

**CHALLENGES FACING MASVINGO LOCAL COUNCIL IN IMPLEMENTING THE
URBAN COUNCILS ACT [CHAPTER 29:15] OF 1996 WITH REGARD TO SERVICE
DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE**

by

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
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DECLARATION

I, OSCAH MAHOSO, hereby declare that this Mini-Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Public Management at the University of Venda is original and has not been submitted for any degree at this or any other university. I further declare that I am the owner of the copyright thereof and all used materials contained therein have been fully acknowledged.


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DEDICATION

I dedicate this Mini-Dissertation to my parents, my mother, Mrs. H. Mahoso and my late father Mr. F. Mahoso.

[Chapter 23:13] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe. The participants of the study were Masvingo Local Municipality public officials. The study was conducted at Masvingo Local Municipality offices. The study is premised on the notion that local government in Zimbabwe confronts varied challenges which inhibit their ability to provide quality services effectively and efficiently. This is as witnessed by the deteriorating of standard and quality of service being provided. One obstacle prevalent is the absence of an effective legislative framework for local government.

The study is going to use a mixed methodology whereby both qualitative and quantitative research methods will be used. The researcher is going to use both methods because quantitative method will give in-depth information about the phenomenon under study while qualitative provides understanding of the phenomenon under study. The research will use a non-probability sampling and its subtype purposive sampling method. Two instruments of data collection namely questionnaire and interview will be used to gather the data from the respondents. The data collected by the questionnaire will be analyzed using the SPSS while data collected using the interview will be analyzed thematically.

The responses of the respondents revealed that Masvingo local council is not legally protected by the Urban Council's Act. The study further revealed that the council does not have the autonomy to make its own by-laws independently. Additionally, the majority of the respondents also revealed that the local authority does not have fiscal generating power. Moreover, about two-thirds of the respondents indicated that urban council's workers or public officials are not elected by the electorate. The participants also revealed that most of the Masvingo urban council workers are not skilled enough to be able to deliver the basic services to the people. The study also pointed out that Masvingo local municipality does not have enough funds to run its activities. The majority of the elected councillors in urban councils are not skilled enough to provide relevant services to the people. Nearly three-quarters of the participants indicated that most residents or rate payers do not pay in time leaving the local authority with no revenue.

ABSTRACT

The study focused on the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe. The participants of the study were Masvingo Local Municipality public officials. The study was conducted at Masvingo Local Municipality offices. The study is premised on the notion that local government in Zimbabwe confronts varied challenges which inhibit their ability to provide quality services effectively and efficiently. This is as witnessed by the deteriorating of standard and quality of service being provided. One obstacle prevalent is the absence of an effective legislative framework for local government.

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The majority of the respondents revealed that Masvingo local council is not legally protected by the Urban Council's Act. The study further revealed that the council does not have the autonomy to make its own by-laws independently. Additionally, the majority of the respondents also revealed that the local authority does not have fiscal generating power. Moreover, about two-thirds of the respondents indicated that urban council's workers or public officials are not elected by the electorate. The participants also revealed that most of the Masvingo urban council workers are not skilled enough to be able to deliver the basic services to the people. The study also pointed out that Masvingo local municipality does not have enough funds to run its activities. The majority of the elected councilors in urban councils are not skilled enough to provide relevant services to the people. Nearly three-quarters of the participants indicated that most residents or rate payers do not pay in time leaving the local authority with no revenue.

The recommendations of the study are:

Appointment of public officials must be done based on merit rather than any other criteria such as political affiliation. In addition, some sections of the Urban Council Act must be repealed in order to curb abuse of power and mismanagement of public services by the public officials. Masvingo local municipality should be allowed to charge for the services and rates within their areas of jurisdiction in line with the guidelines provided by the central government. Budget consultation must be made mandatory and elected personnel should account for previous revenues as basis for justifying financial obligation on citizens.

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- LA: Local Authority
- LGEB: Local Government Board
- LSCF: Large Scale Commercial Farms
- MDC: Movement for Democratic Change
- MLGRUD: Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
- UC: Urban Council
- UCA: Urban Councils Act
- UCAZ: Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe
- UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
- UNESCAP: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
- VDCO: Village Development Committees
- WDCO: Ward Development Committees
- WB: World Bank
- ZANU PF: Zimbabwe African National Union
- ZLGA: Zimbabwe Local Government Association
- ZENWA: Zimbabwe National Water Authority

ABBREVIATIONS

ACF:	African Commercial Farmlands
APA:	African Purchase Areas
BSAC:	British South Africa Company
DPLG:	Department of Provincial and Local Government
GoZ:	Government of Zimbabwe
LA:	Local Authority
LGB:	Local Government Board
LSCF:	Large Scale Commercial Farms
MDC:	Movement for Democratic Change
MLGRUD:	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
UC:	Urban Council
UCA:	Urban Councils Act
UCAZ:	Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP:	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
VIDCO:	Village Development Committees
WADCO:	Ward Development Committees
WB:	World Bank
ZANU PF:	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZILGA:	Zimbabwe Local Government Association
ZINWA:	Zimbabwe National Water Authority

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Local spheres of government endeavor to deliver goods and services to their citizens in an efficient, economic and effective manner as they are considered the closest one to the people (Mosha, 1996:10). Mosha (1996:10) contends that Urban Councils are local government authorities that have been used in the administration of towns and cities in Zimbabwe. Further, Mosha (1996:10) states that there are 31 urban councils that are categorised as local boards, town councils, municipal councils and city councils. These urban councils are administered by one piece of legislation, the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 21:15] of 1996. The Act provides for the powers and functions of urban councils. This Act provides for the setting up of Urban Councils and management of Council areas for example urban settlements. The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) is responsible for supervising the implementation of the legislation. They are an arm of Central Government and are accountable to both government and the people they serve. They are made up of elected officials such as the mayor and several councilors who hold administrative posts. In Zimbabwe, their period of tenure is limited to every five years, after which they have to seek for re-election (Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996).

This is an empirical study which investigates the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe. The chapter will outline the background of the study, statement of the problem, aim of the study, specific objectives of the study, critical research questions, significance of the study, hypotheses of the study, location of the study, limitations of the study, definition of operational terms, brief literature review, research design and methodology, ethical considerations and organisation of the study.

1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Local government consists of decentralized local units, within a democratic system designed to provide local services to the people. Local government units are subordinate members of the central government vested with prescribed, controlled government power to control and regulate defined local areas (Fox and Meyer, 1995:12). In urban areas local government plays an important role in providing services (Bhuiyan, 2010:8). Services delivery is the provision of services to the people in order to enhance their well-being and socio-economic development. Services that are provided by local government institutions include refuse and sewage disposal, water supply, primary health and education. Effective services delivery can be achieved when service provision responds to effective demand and all residents have access to services provided. Efficient service quality delivery and management ensures that the level and mix of services provided match the effective demand of all consumers (Dellinger, 1993:15).

Local governments confront varied challenges which inhibit their ability to provide services effectively and efficiently. In Zimbabwe access to and the quality of urban services in most cities and towns has been deteriorating, constraining productivity and the government's efforts to improve people's living conditions. This has been exacerbated by the challenges presented by the implementation of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996. One obstacle is uncertainty about the legal framework under which local government operates, in particular the status, powers and functions of local government in the state. The absence of an effective and certain legislative framework for local government is indeed an obstacle to service delivery.

Typical problems with the legislative framework include centralized bureaucratic or political control over local government by higher levels of government, limited revenue raising powers, and a lack of clarity on the responsibilities of local government. Local government in Zimbabwe is no exception to these challenges facing local government across the world. This research study therefore, intends to investigate the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe. Thus, the argument being advanced by this study is that service delivery by UCs has been undermined by the uncertainty regarding the legal powers of the Urban Councils Act to protect and guarantee the powers of the UCs.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Urban Councils Act Section 198 (1) empowers urban councils to provide mandatory and permissive services. Mandatory services in this instance refer to those considered a must for any urban local authority. Examples of mandatory services are road construction and maintenance, water reticulation, environmental management, primary health care, building regulation and enforcement of the protection of the land use. Permissive functions are those services over which they have discretion in providing. Examples of permissive functions include fire protection, parks, recreation, cultural facilities, libraries and provision of cemeteries irrespective of size, geographical location or capacity. They also complement central government in the delivery of essential services such as road construction and primary health care. However, Masvingo urban council in its pursuit to deliver the mentioned services it faces a number of challenges that inhibits the council to exercise its roles. This comes as a result of the unfettered powers of the minister of Local Government as stipulated by some sections of the Urban Councils Act.

Section 4A of the UC Act gives the Minister of Local Government power to appoint special interest councilors. This puts in place special interest councilors who hold office at the pleasure of the minister. The Section also allows the minister to fix the number of interest councilors. Section 91 (1)-(2) of the UC Act renders unrestricted access to all councils records, minutes and documentation under the care of a council relating to council meetings, resolutions and affairs. In addition to that Section 114 (1)-(3) of the UC Act grants the minister powers to suspend councilors or revoke suspension. Of particular importance, the uncontrolled powers of the Minister of Local Government, lack of legal certainty on powers and functions of UCs, limited revenue generating powers and lack of autonomy in recruiting senior council administration. Local government's dependence on central government, as enshrined in the law, is indeed weakening local governance. For instance, De Valk and Wekwete (1990:96) noted that local government conditions were such that central government had a lot of powers. It is worth to note that the conditions presented by the UC Act open possibility for Masvingo City Council to be used by central government institutions for the purpose of implementing their own personal and partisanship priorities at the expense of public participation, thereby hampering the process of service delivery. There are serious problems with the delivery of basic services in urban councils in Zimbabwe. These include frequent interruptions in water supply, persistent power cuts,

uncollected refuse, poor health services and dilapidated infrastructure. This is as a result of the fact that UCs in Zimbabwe are forced to exercise delegated powers from central government hence reducing their autonomy and authority to act independently.

Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe. In addition lack of constitutional protection of the urban councils has the potential to inhibit the ability of the UCs to function effectively in the provision of services.

1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY

The main aim of the study is to investigate the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe

1.5 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To discuss the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act.
- To investigate the causes of poor service delivery at Masvingo local council.
- To determine the strategies that can be used to prevent the occurrence of the challenges.

1.6 CRITICAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following are the research questions of the study:

- What are the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act?
- What are the causes of poor service delivery Masvingo local council?
- What are the strategies that can be used to prevent the current challenges?

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The findings of the study will improve the understanding that policy makers in Zimbabwe have on the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act. The study is also going to add knowledge on ways and means to improve service delivery in urban councils. Thus, the study findings will reveal the weaknesses the Urban Councils Act has on service delivery to the people. The study may also assist central and urban local governments in Zimbabwe in identifying contentious issues around the application of the Urban Councils Act. The clarification of issues of the functions and roles of the Urban Councils Act will contribute towards addressing the reasons that have led to the deterioration of service delivery in urban towns and cities in Zimbabwe.

1.8 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The study focuses on the investigation of the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe. The study is focused on Masvingo local Council as the case study. Masvingo is the fourth largest city in Zimbabwe located within Masvingo Province. It is about 200 km away from Harare the capital city.

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The limitations are the challenges that can hinder the researcher to complete the study in time. There is need for funding in order to complete the study in record time. Thus, in order for the researcher to complete the research in time there is need for funding to pay for transport, editing, typing, stationary, printing and making copies. In addition, the study is limited in that it is confined itself to Masvingo local Municipality and does not investigate the challenges faced by other municipalities in Zimbabwe.

1.10 DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

This section will present the definition of operational terms of the study. Punch (2005:53) asserts that the definition of operational concepts of research studies addresses the researchers understanding of the topic explicitly. Thus, the definition of operational terms for this particular study is done in order to clarify the concepts provided.

- **Decentralisation**

Decentralisation is the handing over, by central government of some amount of authority or responsibility to lower levels such as the provincial and district levels within the same ministries or agencies of government (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema, 1983). According to Government of Zimbabwe (2002:2), decentralization promote democracy (public participation and civic responsibility), to increase efficiency and effective service delivery. It is meant to reduce the role of central government interference on local services provision and management.

- **Devolution**

Devolution is the transfer of legally defined elements of political power to local government units (LGUs) or to specified or functional authorities (Crook and Manor, 1991:7). The bodies to which such political power is transferred thus have the responsibility to carry out specified or residual functions in their areas of jurisdiction or pertaining to the provision of goods and services of their specialization. Devolved local units are normally autonomous and distinct from central government. Thus devolution refers to an inter-organisational transfer of power from the centre to units outside the normal command structure of central government (Hyden, 1983:3).

- **Effectiveness**

Effectiveness refers to the achievement of the predetermined objectives (Hanekom et al 1986: 211). It also refers to responsiveness to the real needs and justified expectations of the people to the extent it is expected to be. Effectiveness is the degree to which the outcomes achieve the goals set for the activity- for example, the percentage of roads maintained in good condition relative to policy goals (Andrews and Shah, 2005:197).

- **Efficiency**

Efficiency is understood as the use of material, labour and other resources to the best advantage of the public and without shortage (Mafunisa, 2010:6). In other words efficiency is defined as the amount of output per unit of an input used in the process- for example, the number of road repairs per employee-days involved in the task (Andrews and Shah, 2005:197).

- **Local government**

Local government is a decentralized representative institution with specific powers delegated by the central government to exercise a certain degree of autonomy over a restricted geographical area (Vosloo, Kotze and Jeppe, 1974:23). Local government in other words is lower sphere of governance for the execution of functions that the central government is too far to carry out effectively (Government of Zimbabwe, 2004:5).

- **Municipality**

Municipality is a local entity created as a result of decentralization tasked by central government to provide services to the people (Kamete, 2006:34).

- **Productivity**

Productivity is a measure of the output of goods and services relative to the input of the labour, capital material and equipments (Cascio, 1991:110). Roux, Brynard, Botes and Fourie (1997:208) define productivity as the best way of utilizing resources such as public funds and human resources that produces the greatest expected outcome.

- **Service delivery**

Service delivery is when an organisation or institution involved in provision services is responsible for the quality and quantity of the services and ensures that it is financed and executed (Harpham and Boateng, 1997:66). Service delivery also refers to the municipality's activities to meet the basic requirements of its people. These include provision of service such as water supply, electricity and sanitation (Department of Provincial and Local Government, (DPLG, 2001:6)).

- **Urban Councils Act:**

Urban Councils Act is an act of parliament enacted through amendments that confers discretionary powers on UCs to provide basic services such as water, sanitation, health, education, effluent and refuse removal within their areas of jurisdiction (Urban Councils Act, 1996 [Chapter 29]).

1.11 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

This study is expected to be made up of five chapters, each with a specific theme.

Chapter 1 - Introduction and background of the study: This chapter presents the introduction and background of study. This chapter comprises of the introduction and background, statement of the problem, aim and objectives of the study, significance of the study, delimitation of the study, limitations of the study, definition of major concepts, brief literature review and organization of the study.

Chapter 2 - Literature review: This chapter presents literature related to the challenges facing urban councils in Zimbabwe in implementing the urban councils act. The chapter shall comprise of the literature related to the objectives of the study, namely, challenges facing urban councils in the implementation of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15), the causes of poor service delivery in Zimbabwe urban councils and the strategies that can be used to prevent the challenges from occurring.

Chapter 3 - Research Methodology: Chapter three focused on the general picture of how the study is going to be carried out. This involves the discussions on the research design, research methodologies, study area, study population, sampling technique, sample size, data collection methods, data analysis and ethical considerations. In other words the chapter presented the stages through which the data collection exercise was carried out.

Chapter 4 - Presentation of data, interpretation and Analysis: This chapter focused on the presentation, interpretation and analysis of data or facts obtained from the respondents. The presentation of data was done on tables. Interpretation involved the researcher describing the

results as presented by the tables. The analysis was done through stating the results with the highest percentages on the tables.

Chapter 5 - Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations: Chapter five of the study concentrated on the discussion of the major findings of the study. This was done through presenting the findings as they were obtained in the previous chapter. The findings are presented following the objectives of the study, namely challenges facing Masvingo local council in the implementation of the Urban Councils Act, the causes of poor service delivery at Masvingo local council and the strategies that can be used to prevent the occurrence of the challenges. Furthermore, the researcher also presented the proposed recommendations for further research and the conclusion based on the results found.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Taking Masvingo local municipality as the case study, the study seeks to investigate the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe. The chapter seeks to provide a detailed exposition of the legislations that controls the urban councils in Zimbabwe. Subsequently, the chapter commences the discussion by explaining the legal framework within which urban councils in Zimbabwe are bound. Urban local government plays a paramount role in providing services to the citizens in order to enhance their livelihood. This brings into play a concept commonly used in local government known as service delivery. Local authorities are responsible for the provision of basic services. In this case basic services are prerequisite and essential services vital for human existence. These include inter alia shelter, water supply, primary and secondary sewage disposal and education. The study focuses on urban local government regarded as lower level units whose geographical demarcations encompass urban areas. In Zimbabwe urban local government consists of cities, and towns. The primary purpose of urban local government is the delivery of a wide range of services as mentioned previously.

Service delivery is one of the major roles of the Zimbabwean government. This is enshrined in the new Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, of 2013 which states that, every citizen is entitled to better service delivery. The new constitution of Zimbabwe is regarded as the supreme law of the land and any law, practice, custom or conduct inconsistent with it is regarded as invalid to the extent of the inconsistency (The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Section 2(1)). The obligations imposed by the constitution thereof are binding on every person, juristic, including the state and all executive, legislative and judicial institutions and agencies of government at every level, and must be fulfilled by them. The constitution states that municipalities have the responsibility to make sure that all citizens are provided with services to satisfy their basic needs. The preamble of Chapter 14 of the Constitution on Provincial and Local government states that there must be devolution of power and responsibilities to lower tiers of

government in order to ensure that resources reach to the lower levels of society through devolution of government powers (The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Chapter 14). This is done to promote the democratic participation of all citizens regardless of race, colour or tribe in the affairs that concerns their welfare and to ensure that there is even distribution and allocation of natural resources for the betterment of all community members.

2.2 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ZIMBABWE

This section presents the legislative framework under which the Masvingo local council operates under. The section shall dwell on the following, namely, the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and the UC Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1996.

2.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe

Although the previous Constitution of Zimbabwe amended in 1995 is quiet on the establishment of local government, however, the new draft constitution signed by the President on the 22nd of May 2013 recognizes the existence of lower tiers of government. In Section 5, the Constitution identifies the four tiers of government namely, the national government, the provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. The implementation of the new constitution since its signing by the President remains questionable. This has been stated by the Civil Society Organization and the Opposition parties in Zimbabwe just before the harmonized election of 31st July 2013. Nevertheless, the constitution identifies these lower tiers of government as the most functional entities to ensure the democratic participation in government of all citizens and responsible for the equitable allocation of national resources and the participation of local communities in the determination of development priorities within their areas (Republic of Zimbabwe Constitution Chapter 14, Section 264). The objectives of the devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities are among others:

- To give powers of local governance to the people and enhance their participation in the exercise of the powers of the state and in making decisions that affect them;
- To promote democratic, effective, transparency, accountable and coherent government in Zimbabwe as a whole;

- To preserve and foster the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe;
- To recognize the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development
- To ensure the equitable sharing of local and national resources; and to transfer responsibilities and resources from the national government in order to establish a sound financial base for each provincial and metropolitan council and local authority.

The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 1996, Chapter 14, Section 265 (1) also outlines the principles of provincial and local government. The Constitution states that provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities must, within their sphere of governance:

- 1 (a) Ensure good governance by being effective, transparent, accountable and institutionally coherent;
 - (b) Assume only those functions conferred on them by this constitution on an act of parliament;
 - (c) Exercise their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of another tier of government;
 - (d) Co-operate with one another, in particular by informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matter of interest; and harmonizing and co-ordinating their activities;
 - (e) Preserve the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe;
 - (f) Secure the public welfare; and
 - (g) Ensure the fair and equitable representation of people within their areas of jurisdiction.
- (2) All members of local authorities must be elected by registered voters within the areas for which the local authorities are established.
 - (3) An act of parliament must provide appropriate mechanism and procedures to facilitate coordination between the central government, provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.

The above outlined principles were put in place in order to ensure that local councils act according to requirements and the demands of the new constitution. Unlike the previous constitution that was centered more on centralization than decentralization the present constitution preaches the spirit of accountability, integrity, fairness and equitability.

The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013, Chapter 14, Section 274 states that there are a number of urban local authorities established with a mandate to represent and manage the affairs of people in urban areas throughout Zimbabwe. The urban local authorities are managed by councils composed of councilors elected by registered voters in the urban areas concerned and presided over by elected mayors or chairperson. Thus, the constitution confers powers to the urban local authorities to govern, in their own initiative, the local affairs of the people within the area of establishment or jurisdiction. The urban authorities subsequently have the powers to make by laws, regulations or rules for the effective administration of the areas for which they have been established and the powers to levy rates and taxes and generally to raise sufficient revenue for them to carry out their objects and responsibilities.

2.2.2 Urban Councils Act Chapter (29:15) of 1996

The Urban Councils Act of 1996 sets the framework upon which UCs act including matters such as the service provision (Section 198 (1) of the 1996 Urban Council's Act). This piece of legislation determines the powers, functions and locus of local authorities. It shapes urban local governance and constitutes the tools available to the Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development (MLGRUD) to supervise, monitor, direct and control local authorities. In Zimbabwe urban governance is the immediate responsibility of UCs in co-governance with the (MLGURD), which has an overall supervisory role. Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1995, revised in revised in 1996, provides for the establishment of municipalities and towns and the administration of local boards, municipal and town councils.

The legislation provides for the supervisory and monitoring roles of national government in the running of local authorities. Zimbabwe has a heavy handed legal framework which accords unlimited power, authority and discretion to the Ministry and leaves councils at the mercy of the minister who can easily manipulate, politicize and jettison and still remain intra wires. Zimbabwe's current system of local government was effectively put in place in 1993 when the first local assembly elections were held (Schou, 2000:125). This act provides for the administration of the country's towns and cities. Urban Councils are ranked, according to their size and levels of development in to cities, municipalities, towns and local boards. Cities and municipalities are managed by an elected, fulltime executive mayor, whilst towns and local boards chose a chairman from among themselves to preside over council affairs. The Urban

Councils Act governs a number of hierarchical local government entities ranging from cities and municipalities to towns and newly emerging urban areas or local boards. Local government units in all their form and sizes are referred to as local authorities.

The act confers functions and powers that impose duties upon municipal and town councils. Zimbabwe is divided into 10 provinces 60 rural district councils and 31 urban councils. Local government elections are held after every five years and each councilor represents a ward. The Minister of Local Government (MLG) also appoints special interest councilors. The national government in Zimbabwe supports local government, Rural and urban development. A ministerial Committee on Decentralization was also put in place to support local government. The Zimbabwe Local Government Association (ZILGA) which was formed after the merger of the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ) and Association of Rural District Councils (ARDC) is the representative body for local governance in Zimbabwe. The administration of local government affairs is carried out by councilors who are elected by citizens to represent them and are responsible for ensuring that services are delivered to the community (The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Section 274 (2)). The urban local authorities are managed by councils composed of councilors elected by registered voters in the urban areas concerned and presided over by elected mayors. There are thirty one urban local authorities in Zimbabwe, the largest being Harare City Council and the smallest being Chirundu Local Board (Mushamba, 2010:3).

As stated in the constitution municipalities have the responsibility to make sure that all citizens are provided with services to satisfy their basic needs. Municipalities provide the service themselves through the use of their own resources collected through lucrative taxes assigned by central government. Zimbabwe is a unitary state with the most lucrative fiscal sources of revenue assigned to central government. Examples of lucrative taxes accorded to national government include customs duty, excise duty, sales tax, company tax and income tax (S 101 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe of 1995). The functions assigned to urban councils can be divided into mandatory and permissive functions with the mandatory functions being those services considered a must for any urban local authority to provide. Examples of mandatory functions include road construction and maintenance, water reticulation, environmental management, primary health care, building regulation and enforcement of the protection of the land-use.

Mushamba (2010:7) states that there is an inappropriate balance of power between oversight and local discretion that result in undue interference of central government in the affairs of local authorities. As a result the Urban Councils Act has been criticised for giving the Minister unlimited powers over local authorities.

Section VIII of the Urban Councils Act provides for the establishment of urban local authorities as well as Government Board, composition and functions. Section I23 of the Act outlines the functions of the Board which among others entails provision of guidance and control to the functioning of council employees, conducting enquiries into council affairs and procedure and approval of the appointment and dismissal of senior council staff. The role played by the board is highly significant but what is of concern however is the fact that members of the board are appointed by the Minister further reinforcing and entrenching central government interference in council affairs.

2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN ZIMBABWE

The following section presents the evolution of local government system in Zimbabwe. This starts by presenting the state of affairs during the colonial era, in the post-independence period and the present local government state of affairs.

2.3.1 During Colonial era

The evolution of Zimbabwe local government system can be traced back to the colonial era when the British South Africa Company on arrival in Rhodesia established the Salisbury Sanitary Board in 1891 (Wekwete, 1988:11). Colonisation brought with it a new socio-political and economic dispensation. The mission of the settler community was to take possession of the land and exploiting all the available resources to best advantage. In trying to achieve this they created an administration system that was foreign to the indigenous people (Zinyama et al. 1993:24). This was through the divide and rule principle that kept the once united African ethnic minorities enemies to each other. They set up administrative structures and centres and developed supportive infrastructure such as urban centres, and communication linkages in the form of railway lines, roads and telegram lines (Wekwete, 1992:16).

Before colonisation the predominant nature of local government was characterized by scattered human settlements and sparsely populated rural settlements with no cities and towns except the long disserted pre-colonial city states of Great Zimbabwe, Khami and Dhlodhlo (Munzwa and Jonga, 2010:1). This is explained basically due to the existence of meager population and economic activities that were mainly based on primary mode of production, namely, farming, very small-mining, limited trade (Munzwa and Jonga, 2010:2).

During this point in time traditional leadership was the basis of local government in most of Africa throughout history (Rugege, 2009:2). In pre-colonial Africa, African societies were ruled by kings supported by a hierarchy of chiefs and councilors or advisors, who were either their close relatives or selected from their communities (Rugege, 2009:2). These traditional leaders served as political, military, spiritual and cultural leaders and were regarded as custodians of the values of society. They looked after the welfare of their people by providing them with land for their subsistence needs through agriculture and for grazing (Schapera 1955:68). They also provided for the very poor and orphans. Traditional leaders were responsible for the defense of their people against external aggression and for keeping order in their communities (Ashton, 1967: 213).

In addition, to the above functions they also resolved disputes with the emphasis on reconciliation, and thus ensured harmony among neighbours (Schapera 1955:69). They inspired unity in their people. Pre-colonial African societies are reputed to have had a kind of participatory democracy. Through general assemblies of all adult men the community participated in decision-making on important matters affecting the community (Ashton, 1967: 216). It is important to note that even in pre-colonial times not all traditional leaders were benevolent, generous and caring towards their people. Some were autocratic and oppressive. However, if people were dissatisfied with their leader they could desert him for another, arrange for his death or overthrow him through civil war (Schapera 1955:85). On the whole, though, it can be said that in much of pre-colonial Africa traditional leaders ruled largely with the consent of their people.

2.3.2 Decentralization in the post-independence period

Local authorities in Zimbabwe have a considerable degree of political, administrative and financial authority but however restricted by the law and the central government action (Schou 2000, 126; 137). Even though local councils are popularly elected, it is more accurate to view local authorities as the extension of the Ministry of Local Government instead of standing as independent, autonomous entities (Conyers, 2003:116). In the 1980s and 1990 efforts towards the implementation of decentralisation became a major anecdote. The efforts during the 1980s was coordinating the agencies involved in local planning and development through establishment of intergovernmental hierarchy of provincial, district and local development committees. A people oriented bottom-up approach was devised for planning to begin at the village level and work its way up through the wards, districts, provinces and regions until it reaches the National Planning Commission.

However, although the representation included local elected official it was biased toward the central ministry and the planning process was dominated by technical staff in central government (Schou, 2000: 126). Resultantly, the process proved to be a white elephant as there was lack of organisational commitment, central government intervention in local decision making and weak finances (Schou, 2000: 137). The evidence of the failure of the process of decentralisation was witnessed by the 2000s as the polarisation between the MDC led local authorities and the central government emerged and intensified. The long tradition of central government intervention and involvement of the ZANU PF led government in local decision making help produce a debilitating situation that not only killed the spirit of local governance at local level but also led to the death of the effective local governance nationally.

The new administration also re-organised spatial land use by expropriating prime land from the indigenous people and forcibly moving them in to marginal areas, where the soils were not only sandy and very poor, but also received very low and unreliable rainfall. The same system of land expropriation was used for all urban and mining centers. This spatial reorganization was enabled by a number of statutes, such as the land apportionment act of 1930, the land husbandry act of 1950 and the land tenure act of 1969. The colonial regime used a system that was based on a separatist principle of development in which the black population was regarded as a mass of labour ready to be exploited by the white settlers.

The local government was based on the racial division of land which, through a number of pieces of legislation, created urban areas, which were the preserve of whites, Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCFs), which were only settled by whites and Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), which were settled by blacks and African Purchase Areas (APAs) which were considered African Commercial Farmlands (Patel, 1988). during colonial era there emerged three types of local authorities, namely, the Urban Councils (UCs), Rural Councils (RCs) in Large Scale Commercial Farms and African Councils (ACs) catering for blacks in the TTLs and APAs. The colonial system resulted in great disparities between the areas of the white population and the black population. Consequently, these disparities led to the proliferation of well-developed urban centres and LSCFs and grossly underdeveloped TTLs and APA (Makumbe, 1998:7). The African areas, known at that time as Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas were denied the supply of services. Thus, the areas were without basic infrastructure such as good roads, schools, clinics, electricity and reticulated water facilities. However, the situation was different in urban areas and large scale commercial farms where the services were readily available.

At independence the new government battled with the need to level the prevailing imbalances between the white settler populations and the Africans. This was done through introducing a wide-range of reforms aimed at removing some of the racial considerations of the colonial regime from the local government. Among them, the new government passed pieces of legislation or the colonial laws were either amended or repealed. The amendment of the District Councils Act (Chapter 231) resulted, inter alia, in the creation of larger but fewer District councils which were presumed to be more viable in terms of their capability to marshal local resources (Makumbe, 1996:12).

However, there was little change to the nature and functions of Rural Councils and there continued to be serious disparities in the level of development between the RCs and DCs. The most significant change of the post-independence local government system in Zimbabwe's communal areas come about as a result of the 1984 and 1985 Prime Minister's Directive on decentralization and development. These directives and several pieces of legislation resulted in the creation of grassroots structures, the Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and the Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) (Makumbe, 1998:12). The VIDCOs and WADCOs

were intended to provide the grassroots level in rural areas with an opportunity to participate in the decision making process for development planning and implementation for their areas.

However, the WADCOs and VIDCOs were ineffective as they did not have corporate and statutory status. As a further way of removing the racial factor from the local government system after independence, the Zimbabwean government, in 1988 promulgated the Rural District Councils (RDC) Act which amalgamated DCs and RCs to form Rural District Councils (Makumbe, 1998:13). Thus, RDCs were established to promote rural development through the provision of infrastructure and social services in their areas of jurisdiction. However, RDCs are failing to deliver these services. Governments all over the world endeavor to deliver goods and services to their citizens in an efficient, economic and effective manner. This is particularly important at the local sphere of government as it is the closest one to the people. The effective delivery and management of infrastructure services is a prerequisite for productive investment and economic growth in urban areas (World Bank, 2000:14). Effective services delivery can be achieved when service provision responds to effective demand and all residents have access to services provided. Efficient service quality delivery and management ensures that the level and mix of services provided match the effective demand of all consumers (Dellinger, 1993:5).

Access to and the quality of urban services in most cities and towns in Zimbabwe has been deteriorating, constraining productivity and the government's efforts to improve living conditions. This has been exacerbated by the poor management of municipal services and the structure of central local fiscal relations which affects the adequacy of resources or incentives for improving infrastructure and services (World Bank, 2000:5).

The major findings were that the quality of service delivery was generally poor (Sachikonye, 2007:8). This was mainly attributed to inadequate and disintegrated service delivery and management strategies. In addition human resource issues, poor governance structures and political interferences were causes of concern.

From the year 2000 to around 2008 Masvingo Municipality, like all other urban councils, suffered from a setback of the hostile economic environment that prevailed in the country. During this period the country experienced social, economic and political crises. For example, the unemployment rate was in excess of 80 percent while hyperinflation reached a staggering

300 million percent and growth rate was a negative 12.5% in 2007. On the international arena the country was also under sanctions and this was worsened by suspension from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that effectively closed the lines of credit to the country (RBZ Monetary Policy 2008:7).

2.3.3 State of local government in Zimbabwe

All the world central government oversight and collaboration with local government is widely accepted and a necessary condition for any intergovernmental system. Central government intervention in local affairs to the extent that available local solutions and accountability and are substituted for the central government directives is likely to cause public apathy and resentment. It is this appalling condition that has become the basis of local government in Zimbabwe given that the central government holds reserve powers of control over the local system. Thus, the local authorities cannot act ultra vires and undertake the functions that are not expressly delegated to them (Sachikonye, 2007:81). In order to fully outline the dominants of the central government in local issues the following are important intergovernmental system that stifles local governance and public accountability (Urban Councils Act, 2002:10).

- The constitution of Zimbabwe does provide for a system of local government, the local level is constitutionally protected. Urban councils derive their authorities from their location within the MLG.
- Local government actions are subject to MLG approval includes: annual budget, by laws and resolutions approved by the council, and senior staff hiring and firing through the Local Government Board appointed by the MLG.
- The authority of the MLG to make or adopt council by laws and to set ceilings on Local property tax and other taxes or fees.
- For years the MLG could suspend and dismiss elected councils for general mismanagement and appoint replacement commissioners to act as councillors. However, 2007 the MLG can now appoint only three caretakers to run the council.
- The MLG has power to appoint special interest councillors. Special interest councillors also hold office at the pleasure of the minister. He can by statutory instrument fix the

number of the interest councillors. The MLG can appoint nonvoting special interest councillors to any urban council and as many as one quarter of the council size can be appointed (Section 4A).

- Determines and fixes the first date, place on which a council may hold its first meeting (Section 84(1)).
- Minister has powers to authorize the council to suspend the operation of all or any of its by-laws within the whole or part of the local authority included within the council area or a separate council being established for that area (Section 4 (4) (b)).
- The minister may make such regulations for the control, management and good government of a local government area. For example in section (3) (q) and (r) the minister may fix the charges against any services, amenities or facilities provided by the state either for certain premises or residents; fix or impose in respect of immovable property a supplementary charge to cover the expenses incurred by the state in the maintenance and administration of the area (Section 235 (2), (3)).
- Minister makes general regulations varying from conduct of elections for mayors, councillors or members of local boards, qualification, allowances for members of local board, procedures to be followed at meeting relating to councillors, preparation, expenditure and information to be set out in a budget, procedure to be followed in applying for borrowing powers by a council, and in respect of all matters for which he considers it necessary or expedient in terms of the Act.

2.4 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

This section presents the institutions under which the UCs in Zimbabwe works under. The institutions are the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), Local Government Board, and the Provincial Governor's Office.

2.4.1 The Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development

The Ministry forms the apex of the Local Government system which is responsible for the broader formulation and implementation of Local Government policy in Zimbabwe. It provides the legislative and policy framework within which local government units operate. The ministry also administers the various statutes which establish and operationalize local government in Zimbabwe. It is finally accountable to the Nation, Parliament and the Executive for the efficient operation of local government. It is the ministry that holds the powers to control and direct the affairs of the local authorities. The ministry is entitled to monitor direct and supervise local authorities to ensure efficient service provision. The urban councils act as the main legislation gives the minister of local government the ultimate responsibility to make discretionary decisions on local authorities' matters as witnessed by statements.

The ministry must provide an enabling or facilitative framework within local government operates. The Zimbabwe Institute (2005:4) argues that in practice, however, the ministry of Local Government has increasingly played a controlling and directive role especially since the emergence of a formidable opposition (MDC) with a significant control over Local Government authorities in the urban areas. The Ministry can therefore operate as the central government's tool for harnessing local authorities and stamp out any democratic manoeuvres by threatening opposition parties.

Thus, through the Urban Council's Act the Minister of Local Government has powers to suspend or act in place of a local authority and the power also to nullify some decisions of local authorities, reverse, rescind and suspend council resolutions. This is as attested by the Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 5) that the Minister can intervene in the day a today running of urban councils. The Minister has also the powers to suspend and dismiss democratically elected mayors and councillors and replace them with appointed commissions and councillors. Such provisions militate against the democratic principles of decentralisation and self-governance. It therefore, becomes apparent that the process of deconcentration in Zimbabwe is only a dummy or shadow of the intended goals.

2.4.2 Local Government Board

The local government Board is established in terms of the Section 116 of the Urban Councils Act. According to Section 116 the board shall consist of seven members appointed by the Minister, of whom

(a) One shall be chosen from a list of not less than three names submitted by the Urban Councils Association;

(b) One shall be chosen from a list of not less than three names submitted by the town clerks; (c) One shall be chosen from a list of not less than three names submitted by the Municipal Workers Union;

(d) One shall be a member of the Public Service Commission chosen from a list of not less than three names submitted by the Minister responsible for the Public Service;

(e) Two shall be appointed for their ability and experience in public administration and who are or have been employed by a local authority or the Public Service for a period of not less than five years in a senior post.

The composition of the Board appears broad and ideal for effective local governance however, the challenge lies with the powers given the Minister by the Act in controlling the affairs of the Board. A case in point is the Urban Council Act Subsection (3) of Section 116 that states that if any person or organisation referred to in Section (2) fails or refuses to nominate a person to the Local Government Board when required to do so by the Minister, the Minister may appoint any person to represent that organisation and the person thereof shall hold office as a member as stated in terms of Subsection (1). The challenge with this legislation to local governance is the opportunity for the Minister to subjectively appoint individuals who are loyal to him and his party at the expense of local interests.

The main function of the Board is to be the guardian for the general organisation and control of employees in the service of councils. This function has been highly misused in local government affairs in Zimbabwe as the Board has been on the splurge of suspending and dismissing elected councillors and mayors belonging to the opposition parties. The Board also has too much

powers bestowed upon it. For instance Section 123 (2) provides that the Board may as directed by that Minister:

- (a) Require any council or any councillor, employee or agent of a council to produce any document, book or other record;
- (b) Summon and examine any witness who the Board considers may be able to assist it in the
- (c) Obtain information and advice from any council or any employee or agent of any council.

The powers conferred thereto are necessary for an authority exercising disciplinary action but provided that the authority is impartial. The question therefore goes back to the composition of the Board and the prevailing political climate.

2.4.3 The Provincial Governor's Office

The provincial Governors are political appointed positions that are nominated and appointed by the President on the basis of eligibility for election as a member of parliament. Each province in Zimbabwe has a provincial governor who chairs the provincial council.

2.5 THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF URBAN COUNCILS IN ZIMBABWE

Urban councils are local government authorities that have been used in the administration of towns and cities in Zimbabwe and other parts of the globe (Mosha, 1996). Urban councils are created by the devolution of the central government in local authorities that are tasked to provide services to the citizens in their areas. These are arms of the central government that are put in place to be accountable to both the government and the people they serve within their areas of jurisdiction. They are made up of elected officials such the mayors and several councillors who hold administrative posts. In Zimbabwe, their period of tenure is limited to every five years after which they seek for re-election (Urban Councils Act Chapter 29:15, 1996). Councillors are elected as members of political parties in the country. For example, the period from 1980 to the early 1990s most councillors belonged to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF). However, at the dawn of the 21st century most urban councillors have been drawn from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

It is paramount to note that urban local government powers vary from one country to another. In Zimbabwe, UCs exercise delegated authority to provide services within their jurisdiction. Delegated powers are purposely defined functions transferred from higher levels to subordinate levels of government (De Visser, 2005:14). The delegated powers of the UCs set the parameters of their operational framework as provided by the UC Act and as determined by the central government. Thus all the powers and functions of city, municipality, town councils or local boards are derived from the UC Act. It provides Urban Local Authorities with a wide range of powers and responsibilities for the provision of services. The Act is subdivided into 321 sections. It is administered by the Minister of Local Government (MLG). The UC Act confers discretionary powers on UCs to provide basic services such as water, sanitation, health, education, effluent and refuse removal (Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996).

The functions performed by UCs can be categorized into three distinction groups. The first groups of functions are obligatory function linked with health and the maintenance of a health environment (Jordan, 1984:70). According to Mushamba (2010:3) Urban Councils in Zimbabwe are compelled to perform obligatory functions. Members of the public are obliged to pay for the use of obligated services from local councils. These services include water supply, waste management and health facilities. The second group of functions called the optional functions provides urban residents with an option not to make use of them (Jordan, 1984:70). These services include public transport, parking facilities or ambulances. The third group of services offered by UCs is referred to as amenities. It includes services such as passive open spaces, botanical gardens, parks or beer gardens (Jordan, 1984:70). The minister may also through ministerial directives or statutory statements confer functions upon individual UCs. For example, though city councils, municipalities, town councils and local boards have the powers to lease and sell land, land that belongs to the state they can only do so under the guidance of MLG (Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996). Additionally, the UC Act provides UCs with powers, to make and uphold by-laws, generation and collection of revenues and the provision of services in their areas of jurisdiction.

2.5.1 Powers of the Urban Councils to make by-laws

The UC Act gives urban councils powers to make by-laws in the area under their jurisdiction as stipulated by Section 227 of the Urban Councils Act of 1996. By-laws aid urban councils to

implement its specific operations such as the provision of services, and budget formulation. The urban councils are allowed to make by-laws in the following areas, namely, control property, sewage affluent and refuse removal and vegetation, food, food premises, vehicles, and markets, nuisance, inspection, fees, electricity, roads, public places and traffic, water, amenities, and facilities, control of any service, institution, control of collection, offences and penalties, functions, performances, events and amusements, occupational trade and other activities, proceedings of council and financial matters. In making the by-laws the UCs are entitled to act according to the directives of the central government. The central government has the final mandate to approve the urban council's by-laws before they come into force (Government of Zimbabwe, 2004:2). The MLG may at any time withdraw or make an amendment to any model by-laws made by any urban council. Regulatory services form a major part of the operation of a municipality and a council regulates the conduct of its affairs subject to relevant legislation.

2.5.2 Revenue raising powers

Through the powers bestowed by the UC Act [Chapter 29:15] the urban councils have revenue raising powers. However, the UC Act gives UCs devolved fiscal powers. Meaning that the UCs have limited revenue raising powers. For example, UCs can levy taxes or borrow loans subject to the Minister's approval. As a result, UCs have limited local taxing powers, borrowing powers or access to intergovernmental transfers. They wait for the minister to approve their budgets and other fees as may be necessary to meet their expenditure needs. UCs' revenue is derived from property rating, service delivery charges from water supply, refuse and sewage disposal or health services, fees charged from users of council amenities encompassing services like flea markets or cemeteries, penalties and fines from breach of councils of by-laws, license fees, supplementary charges or revenue generating income projects for example breweries and beer halls (De Visser, 2010:73).

In addition, revenue for the council can be raised by the sale or lease of land but through the approval of the minister (Section 151 of the UC Act, 1996). Moreover, the urban councils can generate funds through property rates and taxes but with the exemption of property owned by the state and governmental buildings (Section 269 of the UC Act, 1996). The urban councils also raise their revenue through fixing charges in line with the current rate of inflation. Thus, a council may by majority vote fix tariffs for services such as electricity, water, refuse removal,

sewage effluent disposal and treatment (Section 219 of the UC Act, 1996) However, the tariffs resolution is subject to Minister's approval (Section 219 of the UC Act, 1996).

2.5.3 Borrowing power of Urban Councils

The UC Act permits urban councils to borrow funds for specified purposes but subject to the approval of the minister (Section 269 of the UC Act of 1996). Borrowing facilitates the ability of urban councils to supplement own revenue generated through local taxing. Before borrowing the council must give the public a notice informing the purpose of the money they intend to make use of. This is done in order to inform the ratepayers and make an application to the minister for permission to borrow the amount (Section 124 of the UC Act of 1996). The UCs may only borrow for the acquisition of immovable property or construction of permanent works or undertakings. A council may borrow from the state, local authority's pension fund, a municipal provident fund, a municipal medical aid scheme or local authority (Section 290 of the UC Act of 1996). The urban councils may also take bonds, debentures or bills subject to the approval of the Minister of Local Government and the Minister of Finance. Moreover, the urban councils may also engage in any commercial, industrial, agriculture or other activity for the function of raising revenue (Mushamba, 2010:111).

2.5.4 Intergovernmental fiscal transfers

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers also called vertical financial equalization entails the sharing of resources generated nationally between central and local governments. These grants supplement UCs own local taxing and borrowing sources in order to deliver their services to the people. UCs access the central government transfers under the Public sector investment Programme and grants for public health (Mushamba, 2010:111). In 2005 the central bank created funding through its quasi-fiscal operations to assist the delivery of services in UCs (Countinho, 2010:80). Central government transfers are meant to bolster the financial coffers of the urban councils in order to cover their delegated functions from the central government for example road maintenance or compliment the resources of UCs for enhancing service delivery.

2.5.5 Budget making process of Urban Councils

A council budget serves as a guide to direct the local authority to estimate its needs and funding to meet its service provision. Before the expiry of any financial year, the finance committee of a council is obliged to draw up and present for the approval of the council, estimates of the income and expenditure on revenue and capital accounts of the council for the next succeeding financial year. The council budget comprises of revenue estimates for the ensuing year, capital estimates for the forthcoming year and the capital development plan for the succeeding three years (Jordan, 1984:54). Copies of the estimates must be made available for inspection by the public forthwith (Section 288 of the UC Act, 1996). A council shall make use of its expenditure after it has been approved in the budget or a supplement budget presented by the Minister of Finance (Section 288 of the UC Act, 1996).

2.6 THE GROWTH OF THE CITY OF MASVINGO

Masvingo operates as the oldest urban establishment in Zimbabwe. It was established as a fort for the pioneer column during the occupation of Zimbabwe by the British in 1892 (Chingwenya, 2010:6). It was named Fort Victoria after Queen Victoria of England. It was after independence that it was named Masvingo after the world heritage cultural centre in its vicinity known as the Great Zimbabwe Monuments. Masvingo town now accorded a city status is the provincial capital of a relatively under urbanised province. The city is surrounded by primarily agricultural industries with a few mining ventures. Masvingo as a result operates as a service and administrative centre surrounded by largely agricultural districts with high population densities such as Gutu, Zaka, Bikita and Chivi (Chingwenya, 2010:6).


In addition, Chingwenya (2010:6) contends that in these districts there are no major urban centres except for the district centres which have been designated since 1980. Masvingo also provides key services to the population in the province as it is well linked with district centres which depend on it for variety of reasons. There are other well established towns though small that lies within the vicinity of Masvingo. These towns include Mashava (A mining town), Triangle and Chiredzi (agricultural based towns) Renco (a mining town). These towns are linked to major economic activities in the province.

The economic structure of the town shows that there is a dominance of services over other services. Services include government services, parastatals and other non-governmental activities. These are reflected particularly the role of the town as a provincial capital where all provincial sector ministry headquarters are located. Thus, the thrust on the process of decentralisation to district centres has resulted in Masvingo losing some of its administrative functions, to the designated district centres (Chingwenya, 2010:6).

2.6.1 Masvingo Municipal Management structure

Masvingo local authority is divided in to 11 wards and is therefore represented by 11 councillors. At the executive level, there are five departments: Town Clerk, Town Engineer, Town Treasurer, Housing Directorate and Directorate. The departments vary in size but the largest is the Town Engineer’s department. The organisational system is largely geared towards administering and providing services.

Table 1: Masvingo Municipal Structure



Source: Chingwenya (2010)

Table 1 shows the municipal structure of Masvingo local municipality. In Zimbabwe, local authorities report to the Minister of Local Government. As shown on the table the municipal council is the highest decision making body within the municipality. This is followed by the mayor. The mayor’s role is part-time and largely ceremonial and councillors are political figures elected to represent their respective wards on the council who focus on policy in their

committees. The Town Clerk also called the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a permanent position mandated with the task to lead all the departments and general administration of the local council. The Town Clerk is linked to the heads of departments that are administration, finance, housing, production, social services as well as engineering and physical planning. These heads then link with their subordinates on what should be done as per councillors and Town Clerk's commands.

2.6.2 Services offered by Masvingo Municipality

These services have a direct and immediate effect on the quality of lives of the people in that community. For example, if the water that is provided is of a poor quality or refuse is not collected regularly, unhealthy and unsafe living environments would be created (Zvidzai, 2009:10). Poor services can also make it difficult to attract business or industry to an area and can limit job opportunities for residents. Urban local councils also complement the central government in the delivery of essential services such as road construction and primary health care.

Table 2: Provision of services by Masvingo Municipality

Protective	Environmental	Utilities	Social services	Housing	Amenities and welfare	Trading
Municipal police	Planning	Roads	Clinics and maternity	Rental housing	Parks, play grounds	Liquor
Fire services	Refuse removal	Electricity	Ambulances			
Street lighting	Sewerage	Water supply	Hospitals	Standards regulation		
Pest control	Pollution control		Primary education			
	Public health		Secondary education	Services		
			Vocational training			

Source: Chingwenya (2010)

The table above shows the range of services provided by Masvingo Municipality. The services offered range from protective, environmental, utilities maintenance, social services, housing, amenities and welfare and trading. Protective services are those to do with fire extinguishers, the municipal police and pest control. Environmental services include services such as refuse removal, sewerage disposal, pollution control and public health. Utilities refer to the services such as the provision and maintenance of tarred roads within the municipality, provision of

electricity and safe water supply. Social services encompass all services to do with health this include the provision of clinics and hospitals, nurses and doctors, medication and ambulances. Housing services pertain to all services to do with provision of accommodation to the people. Amenities refer to the provision of services to do with social and recreational facilities that benefit people socially or economically. For example, recreational parks, botanical gardens, play grounds, golf parks and cricket fields. Trading refers to services construction of beer halls, lease collection which includes taxes, user charges, rents and rates, licenses and other projects. The income obtained from such activities will be used to pay the council staff including councillors, purchasing goods such as computers, repairing and servicing vehicles and the delivery of social and infrastructure services.

2.6.2.1 Water and sewage disposal

Inter alia, the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1996 the principal act empowers urban councils to perform two main functions within their areas of jurisdiction, namely waste disposal and water supply. This involves the construction of dams, weirs, bore holes, water and sewer reticulation infrastructure as well as solid waste dumps (Bagg, 1992:13). These services are provided at a cost in which urban residents, industries, institutions and other clients pay monthly bills to urban council for them. Thus, local authorities in Zimbabwe derive their substantial portions of their revenue of their revenue from water and sewage disposal bills (Marapira and Mungwini, 2005:12). In order to buttress their revenue capacity they are also entitled to government grants. Traditionally, urban councils provided the above services under the watchful eye of the Zimbabwe National Water Authority. In other words urban councils were services providers under the guardianship of ZINWA as it monitored the activities of the local utilities.

2.6.2.2 Provision of Social and Physical Infrastructure

Romeo (1998:3) noted that, it is a mandate of the UCs to provide public services and infrastructural projects. The UCs are engaged in both social and physical infrastructure. According to NANGO (2010:5), social infrastructure includes the construction of schools for primary, secondary and tertiary education, vocational training centres, recreation and sporting facilities, hospitals and clinics, housing as well as cottages for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (O.V.C). According to NANGO (2010:9), rural schools have the lowest proportions of trained

teachers, books, laboratories and other learning resources hence making high achievement difficult. Thus, the RDCs are responsible for the educational services.

2.6.2.3 Health services

It is also the responsibility of these UCs to promote the health sector through building of clinics and rural health centres, staffing and provision of drugs. According to WHO (2000:14) health refers to a network of people and actions that are in one way or the other concerned with promoting, maintaining, restoring and improving the health of society. The definition encompasses services provided by the responsible authorities, which include UCs and these include the building up of clinics, hospitals and rural health centres. The Administrative Handbook of UCs (1992), revealed that the provision of health services is one of the primary functions entrusted upon the UCs and is profoundly encouraged by both the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, and the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). The UCs are also encouraged to establish Mobile Clinic Units. These are meant to service the communities in sparsely populated areas particularly in commercial areas where it is not economically feasible to establish clinics (Administrative Handbook of UCs, 1992).

2.7 CHALLENGES FACING LOCAL COUNCILS IN ZIMBAMBWE IN IMPLEMENTING THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT

This section presents the challenges facing urban councils in implementing the UC Act on UCs in Zimbabwe. The challenges are as follows: lack of legal protection, limited powers to make by laws, limited fiscal powers, partial borrowing powers, and lack of legal guidance on the distribution of central government grants, centrally restricted budget making process, unrestricted powers of the minister, powers to appoint special interest councillors and powers to suspend and dismiss elected officials.

2.7.1 Lack of legal protection

UCs in Zimbabwe exercise delegated powers. They do not have full powers. Full powers reside with central government. This entails that central government determines which powers and functions UCs will perform. This establishes a relationship of principal and an agent. The exercise of delegated powers has compromised the capacity of UCs to deliver services both

efficiently and effectively. The argument is that the final decision over the provision of a particular service should lie with the level of government that can cover the cost of the provision of the service (Oates, 1972:55). The provision of services by UCs is generally poor and one of the causes is that efficiency and effectiveness of provision of services are undermined central government interference in the decisions of UCs. For instance, in 2005, the MLG issued a directive which revoked water management functions from UCs and transferred its management to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) (Musemwa, 2008:12). Arguably, the transfer of water to ZINWA without the necessary accountability mechanisms has led to regressed patterns in the provision of water supply and sanitation in urban areas. The transfer of the UCs' function to provide water also deprived UCs of local taxing sources of revenue thereby constraining their already weak revenue bases. This compromised their financial capacities to generate revenue to fund the provision of other services. In 2008, the MLG issued another directive handing water provision back to councils (Mushamba, 2010:109). This illustrates the extent of instability caused by central interference in local government functions and the negative impact on service delivery.

The UC Act provides electricity as a competence of UCs. However, the generation and distribution of electricity was revoked in 1989 from UCs by central government (Colquhoun, 1993:35). The generation and supply of electricity is under the authority of Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). This removed a potential revenue generating base from UCs. The law subjects UCs to the vagaries and prejudices of central government. Central government gives and takes powers from UCs as it chooses. The lack of protection afforded to UCs by the UC Act has undermined their revenue bases. In addition, the lack of constitutional protection undermines their sense of ownership of the functions they must perform, contributing to poor service delivery.

2.7.2 Limited powers to make by-laws

The making of by-laws is another area where local authorities have been frustrated by central government. Council resolutions in respect of schedule three matters or any incidental matter thereof have authority only when approved (Section 227 (1) of UC Act). The by-law has to be approved by the MLG (Section 228 (3) of the UC Act). The law gives the MLG the discretion either to approve or disapprove the by-law (Section 229 (2) of the UC Act). The discretion given

to the MLG potentially compromises the functions of UCs, because by-laws can only take effect after approval by the minister (Section 229 (4) of the UC Act). The fact that a by-law has no force unless it gains the approval of the MLG underlines the extent of control that the minister exercises over UCs in matters of decision making.

The powers given to the MLG in the UC Act undermines the powers of UCs to make by-laws (Mushamba, 2010:107). For instance, a council might respond to public demands for a service delivery implementation strategy by enacting a by-law, but the by-law is subjugated to central control and cannot be implemented unless it has been approved by the minister. A council thus finds itself tied down by procedures in their decision making even for routine decisions (Mushamba, 2010:107). A council owes its accountability to the urban citizens, so the decision of matters in the schedule three should lie with the end user and not the minister. A thriving ULG requires citizens to set the overall agenda on service provision (Bratton, 2011:2). The design of the UC Act compromises also the efficiency of UCs in the event that the minister fails to approve timeously or he disapproves the by-law. Unless and until the by-law has been approved there is nothing that UCs can do in respect of schedule three or any incidental matters thereto.

2.7.3 Limited fiscal generating powers

The purpose of making UCs powers to generate revenue subject to ministerial approval is to protect urban residents against market forces and macro-economic instability including high inflation. This power has been arbitrarily used to constrain the capacity of UCs to generate revenue without interference by central government. It is clear from the literature on the subject that revenue-raising powers are essential for effective and efficient provision of urban services. For ULG to be able to meet its primary purpose of service provision there should be a genuine devolution and sufficient fiscal powers (Andrews and Shah, 2005:66). The design of the UC Act seriously constrains the capacity of ULG to generate resources that guarantee predictable service provision because the powers bestowed upon the minister inhibit the fiscal independence of urban local authorities. The argument is that the design of the legal framework impacts the extent to which ULG can generate revenue. Andrews and Shah (2005: 66) argue that laws typically limit both the kinds of revenues that local governments can raise and different revenue types.

The UC Act also does not provide urban councils with reliable systems for debt collection for the provision of services such as water supply, refuse and effluent removal or prescribe the process to be employed in debt collection. There is continued recurring failure by UCs to extract or enforce the urban populace to remit fees or charges for services provided such as water supply, rates and waste management. Consequently, councils lose out on revenue. For instance, before the 2013 harmonised elections of July 31, the MLG directed all local municipalities to scrap all outstanding bills backdated to June 30 2013 arguing that it was integral to the party's poverty alleviation strategy (Matenga, 2013). Section 303 of the Urban Councils Act empowers the Minister to order councils to cancel residents' bills for water, electricity, rent, rates, garbage collection and other civic services (Section 303 of the UC Act).

However, the Mayor of Masvingo Mr Chakabuda stated that most urban councils are in arrears and are trying to recover from the 2008 economic decline. The City of Harare is owed US\$273 million from government departments, private sector, and residents alone contributing close to US\$40 million of the total cost from unpaid water bills, rates and supplementary charges (The Herald Newspaper, 2011:4). Urban residents argue that until UCs provide satisfactory services they are not going to pay for erratic services. UCs also lose revenue because they lack the capacity and mechanisms to trace debtors. The effect is that revenue declines, compromising services and facilities. For example, urban residents become susceptible to diseases such as typhoid and cholera because intermittent supply of water causes residents to make use of unprotected water sources which are sometimes exposed to the discharge of raw sewage, such as the Mukuvisi River in Harare.

2.7.4 Partial borrowing powers

The literature on ULG shows that borrowing is another important source of revenue for UCs. UCs may borrow but subject to the approval of the minister (Section 290 (1) of the UC Act). The MLG is empowered to approve and cancel the borrowing powers of a council (Section 290(8) of the UC Act). The UC Act does not protect UCs since the decision of the minister is final. The Section argues that the minister uses powers in the UC Act to compromise and subjugate UCs' reasonable access to other sources of revenue. The argument is that central government stifles borrowing powers especially in those UCs whose political views differ from the minister. This compromises service delivery, UCs possesses inadequate fiscal generating powers. UCs should

be able to supplement local taxing revenue for efficient and enhanced service delivery through borrowing. Majority of these UCs are performing dismally as a result of insufficient fiscal resources.

2.7.5 Lack of legal guidance on the distribution of central government grants

In the context of Zimbabwe's ULG, neither the UC Act nor any other Act provides the legislative framework for a system of intergovernmental grants. The failure by the UC Act to expressly provide for intergovernmental transfers to UCs exposes the whole process to manipulation. In Zimbabwe, grants given to UCs are in most cases conditional grants for specific activities (Coutino, 2010:81). For instance grants are given to UCs to remunerate employees in health and education services or in some instances in times of emergency (Coutinho, 2010:81). Central government grants are channelled to UCs through the Public Sector Investment Programme. UCs also have limited discretion on the use and access of grants. The use of grants depends on conditions attached to the grant and the limitations on their use. Central government transfers in UCs are not distributed on the basis of the principle of equity, which distributes financial resources based on the capacity of individual UCs to generate revenue. Instead, grants are often distributed on the basis of political patronage, making UCs susceptible to the vagaries and prejudices of the national government. The section argues that absence of a system of transfers that takes account of the differing costs and needs of different areas negatively impacts the provision of services in UCs.

Central government grants are necessary to fund those functions that were originally central functions but subsequently delegated to UCs for efficiency purposes. UCs are forced within the limited resources to cater for delegated functions without central provision of additional revenue. For UCs to be fiscally healthy, they should have reliable and sufficient revenue sources. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are crucial for efficiency and the equitable distribution of services amongst UCs (Coutinho, 2010:82). The argument is that lack of an express regulatory framework that sets the allocation procedure of grants renders the process of intergovernmental transfer unpredictable. As a result, UCs are imbued with functions they cannot deliver because of fiscal inefficiency and inequity. The expenditure demands of UCs are not proportionate to the fiscal sources they generate. The argument is that the failure to provide for a legislative framework that guarantees the predictable flow of intergovernmental transfers compromises the

ability of UCs to efficiently and effectively provide services (Andrews and Shah, 2005:70). UCs are forced to distribute insufficient limited revenue amongst the services they provide to accommodate central delegated functions.

2.7.6 Centrally restricted budget making process

A budget is a prerequisite for council expenditure for each year. The budget sets out urban local council's priorities and reflects the allocation of scarce resources among the services the council intends to provide. In Zimbabwe central government determines the UCs budget guidelines showing the procedure of budget formulations in line with the Standardised Accounting Budgeting System, Procedures and Policies Manuals. This creates room for central government interference in the budget making process of UCs. As a result this interference has caused fiscal and monetary policy implications on UCs expenditure programmes and inhibits the UCs processes use to expedite the provision of services. Central government is too geographically and operationally detached to appreciate UCs expenditure that is in line with urban local preferences. UCs are best placed to determine how best to formulate their budgets independently.

As a result, more time is spent on budget processes going back and forth between council and central government impacting on the quality of services provided. For instance the budget for the City of Kwekwe had not been approved by May 2011 (Mhlanga, 2011:10). This impinges on the financial plans of a council and hinders the provision of service to the public at large. UCs cannot do anything meaningful without a running budget; it impacts the delivery of services. The effect is that the service delivery becomes retarded, ineffective and inefficient.

2.7.7 Unrestricted powers of the minister

The supervision of UCs by higher levels of government is an accepted element of effective urban government. Supervision is necessary for uniformity, the realisation of national goals and efficient service delivery in the country as a whole. However, the UC Act confers unfettered powers on the minister. The UC Act subjects UCs politically, organizationally and fiscally to centralised control. The relationship that exists between central and local authorities in Zimbabwe is one between a delegator-delegatee, with the central government as the delegator and local UCs as the delegates (Andrews and Shah, 2005:67). This relationship is manifest in the

manner in which the UC Act allocates power between the two. Anything which is not specifically mentioned is assumed to fall outside urban council's functional jurisdiction.

Even in those areas, in which they have been empowered to act, central government has powers to revoke UCs functions. Central government exerts stifling and inefficient bureaucratic control over many aspects of local authority operations for instance setting of by-laws, service provision functions and fiscal generation (Mhlanga, 2011:10). The minister decides whether a local board shall be constituted by appointed or elected members and their term of office and suspension and dismissal of elected councillors. There is extensive political interference in the internal administration of UCs by the minister (Section 6(4)(a) (f) of the UC Act. The section argues that the disadvantage lies in that the minister limits the capacity of elected officials, in most cases creates conflict. The minister is more concerned with maximising his own self-interests such as power and patronage against public interest and service provision.

2.7.7.1 Powers to suspend and dismiss elected officials

Literature on ULG usually draws a link between democracy and efficient and effective provision of services. The literature also attaches importance of democratically instituted decision-making bodies for the functioning of ULG (Stewart, 1983:121). In the context of Zimbabwean ULG, while the majority of councillors are elected, the UC Act gives the minister powers to suspend and dismiss elected officials and to appoint special interest councillors. The minister has powers to dismiss elected officials. The design of the UC Act does not guarantee the powers of the council. In recent years, the power of suspension has been used arbitrarily in order to weaken opposition in councils. The Minister is notorious for dismissing Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (hereafter MDC-T) mayors and councillors. For instance, he dismissed the Bindura mayor for alleged acts of misconduct (Newsday, 2011:10). It has become common since 2003 for the minister to dismiss elected officials in most urban councils such as Harare, Mutare, Chitungwiza and Chegutu. This chapter argues that councillors and mayors are protected while in office but only if their policies reflect that of central government. What it does is centralising powers and creating institutions which do not enhance service delivery.

2.7.7.2 Powers to appoint special interest councillors

The minister is also empowered to appoint at his pleasure special interest councillors in every municipal and town council not exceeding one –quarter of elected councillors, and even though they are entitled to benefits as those of the elected councillors and participate in the business of the council they have no veto powers. As regards veto powers, unless their concerns are translated into votes in council meetings, there is no way they can influence service delivery. Consequently, the special interest councillors are unaccountable to local citizens largely because the decisions mechanisms that facilitate citizen influence are missing such as veto powers to influence service delivery (Andrew and Shah, 2005:79). So any meaningful contribution to effective and efficient service delivery is constrained by the fact that they cannot vote in council meetings. In addition, concerns have been raised that the minister abuses the institution of special interest councillors. The fact that special interest councillors hold office at the pleasure of the Minister compromises their independence, making it likely that they will align with his views. For instance, it is alleged that the minister appoints unsuccessful councillors at the general election.

Special interest councillors are meant to provide expertise to the UCs. As newly elected councillors come into council without experience so special interest councillors complement them in order to enhance service delivery (Matenga, 2011:4). On the contrary, the appointment process has been succeeded by primacy of patronage, as this has largely served partisan interests (Mushamba, 2010:104). The section points out that appointed councillors will often oppose the decisions of democratically elected councillors even when it is not in the interest of the urban populace for them to do so.

The process for appointing councillors is a violation of citizen representation in decision making process because councillors are not democratically elected (Mushamba, 2010:104). The elected officials are involved in the legislative business of UCs, and in practice elected councillors are outnumbered and always under the authority of the appointees. There is no criterion for controlling the Minister's use of the power to appoint special interest councillors.

2.7.8 Challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Council's Act

This section presents the challenges facing Masvingo Municipality in implementing the urban council's Act.

2.7.8.1 Poor supply of clean piped water in Masvingo residential areas

Water one of the fundamental services that are basic to the healthy well-being of most urbanites. According to Shannon (2002:12) access to water is a basic human right. However, the provision of water in the city of Masvingo remains problematic. Most residents in the city from Mucheke, Aphiri, Target Kopje, Eastview, Majange and Rujeko voiced concerns that there was erratic water supply as opposed to the amounts of money which they are required to pay. The residents complained that the water situation is becoming worse and worse by each day. It was noted that there was intermittent domestic water supply in most areas in the city and residents go for prolonged periods without access to clean piped water. Traditionally the city used to justify its incapacity to provide adequate water supply to the expensive water treatment chemicals and purchase of maintenance equipment. Dube and Van De Zaag (2002:10) argued that low income people in Masvingo are paying far than the recommended amount for safe water despite the supply being erratic.

It is also reported that about 70% of revenue in most urban councils are taken by salaries making local authorities and town councils the best paying parastatals. This means that very little money is left for service delivery, infrastructure repair and other capital projects. Rukuni (2006:13) noted that most of the water challenges been faced in urban areas are a consequence of mismanagement and reluctance by the Ministry of Local Governance to let the city council independently run water supply and sewer reticulation management. In most instances instead of resuscitating regular water supply and efficient sewer reticulation, the city is giving its workers hefty salaries while the local residents bear the brunt of having to live without adequate water supply for ages. This concurs with Chigwenya's (2010:9) conclusion that decentralization of local authorities has been curtailed by the heavy presence of the government's hand in all sectors, as it continued to interfere with the day to day running of the municipality affairs. This therefore means that the local authorities lack autonomy in making independent decisions and policies towards addressing this water crisis. The city council however should be ultimately

responsible and accountable for municipal service delivery of which clean water supply and sewer reticulation should be at the core of municipal service delivery.

2.7.8.2 Refuse collection and waste management in Masvingo

It has also been noted that waste or refuse collection in Masvingo has been one of the most pressing areas of concern by the residents. One respondent noted that the garbage collection crew takes days or even weeks to come and collect refuse from their homesteads. Most shopping centres (especially in high-density areas) such as the Mucheke “A” bus terminus are perpetually inundated with piles of uncollected refuse for ages. These shopping centres have thus become an eyesore due to the piles of garbage that have been there for weeks if not months. Borgman & Wegelin (2005:35) noted that limitations in access to sanitation and refuse collection services by the poor are largely due to a combination of the financial and institutional incapacity to adequately maintain and even extend existing systems into low income areas.

In Masvingo it has been noted by the researcher that waste collection and sewerage management problems have been exacerbated by the densities in some housing areas that are higher than the originally planned sewage system.. Thus, the existing treatment plants for Masvingo do not have the capacity to deal with the quantities of sewage produced. As observed by the researcher most residents of Masvingo have resorted to burning of garbage, this open burning of waste by residents is increasingly becoming a preferred waste disposal option in light of erratic waste collection in the city. This concurs with the findings of Dellinger (1994:10) who noted that in most cities because of the inefficiencies in waste collection and disposal, there is evidence of widespread indiscriminate dumping of garbage in awkward places. Despite the waste management function of the Masvingo city council being weak, the very same city’s by-laws prohibits illegal disposal of waste and anyone who is caught disposing waste in undesignated areas is penalised.

2.7.8.3 Urban Infrastructural Maintenance in Masvingo

Most residents of Masvingo also face challenges with regards to infrastructure such as roads which are hardly repaired despite being in a mediocre state. while the government and by extension city councils places roads amongst their highest priorities for investment, very little attention has been given pertaining to maintenance, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the

existing road networks in the city. The researcher noted with concern that most streets that were initially tarred are now looking as if they were never tarred due to lack of maintenance. Most of the city infrastructure is in a sorry state and one good example is the Mucheke hall which was gutted by fire a couple of years ago and up until now it is still to be renovated and refurbished. Rakodi (1997:23) argued that among the reasons accounting for the failure of many urban authorities in developing countries to cope with demands for service delivery include, the limitations of their political frameworks for city development, the inadequacies of their financing systems and the inefficiencies of their management systems. Thus, street lighting in Mucheke is pathetic and there is a lot of work to be done to improve the state of street lights in the whole of the residential area. Most roads in most residential areas are inundated with large potholes and this is posing a threat to traffic. The city council also has a number of clinics that includes Runyararo clinic, Rujeko clinic and Mazorodze clinic. These clinics are however operating below capacity and most of them lack adequate staff, drugs and equipment to provide meaningful curative treatment and healthcare services.

One council official noted that the country at large has been losing healthcare professionals to neighbouring countries due to the economic challenges that confronted the country. He argued that the city council has also been losing its workers especially nurses who were resigning at a frightening rate as they sought greener pastures outside the country. This has meant that most council clinics are understaffed and thus cannot cope with the number of patients coming for medication and treatment. While the government and by extension the city council places roads amongst its highest priorities for investment, in Masvingo there has been very little maintenance, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the existing road networks. Likewise the researcher observed that water distribution equipment and the sewerage system in Masvingo has rarely been renovated or replaced since it was laid down. This has led to a lot of mega-litres of water being lost through leakages. Due to limited maintenance of the sewerage system, sewerage pipes have been continuously bursting, thereby contaminating some of the water sources that are being utilized by the residents confronted with water blues. In utilizing water from such contaminated sources further exposes residents to a number of related diseases and hence threatening their well-being health wise.

2.7.8.4 Corruption in Masvingo Municipality

Corruption is another problem that has continued to destroy the city of Masvingo. Within the city of Masvingo there are rampant illegal selling of commercial stands in which the small amount of is sold through proper procedures. In addition there is also illegal allocation of residential in fill stands. Masvingo municipal officials were alleged to have allocated in-fill stands in a manner that was riddled with corruption, with the waiting list at the council not being followed. These stands were offered to people who could offer bribes to the council officials. Corruption in Masvingo has been noticed in the allocation of vending spaces. Council officials tend to give preference to those who are able to offer bribes due shortages of vending spaces. The citizens tend to accept paying bribes because that the only way to get them. Thus, this issue militate against the councils efforts to create employment in the informal sector and thus alleviate poverty while at the same time increase the municipality revenue base.

2.8 STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH THE CHALLENGES FACING URBAN COUNCIL'S IN IMPLEMENTING THE URBAN COUNCIL'S ACT

This section presents the strategies that can be adopted by local municipalities in order to deal with the challenges facing them.

2.8.1 Own source of revenue base

Local authorities should be allowed to charge for the services and rates within their areas of jurisdiction subject to policy guidelines provided by the central government (Manyena, 2006:6). There should be a very clear and transparent revenue sharing mechanism between the state and the subnational levels of governments. Such a revenue sharing formula should pay special to the need for equity in the distribution of resources in the different regions. This will ensure that local government maintain monopoly over property tax while government concentrates on more mobile taxable factors like income and value added tax (NANGO, 2010). The property tax will be used for provision of infrastructure and the general protection of environment and property.

2.8.2 Transfer from the national treasury

There should be direct fiscal transfer from the central bank to local authorities instead of passing through sector ministries as is the situation at the moment. There will not be need for

government guarantees when local authorities borrow for the private sector. The advantage of that is the government will reduce its overall debt burden, especially on local borrowings. In such instances there will be need for independent Municipal Bond markets that will source and provide credit rating from local authorities (Mubvami, and Nhehairo (2006:6). For example, the South African Bond markets provide best practice in this regard. Also learning from the South African experience, it is important to have independent and professionally respected credit rating systems if the bond market is to remain attractive to the private. This means that the local authorities also need to have good corporate governance policies and be transparent if they are to become viable investments destinations.

2.8.3 Partnering and twining arrangements

Masvingo Municipality should consider partnership and cooperation with other sister municipalities in foreign countries. Considerable synergies and resources like technology, skills transfer and financial assistance can be gained from these arrangements (Manyena, 2006:6).

2.8.4 Benchmarking

To improve on their service quality, Bindura Municipality should consider benchmarking their products, services and processes against other reputable municipalities. Benchmarking ensures one does not lag behind and become irrelevant to the ever changing customer demands (Denhere, Tafirei, Zivanai, Muchingami, and Chingarande, 2011:71).

2.8.5 Meaningful resource raising power

Local councils must be given adequate resource-raising powers clearly stated in the Constitution to enable sustainable service delivery and the stimulation of development. Availability of resources at local level will enable implementation of provincial development plans. It must be noted that, effective decentralization and local autonomy require appropriate financial autonomy (Denhere, Tafirei, Zivanai, Muchingami, and Chingarande, 2011:71).The following taxing powers can be allocated to local municipalities: liquor licensing provincial road tax, tourism and animal licensing, among others. A system of intergovernmental transfers of financial resources from central government to provinces, depending on need, can address such disparities.

2.8.6 Clarification of roles

It is also recommended that the role of Provincial Governors (PGs) in relation to UCs must be clarified and legislated. Such a move will go a long way in preventing the unnecessary meddling into the affairs of elected councils by PGs. The need to limit the supervisory powers of the Minister over UCs cannot go without mentioning. The supervisory powers, which are prone to political manipulation, allow the Minister to dismiss and replace elected councils with administrators or commissions (Denhere, Tafirei, Zivanai, Muchingami, and Chingarande, 2011:71). Elected councils are politically legitimate and this requires central government to respect them as they represent the wishes and interests of the electorate. This is not to say that mismanagement and corruption must be allowed to flourish in local government. A balance must be struck between the need to maintain central, supervisory and corrective powers, on one hand, and local autonomy and democracy on the other.

2.9 Conclusion

The chapter analyzed a number of areas that are paramount to the study and understating of local governance. It looked at the evolution of the local government system in Zimbabwe beginning in pre-colonial period. This was done in order to give a thorough detailed exposition of how the local government system in Zimbabwe originated. The chapter further also looked on the challenges being faced by the urban local councils in Zimbabwe in the implementation of the urban councils act.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the literature review which is related to challenges presented by the implementation of the urban council's act [chapter 29:15) of 1996 on the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery in UCs in Zimbabwe. This chapter presents the research methodology of the study. Other aspects outlined in this chapter include, study area, population of the study, sampling, data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design is the conceptual structure within which research would be conducted. Research design is defined by Gray (2009:581) as a plan or blue print according to which data are to be gathered to investigate the research questions in most economic manner. According to Du Ploy (2001:81) research design is a plan of how a research project will be conducted. The study will adopt a field survey method. The researcher used a field study as a research design because it enables the researcher to investigate the challenges presented by the implementation of the Urban Council's Act [Chapter 29:15) of 1996 on the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery in UCs in Zimbabwe.

3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

According Marius and Pauw (1998:29) methodology is defined as the study of scientific methods. Silverman (2005:99) defined methodology as, choices we make about the cases to study, methods of data gathering and other forms of data analysis, in planning and executing a research study. For this study the researcher will use a mixed method as a research methodology meaning that both quantitative and qualitative methods will be utilized.

Devos (1998:15) states that quantitative approach is that approach of research in social sciences which is more highly formalized as well as more explicitly controlled with a range that is exactly

defined and which involves of study subjects and broader understanding. Quantitative method focuses on collecting numeric data which is then analyzed statistically (Russek and Weinberg, 1993:39). Quantitative method is appropriate because it gives broader understanding of the phenomenon under study. It describes with precision the characteristics, similarities, differences and causal relations that exist within the population.

Qualitative research is a system of inquiry which seeks to build a holistic, largely narrative, description to inform the researcher's understanding of a social or cultural phenomenon (Terre Blanche, Durrheim and Painters (2006:47). Neuman (2006:46) defined field research as the qualitative study in which the researcher directly observes and records notes on people in a natural setting for an extended period of time. The use of the qualitative method in this study is considered appropriate because it can gather or gain new perspectives on things about which much is already known, or to gain more in-depth information about the phenomenon under study.

3.4 STUDY AREA

The respondents of the study are Masvingo municipality workers. The study area is the Masvingo City Council. Masvingo is the fourth largest city in Zimbabwe. It located within Masvingo Province. The city was the first town to be established in the 1890s and it was called Fort Victoria. It is about 230 kilometers away from the capital city, Harare.

3.5 STUDY POPULATION

Welman, Kruger and Mitchell, (2005:52) define population as the total collection of all units of analysis about which the researcher wishes to make specific conclusions. Babbie (1995:194) also defines population as the aggregation of elements from which the sample is actually sampled. The population for study will be drawn from the following departments, namely councillors, city treasury officials, chamber secretary officials, health services officials, urban planning officials, engineering services officials, water and sanitation officials, human resources officials, amenities official and lastly, housing and community services officials at Masvingo City Municipality who do the day to day activities of the municipality. The total population of the study therefore amounts to 500 employees.

3.6 SAMPLING

Sampling is the process whereby a small population or subgroup of a population of interest is selected for a scientific study (Baumgartner and Hensley, 2006:176). Terre Blanche, Durrheim, Painter (2006:49) defined sampling as the selection of participants from a population and involves decision about which people, setting, events, behaviour and or social processes are to be observed. The selected sample group of the study included the following the town clerk, the deputy town clerk, departments heads, assistant departments heads, councillors consisting of ward and political representatives, and administrative officials from each department.

3.6.1 Sampling Technique

In this study the researcher will use non-probability sampling and its subtype purposive sampling method. Purposive sampling is defined by Neuman (2006:222) as a non-random sample in which the researcher uses a wide range of methods to locate all possible cases of a high specific and difficult to reach population. Babbie (2007:14) defined purposive sampling as a type of non-probability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher's judgment about which one will be most useful or representative. In this study purposive sampling will be used because the researcher has judged the respondents as having the relevant information about the phenomenon under study.

3.6.2 Sampling size

The total sample population of this study consists of 50 respondents. The sampled groups consist of 05 councilors, 06 chamber secretary, 05 city treasurer, 05 health services, 05 urban planning, 05 engineering services, 06 human resources, 06 amenities and 06 water and sanitation personnel. This is as shown on the table below.

Table 3.1: Sample Size

Respondents	Number of people	Sample size
Councillors	11	5
Chamber secretary	15	6
City treasurer	14	5
Health services	15	5
Urban planning	10	5
Engineering services	20	5
Human resources	10	6
Amenities	15	6
Water and Sanitation	20	6
Total	145	50

3.6.2 DATA COLLECTION METHOD

According to Grinnell and Williams (1990:44) data collection method is a procedure specifying techniques to be employed, measuring instrument to be utilized and activities to be conducted in implementing a research study. Mouton and Marais (1990:110) defined data collection as a collection of various kinds of empirical information or data, for instance, historical, statistical or documentary data. For this study two research instruments will be used to collect data, namely, the interview and the questionnaire.

According to Babbie and Mouton (2001:94) a questionnaire is a set of written questions and or statements to which the research subjects are to respond in order to provide data, which are relevant to a research topic. A questionnaire is a set of preset questions that are arranged into open and closed ended questions (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999:59). For this study the researcher will use an open ended questionnaire to collect data. The researcher will visit the Masvingo City Municipality in order to hand out the questionnaires to the relevant population. The researcher will give the respondents time to complete the questionnaires of about 10 to 15 minutes. The research team will collect data according to the departments arranged in alphabetical order. After distribution the research team will come back and collect the finished questionnaires after the stipulated period.

An interview schedule is a list of questions read by an interviewer to the interviewee, while the interviewer is writing down the responses (Bailey, 1994:466). Neumann (2006:276) supported the definition by stating that interview schedule is a set of questions read to the respondents by

the interviewer while recording the responses. An interview schedule will be used in this study because it allows researcher to probe the respondents or ask further questions for clarity. The researcher will carry out the interviews in the respective offices of the officials. This is to make them feel comfortable and react to the questions honestly and freely.

3.7 DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis refers to the process of placing observations in numerical forms and manipulates them according to their thematic properties to derive meaning from them (Monette et al, 2008:486). In this study two methods of data analysis will be used namely quantitative data analysis for quantitative data and qualitative data analysis for qualitative data. Data collected using questionnaire will be analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The information will be presented in the form of tabulations, frequencies and percentages. Data collected using interview schedule will be analyzed using the thematic analysis. The data will be presented in a narrative form.

3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical considerations are a set of moral principles which offers rules and behavioural expectations about the most correct towards experimental subjects, respondents, employers, sponsors, other researchers, assistants and students (De Vos, 2009:57). Ethical issues arise from the kind of problems that social scientists investigate and the methods used to obtain valid and reliable data. Ethical considerations are a list of principles and guidelines offered by professional organisations to guide research practices and to clarify behaviours that are ethical (Neuman, 2000:89). Bless et al, (2006:140) defined ethics as a way of helping to prevent research abuse and assist investigation in understanding their responsibilities as ethical scholars. The ethics that were considered in this research are as follows:

3.8.1 Informed consent

Informed consent is a statement, usually written that explains aspects of a study of participants and asks their voluntary agreement to participate in the study before it begins (Neuman, 2006:135). In this study participants will informed about the purpose, risk, benefits and the

duration or the period the research is going to take. The researcher shall ask for respondents' consent for them to voluntarily participate rather than to force them. Prior to the beginning of the exercise or during the exercise participants have the right to decide not to participate or continue to participate if they feel uncomfortable. In addition, to that all the participants who decide to participate shall be informed about the nature of the study before the start of the research. This is done to debrief them about expectations that might arise during the course of the study.

3.8.2 Confidentiality and anonymity

Bless et al (2006:14) defined confidentiality as a way of maintaining confidence in sensitive and personal information and should be protected and made unavailable to other persons than for academic reasons. The participants will also be informed and assured about confidentiality and anonymity in their participation. In other words the data of research participants will be kept confidential and will not be discussed with any other person except for academic purposes. This means that all the information collected for this research will be treated as confidential as possible.

3.8.3 Privacy of the subject

Privacy refers to the capacity of individuals to control when and under what conditions others have access to their behaviour, beliefs and values (Baumgartner and Hensley 2009:105). This will allow the participation of respondents anonymously. In this study respondents' privacy will be respected, their private information will not be intruded upon without their consent.

3.8.4 Anonymity

Anonymity is the ethical protection that participants remain nameless. Their identity is protected from disclosure and remains unknown (Neuman, 2006:139). For the purposes of this study, the personal information of the participants that can lead to their identity will not be disclosed. Personal details or identifying particulars of the respondents will not be disclosed. Anonymity will also be insured in which the respondents will not write down their names or any personality identification.

3.8.5 No harm to participants

The no harm to participants' principle suggests that the researcher should avoid harming respondents in any way: emotionally physically or psychologically (Goddard and Melville, 2001:49). In this study the subjects will not be harmed in any way, either physically or psychologically. The welfare of the respondents will take precedence throughout the study.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter addressed the following issues research design, research methodologies, study area, study population, sampling, data collection method, data analysis, the ethical considerations relevant to the study. In other words, the chapter outlined the research methodology and the steps with which the researcher took in the data collection exercise.

4.2 Analysis of data collected through questionnaires

4.2.1 Section A: Personal information of the respondents

This section presents and interprets the data about the personal information of the respondents in the study. Personal information of the participants are as follows. Gender, Ages, and departments in which the participants belong.

Table 4.1: Gender of respondents

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Males	27	60%
Females	18	40%
Total	45	100%

Table 4.1 shows that the study was more male than female. As shown on the table males contributed 27 which is about 60% of the total sample while females contributed 18 participants who make 40% of the sample size. The table indicates that the study was gender balanced since

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents, interprets and analyses the data gathered at Masvingo Municipal Council where officials from different departments took part. The data is presented according to the subsections reflected in the research instruments (questionnaire and interview) used in the data gathering exercise. The data collected by the questionnaire was analysed using the SPSS and will be presented in tables. The information gathered through the interview was analysed thematically and will be presented narratively. The data presented in tables represent information gathered from a sample of 45 participants composed of public officials based at Masvingo Municipality. The data presented narratively represent information gathered from a sample of 5 participants who also public officials but did not form part of the sample that completed questionnaires.

4.2 Analysis of data collected through questionnaires

4.2.1 Section A: Personal information of the respondents

This section presents and interprets the data about the personal information of the respondents in the study. Personal information of the participants are as follows, Gender, Ages, and departments in which the participants belong.

Table 4.1: Gender of respondents

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Males	27	60%
Females	18	40%
Total	45	100%

Table 4.1 shows that the study had more males than females. As shown on the table males constituted 27 which is about 60% of the total sample while females contributed 18 participants who make 40% of the sample size. The table reveals that the study was gender balanced since

both were represented though males dominated females. The results indicated that male participated more than females. The table also makes one to conclude that males dominates the workforce at the municipality as shown by the representation.

Table 4.2: Age of respondents

Age Range	Frequency	Percentage
20-30 years	7	15.5 %
31-40 years	12	26.7 %
41-50 years	16	35.6 %
51-60 years	7	15.5 %
61 and above	3	6.7 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.2 reveals that the 41-50 years age group dominated that study. It contributed 16 participants who constitutes about 35.6% of the population under study. This is followed by the 31-40 years age group with 12 participants constituting 26.7% of the sample. Both the 20-30 and the 51-60 age groups contributed 7 participants each contributing 15.6%. The study revealed that the 41-50 age group is the main age group that dominates at the municipality.

Table 4.3: Position of respondents

Departments	Frequency	Percentage
Councillors	4	9 %
Water and sanitation	6	13.3 %
Chamber secretary	7	15.6 %
City treasurer	1	2.2 %
Health services	5	11.1 %
Urban Planning	5	11.1 %
Engineering services	5	11.1 %
Human resources	6	13.3 %
Amenities	6	13.3 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.3 shown above indicates the number of departments in which the participants who took part in study were drawn from. The Chamber secretary contributed 7 participants which stand as the highest number of participants as compared other departments who took part. The 7 participants make up 15.6 % of the population that took part in the study. This was followed by the water and sanitation, human resources and Amenities that contributed each 6 participants

recording 13.3% respectively. The next group which consists of the Health services, urban planning and Engineering services each contributed 5 participants which make 11.1% respectively. Councillors contributed 4 respondents which constituted 9% of the population that took part in the study. The chamber secretary contributed the highest number of respondents constituting 15.6% of the total sample.

4.2.2 SECTION B: THE CHALLENGES FACING MASVINGO LOCAL COUNCIL IN IMPLEMENTING THE URBAN COUNCIL'S ACT

4.2.2.1 The challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Council's Act

This section presents and interprets the data on the challenges of presented by the Urban Council's Act on the Urban Councils.

Table 4.4: Masvingo local council is legally protected by the Urban Councils Act

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	2	4.4 %
Agree	9	20.0 %
Not sure	11	24.4 %
Disagree	13	29 %
Strongly disagree	10	22.2 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.4 reveals that 23 respondents who constituted 51.2% of the total sample disagreed with the statement that Masvingo municipal council are legally protected by the Urban Councils Act while 11 respondents who constituted 24.4% of the total respondents agreed that local authorities are legally protected by the Urban Council's Act. Among the respondents who participated, 11 respondents were not sure about the statement and they constituted 24.4 % as shown on the table. Therefore, the results lead one to conclude that city council is not legally protected by the Urban Council's Act.

Table 4.5: Masvingo local council has powers to make by-laws

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	6	13.3 %
Not sure	13	29 %
Disagree	20	44.4 %
Strongly disagree	5	11.1 %
Total	45	100 %

The table 4.5 above indicates that 7 respondents who constituted 15.5% of the total sample agreed that local authorities have powers to make by-laws. At the same time 13 respondents who 29% of the total sample size was not sure of the statement. However, 25 respondents disagreed with the notion constituting 55.5% of the population under study. The majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement. The fact that the majority of the respondents disagreed clearly indicates that Masvingo local council lack powers to make by laws on their own.

Table 4.6: Masvingo local council has enough fiscal generating powers

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	9	20 %
Not sure	9	20 %
Disagree	12	26.7 %
Strongly disagree	14	31.1 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.6 above reveals that 10 participants who constituted 22.2% agreed with the notion that local authorities have enough fiscal generating powers. However, 26 participants who constituted 57.8% disagreed with the idea. The majority of the respondents revealed that the local council does not have enough fiscal generating powers. Table 4.6, indicates that, 9 participants who make up 20% of the sample were not sure, suggesting that they lack knowledge of the subject. Basing on the results one can conclude that the local council does not have enough fiscal generating powers.

Table 4.7: Borrowing powers of Masvingo local council

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	2	4.4 %
Agree	13	29 %
Not sure	11	24.4 %
Disagree	11	24.4 %
Strongly disagree	8	17.8 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.7 reveals that 15 participants who make up 33.4% agreed with the idea that Masvingo urban council has enough borrowing powers from the government. About 11 participants who make up 24.4% were not sure. However, 19 participants who constituted 42.2% disagreed with the idea. The results therefore, suggest that Masvingo urban council does not have enough borrowing powers from the central government.

Table 4.8: Legal guidance in the distribution of grants

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	10	22.2 %
Not sure	14	31.1 %
Disagree	14	31.1 %
Strongly disagree	6	13.3 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.8 depicts that 11 respondents who contributed 24.4% on the table agreed that local authorities have legal guidance in the distribution of grants. 14 participants who contributed 31.1% on the table were not sure. The table further reveals that 20 participants who constituted 44.4% of the sample group disagreed with the notion that the urban council has legal guidance in the distribution of grants. Thus, the results indicate that the local authority lack legal guidance in the distribution of grants as shown by results on the table.

Table 4.9: Masvingo local council design its own budgets

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	3	6.7 %
Agree	9	20 %
Not sure	9	20 %
Disagree	16	35.5 %
Strongly disagree	8	17.8 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.9 illustrates that 12 respondents who contributed 26.7% agreed that urban councils design their own budgets. The table 4.9 further shows that 9 participants who constituted 20% were not sure. The table also reveals that 24 participants who constituted 53.3% disagreed with the idea. The findings therefore revealed that the local council does not design their own budget independently.

Table 4.10: Masvingo local council has a good relationship with the Minister of Local Government

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	7	15.6 %
Not sure	10	22.2 %
Disagree	13	28.9 %
Strongly disagree	14	31.1 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.10 reveals that 8 respondents who constituted 17.8% agreed with the notion that Masvingo urban council has a good relationship with the Minister of Local Government. In addition, 10 respondents who constituted 22.2 were not sure of the assertion. Table 4.10 also reveals that 27 respondents who constituted 60% disagreed with the assertion that urban councils have a good working relationship with the Minister of Local Government. It can be concluded that indeed the urban council does not have a good working relationship with the Minister of Local Government.

Table 4.11: Masvingo local council public officials are elected by the electorate

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	3	6.7 %
Agree	10	22.2 %
Not sure	16	35.5 %
Disagree	7	15.6 %
Strongly disagree	9	20 %
Total	45	100 %

The Table 4.11 reveals that, 13 respondents who were 29.9% of the sample agreed that public officials are elected by the electorate while 16 respondents who make up 35.6 of sample group disagreed with the assertion. Among them 16 respondents were not sure contributing 35.6% of the sample. Majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement entailing that public officials are not only elected by the people.

4.2.2.2 The causes of poor service delivery at Masvingo urban council

This section presents and interprets the data on causes of poor service delivery at Masvingo local council in Zimbabwe.

Table 4.12: Masvingo local council workers are skilled

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2
Agree	9	20
Not sure	10	22.2
Disagree	14	31.2
Strongly disagree	11	24.4
Total	45	100

Table 4.12 illustrates that 10 respondents who make 22.2% of the population under study agreed that the council workers are skilled to discharge their duties well. However, 25 respondents who constitute 55.5% confirmed that they disagreed with the idea that the council workers are skilled. Amongst them are 10 respondents who constitute 22.2% who were not sure. The fact that the majority disagreed is a clear indication that not all the workers of the council are skilled.

Table 4.13: Masvingo local council has autonomy to make by-laws

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	2	4.4 %
Agree	6	13.3 %
Not sure	2	4.4 %
Disagree	19	42.2 %
Strongly disagree	16	35.6 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.13 illustrates that 8 participants who make up 17.7% agreed that urban councils have autonomy to make their own by-laws independently while 35 participants who constituted 77.8% disagreed that the council has autonomy to make by-laws. Only 2 respondents with a percentage of 4.4% were not sure. Therefore, 77.8% is the majority that responded negatively to the assertion. This leads one to conclude that the council does not have autonomy to make by-laws.

Table 4.14: Masvingo local council workers discourage corruption

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	8	17.9 %
Not sure	11	24.4 %
Disagree	11	24.4 %
Strongly disagree	14	31.1 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.14 above indicates that 9 participants who constituted of 20% of the total sample confirmed that they agree that the local council workers discourage corruption. However, 25 participants who constitute 55.5% on the table disagreed that local council workers discourage corruption. The table 4.14 further indicates that, 11 participants who make 24.4% of the total sample were not sure. Thus, with the majority rejecting the notion it can be concluded that the local authority workers are corrupt.

Table 4.15: Masvingo local council has enough funds to run its activities

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	4	8.9 %
Agree	9	20 %
Not sure	12	26.7 %
Disagree	13	28.9 %
Strongly disagree	7	15.6 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.15 illustrates that 11 participants who formed part of the sample group and constitute 29.9% agreed that local municipalities have enough funds to run their activities. The table also indicates that, 12 of the participants were not sure while 20 participants who constituted 44.5% of the total sample disagreed that with the claim that the local municipality has enough funds to run its activities. Thus, the table shows that the local municipality lack adequate funds to run its activities.

Table 4.16: Masvingo local council has the required infrastructure resources to provide services

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	0	0
Agree	9	20 %
Not sure	12	26.7 %
Disagree	11	24.4 %
Strongly disagree	13	28.9 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.16 shown above illustrates that those who agreed are 9 participants who contributed 20% of the total sample. Those who were not sure were 12 participants who constituted 26.7% on the table while those who disagreed were 24 participants constituting 53.3% on the table. Thus, the majority of the participants confirmed that the city council lack vital infrastructure required to provide basic services. One may conclude therefore, that lack of infrastructure hinder the city council to provide effective and efficient service delivery.

Table 4.17: Masvingo local council workers are given good salaries and in time

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	2	4.4 %
Agree	8	17.8 %
Not sure	8	17.8 %
Disagree	16	35.6 %
Strongly disagree	11	24.4 %
Total	45	100 %

The table 4.17 above indicates that 10 respondents who constitute 22.2% of the total sample agreed that local council workers in Zimbabwe are given good salaries and in time while 8 participants who make up 17.8% were not sure of the statement. However, 27 participants who consisted of 60.0% of the total sample disagreed with the notion, thus suggesting that local council workers are not fully paid.

Table 4.18: Masvingo local council has all the powers to generate revenue

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	3	6.7 %
Agree	6	13.3 %
Not sure	15	33.3 %
Disagree	13	28.9 %
Strongly disagree	8	17.8 %
Total	45	100 %

The table 4.18 indicates that 9 participants who constitute 20% of the total sample agreed that Masvingo local authority has the powers necessary to generate revenue, with 15 participants who were not sure contributing 33.3% of the total sample. Further, 21 participants who constituted 46.7% of the total sample disagreed. Thus, since the majority disagreed with the idea, the one may conclude that the local authority lack powers to generate revenue on its own.

Table 4.19: Elected councillors are skilled

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	0	0
Agree	8	17.8 %
Not sure	12	26.7 %
Disagree	13	28.8 %
Strongly disagree	12	26.7 %
Total	45	100 %

As shown on the table 4.19 8 participants who constitutes of 17.8% agreed that all elected councillors are skilled enough to provide their services to the people. On the other hand 25 participants disagreed with the notion constituting 55.6%. The table also indicates that 12 respondents constituting 26.7% of the sample were not sure of the statement. Thus, basing on the results, it can be concluded that not all elected councillors are skilled enough to provide services to the people.

Table 4.20: Masvingo local council decisions are made by agreement of all council members

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	3	6.7 %
Agree	8	17.8 %
Not sure	5	11.1 %
Disagree	9	20 %
Strongly disagree	20	44.4 %
Total	45	100 %

The table 4.20 above shows that 11 participants who constitute 24.5% agreed with the notion that urban council decision are made by agreement of all council members. In addition, 5 participants who constitute 11.1% remained neutral while 29 participants who constituted 64.4% of the total sample disagreed with the statement. Basing on the results it can be concluded that Masvingo urban council decisions are not made by agreement of all council members.

Table 4.21: Residents pay municipal services in time

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	2	4.4 %
Not sure	10	22.3 %
Disagree	17	37.8 %
Strongly disagree	15	33.3 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.21 indicates that 3 respondents who constitute 6.8% agreed with the statement that residents pay municipal services in time, while 10 participants who make up 22.2% of the total sample were not sure. However, 32 participants who constituted 71.1% disagreed that residents pay municipal services in time. Thus, the results suggested indeed that residents do not pay for municipal services in time.

4.2.2.3 Strategies that can be used to prevent the challenges

This section presents, interprets and analyse the data on the views of the respondents with regard to the strategies that can help prevent the current challenges.

Table 4.22: Officials at Masvingo local municipality are appointed based on merit

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	10	22.2 %
Not sure	8	17.8 %
Disagree	14	31.1 %
Strongly disagree	12	26.7 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.22 illustrates that 11 participants with 24.4% agreed that officials in Local government are appointed based on merit. At the same time 8 participants recording 17.8% on the table were not sure on the issue. However, 26 participants who constituted of 57.8% of the total sample size disagreed with the statement. Given the results it can be concluded that officials in local government are not appointed based on merit alone.

Table 4.23: All sections of the Urban Councils Act work for the betterment of service delivery

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	0	0
Agree	8	17.8 %
Not sure	6	13.3 %
Disagree	15	33.3 %
Strongly disagree	16	35.6 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.23 indicates that 8 participants with a percentage of 17.8% agreed that all sections of the Urban Councils Act work for the betterment of service delivery. Further the table 4.23 indicates that 6 participants with a percentage of 13.3% were not sure while 31 respondents with 68.9% disagreed with the statement that all sections of the Urban Councils Act work for the betterment of service delivery. Thus, since the majority disagreed one may conclude that not all sections of the Act work for the betterment of service delivery.

Table 4.24: The constitution empowers Masvingo local council to promote service delivery

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	3	6.7 %
Agree	10	22.2 %
Not sure	7	15.6 %
Disagree	16	35.5 %
Strongly disagree	9	20 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.24 shows that 13 participants recording 28.9% agreed that the constitution empowers urban local councils to promote service delivery. The table indicates that, 7 respondents constituting 15.6% were not sure about the statement. Further, 23 respondents with 55.6% however, disagreed with the assertion that the constitution empowers the local council to promote service delivery. As the majority stated, therefore, the constitution does not empower Masvingo local council to promote service delivery.

Table 4.25: Councillors are appointed through elections

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	2	4.4 %
Agree	14	31.1 %
Not sure	14	31.1 %
Disagree	8	17.8 %
Strongly disagree	7	15.6 %
Total	45	100 %

Table 4.25 depicts that 16 participants with 35.5% agreed that the councillors are appointed through elections. The table also indicates that 14 participants with 31.1% were not sure while 15 respondents with 33.4% disagreed with the statement that councillors are appointed only through elections. Basing on the results given on the table one may conclude that councillors are not only appointed through elections but through other means.

Table 4.26: Public officials consult residences on matters of service delivery

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2 %
Agree	7	15.6 %
Not sure	12	26.7 %
Disagree	14	31.1 %
Strongly disagree	11	24.4 %
Total	45	100 %

On the table 4.26 above it is depicted that 8 respondents constituting 17.8% agreed that public officials consult residences on matters of service delivery. In addition to that, 12 respondents with 26.7% were not sure of the statement while 25 respondents constituting 55.5% disagreed with the idea. Thus, since the majority disagreed with the statement one may conclude that public officials do not consult residences on matters of service delivery.

4.3 Analysis and interpretation of qualitative data

An interview schedule with three research questions was prepared to guide the interviews. The interview were conducted one on one in which the research noted down the data on a separate piece of paper. The interviews were done in the offices of the respondents at Masvingo

Municipal Offices. All ethical issues pertaining to the conduct of interview were clearly observed.

4.3.1 Challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act.

Participant 1 indicated that:

“There are serious shortcomings in the implementation of the urban council’s act in local authorities. Masvingo local authority does not have a free standing and fairly autonomous level of government. The city council is often taken as objects of political fighting between political parties. Members of council’s in the city council are often divided on decisions based on political affiliation and differences.”

Participant 2 revealed that:

There are a number of challenges the local government system is facing in all urban local councils in Zimbabwe. It seems there is more emphasis on political party’s matters than on delivering services to the citizens. Most councillors that elected on political party basis usually do not have the minimum qualifications to the extent some cannot even read nor write. In addition, quality of citizen participation is poor because councillor meetings are on political party basis. MDC supporters attend MDC councillor meetings and ZANU PF followers attend ZANU PF meetings. This politicization of council activities discourages general participation.

Participant 3 revealed that:

“The urban council’s act attaches delegated powers to urban local councils in Zimbabwe. In this case local council have their powers residing with the central government. As a result this has compromised the capacity of the Masvingo City council to deliver services to the people efficiently and effectively. UCs lack of power and protection by the urban councils act has resulted in undermining their revenue bases.”

Participant 4 also revealed that:

“The urban councils act renders limited powers to the UCs. Meaning that, the Masvingo city council cannot make by-laws without the approval of the Minister of Local Government. By-laws that are formed by the council wait for the approval of the minister. Sometimes the approvals are delayed in the process affecting the delivery of services timeously. Thus, this central government interference stifles efficient and effective supply of services to citizens.”

Participant 5 had this say:

“Urban local councils in Zimbabwe are denied the ability to work independently; as such they are forced to work under the direct control of central government. The Minister of Local Government has the powers to determine tariffs and residential rates in each municipality across the country. For example, in July 2013 just before the elections the minister called all the urban councils to cancel all debt of residences and rate payers. As a result the municipality lost millions of dollars of revenue that was going to assist the councils in service delivery. This directive has caused many municipalities including Masvingo to generate revenue that run far short of the council’s expenditure.”

4.3.2 The causes of poor service delivery in Zimbabwe urban councils.

Participant 1:

“One of the major causes of poor service delivery at Masvingo local municipality is that the council personnel are poorly remunerated and lack adequate incentives. This largely contributed to the exodus of skilled and qualified personnel due to poor salaries and state of affairs. Thus, the absence of skilled and adequate personnel exacerbates the deterioration of delivering of services to the people.”

Participant 2:

“Corruption stands as the prime cause of poor service delivery in many local councils in Zimbabwe where the senior officials are involved in bribery, extortion, and nepotism. With many residence on the waiting list for stands here in Masvingo, those in authority are grabbing stands at cheaper prices and then sell them at exorbitant prices. In some instances they offer them to

those who can afford to bribe the council officials. The council officials tend to give preference to those that are able to offer better bribes due to shortages of stands. These practices militate against the council's effort to reduce the number of residences on the waiting, thus exacerbating poor service delivery.”

Participant 3:

“Many of the councillors who were elected by different parties are illiterate and old aged. They tend to forget and not contribute to policy formulation and enforcement of by-laws. In this instance there is usually poor communication between the councils and the citizens because the councillors are not doing their intended duties.”

Participant 4:

“Most of the decisions taken by the councils are usually one-sided. Citizen participation is weak because the entire process is centred within the local authority. For example budget formulation is not deliberative. Budget formulation is often done by councillors without feedback of the citizens. Residents often complaint that what is agreed in the meeting turns not to be much from the council budget. In other words budget consultations are mere presentations of what has already been prepared.”

Participant 5:

“Poor funding of local councils is one cause that continue to affect their service delivery year and after. Due to the limited powers of the local council to create their own revenue base they are usually left stranded by the central government that keeps on giving promises that are usually not fulfilled. Lack of funding has led to the deterioration of provision of services most especially in the high density suburbs of Mucheke, Aphiri and Rujeko. For example, the supply of water is very erratic because the council lacks the funds to buy chemical to purify the water in order to make it safe for drinking. In addition, rubbish bins that used to be collected on weekly bases are now collected monthly owing to shortage of fuel to run the trucks.”

4.3.3 Strategies that can be adopted to prevent the current challenges.

Participant 1:

“There is need for reforms on the current legislation such as the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) which concentrate powers on the Minister of Local Government. Reforms should be put in place that make sure that power is equitable shared by all stakeholders in the running of local government in Zimbabwe in order that there are checks and balances. The current scenario in which the Minister enjoys sweeping powers has in some instances led to abuse of power and corruption. In addition stiffer penalties need to be put in place in order to curb public officials convicted of corruption charges.”

Participant 2:

“In order for the Masvingo local authority to work effectively, it must its own source of revenue base. It should be allowed to charge for the services and rates within its area of jurisdiction subject. In addition, there should be a very clear and transparent revenue sharing mechanism between the state and subnational lower levels of governments. These mechanisms will make sure that the local authorities are not left stranded as the situation used to be. In this instance all urban local authorities are expected to provide all the necessary services and infrastructure to the people within their respective areas of jurisdiction. These include housing, education, health services, water, sewage, roads and dams etc.”

Participant 3:

“As a public official I feel that it is important that during the councils is taking important decisions for example reconstruction process Masvingo local council officials and local residents should be encouraged to work together. Service delivery priorities should be developed in concert with communities and their representatives. The budget consultation process for example should be developed into a more participatory activity in which available financial resources are linked to decision making. Citizen participation encourage residents to engage in local affairs.”

Participant 4:

“Remuneration of public officials should often be evaluated in line with the current inflation levels. This is done in order to avoid the current situation whereby public officials are concentrating on doing their own business at the expense of council business. In addition to that the local councils should put in place a system that will encourage rate payers to pay up their debts in time. The payments are crucial in cushioning the council funding demands and will go a long way in assisting the council to pay its workers.”

Participant 5:

“Local councillors badly need training in the skills necessary to work effectively in the council. The training should include lessons on their rights and responsibilities. This will rectify the problems that are being encountered in which residences are complaining that the councillors cannot read or write and the fact that they will be able to carry out the work they are elected to do. Training programmes should be put in place in order to equip council workers of the current international standards that are required of council workers. All the local council posts should be refilled by qualified staff in order to avoid the continuation of brain drain.”

4.4 Conclusion

The chapter presented and interpreted the data to be utilised on the recommendations of the findings on the next chapter. The chapter consists of information gathered from the respondents. The information was gathered through the quantitative and qualitative methods in which a questionnaire and an interview guide were used to capture the data from the respondents. 45 participants took part in completing the questionnaire and 5 participants completed the interview schedule. All in all 50 participants took part in the study giving the study a 100% participation rate.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The main thrust of the study was to investigate the challenges facing urban council's in Zimbabwe in implementing the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) with regard to service delivery. The study utilised both quantitative and qualitative research designs. In other words a questionnaire and an interview guide were to gather the data. The collected data was analysed using the SPSS and thematically respectively. This chapter will present the major findings of the study and draw the conclusions and recommendations. It discusses the major findings and finally draws the conclusions and recommendations. The findings were discussed in line with the aims, and objectives of the study.

5.2 MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The study comprised of 50 participants of which 45 completed the structured questionnaire and remaining 5 answered the interview. The findings were analysed as follows:

5.2.1 Challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Council's Act

Based on the findings from the public officers, the researcher can conclude that there a number of challenges facing urban council's in the implementation of the Urban Council's Act. The public officials revealed that local authorities are not legally protected by the Urban Council's Act. This was revealed by majority of the participants. The study also revealed that Masvingo local authority does not have powers to make by-laws on its own. In addition, the majority of the respondents revealed that local authorities do not have fiscal generating power. This was confirmed by more than half of the participants who took part in the study. Further, majority of the participants also confirmed that Masvingo local council does not have fiscal generating powers.

The study also revealed that urban council's in Zimbabwe lack legal guidance in the distribution of grants. This was confirmed by some of the participants who made up the sample group. At the

same time, over half of the participants indicated that urban council's do not have powers to design their own budgets. This was indicated by more than half of the total sample. About two-thirds of the total sample indicated that Masvingo city council does not have a good working relationship with the Minister of Local Government. More than a third of the population under study indicated that public officials are not only elected by the electorate only.

5.2.2 Causes of poor of service delivery at Masvingo local council

Majority of the participants indicated that most of the urban council workers are not skilled. This was confirmed by half of the total sample. The study also revealed more than three-quarters of the participants in the study indicated that the city council in does not have autonomy to make by-laws. Over two-thirds of the population confirmed that. Further, the study also indicated that most of the workers at Masvingo local council are corrupt. This was indicated by a population that was slightly above half of the total sample. The study also showed that majority of the participants stated that Masvingo local council does not have enough funds to run its activities. This concluded that indeed the local municipality lack adequate funds to deliver services to the people.

More than half of the participants further showed that urban councils lack vital infrastructure required to provide service delivery to the people. The majority of the study participants also exposed that local council workers are not fully paid and are not paid in time. This was confirmed a more than half of the participants who took in the study. Furthermore, nearly half of the participants who took part in the study indicated that the local authority lack powers to generate revenue on their own.

More than half of the participants indicated that the majority of the elected councillors at Masvingo local council are not skilled enough to provide services to the people. In addition, over two-thirds of the population under study indicated that Masvingo local council decisions in Zimbabwe are not made by agreement of all council members. Nearly three-quarters of the participants indicated that most residents or rate payers did not pay their dues in time thus undermining the delivery of services.

5.2.3 Strategies that can be used to prevent challenges

The study came up with the following strategies that can be used to prevent the current challenges. More than half of the participants who took part in the study confirmed that most of the officials who work urban local councils are not appointed based on merit. Further, the study revealed that the majority of the sections in the Urban Council's Act the principal act that directs the activities of the urban councils does not work for the betterment of service delivery.

Further, the study confirmed that the constitution does not empower the urban councils to promote service delivery. This was revealed by more than half of the total sample. Furthermore, the study also revealed that most of the councillors are not elected through elections. This was showed by nearly a third of the total participants who took part in the study.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

Based on the findings of the study the researcher came up with the following recommendations: Masvingo local council should be allowed to charge for the services and rates within its area of jurisdiction subject to guidelines provided by the central government. In this case there should also be a clear and transparent revenue sharing mechanism between the state and the sub national levels of government. The local authority is expected to provide all the necessary services and infrastructure to the people within their respective areas of jurisdiction. These should include housing, education, health services, water, sewage, roads and dams.

Masvingo local council should be given a free environment to generate funds on their own. This should include the fact that urban councils must be empowered to enact by-laws to raise local revenue, regulate various activities and implement necessary projects within their areas of jurisdiction. However, the by-laws should be in conformity with the supreme law of the land. Local government policies should put in place rules and regulations that make budget consultations mandatory. Elected personnel should account for previous revenues as a basis for justifying any financial obligation on citizens. The citizens should also be partakers of the budget making process. The Masvingo local council should take this as an opportunity to approve, amend, rearrange and improve their by-laws.

Moreover, there should be established minimum electoral qualifications for councillors which should include educational qualifications and the fact that councillors should reside in areas they represent in order to avoid and do away with non-resident councillors who end up neglecting their areas or wards. Further, this can induce and promote informed and knowledge based discussions and debates in council chambers. The Urban Councils Act should be amended to provide for recall of leaders where citizens are dissatisfied with the performance of the elected leaders. The current legislation on local government grants unfettered power to the Minister of Local Government. Granting too much power to the Minister takes away the initiative from local councils and opens up avenues for manipulation and corruption. In this regard the study recommend that the Minister's primary role be limited to policy formulation and supervision rather than being involved in the day to day activities of local councils.

5.4 SUMMARY

The study investigated about the challenges facing local urban councils in Zimbabwe in implementing the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1996. The study had the following objectives: to discuss the challenges facing urban councils in Zimbabwe in implementing the urban council act, to investigate the causes of poor service delivery in urban councils and to determine the strategies that can be used to prevent the occurrence of the challenges.


The results that there are so many challenges facing urban councils in implementing the urban councils act which included the fact that local authorities are not legally protected by the Urban Council Act, local municipalities do not have enough powers to make by-laws on their own, local urban councils do not have enough fiscal generating powers to raise funds to run their activities, local councils do not the powers to make their own budgets independently from the central government.

The study also identified causes of poor service delivery in urban local councils. The identified causes were that urban council workers are not skilled enough to provide service delivery, urban councils workers are corrupt, local urban councils do not have enough to run their day to day activities, urban council do have the required infrastructural resources to provide services, local government in Zimbabwe do not get good salaries and in time, and residents do not pay municipal services in time.

The study further identified the strategies that can be adopted to prevent the occurrences of the challenges. The study revealed that there are serious shortcomings in the implementation of the current local government policy. There is much inconsistency between the policy and actual practice. The study concluded that there is need to generate a local government policy that put in place the proposed recommendations. Local authorities must be granted the autonomy to generate funds on their own. Additionally, urban councils must be empowered to enact by-laws to raise local revenue, regulate various activities and implement necessary projects within their areas of jurisdiction. Central government interference through the Minister of Local Government should be avoided through limiting the powers of the Minister through limiting his/her duties to policy formulation and supervision. Further, the study proposed that budget consultations with the civil society must be made a mandate rather than an exception. Regular consultation must be carried in order to ensure participatory local governance system.

5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The study carried out by the researcher was geographically limited to the Masvingo Municipality. Thus, the researcher recommends that further studies of the challenges facing urban councils be carried out in other urban councils in order to make generalised findings on the subject. Further, there is a need to understand the views of the residents or rate payers in those urban councils on how they receive services from the urban councils. This will help the government to come up with proper policies that will help promote service delivery to all citizens.



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SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

21 October 2013

Town Clerk
Masvingo Municipality


**REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO COLLECT INFORMATION FOR
STUDIES OF MAHOSO O- STUDENT NO: 11576151.**

The above matter refers.

We hereby wish to confirm that Mr. Mahoso O (Student No.: 11576151) is a registered Master of Public Management student at the University of Venda. He is researching on the following topic: **“Challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Council’s Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe”**.

In order for him to complete his studies, we request your municipality to provide him with the information that he might need for his study project. As an institution of higher learning, we believe that the research he is undertaking will yield the results that might also assist your municipality. We for this reason encourage your municipality to provide him with the necessary information that will be collected through questionnaires and interviews from the councillors, chamber secretary, city treasurer, health services, urban planning, engineering services, human resources, amenities and water and sanitation **personnel. We undertake that whatever information will be provided to him will be solely used for this studies. We also undertake that we will also supply you with the results once the study is completed for your own use.**

We hope that you find this to be in order and therefore, anticipate your assistance.


.....
Professor M.P. Khwashaba
Deputy Dean: School of Management Sciences



University of Venda

SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES
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LIMPOPO PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA
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FAX 015 962 4749

Ingutsheni Central Hospital

P. O. Box 8363

Belmont Industrial Area

Bulawayo,

Zimbabwe

INSTRUCTIONS

Respondents are requested to answer all the questions.
All information provided is going to be kept confidential.

SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

1. Gender

Female	
Male	

Dear Respondent

I am a Master of Public Management student at the University of Venda currently carrying out a study on the topic: "Challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe".

2. Age

20-30 years	
31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
61 and above	

The researcher seeks to investigate the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996. The study is being conducted for academic purposes and all the information you provide will be held with confidence and you will not be identified in any way.


You are requested to provide as honest information as possible.

Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

3. The sign

Conventions	
Characteristics	
City names	
Health services	
Urban planning	
Engineering	
Planning and	
Human resources	
Accounting	
Water and Sanitation	

Yours faithfully,



OSCAH MAHOSO

Email: oscasmahoso@yahoo.com

Cell: +26377 479 9697

QUESTIONNAIRE - CHALLENGES FACING MASVINGO LOCAL COUNCIL IN IMPLEMENTING THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT [CHAPTER 29:15] OF 1996 WITH REGARD TO SERVICE DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE

INSTRUCTIONS

Respondents are requested to answer all the questions. There is no correct or incorrect answer. All information provided is going to be kept confidential. Choose the answer that applies to you.

SECTION A. BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

1. Gender

Female	
Male	

2. Age

20-30 years	
31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
61 and above	

3. The department you belong to

Councillors	
Chamber secretary	
City treasurer	
Health services	
Urban planning	
Engineering services	
Housing and community services	
Human resources	
Amenities	
Water and Sanitation	

SECTION B: CHALLENGES FACING MASVINGO LOCAL COUNCIL IN IMPLEMENTING THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT [CHAPTER 29:15] OF 1996 WITH REGARD TO SERVICE DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE

	Challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] of 1996 with regard to service delivery in Zimbabwe	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1	Masvingo local council is legally protected by the Urban Councils Act.					
2	Masvingo local municipality has enough powers to make by laws.					
3	Masvingo local council has enough fiscal generating powers.					
4	Masvingo local council has enough borrowing powers from the government.					
5	Masvingo local council has legal guidance in the distribution of grants.					
6	Masvingo local council has the powers to design its own budgets.					
7	Masvingo local council has a good working relationship with the Minister of Local Government.					
8	Masvingo local council public officials are elected by the electorate.					

	The causes of poor service delivery at Masvingo local council	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree
9	Masvingo local council workers are skilled to provide service delivery.					
10	Masvingo local council has autonomy to make by laws.					
11	Masvingo local council officials discourage corruption in the discharge of their duties					

12	Masvingo local council has enough funds to run its day to day activities.					
13	Masvingo local council has the required infrastructural resources to provide services.					
14	Masvingo local council workers get good salaries and in time.					
15	Masvingo local council has all the powers to generate revenue.					
16	All elected councilors are skilled enough to provide their services to the people.					
17	Masvingo local council decisions are made by agreement of all council members.					
18	Residents pay municipal services in time.					

26. What are the strategies that can be used to prevent the current challenges?

	What are the strategies that can be used to prevent the current challenges?	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree
19	Officials at Masvingo local council are appointed based on merit.					
20	All sections of the Urban Councils Act work for the betterment of service delivery in Masvingo.					
21	The constitution empowers Masvingo local council to promote service delivery.					
22	Councillors at Masvingo local council are appointed through elections.					
23	Public officials at Masvingo local council consult residences on matters of service delivery.					

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - CHALLENGES FACING MASVINGO LOCAL COUNCIL IN IMPLEMENTING THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT [CHAPTER 29:15] OF 1996 WITH REGARD TO SERVICE DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE

24. What are the challenges facing Masvingo local council in implementing the Urban Councils Act?
25. What are the causes of poor service delivery at Masvingo local council?
26. What are the strategies that can be used to prevent the current challenges?