel documents and other means of trade promotions to the informal traders. Member states have to pass resolutions whose aims are to formalise the activities of these traders. Indeed, harmonisation of border policies is the first step that could facilitate people-to-people interaction. IGAD should also strengthen the IGAD Business Forum (IBF) that will facilitate the interaction of the region's business community.

5.2.5. Lack of political will and commitment

Regional integration requires political will in the first place. Member states have to implement decisions that are taken at annual summits. Incorporation of regional legislation into domestic legal systems also requires political will. Members have to smoothen their relationship in order to get closer and deliberate a common regional discourse. In addition, member states have to avoid mistrust, resentments among each other in order to make the region united and competitive in the global market.

In order for the integration process to move forward, member states have to genuinely believe in it and its progress. They have to acknowledge that integration is a tedious but achievable process. The establishment of IGAD as a regional organisation is not enough for the achievement of regionalisation.

Rather, member states should address political will and commitment of IGAD, providing it with broad and clear responsibilities and mandates.

Membership of IGAD should also be associated with political will. IGAD members belong to more than one REC. They have to limit their membership into one. In doing so, they will confirm their loyalty and commitment towards IGAD. Dual membership has a tendency of dividing the potential, time, and energy of member states. In order to avoid dual accountability, member states have to be faithful to the integration process of IGAD. In addition, dual membership results in overlapping of programs. Thus, member states have to avoid and be committed to the programs of IGAD only.

5.2.6. Lack of peace and security

IGAD is troubled with various forms of conflicts. In order for the regional integration to become effective, member states have to address armed conflicts. Lack of peace and security contributes to the slower integration process. Member states have to continue their effort of attaining peace and security in Somalia and South Sudan. However, since IGAD has capacity challenges, it should involve the international community, donor countries, and international organisations such as the AU, the UN in its peace keeping efforts.

In order to deal with border conflicts, member states have to solve their differences in a peaceful fashion. There must be some dialogue among insurgent groups to attain nationwide peace. IGAD's role in curbing conflict between countries and factions is facilitated by the IGAD Mediation Supporting Unit

(IMSU). However, IMSU is struggling with capacity building and resources. Member states should therefore strive by all means to render financial support. In addition, the political will of member states is vital to make IMSU effective and to abide by its resolutions.

IGAD has to continue with its inclusiveness in its mediation process. Member states have to consult with the elders and community leaders and women to settle problematic areas of the region. Regional integration is not just harmonisation of policies among member states rather it should also involve the recognition of social, cultural and psychological makeup of traditional societies as they are also part of the region.

The involvement of women is so vital since in some pastoralist communities the role of women is not only taking care of children and cooking food. As it was alluded to earlier, women are carrying machine guns to protect themselves from any patriarchal attack and their community. It will, therefore, be important to include them in the peacemaking process and in the ultimate decision. According to Dawit (2016), women of Somalia play a key role in the administration of family and community affairs among Somali nomadic peoples. It is therefore essential to make them part of the decision making process.

The role of civic societies to support any mediation, conflict resolution and peace building process is significant. IGAD has to support the flourishing of civic societies in the region. The IGAD Desk of civic societies should serve as an umbrella of the region's civic societies. IGAD's engagement with the media is quite limited. This is due to the different policies promoted by member states towards the media.

IGAD should engage with the media on a constant basis. When the news of IGAD are echoed, the people will know the stage of its integration agenda and advice accordingly. The Information Resource and Communication Centre of IGAD is responsible for liaising with the media. However, it is faced with financial and human resource challenges. Thus, IGAD should work to make the Centre more effective and a pro-journalist organ.

Radicalisation is a problem but it cannot be addressed by harassing peaceful Somalis that travel across the border seeking greener pastures. Immigration officers should respect the human rights of every traveller; they should stop labelling innocent individuals as terrorists. IGAD has to launch the Centre for Countering Extremism and its narratives, as well as messages and the ideology that is full of hate.

IGAD countries have to focus on the causes and solutions of terrorism in the region. According to Atin and William (2007), the roots of terrorism are more an economic factor. The poor that are deprived of economic opportunities will tend to engage in the occupation of terrorism. Recruiters are choosing refugee camps and shantytowns to have potential terrorists and prospective suicide bombers.

The US president Barack Obama once said *“we know where terrorists thrive. In weak states that cannot control their borders or territory or that do not meet the basic needs of their people. the extremists encourage the exploitation of these hopeless places on their hate-filled websites.”* (President Barack Obama speech at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2007)

Investing in social capital and socio-economic development could be a mechanism of drying the roots of terrorism. Poverty reduction programmes, safety nets and empowerment of the poor would discard the tactics of recruiters. IGAD countries have to agree on a common definition of terrorism. Harmonisation of terrorism laws, immigration and border control legislations is the first step to fight against terrorism that aggravates the impoverishment of the region.

The governments of Somalia and Kenya have to do a lot of work in stifling extremist tendencies since these are the two countries that produce radical Moslem ideals. In addition, member states have to give aid to civic societies that are engaging in humanitarian activities in the Horn of Africa.

5.2. Conclusion

This chapter sought to give recommendations regarding mechanisms through which the IGAD regional integration programs could be achieved and how these could contribute towards the socio-economic growth of IGAD member states. Some suggestions as to how IGAD could go about strengthening its foothold in the Horn of Africa for the sake of economic development of the region have also been advanced.

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