THE ROLE OF YOUTHS IN ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION STRUGGLE: A CASE STUDY OF BULILIMA DISTRICT, 1960 – 1980.

BY

CHRISTOPHER NGWENYA

STUDENT NO: 11641129

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UNIVERSITY OF VENDA

Student: Mr. C. Ngwenya ……

PROMOTER: PROF. R. MOLAPO ……

CO-PROMOTER: PROF. C. NDEBELE ……

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Declaration

I ……declare that this thesis for the degree Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the University of Venda hereby submitted has not previously been submitted by me or any other person for a degree at this or any other University. This is my own work in design and execution and all materials contained therein have been duly consulted.

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Dedication

In addition to my lovely daughters, Cindy, Cynthia and Caroline, my humble mother, Mrs. E. Ngwenya, I dedicate this work to the strength and the enduring spirit of the people of Bulilima District.

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Acknowledgement

First and foremost, this study is a product of help from various people. The first people to thank are my two Professors, R.R. Molapo and C. Ndebele for their professional guidance as early as I began working on my proposal until the final thesis draft. Gentlemen, I salute you.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AK 47	Avtomat – Kalashnikova, 47
AU	African Union
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BDF	Botswana Defence Forces
BSA Co	British South Africa Company
BSAP	British South Africa Police
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CCLA	Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa
CGT	Communist Guerilla Training
CGTC	Communist Guerilla Training Camp I and II
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIIR	Catholic Institute for International Relations
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CJPC	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
COMOPS	Combined Operations
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
CYL	City Youth League
DAs	District Assistants
DCs	District Commissioners
DJ	Disc Jockey
FC	Freedom Camp
FDG	Focus Group Discussion
FLS	Frontline States
FRELIMO	*Frente para o Liberacao do Mocambique*
GCU	Ground Coverage Unit
GDR	Germany Democratic Republic
GF	Guard Force
GS	Grey Scouts

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HDF	High Density Force
HQ	Head Quarters
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IRC	International Red Cross
JOC	Joint Operations Command
JZ	Jason Ziyaphapha
LAA	Land Apportionment Act
LHA	Lancaster House Agreement
LMG	Light Machine Gun
MCAA	Maize Control Amendment Act
MK	uMkhonto we Sizwe
NA	Native Administration
NAZ	National Archives of Zimbabwe
NCs	Native Commissioners
ND	Native Department
NDP	National Democratic Party
NIBMAR	No Independence Before Majority Rule
NIC	Natal Indian Congress
NLA	Native Land Act
NLHA	Native Land Husbandry Act
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCC	Operations Coordinating Committee
PAC	Pan-African Congress
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence for Guinea and Cape Verde
PATU	Police Anti-Terrorist Unit
PCC	People's Caretaker Council
PM	Prime Minister
PSU	Police Support Unit
PVs	Protected Villages
R$	Rhodesian Dollar

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RAF	Royal Air Force
RAR	Rhodesian African Rifles (black battalion)
RF	Rhodesia Front (party)
RLI	Rhodesia Light Infantry (white battalion)
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
SAANC	South Africa African National Congress
SAP	South Africa Police
SAS	Special Air Services
SB	Special Branch
SOWETO	South-Western Townships
SRANC	Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
SS	Selous Scouts
TTLs	Tribal Trust Lands
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	United Federal Party
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Education Fund
UNO	United Nations Organisation
US$	United States Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviets Socialist Republic
VC	Victory Camp
WVA	War Veterans Association
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZAPU-YL	Zimbabwe African People's Union- Youth League
ZBS	Zimbabwe Building Society
ZH	Zimbabwe House
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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Abstract

This study is about the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's national liberation struggle from 1960 to 1980. The study describes and explains how and to what extent Bulilima youths were involved and participated in Zimbabwean guerrilla war. Bulilima is a border district between Zimbabwe and Botswana which, from 1960 – 1980 became Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrillas' central and key strategic entry point into and exit out of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). For the purposes of this study, the term youth refers to young people between the ages of twelve and twenty-five, born in Bulilima District between 1945 and 1967. During the guerrilla war, the use of the category youth was political, with biological and cultural aspects also taken into account. The study is primarily based on the war experiences of twenty-six women and twenty-six men who were youths during the time period of the study (1960 – 1980). It is qualitative and involves forty-eight open-ended interviews in the major villages of Bulilima District. The interviews are complemented by a survey of both primary and secondary sources. It is hoped that the results of this study will raise salient issues on the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Key Terms:

Zimbabwe, Liberation war, Revolutionaries, Youth, Gender, Guerrillas, Informers, Counter-insurgency.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

Liberation movements in Africa owe their existence to colonialism and its negative impact on Africans. Similarly, the subsequent guerrilla wars were precipitated by the oppression, segregation and racial discrimination suffered by Africans under colonial regimes. Spearheading liberation campaigns were nationalist leaders such as, among others, Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Chief Albert Luthuli (South Africa, ANC[1]), Joshua Nkomo, (Zimbabwe), Augastino Neto (Angola) and Dr. Eduardo Mondlane (Mozambique).

During the early stages of their campaigns, most of these leaders adopted Gandhi's strategies of resistance which however, failed to yield any positive results.[2] The armed struggle in Africa was a natural result of the failure of peaceful protests in the 1960s.[3] It became necessary for the liberation movements to change their strategies, hence their resorting to guerrilla warfare in order to achieve self-rule. The guerrilla warfare was spearheaded by the armed wings of the liberation movements,[4] with ZAPU and ZIPRA in Rhodesia a typical example. With reference to Rhodesia, modern forms of African nationalist politics only emerged in the late 1940s with embryonic political parties.[5] The first significant nationalist political movement, the African National Congress (ANC, of the

[1] ANC (South Africa) is the oldest liberation movement in Africa. It was formed in 1912 by, *inter alia,* Alfred Mangena, John Langa Dube (its first president), Pixely Isaka Seme, Thomas Mtobi Mapikela (first treasurer), Walter Benson Rubusana (vice-president) Saul Msane and Solomon T. Plaatje to fight for the end of injustices that were perpetuated by the Union Government to people of colour. A. Odendaal, *The Founders. The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. Johannesburg, 2012. p. 469 and P. Limb, *The ANC's Early Years. Nation, Class and Place in South Africa before 1940*. Pretoria, 2010. p. 96.

[2] Mahatma Gandhi was an Indian activist who propounded the strategy of peaceful and non-violent resistance to oppression, segregation and racial discrimination of people of colour in South Africa. Gandhi called this form of resistance '*Satyagraha*' which means passive resistance. See J. Cherry, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*. Johannesburg, 2011.

[3] Non-violent protests were often organised by trade unionists and nationalist leaders. These were in the form of general marches in the streets, strikes, petitions, and protests. P. Limb, *The ANC's Early Years. Nation, Class and Place in South Africa before 1940*. Pretoria, 2010. p. 75 and A.A. Mazrui and M. Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London, 1984. p. 135.

[4] A.A. Mazrui and M. Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London, 1984. p. 135.

[5] For a detailed discussion here, consult W.G. Morapedi and B.G. Gumbo, Schisms in Zimbabwean Anti-Colonial Movements in Botswana, 1959 – 1979, in *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2016. Pp. 361 – 379.

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then Southern Rhodesia), was formed in 1955.[6] This political movement, however, was feeble in effort, structure and content. In order to bring life into the new political movement, the ANC leadership met with the City Youth League (CYL) leadership in 1957 to form the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC). The SRANC adopted a militant method of defiance and was banned in 1959. In January 1960, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed by the same leadership of the banned SRANC.

The NDP resolved to continue the struggle on a non-collaborationist (with the government) arrangement during its November 1961 congress in Bulawayo. In December 1961, the white regime banned NDP and confiscated its property.[7] A week after the banning of NDP, Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). In 1963, ZAPU split and those who split from ZAPU immediately formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). ZAPU and ZANU were both banned in 1963. ZAPU had to operate under the name People's Caretaker Council (PCC), while ZANU went underground. ZAPU's armed wing, later (from 1971) called the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), took the struggle to another level – the armed conflict. Youths were subsequently recruited to train as guerrillas in Zambia and overseas. Two transit camps were opened in Botswana close to Bulilima District. ZAPU's armed wing began to wage a guerrilla war in the western half of Rhodesia, Matabeleland.[8] ZIPRA accessed most of the districts in Matabeleland through Bulilima District. Bulilima became a strategic and key transit district for ZIPRA cadres and their associates.

Bulilima is situated in the western part of the country bordering Zimbabwe and Botswana (see Figure 1 below). It stretches from Plumtree Town north-westwards until near Hwange National Park. Bulilima became a major recruitment area for ZIPRA guerrillas.[9] Not surprisingly, Bulilima District's administrative centre, Plumtree town, had consistent

[6] C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*. London, 1989. pp. 18 – 19.
[7] G. Baumhogger, *The Struggle for Independence. Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975 – 1980).* Vol. ll. Hamburg, 1984. p. 22.
[8] After the formation of ZANU in 1963, Rhodesia was divided into two political regions along ethnic lines, namely the eastern half of the country known as Mashonaland allied mainly to ZANU and its armed wing ZANLA, and Matabeleland, the western half of Rhodesia, controlled mainly by ZAPU and its ZIPRA guerrillas.
[9] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London, 1975. pp. 94 and 96.

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presence of the Rhodesian security forces and the militarised British South Africa Police (BSAP), Selous Scouts (SS) and Muzorewa's Madzakutsaku.[10] This put Bulilima youths in a precarious position with regard to the guerrilla war. The escalation of the guerrilla war also meant that white farmers were to be protected from guerrilla attacks.



Figure 1: Map of Zimbabwe' Districts. Bulilima District is highlighted in red.

Source: http:relief.web.int/site: Zimbabwe's Districts. Accessed: 26/10/2013. 14:12.

[10] Madzakutsaku were Bishop Abel Muzorewa's auxiliary forces that came into being around 1978 during his tenure as the Prime Minister of the ill-fated Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

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The District Commissioner's (DC) office had to establish a local police force known as the District Assistants (DAs). The DAs became notorious as they operated within farms and the interior of the district in pursuit of 'criminals'. In the process, they wreaked havoc on villages and harassed youths who were the majority.

1.2 Background to the Problem

In the mid-1960s, ZAPU embarked on an armed struggle to force the Smith regime to accede to majority rule. This was followed by a massive recruitment drive and abductions that saw a lot of young men and women from Bulilima District joining the liberation struggle with the hope of training as ZIPRA guerrillas in Zambia, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Algeria among other countries. ZIPRA guerrillas within western Rhodesia used the western border with Botswana as their entry and exit point into and out of Rhodesia.

Bulilima became a central and key strategic district for ZIPRA guerrillas from the 1960s - 1980. As a result, ZIPRA base camps were scattered along the Botswana border from which most incursions were mounted.[11] The consistent presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima meant that Bulilima youths became more and more involved in the liberation struggle.[12] Conversely, ZIPRA's regular presence in Bulilima attracted the attention of the authorities, hence the deployment of security forces to hunt down the insurgents. On the one hand, Bulilima youths became the target of ZIPRA guerrillas for the purposes of recruitment, logistical support and intelligence. On the other, the Rhodesian security forces accused Bulilima youths of feeding, clothing and harbouring 'terrorists'. In light of this, Bulilima youths were sucked into the guerrilla war under circumstances beyond their control. Of concern to this study therefore, is the lack of extensive and detailed studies on Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

[11] L.P. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 92.
[12] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London, 1975. p. 94.

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1.3 Statement of the Problem

The category youth lies in a continuum between childhood and adulthood and the demarcations are socially constructed and consequently, there are few absolutes. For purposes of this study, the following definition of youth is adopted: 'Youth' refers to Balilimas of all population categories between twelve and twenty-five years of age.[13] This conceptual definition of youth enabled the study to cluster and clarify research results related to young people who between 1960 and 1980 fell in this age category and who, from different points of view, and for varying purposes, were referred to as 'youths'.

Youth as a social category in Bulilima context meant young males and females who were able-bodied and deemed physically mature and fit enough to undertake any adult errand. ZIPRA guerrillas regarded youths as allies and future recruitees for the liberation struggle. In this regard, youths coordinated many contributions in kind and deed during the war on behalf of guerrillas. They became guerrillas' eyes and ears as they formed intelligence and spy networks throughout Bulilima District. As enforcers of guerrilla norms, values and expectations, Bulilima youths became the custodians of law in the absence of formal structures. They became gunrunners and often cached arms for ZIPRA guerrillas. Youths also became a constant supply of new recruits needed for the struggle in Zambia.[14]

As expected, these youths saw themselves as engaged in social and political activities aimed at liberating Bulilima from colonialism. Through gunrunning and planting of mines on roads, youths saw themselves as freedom fighters and liberators of the oppressed. On the other hand, female youths saw themselves as their mothers' liberators from patriarchal bondage.[15] Female youths envisaged a gender violence free society and if any male was caught beating his wife he would be severely punished, an indication that they had become law unto themselves. The female youths' close relationship with guerrillas, often an intimate one, gave them overwhelming powers over their elders in

[13] Please, note that people from Bulilima District are commonly called Balilima.
[14] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[15] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 95.

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society. Their newly acquired status and privileged position in society fueled female youths' determination to be involved in the guerrilla war in any way possible.[16]

Conversely, the authorities and security forces saw youths as 'little terrorists', mischief-makers, a misguided generation and 'wives of terrorists'. This was a generation that needed to be wiped out if 'terrorist' activities were to be contained in Bulilima. Youths were blamed for the killing of innocent civilians. They were regarded as a threat, hence a challenge to traditional hierarchy.

The youths' guerrilla war related activities in Bulilima had at least two major effects in that society. Positively, since there could no longer be any doubt about those young people's ability to help engineer the social and political transformation, their activities forcefully brought the population category 'youth' to public attention and recognition in Bulilima. Negatively, their activities contributed to the stereotyping of youth as 'bad children.' They were depicted as unruly, undisciplined, and a faceless mob by the authorities and villagers. The bottom line, however, is that Bulilima youths played a significant role in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war yet little is said about their involvement and participation.

Given this omission of Bulilima youths' efforts in the country's official historiography of the liberation struggle, the study's research problem is that there is not much written or known about the roles played by Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's national liberation struggle despite the fact that youths from this district were heavily involved and participated in great numbers in that struggle.

1.4 Aim of the Study

The aim of this study is to describe and explain the extent to which Bulilima's youths were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle from 1960 – 1980.

[16] Interview with Hlengiwe Ncube, Wuwana Village: 15th October, 2015.

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1.5 Study Objectives

The objectives of this study are:

- To determine how the use of Bulilima District as a strategic crossing point into and out of Rhodesia by ZIPRA guerrillas contributed towards Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.
- To establish how the use of Bulilima District as a strategic entry point into and out of Rhodesia by ZIPRA guerrillas influenced the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the country's guerrilla war.
- To establish the nature of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe.
- To determine how Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the guerrilla war affected their relationships with elders.

1.6 Research Questions

The study answers the following main question:

- To what extent did ZIPRA guerrillas' use of Bulilima District as a strategic point of entry into and exit out of Rhodesia from 1960 to 1980 contribute towards Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war?

Linked to the main question, the study answers the following secondary questions:

- How did the use of Bulilima District as a strategic crossing point into and out of Rhodesia by ZIPRA guerrillas contribute towards the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war?
- How did the use of Bulilima District as a strategic crossing point into and out of Rhodesia by ZIPRA guerrillas influence Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the national liberation struggle of Zimbabwe?

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- What was the nature of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the guerrilla war?
- How did Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war affect their relationship with elders?

1.7 Justification for the Study

There is an abundance of literature on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle such as, among others, Baumhogger (1984), Stoneman and Cliffe (1989), Auret (2009), Godwin and Hancock (1993), Wood (1989), Trethewan (2008), Ellert (1989), Kriger (1992 and 2003), Maxey (1975), Stott (1990), Staunton (1990) and Brickhill (1995). Such literature looks at Zimbabwe's guerrilla war from an elitist point of view. Baumhogger and, Chung for example, discuss youths' involvement in the guerrilla war from an urban perspective, yet Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was rural based and entirely fought in rural areas. On the other hand, Kriger's, and Staunton's studies, *inter alia*, focus on peasant women from rural Mashonaland. These studies do not have detailed and systematic analyses of the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Most studies on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, (those that involve peasants) focus on Mashonaland where ZANLA operated.[17] Youths in Mashonaland experienced the guerrilla war differently from those in Matabeleland due to differences between ZANLA and ZIPRA's modes of operations, mobilisation and ideology. This study is justified since it brings a new dimension in the way Zimbabwe's struggle is seen and understood.

The Bulilima District was a strategic border district for ZIPRA guerrillas in terms of accessing other regions, supply and distribution of arms and ammunition into the country as well as the point of exit for recruitees and wounded guerrillas. In all this, Bulilima youths played central role as already highlighted. This way, the study makes an original

[17] See N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992 and I. Staunton, *Mothers of the Revolution*. Harare, 1990.

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contribution to knowledge as there is not much written about Bulilima youths' involvement in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

This study is different from others in that it looked at the involvement and participation of youths in the guerrilla war from a border-guerrilla-war perspective. It is unique in that Bulilima border-war became a mini-war within a country-wide guerrilla war. Up until now, the guerrilla war to control Bulilima border line remains a hidden and silent event. This study is also unique in that it brings to light the effects of married young women's brutality on fellow Bulilima villagers as they became intimately involved with guerrillas. As such, this study contributes towards filling the gap that exists in literature on the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Through a detailed and systematic analysis of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the struggle, the study brings a new dimension in the way the history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle is written and presented. This study contributes towards making a complete history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle in which different social groups who participated are given prominence.[18] The study has also helped enrich the regional study of war and gender. Through its focalisation of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the struggle, the study challenges some aspects of the official versions of Zimbabwe's nationalist struggle. Furthermore, this study makes a significant contribution to the globalisation of critical studies on youth.

Finally, the most important justification for this study is its use of primary sources in constructing a historical memory, in particular, the use of oral history methodology.[19] Scholars, academics, researchers, feminists, rural and urban populations can benefit immensely from this study. It utilises hard to find, scarce and diminishing oral sources to

[18] Different social groups that took part in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war were men, women and youths who had different social backgrounds.

[19] That being the case, it is hoped that Bulilima youths' experiences to be cited here will serve as a proof that, in the words of Van Onselen, 'History lives in the minds of its people far more powerfully than the cracked parchment of its officialdom might know'. C. van Onselen, *The Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine; A South African Sharecropper, 1894 – 1985*. New York, 1996. p. 10.

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reconstruct roles and contributions of Bulilima youths in liberating Zimbabwe. This study focused on Bulilima's uneducated, marginalised, vulnerable and the poor.

1.8 Definition of Terms

Agents: Spies infiltrated by the Rhodesian security forces and Muzorewa into the liberation movements and rural areas, such as the SS and SB.

Collaborators: Those who aligned themselves politically and ideologically with ZIPRA guerrillas. These were mostly youths.

Guerrillas: Young men and women trained in guerrilla (unconventional) warfare. They mainly operated in small numbers ranging from two to about fifteen per group.

Household: For the purposes of this study, household refers to a single unit of huts where a family lives, in rural Bulilima District. During the guerrilla war, particularly in Bulilima District, most of these Households were female-headed.

Informers: Those who were paid by the Rhodesian security forces for information about ZIPRA guerrillas and their supporters or those who informed on the whereabouts and activities of the Rhodesian security forces to guerrillas.

Involvement: For the purposes of this study, involvement means to be drawn into a phenomenon, to be entangled, linked to, concerned and affected by it.

Mashonaland: A politically defined region of Zimbabwe which covers the eastern half of the country, where ZANLA guerrillas mostly operated during the liberation struggle.

Matabeleland: A politically defined region of Zimbabwe which covers the western half of the country, where ZIPRA guerrillas mostly operated during the liberation struggle.

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Participation: In this study, the term is applied to mean; practically taking part in a phenomenon, to aid, to compete, to engage in, to perform, to be a role player, and to provide assistance in a phenomenon (Zimbabwe guerrilla war).

Pungwes: All-night vigils, characterized by dancing, singing and excessive consumption of alcohol by ZANLA guerrillas. During these pungwes, youths were brain-washed with ZANU and ZANLA propaganda, after which young girls would be 'raped' by the ZANLA guerrillas. Pungwes were common in Mashonaland where ZANLA guerrillas operated (CCJP).[20]

Selous Scouts: This was a secretive and infamous Rhodesian Special Army unit that made cross border raids into Zambia and Mozambique. It also practiced the 'turning' of guerrillas and subsequently employed them to search and report on guerrilla situations. This unit was thought by many to have committed some of the atrocities for which guerrillas were held responsible.[21]

Village: A collection of households or homesteads numbering more than ten, but not exceeding fifty. These played a prominent role in determining and defining both ZIPRA guerrillas and security forces' operations within Bulilima due to the type of settlement pattern at each village (for example, linear, nucleus or scattered).

1.9 Literature Review

The involvement and participation of youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle has generated many debates and studies from scholars and feminists. Most of these studies partly concerned themselves with the lives of youths in refugee camps in Zambia and

[20] Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in Zimbabwe. *Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 2007. p. 45.
[21] For more details on the operations of this special unit, see M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of Robert Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009, P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 134 and J.R.T. Wood, *The War Diaries of Andre Dennison*. Gibraltar, 1989. p. 33.

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Mozambique. Such literature includes, *inter alia*, Stoneman, (ed.), Chung, Bhebe and Ranger, (eds.), Joseph, Snyder, Thomas, and Burrows.

Baumhogger looks at the historical participation of urban youths in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe.[22] He explains how the elite youths in urban centres formed the CYL in 1955, which later merged with the ANC to form the SRANC in 1957. Such youths were educated and came from prominent families. This author does little to highlight the role of rural youths in the formation of the first liberation movements in Rhodesia. As such, his study leaves a gap that needs to be filled regarding the involvement of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

In his Chapter entitled, 'The Anatomy of Unequal Society', Brand focuses on the liberation war in Zimbabwe.[23] The liberation struggle is explored for the economic destruction it caused in rural Zimbabwe. Brand looks at the challenges youths faced when, during the war, their parents fled to neighbouring countries to join liberation movements. However, this is done in passing. Brand's work creates an interesting gap that needs to be filled. This study benefited from Brand's contribution on issues relating to the destruction of rural economy and the vulnerability of rural youths thereafter.

Batezat, Mwalo and Trascott's Chapter, 'Women and Independence: the Heritage and the Struggle', in Stoneman, C. (ed.) *Zimbabwe's Prospects,* look at the condition of youths in Zimbabwe during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.[24] Their study scratches the surface as it lacks systematic and detailed analysis of youths' involvement in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, offering instead, a short narrative on their roles. Batezat, *et al*., also acknowledge the invaluable work done by rural youths in Mashonaland in support of guerrillas. Their study dealt with female cadres such as Joyce Mujuru (She joined the struggle when she was around 17 years old) and how leading male comrades abused their power over women comrades by demanding sexual

[22] G. Baumhogger, *The Struggle for Independence. Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975 – 1980)*. Hamburg, 1984.
[23] C. Brand, The Anatomy of Unequal Society, in Stoneman, C. (ed.) *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*. London, Macmillan Publishers, 1981.
[24] E. Batezat, *et al*., Women and Independence: the Heritage and the Struggle, in Stoneman, C. (ed.) *Zimbabwe's Prospects. Issues on Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa*. London, 1988. pp. 153 – 173.

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services, leading to confrontations in bush camps. Such revelations enriched this study since one of its objectives is to expose the exploitative and abusive nature of the liberation struggle on female youths by men.[25]

Phimister traces the conditions under which black peasants found themselves after Smith's UDI in 1965.[26] He describes how sanctions imposed on the regime after the UDI worsened the position of peasants and that the added effects of the guerrilla war completely destroyed the rural economy. Phimister positions his argument on the basis that the imposition of sanctions forced a lot of rural men to work in white-owned farms that had diversified their production, while the ever increasing poverty led to more younger men and women joining the armed struggle. The implication is that rural areas such as Bulilima were drained of able bodied men and women, leaving youths and the aged exposed to the demands of guerrillas and to fend for the family as well. Phimister's work is relevant to this study as it helps explain the relationship between rural youths and the guerrillas, which unfortunately, tended to deteriorate during the last years of the struggle.

The 1990s saw an increase in the number of scholars interested in the study of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Prominent former guerrilla commanders, Dumiso Dabengwa and Josiah Tungamirai made their contributions. Dabengwa, a former ZIPRA commander, laments the lack of what he calls 'definite' history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. He believed at the moment of making this assertion, that whatever had been written so far, lacked objectivity or had been merely brief sketches of events. He argues in his writing, that in certain instances, scholars have shown open bias with regard to certain issues. Dabengwa corroborates what this study has observed, that there is bias in the historiography of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle towards men and urban elite women. In particular and of relevance to this study, there is no 'definite' history or detailed

[25] Joice Mujuru is one of the few Zimbabwean women who trained as a guerrilla under the ZANLA banner. She became a female commander at the age of nineteen. For a detailed discussion on her role, see F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006.

[26] I.R. Phimister, Zimbabwe: The Path of Capitalist Development, in D. Birmingham and P.M. Martin (Eds.), *History of Central Africa.* Vol. ll. New York, 1983.

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systematic and objective studies on the involvement or participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Stott looks at the liberation struggle from a generalised point of view.[27] She discusses the way ZIPRA guerrillas dealt with peasants. Stott emphasizes the fact that ZIPRA guerrillas were less dependent upon the local population, thus placed less emphasis on mobilising peasants for their success, relying to a greater extent on their military prowess. This is a vital observation since it seconds this study's assertion that youths from Mashonaland experienced the guerrilla war differently from those in Matabeleland due to differences in the ways ZIPRA and ZANLA treated locals. Stott also looks at the treatment of youths by ZAPU officials while in refugee camps. Female youths were treated as children who needed extra care and attention. A few were trained as guerrillas, an indication that there were gender inequalities within ZIPRA guerrilla structures.

The 2000s saw the undertaking of comprehensive studies about the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The studies undertaken provide a generalized history of the liberation struggle that gives an insight of what went on in the base camps. Chung provides a clear picture concerning this aspect.[28] She describes how ZANLA commanders such as Josiah Tongogara visited camps and demanded sexual services from women at night, most of whom were youths. According to Chung, commanders acted as if they had a natural right to demand sex from subordinate women. Female ZANLA commanders also did the same to young and helpless men. She observe that, '…some women commanders who rose to the top exercised the same sexual prerogatives as their male counterparts, taking their pick of thousands of young men who had joined the struggle.'[29] Chung illustrates this systematic abuse of women, in the process revealing how other brave women commanders such as Sheiba Tavarwisa, refused to comply with Tongogara's orders. Chung's work provides a foundation for this study, as it focuses on females in refugee camps, most of whom came from rural areas.

[27] L. Stott, *Women and the Armed Struggle for Independence in Zimbabwe (1964 – 1979)*. Edinburg, 1990.
[28] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006.
[29] *Ibid*. p. 127.

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The National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ Bulawayo) provided a few documents on the guerrilla war in Matabeleland, particularly Bulilima District. Preliminary research had revealed that these documents contained information which showed how the Rhodesian security forces treated youths and their parents who were suspected of feeding, clothing or with-holding information about the whereabouts of 'terrorists'. The documents also contained information about the clashes between guerrillas and security forces. Such information showed how ZIPRA guerrillas used Bulilima as a gateway to Botswana. The information was used to analyse and verify issues raised during the interviews.

1.10 Research Methodology

A sample of the 1960s and 1970s generation of twenty-six Bulilima women and twenty-six men who were youths was interviewed. This group of men and women represented the population sample of Bulilima District and was purposively sampled from Bulilima's thirty-eight major villages. The study targeted those born between 1945 and 1967 as they fall within the study's youth category (see Abstract). That is, if one was born in 1945, he/she was twenty-three years old when the guerrilla war gained momentum in Matabeleland in 1968. Someone born in 1967 was thirteen years old in 1980 when the war ended. This means that he/she was a youth in 1979 when the war was at its peak. This generation's current age range is forty-seven to sixty-nine.

One or two interviewees were randomly picked from each of the thirty-eight villages identified below. These made up the population sample number of fifty-two former Bulilima youths. Four of the twenty females were ex-ZIPRA combatants, while eight had stayed at home and another eight had ben refugees. The same applied to males, but with a slight difference in numbers. That is, six males had been ZIPRA guerrillas, while seven had stayed at home and another seven represented those who had been refugees. The difference in numbers was due to the fact that fewer females were trained as guerrilla operatives and accordingly, it was difficult to trace and locate a slightly bigger number of ex-female combatants as compared to males given the limited time to complete the study.

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In addition, five men who migrated to South Africa in search of work during the 1960s were interviewed. This was done to get their side of the story regarding the situation in Bulilima when they migrated to South Africa. Five former ZIPRA guerrillas who operated within Bulilima during the war were also interviewed for their side of the story. They, however, refused to answer questions related to accusations leveled against them. They cited their safety as the main issue for their reluctance to engage those accusations. Only five were interviewed because it was difficult to trace and locate a larger number. Furthermore, due to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, most of these people are no longer alive, thus it made sound sense to work with a limited but acceptable number. The five informants represent ZIPRA guerrillas who operated in Bulilima District during the liberation struggle.

The Oral History interviews were conducted in the following major areas of the district: Gwambe, Kandana, Mbila, Diba, Ngwana, Matshinge, Gampu, Ntoli, Gala, Gonde, Khame, Zuzaphi, Wuwana, Ndolwane, Makhulela, Masendu, Bambadzi, Hingwe, Mangubo, Madlambudzi, Tsukuru, Mbimba, Malopa, Malalume, Nswazwi, Dombodema, Tshehanga, Tokwana, Nopemano, Tshangwa, Nyabane, Mlomwe, Phumuza, Bezu, Ntunungwe, Solusi Mission and Plumtree Town.[30]

In conducting interviews, the study specifically used (to enhance reliability), structured interviews (open-ended). In a structured interview the interviewer puts a collection of questions from a previously compiled questionnaire (interview schedule), to a respondent face-to-face and records the latter's responses.[31] In this regard, the interviewer is restricted to the questions, their wording, and their order as they appear on the schedule, with relatively little freedom to deviate from it. The structured interview's function is to standardise the interviewing process by means of prepared or formalised questions.

Extended interviews were done to clarify certain issues, elaborate on new findings and developments, and to get more information regarding interviewees' experiences. There were different sets of questions for people who were at home during the war, and those

[30] See figure 3 in Chapter 4 for the location of these major villages.
[31] C. Welman, F. Kruger, and B. Mitchell, *Research Methodology*. (3rd Ed). Cape Town, 2005.

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who were refugees or cadres. This ensured that relevant questions were asked to yield both diverse and accurate information from interviewees. The interviewees' responses were used to test existing assumptions about the involvement of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Oral interviews played an integral part in this study as they provided depth and nuance on the subject. As part of social history methodology, oral interviews helped fill the gap that exists on the history of Bulilima youths' participation in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. Oral interviews enabled Bulilima youths to provide first-hand accounts of their experiences during the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. Oral sources were used to supplement written sources that do not account for specific and personal experiences.

One of the disadvantages of oral interviews is that of the researcher's tendency to impose his own order upon that of the informant. This form of interview also lacked flexibility. Though structured oral interviews reduced time spent on interviewing in general, the interviewees in this particular study sometimes took exception to the manner in which the questions were asked. This forced the interviewer to skip or revise his carefully planned procedure. Nonetheless, structured oral interviews offered a telling advantage in terms of time and labour efficiency. Most importantly, they helped to eliminate needless questions.[32] The study was done in three years.

1.11 Ethical Considerations

This is a case study and certainly ethical issues are a major concern, particularly where human beings are concerned. This section deals with ethical issues in the context of study participants. Issues looked at here included informed consent and voluntary participation, protection from harm, privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity.

Researchers should pay attention to informed consent, right of privacy, protection from harm, and the researcher's involvement.[33] This is in line with the Helsinki Declaration

[32] G. Sjoberg and R. Nett, *A Methodology for Social Research.* New York, 1968. p. 193.
[33] C. Welman, F. Kruger and B. Mitchell, *Research Methodology*. 3rd ed. Cape Town, 2005. p. 201.

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(1972), which makes it a mandate that anyone wishing to embark on a research project obtain clearance from the ethics committee in cases where human or animal subjects are involved.[34] This implies that any research conducted without ethical clearance is invalid and illegal in the eyes of the Helsinki Declaration. Furthermore, anyone involved in research needs to be aware of the general agreements about what is proper and improper in scientific research.[35] In this regard, the following ethical issues were carefully observed and adhered to throughout the field work.

1.11.1 Informed Consent

The study obtained permission from the respondents after they were truthfully informed about the purpose of the investigation and interview.[36] Participants were presented with a letter of consent and the process was explained at that time.[37] They were asked to read the consent form, given an opportunity to ask questions where they needed clarity after which they signed the (consent) form. The study reminded the participants that they were free to withdraw from the interview anytime during the process if they so wished.[38] This was done considering unforeseen conditions that might have prompted their withdrawal.

1.11.2 Protection from Harm

Participants were assured that they were indemnified against any physical and emotional harm.[39] The study ensured that participants were not exposed to any undue physical and psychological harm by conducting interviews at each participant's homestead.[40] If by any

[34] *Ibid*.
[35] H. Strydom cited by K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 306.
[36] C. Welman, *et al.*, *Research Methodology*. 3rd ed. Cape Town, 2005. p. 201.
[37] K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 306.
[38] *Ibid*.
[39] C. Welman, *et al.*, *Research Methodology*. 3rd ed. Cape Town, 2005. p. 201.
[40] P.D. Leedy and J.E. Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*. 7th ed. Ohio, 2001. p. 103.

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chance anything to the contrary had happened to the participants during the interviews, the study had undertaken to assist in any way possible.

1.11.3 Privacy, Confidentiality and Anonymity

The study assured participants that their right to privacy was respected. That is, their identity would have remained anonymous if they so wished.[41] The researcher and each participant had a clear understanding regarding the confidentiality of the results and findings of the study.[42] All information obtained during the two sets of interviews was used for the purposes of this study. Voice recordings used were erased so that no other individual could use the data for anything outside this study.

1.11.4 The Researcher

The study worked or guarded against manipulating respondents or treating them as objects rather than human beings.[43] The study did not, in any way during field work, use unethical techniques of interviewing.[44] It conducted the research according to the Ethics and Research Committee provisions of this university. This study was, therefore, done under the ethics guiding academic research in this university.

1.12 Structure of the Study (summary)

Chapter one provides introduction and, background to and the statement of the problem, aim and objectives, research questions and justification for the study. The Chapter also provides the context and role players in the struggle for liberation in Zimbabwe.

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[41] C. Welman, *et al*., *Research Methodology*. 3rd ed. Cape Town, 2005. p. 201.
[42] Compare: R.B. Burns, *Introduction to Research Methods*. London, 2000. p. 86.
[43] Compare: C. Welman, *et al.*, *Research Methodology*. 3rd ed. Cape Town, 2005. p. 201.
[44] *Ibid*.

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The second Chapter focuses on the historiography of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. It reviews scholarly work, with emphasis on issues pertinent to this study.

The next Chapter presents and discusses the research design, method, strategy and instruments used in this study. The location and limitations of the study also form part of this Chapter.

The fourth Chapter presents data on Bulilima youths who had stayed at home during the liberation struggle. This was examined focusing on the war's implications for youths as they grappled with the realities of the armed struggle. The Chapter discusses the way in which aspects of the economic and political crisis during the war were transformed into influential factors in the reconstruction of gender relations and in the changes of youths' positions in the family.

Chapter five describes and explains the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the liberation struggle during the time they were in bush camps or in the war front. The aim of the Chapter is to illustrate aspects of Bulilima youths' experiences in these specific situations. Such experiences included violence, intimidation, hunger or sexual abuse, guerrilla women's clashes with security forces, and difficult health conditions. In the process, the roles played by Bulilima youths in the guerrilla war is highlighted.

Chapter six is an analysis of data discussed in Chapters four and five. Data from secondary and archival sources is consolidated and analysed in conjunction with that obtained through oral interviews.

The last Chapter provides Conclusion, Recommendations and Suggestions for future improvements for this study. The conclusion is an assessment of the role played by Bulilima youths in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, 1960 – 1980. Finally, this Chapter provides recommendations and suggestions for further improvement on similar future studies. Limited time and resources prevented this study from conducting interviews in Matabeleland North, where rural youths also fought for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

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1.13 Conclusion

This Chapter provided an overview of the study. Generally, the study was done successfully. The critical part of the study, the field work, was conducted under an enabling environment. The former youths were all eager to voice their lived experiences. The only challenge came when ex-ZIPRA operatives who had been deployed in Bulilima declined to answer questions related to their alleged abuse of female youths and bad treatment of elderly villagers. Apart from that, the cooperation afforded this study by former Bulilima youths was beyond reproach.

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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORIOGRAPHY

2.1 Introduction

In this Chapter, a historiographical illustration of Zimbabwean guerrilla war is done. It is done in the form of an in-depth review of selected studies on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. It cannot be overemphasised that the long term cause of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was the colonisation of Mashonaland (1890) and Matabeleland (1893) by Cecil John Rhodes's BSA Co. While these two territories were not the only ones forcibly occupied by white settlers in Southern Africa, the Rhodesian case was unique.[45] Its uniqueness lay in that as early as 1923 the territory became a self-governing colony, with its parliament and its own police force and army.[46] With such mechanisms in place, the white settlers set about consolidating their power in the colony. In the long run, this led to the protracted guerrilla war from 1960 to 1980 following the failure of compromise politics.[47]

This Chapter begins by looking at the theories of revolution. Such literature creates an understanding of the theoretical framework underpinning social revolutions. The second section provides a historiographical review of studies that deal with the Zimbabwean struggle at regional and international levels. Through this, one is made to understand the effects Zimbabwe's war had at both regional and international levels. The third section provides a historiographical review of BaKalanga people in Bulilima District. The last section deals with the 1960s – 1970s historiographical undertakings about Zimbabwe's guerrilla war and progressively moves to the 1980s up to the early 2010s.

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[45] The term 'Rhodesia' was the official name of the country between 1970 and 1978. It is used for most of the period covered by this study. Where appropriate, the titles of Southern Rhodesia and 'Zimbabwe' are used in this Chapter. Also see P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970 – 1980*. Johannesburg, 1993. p. xvii. The colonisation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland and the subsequent development of these two territories as a single country were in crucial respects different from the pattern in other British colonies. M. Loney, *Rhodesia*: *White Racism and Imperial Response*. Middlesex, 1975. p. 15.

[46] On the other hand, other British colonies had no such structures and were governed through her Majesty's Official Representatives. *Ibid*.

[47] See A.R. Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973. An Account and Assessment*. 1973; O. Gjerstad, *Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU 2. George Silundika. 1974* and I. Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953 – 1980.* 1984, for more details on the failure of compromise politics.

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Literature reviewed below is considered to have a direct bearing on this study. It helps illustrate why, when and how youths became involved and participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Before dealing with Chapter overview, it is imperative to briefly discuss war history. This study is part of the field of war history and a brief highlight of this field is necessary if one is to properly locate this study within the field's broader context.

War history is a multi-disciplinary field of study united by common interests in both structural and humanitarian changes and challenges brought about by war.[48] In addition, complex relationships between civilians and adversaries, and the effects of war on social, economic and cultural aspects of life often illuminate and heighten such common interests.[49] War history's proponents and practitioners include, among others, historians, political and social scientists, economic historians, feminists as well as military experts. War history focuses on a number of aspects that include but are not limited to, the impact of war on civilians' lives (particularly vulnerable women, children, the aged and disabled), infrastructure, the general and specific conduct of the war by the adversaries, military issues and the war's impact at regional and international levels.

Given that War History is a multi-disciplinary field of study and war itself is as old as humankind, the historiography of such phenomena dates back to human civilization. In this regard, there is vast literature on war in general and guerrilla wars in particular. The same can be said for the historiography on Zimbabwe's National Liberation Struggle.[50] In this case, special attention is given to the historiography on youths' general involvement and participation in the struggle, as well as the insurgents' execution of that struggle. Additionally, counter-insurgency activities and how they affected youths, particularly in rural areas, is a prominent facet as well. The next sub-section is the Chapter overview.

[48] This study specifically dealt with Zimbabwe's guerrilla war which began in the early 1960s and ended in 1980. Its main focus was on the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in that guerrilla war.
[49] See M. Loney, *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response*. Middlesex, 1975 and Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*. Cambridge, 1988.
[50] Zimbabwe's National Liberation Struggle has been given several names and the most commonly used ones are; The Rhodesian War, Zimbabwe's Bush War, Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War or Zimbabwe's Liberation War/Struggle. For the purposes of this Chapter the study uses the first two titles when dealing with literature that specifically looks at the issues on and about the white Rhodesian community since they were the ones who constantly used such titles. The last two were used interchangeable when dealing with literature on and about the nationalists, their liberation movements as well as guerrillas.

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2.1.1 Chapter Overview

Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was revolutionary in nature. As such, this Chapter starts with a look at theories of revolution which underpin this study. There are many theories of revolution but the following were identified as suitable and were modified to suit the Zimbabwean situation where possible:

- Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories of revolution;
- Voluntarist theories of revolution;
- Cabral, and Fanon's theories of social revolution, and
- Skocpol's Structural theory of revolution.

In conjunction with the above theories of revolution, the study used selected international cases on guerrilla warfare for comparative purposes. Such cases included but were not limited to:

- The Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya;
- The Malaya guerrilla war, and
- Mozambique's guerrilla war.

Moving from the international scene, as this study was located in Bulilima, a district inhabited predominantly by the BaKalanga people, a brief history of the BaKalanga people is given. Subsequent to this, literature related to the following salient historiographical facets and debates relevant to this study was identified and reviewed:

- The contextual background to the conflict;
- The formation of liberation movements in Zimbabwe;
- The immediate causes of the guerrilla war;
- The early stages of the guerrilla war;
- The escalation and intensification of the war in rural areas;

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- The involvement and participation of youths in the armed struggle;
- ZIPRA guerrillas and security forces' operations in rural areas, and
- The role played by FLS in Zimbabwe's armed struggle and its consequences for Bulilima youths.[51]

For a balanced review of literature on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, studies done during the initial phases of the war were reviewed progressively towards those done during the height of the struggle to those done currently. The reason being that studies done during the struggle have an eye-witness factor and they proved to have accurate pointers related to issues raised during field work. Additionally, such literature assisted in propping up facts, arguments or observations raised during the interviews.

Given this Chapter overview, the following detailed Chapter two:

- Theories of revolution
- International literature
- History of BaKalanga people, and
- Literature on Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle.

2.2 Literature on Theories of Revolution

This section focuses on literature concerning Theories of Revolution in which this study is grounded. The first sub-section provides the definitions and clarifications of the two concepts – *theory* and *revolution*. The purpose for this is to provide a basic understanding of these two concepts in the context of Zimbabwe's revolution so that the application of

[51] The involvement and support given to ZANU and ZAPU by the Frontline States led to the aerial bombings and ground attacks by the Rhodesian security forces on ZANU and ZAPU's bush camps in Botswana (only ground attacks), Zambia, Mozambique and Angola from 1976 until the end of the conflict. In Botswana, for example, the Rhodesian Security Forces went to the extent of attacking Botswana Villages along the border such as Mapoka Village. There was also the Lesoma massacre of 1978 in which fifteen Batswana soldiers were killed. Thousands of innocent youths perished in such attacks. See K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief On Record*, Johannesburg, 1987; P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesians c. 1970 – 1980.* Johannesburg, 1993 and, L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle For Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981.

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the selected theories of revolution herein is appreciated. The second sub-section reviews literature on theories of revolution in detail.

2.2.1 'Theory' and 'Revolution': Conceptualisation

Theories of revolution provide some explanations as to how revolutions – past, present and those still to occur – happened and, will occur. A theory can also be viewed as a plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to explain phenomena.[52] That is, issues of concern such as why, how, when and what caused/causes revolutions are best investigated following scientific theoretical frame-works. Zimbabwe's revolutionary war falls within the category of phenomena that can be explained by theories of revolution as provided in the next sub-section.

In addition to the above, a theory can be defined as a coherent group of tested general propositions, commonly regarded as correct, that can be used to explain and predict phenomena.[53] The striking similarities in the above definitions is that they all emphasise theory as having the potential to 'explain' phenomenon from a generalized perspective. This means that theories (in the case of revolutions) are subject to manipulation to fit a certain particular context.[54] Furthermore, theories, by their very nature of being general assumptions, are ideas offered to assist in accounting for phenomena. That being so, theories can be applied selectively to explain a phenomenon in question.[55] This means that not all theories of revolution are applicable to this case study. This Chapter, therefore, is justified to select theories of revolution that can be simplified to suit and be used to explain Zimbabwe's revolution.

Furthermore, a theory is explained as a set of assumptions, propositions, or accepted facts that attempt to provide a plausible or rational explanation of cause-and-effect

[52] www.merrian-webster.com. Accessed: 28th September, 2015. 08:00.
[53] www.dictionary.reference.com. Accessed: 28th September, 2015. 08:05.
[54] www.say/or.org. Accessed: 29th September, 2015. 14:09.
[55] *Ibid*.

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(causal) relationships among a group of observed phenomena.[56] Stressed in this definition is the fact that all theories are mental models of the processed reality.[57] This means that theories are a mental map-work on how different phenomena occurred, occur and will occur. As such, one is duty bound to determine the applicability of a related theory to his/her research area. In line with this study, the voluntarist, then Cabral, and Fanon's theories and finally, the structural theories were dealt with,[58] beginning with the voluntarist. Before embarking on a detailed review of the named theories, suffice it to define revolution. Together with the above sub-section, a definition of revolution creates a platform that leads to an understanding of the concept 'Theories of Revolution'.

A revolution, seen from the Hegelian perspective, is an idea equated with irresistible change, a manifestation of the world spirit in an unceasing quest for its own fulfillment.[59] Change and quest for fulfillment underpin the Hegelian view on revolution. Hegel sees a revolution as an idea that seeks to bring change to the status quo. Once that change has been realised, there is satisfaction. This school of thought, however, does not provide an explanation as to why the need to bring change and how that change is to be brought about for the ultimate prize, 'fulfillment'.

Revolution is also seen as a kind of restoration, whereby the insurgents attempt to restore liberties and privileges which were lost as a result of the government's temporary lapse into despotism.[60] A closer look at the above definition draws one to the conclusion that the anti-colonial revolutions that took place in Africa (Zimbabwe included), Asia and Latin America are amenable to this definition. In this case, the insurgents viewed the colonial elite as strangers who had usurped the freedoms which once belonged to the people now in revolt.[61] Insurgents are justified to embark on a revolution that, if successful, guarantees their lost liberties. That is, insurgents embarked on a 'just revolution'.[62]

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[56] www.businessdictionary.com. Accessed: 28th September, 2015. 08:22.
[57] *Ibid*.
[58] It should be noted that these theories will be modified and regurgitated to suit the Zimbabwean situation. This trend has been adopted by famous revolutionaries such as Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Cabral, and Fanon, among others. See Semmel, (1981) for more details on this.
[59] R. Tanker and M. Midlarsky, www.deepblue.lib.umich.edu. (unpublished paper) Accessed: 18th May, 2014. 15:36
[60] A. Hannah, *On Revolution*. New York, 1965. p. 69.
[61] *Ibid*.
[62] See the international section of literature review for more details on this aspect.

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In a more crude way, revolution is defined as the overthrow of a legally constituted elite.[63] In the context of Zimbabwean situation, the legally constituted elite were the settler regime and the aggrieved party being the liberation movements that sought to overthrow the said regime. In this sense, the above definition is applicable to the Zimbabwean case. This is so when one considers the fact that the settler regime(s) by virtue of being a legally constituted elite in their own right, instituted a period of intense social, political and economic changes that negatively impacted on the black population of the country.[64] This no doubt, created a revolutionary idea amongst the black elite in Zimbabwe, hence the route to Zimbabwe's revolutionary war from 1960 – 1980.[65]

Revolution is further explained in terms of war where wars are classified as personnel wars; authority wars and, structural wars.[66] Structural war is the one relevant to this study as Zimbabwe's guerrilla war falls in this category. That is, in a structural war, insurgents' goals are to introduce social and economic changes in a society they perceive to be oppressive, segregative and racially discriminative.[67] In this context, the above explanation of revolution fits in well with the Zimbabwean revolutionary situation.

On a thematic note, revolutions are viewed in terms of nationalism, where nationalism is regarded as the motivating force of revolutions.[68] It should be noted that nationalism is a product of the French Revolution which later spread throughout Western Europe, and later to the rest of the world, Africa included. It became one of the most significant political and social causes of many revolutions,[69] such as, for example, Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Defining revolutions this way reveals that many theoretical interpretations of these phenomena focus more on what is called 'theories of causation', that is, why revolutions happen.[70] It is from this that political scientists such as Charles Tilly and Samuel P.

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[63] A. Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. New York, 1955. p. 45.
[64] Compare: *Ibid*.
[65] It is within this context then that we see Zimbabwean youths, particularly those from Bulilima becoming involved and subsequently participating in that revolutionary war. See O. Gjerstad, *Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU 2, George Silundika*. Richmond, 1974, on how early Bulilima youths participated in this struggle.
[66] J.N. Rosenary, Internal War as an International Event, in J.N. Rosenary (Ed.), *International Aspect of Civil Strife*. Princeton, 1964. p. 45 – 91.
[67] *Ibid*.
[68] C. Keitner, www.say/or.org. Accessed: 29th May, 2014. 11:23.
[69] *Ibid.*
[70] www.say/or.org Accessed: 29th May, 2014. 11:23.

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Huntington tried to simplify the causation theories by describing revolutions as the result of the power struggle between competing groups.[71] That is, when a conflict between two parties arises, a revolution is a probable outcome if no satisfactory agreement can be reached. This was the case with Rhodesia where, after the failure of compromise politics and a negotiated settlement, a full scale guerrilla war erupted from 1960 – 1980.[72] It should be pointed out that all these causation theories explain revolutionary events. They are not, however, always applicable to all revolutions, and they do not provide scientific ways to predict future revolutionary phenomena.[73]

That said, this study's modified working definition of revolution is as follows, Revolution is, therefore, change effected by the use of violence, in government, and/or regime, and/or society.[74] In this case, society is the conscious mass and the mechanics of communal solidarity which may be tribal, peasant or national. By regime is meant the constitutional structure, democracy and oligarchy; and by government is meant specific political and administrative institutions.[75] Violence, it should be noted, is not the same as force; it is force used with unnecessary intensity, unpredictability, and is usually destructive.[76] This observation is in line with the scope of this study and it was used as a measure on the extent to which violence was perpetuated on Bulilima youths during the guerrilla war. Theories of revolution, as outlined here, were used albeit with some alterations, to explain the Zimbabwean revolutionary phenomenon. Special emphasis was on Bulilima youths' roles therein. The next sub-section provides a detailed review of literature on the theories of revolution as identified below.

[71] *Ibid*.
[72] See the 1960s – 1970s section of literature review in this Chapter for more details on this.
[73] www.say/or.org. Accessed 29th May, 2014. 11:23.
[74] J. Chalmers, *Revolution and the Social System*. Stanford, 1964. p. 16.
[75] *Ibid*.
[76] S.S. Wolin, Violence and the Western Political Tradition, *in American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*. Vol. xxviii. January, 1963. pp. 15 – 28.

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2.2.2 Theories of Revolution: A Detailed Review

This sub-section reviews in detail literature on theories of revolution. The following theories were dealt with here; the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, Structural theories, as well as Cabral and Fanon's theories of revolution. This was done in the order they appear above.

Karl Marx (1818 – 1883),[77] is regarded as the father of Marxist theories of thought. His influence on Marxism has been prodigious. The Chinese and Russians before the collapse of Communism, claimed to be the leading Marxists.[78] This theory is relevant to this study in that it brought two versions of Marxism, namely the Russian version as propounded by Lenin and the Chinese one as defined by Mao. There are Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories of revolution as applicable to Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

First and foremost, Marxism is the philosophy of history, an economic doctrine as much as it is a theory of revolution and the basic explanation for how societies go through the process of change. There are two basic ideas in Marxism - materialism and class struggle. By materialism, Marx meant that the engine that drives society is the economy. He emphasised that people who control the economy also control the political arena, hence his famous quote;

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: that is, the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.[79]

The above laid the foundation for the incorporation and analysis of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories of revolution in the context of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. The second basic rule of Marxist analysis takes historical materialism a step further. That is, all of human history can be explained and predicted by the competition between antagonistic economic classes, or as Marx put it, 'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.' In political jargon, this means that the social classes are competing in essence for control of the state or, as Marxists would put it; the class that controls the Mode of

[77] Karl Marx was the most influential modern thinker, and certainly the greatest social scientist of the last two centuries. Also see Semmel, *Marxism and the Science of War*. New York, 1981 for more details on this aspect.
[78] B. Semmel, *Marxism and the Science of War*. New York, 1981. p. 217.
[79] Karl Max quoted by B. Semmel, *Marxism and the Science of War*. New York, 1981. p. 235.

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Production also controls the State. Marx spent much time examining or concentrating on the reality behind the veil of politics, the economic structure of society.

Viewed from this perspective, one would agree that the economic structure created by white people's settlement in Mashonaland and Matabeleland was such that it led to black people's exploitation when white people gave themselves control of all means of production. In order to ensure that such means of production remained in their hands, colonialists created a host of legislature that practically locked the door for Africans to access Rhodesia's economic cake. From this standpoint, this work is relevant to this study as it provide the basis to argue that the resultant economic structures and their inherent consequences for natives led to the outbreak of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Marxism, as a blueprint for revolution, was forged in the turbulent world of mid-nineteenth century Europe. The overarching idea in Marxism is that all humans have wants and needs, and that human societies are shaped by the production and acquisition of these commodities. Throughout history, every class (social and economic level of society) has tried to improve its position, developing political and ideological concepts to support its aims. The demands and desires of classes often contradict or clash with those of other classes. Business owners, for example, want more profit which means lower wage costs; workers want higher wages which means less profit.

In Marxism this on-going tension is known as class struggle. Capital is the material needed to produce or manufacture goods, for example, land, buildings, machinery, mineral resources and raw materials. In capitalist systems, most capital is privately owned by individuals or shareholders, it is not owned by the state or workers. Marx referred to this group as 'capitalists' or bourgeoisie. In Marxist theory, the bourgeoisie not only own and control capital and production, they also dominate democratic and parliamentary systems of government. These political systems are designed to give the impression of democracy and representation but in reality they represent and support the bourgeoisie and their economic interests. The Marxist theory of revolution can be altered to suit the Zimbabwean conditions that led to the outbreak of the Rhodesian bush war, hence the importance and relevance of this theory.

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Semmel's *Marxism and the Science of War* made an in-depth analysis of the Marxist theory of revolution after which he studied the Leninist and Maoist theories of revolution with particular bias towards the guerrilla war. War in this case is seen as the continuation of politics by other means.[80] Marx and Engels looked at the guerrilla warfare from the context of the French-Spanish wars. They analysed this in three phases/periods. The first period was when the population of the whole provinces took up arms and embarked on a partisan warfare. The second period was characterized by the formation of guerrilla bands from the wrecks of the Spanish armies. Marx and Engels illustrated that these bands managed to inflict considerable damage on the French without being identified as they lived within and among the population. The third period was when guerrillas copied the regularity of the standing army and by so doing were crushed due to their large numbers.

The relevance of Semmel's work to this study is that once guerrillas operate in small numbers and among people, they succeed in their operations as was the case in the first two periods in Spain. Conversely, large numbers of guerrillas attract detection by the regular army hence are easily defeated. This enabled this study to make an informed analysis on how ZIPRA guerrillas operated in Bulilima District and how their numerical operations affected Bulilima youths in terms of their participation in the guerrilla war.

Lenin did not seem to favour a guerrilla strategy in a civil war but supported it only when there was strict discipline among guerrillas. He believed that ill-discipline among guerrillas disorganised the party, hence affecting its effectiveness in conducting the revolution. Seen from Lenin's context, Semmel's work was used to analyse ZIPRA's conduct of the war in relation to the party's war-time sponsors and backers' expectations (Russians and their allies), and how this affected Bulilima youths' participation in that war.

Mao was the strongest advocate of the guerrilla strategy in executing an armed civil conflict. He emphasised the sixteen-character formula thus, 'The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.'[81] Mao further detailed the need for a smaller number of guerrilla operatives against the enemy forces, for example, one guerrilla to ten men; ten guerrillas to one

[80] B. Semmel, *Marxism and the Science of War*. New York, 1981. p. 240.
[81] *Ibid*.

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hundred soldiers, and so forth. Mao's guerrilla strategy was examined in the context of ZIPRA's operational activities in Bulilima to determine whether it conformed to Mao's and how it impacted Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's struggle.

The above theoretical interpretations of revolutions have been vigorously challenged by other scholars and academics. The prominent scholar in this group is Skocpol, with her extensive study of the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions in *States and Social Revolutions*. She argues that the above theories miss something important about revolutions; by focusing on how purposive action brings about revolutions, such theories fail to perceive the structural forces that create a revolutionary situation. Structural theories of revolution came into prominence. Skocpol, posits that a 'social revolution' is both a change in state institutions (a political revolution) and a change in social structures. She argues that 'Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below'.[82] According to Skocpol, two variables cause a revolutionary situation and they are jointly sufficient for a social revolution to occur. First, there must be a 'crisis of state', often provoked by international factors, such as increasing economic or security competition from abroad. Second, the patterns of 'class dominance' determine which group will rise to exploit the revolutionary situation. The result is a social revolution.

It can never be overemphasised that Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was a rural based war. As such, it affected the poverty stricken youths more than any other section of the populace. In light of this, the study observed that ironically, the direct voices of Bulilima youths are missing in most accounts of the revolutionary events in which they played a central role.

While Skocpol advocates for the inclusion of structures in the interpretation of revolutions, Fanon and Cabral,[83] on the other hand advocate for an African way of interpreting colonially orientated social revolutions in Africa. They see revolutions in the eyes of

[82] T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, 1979. p. 4.

[83] Fanon and Cabral were leaders of revolutions in their respective countries, namely Algeria and Guinea Bissau respectively. They led their countries' revolutions to dismantle colonialism, hence have first-hand information regarding what transpired in Africa during the revolutionary winds of change. For more on this see, R. Blackey Fanon and Cabral: a Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa, *in Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 12. No. 2, (1974) pp. 191 – 209.

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colonialism in Africa. For Fanon, Revolution was part of a process of the regeneration of man and society, of self-liberation and rebirth, only through revolution could a suppressed people undo the effects of colonization.[84] For true revolution to occur, independence must be taken, not merely granted; it must be the work of the oppressed people themselves. Fanon emphasised that true liberation is not that pseudo-independence in which ministers having a limited responsibility hobnob with an economy dominated by the colonial past. Liberation is the total destruction of the colonial system.[85] Fanon's theory of revolution justifies the nationalist movements' actions in Zimbabwe, hence it is relevant to explain what transpired in Zimbabwe leading to the outbreak of the guerrilla war. That being so, Blackey's article contributed meaningfully in this context.

Cabral defines revolution in the following manner,

> The national liberation of a people is the rejoining of the historical personality of that people, its return to history through the destruction of the imperialist domination to which it was subjected.

A revolution means the transformation of life in the direction of progress which, in turn, means national independence, eliminating all foreign domination, and carefully selecting friends and watching enemies to ensure progress. The African revolution, and the larger liberation struggle of colonial people everywhere, is the fundamental characteristic of the advance of history in this century. A people must free the process of development of the national productive forces. The struggle is not only against colonialism, but against neo-colonialism as well. Cabral stressed that revolutionists must not fight for ideas alone, but for the national benefits, improved conditions, and a better future for children. In short, Cabral's theory advocates for the total dismantling of colonialism and its inherent oppressive instruments so that the country's resources can benefit everyone in an equitable manner. By suggesting the removal of colonialism in Africa, Cabral's theory fits well with the situation that transpired in the country before and during the war. Blackey's

[84] Fanon quoted by R. Blackey, Fanon and Cabral: a Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa, in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, (1974) pp. 191 – 209.
[85] *Ibid*.

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work was a source of reference for Fanon and Cabral's theories of revolution. This brings us to the international literature section.

2.3 International Literature

This section internationalises the Zimbabwean conflict through a detailed review of the international literature on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. International scholars embarked on studies about Zimbabwe's guerrilla war in the context of the international community. Crowder discusses racial problems in Rhodesia in a comparative context. His analysis is mainly based on how Africans in different colonies were exploited, segregated and discriminated against by different systems of government. He looks at how Africans in turn responded to such oppressive and exploitative systems of government. Crowder reveals how, in the context of each colony, Africans took to the armed struggle. This helped the study make an international comparative analysis of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the guerrilla war.

The relationship between Rhodesia and its Frontline States neighbours received attention from scholars and academics in a rather lukewarm manner. Most studies that document Zimbabwe's guerrilla war provide such an analysis in passing as opposed to an in-depth one.[86] However, in break with the above trend, Morapedi details the relationship between Botswana and Rhodesia from the liberation movements' perspective. Morapedi analyses the dilemmas which the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, and specifically the Zimbabwean war, presented both for the many Zimbabwean refugees in Botswana and the Botswana government. He underlines the fact that as a neighbouring state of both Rhodesia and South Africa, Botswana sought to follow a policy of diplomacy in resolving conflicts between the minority white regimes and the liberation movements and balancing the different pressures on the country. On the one hand, it opposed the use of Botswana as a base from which political violence could be employed against neighbouring states,

[86] The 1960s – 1990s provide a good example of such studies. However, Morapedi conducted an in-depth study on the relationship amongst Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa during Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War, an area that has received little attention from scholars and academics so far.

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and on the other, it opposed regimes that denied their citizens basic human rights and sought to show solidarity with the oppressed by offering political sanctuary to 'genuine' refugees from Zimbabwe.

Morapedi's work had a direct and influential role in this study in that Botswana was used by ZIPRA guerrillas as an entry and exit point to and from Rhodesia. This was ably facilitated by both Batswana and Bulilima communities settled along both sides of the lengthy Botswana – Zimbabwe border. By offering political sanctuary to Zimbabwean refugees, the Botswana government indirectly allowed its border along Bulilima District to be used by both ZIPRA and prospective refugees as a gateway to inland Botswana. The interest of this study was in unravelling the situation created by the use of this part of Zimbabwe – Botswana border for insurrection purposes.

Complexities such as the flooding of armed bands in Bulilima and the penetration of refugee camps by Rhodesian security agents such as the CIO, SS and SB are a critical factor in this study.[87] The upshot is that Bulilima youths were caught in the middle, having to choose which side to support or align themselves with in the struggle. The position they took in this regard automatically meant that they were involved in the war and had to participate whichever way circumstances dictated at any given time. They had become the enemy of either of the belligerents. Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the war is the core focus of this study, hence Morapedi's work is valuable to this study.

In addition, Morapedi acknowledges that the Rhodesian security agents operating in Botswana were a serious danger to refugees, the Botswana government and the leaders of the liberation movements.[88] In this light, the study examined and evaluated the forms of danger posed by such agents to Bulilima youths in refugee camps in Botswana, when they acted as couriers of arms of war for ZIPRA guerrillas and when they assisted the critically wounded guerrillas cross to Botswana.

On youths' participation in the liberation struggles, the participation of South African youths in the liberation struggle preceded the student uprising of June 16, 1976. That is,

[87] W.G. Morapedi, The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960 – 1979,' in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 38. No. 1. (February 2012) pp. 73 – 90.
[88] *Ibid.*

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before the establishment of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) in 1944, young people had been participating in numerous political campaigns in response to measures and laws affecting black people. In the 1920s the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) already had a youth wing.[89] This shows that young people took part in political campaigns from the early years. Gandhi, for example, was only twenty-years old when he helped found the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and became its first secretary. Likewise, Sol Plaatje and Pixley Seme assumed leadership positions in South Africa Native National Congress when they were relatively young. This study benefited from this work through comparative analysis of when Bulilima youths joined the struggle. Through such comparisons, Bulilima youths' participation in the struggle was linked to the regional arena.

On a different note, Dinstein's *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, provides an insight into the legal meaning of war. Having explained war in legal terms, he illustrates the implications of war in the eyes of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The IHL advocates for the protection of civilians from all sorts of harm by belligerents. If civilians are not protected whoever harms them commits a crime against humanity, hence is liable to be brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Zimbabwean situation, therefore, this means that all the atrocities committed by guerrillas and security forces against civilians during the guerrilla war amounted to crimes against humanity. In this regard, this study investigated whether the involvement of Bulilima youths in the guerrilla war did not in any way constitute crimes against humanity. Through Dinstein's work, this study illustrates the incidents that in the principles of the IHL amounted to crimes against humanity with regard to Bulilima youths' actions during the war.

Dinstein also looked at the issue of aggression. He explained an act of aggression (which gives rise to international responsibility) and a war of aggression (which is 'a crime against international peace'). In this context, the study established whether by bombing refugee camps in Zambia, and by destroying bridges and other infrastructure in Mozambique, the Smith regime was not committing crimes against international peace. Dinstein's work

[89] South Africa History on line. Accessed: 12 February, 2015. 14:25.

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benefited this study as it enabled it to analyse Zimbabwe's guerrilla war in the context of the provisions of the International Law on wars.

A guerrilla war is a strategy that, with reference to international literature, began in Western Europe during the Napoleonic wars. Literature that deals with this phenomenon (in the case of this study) include but is not limited to Davidson, *A History of Guerrillas in Africa*, where he provides a historical background to the origins of the guerrilla strategy. He observes that,

> Africa, like other continents, has lately known irregular wars that were anything but small in size, and whose forces were far from loosely organised.[90]

Guerrilla wars are seen as different from other forms of warfare since they are fought by small detachments which are constantly or repeatedly on the move. Davidson discusses guerrilla strategies and tactics where he notes that they avoid head-on confrontation with the enemy, because their enemy is more numerous and better equipped. They adopt a range of specific tactics such as ambush and sabotage of lines of communications. Guerrillas rely largely on their own internal sources of supply and shelter and have no great 'back – up' organisation of logistical support.[91]

By discussing guerrilla strategies and tactics, Davidson's work contributed immensely to this study in the form of a comparative analysis regarding how ZIPRA's strategies and tactics affected Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Additionally, this aspect of Davidson's text enabled this study to investigate how vulnerable Bulilima youths were in the context of ZIPRA guerrillas' strategies and tactics during the course of the war. Related to this, the study also explored how Bulilima youths facilitated the successful execution of such strategies and tactics.

Davidson's observations on guerrillas' reliance on internal sources of supply and shelter, and lack of great 'back – up' and the organisation of logistical support contributed to the core area of this study. That is, his work played a complimentary role in the analysis of how Bulilima youths managed to provide various logistical services and shelter to ZIPRA

[90] B. Davidson, *A History of Guerrillas in Africa*. Essex, 1981. p. 4.
[91] *Ibid*. p. 7.

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operatives in Bulilima District. Key to this analysis was the way Bulilima youths managed to continuously and consistently supply such logistical material needs to a large contingent of ZIPRA operatives in Bulilima for more than a decade. By extension, the study investigated whether this did not compromise Bulilima youths' relationship with the security forces operating in Bulilima as well. Davidson's study became a foundational frame work of analysis regarding BaKalanga youths in the war context. This leads to the section on the BaKalanga people's historiography.

2.4 Literature on BaKalanga People

The history of BaKalanga people has not been studied in depth.[92] At the moment, studies of this ethnic group, settled on a stretch of land along the Zimbabwe – Botswana border from the north-west to the south of the country in Bulilima District, are a patch-work of what should be. Sources that have attempted to study the history of BaKalanga people include Wentzel, *Nau Dzaba Kalanga. A History of the Kalanga*. He produced two volumes on his work which was done using Masola's Transcripts.[93] Wentzel acknowledges that BaKalanga people were present in the area mentioned above as early as 1000 AD, and are linked with the Leopard Kopje culture of Khami ruins.[94] They are regarded as part of the Shona people who migrated from Central Africa. BaKalanga are regarded as the forerunners of the Shona migration to the south with the other Shona tribes following in their footsteps.[95] This aspect of the BaKalanga history enabled this study to justify why BaKalanga are found in Bulilima District.

BaKalanga are said to have five important possessions of which two are relevant to this study. These are an extended family through polygamous marriages leading to many

[92] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 4.
[93] Masola was a semi-literate Kalanga man who lived and worked in Dombodema, at Dombodema London Missionary Society Mission. While working with white Missionaries in Dombodema, Masola acquired writing skills that helped him to produce transcripts on the origins and history of BaKalanga people. Such transcripts were later used by Wentzel to produce his two volume study on the history of BaKalanga people.
[94] P.J. Wentzel, *The Relationship between Venda and Western Shona*. Vol. lll. Pretoria, 1983. p. 24.
[95] *Ibid*. p. 23.

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children, and that a MuKalanga man must have his own place and land to cultivate crops to produce plenty of food for his supposedly big family.[96] The fact that BaKalanga society was/is a polygamous society means that there were a lot of Bulilima youths who took part in the liberation struggle.

The ancestors of BaKalanga lived at the iron-age sight of the Leopard's Kopje and through the Shashe – Limpopo valley.[97] BaKalanga led a cattle herding and crop farming life-style and built round mud-huts from red hardened clay, wooden poles and thatch. They had large granaries where they stored grains from crops. It should be underscored that during the 1960s onwards, BaKalanga people had not changed for the better hence the above text's relevance to this study. BaKalanga sources of livelihood, as alluded to above, also took care of ZIPRA guerrillas when they began operating in Bulilima District after the out-break of the guerrilla war. This study utilized this source to explain how BaKalanga youths in Bulilima contributed to the upkeep of ZIPRA guerrillas.

Contributing to the same debate on BaKalanga, Mazarire, bemoans the absence of studies on BaKalanga history. He points out that until recently, nothing much was known about the Kalanga who have constantly been treated as a sub-ethnicity group of the major groups in south-western Zimbabwe such as Ndebele.[98] The Kalanga people settled in the area (Bulilima) well before the coming of the Nguni migrants. Yet the settlement of these migrants and that of Ngwato and Transvaal Sotho effectively reduced the original Kalanga area of settlement and led to an almost total neglect of the Kalanga history.[99] Mazarire stresses the fact that Kalanga people are found to the south-west of Zimbabwe and Botswana. His work is relevant to this study as it brings the issue of Kalanga settlement to the fore. In addition, this study is justified when one takes into consideration Mazarire's observations on the lack of in-depth studies on BaKalanga people. In this case, the investigation of Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's struggle is set to expand people's understanding of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

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[96] P.J. Wentzel, *The Relationship between Venda and Western Shona*. Vol. lll. Pretoria, 1983. p. 33.
[97] http//www.Kalanga.org/history/early.history. Accessed: 23rd March, 2015. 08:36
[98] G.C. Mazarire, 'Who are the Ndebele and the Kalanga in Zimbabwe?' (unpublished paper) p. 1.
[99] *Ibid*.

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Finally, Ndzimu-Unami Emmanuel's *The Rebirth of BuKalanga. A Manifesto for the Liberation of a Great People History* Part 1, is one of the latest contributions to the debate on the history of BaKalanga people. His contribution to the historiography of the Kalanga people generally serves to confirm what other scholars, particularly those dealt with above, documented. His study, in simple terms, is a run over or an overview of what has been alluded to by other scholars. Of note, however, is the fact that Emmanuel's study is full of emotions. His study was done through anger, an indication that the lack of in-depth studies on Bulilima people is an issue of major concern to other Kalanga scholars.

Emmanuel also takes his anger to early scholars whom he accuses of misrepresenting facts about his beloved tribe. In addition, he laments the political marginalisation of the BaKalanga people, where he says such political marginalisation has led to BaKalanga people becoming third rate citizens in their own land. Nonetheless, some of his observations such as the origins of BaKalanga and their settlement areas are relevant here and were used. This makes his work important to this study as it contributed towards making an informed analysis on the origins and settlement of BaKalanga people.

While Emmanuel's work was done through a trail of emotions, Msindo provides a scholarly work which looks at the transformations of the Kalanga and Ndebele societies in western Zimbabwe before, during and after colonialism. Msindo's first observation here is the absence of scholarship on the history of BaKalanga people in western Zimbabwe. He laments a situation where, 'The history in this part of the country is generalised as the history of the Ndebele people while there are other ethnic groups such as BaKalanga, Tonga, Ndau, Venda and Sotho among others.'[100] Msindo's work deals with the social, economic, political and cultural issues before, during and post-colonial Zimbabwe in a comparative form between BaKalanga and Ndebele ethnic groups. His work is relevant to this study because of its thematic analysis of BaKalanga people's historical background. It lays the foundation for the brief history of BaKalanga people which this study outlines in Chapter four.

[100] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 4.

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Furthermore, Msindo's work provides solid reasons as to why Matabeleland as a region is under researched. He observes that only about three scholarships are available on this region. This explains why, for example, as observed by this study, Mashonaland is over researched, particularly on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Msindo points out that, 'Matabeleland is a 'post-conflict' region also beset by other problems'.[101] The observation supports this study's argument that there is not much written about Bulilima and how the war was conducted there. Bulilima District has been neglected as far as studies on youths' involvement and participation in the struggle is concerned, a situation this study hopes to address. Msindo's work, however, also fails to tackle this aspect comprehensively. He mainly deals with the adult social group as opposed to youth.

Due to scope and major focus of this study, Msindo's work creates a gap in literature on Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. This part of BaKalanga history is under researched owing to the general neglect of this ethnic group by scholars whose work tends to assume that BaKalanga people are Ndebele people. Msindo's work is flawed in that it does not consider the issues surrounding Bulilima youths' involvement in the guerrilla war as worth discussing in his study. It was going to be worthwhile had he analysed how the ethnicity issues underpinning Kalanga and Ndebele peoples affected the participation, cooperation and or undermined each group's execution of the guerrilla war. This gap in literature necessitated this study. In this view, the following section details selected literature on this study, further highlighting the reason why it was undertaken.

2.5 The Contextual Background to the Conflict: 1960s – 1970s literature.

This section reviews literature on the contextual background to Zimbabwe's armed conflict. There is vast literature that deals with Zimbabwe's liberation struggle in the context of its genesis. Several of these trace the Zimbabwean conflict from the time white settlers established themselves here right through UDI up to the apex of the conflict.

[101] *Ibid*.

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In his, *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response*, Loney outlines how the political power wielded by the white settlers enabled them to establish a pattern of race relations which ensured that in every respect Africans served White interests. In acknowledging the fact that the position taken by white settlers in Rhodesia was mainly responsible for the oppressive and exploitative situation the country was in, Loney points out that,

> The presence of a large number of white settlers, intent on establishing themselves in the country created racial, segregatory and discriminatory laws meant to entrench white rule.[102]

He postulates that such laws were the underlying factors that led to Africans rising up against the Rhodesian settler government. Comparatively, this was the case in the Americas where similar dynamics led to a successful revolt against the British and Spanish colonising powers. In Rhodesia, this led to a UDI by the Smith regime in 1965.[103] Loney further indicates that the Rhodesian state reflected the development of a relatively independent, stratified white society, based on the exploitation of the indigenous population, with a legitimate ideology of white superiority. He argues that for white settlers, the maintenance of white control was synonymous with their own survival. The economic progression of white settlers was guaranteed by the two valuable asserts at their 'disposal' – the land and the people. Loney sums up his argument by pointing out that the economic history of Rhodesia is largely the story of the exploitation of these two resources and the resulting armed conflict with the African population from 1960 to 1980.

To consolidate their power and self-governance from 1923 onwards, white settlers enacted laws that ensured Africans' continued service.[104] The subsequent development of White agriculture brought white farmers into conflict with peasant producers. The study took note of such early historiographical undertakings by concentrating on the major issues whose effects eventually contributed to the guerrilla war that sucked in rural youths. While Loney's work is not current, it however provided salient facets appropriate

[102] M. Loney, *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response*. Middlesex, 1975. p. 15.
[103] From henceforth, Unilateral Declaration of Independence will be written in its acronym, UDI.
[104] Such laws included, *inter alia*, the LAA of 1930 and the LHA of 1951. These will be dealt with in detail in Chapters four and five. A.M. Chambati, Africans and the Struggle for their Rights in Rhodesia, 1923 – 1972 in S.E. Wilmer (ed.), *et al.*, *Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973. pp. 29 – 43.

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for this study.[105] While this might be the case, Loney's work, however, presents a conceptual weakness in that it does not engage with why, how and when Bulilima youths participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. In addition, it is flawed in terms of context, in that it does not provide discussions on both guerrilla and security forces' operational activities in Bulilima District as compared to urban centres.

Ranger (ed.), observed that, 'Because the Ndebele and the Shona risings were in so many ways remarkable any account of the African politics in Southern Rhodesia must begin with them.'[106] Ranger (ed.), blames the colonisation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland for the outbreak of the Zimbabwean guerrilla war. He traces the geneses of the Rhodesian conflict from the coming and settlement of white people in Mashonaland and Matabeleland regions and the subsequent renaming of these two as Rhodesia. His analysis locates the Rhodesian conflict in the context of the conquered two regions after their inhabitants had tried to rise against the BSAC rule during the 1896 – 1897 uprisings.

After their defeat, Ranger (ed.), notes that the indigenous people were uprooted from their traditional settlements and resettled in traditionally dry and arid lands that were derogatively known as 'reserves'. In addition, their live-stock were reduced through destocking exercises purportedly meant to relieve pressure on lands that were overcrowded and overused, coupled with natural phenomena such as drought and diseases. Within this context, Ranger (ed.), contends that the Ndebele in particular had a more pressing and concrete grievance, that of their land.

Taking this into consideration, he then traces the formation of resistance groups within the Ndebele Kingship set-up from 1898 – 1923.[107] Ranger (ed.), reveals that it was the land issue that gave the Ndebele Kingship movement its wide support base. He further illustrates that the Ndebele Kingship issue was also a good issue on which to appeal for

[105] Compare: K. Maree and C. van der Westhuizen, Planning a Research Proposal, in K. Maree (ed.), J.W. Creswell, L. Ebersohn, I. Eloff, R. Ferreira, N.V. Ivankova, J.D. Jansen, J. Nieuwenhuis, J. Pietersen, V.L. Plano Clark and C. van der Westhuizen, *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2012. p. 26.
[106] T.O. Ranger, African Politics in 20th Century Southern Rhodesia, in T.O. Ranger (ed.), *Aspects of Central African History*. London, 1968. pp. 210 – 245.
[107] The Ndebele Kingship movement was formed by the surviving members of the deposed King Lobhengula around 1912 in a bid to pressurise the BSAC authorities to return ownership of land to the Ndebele Monarch, and it got wide support from SAANC most of whose members were lawyers. *Ibid*.

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help from outside Rhodesia. Ranger (ed.), points out that during World War II, many African politicians in South Africa were lawyers who took a legal approach to politics.[108]

To those lawyer-turned politicians it seemed possible that something might be gained by appealing to Britain or the world on the basis of the legal rights of King Lobhengula's family and on the grounds that the BSAC had defrauded them.[109] In this way, the Ndebele Kingship movement attracted the support of the SAANC leaders. In any case, elaborates Ranger (ed.), Matabeleland always interested those South African leaders more than Mashonaland given that the Ndebele and Zulu were one stock.[110] In the final analysis, all these issues combined to produce early political movements in Matabeleland which it would have been impossible to create in Mashonaland.

While Bulilima inhabitants formed early political movements to resist Company rule, white settlers were also busy crafting ways and means that ensured they consolidated their hold over the region. The break-through for white settlers came in 1923 when Britain granted them self-governing status. Thereafter, nothing could stop the white settlers from crafting several laws whose major aim was to racially segregate, discriminate, oppress and expropriate prime land formerly owned by the Africans. Hardest hit were Bulilima peasants who during the land expropriation process were pushed into poor land that led to equally poor production, hence chronic poverty in rural Bulilima. Ranger (ed.),

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[108] It is worthwhile to note that using Ranger's (ed.), (1968) analysis the sound relationship between ZAPU and SAANC that later developed and was cemented in the 1960s by a combined ZAPU – MK guerrillas' operations in the now famous Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns, can be traced back to the Ndebele Kingship – SAANC relations of the 1910s – 1920s. This is a valuable observation since most of ZAPU senior members during the 1960s were mentored by the SAANC Youth League in South Africa. For an in-depth analysis of this see O. Gjerstad, *Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU 2, George Silundika.* Richmond, *1974*; K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI, 1975*; D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe.* 1981 and, T. Bopela and D. Luthuli, *UMkhonto we Sizwe*. Johannesburg, 2005.

[109] Cecil John Rhodes sent his chief negotiator John Rudd to negotiate with King Lobhengula so that His Lordship would allow white people to prospect in Matabeleland. Many studies argue that the King was tricked by Rhodes's negotiator into signing a document later known as the 'Rudd Concession'. It is the signing of this document by King Lobhengula that eventually led to the destruction of the Ndebele Kingdom and the King's subsequent flee northwards where his remains are still unknown till today. The document first gave the BSAC the right to prospect for minerals in Mashonaland and eventually in Matabeleland, culminating with the subsequent occupation of the two territories by white settlers under the auspices of Rhodes's BSAC. T.O. Ranger, African Politics in 20th Century Southern Rhodesia, in T.O. Ranger, (ed.) *Aspects of Central African History*. London, pp. 210 – 245.

[110] May be Ranger's (ed.), above elaboration suffices to authenticate earlier observations on this. It helps shade more light on why uMkhonto we Sizwe and ZAPU guerrillas made joint operations in 1967 and 1968 respectively.

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proclaims that such actions by the white settlers became a recipe for Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. This was realised when Africans sought violent means to regain their lost land, liberties, equality before the law as well as equal opportunities at work places, schools and churches. Ranger's (ed.), work was a useful tool of analysis in the contextual background to Bulilima youths' involvement in the war.

As much as Ranger's (ed.) study provides a generalised contextual background to this study, its weakness is that it does not address the early involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the war. It focuses on adults and their contributions in laying the much needed background to Bulilima District's role in the genesis of the conflict. This short-coming in Ranger's (ed.) study is mainly due to his methodological undertakings that were mainly the survey of archival and secondary source documents as opposed to field research where interviews would have led him to involving young people since they contributed the largest available social group in Bulilima District. Ranger's (ed.) study, by failing to address the issues regarding Bulilima youths' early participation in the Zimbabwean problem creates a gap in literature on Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. This study was done to help fill that gap.

In an exclusive interview with Gjerstad, *Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU 2, George Silundika, 1974*, Silundika corroborated what Ranger (ed.) alluded to regarding the relationship between Bulilima people and the SAANC. Silundika pointed out that he became involved in the nationalist movement through the SAANC YL while attending Fort Hare University in the 1950s.[111] During the 1950s, explained Silundika, the SAANC played an important part in fostering an anti-colonial and anti-racist consciousness among youths in Southern Africa. It is therefore clear that Silundika, one of the pioneering youths in the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe, played an active part in launching the NDP around 1960 as its National Secretary General.[112] Gjerstad's work outlines how young people, particularly those from rural Bulilima, participated in the initial stages of the struggle. This

[111] It must be said that George Silundika was a Kalanga, born in Bulilima District, Gala Village in 1929. He stands as one of several top ZAPU leadership members from this district who became involved and subsequently participated in Zimbabwe's struggle as a youth. O. Gjerstad, *Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU 2, George Silundika,* Richmond, 1974. p. 2.
[112] National Democratic Party was commonly known as NDP and is referred as such in this study.

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is an issue which directly talks to this study. Of significance here is Silundika's outline of how recruitment to ZIPRA was done.

Silundika's narration indicates that at first, young people volunteered to be trained as ZIPRA guerrillas. In Silundika's view, initially volunteers came from all over the country but the emergence of ZANU into the political arena created a situation where these two liberation movements recruited on regional and to a large extent, tribal lines. It is from such a situation that ZIPRA guerrillas resorted to recruiting in areas mainly situated along the country's borders in the western parts of Zimbabwe such as Bulilima District. This is an admission on the part of Silundika that there was a considerable number of Bulilima youths who joined the struggle when the two liberation movements began to compete for potential recruitees. This study established how those youths became involved and participated in the liberation of Zimbabwe given that some were as young as seven to nine years old when they were recruited.

Furthermore, Gjerstad's interview with Silundika serves to highlight difficulties Africans faced when they initially followed the reformist policies.[113] Silundika also touched on the issue of ZAPU's ideology when they embarked on the armed struggle. Ideological issues are quite critical in this study as they are grounded on the theories of social revolution, where Marxist-Leninist-Maoist perspectives as derived from the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, apply in this study. It is imperative for this study to establish how ZAPU, and ZANU (for comparative analysis) applied their ideologies as they executed the armed struggle. The extent to which ZAPU's ideological stand-point influenced Bulilima youths' involvement in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was ascertained.

In as much as Gjerstad's work is relevant to this study, it has its limitations. It has a methodological weakness in that the source of information was one interviewee. This does pose a problem as the discussion becomes narrow and subjective. Had Gjerstad conducted several interviews with Bulilima youths then his study would have been broad, comprehensive and an in-depth one. This study, through an in-depth analysis of Bulilima

[113] That is, the old SRANC merely wanted to reform the capitalist system, to attain parliamentary power and bring in an African bourgeoisie to take over the Zimbabwean industry. Gjerstad, *Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU 2, George Silundika*. Richmond, 1974, pp. 14 – 15.

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youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, would add to literature on this phenomenon.

The 1970s continued with academics and scholars investigating the seemingly never-ending conflict in Rhodesia. One of these was Barnett in his work, *Interviews in Depth: ZAPU 1. George Nyandoro*, where he sought to find out from Nyandoro the historical development of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Nyandoro elaborated on the major cause(s) of the Rhodesian conflict. His response was that the source of all that was land, indicating that indigenous people were fighting to reclaim their lost land. Overall though, the struggle was seen by the masses as between black and white people. One should not lose sight of the fact that when the war intensified there were blacks who fought on the government's side while certain white people supported the nationalists' cause.[114] The study used Barnett's work to argue that the struggle was not necessarily about colour; it was more about an oppressive and exploitative system of government that oppressed, discriminated against and segregated black people. The whole system of successive white governments was tailor-made to render indigenous people dependent on white people for their economic survival as a constant supply of cheap labour.

In contributing to the 1970s debate on Rhodesia's escalating conflict, Wilkinson's *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and Assessment*, provided a multi-faceted analysis of the struggle. He noted the invaluable role played by Botswana as it provided the most direct physical access into and from Rhodesia by ZIPRA, their recruits and sympathisers.[115] This observation was relevant to this study as both ZIPRA and the Rhodesian security forces became concentrated in Bulilima District to contest for its control since it had become the insurgents' strategic gateway into or out of Rhodesia.

Furthermore, Wilkinson's study touched on the issue of ideology where his emphasis was on the conduct of a guerrilla war from the Maoist perspective. He contrasted Mao's

[114] Of note here is the former Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister Sir Garfield Todd and her daughter, Judith who fed and gave material support to ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas in Belingwe District. J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses versus Media in the making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 231 and M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 32.

[115] ZIPRA sympathisers were mostly youths who performed a variety of errands on behalf of these guerrillas. Sometimes they assisted wounded ZIPRA guerrillas cross the border into Botswana while others acted as couriers of ZIPRA armaments from Botswana into Zimbabwe. Interview one with Thembani Dube: 7th February, 2016.

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development of his guerrilla strategies and tactics to those pursued by ZANLA and ZIPRA, as well as Fidel Castro (Cuba) and Che Guevara (Bolivia). Wilkinson's work added an international out-look to ZIPRA's operations in rural Rhodesia. This study used the above observation to argue that Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories of guerrilla warfare could be altered to suit specific situations and conditions as obtaining in a conflict zone.

Wilkinson also elaborated on the factors that contributed to the failure of compromise politics in Rhodesia from 1957 to the early 1960s. Immediately after the collapse of the Central African Federation in 1963, noted Wilkinson, the white government passed several laws meant to entrench white supremacy over the indigenous people. This included the banning of political parties and the indiscriminate arrest and detention (in most cases without trial) of nationalist leaders, political activists and those who opposed the status quo publicly.[116] In addition, Wilkinson provided an analysis of UDI where he saw it as a catalyst to the armed struggle. Its announcement was seen by black people as the straw that broke the camel's back with regard to compromise politics.

To this end, a programme of massive recruitment by liberation movements assumed a new dimension. It intensified, with border districts such as Bulilima being the most affected. Due to Smith's arrogance and insensitivity to Africans' plight, Wilkinson noted some high profile incidences that took place in Bulilima District, such as the arrest and subsequent sentencing of Thekwane High School pupils.[117] Wilkinson's work serves to highlight instances where Bulilima youths became involved and participated in Zimbabwe's liberation.[118] Situations such as the one highlighted by Wilkinson serve as evidence that indeed youths from Bulilima participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, albeit in varying degrees and circumstances.

[116] Several youths from Bulilima District were arrested, detained and those deemed dangerous appeared in Courts where most of them were sentenced to death. Also see A.R. Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and Assessment*. London, 1973.
[117] Thekwane Mission High School pupils had gone to nearby Plumtree town to demonstrate against the oppressive, discriminatory and racial segregation system practiced against black people. A.R. Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and Assessment*. London, 1973. p. 14.
[118] While Thekwane Mission High School provided schooling services to local BaKalanga children, it should be borne in mind that it was a boarding school. It also included children from the rest of the country who also participated in the 1971 demonstrations.

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While Wilkinson's work dealt with the Rhodesian conflict from a comparative perspective in terms of ideology and the problems that eventually led to the armed struggle and other civic disturbances, Nyangoni and Nyandoro bring another dimension to the historiography of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Nyangoni and Nyandoro's *Zimbabwe Independence Movements. Selected Documents*, looks at the role of ZAPU's top leadership in exile as they appraised themselves with the situation at home. They provide an overview of most of ZAPU's annual executive meetings and conferences that dealt specifically with issues that affected the majority of the people. These were listed as, *inter alia*, the Native Land Husbandry Act (NHA) and the Native Department (ND). Nyangoni and Nyandoro describe how Joshua Nkomo,[119] internationalised the Zimbabwean conflict through organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union, AU).[120] The internationalisation of the Zimbabwean conflict had the effect of drawing sympathy from organisations such as the International Red Cross (IRC), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHRC) as well as the OAU. Nkomo's efforts enabled ZAPU to receive donations for its refugees in the form of, *inter alia*, clothes, food and sanitary ware for female youths.

Nyangoni and Nyandoro's work also highlights issues surrounding ZAPU – SAANC alliance which led to MK – ZAPU guerrillas' combined operations in the north-western parts of the country.[121] This is a historical incident in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war that helps explain how difficult it was for insurgents to operate in rural areas without the knowledge and support of peasants. In short, such failed guerrilla adventures underpin the important roles played by young people during the armed struggle.

The issues related to Chiefs during the armed struggle also feature prominently in Nyangoni and Nyandoro's analysis of Zimbabwe's armed conflict. Chiefs who refused to support government policies were ill-treated. A case in point was that of Chief

[119] Joshua Nkomo was ZAPU's life President who constantly travelled abroad under the invitations of international organisations where he would be given platform to brief the gatherings on the issues affecting Zimbabweans at the same time seeking international assistance for ZAPU refugees. G. Baumhogger, *The Struggle for Independence. Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe. C. 1975 – 1980*. Vol. ll, Hamburg, 1984. p. 21.
[120] For the rest of this Chapter, the above organisations are written in their acronyms.
[121] ZAPU and MK guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia in 1967 and 1968 dismally failed due to lack of local support from rural peasants who were not yet conversant with the armed struggle. See T. Bopela and D. Luthuli, *UMkhonto we Sizwe*. Johannesburg, 2005, for a detailed analysis of these failed incursions.

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Ndabakayena Mpini Ndiweni of the Nata Reserve (Bulilima) near Plumtree town. He was stripped of his Chieftaincy for protesting against the disrespect Chiefs got from the NC.[122] As Chiefs were custodians of traditional law and customs in rural areas, their association with the ND was often construed by both guerrillas and youths as a conspiracy against the liberation struggle. Nyangoni and Nyandoro's work benefited this study through its focus on the relationship between traditional leadership on one side and, the youths and the guerrillas on the other.

Their work also provides reports on various issues such as problems that bedeviled ZAPU's external branches,[123] a brief on why and how ZAPU had decided to embark on an armed struggle, and the OAU's 24th session of the Council of Ministers' resolution on Zimbabwe. In noting these observations, this study establishes how these problems affected Bulilima refugees and those who were already in the war front. In so doing, a general picture of how Bulilima youths were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was formulated.

While politicians continued with their unsuccessful efforts to resolve the Zimbabwean conflict for the better part of the 1970s on one hand, on the other scholars continued to produce studies that revealed divergent views about the conflict. One such product was that by Atieno-Odhiambo, 'The Origins of the Zimbabwe Problem, 1888 – 1923', in Wilmer, *et al.,* where he looks at the sources of the Zimbabwean conflict. Atieno-Odhiambo, in a similar fashion to Ranger, attributes the causes of the conflict first to the defeat of King Lobhengula in 1893 by Rhodes' BSAC resulting in the permanent settlement of white people in Zimbabwe. He further argues that the fact that the Ndebele

[122] Native Commissioners (from henceforth written as NCs) were eyes and ears of the Smith government in rural areas. They were white people given excessive powers of control by the government, hence had no respect for local Chiefs who they expected to be puppet followers of every instruction from the District Offices. A.M. Chambati, Africans and the Struggle for their Rights in Rhodesia, 1923 – 1972, in S.E. Wilmer (ed.) *et al*, *Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973. pp. 29 – 43 and P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970 – 1980*. Johannesburg, 1993. p. 102.

[123] ZAPU leadership exiled in Zambia, led by its Vice President James Chikerema, was involved in an internal wrangle for the control of the movement in 1970. This led to its split in exile and it is assumed that the split posed a lot of challenges for refugees depended upon the movement's leadership for both guidance and survival in foreign countries. This also affected their undivided execution of war duties, a situation that left most of them inherently vulnerable to manipulation and abuse by the security forces' spy agents. N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 89.

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and Shona peoples rose against the white settlers is testimony to the fact that white rule was not welcome in those two territories of Matabeleland and Mashonaland.[124] The second defeat of the Matabele and Shona peoples meant that the domination of Africans by white people in Zimbabwe had become entrenched.

Atieno-Odhiambo goes on to list measures that were put in place by white settlers in order to force Africans to provide labour in mines and farms. He provides examples of these measures as the introduction of Hut Tax, and the creation of a ND run by NCs. NCs collected tax and recruited labour on behalf of the BSAC and farmers. To rub salt into the natives' wounds, Chiefs were appointed by NCs under the system of Native Administration (NA). These individuals were not hereditary leaders and were largely seen as agents of the exploitative administration by the indigenous people.

On education, Atieno-Odhiambo stresses that African education mainly came from missionaries, which only served to make an African a better Christian, hence obedient servant of his master. In his view, natives got the type of education suitable for hewers of wood and drawers of water, the education of men already impoverished economically, that would not qualify them for franchise and democratic government.[125] Given this predicament, it came as no surprise when Africans ended up launching the second war of liberation in the early 1960s. Atieno-Odhiambo blames the arrival of whites and the subsequent rule they imposed upon the natives as the foundation of the Zimbabwean conflict. His observations are in tandem with Ranger's, hence provide a strong framework for the contextual background of this study.[126] In so doing, it becomes easy for one to follow, understand and hence appreciate how, why, what, where and when Bulilima youths became involved in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

[124] It should be pointed out that before the establishment of white rule in Rhodesia, Matabeleland and Mashonaland were two separate and autonomous Kingdom and Chiefdoms. T.O. Ranger, African Politics in 20th Southern Rhodesia, in T.O. Ranger, (ed.) *Aspects of Central African History*. London, 1968. pp. 210 – 245.
[125] Atieno-Odhiambo, The Origins of the Zimbabwe Problem, 1888 – 1923, in Wilmer (ed.) *et al.*, *Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973. pp. 13 - 28.
[126] For any understanding of youths' contributions in Zimbabwe's war, it is imperative to provide a contextual background that serves as a springboard for the genesis of their involvement and participation in that war. For this and more, see L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle For Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981.

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Atieno-Odhiambo's observations are further corroborated by Chambati's 'Africans and the Struggle for their Rights in Rhodesia, 1923 – 1972', in Wilmer, *et al.,* when he writes, 'In order to have an understanding of the position of Africans in Rhodesia, it is necessary to examine some aspects of the constitutional development in Rhodesia since 1923.' The constitutional development is more or less the same as what Atieno-Odhiambo alluded to above. Issues include but are not limited to, the Land Apportionment Act (LAA 1930) and the ND and the Municipal Act (1898). To present a complete picture of African people's struggle for freedom in Rhodesia, one would have to turn as far back as 1896 when Africans organized revolts against the occupation of their land.[127] African problems in Rhodesia started with the occupation of their land by white settlers.

Through the LAA, Africans were placed in poorer and arid soils, were allotted small pieces of land and placed further away from the main lines of communications. Chambati believes that the LAA and its successor, the Land Tenure Act (LTA) legitimised all discriminatory laws, hence it was a major source of the conflict. Added to this was the ND and the Municipal Act. Chambati is convinced that the ND was created to exercise control over the 'natives'. To achieve this, the country was divided into several districts and white NCs appointed to head each district with both judiciary and executive powers. The issue here is that all endeavours by white settlers were meant to oppress and subjugate Africans in their own land. This was a secondary cause of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Regarding African political activities, Chambati stresses that for one to appreciate efforts made by Africans, it is important to recall how in 1893 and 1896 the Matabele made military attempts to fight against white settlers. In 1897 the Matabele joined forces with the Shona in an effort to drive the settlers away. To Chambati, seeds of African nationalism were planted in land that white settlers seized from Africans. He goes on to tabulate major political events that indicated African struggles against settler rule in Rhodesia from 1896 – 1952. These are seen as the precursor to African nationalism in Rhodesia, which Chambati cites as having begun in 1955 with the formation the CYL.

[127] A.M. Chambati, Africans and the Struggle for their Rights in Rhodesia, in Wilmer (ed.), *et al., Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973. pp. 29 – 43.

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The formation of the SRANC by the CYL and the old ANC in 1957 marked the turning point in Rhodesian African nationalism.

Chambati claims that the coming into being of the SRANC and the enactment of the Security Legislation to curb the spread of radical African nationalism ignited the strong calls for resorting to armed struggle. Such calls were further fueled by the banning of all political parties and activities as well as the arrest and detention of political activists by the Rhodesian authorities in 1963. This confirms this study's assumption that it is worthwhile to understand the contextual background towards Zimbabwe's guerrilla war if one is to have a full picture of the Bulilima youths' participation therein.

Adding his views on a growing list of studies on Zimbabwe's conflict, Maxey's *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI,* outlines the political activities pursued by nationalists in Zimbabwe. His work provides an overview of both the ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces' preparations towards war. Peasants' roles and how they participated in the struggle also feature prominently here. Maxey delineates both ZIPRA and ZANLA's areas of operations and how these affected the peasant populations vis-a-vis the Rhodesian security forces. Furthermore, Maxey's work also looks at the role of the OAU's Liberation Committee and how this organ (of the OAU) worked towards uniting ZANU and ZAPU.

Maxey's work also looks at the role of the triple alliance of Rhodesia, South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique in trying to fight against the rise of African nationalism and its inherent armed struggles in Southern Africa. This was done within the context of White cooperation in Southern Africa in a bid to prop up the Smith regime which was under severe pressure from the insurgents. In light of this, troop reinforcements were sent to Rhodesia by South Africa, while in the eastern border, patrols by Portuguese Mozambique army were a constant feature. Maxey's work brings a regional flavour to the Rhodesian conflict before the fall of Mozambique to FRELIMO in 1975.

Taking Maxey's contributions into consideration, this study too located, verified and established the roles played by youths in light of the conflict assuming an international

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dimension where three international armies were now involved.[128] On top of dealing with white cooperation in Southern Africa, Maxey's work also illustrates ZAPU – MK alliance of the late 1960s. He views this alliance as having fermented the White triple alliance of the early 1970s. In addition, Maxey's work explores the role of Smith's CIO,[129] and the infamous SS in the war. These state security organs are seen as having caused untold suffering among rural peasants in Rhodesia as well as to refugees in camps in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. This was done through clandestine operations that caught both peasants and refugees unawares. Given that a lot of people suffered at the hands of both CIO and the SS, it is within the scope of this study to examine how Bulilima youths conducted themselves under the circumstances, both at home and in refugee camps.

The Smith regime, sensing wide-spread negative publicity drawn by its racist policies across the world, sought to do damage limitation. This task fell into the hands of the Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism. The Ministry set about publishing and distributing propaganda pamphlets overseas,[130] propping up the regime's image that had taken a knock. Such publications (mostly published in the United States and distributed to other friendly nations) portrayed guerrillas as communist trained terrorists.

In *No Hide-Out*, the Smith government accused African nationalists of preparing to use weapons and explosives from external sources to overthrow a legitimate government. The government's propaganda, as reflected in the pamphlets was to the effect that this had been going on since 1962 when two of ZAPU's terrorists were arrested in Shangani (Matabeleland South) with two sub-machine guns and two revolvers. In addition, young Africans were lured by promises of various kinds to leave Rhodesia clandestinely for training in foreign countries. This assertion corroborates this study's assumption that

[128] That is, there were the Rhodesian security forces, the Portuguese Mozambique army and the South African armed forces on one hand, and the Zambian army and ZIPRA guerrillas on the other. K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London, 1975. pp. 41, 42 and 66.
[129] This spy organisation was and is still known as the CIO in Zimbabwe, hence is written thus.
[130] Countries that were targeted by the Smith regime were mainly America, Britain and Australia since they sympathised with the Rhodesian government for reasons mostly related to anti- Communism. It should also be noted that the United States of America and Britain were two of the five members of the powerful Security Council in the UNO. Any resolution that was to be made by the Security Council with regard to the regime required the approval of all the five permanent members of the Council, hence the need for the regime to clean its image internationally. See Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*. London, 1988.

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youths became involved and participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle as early as the beginning of the 1960s.

Of importance to this study is the issue of ZAPU's early recruitment phases and the use of terror tactics during 1960 – 1962 and how the Smith regime responded to this. In this case, the propaganda pamphlets acknowledged that ZAPU recruited young people to its ranks and for military training as guerrillas in other countries. Within this context, this study established when and how ZAPU made inroads in recruiting youths within Bulilima District. Similarly, the issue of the SS becomes an important factor to this study as they operated in Bulilima District in their counter-insurgency activities.

In its *Zambezi – Red Frontier,* one of several pamphlets published in 1968, the Smith regime boasted that it was making so much success against guerrilla incursions that by the end of the decade, no terrorist activities would be taking place in Rhodesia. The government attributed such success to the cooperation given to security forces by villagers. The said cooperation by villagers led to the capturing and subsequent sentencing of 'terrorists'. This was vital information to this study as it was utilised to determine ZIPRA's early relationship with Bulilima youths. In addition, the pamphlet associated guerrilla activities in rural Rhodesia with what transpired in Malaya and South Vietnam. This is an indication that the Smith government studied the British and Americans' counter-insurgency strategies in Malaya and South Vietnam respectively. This study determined that the purpose for conducting such studies on the part of the Smith regime was to implement counter-insurgency strategies as practiced by the British and the Americans then. The study used such historical cases for comparative purposes during data analysis and interpretation.

The 1970s saw the Smith government pushing up its propaganda campaigns by establishing an office in the United States known as the Rhodesian Information Office. The purpose was to publish guerrilla atrocities on civilians. In *Anatomy of Terror*, outrageous pictures of mutilated, decapitated and burnt bodies of black civilians and their cattle were distributed to countries as noted above. The purpose was to show the international community that guerrillas were mere criminals (as evidenced by those pictures) bent on destabilising Rhodesia. The aim was to convince the Western Super

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Powers who had sanctioned the Smith regime that nationalist guerrillas were communist sponsored and that being the case, the Super Powers should lift the sanctions. This was relevant to this study as it revealed atrocities committed by both guerrillas and security forces on innocent civilians. This study shows how the commitment of such atrocities impacted on Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

The Catholic Institute for International Relations' (CIIR) *Rhodesia after the Internal Settlement*, served to inform the world about the escalation of the war and its economic, social and political consequences to ordinary people. In its study, the CIIR claimed that the war had demonstrated the dehumanising effects on combatants and civilians alike. It had created the severe economic, social and political disintegration in the country. The CIIR further observed that despite all this the Smith regime failed to accede to majority rule. It lamented the denial of the vote to the majority of Africans controlled in Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). Africans' placements in TTLs excluded them from the prime farming land, and were segregated against in all social facilities such as hospitals and schools. The paper goes on to present the Zimbabwean war as the story of horror. Only civilians suffer in this war while the elite continue to live in peace. This observation enabled the study to argue that the war affected the vulnerable members of the Rhodesian society more than any other group. This study ascertained how Bulilima youths responded to such onslaughts from the warring parties.

While the 1960s – 1970s studies were done during the actual war, they nonetheless lack a complete picture of how Bulilima youths participated in the guerrilla war. This leads to the next category, the 1980s historiography.

2.6 The 1980s Literature

The years 1980 – 1985 saw some concerted effort by several historians and scholars as they embarked on studies that sought to highlight the country's guerrilla war in any way

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that suited their areas of specialty.[131] Most of such studies are based on the former liberation movements' elite. In recognition of such trends during the 1980s historiography, this study treated such publications with caution as some contained elements of bias and subjectivity towards the elite.

Amongst such studies is Moorcraft and McLaughlin's *Chimurenga! The war in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*, who trace the roots of the Rhodesian conflict from 1890 – 1965. They look at the various legislative acts that served to antagonise the African population. Top of their list is the LAA which formerly divided the country's land between races. In addition, they trace the formation of liberation movements until their banning in 1963. This observation becomes an extension and expansion of the contextual background and helped solidify this study's contextualisation of the said background.

Moorcraft and McLaughlin also point out the way Rhodesian security forces intimidated civilians in certain instances where the latter were suspected of harbouring guerrillas. The security forces burned and destroyed schools and villages if villagers did not report the presence of guerrillas in their communities to authorities. Moorcraft and McLaughlin's work promotes an understanding of the relationship between the security forces and the civilians. This became a frame work of analysis regarding the impact of war on youths in Bulilima District. Noted in their work, for example, is the abduction of Thekwane Mission High School pupils by ZIPRA guerrillas in 1978. This incident was a typical example of ZIPRA's recruitment methods and the ease with which the whole group of students and their abductors crossed into Botswana. The same incident underlines the importance of Bulilima's proximity to Botswana in the face of ZIPRA's need to recruit and then cross the border before being detected by the security forces.

Moorcraft and McLaughlin discuss the Rhodesian security forces' operational strategies and how these impacted on ordinary rural peasants. Their explanation is to the effect that security forces were mostly concentrated in areas where there were equally large

[131] This indicates the multi-disciplinary nature of war history where political scientist scholars, military experts such as Kenny Flower (the former CIO Boss in both Rhodesia and Zimbabwe), economic historians and Religious Leaders carried out studies that sought to inform the world about the just ended bush war. See, for example, K. Flower, 1987, (Military expert), I. Staunton, 1990 (Feminist), and C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, 1989 (Economic Historians), *inter alia*.

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concentrations of white farmsteads such as the Figtree – Marula stretch along the Bulawayo – Botswana railway line in Bulilima District. This study concluded that the persistent presence of security forces in Bulilima was meant to protect white farmers from guerrilla attacks. In addition, the threat of guerrilla attacks was viewed as an indication that white farmers and their property, in addition to major economic installations and infrastructure, were ZIPRA guerrillas' targets in Bulilima.

Moorcraft and McLaughlin's work also highlights the SS's clandestine operations in rural Rhodesia. The SS did field 'pseudo-gangs' to deceive guerrillas and peasants, particularly youths who were seen to be heavily involved in guerrilla activities. Once a village was suspected to have collaborated with guerrillas, punitive measures were meted out by the security forces against that village or villages.

These authors acknowledge that in Bulilima, both guerrillas and security forces controlled where they stood at any given time. They go on to illustrate ZIPRA guerrillas' operational structures, strategies and tactics and how peasants fitted within this jigsaw puzzle. A detailed account of the security forces' raids in Mozambique and Zambia is given prominence as well. Not much, however, is said about Bulilima youths' role in all this.

The challenges faced by peasants in Manicaland during the liberation struggle, particularly those of Makonde, are dealt with comprehensively in Ranger's *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*. Makonde villagers were mobilized by ZANLA guerrillas to participate in the liberation struggle. Their participation attracted the wrath of the authorities who retaliated by burning villages and killing villagers indiscriminately in the name of breaking curfew rules.[132] Ranger's observation above strengthened this study's assumption that both guerrillas and security forces committed crimes against innocent civilians. At the same time, the study used the above observation to make a comparative analysis between Makonde and Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the liberation struggle.

[132] Curfew was enforced from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. and whosoever violated its conditions was short on sight and the authorities would always claim that civilians were mistaken for guerrillas, hence shot. See K. Flower, 1987 and J. Frederikse, 1982 for detailed explanations of the several 'punitive' laws and measures meant for Africans.

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Ranger also notes the reasons that contributed to people in Matabeleland giving support to ZIPRA guerrillas. Most importantly, his work acknowledges the fact that no systematic study of the nationalist or guerrilla periods in Matabeleland had been done at the point of writing his book.[133] This study, therefore, provides a detailed analysis of the involvement of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation war. In so doing, the study helps fill the gap.

Astrow and Lan document Zimbabwe's guerrilla war from the settler government critics' point of view. They are highly critical of the successive settler governments' denial of the right to vote to African people in Rhodesia. Lan's *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, for example, argues that the loss of land was not the only cause nor was it sufficient to make the great, brave leap into the armed resistance seem the only available option. If people were able to make good their losses by selling their surplus agricultural goods to the market which the settler state had introduced, by and large they accepted the limitations to their political and economic freedoms.[134]

Lan points out that the intention of successive white governments was to prevent the black population from developing its agricultural production to the level where it would be able to support itself satisfactorily by this means alone. The strategy refined by the state over the years was to maintain commercial agriculture, industry, and mines under exclusive white control. The black population, meanwhile, was reduced to little more than a source of extremely cheap labour.[135] This study argues along the same lines, that instead of being perpetual sources of labour for white settlers, Bulilima youths sought to liberate themselves by participating in the guerrilla war one way or the other.

Astrow's *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost Its Way*? denounces UDI when he states that it was an acknowledgement that power could not be transferred to an African middle class without infringing the jealously guarded privileges of the European community. UDI is thus seen as the catalyst to the armed struggle. Under UDI, Africans suffered more than white settlers in that the proportion of the African population employed fell from 15,1% to 14,8% in 1970, and their standard of living fell drastically.[136] Exposed to hunger and left jobless,

[133] T.O. Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*. *A Comparative Study*. Harare, 1985. p. 137.
[134] D. Lan, *Guns and Rain. Guerrillas and Spirit Medium in Zimbabwe*. Harare, 1985. p. 122.
[135] *Ibid.*
[136] A. Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost Its Way*. London, 1983. p. 15.

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Bulilima youths had no alternative but to join the liberation struggle. While Astrow and Lan provide sufficient facts on why youths ended up joining the liberation struggle, their studies do not discuss Bulilima youths' involvement in that struggle.

Since this study is about the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, Frederikse's *None But Ourselves. Masses versus Media in the making of Zimbabwe*, gives an informed analysis on the involvement of ZIPRA and Rhodesian security forces in the struggle. His study was conducted through interviews with ex-ZIPRA guerrillas, former Rhodesian security forces and youths around the country as participants. Frederikse's ex-ZIPRA informants outlined the ways they interacted with peasants during the struggle, stressing that the manner and conduct of such interactions were different from that of ZANLA guerrillas.[137] Such information was vital to this study as it helped explain the relationship between ZIPRA guerrillas and youths, as well as between youths and the security forces.

This information also assisted in exposing how youths in Bulilima participated in the liberation struggle. The nationalist leaders' hypocrisy is exposed as it becomes clear that youths also played an important role in liberating Zimbabwe.[138] By investigating the involvement of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, this study uncovers and brings to light the hidden side of Zimbabwe's history as told by the underrepresented Bulilima youths. Frederikse's work was a stepping stone towards this aspect.

By interviewing ex-Rhodesian intelligence security personnel, Frederikse's work provided a balance in this study's analysis. That is, one of his interviewees, Bob North seemed to admire the power and strength of what he called the 'Bush telegraph'. This was a network of *mujibas* set up by ZANLA guerrillas to monitor security forces' movements in rural areas.[139] Bob North explained how, through such networks, their bases could be hit, stomped, or attacked because youths' knowledge was good. He stresses that it was not

[137] That is, ZANLA guerrillas specialised in *pungwes*, all night vigils that potentially exposed youths to security forces attacks and subsequent arrest. For more on *pungwes* see T.O. Ranger, 1985 and N.J. Kriger, 1992.
[138] See F. Chung, 2006 and N.J. Kriger, 1992 for more details on this.
[139] *Mujibas* were ZANLA's male youths in Mashonaland. Female youths were called *Chimbwidos*. Note that in Matabeleland youths were known as '*Intsha*' or '*Ontanga*'. Interview one with Thembani Dube: 7th February, 2016.

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just young boys who were involved, there were a lot of female youths with them. Female youths were used to carry land mines, disguised as pregnancies.

While it is commendable that Frederikse's work details youths' participation in the struggle, it does so in the context of Mashonaland's youths and ZANLA guerrillas. This study was obligated to focus on Bulilima youths' involvement in the guerrilla war given that Mashonaland youths' has been studied comprehensively. Frederikse's study, in view of Bob North's contributions, provides a framework for comparative analysis.

In addition to the above, Bob North's contributions to Frederikse's study gives valuable information about the military wing of the Internal Affairs (DAs). Bob North points out that DAs became soft targets for guerrillas. He is also quoted as saying the use of force appeared to be the best method under the circumstances as villagers refused to divulge information concerning the terrorists' whereabouts even though one of their units had been ambushed. Such information revealed the relationship between security forces and peasants on one hand and between peasants and guerrillas on the other. It was used to verify facts concerning information obtained from the interviewees.

Furthermore, Bob North divulged how the Rhodesian security forces air-bombed Victory Camp in Zambia, killing unarmed female refugees, after which it was claimed the Rhodesian forces had destroyed ZIPRA camps and killed armed guerrillas. He conceded that the Rhodesians had attacked refugee camps. This study established that youths in bush camps were vulnerable to air and ground attacks from the security forces. This study determined how Bulilima youths caught in such situations conducted themselves for survival purposes.

Roselyn Chazuza, a storekeeper at Garfield Todd's store in Belingwe (now Mberengwa), also aired her views regarding the war when interviewed by Frederikse. She pointed out that ZIPRA guerrillas never had *mujibas*. Chazuza explained that ZIPRA guerrillas in Belingwe did their 'dirty work' themselves as compared to ZANLA who used *mujibas* for any errand. This observation concurs with this study's observation that the way ZANLA executed their guerrilla war was different from the way ZIPRA did, hence what happened in Mashonaland is not what transpired in ZIPRA operated Bulilima. Chazuza further explained that ZIPRA guerrillas were more dependent on themselves and did not bother

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people as ZANLA guerrillas did. She stressed that ZANLA guerrillas had massive all night gatherings called *pungwes* that were a nuisance as they wasted people's time.

In addition, Chazuza revealed that there were certain white people who supported the liberation struggle (guerrillas) although they did not want it known.[140] In light of these observations, the study maintain its position that the Zimbabwe bush war was not a racial war. Rather, it was a war against an oppressive system of governance pursued by the white elite. Frederikse's work was a useful tool for supporting such arguments and observations throughout this study.

In his work, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*, Claute discusses the internal upheavals that were caused by Smith's UDI. He looks at UDI as an historical phenomenon that brought political chaos, economic disequilibrium, and social pandemonium in Rhodesia, particularly within black communities. He sums up the African nationalists' state of affairs thus,

> Then came five years of instability, of nationalist unrest, urban violence and political strife culminating in Rhodesian Front's UDI (1965). Divided, dispersed, imprisoned, exiled, penetrated by police informers and closely monitored by SB, nationalist parties were unable to mount any campaign or incursion impressive enough to dent whites' confident assumption of total and enduring superiority.[141]

Claute's observation is to the effect that UDI was the major cause of Zimbabwe's armed struggle, a corroboration of what earlier literature alluded to. This was a relevant insight to this study as it was used to support the view that UDI was one of the primary reasons why Bulilima youths were involved in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Claute's study partly deals with both ZIPRA and the Rhodesian security forces' activities in Matabeleland. He looks at how ZIPRA guerrillas conducted their operations in Plumtree (Bulilima District), Filabusi and Matobo Districts. Of particular importance to this study

[140] An explanation for this secrecy may be that white farmers were afraid of the repercussions for being caught supporting nationalist guerrillas (widely known in white communities as terrorists). Such reprisals may have included withdrawal of government funding, arrests, repossession of one's farm or restrictions, among others. Refer to I. Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953 – 1980*. London, 1984. p. 200 and J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses versus Media in the making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982.
[141] D. Claute, *Under the Skin. The Death of Rhodesia*. London, 1983. pp. 29 and 40.

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was the killing of two white elderly farmers' widows in rapid succession by ZIPRA guerrillas on the seventh of September 1972. The killing of white civilian farmers had repercussions for rural peasants. In follow up operations, security forces burnt down villages, in the process killing innocent youths and elderly people as well. Such incidences are widely touted as having contributed to Zimbabwean youths and rural peasants shifting their allegiance to ZIPRA from that of a neutral position.[142] This study determined how such incidences contributed to Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Claute goes on to raise and elaborate on the roles played by the DAs in rural areas during the liberation struggle. Through his interviews with Joseph Bhebhe in Kezi (Matopo District which neighboured Bulilima-Mangwe to the south east then) Claute explains how DAs were responsible for the arrests and prosecution of many young people who were suspected of helping the 'boys' (guerrillas).[143] Due to their bad conduct in the eyes of the locals, DAs were hated, loathed and hunted daily by both guerrillas and youths in Kezi. Quoted by Claute, Ellen Bhebhe said of her father who was a DA,

> My father was much hated by everyone in our district (Matopo, Kezi area). He deserved to die. My father clung to his bad ways. One night the ZIPRA 'boys' came to our homestead and dragged him from his bed. They brutally killed him with axes, iron bars, then they warned us to leave him there, lying in the open. They said and I quote 'Let the government come and bury him. Let Smith come from Salisbury (Rhodesia's capital city, now Harare) and bury him).[144]

Ellen's emotionless narration of her biological father's brutal killing by ZIPRA guerrillas shows how the guerrilla war sometimes turned relatives, friends and neighbours against each other. This incident stands as an example of how some relationships between

[142] To have a deep understanding of rural people's early reception of guerrilla insurgency and their position, see H. Ellert, 1989; K. Maxey, 1975; D. Martin and P. Johnson, 1981 and, Bopela and Luthuli, 2005.
[143] ZIPRA guerrillas were called *Bayisana* in Kalanga/*Abafana* in Ndebele by elders, which literally means 'Boys' in English. Youths called them '*Obhuti*', meaning 'Brothers'. These nouns show one's affection to someone. ZIPRA guerrillas were regarded as sons and brothers by Bulilima communities (also see Chapter 4 for the meaning and significance of certain terms during the liberation struggle in Bulilima District).
[144] Ellen Bhebe was the daughter of Themba Bhebhe who was employed by the Native Affairs Department as a DA. In her interview with Claute (1983) she explains how her father was hated and eventually killed by ZIPRA guerrillas for being a DA. D. Claute, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*. London, 1983. p. 15.

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youths and elders in Bulilima got affected during the war. It became a useful source of reference. Furthermore, the killing of Ellen's father by ZIPRA guerrillas also informed this study that the war was between guerrillas and the white ruling class. This is made clear by ZIPRA's statements after killing Ellen's father (see the quote above). In this context, Ellen's contributions in Claute's work confirms this study's position that the Zimbabwe guerrilla war sought to destroy the oppressive, segregationist and discriminative system of government in the country.

Claute's study also touches on other issues such as the closing of Matabeleland's rural schools on one hand and how the Smith regime clamped down on the free-flow of information on the other. The closure of all schools in rural Matabeleland left many children of school going age school-less. Smith's censure of newspapers and vocal white liberals led to the closure of many publications and the subsequent deportations of several of these publications' editors, reporters and other out-spoken critiques of the Smith regime.[145] This further illustrates the relationship between government and institutions that were critical of its policies, and that of ZIPRA guerrillas and the communities within which they operated. Such issues are relevant to this study as they helped it trace and establish how Bulilima youths were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

In *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953 – 1980*, Hancock documents the philosophy behind UDI in Rhodesia and its inherent consequences for the Africans. He explains that the Rhodesia Front (RF) believed that UDI would protect the perimeter from soft-headed Western liberalism and hard-minded Eastern Communism and, from instability and the tendency to expropriation which accompanied Black rule in Zambia. Within the secured borders, government would administer the rural areas through the appointed Chiefs and white officials. In addition, the government would snuff out no-racialism rhetoric and opposition, hence preserve white minority's privileges. The

[145] A case in point is the arrest and detention of Garfield Todd and his daughter, Judith in the late 1970s for supporting guerrillas and for being out-spoken critiques of Ian Smith's government and its policies. See J. Frederikse, 1982) *None But Ourselves. Masses versus Media in the making of Zimbabwe*, 1982 and I. Hancock *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia*, 1953 – 1980, 1984 for more details on Todd's struggle against the Smith regime.

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RF thinking was to turn Rhodesia into an apartheid state, in line with what was prevailing in South Africa. In this regard, there was no way Zimbabwean nationalists could achieve self-rule through a negotiated settlement or compromise politics. In the face of it, this current study believes that Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was justified if only to show the RF government and its backers that nationalists were equally determined to free the black population from the yoke of an evil system of governance.

In dealing with pressure groups that sought to pressurize the RF government into abandoning its racial policies, Hancock looks at how institutions such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) pressurised the RF government to reform. The CJPC wanted the RF government to negotiate with the nationalists to end the devastating war which was mostly affecting innocent civilians. Spearheading such campaigns was Bishop Donald Lamont of Umtali (now Mutare). While Bishop Lamont was persuading the Catholic Bishops' Conference to launch periodic assaults upon the government for its handling of the security situation, more Whites were being attacked and killed by guerrillas. Judging by the fact that innocent civilians, Black or White became targets of both guerrillas and security agents, Smith's refusal to negotiate for a peaceful settlement to the Zimbabwe conflict was a sign of his insensitivity to the plight of ordinary citizens. Of interest to this study was the extent to which such insensitivity contributed to Bulilima youths' involvement in the struggle.

The issue of Black oppression, discrimination and segregation on racial lines and its inherent consequences made indigenous people conscious of their dire situation. Once they became aware of their oppressed existence in Rhodesia, they took measures to free themselves from the bondage of white racism. Gann and Henriksen's *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush*, traces the historical development of Zimbabwe's liberation war. Their study pays much attention to guerrilla recruitments/mobilisation methods, guerrilla politics and advancements, guerrilla frontiers and armaments, and guerrilla appeals. Gann and Henriksen point out that during the late 1960s, African nationalism turned from terrorism to guerrilla war of a more extended kind. Exiled parties increasingly depended on mobilising support in the countryside. The issue of mobilisation in the countryside was an important factor for this study. It ascertained how Bulilima youths were

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recruited by ZIPRA guerrillas to join the liberation struggle. Such pertinent issues were central to this study.

On guerrilla formations and armaments, Gann and Henriksen explain that ordinary villagers stood at the bottom of the guerrilla pyramid. They illustrate that voluntarily or coerced, villagers supplied food, intelligence, recruits, and above all porters, critical auxiliaries to an army devoid of motor transport.[146] Gann and Henriksen's work shows how villagers were involved and participated in the guerrilla war. However, this work runs short of providing a detailed account of who was doing what, where, when and how such actions affected those who were doing them.

Discussing guerrilla appeals, Gann and Henriksen advance the notion that both factions of guerrillas couched their appeals to people by reference to ancestral spirits and by-gone revolts, an observation noted by Ranger as well. This study ascertained, through interviews conducted in Bulilima District, that ZIPRA guerrillas did not do that. This was a critical observation since it fell within the parameters of the relationship between guerrillas and peasants in Bulilima. How guerrillas related with Bulilima youths unfolded various ways Bulilima youths participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

For any understanding of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war and the development of Rhodesian counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, an analysis of the period 1962 – 1979 is essential.[147] This assertion by Evans serves to confirm this study's assumption that for one to fully understand and appreciate the circumstances surrounding Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, one has to firstly understand the contextual background of the indigenous peoples' struggle for self-determination and their social and economic emancipation. Evans illustrates that the 1960s were a seminal era in Rhodesian politics in the sense that they produced the storm of contending nationalism that lay at the heart of racial crisis right through until the end of the 1970s.[148] After 1962, White capitalist Rhodesian nationalism collided head-on with Black socialist Zimbabwean nationalism.

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[146] H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle For Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 1.
[147] M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 1979*. Harare, p. 1.
[148] *Ibid*. p. 2.

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Evans reflects that when 'winds of change' ended British rule in Africa in favour of Black nationalist governments, Rhodesia held a unique constitutional position, namely that of self-governing colony under the Crown since 1923.[149] The uniqueness of the Rhodesian situation played into the hands of white settlers who determined to hold on to their perceived superiority status even though 'winds of change' were threatening to break their sails. This analysis resonated with this study as it helped unravel the motives behind Bulilima youths' involvement in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. To that end, Evans's work provided a frame for a comparative analysis and verification of facts.

Evans adds to his comprehensive analysis of the early stages of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war by assessing the Rhodesian COIN doctrine from 1972 – 1979. This is done in the context of the Smith regime's naïve self-belief that the guerrilla insurgency was a passing phase that would be quickly brought under control by the security forces through the application of right strategies and tactics. Guerrillas were equally determined to achieve their goal of Black majority rule in Zimbabwe. This was illustrated by the massive recruitment drives in rural areas of youths and other able bodied people to join the struggle. At the same time, there was a rapid increase in the number of trained guerrillas infiltrating the country from their training bases in Tanzania, Zambia, China, Cuba, Libya, Algeria, the East European Block and the Soviet Union and later, Angola and Mozambique.[150] This had the effect of forcing the government to employ unorthodox means in order to contain the escalating war.

Two observations are made from the above analysis. First, the increased rate of guerrilla recruitment and the resultant number of recruitees meant that rural areas were nearly drained of youths. This study investigated and determined how Bulilima youths who

[149] M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 1979*. Harare, p. 2. Also see T.O. Ranger (ed.), 1968 for more details on this.

[150] The independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 marked the turning point in the Zimbabwean guerrillas' fight for independence in that it created opportunities for ZANLA and ZIPRA to open new bases in the Southern African region where more and more guerrillas would be trained and quickly deployed back home to beef up those already in the field. This had an added advantage in that more pressure was applied to the Smith regime which had to stretch its meagre resources as it now faced two war fronts; the Eastern front (ZANLA) and the Western front (ZIPRA). For a detailed account of this see H. Ellert, 1989, M. Evans, 1981 and K. Maxey, 1975.

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remained behind coped with the ever increasing demands of the guerrilla war.[151] Second, the application of unorthodox means by the government in its bid to contain guerrilla incursions meant that the few remaining youths became the target of the security forces, further complicating an already complicated situation for them. Bulilima youths were always under security forces' surveillance, hence were constantly harassed, beaten or systematically tortured by frustrated soldiers on one hand, and uncertain, jittery and elusive guerrillas on the other. Evans's work played a pivotal role as a source of factual and comparative analysis of data.

The escalation of the guerrilla war created a desperate situation for the Smith regime together with its security commanders. It became possible and necessary for the security forces to pursue guerrilla insurgents into neighbouring countries, namely Mozambique and Zambia in an effort to hit the enemy at his bases. In one of such incidences, described by Martin and Johnson in *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, Rhodesian security forces crossed into Mozambique and brutally murdered Chief Singa's whole family at Singa Village. In fact, this was a retaliatory move on the part of the Rhodesian army. Earlier, FRELIMO guerrillas had first crossed into Rhodesia pursuing a man they suspected to be a Rhodesian informer.[152] Martin and Johnson look at the Rhodesian conflict from a regional perspective. Their study documents the brutality of Rhodesian soldiers and other State security organs on civilians. They cite cases such as Chief Singa and his family's murders which included children as young as less than ten years old. Such brutality was exacerbated by the burning of the family members' bodies after they had been chopped into pieces. This text indicates the level of desperation that had crept into the Rhodesian security forces, as indicated earlier by Evans. Although such incidences drew widespread condemnation from various organisations that were monitoring the Rhodesian situation, the Smith regime never relented on its brutality on innocent civilians.

It should be noted that while Martin and Johnson's work deals with the Rhodesian conflict from an international level, this study dealt with an aspect of the guerrilla war that reflects

[151] As the guerrilla war escalated, more and more resources were needed and demanded by the guerrillas as their numbers continuously multiplied in rural areas. Consequently, this put a strain on those who were required to provide those resources, particularly youths. See N.J. Kriger, 1992 for a detailed discussion on this.
[152] D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1981. p. 4.

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on Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in that conflict. The relevance of Martin and Johnson's work to this study was that of a comparative nature with regard to views raised during interviews and from other secondary sources. Martin and Johnson's study is relevant here as it dealt with issues such as the guerrillas' recruitment drives.

Although these two scholars scratched the surface on ZIPRA guerrillas' recruitment issues, they nonetheless provided helpful pointers as to how, where, when and who ZIPPRA guerrillas targeted for recruitment. There were rural youths who no longer attended school due to school closures, adding to the rapidly growing number of jobless young people in rural areas. This situation created a fertile ground for guerrillas in Bulilima to recruit idle youths for war purposes. The above text provided a strong point about circumstances surrounding Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

With reference to Wankie and Sipolilo battles between the combined MK and ZAPU guerrillas on one side and the security forces on the other, Martin and Johnson (albeit in passing) concentrate on the reaction of ZANU and the Pan African Congress (PAC) over such combined operations. These two are said to have questioned the logic behind an MK – ZAPU combined insurgency, criticising it as a lack of foresight on the part of SAANC and ZAPU. Martin and Johnson, in their informed analysis of the situation at the time, dismissed such comments as a matter of sour grapes on the part of ZANU and PAC. They pointed out that ZANU and PAC felt that the publicity given to the Wankie and Sipolilo battles overshadowed their own efforts thus far. Given that MK and ZAPU's joint operations directly led to the involvement of South African Police (SAP) on behalf of the Smith regime,[153] this study determined how such action affected Bulilima youths who had already joined the struggle. Furthermore, the study established how the presence of more than three thousand South African Police Para-troopers along the Zambezi River changed the course of the guerrilla war with effects as far reaching as Bulilima and impacting on its youths.

[153] The direct involvement of the SADF in the Rhodesian conflict can be explained by the direct involvement of MK as well in the Rhodesian bush war. N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War*. *Peasant Voice*. Cambridge, p. 88. Also see H. Ellert, 1989 for additional information on MK's involvement with ZAPU guerrillas.

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The continued fighting between government troops and the nationalist guerrillas attracted the attention of pressure groups such as Churches. As custodians of social morality in society, certain Churches began to take a subjective position on the conflict.[154] Leading the park was the Catholic Church in Rhodesia. Linden's *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, systematically looks at the role of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe's struggle. His work traces the progressive but at first half-hearted attempt at mediating between the warring parties by the Catholic Church. During the 1960s the Catholic Church was divided over what position to take in the context of the war. There were certain Bishops and Priests who believed that the Church should support the government in its fight against what it saw as acts of 'terrorism' by nationalist movements. Others were totally in favour of the nationalists' cause, fully convinced that they were morally correct to fight against the oppressive system of the RF government.

The Catholic Church owned two very important undertakings in Rhodesia then. These were *Moto*, a monthly publication, and Mambo Press, a Publishing House. Some Catholic Priests and Bishops used *Moto* to publish negative issues about the government and its conduct of the war while writing favourable articles about the guerrilla cause. This infuriated the government. In response, laws were enacted that made it a crime to publish any material without governmental fiat. Due to the government's strong handedness, the Catholic Church became united in its support of the African nationalist movements in Rhodesia. In this light, the Catholic Church became a major anti-government pressure group. Linden asserts that in order to counter the Church's efforts, the government, through its various anti-terrorist legislature, ended up deporting quite a number of Catholic Priests and Bishops who became *persona non grata* in Rhodesia.

While the war was raging on in rural areas, Linden reveals that in rural Missions, priests began to be systematically murdered. The government was quick to blame guerrillas over the Priests' death. Sometimes the supposed murderers were caught and made to confess publicly that they were ZIPRA guerrillas. Within a few days in custody, however, the said 'terrorists' would be reported to have escaped. This was an amazing scenario in the face

[154] The established Church in Rhodesia became divided over the guerrilla war in the country. There were those Churches whose Bishops and Priests supported the Smith regime while others supported nationalist guerrillas. A few decided to remain neutral, with the belief that Bishops and Priests' place was in the Pulpit. See I. Linden, 1980.

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of strained relations between the government and the Church. Of interest to this study is the fact that Priests were only murdered in rural areas and, therefore, their murders had a bearing on youths, particularly in Bulilima where such incidences happened at Embakwe, Empandeni and Usher Missions. This work's value to this study was in the exploration of these murders. It was used extensively to illustrate the themes and emphases whose development formed the core of this study.[155]

With reference to Bulilima-Mangwe (Embakwe Mission), Linden writes,

> A major dissenting voice inside Rhodesia was that of a Notre Dame Sister, Mary McLeish, Superior at Embakwe of an order engaged in non-European education. She said, 'We serve the voiceless poor for whom we should speak.

While the continued squabbling between the Catholic Church and the State is outside the scope of this study, constant reference to Linden's work on such issues that directly affected Bulilima youths is made. In the final analysis, the use of his work revealed how the strained Church-State relationship sucked Bulilima youths into the conflict.[156]

The social Catholicism of the renewed Catholic Church in Rhodesia threatened everything the Settler State stood for. It made demands which, if translated into action, would have stripped Whites of their privileges that were based on the exploitation of black labour, and the redistribution of wealth. In other words, the establishment of Embakwe Mission in Bulilima became a potential source of trouble for the surrounding communities. This was because of the possibility that the government could deploy security forces to monitor the missionaries' activities. It should be borne in mind that due to the Catholic Church's attack on government, the State took a position that the Church had become an ally of the Communist terrorists who masqueraded as guerrillas. The constant presence of both ZIPRA and the security forces in Bulilima District due to the Church-State conflict may be construed as an agency that contributed to Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

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[155] I. Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1980. p. 50.

[156] It is worth noting that the African villagers were relocated elsewhere when Embakwe and Empandeni Missions were established in Bulilima District. Interview one with Thembani Dube: 7th February, 2016.

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It is the historical experience of man, that to understand and deal with the present, one must primarily and of necessity, understand the past.[157] These words were quoted by Baumhogger from ZAPU's Publicity Bureau materials of 1977. Using such documents Baumhogger traced the historical developments of the struggle in Zimbabwe from early activism to the eruption of the guerrilla war. He acknowledges that the origins of ZAPU were rooted in the formation of the SRANC in 1957. Between 1957 and 1963, the settler racist regime of Rhodesia banned the SRANC, NDP and the PCC.[158] The settler governments' attitude, judged within this context, precipitated the guerrilla war. The important issue for this study was Baumhogger's emphasis that the emergence of the SRANC in 1957 was not an unconnected event to the past. This 'past' was the colonisation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland territories in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Baumhogger's observations serve to confirm that colonialism contributed to the involvement of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Furthermore, Baumhogger presents his views from an international perspective. He outlines the role played by the OAU, particularly its strategies to eradicate colonialism in Africa. Baumhogger outlines the OAU's main objective in Zimbabwe as independence on the basis of majority rule. The OAU affirmed that this could be achieved either peacefully or by violent means. Its position was that either way it would lend its unqualified support to freedom fighters led by their nationalist movements.[159] Put differently, by joining the liberation struggle, Bulilima youths were engaging in a just war,[160] in the eyes of the OAU. If Bulilima youths were involved in a war alongside the OAU and other international bodies' blessings, it goes without saying that their contributions need to be investigated and documented as is the case with Mashonaland youths.

The late 1980s equally saw some concerted efforts by scholars to provide a variety of studies on the Zimbabwe conflict. These scholars included Stoneman and Cliffe who wrote *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*. Their study begins by looking at the

[157] C. Baumhogger, *The Struggle for Independence. Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe 1975 – 1980*. Vol. ll. Hamburg, 1984. p. 20.
[158] *Ibid*.
[159] *Ibid*. p. 6.
[160] See Y. Dinsten, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*. Cambridge, 1988, for a detailed discussion on 'Just Wars and Self-defense'.

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geographical and historical setting of Zimbabwe. Stoneman and Cliffe maintain that the discussion of political, economic and social prospects of a country must be located in a framework recognising the physical context.[161]

In the same vein, the difficulties Bulilima youths experienced due to their involvement in the guerrilla war should be understood through the nature of Bulilima terrain, and its poor peasant economy that led to the breakdown of traditional social structures. Bulilima District covers the whole of the south-east to south-western areas along the Botswana border up to the western side of the country near the Zimbabwe-Botswana-Zambia border. Its vegetation is a mixture of savanna grasslands and bushy trees dotted with kopjes and a few mountain ranges along the Tshangwa and Manzamnyama Rivers to the northern side of the district. This is an informed observation by Stoneman and Cliffe as the physical and geographical layout of the district helped shed light on how it impeded or deterred Bulilima youths as they executed their struggle roles. There are always dangers associated with poor terrain during a war, hence this study brought to light how Bulilima terrain affected the participation of youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Stoneman and Cliff also look at the political economy of settlerdom under which they point out issues such as the oppression of Black agricultural activities by successive settler governments. This was done through the establishment of mechanisms that ensured and maintained the thriving of white commercial agriculture. Once more, the LAA comes to the fore. Due to lack of or poor means of production on the part of Africans, their economic lives were disrupted as many flocked to towns in search of wage labour. Realising that their status in Rhodesia was that of impoverishment coupled with some form of semi-enslavement, Africans took to nationalism as a way of mobilising each other to fight against the common enemy, the settler economic system.

Seen from this angle, Stoneman and Cliffe's observations played a vital role in this study as they helped analyse Bulilima youths' involvement in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war in the context of Bulilima's economic, political and social settings. Issues such as how Bulilima youths managed to sustain the guerrilla war in the face of poverty and deprivation are

[161] C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe. *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*. London, 1989. p. 8.

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central to this study. Guerrillas needed food and clothing, cigarettes, over-the-counter medicines and alcohol. They expected the impoverished Bulilima communities to provide them with such 'necessities' of life. This study establishes how Bulilima youths managed to make such provisions amidst tight security controls.[162]

For a detailed, comparative and in-depth analysis of the inner workings of the Smith government and all its organs of counter-terrorism, Flower,[163] in *Serving Secretly: Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*, provides the answer to the above. He produced a study that looks at the inner workings of all the security organs of the Smith government. Flower describes how CIO operatives were involved in all the major incidences that occurred inside Rhodesia and within hostile neighbouring States such as Zambia and Mozambique. According to Flower, CIO operatives acted clandestinely and assassinated certain individual nationalists regarded as very dangerous or who were strategic within liberation movements. As a result, a lot of people lost their lives because of CIO actions. Flower's work was necessary to this study as it brought a new dimension to the historiography of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

In addition, Flower looks at the liberation struggle from a state intelligence perspective, an area in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war that has received less attention from scholars and academics. Its relevance lies in its assistance with exploring how Bulilima youths were able to deal with spies that were infiltrated by the CIO in rural areas to act as individuals in need of assistance to cross the border to Botswana to join the struggle. Bulilima youths' ability to contain such threats received this study's attention. Their involvement and participation in the struggle was fully understood and appreciated.

Equally interesting to this study was the penetration by CIO agents of ZAPU camps in Zambia and elsewhere. That the CIO managed to penetrate such camps shows how Bulilima youth refugees were involved in the guerrilla war. The aerial bombings of refuge

[162] Due to draconian laws that were passed by the RF government when the war escalated in rural areas, peasants' movements were curtailed. It became so difficult and dangerous for Bulilima inhabitants to move from one area to another due to curfews, none existent mechanised means of transport as well as mined roads to compound the situation in case one thought of using donkey driven carts. More on this see M. Evans, 1981 and A. Astrow, 1983.
[163] Ken Flower was the Director of the CIO, an Intelligence and Spy organisation that functioned as information gatherers within and without Rhodesian borders on behalf of the Prime Minister in Rhodesia. K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record.* Johannesburg, 1987. p. 11.

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camps in Zambia and Angola were a result of prior CIO infiltrations of such camps that were later bombed. Such acts were aimed at obtaining valuable information about the physical layout, security arrangements of the camps, armament, and the number of occupants in the camps. The information was supplied to the Prime Minister (PM) who decided what action to take as he was the head of Combined Operations (COMOPS). Regarding this theme, this study ascertained how Bulilima refugees dealt with the air strikes/raids by the Rhodesian security forces. The study appreciated the fact that refugees were required to defend themselves whenever a raid took place. This is an example of how some Bulilima youths participated in the war.

On a slightly different note, Wood did a study on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war from the RF's perspective. He began by outlining the general causes of the war, a contextual background whose genesis was the conquest of the two territories of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. With reference to this, Wood writes,

> A war was fought for the southern half of the territory in 1893, and the conquest was confirmed when an uprising by the Matabele and Shona was put down firmly in 1896 –1897.

Wood's observations confirm what earlier scholars noted as well, that the genesis of the Zimbabwe guerrilla war lies squarely on colonialism and its oppression of black people. Wood adds to the growing list of scholars who agree with this study's assumption that the contextual background will go a long way in making one understand fully why and how Bulilima youths participated in the liberation struggle.

Approaching his study from the security forces' perspective, Woods discusses the circumstances under which the Rhodesian security clusters became involved and participated in counter-insurgency activities. He defines and describes the composition or the structures of the Rhodesian security forces and how each department functioned. Roles of each department are clearly examined, and in this case, the functions and activities of the SB, the SS and the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAF) feature prominently. Of particular relevance to this study is the conduct of these units in relation to peasants. That is, this study reveals how these units' operations and activities largely contributed to Bulilima youths joining the liberation struggle. The study also examined and established

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the type of relationship between the youths and such security units in the context of the protracted guerrilla war. In this regard, Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the struggle is assessed in terms of loyalty to the security forces or guerrillas. Wood's work in this regard became a valuable contribution for this current study's historiographical assessment.

On Zimbabwe's liberation struggle Ellert's *The Rhodesian Front War: Counter – Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*, looks at the activities of both ZAPU guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces as they operated in rural areas. He acknowledges that ZIPRA's operations had their origins in the early 1960s when in 1962 – 3 small groups of men were trained in the Soviet Union, Cuba and Algeria.[164] Wankie and Sipolilo battles are portrayed as a gradual development of the ZAPU guerrillas' bush war from terror attacks in urban areas. Ellert's work provided a framework for comparative analysis in this study due to its balanced account of the war.

In addition, Ellert looks at the work of the BSAP's counter- insurgency activities. He observes that recognizing the need to improve the flow of information from rural areas, BSAP formed a low-grade intelligence wing known as Ground Coverage Unit (GCU).[165] The GCUs were based in rural areas and acted as *pseudo* guerrillas as well. Ellert's narrations on the BSAP's operations were valuable to this study. By sometimes acting as guerrillas, the GCUs' actions had the effect of confusing the unsuspecting youths who mistook them for ZIPRA guerrillas. They exposed themselves to danger as security forces would in turn come and punish those who had assisted the fake guerrillas. Some would be arrested and charged under the subversive and aiding of terrorists act. Bulilima youths' abilities to overcome such situations were investigated by this study. Ellert's work provided the basis for such an investigative analysis as it is a missing aspect in his study.

[164] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter – Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*. Gweru, 1989. p. 10.
[165] *Ibid*. pp. 15 – 16.

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2.7 The 1990s Literature

The 1990s saw scholars producing more critical studies on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Some scholars documented the struggle based on the Smith regime.[166] Of particular note here is Godwin and Hancock's *Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970 – 1980*. Their study is mainly based on the former white government's side of the story. Godwin and Hancock note that according to the official rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s, Rhodesia existed in order to defend Western civilisation from the evils of communism and to preserve civilised standards from anarchy and corruption of black Africa.[167] They point out that the election of RF government in 1962 and the subsequent UDI in 1965 symbolised these objectives.[168]

Rhodesia was declared a republic in 1970. This act was regarded as a slap on disenfranchised black people's faces. These were strong signs that the minority regime was prepared to die for its adopted motherland. The upshot of this behaviour on the part of the Smith government was that it provoked black nationalists into bracing themselves for a total guerrilla war with the government. In order to strengthen their guerrilla armies, more youths were recruited from rural areas, Bulilima included. Of particular note is how the government responded to such massive guerrilla recruitments.

Godwin and Hancock illustrate the structure of the regime's security forces. They discuss the composition of the regular army which had two battalions, the RLI and the RAR. Added to these was the BSAP which had become a para-military organisation since the UDI, as evidenced by the activities of the Police Support Unit (PSU), and the Police Anti-Terrorist Unit (PATU) 'stick' in counter-insurgency operations.[169]

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[166] It must be remembered that the 1980s studies documented the struggle mainly to serve the interests of the nationalists' elite who were now in power as well as the former ruling class elite. For this and more see A. Astrow, 1983; T.O Ranger, 1985 and, P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, 1982.

[167] P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesians c. 1970 – 1980*. Johannesburg, 1993. p. 3.

[168] *Ibid*.

[169] P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesians c. 1970 – 1980*. Johannesburg, 1993. p. 81.

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While Godwin and Hancock's work is nowhere near dealing with issues related to Bulilima youths' involvement in the liberation struggle, they nonetheless bring a new dimension to this study. Their focus on Rhodesian security forces' operations enabled this study to generalise on how Bulilima youths related with the various structures of the Rhodesian security forces. This aspect advanced the interest of this study, as it established how Bulilima youths were engaged in Zimbabwe's war when one factors in the operations of the security forces. With reference to Mashonaland, Godwin and Hancock observe that the government's other main attack on 'terrorism' was the creation of Protected Villages (PVs). The main idea behind the PVs was to prevent rural peasants from giving assistance to guerrillas. Consequently, peasants fell under twenty-four hour surveillance. However, this current study found that PVs did not exist in Bulilima District.

The main feature of the 1990s historiography on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was the shift from populist historiography to a more representative one that sought to provide platforms for peasants to add their voices as well. Kriger's *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, gave the Mutoko District peasants an opportunity to have their peasant voices heard with regard to the roles they played during the liberation struggle. In addition to this, Kriger made a comparative analysis of ZIPRA and ZANLA's mobilising strategies and tactics. She states that ZIPRA had officially adopted the strategy of giving more attention to mass politicisation, yet it had practically placed less emphasis on politicising the population or preparing it for the protracted war. ZIPRA's philosophy was that it fought a war that was military rather than political in character. It relied on scoring spectacular military successes against security forces or symbolic targets, such as the shooting down of two Viscount civilian planes for mobilising political support.[170]

Political education and meetings were tasks left to ZAPU's network of supporters built up through-out Zimbabwe in the early 1960s.[171] On the contrary, ZANLA guerrillas devoted much of their time to '*pungwes'*. The difference in the mode of mobilisation between these two guerrilla armies may be the reason why Bulilima District did not have PVs. The fact that ZIPRA guerrillas did not engage peasants in '*pungwes*' meant that Bulilima youths

[170] N. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 45.
[171] *Ibid*.

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had ample time to monitor the movements and positions of the security forces, hence kept the guerrillas informed on their enemy's positions and movements at all times.

In the context of this study, Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in this war did not involve singing and dancing throughout the night. This was relevant as it helped this study to argue that the way ZIPRA guerrillas fought the war in their war-zones was quite different from the way ZANLA guerrillas did in theirs. Similarly, the study argues that the way Bulilima youths experienced the war was politically different from the way youths in Mutoko experienced the same war due to differences in ideological, philosophical and practical approaches to the war by ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas respectively.

With regard to the relationship between ZANLA guerrillas and youths in Mutoko, Kriger explains the problems that cropped up between youths and parents in terms of generational conflicts. In her analysis of the generational conflict, Kriger attributes most of the problems to youths' relationships with guerrillas. She points out that the division of civilian organisations into parents and youth wings laid the organisational basis for young people to challenge their parents' authority. In this, youths were aided by personal influence they sometimes developed with guerrillas. This gave them an opportunity to develop personal relationships with guerrillas and thereby acquire some power.[172]

On the other hand, parents' duties required less interaction with guerrillas. Their generational differences in an age-stratified society were barriers to them developing close ties with the youths. Kriger's analysis was used for comparative purposes in this study as it defines the relationship between parents and their children on one hand, and between parents and ZANLA guerrillas on the other. Her work assisted this study to make an informed comparative analysis of the way ZIPRA guerrillas related with Bulilima youths and how Bulilima youths in turn related with their parents.

There is very little information with which to reconstruct the lives and experiences of ordinary people during a historical phenomenon such as Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.[173] This observation by Hayes, Tyson and Ndlovu is one of the major reasons why this study was

[172] N. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War*. *Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 179.
[173] P. Hayes, V. Tyson and M. Ndlovu, *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 14.

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done. It gives voice to the voiceless former Bulilima youths who suffered untold horrors at the hands of both ZIPRA guerrillas and the security forces. Hayes, *et al.,'s* work is relevant here as it investigated children's roles in the liberation struggle. They support the view that young people might have been involved in Zimbabwe's struggle as early as 1960, a view also supported by this study. Hayes, *et al.,* base their view on tracing ZIPRA's recruitment places where they discovered that in the main, ZIPRA began a massive recruitment drive in the south-western parts of the country in the 1970s. Another point to note from their study is that Botswana had a reception centre in Francistown for ZIPRA recruits enroute to Zambia from where they were distributed to various training camps around the world. This illustration underlines the importance of Bulilima District to ZIPRA guerrillas as a strategic crossing area into and out of the country. Bulilima attracted the security forces who constructed garrisons at Brunaburg, Mpoengs and Madlambudzi to have a permanent presence deep in rural Bulilima District. This was a strategy meant to counter ZIPRA guerrillas' insurgency activities in the district.

The way Bulilima youths conducted their political activities in the face of the ever present security forces and ZIPRA guerrillas deserves an in-depth analysis. In a similar fashion to Hayes, *et al.,*'s study, this study found out why Bulilima youths joined the struggle. Furthermore, *Hayes, et al.,'*s work investigated through interviews, how youths' lives were in refugee or training camps. Using the same method, this study investigated how Bulilima youths' lives were like in Botswana and Zambia once they joined the struggle.

The Zimbabwe liberation struggle changed the social lives of rural female youths dramatically. Suddenly becoming independent of the shackles of a paternal society, female youths were able to voice their concerns publicly. The newly found social and cultural freedom soon came back to haunt quite a number of them as they became pregnant due to their association with guerrillas. They became young mothers and had to double up as youths in war time and being young mothers at the same time.

In *Women and the Armed Struggle for Independence in Zimbabwe (1964 – 1979)*, Stott conducted a study about the involvement of women in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. She raises the issue of women being left behind by their husbands as they migrated to towns and cities in search of work. This led to women becoming the providers for their families,

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a situation that was contrary to BuKalanga tradition. This increased women's work load as they took on traditional 'men's jobs' such as herding cattle, tilling the land, fencing off fields and the weekly burdens of dipping cattle. Women became the majority of the rural poor, dependent on men's wages for provisions that required cash. Stott reiterates that during the peak of the war, youths were the dominant social group in rural areas. In most cases, such youths had assumed the role of community leaders through their association with guerrillas. Her work has nothing to do with Bulilima youths' participation in the war.

Concerning ZIPRA's mobilisation strategy, Stott admits that ZIPRA guerrillas liaised with local population, particularly in the western and southern areas of Zimbabwe from their bases in Zambia.[174] She emphasises that ZIPRA guerrillas were less dependent upon the local population and thus placed less emphasis on mobilising peasants for their success, relying to a great extent on their military prowess. Stott's work was important to this study since it highlights the ideological differences between ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas. This ideological difference helped this study determine the roles played by Bulilima youths as compared to those played by youths in ZANLA's operation areas.

Also significant to this study, Stott also looks at the life of female youths in refugee camps in Zambia. She discovered that social and economic conditions were very bad, poor and desperate for those young people. Her study reveals the gender discriminations that went on in refugee camps where females were not given equal opportunities as men when it came to chances to be trained as guerrillas. This benefited this study as it discovered what female youths did if they were not drafted into the ZIPRA army. It should be noted that being involved in war does not only mean one will carry a gun. There are several ways in which female youths participated in the struggle without touching a gun. These became the major focus of this study.

Continuing with the debate on the involvement of females in Zimbabwe's liberation war, Staunton's *Mothers of the Revolution*,[175] carried out a survey in all ten provinces of the country to get women's views on how they were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's

[174] L. Stott, *Women and the Armed Struggle for Independence in Zimbabwe (1964 – 1979*). Edinburgh, 1990. p. 16.
[175] Staunton's, 1990 study is not academic but as it is a compilation of interviews done with several women throughout the country on their guerrilla war experiences, it is worthwhile to use it as a source for verification of facts as obtained through interviews and those from other documental sources.

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guerrilla war.[176] It was during this survey that she interviewed Betty Ndlovu of Thekwane Mission in Bulilima District. Betty revealed that she worked in South Africa before working in Rhodesia around 1975. Her elder son was also working in South Africa. This aspect of Ndlovu's account was important as it supported the issue of Bulilima men migrating to South Africa in search of work, leaving behind women fending for the family. Ndlovu's account formed part of the argument that because of the labour economy introduced by colonialism in Southern Africa, many men from Bulilima were compelled to migrate in search of wage labour. As a consequence, women became heads of several households in the district. Bulilima women's situation was further worsened by the eruption of war where, in Bulilima's case, children as young as seven years old joined the struggle.[177] It is this study's argument that the flocking of men to urban centres and surrounding farms coupled with guerrilla recruitment, left Bulilima female youths vulnerable in their communities. They were faced with multiple challenges ranging from breast-feeding to supplying guerrillas with food and clothing among other tasks.

While working in Bulawayo in 1976, Betty visited her homestead in Thekwane one weekend and was confronted by a group of guerrillas. She indicated that her daughter was too close to those guerrillas for a sixteen year old girl. This made Betty uncomfortable. While the guerrillas were still around, Betty explained, they heard heavy gun fire coming from the western side of Thekwane (Dombodema area). At that moment, guerrillas who were with them quickly sent out a group of boys to carry out surveillance. Betty's narration reflects the relationship between ZIPRA guerrillas and Bulilima youths during the war. This became a source of reference for this study as it established various ways Bulilima youths participated in the guerrilla war.

Through Betty's account, Staunton reveals how suspected witches were dealt with by guerrillas. Betty recounted how freedom fighters killed people on the pretext that they sold them out. If soldiers came along guerrillas would cry foul, accusing locals of selling them out. Betty also stated that soldiers killed people as well, for cooperating with guerrillas. On top of this predicament, young people looked after the sick and the aged in addition

[176] It suffices to point out that some women interviewees here were youths during the liberation struggle.
[177] Betty Ndlovu's son joined the struggle when he was seven years old. I. Staunton, *Mothers of the Revolution*. Harare, 1990. p. 241.

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to their babies if they were female youths. The above narration supported this study as it strengthened its argument that Bulilima youths had difficult times during the guerrilla war. Youths' sometimes wayward behavior should be attributed to stressful situations they encountered on a daily basis. The guerrilla war presented trying times for Bulilima youths, and some of such incidents were recorded for future generations.

As indicated at the beginning of this section, peace that prevailed in the country after the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU created opportunities for scholars to conduct studies in Matabeleland in the 1990s. One such work is that of Ranger and Ncube, 'Religion in the Guerrilla War: The Case of Western Matabeleland', in Bhebe and Ranger's (eds.) *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. These two acknowledge that by the time ZAPU was banned in 1964 it had already established strong branches in most parts of the country including rural communities. This created favourable conditions for ZIPRA guerrillas when they entered such areas, where they were able to work with ZAPU elders, drew recruits and auxiliaries from ZAPU YL, and food and supplies from ZAPU women organisations.[178]

Ranger and Ncube's observation shows that there was a strong and active ZAPU membership in rural areas. This is a generalised observation on their part if one considers the fact that one of the major reasons why ZAPU-MK guerrillas' joint operations failed was the lack of peasant support and cooperation in Wankie and Sipolilo. Furthermore, rural peasants were illiterate and politically immature, hence prone to manipulations by settler oriented Chiefs. It is a fact that rural female youths in the 1960s and 1970s were under paternal control, thus a taboo for them to spend time in political gatherings that were male domains. The guerrilla war broke this bond.

Preliminary investigations in Bulilima had indicated that it was quite difficult for any political party to establish vibrant branches in rural areas due to fear of security agents. Similarly, the government's repressive laws made it a high treason if rural people organised themselves under banned political parties' banners. When ZIPRA guerrillas

[178] Such ZAPU structures operated underground in rural areas when the guerrilla war escalated. This was because of fear of reprisals by authorities, hence the effectiveness of both women and youths' organisations is difficult to ascertain. Interview one with Khuli Sibanda, Tshehanga Village: 7th June, 2014.

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first entered Bulilima communities, they had difficulties in relating with locals. This situation was exacerbated by the absence of men, who through their links with urban centres, had some bit of political background and connection with ZAPU. Suffice it to emphasise that politics in rural areas were an area best left for men, not children and women. This was an important point of departure for this study as it argues that ZIPRA's early relationship with Bulilima youths was a bit problematic and unstructured due to the political backwardness of certain rural areas there.

When the Zimbabwe guerrilla war intensified, it turned into a war of strategies and counter-strategies. Writing on ZIPRA's strategy to win the war, Brickhill in 'Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979', in Bhebe and Ranger's (eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, states that due to the failure of the 1960s strategy of deploying large self-contained detachments which characterised many of its 1960s operations, ZAPU decided to change its strategy beginning in the early 1970s. Brickhill's article mainly focuses on ZIPRA guerrillas' general operations in Rhodesia and how strategies and tactics were changed to suit particular situations and developments. He stresses ZIPRA's achievements in the north-western parts of the country, pointing out that such penetration of rural hinterland marked the real break-through for ZAPU forces. During 1977 – 1978, ZIPRA pressed home their advantage by infiltrating almost two thousand guerrillas and rapidly extending their operational areas.

Brickhill's article reveals ZIPRA's operational development, thereby unmasking the complexities that Bulilima youths faced when guerrillas flooded their district. Of importance to this study is Brickhill's focus on ZIPRA's operational zones that covered the rest of the western half of the country. Brickhill argues that by 1978 ZIPRA had control of semi-liberated zones which Dabengwa defined as 'areas where the Rhodesian security forces had lost control'.[179] Brickhill's work helped explain why there were no PVs in all areas ZIPRA guerrillas operated in. This was because of ZIPRA's discipline and firepower. Brickhill further provides useful information on the popularity of ZIPRA

[179] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU, 1976 to 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1996. p. 52.

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guerrillas in the areas they operated in, hence Bulilima youths' perceived enthusiastic support for the struggle.

Furthermore, Brickhill's work brought another dimension to ZIPRA's long term strategy, that of using a regular battalion. Brickhill's article shows that this strategy was copied from the Vietnamese theorist and practitioner of revolutionary war.[180] The international flavour given to this strategy shows that ZIPRA was a dynamic force that moved with time. His work shows how ZIPRA faired in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, hence its relevance here.

This study entered the debate on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle through the investigation of how Bulilima youths were involved and participated in that struggle. Of particular importance in this regard is Ellert's article, 'The Rhodesian Security and Intelligence Community 1960 – 1980: A Brief Overview of the Structure and Operational Role of the Military, Civilians and Police Security and Intelligence Organisations that served the Rhodesian Government during the Zimbabwe Liberation War', in Bhebe and Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Ellert's work explains how these state organs functioned to counter terrorism. These operations caused a lot of suffering among rural peasants. This work is relevant to this study as it highlights the effects of such operations on youths and other vulnerable social groups in rural communities.

Ellert concedes that in certain cases *mujibas* and *chimbwidos* were killed under suspicion of being guerrillas. This means that even security forces were not quite certain as to the physical appearance of guerrillas if they could go to the extent of killing unarmed youths in the name of mistaken identity. The importance of Ellert's work lies in the stressing fact that youths' lives in rural communities were always in constant danger.

2.8 The 2000s Literature

As much as the 1990s presented a new trend in the historiography of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, the 2000s had mixed perspectives. There are those scholars who maintained the 1990s status quo of which Rule's *Electoral Territoriality in Southern Africa*, is a typical

[180] *Ibid*.

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example. Rule's contribution in this study was minimal. He, however, makes an important observation that the military view on civilians' support of guerrillas was that 'peace loving African people' were initially unenthusiastic about the revolution and they fell over themselves to tell the security forces where 'terrorists' were.[181] Rule's claim confirms this study's position that some Bulilima areas did not have vibrant party structures due to their highly paternalistic communities. He notes that it was only in the later years of the struggle that villagers were coerced by ZANLA guerrillas, where they were taught liberation struggle songs under pain of death that they had to change their attitude. This study ascertained whether ZIPRA guerrillas did the same in areas they operated in. Rule's work was of limited but valuable use in this study.

The mid to late 2000s saw a shift in the historiographical trend on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Scholars lean towards the production of studies that are more critical of Mugabe's government. This was mainly because of the country's political decline and the economic meltdown and their related social consequences for the general population. Scholars of note in this regard are Bopela and Luthuli, Holland, Chung and, Auret, among others.

This study contextually ascertained how the antagonism between ZANU and ZAPU contributed to the loss of Bulilima youths' lives during the guerrilla war. Seen from a critical angle, it was an unnecessary and unwarranted antagonism. In a related study, Bopela and Luthuli,[182] in *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, outline and stress the importance of alliances between and among liberation movements. They applaud the MK – ZAPU guerrilla alliance and stress that had ZANU and ZAPU done the same, Zimbabwe's guerrilla war would not have taken so long and cost so many innocent lives. Their argument is based on the fact that the CIO cleverly exploited this ZANU – ZAPU antagonism in Zambia which later caused a lot of grave damage to the effectiveness of the two parties. The CIO fueled the inter-party hatred by carrying out killings and sabotage against both parties in a way that made each side believe their political rivals were to blame.[183] The above text was

[181] S. Rule, *Electoral Territoriality in Southern Africa*. Aldershot, 2000. p. 117.
[182] It should be noted that Bopela and Luthuli are the survivors of the joint MK – ZAPU Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns and their eye witness testimonies here go a long way in augmenting this study as far as the analysis of facts regarding the importance of youths' involvement in the guerrilla war is concerned. They were a part of the MK guerrilla contingent in those campaigns. T. Bopela and D. Luthuli, *UMkhonto we Sizwe*. Johannesburg, 2005.
[183] *Ibid*. p. 57.

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meaningful to this study as it assisted in tracing inter-party conflicts that potentially and practically affected refugees in Zambia. Within this setting, the study benefited from Bopela and Luthuli's study. Interviewees revealed how inter-party conflicts affected the execution of the struggle in Botswana and Zambia.[184]

Furthermore, Bopela and Luthuli through their personal experiences of Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns, illustrate that guerrillas cannot survive in the way a stand-alone regular army does as the former derive their support from the people they seek to liberate.[185] Through peasants' support, the 1970s guerrilla operatives were able to properly execute their war duties effectively compared with the 1960s insurgents. Given that guerrilla operatives cannot survive without peasant support, Bopela and Luthuli's work contributed positively to this study by insinuating that without youths' involvement in the guerrilla war, Zimbabwe would not have attained its independence.

The Zimbabwe liberation war left many people with different experiences and perceptions about it. It is only through engaging in a discussion with someone who experienced the phenomenon that one gets to relieve the embedded experience. Holland's *Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter who became a Tyrant*, takes a different approach to reflect on the history of Zimbabwe. Interviewing prominent people who grew up and were with Mugabe during the struggle years, Holland came up with a rather one-sided narration of some aspects of the country's war history. Most of those interviewed blamed Ian Smith and his government for all that happened during the war.

Holland found out that the majority of white people were not told the truth by the Smith government about what agitated the nationalists in the country, hence their negative attitude towards Africans in general. That is, had white civilians been told the truth about

[184] Only Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania are mentioned here because these were the three countries that housed ZAPU and ZANLA refuge camps (in addition, Zambia and Mozambique had guerrilla training camps). Additionally and more importantly that is where inter-party conflicts that more often than not resulted in fighting skemitches. In Botswana, for example, conflicts between ZANU and ZAPU, and the Muzorewa side were fairly common but not bloody. These movements accused each other of various misdemeanours and, those conflicts were struggles to win the Botswana government's favours. For a detailed analysis of these inter-movement conflicts in Botswana, see W.G. Morapedi, Schisms in Zimbabwean Anti-Colonial Movements in Botswana, 1959 – 1979, in *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2016. pp. 361 – 379. For those that happened in Zambia, see F. Chung, (2006) for a detailed account.

[185] T. Bopela and D. Luthuli, *UMkhonto we Sizwe*. Johannesburg, 2005. p. 57.

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the actual causes of black people's agitation, chances were the conflict would not have been that protracted. These were the views of those interviewed by Holland when she conducted her study. Living in ignorance, Smith became a symbol of racist supremacy.[186] While this aspect is not within the scope of this study, its relevance here is in the conduct of Bulilima youths in the context of the war fought at their door steps. This way, Holland's work contributed towards the comparative aspect of this study.

The mid 2000s saw the undertaking of comprehensive studies about the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The studies undertaken provide a generalised account of the liberation struggle that gives an insight of what went on in the bush camps. Chung provides a clear picture concerning this aspect. She describes how ZANLA commanders such as Josiah Tongogara visited camps at night and demanded sexual services from women, most of whom were youths. Chung notes that commanders acted as if they had a natural right to demand sex from subordinate women. Female ZANLA commanders also did the same to young and helpless male youths. Chung writes,

> …some women commanders who rose to the top exercised the same sexual prerogatives as their male counterparts, taking their pick of thousands of young men who had joined the struggle.

Chung illustrates this systematic abuse of women, in the process revealing how brave women commanders such as Sheiba Tavarwisa were in refusing to comply with Tongogara's orders. Chung's work provided a foundation on this treatment of female youths in refugee camps, most of whom came from rural areas.

Auret's critical study, *From Liberator to Dictator: An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*, mainly focuses on Zimbabwe's political and economic decline for which he blames Mugabe and his government. Of importance to this study is the historical perspective which he provides as he briefly narrates some aspects of the liberation struggle. Auret outlines Zimbabwe's social and economic situations that the majority of Africans found themselves in from the 1890s to the 1970s. He asserts that the LAA and its successor, the LTA were to blame for the Africans' economic woes. Auret further

[186] H. Holland, *Dinner with Mugabe. The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter who became a Tyrant*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 135.

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stresses that the Africans' plight was worsened by the 1969 constitution that formerly introduced semi-apartheid in Rhodesia.[187] It is within this context that the escalation of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war should be understood.

Given that the 1969 constitution stripped Africans of any citizen's rights and privileges in their own country, it came as no surprise when they resorted to a fully-fledged guerrilla war as opposed to compromise driven 'terrorist' tactics of the 1960s. This analysis provided this study with some pointers as to why Bulilima youths joined the struggle, especially focusing on the social and economic consequences of the LTA and the 1969 constitution on rural peasants.

To compound the Smith regime's problems to the east of Rhodesia, Mozambique was liberated by FRELIMO in 1975. An independent Mozambique meant that another military front had opened up along the entire length of the eastern border.[188] Guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities began in earnest in rural Mashonaland. Quite regularly, security forces would call at peasants' homesteads looking for something to eat or somewhere to rest. Security forces operated in villages, hence their regular presence.

As the war escalated, so too did the need for security forces, in both numbers and variety. Security units such as the infamous SS, PATU and the Grey Scouts (GS- mounted police units, on horses and in armoured cars) came into being and prosecuted the war vigorously.[189] By focalizing the categories of security forces operating in rural areas at any given time, the above text played a major role in this study. It illustrates the militarisation of rural areas, hence an awkward situation for Bulilima youths.

In Auret's view, there is no doubt that guerrillas used terror tactics in their campaigns. They raided civilian homes, attacked women and children, committed barbaric acts against innocent people considered to be 'sell-outs', used landmines indiscriminately and murdered unprotected missionaries.[190] This is a valid observation by Auret. Valid in the

[187] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 25.
[188] *Ibid*. p. 32.
[189] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 32.
[190] *Ibid*. p. 33.

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sense that guerrillas' mission or mandate was to liberate rural people not to murder, rape, maim or harass them. This study used such information to investigate the role played by youths in aiding or actually committing such crimes against peasants. It found out that youths did nothing to prevent the commitment of such atrocities. Through a comparative analysis of similar events elsewhere in the country, Auret's work was key in this aspect.

Literature documenting first-hand counter-insurgence activities in Rhodesia's bush war in Matabeleland is limited. Trethewan's *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*, is one leading source in this genre.[191] His study was influenced by his personal involvement and experience in COIN operations in Insiza District (Filabusi). Trethewan traces the genesis of the Rhodesian bush war (as he calls it) from the defeat of King Lobhengula in 1893 and the failure of both Ndebele and Shona uprisings of 1896 - 1897. Thereafter, white settlers through the BSAC consolidated their power. In 1923 the BSAC made way for the formal colonial administration. The country became a self-governing colony.

To consolidate their political and economic control, white colonial politicians led by Sir Roy Welensky formed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. It was during the 1950s that Black Nationalism began rearing its head in Rhodesia.[192] Trethewan's work enabled this study to trace and locate Bulilima youths' background as far as their involvement in the struggle is concerned. His input prompted this study to investigate Bulilima youths' political consciousness. This was partly to determine whether Bulilima youths were politically active as early as those in urban centres or not.

Trethewan discusses GC operations in Filabusi where he notes that tribal differences between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas went deeper than was originally assumed.[193] Such conflict sometimes resulted in mini-battles which compromised their position to the security forces. Trethewan describes and discusses his work as a GC operative as that

[191] A. Trethewan was a BSAP who became a member of the Rural Police Ground Coverage Unit. He was based in Matabeleland's Insiza District as a GC operative, hence his contributions here are very informative to this study. Trethewan has first-hand experience on how ZIPRA guerrillas operated as well as how youths under them functioned as well. For more on this see A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operative*. Johannesburg, 2008.

[192] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operative*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 32.

[193] *Ibid*. p. 140. However, this should be taken with caution as it is his personal opinion, not based on substantiated facts. It should be noted that there were plenty of ZIPRA guerrillas who were of Shona origin.

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of gathering intelligence information from locals in rural areas. He illustrates how information gathered through GCs would lead to battles with guerrillas, in the process providing his subjective views on guerrillas' activities and relationships with rural peasants. He describes several battles with guerrillas as well as peasants' situations since they were always caught in between. The youths' roles in the war feature prominently throughout his study. His work was a vital source of information for verifying facts as collected from other sources.

In 'Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed', Preston assessed the Zimbabwe guerrilla war from a different angle. He studied the guerrilla war from a termination perspective where he argues that the 'turning point' serves to reinforce belligerents' awareness of the futility of continued fighting.[194] Sources of turning point are given as an inconclusive defeat, a bloody stand-off that suddenly brings costs home, a loss of foreign support or an increase in foreign pressure, or a shift in fortunes that weakens the stronger side or strengthens the weaker one.[195] Given that Zimbabwe's guerrilla war more than met the above criteria, this study assessed the impact of the war on Bulilima youths both at home and in bush camps, and how this changed their lives. In conjunction with the above, the study determined how the termination of the war through negotiated settlement changed the social, economic and political lives of Bulilima youths. Bulilima youths' social, economic and political lives, however, could not be studied in isolation, hence the general approach was to deal first with these aspects at community level. Preston's work anchored this section of the study's analysis regarding the termination of hostilities in Zimbabwe.

So much has been written about the attitude of white settlers in Rhodesia from the time they colonised the country up to the 'termination of the war' as Preston puts it.[196] Writing about white settlers' attitudes towards indigenous populations, Shutt's 'The Natives Are Getting Out of Hand: Legislative Manners, Insolence and Contempt Behaviour in Southern Rhodesia, c 1910 – 1963', discusses the power given to NCs by successive

[194] M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 65 – 83.
[195] *Ibid*.
[196] See this Chapter's first section for more information on white settlers' attitude about black people.

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settler governments as emanating from the superior attitude exhibited by white settlers towards Africans. Shutt sums up white attitudes towards Africans as follows,

> In Southern Rhodesia … insolent Africans disrupted the image and just domination that settlers and their government projected. Indeed Native Commissioners argued that they needed judicial power to prosecute insolent Africans, who, if left unpunished, would undermine state and settler authority.[197]

He goes on to list legislation that provided NCs with enhanced judicial powers because the poor manners of insolent Africans threatened the government officials' prestige. Despite the wide range of acts that constituted 'insolence', such cases reveal a formulaic quality to the evidence base: insolent Africans were men who shouted, made a scene outside government offices and expressed their anger.[198] In sharp contrast to unruly, provocative and ill-mannered Africans, NCs were portrayed in court records as sober, self-contained and reasonable. Despite this image of sober law-giver, NCs remained committed to the use of coercion in their dealings with Africans.[199]

Shutt's analysis of white settlers' attitude towards black people made a valuable contribution to this study. It showed how such attitudes eventually forced many youths to join the war. Forced by circumstances most of which culminated from the abuse of authority by NCs, some Bulilima youths joined the war in protest over this. This study shows how, when such youths returned home as guerrillas, carried out acts of revenge on NCs and their guards, the DAs. Using Shutt's work as a point of reference, this study outlines through interviews, the motives for Bulilima youths' behavior towards those linked to the NC's offices in Plumtree Town.

The growing critical literature on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war found space through a variety of publications. One such work is that of Msindo, 'Winning Hearts and Minds: Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe 1962 – 1970'. He critically argues that the Smith regime's propaganda was not successful. Msindo argues that from being a sign of the

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[197] A.K. Shutt, The Natives Are Getting Out of Hand: Legislative Manners, Insolence and Contempt Behaviour in Southern Rhodesia, c 1910 – 1963, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 2007), pp. 653 – 672.
[198] *Ibid*.
[199] See the 1960s - 1990s sections of this Chapter for detailed reviews on this aspect of Zimbabwe's history.

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strength of the RF regime, government propaganda was a response to political paranoia and insecurity in the face of an uncertain future.[200] He stresses that Smith's propaganda was not as successful as sometimes assumed as it was not effective enough to fully counter alternative opinions. He critically analyses the way the RF government used its propaganda machine and how recipients of such exaggerated information behaved under the circumstances. Msindo's unique approach to the Zimbabwe guerrilla war historiography was necessary for this study. It was used as a basis for analysing how such propaganda affected Bulilima communities. In doing so, the study dealt with Bulilima youths' reactions as well as the positional stand they took in the face of such onslaught. Msindo's work plays a supportive role in propping this study's arguments regarding the influence of propaganda in escalating Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

The availability of sources of information sometimes determines the angle from which scholars approach an area of study that seems to dominate historical studies at any given time. This study, for example, due to limited studies on Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, is basically informed by interviews done in Bulilima with former youths. In a similar fashion, Munochiveyi's 'Oral Histories of Imprisonment, Detention and Confinement during Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle, 1960 – 1980', studies the conflict thus.[201] She conducted her study through undertaking several interviews with people who were affected by the guerrilla war one way or the other. Of particular importance to this study was the interview done with George Silundika's cousin, Emmie Sifelani Ncube.[202]

During the interview, Emmie narrates her involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's political life. She states how, when she was still at school, she participated in politics. When she got employed in Salisbury she was steeped even deeper in politics as she

[200] E. Msindo, Winning Hearts and Minds: Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe 1962 – 1970, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2009. pp. 663 – 681.
[201] C. Munochiveyi, Oral Histories of Imprisonment, Detention and Confinement during Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle, 1960 – 1980. (Unpublished Oral History paper), 2008.
[202] Emmie Sifelani Ncube was a Kalanga youth from Gala Village, Bulilima District, and one of the female youths who joined the liberation struggle at a tender age. Her narration here serves to confirm the dangers and difficulties female youths faced and subsequently over-came in a bid to participate in the war. That being so, Emmie's narration added to the information that was collected through interviews and was generally used to exemplify how Bulilima youths were involved and participated in the struggle. See Munochiveyi, Oral Histories of Imprisonment, Detention and Confinement during Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle, 1960 – 1980. (Unpublished Oral History paper) for additional information here.

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joined ZAPU. Upon joining ZAPU, Emmie actively campaigned for the enfranchisement of Africans in Rhodesia. It was through such political activism that Emmie was arrested and detained in the mid-1960s in the capital. Her account so far suggests that there were quite a number of female youths in the 1960s who participated in the struggle but whose accounts are not documented due to reasons observed earlier on. Munochiveyi's work, (unpublished) laid the foundational phase for this study as it analysed why and how Bulilima youths became involved and participated in the war.

In addition, Emmie's explanation and description of her life in detention prisons as well as her journey to Zambia to join the struggle provides first-hand information on the bravery of female youths as they grappled with realities of oppression in Rhodesia. Emmie's courageous undertaking to mislead Rhodesian soldiers so that she and her friends could cross the border into Zambia is testimony to the sacrifice Bulilima female youths made to liberate their country. This study ascertained that this was the trend with most Bulilima youths who joined the struggle in Botswana and Zambia. In this context, Emmie's input was complementary to this study's analysis of findings as well as the conclusion.

Former ZIPRA guerrillas also weighed in on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war debate. Sibanda's *The ZAPU 1961 – 87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*, purposes to redress the historiographical imbalance regarding Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. This comes at a time when the current trend in the historiography of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war has been distorted by the undue emphasis upon the role of ZAPU's rival, ZANU in the prosecution of the war. Sibanda discusses the role played by ZIPRA guerrillas in liberating Zimbabwe and the general support provided by peasants to ZIPRA guerrillas. He illustrates how Joshua Nkomo internationalised the Zimbabwe problem, a situation that led to ZAPU gaining international exposure.

The issue pertaining to ZANU receiving more space and time from scholars and academics confirms this study's observation that not much has been done to investigate the role played by Bulilima youths in liberating Zimbabwe. To this end, this study observed that Mashonaland Districts are over researched to the exclusion of Matabeleland. This is the main reason why this study was undertaken. Sibanda's work serves to support this study and its claim. More importantly, the purpose of this study is to redress the anomaly

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created by the lack of in-depth studies on Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

The issue of ZIPRA's support by rural peasants has a direct link to this study. Sibanda's work, however, lacks in-depth analysis on how Bulilima youths participated in the liberation struggle. This study's contribution to a body of literature on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle is to help fill this gap. This complements Sibanda's study, thereby bringing some balance to both studies, in addition to motivating other researchers to do similar studies with other districts in Matabeleland.

'Discipline is a subject more referred to than examined in the historiography of Zimbabwe's struggle.'[203] These words were written by Mazarire in 'Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA: 1964 – 1976', in an effort to tackle yet another aspect of Zimbabwe's war that has received scant attention from scholars and academics. Few studies have investigated the systematic deployment of disciplinary structures in Zimbabwe's guerrilla movements.[204] His work focuses on ZANLA's disciplinary mechanisms as laid down by its parent organisation, ZANU. There was a thin line between the party and its army. Theoretically, this might not have presented problems when it came to disciplinary control. He notes that rules governing these two structures were interchangeable. This reflected fluidity in the undertaking of disciplinary action within both ZANU and ZANLA structures. Mazarire's work, however, confirms that the military triumphed in ZANU. This underlines the fact that those with guns ruled over those without. His work also confirms the fact that discipline within guerrilla movements during the liberation struggle was a matter of concern to party leaders.

This study used Mazarire's work to investigate how discipline within ZAPU and ZIPRA structures in refugee camps and areas of operation, particularly in Bulilima was enforced. This included the issue of how lack of discipline affected the youths' participation in the guerrilla war. This study investigated the extent to which disciplinary measures were administered in cases of ill-discipline amongst ZIPRA operatives. If ZIPRA were an ill-

[203] G.C. Mazarire, Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA: 1964 – 1976, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, (September, 2011) pp. 571 – 591.
[204] *Ibid*.

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disciplined bunch of guerrillas, how then did this impact on the conduct of Bulilima youths in the face of lawlessness brought about by the guerrilla war in Bulilima District? From a comparative angle, Mazarire's work contributed immensely towards the understanding of discipline as affecting the conduct of the war by both guerrillas and youths.

Continuing with the debate on discipline, Alexander in 'Nationalism and Self-government in Rhodesian Detention: Gonakudzingwa, 1964 – 1974', looks at how the detained members of ZAPU resisted the terms of their imprisonment and sought to displace the State's authority with their own institutions.[205] In order to remain united under difficult conditions made worse by their confinement in remote Gonakudzingwa, ZAPU detainees constructed a hierarchy of rule-bound and specialised committees that closely regulated their daily lives. They imagined an inclusive nationalist mythology, and promoted civility and restraint.[206] Detainees' self-government, however, could not contain all divisions and disputes, but it did offer an alternative vision of nationalism and authority that stood in stark contrast to the practices of nationalists and guerrillas in exile and Rhodesia's war zones.[207] Alexander's work insinuates that discipline is mainly achieved and maintained when people, whether free or not are united. It also believes that formal structures modeled in the hierarchical bureaucracy serve to cement and consolidate unity, hence the achievement of discipline within an organisation.

Alexander's work shines a light on how discipline or lack thereof affects the integrity of any organisation. ZIPRA guerrillas, as an organ of ZAPU, were affected by incidences of ill-discipline that resulted in a revolt in Zambia. This assisted this study determine how such revolts affected Bulilima youths in refugee camps and war zones. Viewed this way, Alexander's work is relevant to this study. It brings a wealth of knowledge regarding the analysis of discipline within liberation movements, particularly within ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima as well as that of youths in refugee camps. Lack of discipline sometimes led to conflict between guerrilla armies and their host governments. That is, in Botswana there

[205] J. Alexander, Nationalism and Self-government in Rhodesian Detention: Gonakudzingwa, 1964 – 1974, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, (2011) pp. 551 – 567.
[206] *Ibid*.
[207] J. Alexander, Nationalism and Self-government in Rhodesian Detention: Gonakudzingwa, 1964 – 1974. pp. 551 – 567.

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were misunderstandings between ZAPU and the Botswana government on the control of refuge camps. At Dukwi refuge camp, for example, the Botswana government accused ZAPU of turning itself into a government of the camp.[208] This subject takes us to the concluding section of this Chapter.

2.9 Conclusion

Building on the research questions, the aim and objectives of the study as well as the statement of the problem, and the mini-historiography in Chapter one, this Chapter provided a detailed historiography on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. This was done based on selected sources that were categorised according to their years of publication. The reason for this was to provide logic and understanding of the historical development of events that led to the outbreak of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. For instance, earlier scholarship on Zimbabwe's conflict were undertaken as events unfolded, hence provided strong cases for arguments during this study. To provide a balanced view on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, historiographical review of work done by those who were guerrillas on one hand and those who were members of the security forces on the other, was done. Selected international sources on the guerrilla war and those on theories of revolution were reviewed to locate the Zimbabwe guerrilla war in the context of the international stage. The study discovered that there is not much historiography on BaKalanga people as a tribe. The study managed to review a few selected sources available. This was to establish BaKalanga people's settlement areas as related to this study. The next Chapter details methodology, research design and methods used to collect data for this study.

[208] For a detailed discussion on this, see W.G. Morapedi and B.G. Gumbo, Schisms in Zimbabwean Anti-Colonial Movements in Botswana, 1959 – 1979, pp. 361 – 379.

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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Introduction

This Chapter describes and explains the methodology and research design followed during the research process. First, the Chapter provides a theoretical framework underpinning this study. Noted here are ontology and epistemological world views on research. At the end of this section, there is a summary that explains why this study chose the paradigmatic perspective decided on. This is followed by a section on methodology which outlines the methodological approach the study followed.[209] The third section details the research design which incorporates the study's population, sampling, sample and sampling procedures. A section on methods (data collection strategies) follows. The fifth section is about data analysis. Included here are issues of the validity and reliability of the study's findings. The last section concludes this Chapter.

Research is the creation of knowledge or its development from existing studies. In this regard, universities play an important role.[210] For one to create or develop knowledge, one has to be knowledgeable in a particular field of study. In this way, research is about understanding the world. Our understanding of it is in turn informed by how we view that particular world; what one views understanding to be and what one sees as the purpose of understanding.[211] In short, one approaches research from a certain perspective or paradigm. This paradigmatic perspective is what Creswell calls the philosophical world view which the researcher proposes in the study.[212] The philosophical world view shapes the way a study is to be conducted right from the paradigmatic perspective up to the

[209] The study drew from, K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps In Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 297 and J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches.* Los Angeles, 2014. p. 205, in its methodology. These were then adapted and modified to suit this study's research conditions and expectations.
[210] U.D. Holzbaur, L.O.K. Lategan, K. Dyason and D. Kokt, *7 Imperatives for Success in Research*. Bloemfontein, 2012. p. 21.
[211] L. Cohen, L. Manion and K. Morrison, cited in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al., First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 31.
[212] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design*. *Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches.* 4th ed. Los Angeles, 2014. p. 6.

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specific methods of data collection and analysis. World view is also seen as 'meaning a basic set of beliefs that guide a research action.'[213] In addition, world view is referred to as paradigm,[214] ontology and epistemology.[215] Given that the philosophical world view is variously seen, suffice it to provide an explanation of each of these three concepts.

Paradigms are systems of interrelated ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions.[216] Generally, paradigms are theoretical frameworks within which all scientific thinking and practices operate. In a more specific way, a paradigm is defined as a model or pattern containing a set of legitimated assumptions and a design for collecting and interpreting data.[217] Paradigms are broadly conceived research methodologies.[218] Paradigms, by their being 'legitimated assumptions' and inherently 'conceivable', are subject to an individual researcher's orientation. Creswell aptly observes, 'I see world views as a general philosophical orientation about the world and the nature of research that a researcher brings to a study.'[219] When a researcher engages in a study, he/she already has a preconceived idea as to how his/her study is to be conducted. A researcher therefore, does not approach or undertake a study from a philosophical vacuum, but does so from an informed philosophical context. This is so in the sense that, 'Paradigms are central to a research design because they impact both on the manner in which the question is to be studied.'[220] In this case, a researcher makes certain assumptions and uses certain systems of meaning in favour of others.[221] That said, it is useful then to think

[213] S. Guba, cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 4th ed. Los Angeles, 2014. p. 6.
[214] Y.S. Lincoln, S.A. Lynham and E.G. Guba, Paradigm Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences Revisited, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: CA, 2011. pp. 97 – 128 and D. Mertens, *Transformative Research Evaluation.* New York, 2010. p. 30.
[215] M. Crotty, *The Foundations Of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 1998. p. 102.
[216] M.T. Blanche, K. Durrheim and D. Painter (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. 2nd ed. Cape Town, 2006. p. 40.
[217] R.L. Barker, cited by A.S. de Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouche and C.S.L. Delport, *Research at Grass Roots: For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. 4th ed. Pretoria, 2011. p. 40.
[218] W.L. Neuman, cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 4th ed. Los Angeles, 2014. p. 6.
[219] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 4th ed. Los Angeles, 2014. p. 6.
[220] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 40.
[221] K. Maree and C. van der Westhuizen, Planning a Research Proposal, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 32.

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in terms of the following three significant lenses to examine the practice of research: i) Ontological assumptions, ii) Epistemological assumptions and iii) Methodological considerations.[222] The following details ontology and epistemology.

Ontology is the philosophical study of 'being' and 'existence'. The concept 'being' in this case indicates individual existence, while 'existence' depicts reality. In this context, ontology specifies the nature of the reality to be studied.[223] The further development and execution of the research topic into a research design depends on the way one believes the research question could be answered most truthfully, hence his/her assumption of how reality should be viewed,[224] in other words, one's ontology.[225] The researcher has a philosophical assumption that serves as a starting point or guiding principle on how the study could be done to answer the research question. He/she carefully delineates his basic ontological assumptions, for example, by stating that he/she assumes that social reality can be understood from an external point of view or merely through words and names created by the mind within levels of individual consciousness.[226] In this regard, the first relevant question that one should ask when designing a qualitative study is: how should social reality be looked at?[227] Answering this question provides one's ontological assumptions which then guide one's research. De Vos *et al.,* point out that,

> Following from this are two basic answers, namely the belief that reality should be approached objectively as an external reality 'out there' requiring the researcher to maintain a detached, aloof position when studying it. Or the belief that there is no truth 'out there' and that reality is subjective and can only be constructed

[222] *Ibid*.
[223] C. Ndebele, Socialist Curriculum Development and Implementation in Zimbabwe from 1980 – 2004: With specific reference to education with production model and the Social Studies and History Curriculum. (Unpublished PhD thesis, 2007). p. 132.
[224] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. pp. 308 – 9.
[225] J. Mason (2002), cited by A.S. de Vos, *et al., Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. pp. 309.
[226] K. Maree and C. van der Westhuizen, Planning a Research Proposal, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 31.
[227] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. pp. 309.

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> through the empathetic understanding of the research participants' meaning of their life world.[228]

These two viewpoints represent the quantitative and qualitative research methodologies respectively. Their difference is explained thus, 'The conception of knowledge as a 'mirror of reality' is replaced by the conception of the 'social construction of reality' where the focus is on the interpretation and negotiation of the meaning of the social world.'[229] Given this view, the ontological assumption that guided this study is that social reality can be understood merely through words and names created by the mind and within levels of individual consciousness.[230] Complementing ontological beliefs are epistemological theories that are the subject of discussion below.

Epistemology is a theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between justified belief and opinion. Epistemology is, 'The study of our method of acquiring knowledge. It answers the question, 'How do we know?' It encompasses the nature of concepts, the construction of concepts, the validating of the senses, logical reasoning, as well as thoughts, ideas, memories, emotions, and everything mental.'[231] Simply put, epistemology deals with the nature of knowledge itself where it focuses on people's means for acquiring such knowledge and how we can differentiate between the truth and what is not true. An all-encompassing explanation of epistemology is given below:

> Epistemology is the study of the nature and scope of knowledge and justified belief. It analyses the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief and justification. It deals with the means of knowledge production, as well as skepticisms about different knowledge claims. It is essentially about issues having to do with the creation of and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry.[232]

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[228] *Ibid*.
[229] S. Kvale, *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 1996. p. 41.
[230] L. Cohen, *et al.*, cited by K. Maree and C. van der Westhuizen, Planning a Research Proposal, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 31.
[231] www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Main.html; Accessed: 7th December, 2015. 10:30.
[232] www.philosophybasics.com/branch_epistemology.html; Accessed: 7th December, 2015. 11:24.

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Key concepts relevant to this study from the above definition are 'means of knowledge production' and the 'creation and dissemination of knowledge'. These indicate that epistemological assumptions influence the nature of a research design and methodology. Given this, the next relevant question for the research design is: What are the principles and rules by which one believes reality should be known? Or differently stated, what research perspective should one use to design a research?[233] In view of the later, this study adopted an interpretive perspective. This is so when one considers that,

> …a different methodology (from that of natural sciences) is required to reach an interpretative understanding … and explanation that will enable the social researcher to appreciate the subjective meaning of social action. The assumption is thus made that reality should be interpreted through the meaning that research participants give to their life world.[234]

It should be noted then that the types of beliefs held by individual researchers often lead to them embracing qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods approach in their research.[235] The paradigmatic assumptions and perspectives, as discussed above, impact significantly on the methodological choices, hence demand a consideration of different research methods. It is within this context that the following section discusses this study's methodology and research design. But before that, the study presents an overview of why it followed the interpretivist perspective.

3.2.1 Summary overview

This part is a summary overview of why the study followed an interpretivist paradigm with qualitative research. Conducting this study from an interpretivist perspective allowed the study to interact closely with the participants to gain insight and form a clear

[233] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 309.
[234] *Ibid*. pp. 309 – 10.
[235] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 4th ed. Los Angeles, 2014. p. 6.

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understanding,[236] as to why and how Bulilima youths became involved and participated in the struggle. The study attempted to make sense of the participants' life worlds by interacting with them, appreciating and clarifying the meanings they ascribed to their experiences during the liberation struggle years.[237] The study strove to form a holistic view of the participants within their context by exploring their experiences, views and feelings regarding their involvement and participation in the struggle.[238]

The study used the interpretivist paradigm as it has relevant components of the research process. This became advantageous to the study since incorporating this paradigm into the research enabled it to apply the acquired meanings from the cases in order to understand and interpret the data obtained from archival and secondary sources.[239] Within this context, the interpretivist paradigm underpinned this study's research process.

In line with the research paradigm, the study utilised the following situations during the research process:

- Participants were eager to participate in this study;
- Participants voluntarily identified others who were youths during the Zimbabwe's liberation struggle;
- Some participants accepted that the interviews be tape-recorded, and
- Participants engaged in focus group discussions willingly, and cooperated during such discussions as they shared their lived experiences of the struggle years.[240]

The confirmation of the research paradigm followed by this study paves way for an illustration of the methodology used in the study. This is discussed in detail below.

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[236] K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 297.
[237] *Ibid*.
[238] M. Terre-Blanche and K. Kelly, Interpretative Methods, in M. Terre-Blanche and K. Durrheim (Eds.), *Research in Practice: Applied Methods for Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2002. p. 114.
[239] P.D. Leedy and J.E. Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*. 7th ed. Ohio, 2001. p. 27.
[240] Adopted from K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 301. This was then modified to the specifications of this study.

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3.3 Research Methodology

Qualitative research was chosen over other methodologies because the study is interpretivist in nature and does not require any enumeration. This approach enabled the researcher to visit where participants lived, gather their stories and then write a literary account of their experiences,[241] from the liberation struggle days. The advantage of using the qualitative research approach is that one often approaches reality from a constructivist position, which allows for multiple meanings of individual experiences.[242] Advocacy/participatory perspective is added to help promote social justice for individuals marginalised by society,[243] as is the case with Bulilima District communities. Another advantage of qualitative research to this study is the process of research where data was collected in participants' setting, data analysed inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the research making interpretations of the meaning of data.[244] Qualitative research was also advantageous to this study in that research questions were open-ended, hence enabled one to understand participants' experiences in relation to the study's central phenomenon.

The study's sample size was small, manageable and was purposefully selected from individuals,[245] who were youths during Zimbabwe's liberation struggle in Bulilima. The study collected data about Bulilima youths' participation in the country's guerrilla war. This data was collected from people who were immersed in the setting of everyday life during the guerrilla war years in which the study is framed.[246] The researcher's role here was that of being an instrument of data collection, where he asked the participants broad,

[241] N.V. Ivankova, J.W. Creswell and V.L Plano-Clark, Foundations and Approaches to Mixed Methods Research, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 265.
[242] N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S, Lincoln (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2005. pp. 1 – 42.
[243] D.M. Mertens, Mixed Methods and The Politics of Human Research: The Transformative – Emancipatory Perspective, in A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie (Eds.), *Handbook on Mixed methods in the Behavioural and Social Sciences.* Thousand Oaks, CA: 2003. pp. 135 – 164.
[244] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 4.
[245] M.O. Patton, *Qualitative and Evaluation Methods*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2002. p. 33.
[246] N.V. Ivankova, J.W. Creswell and V.L Plano-Clark, Foundations and Approaches to Mixed Methods Research, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 265.

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open-ended questions about their lived experiences during the phenomenon.[247] Given this, the type of qualitative data for this study is,

- Individual and focus group interviews (that is, interview transcripts),
- Field notes and observations during both sets of interviews, and
- Documents, that is, public (archival and secondary) and private records about Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

During field work, data was captured by making notes on interview and observation protocols and by using audio recording devices. Audio recordings were then transcribed for the purposes of further data analysis.[248] Data was analysed qualitatively.[249] Such data analysis was based on the values and meanings that participants ascribed to their world during the struggle years. Bulilima youths who were involved in the struggle did so in varying degrees, settings, and under different conditions and circumstances. Data analysis produced an understanding of the problem based on multiple-contextual factors.[250] Data interpretation involved stating the larger meaning of the findings and the personal reflections about the lessons learned,[251] during the entire research process. That is, the research problem, research question and the study's personal experiences influenced the methodological approach of this study. A research problem is an issue or concern that needs to be addressed.[252] The study's research problem emanated from a void in literature, and most importantly a need to give voice to the marginalised,[253] Bulilima people who were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. The problem required a specific research methodology, hence the qualitative approach.

If a concept or phenomenon needs to be explored and understood because little research has been done on it, then it merits a qualitative research.[254] Qualitative research is

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[247] *Ibid*.
[248] N.V. Ivankova, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Designs: Choosing Among Five Traditions*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2007. p. 15.
[249] *Ibid*.
[250] N.V. Ivankova, J.W. Creswell and V.L Plano-Clark, Foundations and Approaches to Mixed Methods Research, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. pp. 265 – 66.
[251] V.S. Lincoln and E.G. Guba, *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Berverly Hills, 1985. p. 24.
[252] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 20.
[253] *Ibid*.
[254] J.M. Morse, quoted by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 20.

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especially useful when the topic is new, and (more importantly for this study) when the subject has never been addressed with a certain sample or group of people.[255] Qualitative research was suited for this study as it was flexible and accommodative with regard to the study's paradigmatic orientation and experiences.

With regard to the study's personal experiences, qualitative approaches have been discovered to be more flexible than quantitative methods of inquiry. That is, they provide space for one to be innovative and to work more within his/her researcher-designed frameworks.[256] In addition, qualitative approaches allow more creative, literal-style writing, and for transformative writers (such as this study), there is a strong stimulus to pursue topics that are of personal interest in creating a better society for them and everyone.[257] Given this analogy, qualitative research was best suited for this study.

Furthermore, qualitative research is preferred for this study in the sense that qualitatively collected data is in the form of written or spoken language, or in the form of observations that are recorded in language, after which data is analysed by identifying and categorising themes.[258] As opposed to quantitative methodology, qualitative methods enable one to study selected issues in depth, openness, and in detail as they identify and attempt to understand the categories of information that emerge from the data collected.[259] In this case, a qualitative investigation of the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war started by determining how youths found themselves involved in the struggle. Based on in-depth individual and focus group interviews,[260] and the integration of data from primary and secondary sources, this study built up a detailed picture of Bulilima youths' life stories and experiences emerging from their involvement and participation in the war. That being so, this model enabled the study to use its field work results component to describe, explain and interpret the archival and secondary source documentary results component of the research.[261] Field work was entirely based

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[255] *Ibid*.
[256] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 20.
[257] *Ibid*.
[258] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 47.
[259] Quantitative methods, in contrast, begin with a series of predetermined categories usually embodied in standardised quantitative measures, and use this data to make broad and generalisable comparisons. *Ibid*.
[260] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 47.
[261] K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 265.

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on conducting individual and in-depth focus group interviews using a population sample purposively selected following set procedures.

With regard to the sample, the study selected fifty-two people who were youths from 1960 to 1980 (12 - 25 years during that period) for conducting semi-structured interviews with them.[262] Through these interviews, the study obtained more in-depth descriptions and explanations on how these people were involved and participated in the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe. The interviews aided in ascertaining,[263] whether Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was influenced by Bulilima District's proximity to the border with Botswana, a core focus of this study. Once data was collected, it was then analysed, interpreted and integrated following qualitative procedures outlined in the following research design section.

3.4 Research Design

This study specifically selected a case study design. This is because this design is congruent with the research's philosophical assumptions, and most appropriate for generating the kind of data required by it to answer the research question(s) posed.[264] The units of analysis include, *inter alia*, individuals, groups and institutions. The case study design provided this study with multiple sources of information, simultaneously facilitating the process of explaining and describing,[265] the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. This way, the 'how' and 'why' questions of the study were answered.[266] A case study involves comprehensive and systematic investigation of a few cases.[267] Case studies involve samples and this study's sample

[262] *Ibid*. p. 299.
[263] N.K. Denzin and Y.S, Lincoln (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2005. p. 65.
[264] *Ibid*. p. 75.
[265] C.B. Fouche, Research Strategies, in A.S. de Vos (Ed.), *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Services Professions*. 2nd ed. Pretoria, 2002. p. 21.
[266] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 75.
[267] C. Bless and C. Higson-Smith, *Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective*. 2nd ed. Cape Town, 1995. p. 18.

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were Bulilima youths who were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war between 1960 and 1980. The study's unit of analysis (case) was the role of Bulilima youths in the liberation war. More than fifty former youths selected were the study's embedded cases. Nieuwenhuis says of case studies,

> Case studies offer a multi-perspective analysis in which the researcher considers not just the voice and perspective of one or two participants in a situation, but also the views of other relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them. It opens the possibility of giving a voice to the powerless and voiceless like children or marginalised groups. This is essential for researchers to come to deeper understanding of the dynamics of the situation, and this aspect is a salient feature of many case studies.[268]

This explanation of case studies fits in well with this study's aim and purpose, which is giving voice to the voiceless former Bulilima youths who contributed so much to liberate Zimbabwe, yet nothing has been said about their contributions so far.

A case study design was very useful as it enabled this study to learn about Bulilima youths' situations during the liberation struggle years. These are poorly understood and not much is known about them.[269] In addition, the case study's strategic value lies in its ability to draw attention to what can be learned from the single case.[270] A case study design is advantageous to research as it provides a large amount of information and detail about the research topic, and allows the researcher to deal with a wide variety of raw data.[271] This implies that case studies such as this one provide effective data collection methods that result in plentiful data being collected during the research process, making them an effective research design qualitatively. The case study design thus helps provide the researcher with methods to collect both descriptive and explanatory data within the same study. This design creates room for original ideas to surface from vigilant and detailed observations.[272] De Vos, *et al*., concur and write,

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[268] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 75.
[269] P.D. Leedy and J.E. Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*. 7th ed. Ohio. 2001. p. 17.
[270] T.H. Schram, *Conceptualizing and Proposing Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed. New Jersey, 2006. p. 107.
[271] K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 300.
[272] *Ibid*.

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> Since qualitative researchers are interested in the meaning subjects give to their life experiences, they have to use some form of case study to immerse themselves in the activities of a single person or small number of people in order to obtain an intimate familiarity with their social worlds and to look for patterns in the research participants' lives, words and actions in the context of the case as a whole.[273]

One can say that a case study enables the researcher to interact with research participants empathically in order to gain an understanding of their lived experiences vis-à-vis the phenomenon under study. In this case, the descriptive case study (also called intrinsic case study), strives to describe, analyse and interpret a particular phenomenon.[274] In this context, this study used the descriptive case study to describe and explain how and why Bulilima youths became involved and participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

In as much as case study designs have these advantages, we must not lose track of the fact that they also have their shortcomings. Case studies are known to be time consuming and, the research might generate quantities of data the researcher might find hard to analyse.[275] This is not much of a disadvantage since case studies, by virtue of making use of data collection techniques such as interviews, have a self-checking mechanism against accumulating unnecessary data (data saturation or sampling to redundancy).[276] In fact, this supposed weakness reveals yet another strength of case studies – their ability to use multiple sources and techniques in the data collection process.[277]

In addition, case studies may not be generalisable in certain instances.[278] On top of this, there is the issue of problems emerging with regard to the validity of the information and

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[273] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 320.
[274] R.K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2003. p. 55.
[275] R. Wimmer and J. Dominick, *Mass Media Research: An Introduction*. Belmont, 2000. p. 42.
[276] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 350 and M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 50.
[277] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al.*, *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 76.
[278] K. Maree (Ed.), *et al.*, *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 300.

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the causal relations that are often hard to test.[279] Such a criticism is neither here nor there since this is neither the purpose nor intent of case study research. Case study research is aimed at gaining insight and understanding of the dynamics of a specific situation.[280] The researcher's awareness of these limitations with regard to the study design enables him/her to devise measures that serve to counter such perceived challenges. This prevents them from affecting the quality of the study by eliminating biased views and continuously monitoring all interpretations in order to provide a rigorous study.[281] Given these limitations, the aim of qualitative interpretivist study is not to generalise but to provide rich descriptions of the participants' perceptions of their life-worlds.[282] Multiple cases might assist the researcher in establishing a range of views.[283]

The researcher maintained a balance within the study through the provision of in-depth descriptions of the perceptions of the participants,[284] obtained during the field work as well as data from archival and secondary sources. Furthermore, in-depth descriptions of the participants' perceptions were enhanced by audio-taping all interviews and focus group discussions, a process that was done with the participants' consent.[285] In this sense, the case study design was chosen based on the fact that it provided the study with a holistic view of the real-life situations,[286] Bulilima youths went through as they became involved in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. In the same vein, the use of this design enabled the study to produce descriptions and explanations of the perceptions,[287] of Bulilima youths with regard to their involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla

[279] G. Lindegger, Research Methods in Clinical Research, in M. Terre-Blanche and K. Durrheim (Ed.), *Research in Practice: Applied Methods for the Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2002. pp. 251 – 268.
[280] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 76.
[281] K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 300.
[282] *Ibid*.
[283] G. Wisker, *The Postgraduate Research Handbook: Success with your MA, MPhil, Ed and PhD*. New York, 2001. p. 28.
[284] K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 300.
[285] A. Kanjee, Assessment Research, in M. Terre-Blanche and K. Durrheim, (Eds.), *Research in Practice: Applied Methods for Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2002. pp. 287 – 306.
[286] K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 300.
[287] *Ibid*.

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war. Bulilima youths' perceptions were solicited from the youth population purposively chosen for this study as indicated below.

3.4.1 Population

The preceding section detailed the nature of this study's research design (case study design). Embedded within the research design are issues such as the study's population and its inherent sampling. This subsection explains and discusses population, and justifies why that population size.

The population of a study can be defined as a group of elements or cases of individuals, objects or elements that conform to a specific criteria and to which one intends generalising the results of the research.[288] Population, therefore, means objects or people used for the purposes of obtaining information about a phenomenon. Population is seen as the entire set of objects or people which is the focus of the research, and about which the research wants to determine some characteristics.[289] This implies that certain studies, particularly case studies, cannot be feasible if there is no population. Simply put, population refers to a group of participants in a research whose function is to provide vital information concerning the study at hand. The target population of this study were former Bulilima youths who were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. This population was divided into two categories – youths who participated in the struggle while at home, and those who had joined the struggle in Botswana and Zambia. This ensured that the study obtained in-depth and balanced information about the contributions Bulilima youths made to emancipate the country's black majority. The two sets of youth categories brought a holistic understanding of the crucial role these former youths played during the phenomenon. In view of the fact that the study area was the whole of Bulilima District, it is imperative to look at sampling and the sample.

[288] J.H. McMillan and S. Schumacher, *Research in Education. Evidence based Inquiry*. 7th ed. New York, 2010. p. 129.
[289] C. Bless and C. Higson-Smith, *Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective*. 2nd ed. Cape Town, 1995. p. 84.

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3.4.2 Sampling and Sample

Having defined and discussed population as well as delineating the population group of this study, below is presented and discussed sampling and the sample size of this study. The notion behind sampling theory is that a small set of observations can give an idea of what can be expected in the total population of the intended study.[290] Sampling is a process whereby a small group of selected respondents is used and then the results are generalised to a larger group from which the smaller group was chosen.[291] Sampling refers to a small selection of individuals from a larger and broader group for the purposes of properly and timeously collecting data. Sampling can also be seen as a process used to select cases for inclusion in a research study.[292] Sampling is a method of choosing a specific number of individuals within a larger group for the purposes of undertaking a study with them. It is a systematic way of choosing a group to be representative.[293] Sampling is undertaken with the sole purpose of creating a workable and manageable sample. Sufficient data could then be collected within that group in order to have an in-depth and nuanced understanding of the phenomenon under study.

Providing reasons for choosing a sample, De Vos point out that researchers in most cases fail to study the whole population due to time constraints and the financial cost associated with that, hence end up choosing a sample.[294] The above definitions have three common concepts amongst them, namely 'choosing', 'small group' and 'large group'. The working definition is; sampling is the process of choosing a small working group from a large one for the purposes of collecting data effectively, efficiently and expeditiously. This way, the study identified a sample of prospective interviewees by focusing on the whole population of former Bulilima youths who participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war from 1960 – 1980.

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[290] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 390.
[291] W. L. Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Boston, 2000. p. 34.
[292] Van Vuuren and A. Maree, Survey Methods In Market and Media Research, in M. Terre-Blanche and K. Durrheim (Eds.), *Research in Practice: Applied Methods for Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2002. p. 274.
[293] M. Shipman, *The Limitations of Social Research*. 3rd ed. New York, 1988. p. 52.
[294] A.S. de Vos, *Research at Grass Roots: A Prime for the Caring Professions.* Pretoria, 1998. p. 10.

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A sample, therefore, is composed of units or a subset of a population considered for actual inclusion in the study, or it can be seen as a subset of measurements drawn from a population in which we are interested.[295] A sample then is a small portion that is used in a study from a target population. In this study, the major reason for sampling was feasibility.[296] It would not be possible to cover the total population completely such as,[297] for example, Bulilima youths who were involved in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. In this regard, the use of samples becomes handy and will more often than not provide accurate information as opposed to when one studied the entire population.[298] With most case studies, the population itself would be too big to study, hence only a portion or sample of the entire population is used.[299] The size of sample is dependent upon the population size. That is, the larger the population, the smaller the percentage of that population the sample needs to be and vice versa.[300] It is important then for a researcher to come up with a sample for his/her study. This can only be done if one adheres to sampling procedures such as outlined in the following subsection.

3.4.3 Sampling procedures

Sampling procedures are the technical entity of the triangulation process of sampling, sample and sampling procedures. Technical in that it follows a certain pattern if it has to be fulfilled. It is within this understanding that this subsection discusses sampling procedures as was done in this study.

As stated in the methodological section, this study followed an interpretivist perspective. The sampling concerns and procedures that are different from the positivist perspective are discussed.[301] Rather than insisting that samples should be representative, qualitative

[295] Y.A. Unrau, P.A. Gabor and R.M. Grinnel, *Evaluation in Social Work: The Art and Science of Practice*. London, 2007. p. 279.
[296] S. Sarantakos, *Social Research*. South Yarra, 2000. p. 139.
[297] S.J. Yates, *Doing Social Science Research*. London, 2004. p. 25.
[298] [298] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 224.
[299] *Ibid*.
[300] W.L. Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. 5th ed. Boston, 2003. p.232.
[301] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 288.

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researchers ensure that their findings are transferable. That is, they help to understand other concepts or groups similar to those studied.[302] This is not always the case, however, and was not the case with this study. The issue is, the way Bulilima youths were involved, participated and experienced the guerrilla war is totally different from the way the youths in ZANLA operated areas experienced the same phenomenon. In this case, the study's findings are not transferable to Mashonaland areas where ZANLA guerrillas operated. In other words, there is no probability sampling and possibilities for generalisation beyond the sample itself, the sample is thus purposive.[303]

In this study participants were drawn from a group of Bulilima youths who participated in the country's fight for freedom between 1960 and 1980. This study is qualitative in nature, hence it used purposive and snowball sampling. In qualitative data collection, purposeful sampling is used so that individuals are selected because they have experienced the central phenomenon.[304] The study chose purposive sampling mainly because it enables the identification of the sample participants easier as compared to other procedures. The study had the liberty to choose those participants it considered more suitable for the research's data collection process. As pointed out, purposive sampling involves the researcher hand-picking the participants based on exact characteristics in order to develop a sample that is large enough yet possesses the required traits.[305]

This way, the study included stratification where individuals to be represented in the sample had to meet specific characteristics outlined hereunder so that the sample in turn reflected a true proportion of individuals required for the research.[306] This procedure is referred to as judgmental sampling.[307] The researcher uses his/her judgment to come up with a sample. This type of sample is based entirely on the discretion of researchers. That

[302] E. Henning, S. Gravett and W. van Rensburg, *Finding your way in Academic Writing*. 2nd ed. Pretoria, 2005. p. 102.
[303] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 288.
[304] K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. pp. 300 - 1.
[305] T.R. Black, *Doing Qualitative in Social Sciences: An Integrated Approach to Research Design, Measurements and Statistics*. London, 1999. p. 60.
[306] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2003. p. 70.
[307] A. Rubin and E. Babbie, *Research Methods for Social Work*. 5th ed. Sydney, 2005. p. 247.

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is, a sample is composed of elements that contain the most characteristics or typical attributes of the population that best serve the purpose of the study.[308] Those sampled here had to meet the following criteria;

- All participants must have been born and bred in Bulilima District,
- Must have been living in Bulilima during the 1960s – 1979,
- Must have joined the liberation struggle while living in Bulilima, and
- Must be 45 – 68 years of age at the moment of interviewing.[309]

Purposive sampling only applied to those required to do semi-structured and focus group interviews. Snowball sampling was used for the sample that had to do with former ZIPRA guerrillas who operated in Bulilima District during their insurgency campaigns.

Snowball sampling is explained as a sampling procedure which is used where there is knowledge of the sampling frame and limited access to appropriate participants for the intended study.[310] A researcher approaches a prospective case (participant) associated with the case being investigated so that that particular case may lead or identify other cases. This one person then refers the researcher to another person and the chain continues until the researcher has enough number of cases for his/her study.[311] This process is called 'snowball', referring to the way in which a rolling snowball gets larger and larger as it rolls down-hill.[312] It must be emphasised that the study applied this technique on only those cases who were ZIPRA operatives within Bulilima District during the guerrilla war. This technique became handy since it was difficult for the study to hand pick such cases as they came from different areas within Bulilima.[313]

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[308] R.M. Grinnell and Y.A. Unrau, *Social Work Research and Evaluation: Foundations of Evidence Based Practice*. New York, 2008. p. 153, and D.R. Monette, T.J. Sullivan and C.R. DeJong, *Applied Social Research: A Tool for the Human Services*. 6th ed. Sydney, 2005. p. 148.
[309] This criteria was adopted from K. Maree (Ed.) *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. pp. 301, and then adapted.
[310] M. Alston and W. Bowles, *Research for Caring Professions: An Introduction to Methods*. London, 2003. p. 90.
[311] R.M. Grinnell and Y.A. Unrau, *Social Work Research and Evaluation: Foundations of Evidence Based Practice*. New York, 2008. p. 153 and B. Royse, *Research Methods in Social Work*. London, 2004. pp. 197 – 8.
[312] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 291.
[313] On the other hand, this study's situation is worsened by the fact that HIV/AIDS pandemic has ravaged the country, and most of these cases might have succumbed to the scourge.

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Another way of making contact with potential participants is through the support from advocacy groups who represent people who have particular kinds of experience.[314] Some former guerrillas married local BaKalanga women soon after the war.[315] Villages and particular homesteads where such marriages took place were identified. Such groups are often willing to assist the researcher to be in touch with potential participants,[316] hence the start of snowballing technique. In this way, the study's research design was completed. This brings the Chapter to data collection methods as discussed below.

3.5 Methods of Data Collection

This section focuses on methods that were used to collect data qualitatively during field work. It provides a clear understanding on how data was collected during the entire research process. It also clarifies why a particular method was used instead of others. In the case of this study, method refers to the way qualitative data was collected or the techniques that were applied to collect data during the entire research process. As was the case with this study, the choice of methods had to be based on the theoretical framework and the variables involved. That is, research methods are formulated based on a paradigmatic perspective underpinning that study. Each of these designs has its own perspective and procedure, the research process (methodology and methods) reflects the procedures of the chosen design.[317]

Data are the basic material with which researchers work. Data emanates from observation and can take either one of the two forms – numbers (numeric/quantitative data) or language (words/qualitative data).[318] A research study can therefore provide valid conclusions only if the researcher has sound data to analyse and interpret. Data should capture the meaning of what the researcher is observing.[319] To this end, data are

[314] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 291.
[315] Preliminary interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 24th June, 2015.
[316] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 292.
[317] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 312.
[318] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 51.
[319] *Ibid*.

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collected either by interviews or by observing and recording human behaviour in the context of interaction. Given that qualitative data is collected through observation and interviewing, it should be pointed out that these two types of techniques are favoured by researchers working within the interpretive and constructionist paradigms.[320] Qualitative data in this study was collected in this basic or generic type of qualitative design, by means of semi-structured interviews, in-depth focus group interviews and survey of primary and secondary sources.[321] These techniques are discussed below.

3.5.1 Interviews

Interviewing is the predominant mode of data collection in qualitative research.[322] An interview is a process by which researchers obtain information through direct interchange with an individual or a group that is known or expected to possess the knowledge they seek.[323] They are a form of communication that results in information gathering.

Loosely explained, interviews are done because one is interested in other people's stories.[324] We understand other people's life experiences through the stories they share with us. It is only after sharing such stories that we get the sense of what that story entails, hence the construction of the meaning through information shared. Interpretive approaches see interviews as a means to an end and will thus try to create an environment of openness and trust within which the interviewee is able to express herself or himself authentically.[325] When meanings are created, this is attributed to the cordial relationship so established between interviewer and interviewee. Interviews are summarised this way,

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[320] A. Niehof, *Household, Family, and Nutrition Research: Writing a Proposal*. Wageningen, 1999. p. 20.
[321] E. Henning, *et al.*, *Finding your way in Academic Writing*. 2nd ed. Pretoria, 2005. p. 103.
[322] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 186.
[323] E. DePoy and S. Gilson, *Evaluating Practice: How to do good Evaluation Research in Work Settings*. London, 2008. p. 108.
[324] I. Seidman, *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences*. 2nd ed. New York, 1998. p. 1.
[325] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 51.

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> The aim of qualitative interviews is to see the world through the eyes of the participant, and they can be a valuable source of information, provided they are used correctly. The aim is always to obtain rich descriptive data that will help one to understand the participant's construction of knowledge and social reality. If the person one is interviewing thinks the topic is important and they trust him, they will give him information that he will not be able to collect in any other way.[326]

The catch word here is trust. This implies that for a fruitful interview, the study has to establish a good relationship with participants. Once this is achieved, it follows that the study is assured of obtaining in-depth data that contributes meaningfully to the study at hand. Storytelling is essentially a meaning-making process.[327] Where there is a story, there is a listener, hence interviews are interactional events, and interviews are deeply and unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that ostensibly reside within participants.[328] This implies that those providing information are a sample portion of the larger population. In the qualitative research process, the researcher keeps a focus on learning the meaning that participants hold about the problem issue, not the meaning that the researcher brings to the research or that writers express in literature.[329]

Qualitative research has three major types of interviews, namely open-ended unstructured, semi-structured and structured interviews.[330] The study concerned itself with the semi-structured interviews as they were used for data collection during the field work. These are discussed in the subsection that follows.

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[326] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 87.
[327] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 342.
[328] *Ibid*.
[329] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 186.
[330] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 87.

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3.5.2 Semi-structured (face-to-face) interviews

This study used semi-structured interviews as one of its data collection techniques. Semi-structured interviews are a form of data gathering technique which enables the researcher to collect in-depth information from participants comprehensively. It is a unique form of conversation which provides the researcher with empirical data about the social world, simply by asking participants to speak about their lives.[331] This type of interview creates a relaxed atmosphere to the interviewee as it is mainly conducted within his/her natural setting, a situation that usually brings confidence to this story teller.

Added to this is the fact that the interview's structure is flexible as it has an insignificant number of restrictions, and it is often presented in the form of a guide rather than rules to be adhered to.[332] A semi-structured interview schedule basically defines the line of inquiry.[333] With semi-structured interviews, the researcher has a set of predetermined questions on the schedule, but the interview is guided rather than dictated by the schedule.[334] A schedule of interview questions guides interviewees to focus on core areas or themes of research since they are designed for that purpose.

Semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to gain in-depth information about his/her sample participants' beliefs, perceptions and their account of a phenomenon under study.[335] In short, semi-structured interviews are an in-depth tool of data gathering method. Interviews are techniques that are designed especially to elicit a vivid, holistic and detailed picture of the interviewees' perspective on the study in question.[336] This way, participants are perceived as the experts on the subject and should be allowed maximum

[331] J.A. Holstein and J.F. Gubrium, Active Interviewing, in J.F. Gubrium and J.A. Holstein (Ed.), *Post-modern Interviewing*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2003. pp. 67 – 80.
[332] S. Sarantakos, *Social Research*. 3rd ed. New York, 2005. p. 85.
[333] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs And Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al.*, *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 87.
[334] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 352.
[335] A.L. Strauss, *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists*. Cambridge, 1987. p. 116.
[336] S. Kval, *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 1996. p. 29.

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opportunity to tell their story.[337] Semi-structured interviews played an important part in the data collection process during the field work.

A local research assistant was engaged. The involvement of one of their own in the project boosted the respondents' self-confidence by easing their nerves. The research assistant translated English to Kalanga and vice versa for the benefit of both the participants and the study. Establishing such a relationship enabled the study to gain more information and generate data for itself.[338] All interviews were audiotaped while hand written notes were used to support the recordings. A voice recorder allows a much fuller record than notes taken during the interview.[339] Audio recording allowed the researcher to concentrate on how the interview was proceeding. The researcher was able to give his undivided attention to the interview process to guide it accordingly. Observation notes were taken during the interviews. Such observations included non-verbal cues. This assisted the study during the transcription for analysis purposes. Recorded interviews were transcribed after which the texts were analysed for content.[340] These are strengths of the semi-structured interviews.

Semi-structured interviews, however, have short comings. These are, *inter alia*, bad rapport with participants; coping with unanticipated problems; and managing large volumes of data generated by relatively brief interviews.[341] Another disadvantage is that of interviewer falsification. This is an intentional departure by the researcher from the designed interview schedule which results in the contamination of data.[342]

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[337] J.A. Smith, R. Harre and L. van Langenhoven, *Rethinking Methods in Psychology*. London, 1995. p. 9.
[338] K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 302.
[339] *Ibid*.
[340] K. Charmaz, Qualitative Interviewing and Grounded Theory Analysis, in J.F. Gubruim and J.A. Holstein (Ed.), *Handbook of Interview Research: Content and Method*. London, 2002. pp. 678 – 94.
[341] J.M. Morse, *Qualitative Nursing Research: A Contemporary Dialogue*. Newbury Park, 1991. p. 188.
[342] D.R. Monette, T.J. Sullivan and C.R. DeJONG, *Applied Social Research: A Tool for the Human Services Professions.* 6th ed. Sydney, 2005. p. 179.

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Voice-recording interviews' inherent problem is that of the participant becoming unhappy about being recorded. This may lead to him/her withdrawing from the interview.[343] Further, a voice recorder is a mechanical/technical instrument. Chances are that it might develop a technical fault in the middle of the interview and fail to record. As these problems were anticipated, the study minimised their impact on the data collection process by adopting precautionary measures. Given that this study used two techniques for data collection in the field, the next section is on focus group discussions.

3.5.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus groups are group interviews that are a means of better understanding how people feel or think about a phenomenon.[344] Participants are selected because they have certain characteristics in common that relate to the topic of a study. The focus group is a carefully planned discussion session designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment.[345] Focus groups are a research technique that collects data through interaction on a topic determined by the researcher.[346] What the participants say during the discussions constitutes the essential data in focus groups.[347] Focus group discussions create a platform for sharing ideas on experiences with regard to a particular phenomenon. They are a stimulus for group members to recall and enhance their memory of the topic at hand. The purpose of focus groups is to promote self-disclosure among participants.[348] This self-disclosure is certain if group members engage in a discussion that facilitates openness among group members where divergent

[343] D.R. Monette, T.J. Sullivan and C.R. DeJONG, *Applied Social Research: A Tool for the Human Services Professions.* 6th ed. Australia, 2005. p. 179.
[344] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 359.
[345] R.A. Krueger (1988), cited by M.J. Kingry, L.B. Tiedje and L. Friedman, Focus Groups: a Research Technique for Nursing, in *Nursing Research*. 39 (2): 124 – 145.
[346] D.L. Morgan, *Focus Groups as a Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 1997. p. 8.
[347] D.L. Morgan and R.A. Krueger, *The Focus Group Kit.* Vol. 1 – 6. Thousand Oaks, CA: 1998. p. 1.
[348] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 361.

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thinking and tolerance are pillars of the discussions. Focus groups are useful when multi viewpoints are needed on a specific topic.[349]

Focus groups are capable of generating complex information at low cost in a minimum amount of time.[350] This, however, is dependent on whether group members are the right people amongst themselves. If group members do not gel, their discussions will not be vibrant, resulting in members losing interest and focus, thus becoming unproductive data wise. The right group composition will generate free-flowing discussions that contain useful data.[351] The researcher should create conditions for an easy, productive conversation, and ensure that while participants are comfortable talking to each other, they also serve his/her goal.[352] The researcher's creativity matters a lot here as his/her ability to steer the discussions in the right direction might make or break this data collection process. Focus groups rely on purposive sampling as well. The two focus groups had six members each, purposively selected among former Bulilima youths. Focus groups have normally between six and ten participants,[353] and the FGD sizes in this study were in this range.

This study did two FGDs on the understanding that these groups are said to generate more information than one-on-one interviews.[354] Focus group interviews were recorded and transcribed, ready for analysis. Before data analysis, the study dealt with a minor but technically integral part of both semi-structured and focus group interviews. This was the issue of field notes. Field notes contained descriptions of the study's reflections regarding conversations, interviews, moments of confusion, intuitions and the stimulation of new ideas during the study.[355] The study utilised notes written during conversations with

[349] *Ibid*.
[350] T. Kroll, R. Barbour and J. Harris, Using Focus Group in Disability Research, in *Qualitative Health Research*. 2007. 17 (5) 160 – 98.
[351] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 150.
[352] *Ibid*.
[353] T. Kroll, R. Barbour and J. Harris, Using Focus Group in Disability Research, in *Qualitative Health Research*. 2007. 17 (5) 160 – 98 and A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 361.
[354] *Ibid*.
[355] M.J. Mayan, *An Introduction to Qualitative Methods: A Training Module for Students and Professionals*. Albeta, 2001. p. 43.

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various people in Bulilima District with regard to the topic. Field notes complemented data collected during the interviews and documentary sources. The survey of documentary sources as a method of data collection for this study is discussed below.

3.5.4 Documentary study: Secondary and Archival sources.

Generally, qualitative research methodologies rely on observation and interviewing to collect data. This is done at the expense of archival documentary.[356] Document study is the study of existing documents, either to understand their substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which may be revealed by style and coverage.[357] Sources are classified on primary and secondary basis.[358] Primary sources are original documents such as memos, reports, minutes of meetings, invoices and receipts, among others. Secondary sources consist of material derived from someone else as the original source.[359] Primary sources, by virtue of being original, have more weight than secondary sources in terms of information reliability. This implies that they are more reliable than secondary sources.[360] Secondary sources are someone else's interpretation of primary sources, they should therefore be thoroughly scrutinised for accuracy.[361] That is, chances are high that secondary sources may contain misleading information, may be subjective or biased towards that particular author's beliefs or views.

Secondary source documents relevant to this study were studied to collect data to complement data collected from interviews. In studying such documents, the study evaluated the authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning of information in

[356] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 376.
[357] J. Ritchie and J. Lewis, *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London, 2003. p. 35.
[358] W.L. Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative Quantitative Approaches*. 4th ed. Boston, 2000. p. 395.
[359] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 376.
[360] H. Strydom, Sekondere Analise as Navorsingsprosedure in Maartskaplike Werk. *Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk.* 33 (3): 223 – 232. Translated to English on behalf of the study by Dr. T.D. Sikhwari, 2 – 5 February 2015.
[361] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 376.

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that text.[362] The credibility of a document as evidence hinges on the truth and accuracy of its reference and how widely it represents the phenomenon the researcher is investigating.[363] This means that a secondary source document's validity as a reliable source that should be used for data collection lies more in how far and widely it engages with literature regarding the phenomena being studied. As this study engaged secondary source documents, questions of why, how and whose interest that particular document serves,[364] were upper most so as to collect valid, in-depth and relevant data used in this study. Data collected from secondary sources was used in conjunction with data from archival sources, the subject of the following paragraph.

Archival sources are primary sources of information often deposited in archives. These comprise documents preserved in archives for research purposes.[365] Such materials were studied for relevance to the phenomenon under study. The study concerned itself with documents that had to do with the DCs reports in Bulilima District and the activities of DAs. These reports were written between 1960 and 1979, a period under study here; that is, 1960 when the guerrilla war started, and 1979 when it ended with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement (LHA). Data was analysed in preparation for data interpretation. The next section outlines data analysis and the procedures the study followed in doing so.

3.6 Data Analysis

The concept data analysis refers to the process where data is separated into categories or themes to facilitate its interpretation. A methods discussion in a qualitative study needs also to specify the steps in analysing the various forms of qualitative data.[366] Data analysis, therefore, enables one to make sense of text data.[367] It is a process where a

[362] *Ibid.*
[363] Y. Jupp, *The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods*. London. 2006. p. 80.
[364] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 376.
[365] *Ibid*.
[366] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 194.
[367] *Ibid*.

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researcher separates data into a variety of small interrelated groups so that he/she in turn constructs a deep understanding and meaning of the data collected vis-a-vis the research topic. The key to doing a good interpretive analysis is to stay close to the data, hence interpret it from a position of empathic understanding.[368] Data analysis is described thus,

> The purpose of interpretive analysis is to provide 'thick description', which means thorough description of the characteristics, processes, transactions, and contexts that contribute to the phenomenon, as well as an account of the researcher's role in constructing this description.[369]

Data analysis is a process of sorting data in a way that leads to its understanding with regard to the research question. Mayan says of data analysis,

> It is the process of observing patterns in the data, asking questions of those patterns, constructing conjectures, deliberately collecting data from specifically selected individuals on targeted topics, confirming or refuting those conjectures, then continuing analysis, asking additional questions, seeking more data, furthering the analysis by sorting, questioning, thinking, constructing and testing conjectures.[370]

Data analysis is an endless process that only ends when the final draft of the study is wrapped up. It involves segmenting and taking apart the data (like peeling back layers of an onion) as well as putting it back together.[371] This study began data analysis during data collection. In fact, by the time data collection is completed, data analysis should be well under way.[372] Data collection and analysis at some point should run concurrently. Data analysis in qualitative research proceeds hand- in-hand with the data collection and write-up of findings.[373]

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[368] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 321.
[369] C. Geertz (1973) cited by M.T. Blanche *et al* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 321.
[370] M.J. Mayan, *An Introduction to Qualitative Methods: A Training Module for Students and Professionals*. Alberta. 2001. p. 21.
[371] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 194.
[372] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p.322.
[373] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 194.

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As data collection winds up and the analysis gets into full swing, one takes his/her data and immerses oneself in it, working with texts (field notes, interview transcripts).[374] This shows the inter-connectedness of these three aspects of qualitative research. While interviews are going on, researchers may be analysing an interview collected earlier and writing memos.[375] Qualitative data analysis is a process of inductive reasoning and theorising which certainly is far removed from structured, mechanical and technical procedures to make inferences from empirical data of social life.[376]

Having said that, this study analysed data by sorting, organising and reducing it into more manageable pieces and then exploring ways to reassemble them.[377] Once data was 'dismantled' this way, the study coded each major part according to thematic components of the research topic. The coding enabled the study to identify various pieces of data to enable an easier process of reassembling the data in a coherent and meaningful way. All data collected underwent a context analysis mode.[378] Coding was the first stage of data analysis here. Data was sorted into the responses for each participant.[379] These were assigned codes/labels. When assigning codes/labels to data, the researcher used the interviewees' language at first,[380] hence data was coded according to their responses.

Once the coding was done, the study moved to its next phase of data analysis process where it organised/combined related codes into themes or categories.[381] Each category was assigned a label. The study used its own descriptive phrases or words from the text to establish a category.[382] Here, the researcher wrote a short description for each, with examples or quotes from the text that illustrated the meaning of the category, at the same time making sure that the study was able to relate these to the data source and the context

[374] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p.322.
[375] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 195.
[376] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 399.
[377] T.A. Schwandt, *The Dictionary of Qualitative Research*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks. CA: 2007. p. 7.
[378] E. Henning, *et al.*, *Finding your way in Academic Writing*. 2nd ed. Pretoria, 2005. p. 103.
[379] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For The Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 399.
[380] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p.322.
[381] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 108.
[382] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p.322.

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within which they were generated.[383] This helped the study to have a general picture of how different themes correlate with each other when writing a report.

Data categorisation entails marking different sections of data as being instances of, or relevant to, one or more of the study's themes where a phrase, a line, a sentence, or a paragraph is coded.[384] The study continued to categorise until it identified and labelled all the coded data into relevant categories.[385] It should be borne in mind that this process is an iterative one. That is, the study at some stage had to adjust the definition of categories, or identify new ones to accommodate data that did not fit in the existing labels.[386] The study was not forced into using data that, during coding and re-coding processes, could not be accommodated anywhere within the themes/categories, even the newly identified ones. The study used this type of data to reconstitute other themes relevant to it.

In analysing data, researchers need to 'winnow' the data, a process of focusing on some of the data and disregarding other parts of it.[387] The purpose was to aggregate data into a small number of themes, such as, for example, five to seven,[388] so that data is manageable and workable for a quality thesis report. This marked the end of coding.

Hand coding is laborious, time consuming and sometimes confusing if not properly initiated at the beginning.[389] Its end led to the last stage of data analysis, storing data on a computer. The computer in this instance was used to help manage coded and analysed data. This study used the Atlas.ti computer programme. This programme was chosen over other programmes because of its reliability. It also makes the 'cutting and pasting' of physical text in the process of grouping and regrouping one's material unnecessary.

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[383] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 109.
[384] G. Guest, K.M. MacQueen and E.E. Nancy, *Applied Thematic Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2012. p. 37.
[385] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 109.
[386] *Ibid*.
[387] G. Guest, K.M. MacQueen and E.E. Nancy, *Applied Thematic Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: 2012. p. 37.
[388] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 195.
[389] *Ibid*.

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Instead, one can label segments of text with code headings, and instantly retrieve as a batch all of the text under a particular code heading.[390]

Once coded and analysed, data was stored in the computer system from where it was easy to continuously retrieve it for use without any fear of losing it. Once all the data was coded, the study qualified the interview data by generating themes within the secondary sources. Data was compared with themes from the archival sources for the purposes of interpretation.[391] The two sets of content analysis were combined to search for main themes and in an attempt to see pervasive patterns in the information.[392] These themes were tabulated and inferences made in order to address the research question,[393] marking the final end of data coding and analysis.

When the analysis of both types of data (interviews, archival and field notes) was completed, the final consolidated data was interpreted using data from secondary sources. The study's theoretical findings were also reviewed for validity and reliability. That said, the examination of the validity and reliability of data collected follows below.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

This section is about the validity and reliability of the study's findings. While quantitative researchers emphasise internal and external validity or representativeness and reliability and objectivity as the conventional criteria for good research, the case is not the same with qualitative researchers. They regard these constructs as inappropriate in establishing the 'truth value' of a qualitative research project.[394] Instead, qualitative researchers propose the following alternative constructs which they believe reflect the assumptions of

[390] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p.324.
[391] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 109.
[392] E. Henning, *et al.*, *Finding your way in Academic Writing*. 2nd ed. Pretoria, 2005. p. 103.
[393] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 109.
[394] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 419.

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the qualitative paradigm accurately; credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.[395] Some of these constructs are discussed below.

3.7.1 Credibility

Qualitative researchers regard this construct as the most important in measuring the validity of a qualitative research project.[396] Credibility is the alternative to internal validity. It demonstrates that the inquiry was conducted in a manner that ensured that the subject has been accurately identified and described.[397] Validity is one of the strengths of qualitative research. It determines whether the findings are accurate from the stand point of the researcher, the participants, or the readers of the account.[398] A study has to meet certain criteria for it to be regarded as valid. Such criteria must satisfy the above interested parties. The researcher checks for the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures. Reliability indicates that the researcher's approach is consistent across different researchers and different projects.[399] In order to establish the validity and accuracy of the findings, the study used crystallisation instead of triangulation.

It is argued that triangulation is based on an assumption of a fixed point or object that can be triangulated, hence dismisses this fixed position as the outcome of a quantitative study.[400] Triangulation is more of a quantitative strategy of validity check as opposed to being a qualitative one. The concept of crystallisation that enables qualitative researchers to shift from seeing something as a fixed, rigid, two dimensional object, towards the idea of a crystal, which allows for an infinite variety of shapes, transformations, dimensions and angles approach, is proposed.[401]

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[395] Y. Lincoln and E. Guba, Establishing Trustworthiness, in A. Bryman and R.G Burgess (Eds.), *Qualitative Research*. Vol. lll. London, 1999. p. 180.
[396] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 419.
[397] *Ibid*.
[398] J.W. Creswell and W.L. Miller cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 201.
[399] G.R. Gibbs cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. pp. 201 – 2.
[400] I. Richardson, New Writing Practices in Qualitative Research, in *Sociology of Sport Journal*. 17: 5 – 20.
[401] *Ibid*.

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If themes are established based on converging several sources of data or perceptions from participants, then this process can be claimed as adding to the validity of the study.[402] In qualitative data, validity cannot be measured, neither can it be determined through linear constructs. Within this context, what we describe as our findings are those which crystalise from the data. This crystalised reality is credible enough in so far as those reading our data and analysis are able to see the same emerging pattern, and this adds to the trustworthiness of our research.[403] This way, credibility is measured.

The study used the following strategies to check the accuracy of its findings. The prolonged engagement and persistent observations in the field; peer debriefing and member checks.[404] The study used the member checking strategy to determine the accuracy of its qualitative findings. The final draft document was taken back to the participants for their inputs with regard to its accuracy.[405] Participants were requested to comment on the findings. Their comments were used to align the study accordingly.

Prolonged engagement and constant observations in the field also contributed to accuracy of the findings. It enabled the study to develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study and could convey detail about the site and people that lends credibility to the narrative account.[406] By spending more time in the field, the researcher gained more experience and understanding of the participants' natural settings. This enabled the study to have an informed view about participants and how they think, feel, perceive issues and relate to each other. The more experience the researcher has with the participants in their settings, the more accurate or valid will be the findings.[407]

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[402] J.W. Creswell and W.L. Miller cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 201.
[403] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 81.
[404] A.S. de Vos, *et al.*, *Research at Grass Roots. For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions*. Pretoria, 2011. p. 420 and J.W. Creswell and W.L. Miller cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 201 – 2.
[405] J.W. Creswell and W.L. Miller cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 201.
[406] *Ibid*.
[407] J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 201.

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To further enhance the accuracy of the findings, the study employed the peer debriefing strategy. The study located a peer debriefer who reviewed and asked questions about the study so that the findings resonated with people other than the researcher.[408] In this context, this study located someone within the Department of Development Studies at the university to be the peer debriefer. An interpretation beyond the researcher invested in another person adds validity to the findings.[409] The utilisation of the above validity check strategies went a long way in validating this study's findings, hence its reliability.

A study has to be reliable if it is to serve the purpose for which it was done. A study's approaches have to be consistent or stable.[410] The consistence of a study makes it reliable to users. Qualitative researchers need to document the procedures of their case studies.[411] Documentation of such procedures enables other researchers to use them in their studies. The use of the said procedures is a reflection that other researchers have confidence in one's study, hence its reliability. This study used multiple methods of data collection such as interviews, focus group discussions, archival and secondary source documentary analysis,[412] as well as field note taking.

This way, the study enhanced its reliability among users. To create a foundation for transferability and allow other researchers to use the findings in making comparisons with their work, a research report must contain an 'accurate description of the research process'; an explanation of the arguments for different choices of methods and a detailed description of the research situation and context.[413] This study made a meaningful contribution to the field of research by creating a sound and academically acceptable research design. Its validity and reliability was enhanced by the cooperation of

[408] M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 379 and J.W. Creswell and W.L. Miller cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 202.
[409] J.W. Creswell and W.L. Miller cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 202.
[410] *Ibid*.
[411] R.K. Yin quoted by J.W. Creswell and W.L. Miller cited by J.W. Creswell, *Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London, 2014. p. 203.
[412] J. Nieuwenhuis, Qualitative Research Designs and Data Gathering Techniques, in K. Maree (Ed.), *et al*., *First Steps in Research*. Pretoria, 2007. p. 80.
[413] S. Smalling cited by M.T. Blanche, *et al.,* (Eds.), *Research in Practice. Applied Methods in Social Sciences*. Cape Town, 2006. p. 381.

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participants during field work. Participants' cooperation was assured when their personal expectations and feelings during the data collection process (interviews) were acknowledged and respected (see Chapter 0ne, section 1.11, ethical consideration). The following concludes this Chapter.

3.9 Conclusion

Bulilima District youths were one of the major social groups that contributed so much to the liberation of Zimbabwe yet so little is said or known about them. This research methodology and design was an attempt at formulating a research process that led to collecting qualitative data used to describe and explain how Bulilima youths were involved and participated in the country's guerrilla war. Doing so led to, through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, giving voice to some of the voiceless people of Bulilima District. Such research was done through a process that brought an in-depth understanding of the roles played by Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

What these former Bulilima youths said of their lived experiences during the country's liberation war is the subject of the following two Chapters. Chapter Four focuses mainly on those who were youths at home, while Chapter five deals with the other category.

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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION- YOUTHS WHO WERE AT HOME DURING THE STRUGGLE

4.1 Introduction

Several thousands of Bulilima youths took part in the war against the settler regime, yet credit for the country's independence is given to former liberation movements' leadership.[414] Whenever Bulilima youths' involvement in Zimbabwe's armed struggle is studied, it is done in passing.[415] While the former liberation movements' leadership is glorified as messiahs, liberators, heroes and heroines; youths are referred to as war collaborators, a concept that demeans and belittles their massive and incontrovertible contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe as this study shows. Given this biased historiography, historians are advised to move beyond the grand view that presents history as a narrative of the agency of colonial bureaucrats and the African elites to representative history from below.[416]

Bulilima District suffers from the anomaly highlighted above. This is clearly illustrated by the lack of in-depth and systematic studies on the participation of Bulilima youths in the country's armed struggle; this despite the district's strategic position in relation to the country's exit and entry points to the outside world in the context of the nationalists' clandestine activities.[417] The main problem with Zimbabwe liberation struggle's

[414] Former liberation movements' leaders assumed the leadership of the new Zimbabwe immediately after independence. In the process, they brought under their control public media houses (both print and electronic) such as the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Zimbabwe Papers that served to expound endless propaganda through music, poetry, literature and staged testimonies by a few cronies during national events about how these leaders liberated the masses from colonial bondage. Given such massive publications, the Zimbabwean public was hoodwinked into believing that only machinations of the leaders of the liberation movements liberated them from oppressive settler rule.

[415] For examples to this effect, see E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012; F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006 and A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014, among others.

[416] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 68.

[417] Generally, nationalists' clandestine activities involved the mobilisation and recruitment of youths to join the struggle in Zambia, the use of youths as couriers of information from Bulilima to Botswana based ZAPU officials and, ZIPRA guerrillas' insurgency activities along the border.

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historiography is that it is top-down, hence the inherent weakness of overlooking those of lower social status in society. Given evidence at hand, Bulilima District played a pivotal role in enabling ZAPU to recruit and transit its recruitees to Botswana on their way to Zambia.[418] Within this orbit, Bulilima District's importance to ZAPU cannot be divorced from its people, particularly the youths of that time.

Bulilima youths' vulnerability to ZIPRA guerrillas' recruitment drives and its propaganda and indoctrination tenets (thereby becoming a target group of such machinations) means the youths deserve their place in Zimbabwe liberation struggle's historiography. These former Bulilima youths were categorised in two – those who were at home for the entire duration of the guerrilla war and those who were either refugees or in the war front as guerrillas. This Chapter illustrates how Bulilima youths were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle and by implication, their importance in liberating Zimbabwe from oppressive colonial rule.

The Chapter is divided into three sections. The first section introduces the Chapter and is split into the following subsections; the historical background of BaKalanga people in relation to their settlement in Bulilima District and, Bulilima District's economic condition(s) during the period studied. The first subsection pertains to the history of BaKalanga people in Bulilima, the geographical location of the district and its vegetation, weather/climatic patterns and landforms. This illustrates how the above directly and indirectly affected Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Bulilima youths were involved and participated in a guerrilla war that exposed them to the dangers of both air and ground attacks by Rhodesian security forces in their engagement with ZIPRA guerrillas.[419] Vegetation cover, therefore, was of necessity if youths were to survive.

The second subsection outlines Bulilima communities' economic activities. The focus is on how BaKalanga people survived economically before the outbreak of the guerrilla war and how the war affected their economic undertakings. Before the war, Bulilima youths engaged themselves in various subsistence activities for their families' survival. The

[418] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2016 and Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema sub-Village, Gonde Village: 28th of March, 2016.
[419] Interview with Kolema Tshuma (a former ZIPRA guerrilla operative in Bulilima District), Thekwane Mission: 5th August, 2015.

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advent of the war changed all this as youths either spent their time with guerrillas, attending to guerrilla and security forces related issues or joined the war in Botswana and Zambia. This left Bulilima communities vulnerable to poverty.[420] Participating in an economically demanding war under poverty demonstrated the sacrifices Bulilima youths made to feed and clothe guerrillas when they flooded Bulilima District.

Section two presents and discusses data collected from interviewees who were youths at home during the guerrilla war. In all this, data collected from focus group discussions, supportive individuals and secondary sources is consolidated either in a corroborative, refutive manner or as facts for discussion in consideration of divergent views.

4.1.1 Contextual Background: BaKalanga in Bulilima District

The BaKalanga people occupy an area to the south-west and western parts of Zimbabwe and to the north-east and eastern parts of Botswana. They comprise of various sub-ethnic groups.[421] BaKalanga people are found on both sides of the border in communities ten or so kilometres from Plumtree Town to as far away as Bambadzi and Makhulela along the Botswana – Zimbabwe border, stretching inwards to villages such as Solusi, about 40 kilometres from the city of Bulawayo. A common feature in Kalanga communities settled along the border is that each village on the Zimbabwean side has its replica on the Botswana side. These Batswana communities played a decisive role in enabling Bulilima youths to cross into Botswana to join the liberation struggle.

Although there are no major in-depth and systematic studies about BaKalanga people as an ethnic group compared to, for example, the Ndebele or white settlers, the general consensus is that these people's settlements in the western parts of Zimbabwe are

[420] 'Elements of poverty' refers to all negative activities that directly or indirectly contributed to the total failure of or the non-undertaking of economic endeavours by Bulilima peasants in the absence of their offs-springs.
[421] It must be noted that the study uses the plural 'groups' as an indication that within the collective 'Kalanga' ethnicity, there are a number of sub-ethnic Kalanga groups such as Balilima of Bambadzi, Hingwe, Mangubo and Mbimba and the Dalawunda in areas close to Plumtree town.

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aeon.[422] Due to the changing political atmosphere brought by new arrivals north of the Limpopo River, in particular the Ndebele people around 1838 and then the BSAC's Pioneer column in the last decade of the nineteenth century, BaKalanga people found themselves pushed to the peripheral areas of western Zimbabwe. The arrival and settlement of King Mzilikazi north of Limpopo River subdued and brought BaKalanga people under the Ndebele control and influence.[423] In the process, certain Kalanga Chiefs lost their territories and positions of influence. To escape from Ndebele clutches, influence and the subsequent dilution of Kalanga culture and customs, Kalanga Chiefs and their subjects pushed further westwards and settled in present day Botswana.

The dislocation and disorientation of Kalanga societies was further compounded by the conquest of the Ndebele Kingdom by new arrivals in the form of BSAC and its appendage settlers. After the fall of the Ndebele State, the period from the 1890s to the 1950s was characterised by crucial political changes that influenced Zimbabwean society and culture, causing the Bulilima communities to further change for the worse in terms of their territorial settlements' size and outlook.[424]

Territorially, the introduction and implementation of the 1930 LAA,[425] saw BaKalanga people on fertile soils uprooted and dumped in drier, arid and peripheral areas such as Bambadzi, Hingwe, Makhulela and Ndolwane to pave way for new white settlements. A case of Empandeni where communities were removed to pave way for a missionary farm is a typical example.[426] Similarly, some Kalanga Chiefs avoided the payment of hut tax and dipping levies by relocating to Botswana where they subsequently regarded

[422] See E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012; T. Dube, Shifiting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilima-Mangwe District, Matabeleland South, Zimbabwe, c 1946 – 2005. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Witwatersrand University, 2015 and P.J. Wentzel, *Nau DzabaKalanga*. *A History of the Kalanga*. Vol. 1, 2 and 3. 1983.
[423] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 65.
[424] *Ibid*.
[425] The 1930 LAA in Rhodesia must be seen in light of the 1913 Native Land Act passed by South Africa's Union Government. As was the LAA, the NLA limited the landmass owned by natives in South Africa. In a similar fashion, these two acts created specific areas for natives which came to be known as 'homelands' in the case of South Africa and Native Reserves in the case of Rhodesia. Consult www.sahist.org.za/article/grp-areas-act for more details on South Africa's NLA and its successor legislations.
[426] T. Dube, Shifiting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilima-Mangwe District, Matabeleland South, Zimbabwe, c 1946 – 2005. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Witwatersrand University, 2015. p. 67.

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themselves as Khama's subjects.[427] This way, Kalanga communities were permanently disfigured territorially. Such politically and economically induced relocations can be traced from the time BaKalanga people came into contact with King Mzilikazi's Ndebele nation.[428] There is therefore, a strong bond that exists between Bulilima communities and their counterparts in Botswana. This explains why Botswana Kalanga villagers readily assisted Bulilima youths as they trekked across the border to join the armed struggle.

The continued uprooting and dislocation of Kalanga communities served to unify BaKalanga people from both sides of the divide against their perceived common enemy, first the Ndebele, and then the white settlers. Their seemingly fluid and coordinated movements from one settlement area to another across the border can be explained by their loose political system. BaKalanga communities did not have an integrated and centralised political system such as attained in Ndebele society.[429] Within this political setup it was easy, therefore, for the said Kalanga Chiefs to cross and settle in Botswana in times of need. For example, nineteenth century Bulilima-Mangwe was ruled by a number of small Kalanga Chiefs, some of whom often formed alliances or combined in the second half of the century, to resist Ndebele control.[430] The relationship among Kalanga communities on both sides of the border is historically rooted and traditionally bonded. This is a crucial observation when one considers how the Botswana communities later facilitated the easy entry of Bulilima youths into Botswana to join the armed struggle.[431] The continued uprooting and dislocation of black communities by white settler governments was not a phenomenon confined to Bulilima-Mangwe communities only.

[427] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 74.
[428] Msindo exemplified these Kalanga Chiefs as Mengwe, Sinote, Nswazvi and Madandume (Malalume), among others. *Ibid*. p. 74. Also see N. Parsons's The Pipeline: Botswana's Reception of Refugees, 1956 – 1968, in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, June 2008. pp. 17 – 32.
[429] See E. Msindo, 2012 and T. Dube (unpublished thesis), 2015, for BaKalanga communities' political system.
[430] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 72.
[431] Interviews with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015; Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th March, 2016 and Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2016.

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South Africa had a systematic social engineering according to apartheid prescription.[432] This meant that racial classification led to the relocation of black people. In Bulilima District, the imposed system choked under the ineptitude of NCs imposed on Africans by successive settler governments. The white minority governments' land policies were to later haunt them as seen by the cooperation between BaKalanga peasants in Botswana and Bulilima youths during Zimbabwe's armed struggle.

Given that BaKalanga communities underwent generational war-induced transformations, it is no wonder that they finally settled along the western and eastern margins of Zimbabwe and Botswana. The fact that these communities are found on both sides of the Zimbabwe- Botswana border is illustrative of these communities' cultural similarities. Both sides of the divide openly welcomed ZIPRA guerrillas as they infiltrated the country through Botswana.[433] Given Batswana communities' cooperation on this matter, Bulilima District became a strategic and transit district for ZIPRA guerrillas as they recruited tens of thousands of Bulilima youths for war. Similarly, guerrilla infiltrations increased proportionately to the opening up of a Southern Front by ZIPRA War Council, later code named 'Operation Tangent' by Rhodesia's COMOPS Chiefs. ZIPRA established for itself a favourable permanent facility for incursions into Rhodesia.[434]

The laws as enacted, passed and implemented by successive settler governments turned in the long run to be detrimental to the effective governing of the country, particularly when one factors in the ease with which ZIPRA guerrillas penetrated the country through the Botswana border. Bulilima communities who were removed from their original settlements in Figree, Marula, Khami and Solusi, for example, settled along the Botswana border while others established new settlements across the border.[435] The deliberate shifting and

[432] For a detailed analysis of this occurrence, see C. Ngwenya, The Economic Contribution of Sunni Bohra Muslims in South Africa: A Case Study of the Dockrat Family Business. (Unpublished Master's Dissertation), University of Johannesburg, 2010.
[433] Interview with Moketsi Ndlovu, Dombodema Village: 28th March, 2016 and Focus Group Discussion One, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015.
[434] 'Operation Tangent' was the code name for all areas covering the South and Western sides of Rhodesia where ZIPRA guerrillas operated in after infiltrating the country from the Botswana border. For details here, see N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999.
[435] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 73 and T. Dube, Shifiting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilima-Mangwe

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shuffling of African societies in general and BaKalanga communities in particular had an unintended outcome of creating and re-establishing united BaKalanga settlements on both sides of the border.[436] BaKalangas' unity in culture, customs, tradition and values is further reflected in the emphasis that Bulilima-Mangwe District is mainly a Kalanga-dominated society in the borderlands of southwestern Zimbabwe.[437] Generally, BaKalanga people were unified by political and economic hardships they were collectively subjected to as an ethnic group by their successive conquerors.

BaKalanga's settlement patterns and political structures since their migration to Southern Africa reflect a decentralised political power. The nineteenth century Bulilima-Mangwe was controlled by various Kalanga Chiefs who formed formidable alliances during times of need.[438] Such alliances became more prominent and pronounced during the escalation of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. This became evident when Bulilima youths, in response to guerrilla calls to join the liberation struggle, crossed into Botswana unhindered by Batswana villagers.[439] Retrospectively, BaKalanga communities on either side of the border are one people in two countries.[440] Generally, BaKalanga are a highly traditional religious people, and this helped shape and transform their identity, and unified them across international borders in the face of an onslaught from real or perceived enemies.[441]

The following bears testimony to the above,

> In fact, the BaKalanga who live along the Botswana side of the border do not consider themselves different from the people who live on the other side in

District, Matabeleland South, Zimbabwe, c 1946 – 2005. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Witwatersrand University, 2015. pp. 67, 85 and 86.

[436] There are fully established Kalanga communities on both sides of the Botswana – Zimbabwe border who co-exist peacefully. The reason for their harmonious co-existence is that villagers on both sides have blood relatives such as David Hlabano's aunt who lives on the Botswana side of the border and Shadreck Nkobi's relatives who also live across the border as well. Interview one with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015 and Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 31st March, 2016.

[437] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 67.

[438] *Ibid*. p. 72.

[439] In recognition of their originality from Zimbabwe and their subsequent resettlement in Botswana, Msindo calls these communities across the border 'The Diasporic Kalanga Communities'. E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 74.

[440] Htt//www.repository.up.ac.za (unpublished Master's Dissertation). pp. 86 – 87, 88 – 89 and 90 – 91. Accessed: 14th June, 2015. 11:46.

[441] *Ibid*.

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> Zimbabwe. They have kept their cultural history intact. As such, during troubled times, BaKalanga of Botswana turned more and more to Manyangwa, even on national matters.[442]

It is clear that these two sets of communities were separated by colonial-created, white-settler enforced international boundaries. The loose border controls laid bare the in-efficiencies of foreign imported systems of governing indigenous communities by white-settler governments. That is, Bulilima communities also showed their disquiet … by taking advantage of the loose control of the Rhodesia-Bechuanaland border to escape into Botswana with their people, as they had done during King Lobhengula's time.[443] Such border control inefficiencies were to later aid Bulilima youths as they had done their ancestors. Put plainly, the ineptitude with which the settler governments handled border control mechanisms calls into question the NCs' political capability as they were mandated to effectively run the Bulilima-Mangwe District's affairs. This point is made even more salient when one considers that the same communities were, in the 1960s onwards allowed the same privilege to crisscross the border with impunity as was the case when they evaded the payment of taxes during the 1930s.[444]

It can be said that Kalanga culture as it had come to be was still able to maintain a high level of continuity even under Ndebele overlordship.[445] This unity in culture and religion played a very influential and significant role in the context of Bulilima youths when they got involved and participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle despite their increasingly deteriorating economic conditions. Bulilima's economy, before and during the colonial rule was directly linked to culture, tradition and religion. The following subsection discusses Bulilima's economic activities in the context of BaKalanga people's survival strategies during the 1960s onwards. It details their economic activities in the 1960s and 1970s.

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[442] Htt//www.repository.up.ac.za (unpublished Master's Dissertation). p. 97. Accessed: 14th June, 2015. 11:46.
[443] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990.* New York, 2012. p. 74.
[444] *Ibid*. p. 76.
[445] G.C. Mazarire, Who are the Ndebele and Kalanga in Zimbabwe? (Unpublished paper), 2003. p. 6.

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4.1.2 Bulilima People's Economic Activities

The economy of a place is measured by productive activities undertaken by its inhabitants. The economy of a place, therefore, is the business of that place.[446] Bulilima District's economy during the 1960s was what BaKalanga villagers were producing for their upkeep as a society. The economy of a place is, therefore, the sum total of goods and services produced by all its people, family units, businesses and communities.[447] In the case of Bulilima District, the survival strategies undertaken by its inhabitants collectively defined its economic standing. BaKalanga people's economic activities were culturally defined, designed to maintain the religious leanings of the communities.

Their economic undertakings are discussed in conjunction with their social endeavours that were more or less economic. This subsection is divided into two; the economic activities pursued by BaKalanga people for their survival, and the geophysical position of Bulilima District in Zimbabwe. This study is about the extent to which the Botswana border influenced Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. As such, this section provides the basis from which we can understand and appreciate the economic dynamics at play during that period. Consequently, these economic dynamics galvanised Bulilima youths into seeing the border and what lay beyond it as part of the solution to their social and economic woes. This is also done in cognisance of the deteriorating political climate in Rhodesia, one that was a creation of successive settler governments in order to retain absolute and exclusive control over the country's means of production.

Bulilima communities' survival strategies and their inherent negative effects on the environment attracted the unwanted attention of the settler authorities. The late 1930s saw most reserves suffering from overpopulation and massive land degradations which resulted in settler authorities passing the NLHA of 1951.[448] African communities were required by law to destock their cattle. Each household was required to retain a herd of

[446] J. Bester and K. Bell, *Real People Power. Your Path to Economic Freedom*. Johannesburg, 1997. p. 5.
[447] *Ibid*.
[448] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 89.

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between five and twelve cattle after destocking.[449] This curtailed Kalanga families' capacity to make themselves economically viable. The Act resulted in economic disillusionment within Bulilima communities, hence it became unpopular with peasants.[450] Without cattle, BaKalanga people were doomed. Like with Ndebele communities, cattle were central to BaKalanga people's existence because they were both economic and cultural pillars of their society.[451] Cattle played a vital role in BaKalanga people's economic, social and religious wellbeing.

The NLHA undermined BaKalanga people's survival strategies given that they relied heavily on cattle for draught power (ploughing), transportation of poles, drawing of fencing branches, *lobola* (bride price) payment and most importantly, as source of milk for their children. BaKalanga communities practiced diverse economic activities, but the most common was cattle rearing.[452] Occasionally, but rarely a beast would be sold for cash to buy farm implements such as an ox-drawn plough or a scotch cart. Scotch carts were a preserve of the rich households.[453] These were often identified by large homesteads characterised by large herds of cattle, goats, sheep and many children. In Bulilima society, large families were highly respected as they displayed power and influence within their specific communities.[454] Extended families, therefore, were a common feature.

Polygamy was a sign that a man was wealthy, hence could afford to pay *lobola* for more than two wives. The practise was, therefore, common among the wealthy in the district, hence large families. Large families were critical for the economic wellbeing of households. They provided the much needed labour which was the cornerstone of economic survival in Bulilima District. Young boys and girls, for example, did different but complementary work for the family.[455] Given that Bulilima communities engaged in

[449] T. Dube, Shifiting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilima-Mangwe District, Matabeleland South, Zimbabwe, c 1946 – 2005. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Witwatersrand University, 2015. p. 85 and NAZ S2806/1/8, Harare. Land Husbandry Act, Bulilima-Mangwe District.
[450] A.R. Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and Assessment*. London, 2008. p. 3.
[451] Consult E. Msindo, (2012) for more information on the importance of cattle to Bulilima communities.
[452] www.wsu.ac.za/hsrc/2146-8.pdf: S. Munyati, S. Rusakaniko, P.F. Mupambirei, S.T. Mahati, P. Chipatamoto and B. Chandiwana, A Census of Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Zimbabwe's Two Districts; Bulilima District. Accessed: 16th February, 2016. 07:40.
[453] Interview with Gogo Na Sudze Moyo, Mbila Village: 18th December, 2015.
[454] Interview with Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village: 23rd February, 2015.
[455] Interview with Khulu Solomon Hikwa, Dingumuzi Township, Plumtree: 29th December, 2015.

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varying economic activities throughout the year, it is instructive to look at what they did within a given season.

The rainy season (summer) saw the communities take to farming. BaKalanga people are traditionally subsistence farmers.[456] Activities here included, *inter alia*, ploughing and planting of various crops, weeding, harvesting and collecting harvested crops to granaries. These activities, by their very nature, were gendered. This is where the significance of a large, extended family came into play. Many children meant that work was done speedily. This ensured good yields in times of plenty rainfall.[457] Females planted, weeded, harvested and separated seeds from their stalks/heads (*ukubhula*) at the beginning of winter.[458] In addition, young women and girls fetched water, cooked meals (three times a day), did family laundry, picked legume crops and dug up root ones such as ground and round nuts, sweet potatoes and collected melons and water melons for storage in granaries. Further, they collected edible small natural growing plants such as *delele/idelele* and *nyovi/ulude*, as well as cow pea leaves (*nlibo wenyemba/umbida wendumba*). Apart from *delele/idelele* which they dried without boiling, *nyovi/ulude* and cow pea leaves were boiled and dried for use during winter or times of shortage. Young females did all this under the supervision of their mothers/grandmothers. This was a continuous process of grooming them for their future roles as wives and mothers.[459]

Peasant boys' duties involved fencing the fields, ploughing, herding cattle in the forest, ferrying crops from the fields to the granaries using a scotch cart (wealthy families), milking goats and cows, driving cattle to dip-tanks and, generally doing any kind of masculine work considered inappropriate for females.[460] All this was done under the watchful eyes of older men who played guidance and supervisory roles, consciously and

[456] M. Matsa and S. Mini, Grappling Climate Change in Southern Zimbabwe: The Experience of BaKalanga Minority Farmers, in *Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014. pp. 34 – 52.
[457] Interview with Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village. 23rd February, 2015.
[458] Interview with Gogo Na Nkosana, Joli Village: 27th August, 2016.
[459] *Ibid*.
[460] Interview with Khulu Mathanda Ndlovu, Bezu Village: 13th May, 2016.

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unconsciously.[461] Similarly, these young men were groomed for the future as economically productive fathers who would be able to feed their families.

In winter, Bulilima communities engaged in different economic activities from those done in summer. Due to the dry nature of the environment in winter,[462] women fetched firewood on a daily basis making *ibonda*,[463] plastered huts with clay, fetched grass for and thatched huts, continued with the separation of crop seeds from stalks/heads/tussles (*ukubhula*), fetched water (on a daily basis, this time from distant sources such as rivers and dams) and occasionally brewed traditional beer for sale (*nndale/indale*). On weekends, they collectively went to these distant sources of water with the family's dirty linen to do laundry. Women's daily chores involved the pounding of finger millet (*zembwe/unyawuthi*) (and sometimes sorghum and maize) using mortar and pestle (*ingiga lomgigo*) to produce mealie-meal for cooking *hadza/isitshwala*.[464] On daily basis, female youths and their mothers pounded finger millet for preparing either lunch or supper. As Trethewan observes in the case of Filabusi villagers (Insiza District), 'Harvested maize was kept in granaries in the village and ground by mortar and pestle to make mealie meal.'[465] This shows the general link of traditions between AmaNdebele and BaKalanga people. The issue is women did the pounding, hence pounding was one of their gendered roles.

Women's leisure time was passed doing activities such as crafting/making mats (*cansi/amacansi*) using small long reeds (*mizi/imizi*) and strings made out of sisal fibre (*kuha/isikuha*), sieves (*tshiswina/isihluzo*) (for sieving traditional beer), beading, collecting wild fruits such as *nsubvu/umtshwankela* and *makwakwa/amakwakwa* (monkey oranges)

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[461] I. Phimister, The Combined Contradictory Inheritance of the Struggle Against Colonialism, in C. Stoneman, (Ed.), *Zimbabwe's Prospects. Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa*. London, 1988. p. 8.

[462] https://books.google.co.za: Accessed: 19th July, 2016. 08:06.

[463] *Ibonda* is a large collection and cumulative *iminyaba* (a bundle of firewood conveniently carried on the head by females) staked on top of each other until a large body of these is formed. This was a way of storing firewood for use during summer when the environment was wet, hence not conducive for fetching firewood. Again, winter was ideal for this because trees would be dry, hence plenty of firewood.

[464] It should be known that contrary to popular and misleading belief that maize was the staple food for BaKalanga people, the fact is that it was not. BaKalanga's staple food was finger millet (*zembwe/unyawuthi*). Maize was mainly grown for traditional beer brewing and, for consumption while it was green, where it was enjoyed either cooked or roasted over row fire. Additionally, dry maize was eaten as *hanga/inkobe* (a mixture of boiled dry maize and pea beans or round nuts), *magwadla/amagwadla* (boiled dry maize) or *umxhanxa/nnxhanxa* (a mixture of boiled dry maize and melon). In this way, maize played a supplementary role to the staple diet of *hadza le zembwe*, otherwise its main purpose was for beer brewing.

[465] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 113.

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for making *hwakwa/ihwakwa* (roasted fresh seeds of *amakwakwa* fruits), and crafted *seme/ingcebethu* and *izitsha*, (out of special grass called *dodlana/idodlana* and *lala/ilala*) in addition to pottery.[466] These were mostly done by elderly women (*Kuku/Ogogo*) while young girls played assistants to their seniors.

Conversely, men concentrated on what could be classified as heavier work such as carving mortars and pestles, yokes and their complementary parts (*zwikeyi/izikeyi*), drums (*ngungu/ingungu*), handles (for picks, hoes, axes), wooden doors, sledges, cutting poles (*nongo/intungo, mmanda/imanda and mbalilo/imbalilo*) for the construction of huts, carving stools, constructing granaries, making cattle-skin blankets (*ukutshuka amaxaba/debwe*), ropes and specialised thatching (*tafula/ukutafula*).[467] Boys worked with their fathers or grandfathers as apprentices. Some of the above activities were done as leisure, yet they were a must as BaKalanga villagers could not do without all the items listed above.[468] These items were necessities of life and they complemented what was produced by women. That is, women could not pound finger millet without a mortar and pestle and what they pounded had to be sieved using *ukhomane*, for example. Men could not use their wooden plates without food cooked using clay pots made by women. Some men and women made careers out of these activities, depending on one's talent, skill and social upbringing.[469] These are examples of the complementary nature of women and men's economic activities as pursued by Bulilima villagers seasonally. Any disruption thereof disabled the smooth functioning of these interconnected, interdependent and mutually supportive economic survival activities.

On top of their routine activities, BaKalanga people embarked on major income generating schemes some of which were in the form of social gatherings. These involved traditional beer brewing, where brewed beer (*indale/nndale*, as these beer-drinking parties were commonly called) would be sold to fellow villagers.[470] People would gather

[466] M. Matsa and S. Mini, Grappling Climate Change in Southern Zimbabwe: The Experience of BaKalanga Minority Farmers, in *Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies*. Vol. 4. No. 1. 2014. pp. 34 – 52.
[467] *Ibid* and, Interview with Khulu Sa Madodana Tshuma, Ntunungwe Village: 9th February, 2015.
[468] Interview with Gogo Na Nkosana, Joli Village: 27th August, 2016 and Khulu Sa Madodana, Ntunungwe Village: 9th February, 2015.
[469] Interview with Khulu Sa Mosi Ndlovu, Mzwanyane Village: 28th August, 2016.
[470] M. Matsa and S. Mini, Grappling Climate Change in Southern Zimbabwe: The Experience of BaKalanga Minority Farmers, in *Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies*. Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014. pp. 34 – 52.

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at that particular homestead, buy and drink beer (commonly known as seven days, for it took full seven days to prepare, brew and sell). Here, women would bring their varied craft items such as *ingcebethu* or *icansi* to work on while drinking with friends, colleagues and relatives.[471] Men would do the same, bringing perhaps, *keyi*/*isikeyi* they would be carving. Women drank separately from men, usually in large groups of friends and associates. It was uncommon for an individual to buy beer and drink alone or with a friend only.[472] This demonstrates the cooperation and togetherness that characterised BaKalanga people. No one below the age of thirty drank beer publicly in Bulilima communities then.[473] *Indale* drinking party was an income generating undertaking by BaKalanga villagers to boost their meagre cash reserves.

It should be noted that the afternoon drinking spree was for elderly people. The party was extended to the evening when young people of all ages except toddlers aged five and below, were given an opportunity to socialise without the prying eyes of their elders.[474] This was referred to as '*iphathi*' by locals where a radio was hired and music played throughout the night. Here, young people of both sexes made bets (*ukubheja*) for songs (records) of their choice and danced on stage.[475] Only those who placed a bet with the disc jockey (DJ) had their songs played.[476] In this way, order was maintained. Young people enjoyed themselves from dusk to dawn. Through such forms of socialisation, young people found love and eventually got married.[477] *Amaphathi* not only served as a means of generating income. They also served as platforms for socialising and courtship for young people. It is important to note that *Amaphathi*, by virtue of being done in the evenings, allowed young people, both males and females to do their daily routines without

[471] Interview with Gogo Na Nkosana Ncube, Joli Village: 27th August, 2016 and Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village, 23rd February, 2015.
[472] Interview with Khulu Mathanda Ndlovu, Bezu Village: 13th May, 2016.
[473] Young men below the age of thirty were regarded and treated as children by community elders, hence it was taboo for them to drink with and among elders. Similarly, women below fifty were not part of the drinking social group. They were *Omalukazana* (Daughters in law), hence kept away from their in-laws. This served to underline the discriminatory and patriarchal nature of Bulilima District. Interview with Gogo Na Sudze, Mbila Village: 18th December, 2015 and Khulu Solomon Hikwa, Dingumuzi Township, Plumtree: 29th December, 2015.
[474] Interview with Gogo Na Nkosana Ncube, Joli Village: 27th August, 2016; Khulu Mathanda Ndlovu, Bezu Village: 13th May, 2016; Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village. 23rd February, 2015 and Khulu Sa Madodana, Ntunungwe Village: 9th February, 2015.
[475] Interview with Khulu Sa Mosi Ndlovu, Mzwanyane Village: 28th August, 2016.
[476] Interview with Khulu Solomon Hikwa, Dingumuzi Township, Plumtree: 29th December, 2015.
[477] *Ibid.*

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any distraction or missing out on work due to such activities.[478] At the same time, this arrangement allowed older people time and space to socialise on their own during the day. The same privilege was reciprocated by elders to their children (or grandchildren) to socialise and court without the watchful eyes of their elders. Respect was highly valued in BuKalanga land. BaKalanga people balanced their acts economically and socially.

This form of socialisation in the name of fundraising was to play a significant role when guerrilla recruitment drives intensified in Bulilima District. Similarly, it was to have serious repercussions when the Smith regime introduced the draconian Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill in 1973.[479] Further, these social orientated activities had a bearing on who to support between guerrillas and the security forces when one considers the amount of interference, disruptions and disturbances each brought to Bulilima communities when the guerrilla war intensified. Bulilima District's economic activities were unitive in nature through their socialisation elements which invoked a sense of togetherness.[480] This was further reflected in their community cooperation work-parties locally known as *amalima*.[481] Bulilima community managed to survive as one, socially and economically. In fact, this naturally coordinated behaviour by Bulilima communities 'was forced to the surface' when the settler regime(s) exacted economic pressure on Bulilima citizens through the introduction of racially biased legislation.[482] This was part of wider repressive economic measures directed at black communities throughout the country. In light of this, the sub-section that follows discusses the origins of Bulilima youths migration to towns and cities.

[478] One should point out that beer drinking parties and *Amaphathi* were done over the weekend, particularly on a Saturday when everyone would not be doing anything the following day, a Sunday. BaKalanga people do not work on a Sunday, hence it was convenient for them to party on Saturday and rest on Sunday. Interview with Khulu Sa Mosi Ndlovu, Mzwanyane Village: 28th August, 2016.
[479] A.R. Wilkinson, *Insurgence in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and Assessment*. London, 2008. p. 17.
[480] Interview with Gogo Na Nkosana Ncube, Joli Village: 27th August, 2016; Khulu Mathanda Ndlovu, Bezu Village: 13th May, 2016; Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village. 23rd February, 2015 and Khulu Sa Madodana, Ntunungwe Village: 9th February, 2015.
[481] M. Matsa and S. Mini, Grappling Climate Change in Southern Zimbabwe: The Experience of BaKalanga Minority Farmers, in *Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies*. Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014. pp. 34 – 52.
[482] Bulilima villagers established cooperative work parties that saw most homesteads realising good yields during times of plenty rainfall. Work parties were meant to assist each other in ploughing, weeding and harvesting of crops, particularly to families with fewer members. Wealthy families hired people to work for them, particularly members of poor families.

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4.1.3 The Origins of Bulilima Youths' Migrations to Urban Centres

Black communities in the reserves were required by law, for example, to pay hut tax and dipping levies. In Bulilima District, this became problematic as locals resisted the move by the government to make them pay those taxes.[483] As much as they could resist this government directive, BaKalanga could not resist the economic winds of change sweeping across rural Rhodesia then. A combination of racially skewed legislation (The LAA, 1930 and the NLHA, 1951),[484] and the pressure from the NC's Office for them to pay taxes, resulted in able bodied BaKalanga men (and to a lesser extent women) trekking to urban centres, mines and farms in search of work.[485] Bulilima youths found themselves migrating to Botswana and South Africa in large numbers in search of job opportunities. This developed into a trend which is regarded as a 'look south policy'.[486] This underpins the rate at which Bulilima youths emigrated and still emigrate to Botswana and South Africa in search of employment.[487] Such migrations should be seen in light of Bulilima District's proximity to the Botswana border and the long established system of BaKalanga people to always cross over to Botswana when faced with unpleasant situations. Theories of migration see this in terms of the push and pull factors.[488] Migrations are a worldwide phenomenon that, however, differ from region to region in terms of magnitude, intensity and scale. In other words, human migrations existed throughout human history.[489] Bulilima migrations became part of the historical statistics.

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[483] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 77.
[484] *Ibid.*
[485] Interview with Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village. 23rd February, 2015; Khulu Sa Mosi Ndlovu, Mzwanyane Village: 28th August, 2016 and E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 77 and I. Phimister, The Combined and Contradictory Inheritance of the Struggle Against Colonialism, in C. Stoneman, (Ed.), *Zimbabwe's Prospects. Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa*. London, 1988. p. 9.
[486] For a detailed version of this, see M. Matsa and S. Mini, Grappling Climate Change in Southern Zimbabwe: The Experience of BaKalanga Minority Farmers, in *Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies*. Vol. 4. No. 1. 2014. pp. 34 – 52.
[487] *Ibid* and E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 77.
[488] For a detailed clarification on theories of migration, see A. Godley, *Jewish Immigrant Entrepreneurship in New York and London. Enterprise and Culture*. New York, 2001.
[489] C. Ngwenya, The Economic Contribution of Sunni Bohra Muslims in South Africa: A Case Study of the Dockrat Family Business. (Unpublished Master's Dissertation) University of Johannesburg, 2010. p. 36.

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Besides politically induced migrations such as was the case with Voortrekkers in South Africa in the first quarter of the 19th century,[490] and King Mzilikazi and his Khumalo clan (also in the early 19th century), the majority of cases in Bulilima were individually sanctioned migrations, hence economic driven.[491] Bulilima youths' migrations were economic driven in that they were required by law to pay hut tax and dipping levies. Their economic activities as discussed above were not money economy driven, hence families could raise little if nothing to offset what they owed the tax man (NCs in this case).[492] With mounting pressure from the NC through tax and dipping levy payments and Bulilima District's inherent lack of viable economic opportunities, Bulilima's economically active youths were driven out of the district in large numbers to try their luck elsewhere. In this case, the need for one to try his/her luck elsewhere is a typical push factor and the hope or anticipated opportunity to find employment in urban centres was the related pull factor,[493] for Bulilima's young people. The trend continued until the outbreak of the guerrilla war (after Smith's UDI, 1965) and the war's intensification from 1970 onwards.

When guerrillas began their recruitment drives in Bulilima District, they found a district with skewed demographic figures.[494] Owing to economic related migrations, there were more young females compared to their male counterparts in the district. This partly explains why guerrillas recruited small boys as young as seven to nine years old.[495] In addition, young females fell victim to ZIPRA's recruitment activities. It is no surprise that Bulilima District had one of the largest numbers of female recruitees compared to other districts in Matabeleland South Province.[496]

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[490] *Ibid*. p. 42.
[491] To understand fully the individually sanctioned and economic driven migrations, see C. Ngwenya, The Economic Contribution of Sunni Bohra Muslims in South Africa: A Case Study of the Dockrat Family Business. (Unpublished Master's Dissertation) University of Johannesburg, 2010.
[492] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 77.
[493] C. Ngwenya, The Economic Contribution of Sunni Bohra Muslims in South Africa: A Case study of the Dockrat Family Business. (Unpublished Master's Dissertation) University of Johannesburg, 2010. p. 36.
[494] Interview with Khulu Mathanda Ndlovu, Bezu Village: 13th May, 2016 and Khulu Solomon Hikwa, Dingumuzi Township, Plumtree: 29th December, 2015.
[495] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015 and Kolema Tshuma, Thekwane Mission: 5th August, 2015.
[496] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016 and Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.

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While young men trekked to Botswana and South Africa, young women remained behind doing double tasks. In the absence of men, women were in charge of many household chores some of which were the responsibilities of absent men.[497] This conflicted with BuKalanga culture. Cultural constructs made women subordinate to men. By Kalanga tradition and culture, women are not to take any decision outside cultural jurisdiction.[498] In light of this, Bulilima women faced a massive dilemma when guerrillas began operating in Bulilima District. Guerrillas, for example, refused (for whatever reasons) to eat traditional foods eaten by BaKalanga villagers.[499] What guerrillas did not realise was that by being provided with food, conscientised Bulilima villagers were doing them a favour. In such cases, women were forced to make and take decisions that were contrary to the dictates of BuKalanga tradition and culture – kill a beast to feed guerrillas.[500] These were signs that the guerrilla war had turned up in Bulilima District. The following subsection is on Bulilima District's geophysical layout.

4.1.4 Bulilima District's Geophysical Layout

Like any other rural society in Rhodesia then, Bulilima communities were established on the peripheral areas of the district as a result of massive evictions that disrupted their established social order.[501] BaKalanga people, it should be noted, did not settle in Bulilima District because of the settler-induced evictions. They had settled in the district as way back as their history could be traced, but in favourable locations such as the central belt from Plumtree Town to Figtree, as well as in Bulawayo's outlying areas, namely Solusi,

[497] http:/pubs.iced.org/pdfs/7827//ED.pdf. Accessed: 16th February, 2016; 10:15.
[498] Interview with Gogo Na Nkosana Ncube, Joli Village: 27th August, 2016; Khulu Mathanda Ndlovu, Bezu Village: 13th May, 2016; Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village. 23rd February, 2015 and Khulu Sa Madodana, Ntunungwe Village: 9th February, 2015.
[499] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016; Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village, 24th March, 2016 and Focus Group Discussions One and Two, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village and Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 17th November 2015 and 1st June, 2016.
[500] Interview with Gogo Na Happy Ncube, Joko Village. 23rd February, 2015; Khulu Sa Mosi Ndlovu, Mzwanyane Village: 28th August, 2016.
[501] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 85.

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Ntunungwe, Bhalule, and Mayembe, among others. This subsection outlines Bulilima District's geophysical position in western Zimbabwe.

Bulilima-Mangwe District was one very large district. Before it was split, what is presently Bulilima was called Bulilima-Mangwe North.[502] Bulilima District's size in terms of land mass is estimated to be around 553 636, 85 hectares, where to the north the district is bounded by Tsholotsho District, Umguza District to the east, Hwange National Park to the west, Plumtree town to the south and an international boundary,[503] to the south-west stretching westwards (see **figure 2**).[504] Bulilima District lies in Zimbabwe's ecological region five.[505] As a result, it is an extremely hot and very dry district not suitable for human settlement if economic issues that sustain people's livelihoods are considered. In addition, Bulilima District is located within Southern Africa's Savannah region.

The Savannah is an enormous plain characterised by hills and forests. It is infested with tsetse flies that cause sleeping sickness to people and, mosquitoes that carry the deadly malaria parasite.[506] Further, the Savannah is an open grassland characterised by shrubs that are scattered all over its plains and isolated trees.[507] Bulilima has warm temperatures throughout the year. Characteristic of the Savannah places, it has two very different seasons, namely the very long and dry season (winter) and the wet season (summer).[508]

Given these two different weather patterns, Bulilima communities lived off their land throughout the year.[509] That is, the systematic weather patterns and vegetation determined Bulilima communities' economic activities at any given time. During dry periods, for example, grasses are dry and dormant while trees experience water stress.[510]

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[502] T. Dube, Shifiting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilima-Mangwe District, Matabeleland South, Zimbabwe, c 1946 – 2005. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Witwatersrand University, 2015. p. 39.
[503] The international boundary is the Botswana border which is at the core of this study.
[504] M. Matsa and S. Mini, Grappling Climate Change in Southern Zimbabwe: The Experience of BaKalanga Minority Farmers, in *Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies*. Vol. 4. No. 1. 2014. pp. 34 – 52.
[505] Zimbabwe has five agro-climatic regions that are categorised according to climatic and temperature conditions and, rainfall patterns. Bulilima falls under region five, the hottest and driest region in the country. *Ibid*.
[506] www.worldstory.net/en/savannah/the_savannah.html. Accessed: 21st July, 2016; 14: 26.
[507] www.blueplanetbiomes.org/savanna.htm. Accessed: 21st July, 2016; 16:37.
[508] *Ibid*.
[509] It must be noted that current Bulilima communities no longer practice most of their traditional survival strategies due to the money economy and persistent El Nino induced droughts in Southern Africa.
[510] www.encyclopedia.com/vegetation/savanna.aspx. Accessed: 21st July, 2016; 16:45.

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

Figure 2: Map of Zimbabwe showing Bulilima District's geophysical location as discussed above.

Source: https://www.google.co.za/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=bulilima%20district%20map: AfriGIS (Pty) Ltd Google maps. 2016: 20th November, 2016; 14:18

Bulilima District is thus prone to veld fires during this period. This is due to the fine dry fuel or foliage produced by dry grass and other dry plant matter.[511] The district is, therefore, barren and empty of vegetation in winter.

The district's situation in this regard is further compounded by its being dominated by Bushvelds as opposed to woodlands.[512] Bulilima's vegetation is characterised by a grassy ground layer and a distinct upper layer of wood plants, which are unfortunately dominated by shrubs or bushes.[513] The disadvantage of such vegetation (during the guerrilla war) was that it did not provide overhead cover to guerrillas when pursued by the Rhodesian air force.[514] There are several reasons why Bulilima District had low vegetation cover. One was the combination of water stress and fire which kept tree density low,[515] thus exposing Bulilima youths and guerrillas to Smith's aerial firepower during the war. Added

[511] *Ibid*.
[512] www.plantzafrica.com/vegetation/savanna.htm. Accessed: 21st July, 2016; 17:02.
[513] *Ibid.*
[514] www.nationalgeographic.org/media/africa-savanna-illustration. Accessed: 21st July, 2016; 17:27.
[515] www.encyclopedia.com/vegetation/savanna.aspx. Accessed: 21st July, 2016; 16:45.

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to this was the fact that BaKalanga people were not nomads like the Massai tribe of Kenya.[516] They practiced a communally based system of subsistence agriculture where each community settled permanently within a geo-politically defined village under a headman (*uSaBhuku*). The headman reported to the sub-Chief (*uMlisa*) who in turn reported to the Chief proper (*Induna*).

Bulilima's traditional political system is outside the scope of this Chapter.[517] The nature of Bulilima communities' settlement patterns led to the unavoidable pressures on settled lands. The communities survived through exploiting their environment throughout the year. In the process, they caused land degradations through constant and systematic cutting down of trees for various reasons and purposes,[518] thereby causing environmental stress. Bulilima communities lived off their land. When ZIPRA guerrillas began to infiltrate the country, BuKalanga culture, tradition and customs were totally disrupted and distorted in their service. The situation was exacerbated by the RF government of Ian Douglas Smith which created a semi-apartheid state when it announced a UDI from Britain in November 1965.[519] Thereafter, Rhodesia slowly slid into a protracted guerrilla war that drew so many Bulilima youths into taking part, hence data discussion below.

4.2 Data Presentation and Discussion

The above outline of Bulilima District's location in western parts of Zimbabwe and BaKalanga villagers' survival activities in the context of peasant production under colonial repressive legislature, created a dire situation Bulilima youths found themselves in from

[516] www.geographphy.learnontheinternet.co.uk/tropics/savanna.htm. Accessed: 21st July, 2016; 17:38.
[517] The traditional politics of BaKalanga people as settled in the western parts of the country are well discussed in an in-depth and systematic way by E. Msindo, 2000 and 2012.
[518] Bulilima communities cut trees to mend the fences of their fields every year during the planting season. It was the same during the dry season when they cut trees for *nnungo*/*intungo* and *imbalilo* for either the construction of a hut or selling. This had, unfortunately, long term negative effects on the environment, particularly the depletion of trees and, land as it gradually got degraded, thereby causing massive soil erosion.
[519] It should be noted that the RF government came into power as a response by hardline white-supremacists farmers who were totally opposed to the gradual granting of franchise to black Rhodesians. In fact, these farmers, led by Ian Douglas Smith, were appalled and disgusted by Sir Roy Welensky's ruling United Federal Party's (UFP) 1961 constitution that sought to appease Africans who, however, out-rightly rejected it.

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1960 until the termination of hostilities at the end of 1979. Within a collage of Acts that dwarfed Bulilima youths' ability to fend for themselves, the foundation for the genesis of their migration to urban centres was laid. The same foundation later anchored Bulilima youths' drive to participate in the country's liberation war either at home, Botswana or in Zambia. Given the untenable economic conditions in rural Rhodesia, particularly in Bulilima District, Bulilima youths found themselves involved and participating in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war at various levels.

At face value, it seems as if it was easy and simple for Bulilima youths to join the liberation struggle, but available evidence is to the contrary.[520] For more than a year, data was collected from more than fifty respondents who were active youths during the guerrilla war in Bulilima District and those who had joined the war in Botswana and Zambia.[521] In conducting these interviews (focus group discussions included), the crux of the exercise was to determine the extent to which ZIPRA guerrillas' use of Bulilima District as a strategic point of entry into and exit out of Rhodesia from 1960 until 1980 contributed towards Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Two interview schedules were designed, one for each category of youths. A third harmonized interview schedule was designed for focus group discussions. Questions were formulated in such a way that each interviewee's responses collectively indicated the extent to which the use of the Botswana border by ZIPRA guerrillas influenced their involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war (see interview schedules, Appendix 1).[522] Interviewees freely and voluntarily provided the following responses

[520] This position was taken by the study after considering all the data collected during the field work in Bulilima District, on top of data collected from archival and secondary sources.
[521] Bulilima District had thousands of youthful guerrillas who operated inside the country, and several of them actually operated in Bulilima District, while a countless number of them were sent overseas for specialised training in fields such as engineering, medicine, jet fighter pilots and as tank operators, among other fields. Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[522] For the subsidiary questions, check Chapter one, page 9.

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which addressed the study's research question and its related three tributaries.



Figure 3: Map of Bulilima District showing the study's major research villages.

Source: https://www.google.co.za/webhp?sourceid=chromeinstant&ion=1&espv=2&i=UTF-8#q=bulilima%20district%20map: AfriGIS (Pty) Ltd Google maps. 2016: Accessed: 20th November, 2016. 14:37.

The map above (**Figure 3**) shows the study's research area, (Bulilima District's major villages) where data was collected. Missing, however, are Mbimba and Kandana Villages

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due to typographical error. Also, sub-villages are not shown here. As the following section demonstrates, marginalised and neglected peasants have a lot to say about how they helped liberate Zimbabwe.

4.2.1 Bulilima Youths who were at Home during the Liberation Struggle

In the majority of cases, Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was circumstantial. Some youths were caught in the middle of a recruitment drive while others were forced to cross the border to Botswana due to CIO and SB operatives.[523] For others, however, their involvement in the guerrilla war was situational, a situation entirely beyond their control. To such individuals, particularly most of those who were at home during the armed struggle, it was a matter of doing as told by men with guns.[524] It could not be disputed that given a choice, some of them would not have participated in the armed struggle.

Further, as it is revealed in this subsection, being involved and participating in the country's guerrilla war left female youths bitter– as single young mothers with scared memories, full of sorrow, regret and, a sense of hopelessness and despair.[525] To others, their involvement and participation in the struggle left some families fatherless and neighbours bitter and angry with each other. Other youths' participation left some parents childless, a condition that would haunt them till death. Finally, to others it was a journey worth travelling, a duty worth fulfilling, and a voluntary undertaking. As Ncube puts it, 'The Zimbabwe liberation struggle was a murderous struggle in which the end justified the

[523] There were varied circumstances that directly forced Bulilima youths to be involved and participate in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Some of these were, for example, plane hijackings. Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[524] Focus Group Discussion One, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015.
[525] Interview with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village, 24th March, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village, 28th March, 2016 and Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village, 1st March, 2016.

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means.'[526] The following is what the interviewees had to say for themselves about their involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Lungisani Moyo pointed out that the guerrillas who operated in his village, Dombodema, were ZIPRA.[527] He acknowledged that ZIPRA guerrillas entered the country through the Botswana border which was both loosely guarded and patrolled.[528] The Botswana border could be crossed by anyone who so wished. Lungisani's observation is in line with what Msindo observed, that the Botswana- Zimbabwe border was poorly guarded,[529] if guarded at all. Such state of affairs served to encourage unlimited illegal border crossings by ZIPRA guerrillas. To this, Lungisani concurred, stressing that ZIPRA guerrillas were always present in Dombodema.[530] Their continued presence in Dombodema meant that youths such as Lungisani found themselves involved in the struggle one way or the other.

As much as the patrol and control of an international border was the prerogative of the two nations that shared it, one would not have expected much from the Botswana authorities since they sympathised with local BaKalanga villagers.[531] Tightening border controls would have been counter to ZIPRA guerrillas' recruitment activities. ZIPRA guerrillas took advantage of the *laissez faire* border patrols and infiltrated into Bulilima District willy-nilly to pursue their insurgence activities.

Asked to explain the Botswana border's helpfulness to youths, Lungisani said,

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[526] Trevor Ncube said this as part of his foreword to M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. xiv.

[527] ZIPRA was the military wing of ZAPU, the political liberation movement (whose life president was Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo), based in Zambia after its ban by the settler government in 1963. ZIPRA was formed in 1971 as ZAPU planned to intensify its war against the Smith regime after all efforts to resolve the issue of segregation, oppression and discrimination against black Zimbabweans had failed.

[528] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016 and P.T. Mgadla, 'A Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.

[529] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 98.

[530] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016.

[531] Htt//www.repository.up.ac.za (unpublished Master's Dissertation). p. 88. Another explanation for the loose border patrols on the side of Botswana was the fact that Botswana government had, until 1977 no standing army for such patrols. It had a small and insufficient Police force. For a comprehensive discussion on the state of Botswana government's military, consult P.T. Mgadla, 'A Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.

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> Yes, the Botswana border was helpful and influential to us and our brothers and sisters who joined the struggle in Botswana and Zambia. People who joined the struggle used it, because it had no natural obstacles like the Zambian border. There were no dangers and nearby Botswana homes aided youths to hide [in case of danger].[532]

Lungisani's response acknowledges the influential role the Botswana border played in enabling prospective Bulilima refugees fulfill their dream of joining the armed struggle outside the country. He makes two key observations to qualify his assertion. Lungisani raises the issue of Bulilima youths joining the liberation struggle through the Botswana border which had no natural barrier to inhibit their crossing, such as the Zambezi River to the country's northern border with Zambia. His observation is what other scholars raised about the Zimbabwe-Zambia border with regard to inhibiting guerrillas' infiltrations into the country.[533] Based on such studies and Lungisani's observation, it was dangerous, risky and therefore fatal to leave or enter the country through the northern border. Conversely, it was safe to cross into or out of the country through the Botswana border.

Lungisani also acknowledges the assistance given to Bulilima youths who crossed into Botswana by Batswana communities settled along the border with Zimbabwe. These Batswana, according to Lungisani, minimised danger for Bulilima youths by hiding them in cases where Rhodesian state security agents (SB and CIO) were on their trail. This also matches what Msindo, Dube and Motswana noted as cooperation between BaKalanga communities from both sides of the border.[534] He further agrees that ZIPRA guerrillas used the Botswana border quite frequently as their crossing point into or out of the district. Lungisani adds that even their supplies came through the Botswana border.[535] Apart from being a gateway into or out of the country, the border was also used as a

[532] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016.
[533] For more on this aspect, see A. Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* London, 1983. p. 47; I. Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1980. pp. 246-7 and S.E. Wilmer, (Ed.), *et al*., *Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973. p. 42.
[534] See E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012; T. Dube, Shifiting Identities and the Transformation of the Kalanga People of Bulilima-Mangwe District, Matabeleland South, Zimbabwe, c 1946 – 2005.'(Unpublished PhD Thesis), Witwatersrand University, 2015 and Htt//www.repository.up.ac.za (unpublished Master's Dissertation).
[535] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st Match, 2016.

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smuggling zone by ZIPRA guerrillas. They smuggled into the country light arms and ammunition. The realisation of this loop-hole by ZIPRA generally led to their flooding Bulilima District for the execution of the guerrilla war.

ZIPRA guerrillas' presence in large numbers led to the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the country's guerrilla war. To this, Lungisani said, 'We were involved by guerrillas who made us [part of] their youth [system]. We became their messengers [and, their] eyes and ears. Our involvement was to the effect of providing information to guerrillas about the situation, *ukutsheka umumo* (guerrilla – youth *lingo* to mean 'check the situation'). We told them (guerrillas) about those we suspected to be sellouts.'[536] Here, Lungisani narrates issues of Dombodema youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. To him, youths were information gatherers, reporting to guerrillas on any situation that might endanger the latter's lives. On top of that, youths played detectives, investigating any one they suspected to be involved with the Rhodesian security forces.

Youths' main functions in Dombodema during the war involved monitoring the prevailing situation for any sign(s) of the presence of 'enemy forces' (as he called the Rhodesian army). They also policed their communities so that they were better placed to flush out actual or perceived sellouts.[537] Dombodema youths were guerrillas' guards who ensured their safety at all times. Moorcraft and McLaughlin corroborate Lungisani's narration when they write:

> The youth system, which was crucial to the survival of combat guerrillas, encompassed tens of thousands of young people throughout the country. These youths acted as intelligence scouts and messengers for guerrillas, and in some cases as enforcers of guerrilla discipline meted out to civilians.[538]

Youths played a central and crucial role in the survival of guerrillas throughout the country for the entire war period. Bob North,[539] attests to the invaluable support given to guerrillas by youths. He points out a scenario where youths would monitor their bases, adding, 'one

[536] *Ibid*.
[537] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016.
[538] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 76.
[539] Bob North was a Rhodesian Intelligence Corps operating in rural areas. He was interviewed by Frederikse when he conducted his study, *None But Ourselves, Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982.

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would be guaranteed after a few days their base would be attacked,' and reiterating that, 'youths' bush telegraph – that word of mouth network – was by far superior to our intelligence (Army's). They knew exactly (guerrillas) what we (security forces) were doing, virtually twenty-four hours a day, through their runners, sympathisers; the mujibas.'[540] Related to Bulilima District, this meant that no one could enter the district without the knowledge of, and immediately attracting youths' attention and its attendant scrutiny. The 'bush telegraph' is to the effect that youths were strategically posted at any given time for the speedy transmission of information to guerrillas. Within this frame, and through strategic placement, youths always knew the whereabouts of guerrillas.

Lungisani also acknowledged that they monitored the presence and movement of enemy forces (security forces).[541] This statement is an illustration that Dombodema youths unequivocally supported ZIPRA guerrillas and, through that association, security forces were their 'enemy forces' as well. On why they regarded the Rhodesian army as their enemy, Lungisani smilingly said, 'Soldiers punished us heavily through burning our homesteads, [arbitrarily] arresting and beating us each time they patrolled our communities', adding, 'there were heavy penalties for assisting or cooperating with guerrillas.'[542] Such heavy penalties were born out of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill of 1973 which made death the maximum penalty for harbouring, assisting or failing to report the presence of guerrillas.[543] What Lungisani lamented is reflected in the following statement by the Minister of Law and Order when he introduced the Bill to Parliament (1973), 'Government is determined to make absolutely clear to anyone contemplating terrorist activities or assisting terrorists in any way, that he will do so at the risk of his own life.'[544] Bulilima youths such as Lungisani, whether knowingly or unknowingly, continued with their support of guerrillas despite imminent death if caught by the 'enemy forces'.

[540] Bob North interviewed by J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves, Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 70.
[541] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016.
[542] *Ibid*.
[543] A.R. Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and Assessment*. London, 2008. p. 17.
[544] *Ibid*.

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Similar sentiments were echoed by Mrs. Moyo of Khame who admitted that those caught supporting guerrillas were beaten by soldiers, while others were arrested or had their homes burnt down to ashes.[545] Similarly, those who supported soldiers were either killed or beaten by guerrillas.[546] In short, the punishment of those thought to be in support of either belligerent was a forgone conclusion. This created a dilemma among Bulilima youths as they found themselves caught between life and death. Youths were part of the struggle, whether they wanted it or not. They just had to participate one way or the other.[547] Such participation was, consequently, in support of either guerrillas or the security forces. Guerrillas and soldiers alike failed to put the willingness or intention to support in perspective when dealing with those they suspected of supporting their enemy. To these warring nemeses, circumstantial consideration in relation to the purported support provided to their opposite was immaterial.

While this became the norm rather than an exception, Bulilima youths suffocated in their guerrilla borne responsibilities. 'We cooked, washed, ironed and provided them (guerrillas) with bathing water, in addition to being their eyes and ears. We bought cigarettes in bulk and stored them at certain homesteads, often the chairperson of the party (ZAPU). We bought cigarettes from Tsholotsho Business Centre,'[548] lamented Mrs. Moyo in sadness. Khame Village borders Tsholotsho District, and its business centre was nearer to Khame than Plumtree town. As much as the distance between Khame and Tsholotsho Business Centre was too far on foot, youths such as Mrs. Moyo had to embark on such long journeys to appease guerrillas. There was no arguing with guerrillas those days. Youths just did as they were told to avoid incurring guerrillas' displeasure,[549] consequences of which were too ghastly to contemplate.

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[545] Mrs. Moyo refused to provide the interviewer with her full details, preferring instead to be identified by her marriage surname.
[546] Interview with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016; Focus Group Discussion One, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015 and Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[547] Interview with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016.
[548] *Ibid.*
[549] H. Holland, *Dinner with Mugabe. The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter who became a Tyrant*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 146.

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Problems faced by youths in Khame Village were as a result of guerrillas who had swamped Bulilima District. In blaming their suffering on guerrillas, she acknowledged the critical role played by the Botswana border in ensuring their constant presence (*amalwecatsha,* as guerrillas were called by locals) in the district.[550] Simply put, guerrillas were in Bulilima District because of the Botswana border. The border provided the most direct physical access into Rhodesia.[551] The ease with which guerrillas accessed Bulilima District had the unintended effect of overburdening youths with a pastiche of responsibilities beyond their economic and moral capabilities. That being the case, parents were forced by the prevailing conditions to let their female children get involved with guerrillas. 'Our parents got us involved […] in the struggle. They did this by asking us to do 'things' for guerrillas as they themselves (parents) could not run around like us',[552] reflected Mrs. Moyo rueful. Youths' services were enlisted by parents due to their high mobility and their ability not to question elders over any errand they were tasked with.

Quizzed on whether their parents liked what their children were doing, Mrs. Moyo's response was that,

> Parents had no choice here, because their hope was with guerrillas [delivering them from the evils of the settler government]. They sacrificed us with the understanding and hope that helping freedom fighters would set them free from white colonial rule.[553]

Such statements by parents reflected the trappings of propaganda as dished out by guerrilla commissars to villagers. This was acknowledged by George Silundika,[554] that ZAPU Political Commissars worked at all levels within ZIPRA, carrying out political education among masses within their areas of operation.[555] Villagers were thus

[550] Interview with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016.
[551] A.R. Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and Assessment.* London, 2008. p. 1.
[552] Interview with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016.
[553] *Ibid*.
[554] George Silundika was ZAPU's Publicity and Information Secretary. He was a Kalanga, born in Bulilima District, Gala Village in 1929. For more on George Silundika's place of birth/origin, see E. Msindo, 2012 and O. Gjerstad, 1974.
[555] O. Gjerstad, *Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU 2, George Silundika*. Richmond, 1974. p. 4.

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conscientised about the need to back ZIPRA guerrillas as opposed to supporting the Rhodesian security forces, the gate keepers of white rule in Rhodesia.

In support of the same issue, Lungisani pointed out that when the war started, they were always told by guerrillas how bad white rule was to black people.[556] Part of ZIPRA guerrillas' recruitment strategy was to first convince youths that the colonial system was bad. The intention was to win youths over to their side. As a result of guerrilla propaganda and indoctrination, everything associated with settler government was seen in a negative light. 'Soldiers were always harsh on us. When they arrived in our area, we would run away and spend the night *kuhango/egangeni* (in the bush). We could not help soldiers because they were harsh to us',[557] emphasised Mrs. Moyo. Her comments on the Rhodesian army illustrate a community that was conditioned to see the security forces as the common enemy. Conversely, guerrillas were seen as the messiahs, hence were to be helped at all costs. 'Guerrillas were sociable', stated Mrs. Moyo emotionlessly, adding, 'soldiers were afraid of guerrillas. Once you said you saw them somewhere around, soldiers quickly got into their trucks and drove off in the opposite direction.'[558] Instead of seeing soldiers as cowards, their reaction to the knowledge of guerrillas could be explained from various angles.

The security forces, for example, had the capacity and resources to infiltrate and study the behaviour and conduct of guerrillas in Rhodesia and elsewhere.[559] Objectively, their sudden departure in the opposite direction should be seen as a strategy to circle and cut the insurgents' escape route, thereby catching them unawares. Guerrillas' continuous presence at Khame was attributed to Bulilima District's closeness to the border, where guerrillas used it frequently as an entry and exit point into and out of Rhodesia.[560] Guerrillas' constant presence at Khame led to youths providing services to them, thereby making them accomplices to crimes against the Smith regime, in the eyes of the security forces. 'It was because of the border. Guerrillas would come and go at will,'[561] insisted

[556] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016.
[557] Interview with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016.
[558] *Ibid*.
[559] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. pp. 122 – 3.
[560] Interview with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016.
[561] *Ibid*.

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Mrs. Moyo resignedly. The continued presence of the insurgency force in Bulilima attracted the unwelcome presence of counter-insurgency forces in Mrs. Moyo's eyes. Her opinion on the border's influence was echoed by Shadreck Nkobi of Matshinge Village.

Nkobi stressed that ZIPRA guerrillas mainly used the Botswana border for their access to Matabeleland region, adding that as a consequence, Bulilima District was used as a platform to recruit and take youths to Botswana.[562] This suggests that ZIPRA guerrillas recruited a lot from the district, directly or indirectly. To exemplify indirect recruitment, Shadreck provided his involvement and participation in the liberation struggle as a case in point. He said that because of his father's role as an active ZAPU politician, guerrilla messengers in Rhodesia and Botswana elicited his services as a child courier. He was used to relay information from Rhodesia to Botswana and vice-versa.[563]

Shadreck revealed a very unique way in which he was involved and participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. His was totally different from the rest of the interviewees. Shadreck was taken advantage of by ZAPU officials through his father's political association with ZAPU to convey information from Rhodesia to strategically located ZAPU functionaries in Francistown and back to Rhodesia.[564] He was heavily involved to such an extent that his duties assumed a permanent role. Messengers and political agents made frequent trips to and from across the Rhodesian frontiers.[565] To Shadreck, crisscrossing frontiers was because he could, as a child, sneak easily across the border without security agents taking any serious note of him and the potential threat to the security of Rhodesia his messages posed. 'Yes. I became involved because of my father. He used to send me with information across the border to Francistown. I had easy access to ZAPU camps in Botswana as I was well known in ZAPU quarters,' quipped

[562] Interview with Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 31st March, 2016.
[563] *Ibid*.
[564] ZAPU had secret offices and officials in Francistown and Gaborone who coordinated 'special' ZAPU related matters and activities between Rhodesia and Zambia, with Botswana playing a linking role. To this end, Shadreck, whose father was one of the top ZAPU officials in Bulilima and Bulawayo, was converted into a conveyor belt that conveyed secret information between officials in Rhodesia and Botswana. For further explanation on this, see P.T. Mgadla, 'A Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.
[565] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 131 and P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.

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Shadreck.[566] He attributed his involvement in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war to the district's proximity to the border.

In addition, Shadreck explained the usefulness of the Botswana border to his venture in terms of the relationship and kinship ties that existed between Botswana Kalanga communities and Bulilima ones. He said,

> The border was very influential and useful to me as a young courier first, because I had Batswana relatives who were in Immigration Offices there. Second, there were no foot patrols on our side, the security forces used trucks, and hence we could easily hide when we heard the sound of approaching trucks. Last, our relatives in Botswana made my life very easy. They fed me, accommodated me over night and always assigned someone to accompany me to Francistown.[567]

Seen from Shadreck's narration, the Botswana border was an invaluable assert to both ZAPU officials and ZIPRA guerrillas as they executed their duties in the course of the struggle. This was also highlighted by Lungisani when he pointed out that without the Botswana border's accessibility, ZIPRA guerrillas and their youths would have found it difficult to execute their duties effectively and progressively.[568] This way, more and more youths were drawn into the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe. 'Honestly speaking', went on Shadreck as he shrugged his shoulders, 'the border was used by ZIPRA guerrillas as a crossing point for their recruitees as well as their colleagues who were deployed to these parts of the country to fight the Smith government,'[569] he concluded.

The issue of ZIPRA guerrillas' operations in Bulilima District was also explained by Sithokozile Zaba of Ntoli as a gradual process that was first marked by a small number of guerrillas mainly concerned with recruiting as many youths as possible. As the war intensified, more guerrilla incursions through the Botswana border became pronounced.[570] As more and more guerrillas were infiltrated through the Botswana border, more and more Bulilima youths were sucked into the Zimbabwean conflict. Ultimately, the

[566] Interview with Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 31st March, 2016.
[567] *Ibid*.
[568] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village, 31st March, 2016.
[569] Interview with Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 31st March, 2016.
[570] Interview with Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016.

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conflict, due to its wide scale involvement of peasant youths and their peasant parents, was regarded as a peasant-based guerrilla war.[571] The presence of guerrillas in large numbers in Bulilima meant that counter-insurgency forces responded likewise. The escalation of the war meant more pressure and exposure of youths to the so called 'cross-fire' situation as guerrillas and security forces clashed regularly due to their large concentrations in the district.[572] The presence of counter-insurgency forces increased proportionately to the volume of the insurgency army in Bulilima, which in turn proportionately drew more and more youths into the struggle.

The result was a hopeless situation for youths (female) who were forced against their will to participate in the warfare.[573] Probed on what youths were forced to do, Sithokozile reiterated what other interviewees had said, 'We were eyes and ears of guerrillas, we cooked, washed, ironed and provided information [to guerrillas] on the whereabouts of soldiers'. She added, 'we held youth meetings secretly as to how best to assist guerrillas [strategise].'[574] As opposed to ZANLA operated districts in the eastern parts of Rhodesia,[575] Bulilima youths held their strategic meetings during the day and these were often short, about two hours or so.[576] Short meetings were signs that Bulilima youths were conscious of the dangers of being caught by the security forces in such compromised gatherings. Bulilima youths thus held brief meetings to strategise on how to execute their duties in the interest of guerrillas. Such meetings, in the majority of cases, were held independent of ZIPRA guerrillas.[577]

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[571] P. Bond and M. Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge. Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice*. Pietermaritzburg, 2002. p. 8.
[572] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 32.
[573] Interview with Sithozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016.
[574] *Ibid*.
[575] ZANLA guerrillas' dealings with youths in their areas of operation differed greatly from that of ZIPRA's dealings with its youths. For a greater understanding here, see N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992; N.J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe. Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980 – 1987*. Cambridge, 2003; T.O. Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. A Comparative Study*. Harare, 1985 and F. Chung, *Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006, among others.
[576] Interview with Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016.
[577] Interview with Melusi Zaba, Gala Village: 21st May, 2015; Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village, 31th March, 2016 and Thembani Dube (former ZIPRA operative who operated in Bulilima District), Solusi Mission, 7th February, 2016.

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'Guerrillas asked us for information, they wanted us to have ready information about the whereabouts of soldiers, hence we ended up having meetings to strategise over what guerrillas expected of us,'[578] elaborated Sithokozile in a dry fading voice. This is in reference to the fact that Bulilima youths had special gatherings, on their own volition, to map the way forward in light of guerrilla demands for updated information on the movement(s) and position(s) of the enemy forces at any given time. This was contrary to ZANLA enforced and presided all-night meetings in Mashonaland areas where youths were forced to spend endless nights in meetings to appease ZANLA guerrillas' insatiable appetite for youths' company. Nonetheless, youths were intelligence as well as counter-intelligence agents, who gathered information about the movements of security forces and discovered the presence of informers among the local population.[579] The fact that Bulilima youths occasionally held meetings underpins their cooperation as a ZAPU youth movement structure intent on providing the much needed support to its sister ZAPU armed wing structure (guerrillas) operating in Bulilima District.

While this was the case, Sithokozile had misgivings about the whole guerrilla episode. She repeated the issue of youth involvement as underpinned by coercion rather than mutual consent. 'We were forced to be involved. We did what we did out of fear of being labelled sellouts, Rhodesian security forces collaborators, and so on,'[580] she claimed bitterly. In other words, youths had no choice whether to render their services to guerrillas or not. Out of fear of death, youths were compelled to accede to guerrillas' demands. Sithokozile's fears were confirmed when she said, 'At first, our parents liked what we did for guerrillas, but as time went on, they did not like it as guerrillas began to harass us, forcing us to do things we did not like, for example, they made female youths their 'wives'. If parents complained, they were labelled sellouts and summarily killed. In extreme cases, homesteads were burnt down to drive the message home to would-be protesters.'[581] Such guerrilla violence was common throughout Bulilima District in particular and in the country in general. Observed Auret, 'There is absolutely no doubt at all that forces of

[578] Interview with Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016.
[579] C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*. London, 1989. p. 27.
[580] Interview with Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016.
[581] *Ibid*.

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liberation used terror tactics in their campaign, they … attacked women and children, committed barbaric acts against people considered to be 'sell-outs'.'[582] 'Sell-outs' became a catch-word synonymous with death in Bulilima District during Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Evidently, it was abused by both youths and guerrillas to intimidate villagers with opposing views to some of the goings-on between female youths and guerrillas.

On the issue of the porous border, Sithokozile reiterated that it was very helpful because they used it to cross into Botswana as prospective refugees and Batswana people understood their plight, hence assisted them a lot.[583] Apart from being of assistance to refugees, the border became handy when guerrillas used it to enter or leave the country, and it was an open secret that ZIPRA guerrillas used it that way.[584] Such knowledge existed within the security forces circles as seen by their presence in rural Bulilima.

Abraham Moyo echoed Lungisani and Sithokozile's narrations when he said,

> I was a youth. We were eyes and ears of ZIPRA, doing errands for '*Obhuti*' (our brothers, as ZIPRA guerrillas were affectionately known by youths). We called them *Obhuti* as a sign of respect to them. I was chosen by elders to be a youth. We used to have meetings as villagers, branch meetings so that when soldiers were around, we would inform each other speedily. During one of our meetings, we agreed that there should be youths to monitor the situation (*ukuhlala siqaphele*) on a daily basis, to be the eyes of everyone.[585]

Abraham's explanation of his involvement in the liberation struggle reflects a politically advanced community. They were a politically informed community which had the propensity to form ZAPU structures such as a youth wing to oversee and monitor the presence of the Rhodesian army on behalf of villagers. An explanation for this, according to Ranger, was the long standing bitterness of rural Matabeleland peasants over the loss of their land due to racially biased evictions.[586] Abraham was not directly influenced by guerrillas to participate in the struggle but by his community that exhibited political

[582] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 32.
[583] Interview with Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016.
[584] *Ibid*.
[585] Interview with Abraham Moyo, Joko Village, 23rd March, 2016.
[586] T.O. Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. A Comparative Study*. Harare, 1985. p. 137.

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maturity to safeguard itself against the potential harassment by the Rhodesian army. Narrating on how they assisted guerrillas in his area, Abraham said,

> We helped guerrillas, we protected guerrillas, informing them about the presence of soldiers in the area. Guerrillas used to send us to do various errands such as collecting their clothing items like shoes from as far away as Ntunungwe, buying cigarettes for them and so on. Parents collected money for cigarettes, clothes, shoes and other items of necessity for guerrillas. In addition, we were informants, informing guerrillas about the whereabouts of the Rhodesian army.[587]

Given such claims, there is no doubt that the massive presence of guerrillas in Bulilima District played an influential role on youths' participation in the country's guerrilla war. What is also clear is the fact that ZAPU had a sophisticated presence that reflected a community with a long standing association with it. What is also clear is the fact that Joko villagers had politicised their children into seeing the Smith regime and any structures associated with it as bad. That is why Abraham saw the Rhodesian army in bad light.

He said soldiers harassed them whenever they operated in their area, although he acknowledged that there were those who were cruel and those who were kind hearted to youths, but stressed their cruelty to elders.[588] No matter what the circumstance, the presence of the security forces was always viewed as a menace by Bulilima youths. ZIPRA's influence changed youths' hearts and minds, hence their undivided support for the liberation struggle on ZIPRA's behalf. This was in line with the long term objective of a guerrilla war, to gain the political support and control of the country.[589] Kriger, however, does not see the rallying behind guerrillas by youths and their parents in terms of political propaganda and indoctrination. She sees it from both a patriarchal and matriarchal perspective. 'To arouse peasants' sympathy guerrillas told them of how they were suffering to fight for freedom 'for sons and daughters' of Zimbabwe', adding, 'appealing to parental responsibility, they reminded them: 'we are your children'.'[590] Such emotional appeals for support had the intended effect of rousing a community's collective sympathy,

[587] Interview with Abraham Moyo, Joko Village, 23rd March, 2016.
[588] *Ibid*.
[589] K. Maxey, *The Fight For Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London, 1975. p. 12.
[590] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 99.

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hence its composite efforts towards raising funds and material commodities for guerrillas – 'their sons'. As Abraham has us believe, 'Yes, our parents approved of what we did for and with guerrillas. In fact, they are the ones who were always contributing moneys for guerrillas' up keep. They bought commodities and sent us to give guerrillas.'[591] In this way, guerrillas' welfare had become Bulilima communities' responsibility.

Probed as to how guerrillas came to Bulilima District, Abraham said that at first they used the Zambian-Zimbabwe border, but due to difficulties and distance between Bulilima and Zambia, they had to use the Botswana border. He reiterated that guerrillas used to cross to Botswana with refugees.[592] It is imperative to acknowledge that the Botswana border led to extensive recruitment of Bulilima youths by ZIPRA guerrillas. In addition, the border contributed, to a large extent, to the involvement of Bulilima youths in the protracted guerrilla war in a similar fashion to the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. This was because the Mozambique border, as was the case with the Botswana one, had no natural obstacle like the Zambezi River to the north.[593] As a result, it was easy for guerrillas to infiltrate the country in large numbers. This infiltration, by intent, resulted in several thousands of youths getting involved and subsequently participating in the war.

This was also the case with the way Nomusa Mlalazi of Tshangwa got involved in the country's armed conflict. She said that before the arrival of guerrillas in their village, they used to listen to Joshua Nkomo,[594] (on Radio Lusaka) who always preached to his listeners to help guerrillas.[595] Nkomo's radio talks laid the foundation for guerrilla appeals for cooperation and assistance from local communities such as Tshangwa Village. In Nomusa's case, when guerrillas eventually flooded her village, they found a receptive and

[591] Interview with Abraham Moyo, Joko Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[592] *Ibid*.
[593] A. Astrow, *A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* London, 1983. p. 47.
[594] As stated earlier, Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo was ZAPU's life president and ZIPRA's Commander-in-Chief. Nkomo had a magnetic pull over the people of Matabeleland, hence whatever he said, whether through radio or at rallies, was the ultimate truth. Nkomo was religiously followed by all and sundry in this region. He was and is still highly regarded and valued by Matabeleland's citizens and, because of his role in spearheading the destruction of settler rule in the country, he was popularly known as 'Father Zimbabwe'. Comparatively, Nkomo was a Nelson Mandela of Matabeleland Region. J.M.N. Nkomo died in 1999 and was declared a National Hero by the government. For a detailed but one sided story of his political life, consult his auto-biography; *The Story of My Life*. Harare, 2003.
[595] Interview with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.

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politically informed community ready to assist them as Nkomo had pleaded through radio. Outlining her duties, Nomusa said, 'As female youths, we cooked for guerrillas, gave them blankets, and slept with them as their girlfriends. We were always cooking, no longer doing our traditional household chores. Guerrillas beat us when we gave them *nlibo/umbida* [boiled cow pea leaves or *nyovi/ulude*].'[596]

There are three key issues raised by Nomusa here. The first is that young women were being turned into 'wives' by guerrillas. This exemplified guerrillas' moral decay which led to their systematic and consistent sexual abuse of female youths such as Nomusa. The second is that of female youths 'always cooking' for guerrillas at the expense of other household duties that equally needed their attention. This implies that guerrillas were always present in Tshangwa Village creating a situation where female youths had to constantly attend to their social and sexual needs. The effect of this was the permanent disruption and dislocation of BuKalanga traditional patterns of life.[597] The last issue is that of guerrillas' refusal to eat traditional Kalanga food such as *nlibo/umbida*. Their refusal put female headed households under pressure as shall be analysed in Chapter six. In a related matter, Kriger notes that ZANLA guerrillas had dietary restrictions too. They did not eat okra (*delele/idelele*), beans and, groundnuts among other traditional foods.[598] The guerrillas' refusal to eat such traditional foods also showed their lack of understanding, appreciation and sympathy to the dire situation faced by poverty stricken Bulilima communities they purported to be fighting to liberate.

In addition to cooking, Nomusa explained that as youths, they were always in the bush, '*sitsheka umumo*' – always on a reconnaissance mission, checking for the presence of the Rhodesian army. She indicated that this enabled them to be in constant touch with the position and movement of soldiers at any given time and, they would always alert guerrillas on the whereabouts and exact positions of the enemy forces. Further, they were always sent by guerrillas to nearby Plumtree town to spy on the soldiers' activities there. Nomusa also indicated that they always woke up early in the morning, ate breakfast,

[596] *Ibid*.
[597] Interview with Melusi Zaba, Gala Village: 21st May, 2015 and Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[598] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 99.

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patrolled various communities on the lookout for soldiers, and came back home to cook for guerrillas. Another issue she mentioned was youths burying dead guerrillas and soldiers killed in action.[599] Going to Plumtree was risky for female youths such as Nomusa as the town was the security forces' district Head Quarters (HQ), their nerve centre. They could easily have been tracked back by SB, CIO or the SS on their way back,[600] hence unsuspectingly lead them to ZIPRA guerrillas' hide-outs. This would have been translated by some unreasoning guerrillas as selling-out, hence it had deadly consequences for Nomusa and her colleagues. The load of work as stated by Nomusa meant that for the entire war, Bulilima youths were at the services of guerrillas.

Youths also faced problems from the security forces with regard to their support of guerrillas. Astrow points out that because of support that peasantry gave to guerrillas, security forces began ruthless retaliation, imposing fines on those suspected of assisting guerrillas, and often seized cattle to pay for the fines.[601] Guerrilla demands on one hand and security forces' retaliatory measures on the other, resulted in Bulilima youths and their communities leading disconsolate lives. Nomusa and her community had become what Davidson regards as guerrillas' internal sources of supply and shelter.[602] This implies that guerrillas, by definition, rely heavily on peasantry for their survival and upkeep, as was the case with ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima District. Bulilima, as an impoverished district, meant that guerrillas operating there had no back-up organisational and logistical support,[603] compared to the Rhodesian army. To this end, Nomusa and her community were in a fix. She summarised their controversial quandary thus,

> Yes, our parents approved of what we were doing because they wanted to liberate the country. But they were not pleased with certain issues such as guerrillas sleeping with us in the mountains. They were, on the other side happy as they assisted guerrillas with clothes. We were not happy sleeping with guerrillas. We were beaten if we refused to sleep with them. There was no refusing with your

[599] Interview with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.
[600] SB and CIO agents specialised in clandestine dealings by nationalists and their supporters such as Nomusa and her fellow youths.
[601] A. Astrow, *A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* London, 1983. p. 47.
[602] B. Davidson, *The People's Cause. A History of Guerrillas in Africa*. Essex, 1981. p. 4.
[603] *Ibid*.

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> children to sleep with guerrillas. One day guerrillas called a meeting in the morning with youths and elders. There was this mother who was accused of refusing with her children to spend the night with guerrillas. Obviously she was labelled a sell-out and was killed instantly by guerrillas. Another issue that did not go down well with our parents was the issue of guerrillas refusing to eat *umbida*, even the taking of clothes belonging to our brothers who worked in South Africa was not liked by our parents, but they could not refuse. Guerrillas would kill them instantly if they refused. Guerrillas took jeans, black t-shirts, not white items. They said that white items exposed them to soldiers from a distance, hence dark clothes.[604]

The issue of a woman who was summarily executed by guerrillas in Tshangwa for objecting when guerrillas wanted her daughters for their sexual gratification fits in well with what Mrs. Moyo touched on about the fate of parents who voiced their concerns over some of the guerrillas' wayward behaviour towards young girls, their being labelled sell-outs and then instantly killed. In this way, Bulilima female youths became inured to guerrillas' insatiable appetite for sex. That guerrillas were choosey, there is no doubt, that some of their justifications for being so were understandable is accepted, but to demand at all costs from impoverished peasants is beyond anyone's comprehension. Elizabeth Ndebele (in the reference literature), said of guerrillas, 'Both groups, ZANLA and ZIPRA needed clothes and cigarettes. If one did not have such items, one had to go and find them from someone else in order to give them.'[605] The above two sets of information demonstrates a rather diabolical trend by guerrillas throughout rural Rhodesia to demand provisions that were beyond the economic capabilities of poverty stricken peasants. They did this despite the apparent economic misery villagers were sunk into by the systematic and racially crafted legislation.

Nomusa blamed their predicament on their village's proximity to the surrounding farms and the Botswana border. She recalled,

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[604] Interview with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.

[605] Elizabeth Ndebele in an interview with Staunton in the Silobela District of the Midlands Province, Zimbabwe. Staunton did a study on the involvement and participation of rural women in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war throughout the country. Her study, however, is not academic but relevant to this one in terms of her interviewees' responses to guerrilla presence in their districts. I. Staunton, *Mothers of the Revolution*. Harare, 1990. p. 188.

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> Soldiers, SS and guerrillas were always in our village. SS often came to our place acting as guerrillas, would request for food and then kill those who cooked for them. They acted as ZIPRA guerrillas, requested for food, called for youths and women's league chairpersons in our main branch and killed them. We recognised them through their behaviour. They burnt the homestead of Mr. Mabere Ndlovu, the ZAPU Chairperson in our branch.[606]

Nomusa's narration fits in well with what scholars on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle note with regard to SS's activities and brutality. Kriger, for example, writes of them,

> A small but important force that was associated with the army was the Selous Scouts. They were used as pseudo guerrilla gangs and by the end of the war numbered 1800: they were chiefly Africans among whom were some ex-guerrillas. In the word of their creator, their objective was to 'infiltrate the tribal population and the terrorist networks, pinpoint the terrorist camps and bases and then direct conventional forces in to carry out the actual attacks.[607]

Amidst this identity confusion, youths and villagers paid the price for their 'misplaced' loyalty and trust. Moorcraft and McLaughlin put it bluntly: 'Selous Scouts did field 'pseudo-gangs' to deceive the guerrillas and their supporters and, to carry out punitive atrocities against villages which collaborated with guerrillas.'[608] This happened in villages such as Nomusa's where unsuspecting peasant youths cooperated with 'fake' guerrillas bent on destroying their young lives and their parents' hard-earned meager properties. It should be pointed out, however, that it was the duty of all state security organs to protect the Rhodesian state as mandated by law, from insurgents and their collaborators.

The behaviour and brutality of security forces should be understood from Nhlanhla Siqhoza's (of Mlomwe Village) narration who commented,

> We were eyes and ears of guerrillas, always checking for the presence of Rhodesian security forces. There was a ZAPU branch called Gobajetshe covering a wide area. The executive members of this branch organised youths to be the eyes and ears of the branch. We informed the branch of any activities taking place

[606] Interview with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.
[607] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. pp. 111 – 112.
[608] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 49.

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> here. When guerrillas were here, we spread out as youths to other branches to gather information about the whereabouts of the soldiers. We made sure that guerrillas were safe from security forces' surprise attacks.[609]

By aligning their loyalty with guerrillas (Rhodesian security forces' sworn enemy) youths such as Nhlanhla automatically became enemies of the state as well. As Nhlanhla narrated further,

> Guerrillas made us participate in this war. Now that they were here to liberate us, we had to assist them. As youths, we wanted to liberate the country through assisting guerrillas. We were informed by our elders who conscientised us on the need to help guerrillas as opposed to Rhodesian security forces.[610]

Engagement with Nhlanhla's narration reveals that ZAPU had developed roots in this community. Mlomwe community as was the case with Joko Village, was politically mature, an observation that might help explain the security forces' hostile attitude towards locals. There was solid and informed cooperation between ZIPRA guerrillas and BaKalanga elders, who, for the love of their liberation movement (ZAPU), compromised their children's lives by encouraging them to support the insurgents. Elaborating on the same issue, it is said that when ZIPRA guerrillas entered an area, they were able to work with ZAPU elders, draw recruits and auxiliaries from ZAPU YL, and food and supplies from ZAPU women's organisations.[611] Given this three way support, ZIPRA guerrillas' conduct of the war can be described, at worst, as semi-comfortable and, at best as luxurious.

The link between BaKalanga communities and liberation movements could be traced back to the inception and implementation of racially born and economically unviable rural agricultural policies from the 1890s.[612] This set the tone for rural-urban migrations.

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[609] Interview with Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[610] *Ibid*.
[611] T.O. Ranger and M. Ncube, Religion in the Guerrilla War: The Case of Southern Matabeleland, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Harare, 1996. pp. 35 – 57.
[612] The arrival of the Pioneer Column in the present day Zimbabwe resulted with land alienation and thereafter, Africans were deprived of their ancestral land when the Company authorities passed a series of enabling legislation, the first of which was the African or Native reserves in Matabeleland, 1894. This was followed by a series of laws meant to remove Africans from their land into the work place, laws such as the hut tax, 1904; the passage of private Locations Ordinance, 1908; the Kaffir Beer Ordinance, 1912 (prohibiting Africans from selling beer), the dog tax, 1912 and the cattle dipping fees/levies, 1914. For more details on these and other restrictive laws on African agriculture, consult A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 1914.

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BaKalanga migrant labourers thus imported ZAPU's nationalist ideas and tendencies to their rural areas. In the process there was cross-pollination of ideas, hence Bulilima communities' unconditional support for ZAPU and its affiliates, ZIPRA inclusive. Within this frame, no doubt, BaKalanga communities were in no mood to compromise on their ZAPU promised self-rule and ZIPRA spearheaded onslaught on government. This fed on Bulilima youths' confrontational attitude towards the state's security apparatus. Mlambo observes that, 'Organised on a mass scale hitherto unknown in the country… [ZAPU's] political rallies were often attended by thousands of Africans from all walks of life. It also adopted a fighting approach to the colonial administration.'[613] This mainly explains why BaKalanga people resorted to backing ZIPRA guerrillas as opposed to their adversaries.

Conversely, counter-insurgency forces tended to be more brutal in their dealings with BaKalanga youths. As Nhlanhla confirmed, 'Soldiers treated us badly. They demanded guerrillas from us. Once they were here, we ran away and hid in the forest. Soldiers did not take no for an answer to their questions on guerrillas' whereabouts.'[614] The Rhodesian army's attitude towards youths indicates that they had factual evidence of youths' cordial relationships with guerrillas, hence could not be fooled by 'cheap' negative responses. Youths' cordial relationship with guerrillas (which incensed soldiers) is romantically recounted by Nhlanhla in the following manner,

> Guerrillas did not bother us. They knew that we were part of them. In fact they loved us so much, we were their boys, [and] they were our brothers. It was always fun to be around them when they were around. In terms of roles, youths were for surveillance and other errands while elders provided food, clothing, shelter and blankets for guerrillas' comfort. In turn, guerrillas taught us to report the presence of the army to them. We enthusiastically relayed such information to other areas.[615]

The stark contrast between the way Bulilima youths were treated by guerrillas on one side, and the security forces on the other, is a measure of how valuable youths were to either of the antagonists.

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[613] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 1914. p. 147.
[614] Interview with Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[615] *Ibid*.

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Bulilima youths, for example, were ZIPRA guerrillas' benefactors as Nana Nkomo of Mbila Village asserted; 'Guerrillas demanded food, they were not begging. They merely told us to cook and, that we always did. In addition, we washed and ironed their clothes, provided them with bathing water, soap, towels and many other items necessary for their comfort.'[616] While guerrillas enjoyed such 'free benefits' from youths such as Nana, they were obliged then (metaphorically put) to treat them with consideration or kindness. Unlike the guerillas, Rhodesian soldiers were a self-reliant, and self-sufficient army. They had all the provisions required for an army in an operation at any given time, hence were not obliged to be considerate or kind to their suspected enemy collaborators. Nana's views were corroborated by Nomusa who summed it up by saying, 'We gave guerrillas clothes, cigarettes, cooked for them and, on their behalf, gave false information to soldiers.'[617] Whether knowingly or unknowingly, soldiers were reciprocating the raw deal they were given by youths each time they were on patrol in Bulilima communities. To soldiers, youths' failure to cooperate with them was a sign that they were compromised by guerrillas, hence they were seen as deliberately withholding vital information that would lead to guerrillas being apprehended.

Regarding the predicament of the youths, Nana agreed that it was the Botswana border which allowed guerrillas to cross willy-nilly into and out of the country, recruiting young men and women at will for the guerrilla war that created this difficult situation. Due to the perpetual presence of guerrillas in Bulilima, youths found themselves participating in the guerrilla war. Guerrillas told youths that they were fighting for them, hence they had no choice under those circumstances but to participate.[618] From guerrillas' perspective, youths were obliged to complement guerrillas' efforts in their war against the Smith regime. Nana insinuated that youths were coerced to participate in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. This point is also noted by Godwin and Hancock who quote Ian Smith as having said, 'Poor tribesmen kept on assisting 'terrorists' not because they were unhappy but because the 'terrorists' were holding guns to their heads.'[619] If indeed Smith was honest

[616] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016.
[617] Interview with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.
[618] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016.
[619] P. Godwin and I. *Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, c 1970 – 1980.* Johannesburg, 1993. p. 99.

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in his observation, it boggles the mind why then his soldiers brutalised and murdered defenseless peasants. In Smith's view, youths supported guerrillas out of fear of death. To this, there were those who passively supported guerrillas while others did so actively.[620] In view of this, Bulilima male youths actively participated in guerrilla related activities while female youths did so grudgingly. Nana commented,

> We swept guerrillas' footprints whenever they passed across our homes to confuse security forces who might be tracking them. We spent nights guarding those suspected to be witches, we were interrogated by guerrillas on why witches were caught. We bought cigarettes for guerrillas. Our parents were not happy, they pretended as if they were happy. It was a matter of survival. Parents did not want or like what we were doing. In fact, we provided guerrillas with what they wanted. When soldiers came here, we told them lies, but they beat up those suspected of keeping and feeding guerrillas, nonetheless.[621]

While parents unwillingly let their girls get involved with guerrillas, little did they know that such half-hearted sympathy for a guerrilla cause would result in beneficiaries, (figuratively put), biting the hand that fed them. Nana pointed out the guerrillas' blemishes but seemed to be sympathetic towards them, 'Compared to soldiers, guerrillas were better. The only problem was that they slept with us without our consent. If you refused they beat you up. They simply told us to sleep with them, and we childishly complied.'[622] Somehow, Nana seems to be saying that being raped by guerillas was 'better' treatment than perhaps, being raped by the Rhodesian forces. This underlines the fact that female youths became helpless victims of war, while others became active heroes.[623] In addition to being 'politely raped' by guerrillas after 'childishly' acceding to their demands, Bulilima female youths faced another onslaught from the security forces hunting for guerrillas.

In blaming the Botswana border for their suffering at the hands of both guerrillas and the security forces, Nana said,

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[620] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesian since UDI*. London, 1975. p. 12.
[621] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016.
[622] *Ibid*.
[623] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 75.

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> The Botswana border enabled guerrillas to enter and leave the country freely. It was easy to cross as Batswana people guided guerrillas on their way to and from Zimbabwe. Soldiers were always here looking for guerrillas. As a result they harassed us, they beat us, they intimidated us, and they accused us of harbouring guerrillas.[624]

The 'man in the middle' as Moorcraft and McLaughlin refer to peasants during Zimbabwe's armed conflict, bore the brunt of the guerrilla war.

This was further confirmed by Clement Ncube of Phumuza when he said, 'If we were caught by soldiers helping guerrillas in any form whatsoever, we were beaten thoroughly, our homesteads burned down, then killed.'[625] Clement blamed their awkward position on guerrillas whom he said could not survive without the assistance of the youths. On this subject, Moorcraft and McLaughlin write that, 'Unarmed men, women and children became the archetype of 'the man in the middle' and were cajoled, wooed, battered and abused by both sides.'[626] Youths' involvement in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was a horrendous experience for many. Clement apportioned blame to his district's proximity to the Botswana border. In his own words, 'Guerrillas were always here, collecting youths and crossing with them to Botswana. That is where guerrillas and youths crossed to and from Botswana. As a result, soldiers were always here as well, hunting for guerrillas, at the same time checking whether we supported, fed and hid guerrillas.'[627] Given that guerrillas were always in the district and could not survive without youths' assistance, it is understandable why Rhodesian soldiers treated youths as their enemies.

'Guerrillas called meetings where youths were told to be their eyes and ears. Through such meetings, we were always on the lookout, checking for any sign of soldiers, cooking for guerrillas, being sent to shops to buy shoes and cigarettes,'[628] said Clement Ncube pleading his case. The support given to guerrillas by youths was not only in Bulilima District but a countrywide phenomenon. In the eastern parts of the country, for example,

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[624] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016.
[625] Interview with Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[626] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 49.
[627] Interview with Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[628] *Ibid*.

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the government dealt ruthlessly with peasants believed to be harbouring guerrillas. As Caute notes, 'Unable to drive guerrillas from among the people, the regime decided to remove people from guerrillas. They duly uprooted half a million people from their villages and fields … and herded them at gunpoint into Protected Villages (PVs).'[629] The PV system was a foreign concept with all the makings of the Malaya guerrilla war where millions of villagers were successfully removed by the British, a strategy meant to isolate Chinese aligned guerrillas. Caute comments on this; 'There were precedents: such villages [PVs] had been established with some success during the Malaya counter-insurgency operation in the 1950s: later the Portuguese set up *aldeamentes* in Mozambique to combat *Frente para o Liberacao do Mocambique* (FRELIMO): the United States had similar strategies in Vietnam.'[630] This underscores the seriousness with which the Smith government viewed the guerrilla support by youths and their parents.

In Bulilima District, however, the Smith government did not try to drain the sea to expose the fish.[631] Given the prevailing situation then, guerrillas and security forces approached youths differently, hence had different expectations from their interactions. Clement put it this way, 'Guerrillas requested us to be on the lookout for any signs of trouble (*ukutsheka umumo*). Soldiers, on the other hand mainly asked us for the whereabouts of guerrillas. We always lied to them [soldiers].'[632] As different these two approaches to youths might have been by the two adversaries, they do reflect however, how much each adversary was dependent on the youths.

Soldiers approached youths with a preconceived mentality that they concealed guerrillas' whereabouts. This is noted in Clement's following response,

> Guerrillas treated us well. They needed our support such as I mentioned earlier. In turn, guerrillas gave us strategies as to how to respond to the Rhodesian army when it asked us for their locations. We were told to say, 'Yes, guerrillas were here

[629] D. Caute, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*. London, 1983. p. 60.
[630] *Ibid*.
[631] The reasons for the failure by the Smith government to implement the PV concept in Bulilima District are analysed in Chapter six.
[632] Interview with Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016.

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yesterday'. In most cases this got us into trouble as soldiers would beat us, screaming, 'Why did you not report their presence to authorities'?[633]

Nomusa also attested to the fact that they provided false information to security forces looking for guerrillas.[634] Providing falsehoods to soldiers became risky for Bulilima youths as soldiers could easily detect they were being lied to, hence deliberately misled. Out of frustration, soldiers resorted to highhandedness in dealing with Bulilima youths' intractable attitude towards them. Security forces tended to use inhumane methods to elicit information from civilians.[635]

The brutality meted out to the youths by the Rhodesian forces solidified the bond between guerrillas and youths. 'Soldiers beat us, intimidated us, saying that we tell them lies all the time, every time. They accused us of hiding and protecting guerrillas from them,'[636] said Clement, a hint of protest in his voice. Soldiers' cruelty, given the facts above, stemmed from youths' intransigence. Nhlanhla accepted that soldiers knew that guerrillas lived among people who in turn gave them all forms of support.[637] Denying knowledge of guerrillas' hideouts was an insult to the security forces' intelligence, hence their strong arm tactics in dealing with liars. In other words, security forces used brutality to obtain information from villagers such as stabbing them through their feet with bayonets and beating them up.[638] This was brutal interrogation to say the least. Noting the brutality of the security forces in Mount Darwin, Maxey writes that, 'Villagers were surrounded and hundreds of bullets pumped into them. Furthermore, most of the men were taken away to military camps and badly beaten up. Many of the women decided to escape from the area, and made their way to Zambia.'[639]

The Rhodesian army's heavy handedness in dealing with youths contributed to their strong belief and trust in ZIPRA guerrillas. Clement adoringly said of them, 'ZIPRA

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[633] *Ibid*.
[634] Interview with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village, 24th March, 2016.
[635] I. Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1980. p. 197.
[636] Interview with Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[637] Interview with Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village, 23rd March, 2016.
[638] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny.* Claremont, 2009. p. 36.
[639] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Rhodesia since UDI.* London, 1975. pp. 138, 139 -40.

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guerrillas made me get involved in the struggle because they were here to liberate us, they were fighting on our behalf, hence we helped them. I did what I did because I realised that ZIPRA were to liberate us from the Smith regime.'[640] The problem with Clement's narration is that it fails to appreciate that ZIPRA guerrillas were equally brutal to villagers. His uncritical portrayal of ZIPRA as a benevolent liberation army helps explain the power of propaganda and indoctrination and its effects on youths' reasoning capabilities.

With reference to ZANLA operated eastern parts of the country, youths were seen as the link between guerrillas and the colonial economy, with powers to collect contributions from villagers for guerrillas.[641] In this way, youths enforced guerrillas' silent bye-laws governing their upkeep. In explaining the general powers vested on youths by guerrillas, it is observed that youths carried out routine tasks such as the sabotage of telephone lines, intelligence gathering, carrying messages, and even punitive beatings and killings of those suspected to be sell-outs or witches.[642] Given such power dynamics, it is no surprise that youths strongly believed that guerrillas were to liberate them, while soldiers were in Bulilima to harass youths.[643]

Mhambi Moyo of Bezu Village chipped in, saying that the Botswana border led to a situation where Bulilima youths found themselves taking part in the liberation war regardless of their will.[644] He reiterated what others pointed out saying,

> ZIPRA guerrillas used to enter and exit the country through the Botswana border. As time went on, guerrillas flooded our district and, in the process we became enlisted as guerrillas' eyes and ears, *'sasitsheka umumo, sigcina indawo yonke'*. We were guarding guerrillas, providing them with intelligence information so that '*bengabulawa ngama Bhunu*' [they would not be killed by Boers]. We were everything to guerrillas. We organised villagers to cook for guerrillas when they were around. We were guerrillas' security guards. *Sasithunywa lokhu lalokhuyana ngo bhuti* [We were sent by guerrillas to do various errands on their behalf].[645]

[640] Interview with Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[641] C. Stoneman and L. Cliff, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*. London, 1989. p. 27.
[642] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 - 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 126.
[643] Interview with Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[644] Interview with Mhambi Moyo, Bezu Village: 26th June, 2016.
[645] *Ibid.*

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Mhambi's response points to the fact that youths spent most of their time working for guerrillas on issues pertaining to their safety and security. Youths such as Mhambi became an invaluable asset to guerrillas in the context of logistical and intelligence gathering. Nhlanhla weighed in with the pronouncement that as youths, they spent their time keeping guerrillas safe from the prying eyes of the security forces through patrolling the communities. He added that as youths, they made sure that guerrillas' stay in their community was 'comfortable'.[646] In view of this, guerrillas in Bulilima District relied heavily on youths for their survival. As Nhlanhla pointed out, youths 'baby-sitted' guerrillas to make their stay 'pleasant and relaxed'. Nhlanhla and company were ZIPRA's soul-mates, hence their undivided and unquestionable loyalty.

Such loyalty became apparent during the interviews when Mhambi admitted that it was the need to protect guerrillas from the enemy forces that compelled youths to help in any way possible.[647] Mhambi's views on guerrillas illustrate the power of ZAPU structures in rural areas in addition to propaganda youths were subjected to by guerrillas to turn them into vigilant guards twenty-four hours a day. As noted earlier, Bulilima male youths had a tendency to deliberately overlook and ignore ZIPRA guerrillas' short-comings while quick to blame the Rhodesian army for any calamity that befell them. A case in point was ZIPRA guerrillas' tendency to force female youths and married women into sexual encounters without their consent.[648] No doubt then that male youths' glorification of ZIPRA guerrillas as liberators, revolutionary forces and freedom fighters should be taken with caution. One should bear in mind that guerrillas destroyed several marriages through impregnating married women, on top of summarily executing those suspected of being sell-outs.[649] Guerrilla cruelty was mildly acknowledged by Abraham who stated that one was in trouble with guerrillas if he sold them out, adding that 'they took you, killed you and buried you in

[646] Interview with Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[647] Interview with Mhambi Moyo, Bezu Village: 26rd June, 2016.
[648] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016; Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016 and Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016.
[649] Interview with Senzeni Mkandla, Diba Village: 13th February, 2016 and Sipho Nkomo, Maduke Village: 11th May, 2015. These two were married young women and their husbands were migrant workers in South Africa. They were impregnated by ZIPRA guerrillas who were operating in their area. Senzeni Mkandla's marriage collapsed soon afterwards while Sipho Nkomo's survived until now.

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an animal hole. One simply disappeared never to be seen again in life.'[650] This was cruelty equivalent to that of the security forces.

The apparent contradictions in responses such as Mhambi's can be attributed to Bulilima male youths' disregard for the welfare of their female counterparts. This is clear when Mhambi blamed security forces for mistreating youths as they were accused of harbouring, feeding and with-holding information about guerrillas' whereabouts.[651] That is, security forces did not seek any favours from anyone, hence they beat up both male and female youths, Mhambi explained. Mhambi was quiet on the fact that guerrillas slept with female youths without the latter's consent. In Mhambi's world, guerrillas were fine so long as they did not molest the Mhambis, but security forces were devils, because they beat the Mhambis. In addition, Mhambi's views reflect a 'poisoned attitude' towards female youths during the liberation struggle.[652] Mhambi's failure to question guerrillas' behaviour towards women in general and female youths in particular, should be seen in light of the traditional or customary laws that discriminated against women.[653] Women were treated as sexual toys meant to satisfy men's sexual egos. More appalling was Mhambi's admission that female youths were guerrillas' wives, even though the sex was nonconsensual.[654] This is appalling in the sense that he seemed not to bother to censure such brutal behaviour, opting instead to see guerrillas in perfect light.

In Mhambi's own words, 'Guerrillas treated us well because we were one of them, we protected them, and we fed them.'[655] Protected them or not, ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima District committed heinous crimes against female youths and they should be condemned as such. They prematurely hacked to death suspected witches, and in one of such incidences Mhambi was part of the cheering crowd.[656] One surprising feature about those

[650] Interview with Abraham Moyo, Joko Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[651] Interview with Mhambi Moyo, Bezu Village: 26th June, 2016.
[652] Poisoned in the sense that it was male youths such as him who also took advantage of the collapse of law and order in rural areas during the height of the guerrilla war and abused female youths with a misguided understanding that nothing would be done to them since they were guerrillas' partners in sexual related crimes.
[653] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 75.
[654] Interview with Mhambi Moyo, Bezu Village: 26th June, 2016.
[655] *Ibid*.
[656] This was when Mhambi and other youths, with their guerrilla heroes, presided over the killing of Na Toki and Na Mathe, two elderly women suspected of bewitching and subsequently killing Na Khesemiya, (Na Toki's *nyanewabo*, two females married to one husband). These two suspected witches were tried, convicted and sentenced to death

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accused of being witches during the armed struggle was that all accused persons were females, mostly old, defenceless and unable to run away and escape the jaws of death.[657] Given this selective punishment, female youths became more and more vulnerable as the war intensified in Bulilima. Contrasted with males, females were guerrillas' soft targets. They could be used to demonstrate guerrillas' readiness to deal ruthlessly with anyone who happened to cross their path, a deterrent to would-be offenders.[658] In other words, female youths were expendable.

Ali Joli Ncube of Diba blamed the abuse of female youths by guerrillas on the Botswana border. She said, 'There were too many guerrilla groups in our area. This was because guerrillas could easily enter or leave the country at will. The border offered some form of protection to guerrillas since they could escape to Botswana when under heavy fire from the security forces.'[659] The continuous presence of guerrillas in Bulilima District meant that female youths such as Ali got involved and participated in the country's guerrilla war. Their participation, as Ali put it, was in the form of cooking, washing, '*ukutsheka umumo*', (reconnaissance), and most painfully, sleeping with guerrillas '*singafuni*' [by force].[660] Further, Bulilima youths were involved in the guerrilla war by virtue of being sent to Plumtree to do guerrilla related errands such as buying clothing and cigarettes, coordinating meetings within and outside their villages, visiting security forces' camps (Madlambudzi garrison, for example) to spy on the activities of the soldiers and collecting specific information needed by guerrillas for questioning alleged sell-outs or witches.[661] Female youths in Bulilima District were used as porters for guerrilla goods such as jeans and shoes, in addition to gathering information on the movements of security forces.

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by guerrillas, with the Mhambis endorsing the whole process, then enthusiastically carrying out the diabolical murders. Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016.

[657] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016; Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 23rd March, 2016; Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.

[658] Interview with Melusi Mlilo (ZIPRA operative, Bulilima), Khalanyoni Village: 3rd November, 2015.

[659] Interview with Ali Joli Ncube, Diba Village: 2nd February, 2016.

[660] *Ibid*.

[661] Interview with Siphetheni Khupe, Tokwana Village: 16th December, 2015.

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Another reason for the involvement of female youths this way was that they were regarded less suspiciously by the police and the army personnel at road blocks.[662] Such beliefs were also embedded in guerrillas' reasoning as reflected in the following extract,

> The following day another guerrilla came to my home. He told me that when I went back to Bulawayo I should buy him some sting jeans. I told him I would not do so, because I was the bread winner for my children and, if anything happened to me, or if I was arrested and imprisoned for that, there would be no one to take care of them. But he said that women were able to make it through road blocks because they were not thoroughly searched.[663]

In view of such beliefs, no doubt, female youths in Bulilima were bound to be tasked with errands that highly compromised their lives in view of the marauding security forces and the harsh treatment of those caught aiding 'terrorists' in any form.

With guerrilla reliance on youths for almost all their logistical and information needs, female youths in Bulilima District found themselves deeply involved in the guerrilla war. Bob North illustrates the wide-scale involvement of female youths by noting, 'They [guerrillas] had a lot of female youths working for them. Women were used to carry landmines in the form of pregnancy, hence I would say females were pretty involved'.[664] Female involvement, particularly on errands usually associated with male youths, should be seen as a stop gap measure by guerrillas since the majority of male youths had joined the struggle in neighbouring countries. This was also a sign that guerrillas were desperate for auxiliary 'man-power'.

This was true in villages such as Mbila and Tshangwa where Nana and Nomusa lived respectively.[665] The majority of youths here were females, a scenario that saw them undertaking guerrilla errands most suited for male youths (based on the patriarchal nature

[662] Interview with Ali Joli Ncube, Diba Village: 2nd February, 2016 and Siphetheni Khupe, Tokwana Village: 16th December, 2016.
[663] Betty Ndlovu of Thekwane Mission, being interviewed by I. Staunton, *Mothers of the Revolution.* Harare, 1990. p. 245. A sting jean was a cargo jean (with side thigh-pockets) which was in fashion during the 1970s. Due to its capacity to help someone carry several minor items, guerrillas popularised this trousers among themselves.
[664] J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 70.
[665] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.

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of Bulilima District). As Ali put it, 'In certain villages, guerrillas had swept away every male youth available. Only those who were either sick or in town with their parents survived guerrilla recruitments in our villages. *Babethatha wonke umntwana osekhaya, bengatshiyi muntu. Babethi kuyiwa empini, besichaphisa ngeBotswana* [They were recruiting every youth available, no one was spared. They told us that we were going to join the liberation struggle and took us across the Botswana border].'[666]

Given this situation, it is no surprise that female youths such as Siphetheni Khupe presided over disciplinary matters involving sell-outs and witches. 'We were the ones who collected, beat up and even hanged those who were witches,'[667] acknowledged Siphetheni remorsefully. By expressing her regrets and sorrow over their actions during the armed struggle, maybe Siphetheni had come to realise that indeed they might have killed or tortured innocent souls in the heat of the war. This could be a sign that upon reflection, she was appalled by what they did as female youths during the liberation war. This can be gleaned when she added that female youths in her village were heavily involved in every aspect of the war, at the expense of their womanly and homely traditional duties.[668] This negatively impacted on the economic activities of most families, the effects of which are analysed in Chapter six.

Ali and Siphetheni (in separate interviews) further claimed that the persistent presence of guerrillas in their communities attracted the unwanted presence of the security forces who had the propensity to force information out of everyone unlucky to cross their path.[669] The phrase 'unlucky to cross their path' is an indication that whenever security forces arrived in a village, villagers hid in the forest as indicated by Nomusa of Tshangwa. Further, the flight into the forest shows that soldiers were very brutal to villagers who also did not want to cooperate with the authorities for fear of being labelled sell-outs by guerrillas and their overzealous youths. As Sithokozile stated,

[666] Interview with Ali Joli Ncube, Diba Village: 2nd February, 2016.
[667] Interview with Siphetheni Khupe, Tokwana Village: 16th December, 2015.
[668] *Ibid*.
[669] Interview with Ali Joli Ncube, Diba Village: 2nd February, 2016 and Siphetheni Khupe, Tokwana Village: 16th December, 2015.

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> When soldiers arrived in our village, as youths we would have already disseminated the information to all villages adjacent to ours. This enabled people to hide in the bush. We hid in the bush for two reasons; for fear of being tortured, arrested and even killed for our support of guerrillas. When soldiers came here they already had accurate information as to who did what for guerrillas, when and where, and we feared giving information to soldiers that would lead to the death of guerrillas as we would later be labelled sell-outs, security forces collaborators *njalo*, *njalo* [and so on].[670]

By running away to spend several hours in the forest, youths and villagers were indirectly withholding information from the security forces. This was a direct and active participation in the liberation struggle of the country on the side of the insurgency forces.

In corroboration, Saziso Mdongo of Mbimba explained that since they were a few kilometres from the border, their village was a village of women. She pointed out that they often spent most of their time across the border in Botswana with relatives for fear of both guerrillas and soldiers.[671] Mbimba is less than six kilometres from the Botswana border. As such, guerrillas were always there, and had taken almost all young people to join *impi* [war].[672] In addition, Mbimba and Bambadzi were one of the villages with many young men working either in South Africa or Botswana.[673] The combination of wage labour and ZIPRA recruitment drives emptied the two villages of their male youths, leaving little girls performing duties they otherwise would not have done under normal circumstances.[674] Bambadzi and Mbimba share the same experience of little boys and girls performing war duties on behalf of guerrillas, thanks to their villages' proximity to the border. Moorcraft and McLaughlin underscore this point when they write, 'ZIPRA had base camps scattered along the Botswana border from which most incursions were mounted.'[675] ZIPRA

[670] Interview with Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016.
[671] Interview with Saziso Mdongo, Mbimba Village: 21st August, 2015.
[672] *Ibid.*
[673] Bambadzi is a village along the border of Botswana and Zimbabwe. Villagers there fetch water across the border from Maitengwe River. Bambadzi villagers have blood relatives on the Botswana side, hence cross to visit as and when they want. This village was swept clean of youths by both labour related migrations and guerrilla recruitment drives.
[674] Interview with Koziba Ndlovu, Bambadzi Village: 9th December, 2016.
[675] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 - 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 92.

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operated within the safety of the Botswana border where guerrillas could cross and hide to escape the pursuing Rhodesian forces.

These two villages' closeness to guerrilla bases meant that youths were involved with guerrillas on a daily basis. To this end, Saziso and Koziba lamented their involvement with guerrillas when they were very young. Their outlines were to the effect that they were forced to cook, wash and sleep with guerrillas even though they were not yet sexually mature.[676] A similar situation was also observed where small children and youths who often laid mines and land mine blasts became one of the most serious problems for Rhodesian forces.[677] By planting mines, youths directly participated in the guerrilla war at a tender age. That is, some of them participated at ages under fifteen,[678] as were Koziba and Saziso. Such direct participation exposed Koziba and Saziso to the taste of military power, hence misplaced authority over their parents and community elders. 'Because we could collect and carry ZIPRA guns and ammunition from Botswana, and because we were made to police our communities by guerrillas, we felt we had overwhelming authority over our elders,'[679] added Saziso rather regrettably. Being guerrilla porters made youths falsely believe that they were some sort of little guerrillas as well, hence a misplaced sense of superiority over their elders.

Such misguided feelings of authority by youths tended to polarise the otherwise harmonious social group relations within Bambadzi and Mbimba communities. Guerrillas enlisted many young youths as porters to carry war materials into Rhodesia,[680] as did Koziba and Saziso. Koziba added, 'We spent most of our time operating as guerrilla detectives, seeking out strangers, gathering any piece of information about sell-outs, witches and those who bad mouthed '*Obhuti*'.'[681] 'If we caught any of these', continued Koziba, 'we took him/her to guerrillas and, depending on the severity of the accusation,

[676] Interview with Saziso Mdongo, Mbimba Village: 21st August, 2015 and Koziba Ndlovu, Bambadzi Village: 9th December, 2016.
[677] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 - 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 107.
[678] I. Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1980. p. 283.
[679] Interview with Saziso Mdongo, Mbimba Village: 21st August, 2015.
[680] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 121.
[681] '*Obhuti*' was an affectionate term of respect given to ZIPRA guerrillas by youths in Bulilima District during the guerrilla war. Interview with Koziba Ndlovu, Bambadzi Village: 9th December, 2016.

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'*Obhuti*' would allow us to discipline the said culprit(s).'[682] Guerrillas, by giving youths such powers, corrupted the once perfect Kalanga traditional system, in the process alienating elders from their off-springs.[683] In this regard, guerrillas made increasing use of young women, itself a revolutionary departure in a society where divisions of labour had been accepted as part of nature, as a social arrangement hallowed both by tradition and the ancestors' wishes.[684] Simply put, guerrillas presided over the collapse of Kalanga family traditional authority and replaced it with 'gun-power-authority' where little girls ruled over their parents. In possession of such authority, youths' perverse actions continued unabated throughout the war.

Writing about guerrilla-youth-parent relationships, Kriger noted the following,

> In long hours that the youth were obliged to spend eating and sleeping with guerrillas at their base after *moraris* (*pungwes*/all night meetings), they had an opportunity to develop personal relationships with them. Like youth most guerrillas were young, single, and of low status and these actors helped to strengthen bonds between them. Youth thus used power they acquired from their duties in support organisations to challenge parents' authority over their lives.[685]

Similarly, Bulilima youths used their privileged close association with ZIPRA guerrillas to rebuke parental authority and control over their activities. Commenting on the same issue, Holland points out that youths' growing megalomania and immunity from accountability was due to guerrilla indulgence than parents realised, or conversely, youths simply used guerrillas to advance their own ends.[686] The 'gun-power-authority' liberated youths from traditional bondage and parental thralldom.

This was apparent in Bigboy's response regarding youths' activities in his village. 'We became authoritative over our parents. We told them what to do as youths. We would, for example, arrest any unknown person in our village, anyone youths did not know'.[687]

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[682] *Ibid*.
[683] How deep-seated the problem became is a subject for analysis in Chapter six.
[684] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. pp. 100 – 101.
[685] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 179.
[686] H. Holland, *Dinner with Mugabe. The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter who became a Tyrant*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 213.
[687] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.

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Literally, Bigboy and his age-mates were guerrillas' uncommissioned-peasant-boy-police officers. Youths pinpointed 'sell-outs' to guerrillas,[688] among other dangerous and contentious activities they performed on guerrillas' behalf. Acknowledging the detective and policing work in Mutoko District, Kriger argues that youths were talked by guerrillas into performing strenuous work such as gathering of information, reporting alleged traitors to guerrillas, and patrolling villages to warn guerrillas of the coming of enemy forces.[689] Mutoko youths relied on guerrillas to exert their authority over Mutoko villagers.

Bigboy went on to list activities they performed for '*Obhuti*' as, *'Ukutsheka umumo', sihlola amaBhunu* (Boers)'. Youths helped guerrillas a lot by informing them about the presence and whereabouts of soldiers in the area. This practically reduced the number of 'potential battles that would have erupted should the two belligerents have come into contact, whose result would have been the burning of our homesteads by the security forces in retaliation.'[690] Salient in Bigboy's response is the issue of burning of homesteads after guerrilla-security forces shoot-outs. The zeal and consistency with which the security forces burnt homesteads after an engagement with ZIPRA guerrillas should be understood in light of martial law introduced by the Smith regime when the war intensified.[691] Proclaiming martial law on the third of September 1978, the Minister of Information said,

> Executive officers of Government, the military forces and other security forces of Government, are hereby vested with full and complete powers and authority to do all things in their judgment proper and necessary for or towards the object of suppressing and dealing with said hostile actions and for restoring and maintaining good order and public safety in those parts of Rhodesia. Under martial law there will be no reason for them to seek chapter and verse under the law for any action they propose to take … the safety of the state will be supreme law.[692]

[688] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 145.
[689] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 119.
[690] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.
[691] Martial Law permitted military courts to try and condemn to death guerrillas or villagers suspected of association with guerrilla armies.
[692] Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), *Rhodesia after the Internal Settlement*. London, 1978. p. 17.

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Given that the security forces were given license to kill, burn, torture or destroy whatever they thought, believed and deemed a threat to the 'safety of the state', it is no surprise that Bulilima youths diligently tracked and informed on the whereabouts of security forces at any given time. Eager to put into practice new powers vested on them by the government, security forces indiscriminately looted villagers' homes, killed livestock and peasants at will, burned huts with all the aplomb of film makers, arbitrarily arrested anyone around and raped hapless women and young girls,[693] all in the name of 'terrorist' suppression. Explaining female youths' predicaments, Auret notes that, 'There was a systematic rape of young girls by police in camps. Police would go to a village, pick up young girls … after a couple of weeks these girls would be returned and more collected from another homestead.'[694] This was done under the guise of interrogation, seeking information that would help catch 'terrorists' from those girls. In a veiled reference to such powers, Bigboy added, 'If it became known by Rhodesian security forces that you supported guerrillas, your homestead was burnt down and you were killed.'[695] Such horrible intimidation of youths and villagers threatened guerrillas' security in Bulilima as it eroded youths' loyalty towards guerrillas due to fear of reprisals from the security forces.

To counter this, guerrillas introduced their own 'bush martial law',[696] overzealously implemented and executed by Bulilima youths, to the horror and utter disgust of villagers. In Bigboy's own words, 'If you were suspected of collaborating with security forces, you were instantly killed by guerrillas as a sellout. Such people were killed horribly. They were stoned by guerrillas as was the case with Mr. Thame MaDimbugwa (Phumuza), Mr. Nunu (Ngwana), Mr. Dzungwa (Ngwana) and Mr. Mzomutsha (Ngwana), among a lot of those who died a terrible death. Sell-outs were paid R$5000, 00 in Plumtree.[697] It was easy to

[693] D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1981. pp. 4, 4 – 5.
[694] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 36.
[695] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.
[696] 'Bush martial law' in the case of this study were ZIPRA guerrillas' summary executions and arbitrary harassment of villagers proportionate to what the security forces were meting out to them as well. Simply put, 'Bush martial law' was a counter to the 'state's martial law'.
[697] It should be noted that during the period under study, the Southern Rhodesia currency was pound sterling (£) (from 1964 – 1970). In 1970 Southern Rhodesia was declared a Republic and it became Rhodesia, its currency (£) was replaced by the Rhodesian Dollar (R$). The R$ was a strong currency, where around 1978, R$1 was equivalent to about US$1, 50 and was at par with British pound sterling.
www.revoly.com/main/index.php?s=Rhodesian%20dollar&item. Accessed: 16th February, 2016; 09:07. This means

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die those days, as was Mr. Silundika, for example, who was killed just for insulting guerrillas.[698] Such cold blooded and callous murders showed total disregard for human life on the part of guerrillas and their compromised youths. This also exhibited guerrillas' fear of losing the much needed support and protection of youths against the Rhodesian army. Flower points out that guerrillas murdered civilians with the hope that that would gain them psychological advantage when security forces equally killed villagers in their counter-action.[699] Kriger concurs and writes, 'Guerrillas made superficial investigation of alleged informers. They did not follow the principles to try a sell-out. They only wanted to show villagers that they had power to do anything and instill fear so that none would repeat the same mistake.'[700] Villagers were thus used as an example of how cruel guerrillas dealt with anyone suspected of endangering their lives.

Guerrillas tended to be soft on youths. In a bid to appease youths, for example, guerrillas told them to provide security forces with false information. 'Guerrillas advised us to tell soldiers we saw them a day or two ago,'[701] admitted Bigboy. This was also corroborated by other interviewees,[702] an illustration of the level of desperation that had gripped guerrillas in the face of the security forces' onslaught on all those caught assisting, collaborating, harbouring, feeding and associating with guerrillas in whatever form or way. This became a poor strategy on the part of guerrillas as soldiers could or would not be fooled. Bigboy sadly said, 'They beat us if we said we had not seen guerrillas. If you said you had in the last few days [as guerrillas had advised] you were instantly killed, or arrested for failing to report their presence to authorities'.[703] By following guerrillas' lame advice, Bigboy and company's responses were malignant to the security forces.

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that sell-outs benefited a lot from the R$5 000, 00 they received each time they sold out guerrillas. This was appetising to poor villagers who were suffocating under war induced economic misery and guerrilla-born social problems.

[698] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.

[699] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 204.

[700] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 156.

[701] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.

[702] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016.

[703] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.

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Consequently, they were punished for withholding information that could lead to the potential containment of 'terrorist' menace, in the eyes of the security forces.

Despite all this, Bulilima youths were pertinacious in their protection of '*Obhuti*'.[704] Guerrillas, it seems, were not keeping abreast with the ever changing counter-insurgency legislature, otherwise they would not have encouraged youths to openly falsify information, a situation that exposed them to lawful accusations by security forces. This way, ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima displayed their lack of a shrewd and perspicacious mind. In 1974, for example, the Smith regime had made it an offence for anyone to willfully deny knowledge of 'terrorists' or giving false information concerning them, at the same time making it an offence punishable by death when an individual(s) is/was convicted of recruiting 'terrorists'.[705] Guerrillas' advice to Bulilima youths, therefore, ran counter to their claim to be intelligent. The best option for Bulilima youths under such circumstance was to be vigilant, always on the lookout so that the arrival of the security forces would not catch them off-guard, hence quickly seek refuge in the forest until the army moved on.

Bigboy blamed all this on his district's proximity to the Botswana border which he said encouraged guerrillas to be always present in their communities.[706] This was a similar situation to the country's eastern border with Mozambique when FRELIMO came into power in 1975. In other words, a black government in Mozambique, sympathetic to ZANU allowed the entire eastern border to be used by ZANLA guerrillas.[707] As a result, this attracted intense border patrols by the Smith regime, hence the continuous presence of security forces in those districts. In this context, the 2nd Battalion (RAR) was a product of intensification of counter-insurgency war in Rhodesia after *coup d' etat* in Portugal in 1974 brought Samora Machel and FRELIMO to power in Mozambique.[708] In this way, border districts attracted two competing armies, in the process exposing youths and villagers to the rigours of both insurgency and counter-insurgency activities. The border was used by

[704] *Ibid*; Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016; Koziba Ndlovu, Bambadzi Village: 9th December, 2016; Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st Match, 2016 and Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[705] P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia. C. 1970 – 1980*. Johannesburg, 1993. p. 102.
[706] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.
[707] J.T.R. Wood, *The War Diaries of Andre' Dennison*. Gibraltar, 1989. p. 12.
[708] *Ibid*.

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guerrillas to cross in and out of the country and soldiers would visit communities searching for guerrillas. In addition, the border helped a lot of people in our district to join the struggle.[709] As has been already noted, Bulilima District had two categories of youths who participated in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.[710]

The problem with youths' involvement in this war was, according to Bigboy, the sexual abuse of girls by guerrillas, particularly towards the end of the war.[711] Female youths' predicaments were exacerbated by the fact that guerrillas in Bulilima did not provide villagers with clearly defined structures of control, line management and platforms to lodge their complaints and grievances against such abuse. In the absence of such formal structures, female youths suffered in silence. Not all parents, however, could contain their rage, anger and disgust over the sexual abuse of their daughters, as was the case with Bheji Gumede of Makhulela.[712] Sikhathele Gumede of Ndolwane tearfully narrated how her father was murdered by guerrillas for complaining to them about sexually abusing his daughter, who was fourteen by then. Full of emotion, she stated that immediately after voicing his displeasure to guerrillas, her father was labelled a sell-out and was summarily executed and buried in an animal hole in similar fashion to someone burying a dog.[713] This points to guerrillas' intolerance of any criticism brought against them, an indication that they were law unto themselves, hence 'bush martial law'. Any denouncement of their sexual abuse of young girls was punishable by death.

Sikhathele emphasised that female youths did a lot to help liberate their country, giving examples of their cooking, washing, patrolling communities in search of information and checking out suspicious strangers, appraising different guerrilla groups on the situation vis-a- vis presence of the Rhodesian army, and most painfully, being unwilling guerrillas' 'bed mates'.[714] On top of all this, Bulilima female youths had to contend with the

[709] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.
[710] See the introduction section for the two categories. There is, however, this 'insignificant other' the third category of Bulilima youths who were involved and participated in the struggle as Smith's soldiers such as Million Moyo of Mbila Village and Robert Mabhena of Phumuza Village. This category of Bulilima youths is a neglected lot as well when it comes to studies on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.
[711] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.
[712] Interview with Sikhathele Gumede, Ndolwane Village: 5th May, 2015.
[713] *Ibid*.
[714] Interview with Sikhathele Gumede, Ndolwane Village: 5th May, 2015.

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marauding security forces seeking to establish their authority within Bulilima communities in the face of an upsurge in insurgency activities.

Cosmos Ncube of Hingwe Village attested to the increase in guerrilla activities which attracted the security forces to their village. He pointed out that,

> Soldiers, looking for guerrillas, harassed us each time they were around. The baffling issue was that always, soldiers had accurate information about guerrillas, who did what for them, when, where and how. This complicated our responses to their questions, hence their harsh reactions when we provided mismatching answers to their informed enquiries.[715]

Cosmas's account suggests that there were indeed sell-outs in their village. Such individuals informed on guerrilla activities to the security forces. A plausible explanation for this could be SS's clandestine activities.[716] The SS, for example, were 'constitutionally recognised terrorists'. They were meant to provide the security forces with the inner workings of the 'unconstitutional terrorists'. To this end, the SS were a bush-wise tracking contingent, trained to survive for lengthy periods in the wilderness.[717] ZIPRA's intelligence system could not stay ahead of the SS and Bulilima youths found it difficult to distinguish between the real and the copy-cat guerrillas. In light of this, soldiers were always a step ahead with regard to guerrilla activities in Bulilima communities.

In Cosmas's case, guerrillas had informed them to report any new strangers in their community. Cosmas indicated that there were about five ZIPRA groups operating in their community.[718] This means that with time, communities got used to guerrilla groups that operated in their areas. This way, youths were able to counter the SS's pseudo-operations. As Trethewan puts it, 'Terrorists operated in loosely defined areas, such areas overlapped and groups often transited through one area to another. This had the effect

[715] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.
[716] For the inner workings of the SS, consult K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987 and, P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 - 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982 among a variety of studies that have dealt with the SS factor in the context of counter-insurgency strategies during the armed struggle in Rhodesia.
[717] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 65.
[718] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.

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of complicating intelligence matters for Rhodesian security forces.'[719] Such complications were further compounded by youths in terms of information gathering reports they provided guerrillas with. Cosmas said,

> As youths we were very active. Everyone in our area was ZAPU. There was this issue '*yokuthi ama* youth *atsheka umumo'*, *sidingisisa ukuba amaBhunu adlule nini, esiya ngaphi.* [Youths were the ones who monitored the situation, checking the whereabouts of Boers]. The issue here was for us to be well informed and [be] aware of what was happening in our area, for example, if there is anyone unknown, we made sure that '*Obhuti*' got to know about him/them. Then they would come and deal with that person.[720]

Cosmas's account reveals a village's united approach in handling both insurgency and counter-insurgency issues affecting their daily lives. Such unity could be a result of the village being pro-ZAPU, and hence obliged, through association, to unite behind ZIPRA guerrillas. The background to such unity can be gleaned from the fact that after the banning of nationalist parties in 1964, ZAPU branches continued to exist underground in most parts of the country.[721] Based on the powerful nature and influence of ZAPU in the Matabeleland region, one can argue, these branches were voluntary entities formed without ZIPRA coercion.

While ZIPRA guerrillas benefitted from ZAPU branches, there was absolutely nothing youths benefitted from the presence of guerrillas in their communities. Guerrillas failed to protect communities against security forces' brutality. Youths became helpless participants in guerrilla activities, thereby becoming vulnerable to security forces whenever they arrived in a community, with guerrillas nowhere to offer protection.[722] Guerrillas' unwillingness to protect youths stemmed from their limited resources against a highly prepared enemy and their consistent hit and run strategy. Cosmas provided the following rather lame explanation for this guerrilla strategy, 'Guerrillas did not fight among people. They ran away when they saw soldiers. Soldiers in turn force-loaded villagers into

[719] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 142.
[720] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.
[721] T.O. Ranger and M. Ncube, Religion in the Guerrilla War: The Case of Southern Matabeleland, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Harare, 1996. pp. 35 – 57.
[722] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 104.

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their trucks, using them as shields in case guerrillas way-laid them along the way.'[723] Guerrillas' lack of enthusiasm to fight their enemy in homesteads and among villagers was probably born out of their concern for the unnecessary loss of innocent lives when villagers were caught in the 'cross-fire'.

A typical cross-fire example is given in the following vein, 'A guerrilla came to Karoi, asked for food and while being given, a Chief's son went to get security forces. When the army arrived, they fired indiscriminately, killing twelve villagers and that particular guerrilla.'[724] As much as they did not want to fight within and among villagers, guerrillas could not and did not want to keep away from villagers. This practically endangered villagers' lives and property. Given the above, guerrillas were a fatal liability to youths.

This meant that Bulilima youths had to spend their time 'baby-sitting' guerrillas to avoid being caught in the 'cross-fire.' Listing some of his duties as a youth, Cosmas said,

> We used to help transport wounded guerrillas across to Botswana for medical treatment. We carried ammunition for guerrillas to other districts such as Kezi and Tsholotsho. We collected information such as how many soldiers there were, their trucks and their make. Our area was a [semi] liberated zone. It was safe for us to transport wounded guerrillas across the border as well as smuggle into the country their ammunition.[725]

Such 'liberated zones' became guerrilla havens due to their artificial peace. On the issue of wounded guerrillas raised by Cosmas, it is an established fact that medical cases which could not be handled by poorly trained and equipped medics attached to guerrilla units or treated in sympathetic clinics were evacuated on foot to base camps across borders.[726] This way, youths like Cosmas became handy.

Several scholars point out the use of youths by guerrillas as their porters and couriers.[727] While youths provided ZIPRA guerrillas with such invaluable services, insurgents did not

[723] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.
[724] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Rhodesia since UDI.* London, 1975. p. 83.
[725] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.
[726] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 - 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 131.
[727] To understand how youths performed their duties as guerrilla couriers and porters read, *inter alia*, N.J. Kriger, 1992; P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, 1982; L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, 1981 and K. Flower, 1987.

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show any appreciation. This became clear when Cosmas said that at some stage, there were those killed or beaten by guerrillas such as Habo Ncube who was beaten for failing to attend a meeting. Dotshi Dube was killed after being accused of selling out.[728] Obviously, as was any death administered by guerrillas, Dotshi died a slow, painful death. Cosmas described Dotshi's death as very horrible. Guerrillas had tied both legs and arms of his pair of overalls and then poured boiling water inside the overalls he was wearing. Afterwards, they immersed him in a drum full of boiling water prepared by the likes of Cosmas. He was left like that for the whole night, wailing like a wounded puppy till they shot him dead the following morning, taking him out of his misery.[729] One certain fact about ZIPRA guerrillas operating in Bulilima District was that they were merciless murderers when it came to 'sell-outs', 'witches' and those who challenged their authority.

Their hardline stance and uncompromising attitude towards anyone accused of such misdemeanor somehow contributed to some individuals developing negative attitudes towards guerrillas and their associates, the youths. Hlengiwe Ncube of Wuwana cried when she recounted how their homestead was torched to the ground following an informer-linked arrival of Rhodesian soldiers at her homestead.

> Our father had a very big homestead. Guerrillas used to rest by the kopje adjacent to our homestead. Every time guerrillas were around, we would as youths, organise villagers to prepare and bring food to our home. This did not sit well with some of our neighbours who went to Madlambudzi garrison and informed the Rhodesian army about the happenings at our home. When soldiers came, they were in no mood to ask questions. They simply torched down every hut, kraal, or structure that makes a rural peasant homestead. Soldiers were shouting out my father's name. My parents, fortunately, were not at home at that sad hour of my life. Upon getting the news from our efficient youth system, my parents escaped to Botswana where we have relatives. We were left under the care of our grandparents, until our parents returned after the war.[730]

[728] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.
[729] *Ibid*.
[730] Interview with Hlengiwe Ncube, Wuwana Village: 15th October, 2015.

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Hlengiwe's tragedy was the fate that befell most villagers suspected of harbouring and feeding guerrillas. This was the case in Belingwe where thirty-three huts were razed down by army-men purportedly avenging Chief Mafala's death at the hands of guerrillas.[731] The above observation reflects a countrywide systematic and brutal punishment of youths and villagers by both revolutionary forces on one side and the security forces on the other. On the part of the security forces, their barbaric actions were encouraged by ministers such as van der Byl (Minister of Defence) through their reckless, inflammatory and acrimonious utterances such as '…villages found harbouring guerrillas will be bombed and destroyed in any manner which the on-spot commander considers desirable.'[732] In other words, what soldiers did to Hlengiwe's homestead and others that suffered the same fate had ministerial fiat. In the case of ZIPRA guerrillas, however, it is doubtful that their brutality on civilians met with their handlers' approbation.

This is in view of the fact that exiled ZAPU leadership always preached peaceful co-existence between ZIPRA guerrillas and peasants.[733] Further, ZIPRA as both a guerrilla army and a conventional one, was touted as a highly disciplined liberation army. Listening to those who were close to ZIPRA combatants during the war narrate their ordeal at their hands gives a picture quite contrary to ZIPRA the disciplined army. As much as this was theoretically possible, facts at hand have proven that ZIPRA guerrillas operating in Bulilima District were not decorous as publicly portrayed by nationalist leaders. Hlengiwe decried, for example, the abuse they suffered at the hands of ZIPRA combatants, accusing them of ill-treating female youths and elderly villagers.[734] As she pointed out, accusations heaped on most of the guerrilla victims could not be substantiated, let alone

[731] Note that during settler rule in Rhodesia, African Chiefs directly reported to NCs, later called DCs and were, therefore, the DCs' eyes, ears, legs and mouth within those traditional areas they represented in the larger spheres of the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). For all their efforts, Chiefs drew monthly stipends from the DCs' offices. Chiefs were highly controlled and manipulated by white DCs. In the eyes of guerrillas, and rightly so, Chiefs, legally and by association, were an extension of white rule in rural communities, hence a 'symbol of black oppression'. To this end, Chiefs were targets of guerrillas. On the death of Chief Mafala in Shabani, see D. Caute, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*. London, 1983. p. 348.

[732] *Ibid*. p. 59.

[733] To understand the theories put forward for touting ZIPRA as a disciplined guerrilla army, check with N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999 and A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008.

[734] Interview with Hlengiwe Ncube, Wuwana Village: 15th October, 2015.

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pass public scrutiny by villagers where those victims came from. The plausible reason for guerrillas' actions was to subjugate villagers through fear.

Hlengiwe blamed this difficult situation on the district's border with Botswana as the source of their problems with both guerrillas and the Rhodesian army. She said the border, by virtue of being porous, in her own words, 'meaningless border', allowed ZIPRA guerrillas free reign in accessing their communities.[735] In the context of the escalating guerrilla war, Hlengiwe insinuated that the persistent presence of guerrillas in turn attracted the security forces. Security forces hunted guerrillas who lived among and within villagers.[736] Given this state of affairs, youths such as Hlengiwe found themselves unconditionally at the service of ZIPRA guerrillas. Unconditional in the sense that the 'wiping out' of her entire homestead made Hlengiwe realise that security forces were the people's enemy.[737] Her bitterness stemmed from the cold-bloodedness displayed by the army when they torched her home to ashes. To Hlengiwe, no sane person could do what she witnessed the army do to her homestead. 'They acted like they were possessed, shooting and shelling all our huts indiscriminately, without pausing to reflect whether the aged, small little babes, the crippled or the sick were inside those huts. They were ruthlessly shelling with their big guns from helicopters.'[738] Hlengiwe's tale is one of the many tales that have gone untold in the historiography of the guerrilla war.

No doubt, embedded in those soldiers' minds was the belief that they were destroying one of the sources of terrorists' livelihoods, of their up keep and their hide-out. Little did they know that the eradication of Bulilima communities' support of ZIPRA guerrillas was an arduous task that could not be achieved through such abhorrent destruction of villagers' property.

In a related incident, Inothi Ncube narrated his horrific experience thus,

> My parents were arrested and taken to prison for assisting guerrillas. Our homestead was burnt down, all our food, clothes everything we possessed.

[735] *Ibid.*
[736] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016; Clement Ncube, Phumuza Village: 23rd March, 2016 and Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.
[737] Interview with Hlengiwe Ncube, Wuwana Village: 15th October, 2015.
[738] *Ibid*.

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> Following this incident, guerrillas called a meeting and referring to their note books, began calling names of those suspected to be sell-outs. All those called were summarily executed without trial.[739]

Hlengiwe and Inothi's experiences help explain why youths overzealously collaborated with ZIPRA guerrillas as opposed to Rhodesian security forces in Bulilima. This is also reflected in Levy Ngwenya's utterance,

> I chose to remain fighting the war internally. As youths we had special duties that we carried in the liberation struggle. We were eyes and ears of freedom fighters. When the army entered our district, we youths spread information quickly so that our brothers [guerrillas] would know which step to take. We were also responsible for cleaning guns. When a gang of guerrillas left for other parts of the country, they left us with some weapons, like land mines, to put them into use if the enemy should come.[740]

Salient in Levy's account is guerrillas' militarisation of youths so that they could fight guerrillas' battles in their absence. The planting of land mines and other military drills youths were subjected to by ZIPRA guerrillas,[741] was tantamount to establishing an informal guerrilla army reserve that served to sabotage and curtail the security forces' mobility in rural areas through planting of landmines.

Unfortunately, the landmines youths planted not only destroyed and maimed security personnel, they also killed unsuspecting and innocent village road users. This was so in Matshinge when a mine planted by youths there killed a father of twelve children, destroyed his scotch cart and all six donkeys drawing it.[742] Such terrible incidents are testimony to the short comings of guerrilla tactics in Bulilima in their campaign against the Rhodesian army. In addition, such military endeavours by youths falsely emboldened their egos. As Hayes, *et al*., put it, 'Boys acted as enforcers, 'disciplining' people who were thought to be uncooperative or had 'sold out'.[743] Instead of applauding youths in the

[739] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p.75.
[740] *Ibid*. p. 76.
[741] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 31st March, 2016.
[742] Interview with Mrs. Angeline Ngwenya, Makhulela Village: 17th July, 2015.
[743] P. Hayes, *et al., Children of History*, Harare, 1992. p. 76.

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process of executing their 'official duties' as mandated by guerrillas, Bulilima villagers saw a bunch of recalcitrant fools clinging to their ignorance of why the country was at war. Hlengiwe concurred with this view,

> The majority of us, particularly male youths, became unruly, disobeying elderly advice in the name of fighting the war with '*Obhuti*'. Parents dared not argue, least they incurred '*Obhuti*'s wrath. They boasted that *Obhuti* wanted them to do their work effectively whenever they harassed people. Anyone they did not know in our community was in serious trouble. Youths would beat him up and then take him to guerrillas. Youths had so much power and influence in our place. The problem was that we were only answerable to ZIPRA guerrillas. Our parents lost total control over us. Some of us kept guns and bombs hidden in granaries.[744]

By keeping guerrilla ammunition in their homes, youths saw themselves as part of the ZIPRA guerrilla movement. Bulilima youths collectively developed a sense of superiority and dominance in their communities.

This was exhibited when, for example, Mbila Village youths 'arrested' a man from Gwambe Village who they did not know.[745] Upon being questioned by Mbila youths, (their names supplied) the man responded in a not so satisfactory way and was then taken to guerrillas who were at Joli Village. He was handed over to the ultimate authority, who by that time were drunk as there was an *indale* beer drinking party *ko Naka Sigabadi*. Guerrillas, under the influence of alcohol, questioned the 'suspect' and, just like Mbila youths, did not believe his narration. Unlike the Mbila youths, they shot the 'suspect' dead after ordering him to run home for his dear life.[746] Bigboy's account reflects a sad reality of how some people lost their precious lives over small issues that only needed a full and proper application of the mind. That stranger's death also reveals ZIPRA guerrillas' (operating in Bulilima District) lack of discipline, investigative skills and, above all, patience. Lack of patience in the sense that guerrillas, in their trained wisdom, should

[744] Interview with Hlengiwe Ncube, Wuwana Village: 15th October, 2015.
[745] It later came to light after the war that the man was actually sent by guerrillas in his area to pass intelligence information to their counter parts who were supposed to be at Mbila Village around that time. This was revealed by the late youth's brothers when they exhumed his remains after the war. Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015.
[746] *Ibid.*

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have sent youths to Gwambe to verify the authenticity of the 'suspect's' story before murdering him. As it later became clear, the man was indeed sent by ZIPRA guerrillas who were at Gwambe to pass on information to their colleagues who were supposed to be at Mbila.[747] As it turned out, (unfortunately for the hapless stranger) 'bush martial law' prevailed over 'trained wisdom', hence the stranger was used as 'target practice'.

Guerrillas' trigger happiness was corroborated by Khuli Mathulela Sibanda of Tshehanga who said,

> Guerrillas took exception to those who were suspected of being sell-outs. I experienced first-hand executions of people suspected to be sell-outs. People were executed in the presence of the community to deter would be sell-outs. Unfortunately for some, their cases were not well researched. People were sometimes killed without any evidence that proved their wrong doing.[748]

Khuli's account strengthens what other interviewees pointed out, the abuse of youths and villagers by those who purported to be their liberators. Given guerrillas' quick reactions in dealing with those suspected of selling them out, suffice it to say that sell-outs, by implication, compromised guerrillas' cover. Further, sell-outs not only compromised guerrillas' cover, but also led to the death of innocent villagers and the destruction of their property by the army. Hlengiwe's case and that of Karoi villagers are typical examples of mass killings caused by selling-out. Within this understanding, one would forgive guerrillas for their inflexible attitude towards sell-outs.

Sell-outs, by intent, imperiled guerrillas' lives within Bulilima District's communities. On the other hand guerrillas, through dependence, worried and haunted Bulilima female youths and by extension, villagers. Alexander summed this thus, 'Guerrillas became a debilitating drain on rural resources; their demands extended to alcohol and access to young women and they used violence more frequently against civilians.'[749] In the context of competing forces, therefore, violence was used to cower villagers into submission.

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[747] Interview with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 8th May, 2015 and Gogo Na Nkosana Ncube (one of the witnesses to the callous murder of the unfortunate man in question), Joli Village: 27th August, 2016.
[748] Interview with Khuli Mathulela Sibanda, Tshehanga Village: 2nd January, 2016.
[749] J. Alexander, Things Fall Apart. The Centre Can Hold. Process of Post-War Political Change in Zimbabwe's Rural Areas, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Harare, 1996. pp. 175 – 191.

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With regard to guerrilla presence in his area, Khuli recalled,

> My area, (Tshehanga) was frequented by guerrillas. Hardly two weeks passed without guerrillas announcing their presence in the area or nearby villages. As youths, we easily identified with guerrillas since they relied heavily on our services that included, among other things, carrying their luggage, being their eyes and ears, cooking for them, buying cigarettes and guarding them when they were around in order to pass on information quickly about the movement of security forces in the area.[750]

The salient issues raised by Khuli here are those that involved him and his fellow youths quickly reactivating the 'bush telegraph' (as pointed out by Bob North earlier) when guerrillas were around and their playing 'security guards' to protect the insurgents from any surprise attacks by counter-insurgents.

To cap Khuli's narration, Brickhill reiterates that ZIPRA's logistical support was organised and provided for by youths in collaboration with their parents.[751] Guerrillas' reliance on youths as their guards created, within youth organisations in Bulilima, a belief and understanding that they were the sole protectors of the freedom fighters. The self-styled title and position of 'guerrilla protectors' inadvertently turned Bulilima youths into a reprobate group in the eyes of their parents. In Wuwana, for example, villagers had washed their hands of youths as they tended to terrorise innocent people in the name of guerrillas.[752] In other words, Wuwana's youths had become a proverbial 'Third Force' in distabilising the lives of villagers there. Youths' behaviour was clearly influenced by guerrillas, directly or otherwise.

Khuli explained guerrilla influence in this way,

> Guerrillas would come into the area and introduce themselves as freedom fighters. After getting political lessons from them, we were left with no option but get involved in the struggle. The thought of freedom, and schools reopening appealed

[750] Interview with Khuli Mathulela Sibanda, Tshehanga Village: 2nd January, 2016.
[751] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War.* Harare, 1996. pp. 48 – 70.
[752] Interview with Hlengiwe Ncube, Wuwana Village: 15th October, 2015.

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> to me. As such, I had to do whatever errand was assigned to me regardless of the dangers lurking in the air, or what my parents would think of me.[753]

Bulilima youths owed their involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation to the constant presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in the district. The ever presence of guerrillas in Bulilima District was due to their regular use of the Botswana border for their entry and exit in and out of the country.[754] Not only did guerrillas use the border as their link to the outside world, the border was also used by guerrillas to establish themselves in Bulilima District. In addition, the border was used by Bulilima youths to take wounded guerrillas across the border for medical attention using scotch carts.[755] Youths also used the border to buy groceries for guerrillas in Botswana.[756]

Bulilima youths were involved in every aspect of the ZIPRA guerrillas' lives during the liberation struggle years. Khuli added, 'As a youth, I was part of every activity that was meant to assist guerrillas. As pointed out earlier, we would inform guerrillas about the movements of soldiers in our area, help cook for them, washed their clothing and did any chores assigned to me by '*Obhuti*'.[757] Given the above facts, it is no doubt that Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was heavily influenced by the presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in the district. The ever presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in the district, itself born out of the international border that was porous in nature and accessible traditionally, appealed to youths who contemplated joining the liberation struggle to find something meaningful to do with their idle lives after a few years of primary schooling.

'I guess the dream of carrying a gun one day after seeing the guerrillas gun toting was a defining moment for me to get involved and participate on behalf of guerrillas,'[758] concurred Khuli. This implies that by being involved with guerrillas, Bulilima youths saw themselves progressively becoming guerrillas as well. To Khuli, guerrillas who operated in his village were his role models. Acting as a stimulus to Khuli's young and innocent

[753] Interview with Khuli Mathulela Sibanda, Tshehanga Village: 2nd January, 2016.
[754] *Ibid*.
[755] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.
[756] *Ibid*.
[757] Interview with Khuli Mathulela Sibanda, Tshehanga Village: 2nd January, 2016.
[758] *Ibid*.

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ego, gun wielding guerrillas drove him into participating in the struggle as an initiation process for a bigger picture, training as a ZIPRA guerrilla in Zambia.

On the issue of the porous border, Cosmas said, 'The Botswana border was so significant to us and '*Obhuti*'. It had no fence by that time and soldiers were afraid of it. They believed that guerrillas were too many at the border. We bought food, cigarettes and sugar for guerrillas' use across the border in Botswana.[759] The fear by security forces to patrol the border was the manifestation of the frequency with which guerrillas used the border, hence the impression that there were too many guerrilla bases along the border. The *laissez-fair* situation that obtained along the border resulted in tens of thousands of Bulilima youths getting involved and participating in Zimbabwe's armed conflict. The involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in that struggle was in three categories; those who got involved in the struggle as youth at home, those who were refugees in Botswana and Zambia, and those who were guerrillas.

Having presented and discussed data collected from the first category of youths, the following section concludes this Chapter.

4.3 Conclusion

Bulilima youths who were at home during the struggle years found themselves at the receiving end of the guerrilla war. This is particularly true of female youths who were exposed to guerrilla brutality. ZIPRA guerrillas utilised the Botswana border to access Bulilima District. Realising their break-through, the district became awash with guerrillas who used it as their sanctuary. In all this, growing children of twelve years and above were incorporated into a guerrilla youth system whose functions later left villagers horrified. Starved of sex during their stay in bush camps, ZIPRA guerrillas took advantage of hapless sexually immature girls to satisfy their sexual urges.

Not to be outdone by guerrillas' waywardness, the security forces came in with their own mode of operation, 'cleaning of Bulilima District of insurgents and their backers'. Using

[759] Interview with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 3rd April, 2016.

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this philosophy, which however lacked erudition in as far as understanding and appreciating the hopelessness of youths and villagers regarding guerrilla support, villages were burnt, villagers killed, arrested and tortured endlessly. Bulilima burned as more and more guerrillas were infiltrated into the district. Realising their vulnerability to security forces who mostly operated from Plumtree and garrisoned camps such as Madlambudzi, guerrillas turned more to youths for their safety. Eager to prove their mettle, youths overzealously controlled communities, brutalised anybody and everybody in the name of '*Obhuti*'. Villagers watched helplessly as their children became beasts incarnate.

Bulilima youths who were at home during the liberation struggle created waves within their communities in the name of helping guerrillas. Based on what they said above, it is worthwhile to hear how those who joined the struggle in neighbouring countries helped liberate the Zimbabwe. This is discussed in the next Chapter.

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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION – YOUTH WHO HAD JOINED THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

5.1 Introduction

The Smith regime's uncompromising stance against the implementation of the one man one vote principle in the country created a hopeless situation for Zimbabwean nationalists. The UDI left them with no choice but to embark on a guerrilla war. In the case of ZAPU, it looked to Bulilima youths to spearhead its guerrilla campaign. Using Bulilima District as its major recruitment area, ZIPRA initiated a region-wide recruitment campaign that saw thousands of youths joining the liberation struggle in Botswana and Zambia. [760] Bulilima District was hardest hit, providing the bulk of new recruits for guerrilla war purposes. This was ably facilitated by the Botswana border which made it easy for ZIPRA guerrillas to enter and exit the country at will. Given this situation, Bulilima was nearly swept clean of its youths. It is within this context that this Chapter presents and discusses data obtained from Bulilima youths who had joined the struggle in Botswana and Zambia. The Chapter is divided into two sections, data discussion and the conclusion.

5.2 Bulilima Youths Who Were Refugees and those Who Were Guerrillas[761]

Male youths who remained at home during the liberation struggle seemed to have enjoyed their involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. The

[760] From what the interviewees said about the locations of their refuge camps, (some deep in Zambia's rainy forests), these camps were generally situated in the bush. In order to enhance our understanding and appreciation of the hardships Bulilima youths faced in refuge camps, the study felt it appropriate and befitting to, from here forthwith, call these refuge camps, 'bush camps'.

[761] The term 'refugees' generally refers to individuals who are victims of natural disasters; who flee their areas because of religious problems; and who flee their country due to political and social instability. In the case of this study, 'refugees' refers to Bulilima youths who had fled Bulilima District and joined the country's liberation struggle either in Botswana or Zambia due to the political and social situation that obtained in the district then.

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opposite is true of female youths.[762] All female interviewees expressed displeasure at the way they were treated by both guerrillas and security forces. Their participation in this guerrilla war was not voluntary. They were coerced into doing whatever they did during the armed struggle.

Meanwhile, Bulilima District had several thousands of its youths who had joined the struggle in Botswana and Zambia. Out of these, some were refugees while others trained as guerrillas proper and infiltrated Rhodesia to fight the security forces while others were sentries in bush camps. This section discusses data collected from the above sets of interviewees. This is how they responded during the interviews.

MaMoyo[763] said of her joining the liberation struggle, 'I joined the liberation struggle to liberate my country from colonialism, oppression, racial segregation and discrimination in all spheres of life, that is, economic, social and political domains.'[764] Her realisation that they were oppressed as black people motivated her into joining the liberation struggle in Zambia. Asked what made her join the war, MaMoyo responded thus, 'I was recruited by ZIPRA guerrillas who took us across the Botswana border and left us there. While in Botswana, those guerrillas pretended they did not know us. They had also instructed us to act as such.'[765] Her information provided several insights into what was going on then.

First, ZIPRA guerrillas used the Botswana border to enter, recruit youths for war, then retraced their way back into Botswana with their recruits unscathed. The ease with which the whole process was done shows that the Botswana border provided the best frontier for ZIPRA infiltration into the country …[766] This way, the Botswana border played a key role in enabling Bulilima youths to join the guerrilla war. 'Yes, the Botswana border helped

[762] Interview with Sikhathele Gumede, Ndolwane Village: 5th May, 2015; Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 24th March, 2016; Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016; Sithokozile Zaba, Ntoli Village: 1st April, 2016 and Ali Joli Ncube, Diba Village: 2nd February, 2016.
[763] Miss. Moyo was not comfortable providing her first name to the interviewer since she is an active member of ZANU (PF). She believed giving her identity here would compromise her party position. Throughout the study, therefore, Miss. Moyo is referred to as MaMoyo.
[764] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015.
[765] *Ibid*.
[766] http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjss20. W.G. Morapedi, The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960 – 1979, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 38:1. pp. 73 – 90.

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us to cross into Botswana safely to join the liberation struggle,'[767] asserted MaMoyo. If it was easy and safe to enter Botswana clandestinely, the same applied to the SB and CIO operatives. This posed danger to Bulilima youths in Botswana's holding camps.

Second, by pretending they did not know each other, guerrillas and their recruits showed fear of being identified by Rhodesian security agents posing as refugees and those infiltrated into ZAPU as officials.[768] This was because agents of SB and CIO also operated in Botswana as refugees (from garrisoned base camps such as Madlambudzi).[769] Generally, Bulilima youths who crossed into Botswana to join the struggle were not safe as they could be abducted and tortured by SB operatives in Botswana.[770] There was a tendency by SB to secretly abduct youths who were suspected of collaborating with guerrillas, either at home in rural and urban areas or in neighbouring countries that housed Zimbabwean refugees.[771] Ellert notes that, 'Special Branch also ran sources in Botswana and Zambia who provided information on external nationalists …'[772] MaMoyo's safety lay on how she conducted herself while in Francistown's holding camps.

She admits that the ease with which people could cross into and out of the country through the Botswana border heavily influenced most Bulilima youths to join the struggle. Quizzed further as to why she decided to join the struggle, MaMoyo said,

> I was encouraged by Radio Mthwakazi, a popular station among black people from Matabeleland. The station used to announce or publicise the benefits of joining the liberation struggle. Some of the station's catch phrases were; '*White people took our land, we have to get it back'*; and, *'The only available option is to join the war.*'

[767] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015.
[768] For a detailed analysis of the SB, CIO and SS operations in Botswana, see P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.
[769] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 114.
[770] P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16. In this case, Ethan Dube, one of ZAPU officials stationed in Gaborone, was abducted by SB and taken back to Rhodesia never to be seen again.
[771] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015 and P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.
[772] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*. Gweru, 1989. p. 20.

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> Through such persuasive language, one was encouraged and motivated to join the struggle. That is how I volunteered to be recruited by ZIPRA.[773]

MaMoyo's narration reflects the power of propaganda when effectively used through mass media platforms such as radio stations.

In addition, MaMoyo's account informs us about the desperate situation ZAPU found itself in with regard to youths needed to train as ZIPRA combatants. This desperate situation is best reflected in the following statement, 'We were bombarded with outcries from the political leadership both inside and outside the country, [who] were getting impatient with what they considered to be our delay in launching the armed struggle.'[774] Such delays were as a result of the shortage of recruits in addition to logistical and organisational dilemmas faced by ZAPU's external War Council. This further explains why districts bordering Botswana such as Bulilima were nearly swept clean of their youths by ZIPRA's recruitment drives.

MaMoyo added that their recruiters took them through the Botswana border to Francistown where they were registered. She stayed a few weeks in Botswana after which she was flown to Zambia. In Zambia, MaMoyo was taken to Victory Camp (VC).[775] She had fulfilled her dream of joining the liberation struggle. That is, Zambia had ZAPU HQ and guerrilla training facilities. Basically, all decisions as to who should do what, when and how were made in Zambia. ZIPRA guerrillas' mission, in addition to fighting the enemy forces, was to work with ZAPU officials in recruiting and sending people to Zambia for military training.[776] This was in contrast to Botswana which did not provide such privileges to any liberation movement in Southern Africa. Botswana only provided refugee transit camps in Francistown and Selebi Pikwe.[777] Botswana's reluctance to provide

[773] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015.
[774] Akim Ndlovu, first ZAPU army commander, quoted by N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 18.
[775] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015.
[776] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 17.
[777] Botswana did not provide guerrilla training facilities to ZAPU for fear of antagonising its two white settler ruled neighbours, South Africa and Rhodesia. W.G. Morapedi, The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960 – 1979, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 38:1. pp. 73 – 90.

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military support to Zimbabwe's liberation movements should be seen in light of its economic dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa.[778]

Not all FLS were in a position to provide military support, however. A hostage state like Botswana, for example, economically dependent on South Africa and Rhodesia, could not antagonise its neighbours by openly supporting the region's armed struggles or allowing liberation movements to use its territory to launch military attacks.[779] In fact, any armed personnel seen in Botswana were promptly arrested and deported out of the country. In partly explaining one of the major reasons for the SAANC - ZAPU alliance of the late 1960s, Bhebe observes that, 'Furthermore the [SA] ANC, in pleading with ZAPU for the formation of an alliance, pointed out that their guerrillas who tried to pass through Botswana … and were still in no position to do anything that might be interpreted as hostile to South Africa, were often intercepted by Botswana Police and returned to Zambia.'[780] Botswana's stance flew in the face of the FLS's mandate to liberate Southern Africa from colonial domination and rule. It was then left to Zambia to shoulder the burden of facilitating ZIPRA training and accommodation, notwithstanding consequences that came with such an undertaking.

Proceeding to Zambia meant that one's chances of being selected for guerrilla training were brighter than when one was in Botswana. Generally, selection for one to proceed to Zambia was based on one's athleticism. 'To go to Zambia, one was chosen according to physical appearance. If one was heavily built and tall, one was chosen to go to Zambia. I cannot say age because we had no documentation [to verify one's age]. I was one of the lucky ones chosen to train as a guerrilla at Mkushi.[781] We trained on guerrilla warfare.'[782] In the absence of documentation to verify one's age, ZIPRA had child guerrillas. This

[778] P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16. Mgadla and Morapedi discuss Botswana's position here clearly, hence they should be consulted for one to appreciate the country's decision on this matter.
[779] W.G. Morapedi, The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960 – 1979, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 38:1. pp. 73 – 90.
[780] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 21.
[781] It should be noted that ZIPRA officials, for reasons known to themselves, preferred males to females for guerrilla training.
[782] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April 2015.

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implies that under-aged individuals whose body frames appealed to the selectors became guerrillas, hence child-soldiers. The onset of the armed struggle saw massive recruitment of youths to undergo military training in Zambia and elsewhere.[783]

Quizzed as to how youths in Zambia participated in the struggle, MaMoyo said that youths were for logistics, others were trained as commissars who provided news about what was happening in Zimbabwe. This was mainly good things about the effectiveness of our guerrillas in the war-front so that everyone was motivated and encouraged to stay on despite hardships we faced on a daily basis. Propaganda played a very important role in keeping us together throughout the struggle years.[784] Once in Zambia, youths were put into effective use to serve the interests of the party. At that point, what ZAPU needed was unity of purpose and solidarity among its multitude of underserviced refugees.

ZAPU youths remained united in the face of mounting set-backs inflicted by the government forces on the war-front,[785] and the party's own internal conflicts that threatened to tear it apart,[786] and indeed did so in the early 1970s.[787] From a critical point of view, youths were used to depict a semblance of peaceful cohesion, prosperity and unity within ZAPU's external structures in Zambia. MaMoyo recalls, 'Commissars listened to news, then told us only good things as a means of encouraging us to soldier on.'[788] In other words, youths in ZAPU's holding camps in Botswana and bush camps in Zambia and elsewhere received 'doctored' news tailor-made to raise their waning enthusiasm in as far as participating in the liberation struggle was concerned. This was also to project ZIPRA guerrillas fighting in the country as having an upper hand in their fight against the Rhodesian army. Crudely put, ZAPU officials in exile fed youths lies in order to gain their loyalty, support and zeal to retain their fighting spirit in the face of mounting odds against the Rhodesian security forces.

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[783] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 202.
[784] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April 2015.
[785] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 162.
[786] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 25.
[787] *Ibid*. pp. 204, 205 and 206.
[788] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April 2015.

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MaMoyo commented, 'There is no joy or happiness when fighting. At first, youths did not realise that war had rules. We thought that after the war people would live in big houses, own farms, companies, stores, work where they wanted, drive own cars and practically enjoy that which was enjoyed by white people.'[789] Based on this, there is no doubt that in the majority of cases, youths joined the war for material gain. School-going youths thought that it was a matter of them reaching Zambia, get trained as guerrillas and go back home to liberate Zimbabwe.[790] Little did they know that Zambia would turn out to be a baptism of fire, a place of agony, misery, gnashing of teeth and suffering of the worst order. To keep their spirits up, at the same time dealing with monumental and morally damaging set-backs, MaMoyo said of youths,

> Through singing revolutionary songs, we rejuvenated our dying spirits and eagerness to be in Zambia. We used to run around singing liberation songs that kept us focused on why we were in Zambia. This way, we were constantly rejuvenated and captivated in refugee camps.[791]

In fact, youths in bush camps did more than just sing. Some of their duties included, among others,

> Carrying 50kg bags of maize-meal during rainy season when trucks were stuck in the mud or could not access refugee camps situated deep in the Zambian forests. In the process we got soaked wet with our heavy loads. Youths in the refugee camps participated in the liberation struggle in various ways. We produced various items such as clothing, food, camping materials, spreading of propaganda as well as practically fighting Rhodesian soldiers as guerrillas.[792]

In short, youths were responsible for their stay and upkeep in Zambian bush camps. In addition, youths in bush camps were made to see their suffering as a direct consequence of the Smith government in Rhodesia. This had the intended result of stoking youths' emotional furry, anger and hatred towards anything white in Rhodesia. That way, they

[789] *Ibid*.
[790] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 165.
[791] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April 2015.
[792] *Ibid*.

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viewed their suffering and misery in bush camps as a stepping stone towards future happiness.

The participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war (while in Zambia) differed according to gender, age and one's level of education. Once in Zambia age determined what one was to do, for example, grown up youths were sent for guerrilla training while children were destined for school. In addition, female youths had specific responsibilities such as sewing and knitting of garments while males did carpentry, dug trenches and other related heavy duty tasks.[793] These activities were designed to keep youths focused on fighting the enemy, the Smith regime.

David Hlabano of Mangubo explained youths' contribution to the struggle thus,

> In Zambia, youths helped the struggle through the provision of clothes, food and other items of necessity to adults in camps. We shared with our trained colleagues, adults and elderly people since the United Nations Organisation (UNO) assisted mainly youths. We indirectly provided, through the UNO, food to adult refugees. Another issue was that the presence of children and young people (we had children as young as seven years old) in refugee camps weighed heavily in favour of the party (ZAPU), because it was easy for anybody to feel pity for children, hence offer any form of assistance. A brother to one of our current Cabinet Ministers, Prof. Jonathan Moyo, for example, had a farm adjacent to our camp, (J.Z. Camp) and he would, occasionally donate beef to us.[794]

Youths' presence in bush camps invoked sympathy, empathy and pity from well-wishers who were compelled by misery, poverty and despicable conditions under which youths lived and survived to donate in cash or kind. Leading the donor community was the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Eastern Bloc countries led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Sweden (a capitalist orientated country with a socialist government that was pro-liberation movements in Southern Africa). Sweden provided the largest financial support to the two main liberation movements of

[793] C. Ndebele, Socialist Curriculum Development and Implementation in Zimbabwe from 1980 - 2004: With special reference to Education with Production Model and Social Studies and History Curriculum. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Fort Hare University, 2007. p. 9.
[794] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.

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the country.[795] Youths' invaluable service to the party this way ensured that guerrilla trainees were fed and clothed during their training sessions.

David Hlabano also explained Bulilima youths' participation in the country's liberation struggle while in Zambia, in terms of education. He recalled thus,

> In Zambia, we were taken to J.Z. Camp where a school for young refugees was opened. It was called J.Z. School for Boys. We formulated and implemented our own curriculum, but initially, we used the Zambian Government's curricula including their text books. We then realised that its standard and depth were below that of Rhodesia or our expectations as a liberation movement. This necessitated the formulation of our own brand of curricula that was in line with our aspirations and expectations as a party. The curricula were designed, formulated and implemented by youthful teachers who had joined the liberation struggle. Coincidentally, the majority of those teachers were from Bulilima-Mangwe District, including my father.[796]

The issue of schooling was very crucial to ZAPU if the party was to be forward looking in terms of administering the country at a later stage. The country, let alone the administration of liberated zones, required educated civil servants who would be expected to run civil services professionally and efficiently. In the northern parts of the country, for example, ZIPRA guerrillas had created semi-liberated zones.[797] Such areas urgently called for party administration. ZAPU's objective was to restore civil administration in liberated zones and reopen schools which had been closed because of war.[798] In addition, ZAPU recruited schooled youths (those few who had managed to complete their 'O' and 'A' Levels) for its specialised programmes such as jet-fighter pilots, mechanical engineers, medical personnel, regular army strategists and army technicians, among others for further training abroad.[799] In this case, youthful teachers such as David's father

[795] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 167.
[796] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[797] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 108.
[798] D. Dabengwa, ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 24 – 35.
[799] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 207.

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and Rambofeni and two of his former colleagues (Gwanda) used their educational backgrounds to help establish schools in bush camps.[800]

A similar scenario could be observed being implemented within ZANU run bush camps in Mozambique by refugees with educational background such as Fay Chung. Writing about the establishment of an education department in Mozambique's bush camps Chung comments,

> Schools started immediately with whatever materials were available. There were no text books, exercise books or black boards. Instead, the card board boxes that came from Norway through the World Food Programme … were the only available school materials. Charcoal and card board became chalk and black boards, the pencils, and exercise books for the eager teachers and children. Children usually wrote words in the sand with their fingers. [801]

ZANU's schools in the bush began in a similar pattern to ZAPU's, bush curricula designed by displaced teachers under trees, in rainy and stormy conditions, dwarfed only by the camps' misery, poverty and chronic starvations in alarming proportions. This is but one of the examples of the difficulties Bulilima youths faced in their endeavors to free their country. Bulilima youths were influenced by ZIPRA to join the liberation struggle. Guerrillas mobilised them through meetings where they told youths about Smith's bad government and how black people were racially segregated, oppressed and discriminated against. ZIPRA guerrillas were so many in Bulilima, moving in small groups.[802]

The presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in large numbers helps explain the ease with which they could cross into and out of the country through the Botswana border. Recruitment through Botswana had become an established system.[803] This was further illustrated by

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[800] Rambofeni was the Head Teacher of Shashi Primary School who became heavily involved in recruiting Gwanda youths for ZIPRA training in Zambia. His association with ZAPU and ZIPRA this way landed him in serious trouble with the Gwanda Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and, for fear for his life, Rambofeni joined the struggle through Botswana. A detailed analysis of his political activities in rural Gwanda is provided by N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999.

[801] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 203.

[802] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.

[803] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 164.

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David when he pointed out that after being convinced by guerrillas to join the struggle, they took the initiative to mobilise themselves and crossed the Ramakwebane River, then the Botswana border 'where we were warmly welcomed by Batswana villagers who took us to Tsetsebe Police Station. The police also welcomed us nicely and fed us [as well]. In fact, they were now used to welcoming large groups of youths and adults alike from Rhodesia going to war. The next morning, we were taken by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) trucks to Francistown where there were ZAPU transit camps.'[804] The above narration points to a well-organised, coordinated and effective ZIPRA recruitment system from Bulilima District to holding camps in Francistown and Selebi Pikwe.

This movement is corroborated by Rambofeni who states that the BDF made it their duty to use their trucks to transport multitudes of refugees from the Kobojango to Francistown en-route to Zambia.[805] The efficiency with which the Botswana people assisted Bulilima youths could be further attributed to the solidarity the Batswana citizens showed to the Zimbabweans. By allowing its army trucks and Police Stations to be involved in assisting Zimbabweans as they sought to join the liberation struggle, at the same time arresting armed personnel found on its territory, the Botswana government was playing a balancing act.[806] That is, it wanted to please both the Rhodesian and South African governments,[807] at the same time seemingly pushing both the FLS and the OAU's agenda of assisting liberation movements in Southern Africa.[808] That is, Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, while reluctant to allow the creation of ZIPRA bases in Botswana because of his rail links with Rhodesia, did agree to set up transition camps to hold recruits before they were flown to Zambia for training.[809] This way, Botswana managed to secure and maintain its luke-

[804] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[805] Rambofeni in an interview with N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 164.
[806] W.G. Morapedi, The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960 – 1979, in *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 38:1. pp. 73 – 90.
[807] See Mgadla and Morapedi for Botswana government's position in this regard.
[808] The FLS were Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia before 1975. Mozambique became part of the system after attaining its independence in 1975. J. Ciment and K. Hill, (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since WWII*. Vol. II. London, 1999. p. 1293; J.R.T. Wood, *The War Diaries of Andre' Dennison*. Gibraltar, 1989. p. 21 and F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 105.
[809] M. Evans, *Fighting against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 1979*. Harare, 1981. p. 7.

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warm relationships with the South African and Rhodesian governments on one side, and the Zimbabwe liberation movements, the other FLS and the OAU on the other.

David did not stay long in Selebi Pikwe. After a week he was flown to Zambia where he feels he contributed a lot towards the liberation of this country. He was grateful for the accessibility of the Botswana border. In his own words, 'The Botswana border motivated us to join the struggle. It was porous, no fence and no Rhodesian Soldiers at certain points. It was more favourable to us. The Batswana Police and their BDF cousins assisted, hence we crossed freely, under their protection, in fact.'[810] The massive support Bulilima youths got from BaKalanga communities in Botswana underpins the important role played by Botswana border towards the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the country's liberation struggle. Not only did such help motivate and encourage Bulilima youths into joining the liberation struggle, it also led to ZIPRA guerrillas opening up a new Southern Front to launch their attacks on the Smith regime.[811] Given this help, it is no surprise that several thousands of Bulilima youths joined the armed struggle in Botswana and Zambia. This way, the Botswana border was helpful in their involvement.

On his actual participation in the struggle, David said that he did so in two phases – first as a youth at home and second, as a youth in a refuge camp. David explained proudly,

> While at home we provided vital information to guerrillas, we politicised people on the need to support guerrillas. We also assisted other youths who came from other districts like Kezi, Gwanda, Bulawayo, Beit Bridge and Tsholotsho who did not know about Bulilima-Mangwe and the safe crossing spots along the border. That is, Police camps were situated along the border so as to deter people's movements from Rhodesia to Botswana [unofficially]. Our role as youths was to guide and assist those who wanted to cross and join the war in Botswana and Zambia.[812]

David and his colleagues were turned into political commissars by guerrillas. At the same time, they were guides to potential ZIPRA recruits from other districts who did not know their way around Bulilima. This partly explains why ZIPRA left the politicisation of the

[810] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[811] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 107.
[812] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.

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masses to ZAPU structures when contrasted with ZANLA guerrillas. ZAPU structures specialised in political mobilisation of peasants.[813] Given such opportunities, youths such as David did not disappoint in their new positions of responsibility.

Guerrillas provided Bulilima youths with some form of occupation where before they had been idle.[814] Youths' idle lives became ZIPRA guerrillas' 'wind-fall', if one is to consider the massive work Bulilima youths did for and on behalf of those combatants. Guerrilla recruitment became intensive from inside the country and it centred on the unemployed school leavers.[815] Finding something worthwhile to do on behalf of ZIPRA inspired and motivated David and company. Concurring with the above, it is noted that tens of thousands of school children, some with 'O' Level– left school each year and were unable to get a job, hence were producing many new recruits who made their way to Zambia.[816] It is within this context that David and other Bulilima youths became enmeshed in guerrilla related activities in Bulilima District.

David went further, pointing out that in addition to political education, they escorted guerrillas on their way to Botswana (repeating this to hammer the point home) to collect ammunition in Zambia. In this case, guerrillas were disguised as youths. Youths helped guerrillas this way because 'we knew our way around here (border) and we were always up-to-date with the movements and whereabouts of security forces at any given time', adding, 'we also provided 'intelligence' information to guerrillas and other youths who were crossing into Botswana.'[817] David's excitement could be clearly observed as he

[813] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 - 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 92; N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 121; S. Rule, *Electroral Territoriality in Southern Africa*. Aldershort, 2000. p. 117 and J. Tungamirai, Recruitment to ZANLA: Building up a War Machine, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 36 – 45.
[814] It should be noted that during the mid-1960s onwards, there was rapid unemployment in Southern Rhodesia (then Rhodesia, 1970) due to international sanctions imposed on the country due to Smith's UDI. Throughout the country, youths faced massive unemployment which was exacerbated by the sanctions induced economic melt-down. As a result of these factors, youths found themselves stranded on the job market, without jobs, hence their idle lives. For this and more on the country's unemployed youths, see N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999 and E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012, among others.
[815] A.A. Mazrui and M. Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London, 1984. p. 146.
[816] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI.* London, 1975. p. 6 and I. Phimister, The Combined and Contradictory Inheritance of the Struggle against Colonialism, in C. Stoneman, (Ed.), *Zimbabwe's Prospects. Issues of Race, Class, State, and Capital in Southern Africa*. London, 1988. pp. 8 – 15.
[817] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.

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narrated how they were involved and participated in helping the ZIPRA guerrillas' cause in Bulilima District. Youths' enthusiasm in helping ZIPRA guerrillas stemmed from the fact that they too wanted to be guerrillas, to carry a gun,[818] to be '*Obhuti*'; to control their destiny and, most importantly, to challenge the white man's pillars of supremacy – 'economic and political power'. True to their wish, David and his four ZIPRA 'aspirants' were flown to Zambia, one step closer to becoming trained '*Obhuti*'.

While in Zambia, David elaborates, the presence of tens of thousands of youths in camps enabled guerrillas to obtain assistance in the form of food parcels, medicine, clothes and other provisions necessary for one's upkeep in a camp. He added with a smile, 'If it was not for youths, ZAPU would not have managed to sustain its war efforts as it did not have enough funding to pursue the war against the Smith regime.'[819] Here, David provides a generalised view of youths' roles in the liberation struggle. On what exactly he personally did towards the liberation of the country, David said, 'I was coaching soccer and my team was called Stubborn Buffaloes. I was one of the founders of our league at J. Z. Camp. I was influential in inviting teams from the Zambian local leagues. This was sort of entertainment we had. Everybody was home sick, we all wanted to go back home.'[820] Soccer preoccupied young boys in bush camps in addition to their normal routine schedules. Soccer also became these young boys' link with the outside world, an undertaking they most probably welcomed.

The scenario described by David was in contrast to that of female youths who had no contact with locals as they were far from them.[821] This is an indication of the miserable life female youths led in their isolated bush camps as opposed to male youths who had the luxury of welcoming locals for sporting activities during times of war. According to David, such forms of contact with locals were strategies meant to ensure their safety. 'Soccer matches provided us with vital information such as the whereabouts and

[818] Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016. For more information on guerrilla recruitment, consult N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999.
[819] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[820] *Ibid*.
[821] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015.

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movements of enemy soldiers and their intentions.'[822] This implies that Rhodesian soldiers made commando-style patrols across the Zambian border to intimidate refugees. The reasoning behind such raids by the SS in Zambia and Mozambique was to attack 'terrorists' before they infiltrated Rhodesia.[823] Indeed, in one of such operations, the commandos managed to plant land mines on bushy roads along the Zambian side of the border one of which purportedly killed ZIPRA Commander, Alfred Nikita Mangena in June 1978.[824] SS commandos did operate across both the Botswana and Zambian borders.[825] Their operations inherently posed threats to refugees such as David and colleagues in bush camps. Any information from locals regarding SS commandos' movements was welcome news then.

David summed up their participation in the struggle thus, 'As youths in refugee camps, we fetched water, firewood, built make-shift classrooms, made furniture and formed choirs that provided entertainment and moral support to all those in the war front. There was always an hour of political education.'[826] Here, David describes youths' participation in the struggle collectively. Collectively, youths were able to build make-shift bush schools and furnished them through woodwork ventures, among other such self-help projects offered by ZAPU to its multitude of young refugees.[827] Through youths' efforts, bush camps became both 'sheltered workshops' and 'sheltered schools'. This way, youths pursued their education at the same time engaging in self-reliant but non-remunerated projects within the confines of their grossly uncomfortable camps.[828] Based on David's

[822] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[823] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent to Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 53.
[824] It should be noted that Joseph Alfred Nita Mangena's death became a controversial and highly sensitive issue. Zapu official communique blamed the Rhodesian security forces for his death. The official version, therefore, was that his vehicle (jeep) was blown by a land mine (purportedly planted by the RSF agents) along the Zambian border while he was inspecting ZIPRA base camps there. Some who are privy with ZAPU's goings on then, however, say he was murdered by those who feared and were jealous of him being a powerful and well liked commander by his ZIPRA cadres. This version is from Moses Twala, an MK veteran. For more details here, read 'Tell the Truth about Mangena's Death.' By Thabo Kunene, on Bulawayo News 24.com. Accessed: 7th August, 2016. 12:05.
[825] P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.
[826] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[827] C. Ndebele, Socialist Curriculum Development and Implementation in Zimbabwe from 1980 - 2004: With special reference to Education with Production Model and Social Studies and History Curriculum. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Fort Hare University, 2007. p. 9.
[828] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.

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narration, it is no doubt that ZAPU used youths as a pool from which it would recruit individuals for its divergent programmes as mentioned earlier. That was in Zambian bush camps. Botswana also housed tens of thousands of ZAPU guerrilla hopefuls, purportedly waiting for the day their names would be called among those to be 'transferred' to Zambia, which was every hopeful's dream destination.

Sibongile Tshuma of Kandana is one of many Bulilima refugees who spent their refugee lives in a Francistown holding camp. Her story began,

> I joined the liberation struggle so that I would help liberate my country from colonialism. There were youths who went about mobilising [other] youths to join the struggle. When my sister decided to go '*empini*', I joined her. I could not let my sister go alone as we were close to each other. Male youths mobilised us under ZIPRA instructions. There was a special meeting place for all those mobilised, a place called Ngwana. There were about ten guerrillas waiting for us there.[829]

Here, Sibongile reveals the relationship between ZIPRA guerrillas and Bulilima youths in terms of roles played during ZIPRA's recruitment drives. The issue is that when guerrillas arrived at a village, they identified youth league structures and then instructed the youth leadership to mobilise other youths for recruitment to Zambia for guerrilla training.

Sibongile's revelation is reinforced by the fact that nationalists, in this case guerrillas, relied upon their political alliance with peasants.[830] Such political alliance ensured guerrilla survival in a hostile environment that was further compounded by the presence of peasant sell-outs. Exiled parties increasingly depended on mobilising support in the country side.[831] ZIPRA guerrillas needed the support and loyalty of Bulilima youths. They relied a great deal on party branches and party contact for support during the war.[832] Where guerrillas were not afforded these, they were easy prey to the pillaging security

[829] Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015.
[830] P. Bond and M. Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge. Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice.* Pietermaritzburg, 2002. p. 8.
[831] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 8.
[832] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.

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forces. This was the case with early guerrilla incursions of the 1960s.[833] In Bulilima District, however, ZIPRA guerrillas found an ebullient community towards anything ZAPU.[834] Bulilima youths endeared themselves well to ZIPRA guerrillas.

Sibongile continued her narrative this way,

> From Ngwana, we were taken by six guerrillas who accompanied us to the Botswana border. These guerrillas divided themselves into three pairs, one led us, the other was in the middle and the last pair brought our rear. We were so many and they made us walk in two single files. We crossed the border at Ramakwebane River. On the Botswana side, we were made to rest for a day during which time we were finger-printed at Jackalasi Police Station. I do not know why our fingerprints were taken. We were children, we knew nothing and we never asked any questions.[835]

Buried in Sibongile's account is the issue of cooperation between ZIPRA guerrillas and their recruits, and between ZAPU as a liberation movement and the Botswana government as a FLS member.

Also buried in this account is the issue of Botswana Police screening refugees for SB or CIO agents.[836] This act is illustrated by the finger-printing of Sibongile's group at the police station. Botswana security officials were aware of the infiltration by SB and CIO agents of exiled liberation movements. In Flower's words, 'The CIO's penetration of guerrilla organisations from pre-UDI days to until the early 1970s was as complete as it could have been.'[837] Bulilima youths were in danger of being abducted and tortured for information about 'terrorists' and their activities. In the case of ZANU as well, Chung notes the high infiltration rate by CIO agents within its refugees, whose task was to provide information

[833] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI.* London, 1975. pp. 62, 77 and 82.
[834] This is evidenced by the responses from more than forty individuals who were interviewed during the course of oral data collection in Bulilima District.
[835] Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015.
[836] For a detailed discussion on this, see P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.
[837] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 105 and P.T. Mgadla, 'A Good Measure of Sacrifice': Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965 – 1985), in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2008. pp. 5 – 16.

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back to their bosses in Rhodesia.[838] The Botswana government through its security apparatus, sought to protect and ensure the safety of ZAPU refugees in general and Bulilima youths in particular by flushing out SB and CIO operatives from among the flood of refugees seeping through its border. SB and CIO agents were a danger to ZAPU loyalists as exemplified by their kidnapping of ZAPU personnel in Gaborone, Botswana.[839] As such, Sibongile and crew were not safe from the clutches of the SB and CIO agents.

After a day Sibongile's group was taken to Francistown's holding camps. (Sibongile's assertion matches what was indicated by MaMoyo and David with regard to those chosen to train as guerrillas). In addition, her response reinforces the fact that Botswana never trained ZIPRA guerrillas. ZAPU set up training camps in Zambia, Angola, Libya and other African states that were prepared to accommodate nationalist guerrilla armies.[840] Unfortunately, Sibongile did not realise her dream of fighting to liberate her country as a ZIPRA female combatant. An explanation for her failure to make the grade may be her height. Sibongile (even at the moment of conducting this interview) is a very short woman without the athleticism associated with a capable soldier.[841] Physically challenged youths were thus confined indefinitely to transit camps. There was nothing suggesting transit about keeping several thousands of guerrilla contestants for more than three years in 'transit camps'. These ZIPRA 'rejects' were left to perpetual singing while watching from a distance, batch after batch of the 'true sons of the soil' (the chosen ones) being flown to Zambia for the 'promised' guerrilla training stint. These would be infiltrated back to the country with guns blazing, *sebengo Bhuti phela* (guerrillas proper), and having accomplished their mission of becoming guerrillas.

Probed on what she did while in a Botswana 'transit camp' for the duration of the war, Sibongile replied,

> We spent most of our time doing drills such as how to take cover (hide) in case of danger, toyi toying, as a way of strengthening or conditioning our bodies, marching

[838] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 83.
[839] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI.* London, 1975. p. 47.
[840] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 20.
[841] The researcher's personal assessment of Sibongile Tshuma's physical appearance after meeting her during field work.

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> and most importantly being politicised so that we understand and appreciate why we were fighting [a polite way of saying 'why we were dumped here'].[842]

Political indoctrination, with its intended brain-washing, it seems, was ZAPU's main weapon used to win over youths' minds and hearts. This view is given credence by David Hlabano when he said, 'In Botswana, we did not do much apart from singing liberation songs, being taught on a daily basis, political justifications as to why we were fighting the Smith regime.'[843] Youths in Botswana's 'transit camps' specialised in singing, undergoing political conversion and doing war related drills to enable them to escape in case of attacks by the enemy forces.

Sibongile elaborated, almost defensively,

> Youths sang a lot to boost morale among themselves. This was to help liberate our country. Our singing meant that we were giving moral support to those who were practically fighting inside the country. Everyday political commissars briefed us on the on-going war at home, where we were told about lots of guerrilla victories and less of their losses.[844]

As was the case in Zambian bush camps, political commissars were in the forefront in the political manipulation of facts regarding who was scoring spectacular victories in limited battles that ZIPRA and the Rhodesian army engaged in.

In other words, undergoing political propaganda indoctrination on a daily basis became part of youths' political education programme in bush camps. The outcome of this was a subservient youths who endured all forms of hardships without questioning their circumstances.[845] Sibongile, for example, nearly died of diarrhoea. She survived the

[842] Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015.
[843] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[844] Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015.
[845] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015; Focus Group Discussion One, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015; Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015 and Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015. It must be said that refugees in Botswana and Zambia lived /survived under very difficult and appalling conditions. They went for days without food, slept in one or no blanket at all, were poorly protected when the Rhodesian security forces bombed their camps, were made to carry fifty kg bags of mealie-meal for more than fifteen km during rainy seasons, yet they never questioned all this, opting instead to suffer in silence.

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water-borne ailment after staying for more than four months in the camp's clinic.[846] Diarrhoea outbreaks in bush camps were a common phenomenon associated with the consumption of contaminated food and the intake of water from unprotected sources, overcrowding and the generally poor hygienic conditions. Similar cases were also a daily occurrence in ZANU run bush camps in Mozambique. Highlighting such problems, Chung writes, 'Many [refugees] died from a combination of malnutrition and endemic diseases, such as malaria and dysentery. Death was a daily experience.'[847] These cases underpin youths' vulnerability to endemic diseases due to inhuman living facilities and unacceptable levels of hunger and starvation young revolutionaries were subjected to by those living in comfort somewhere on the out-skirts of Lusaka in Zambia.

This underlines the poverty, misery and suffering that engulfed bush camps as more and more youths flocked to join the struggle.[848] Unfortunately, ZAPU and its political spin-doctors chose to down-play the magnitude and severity of the calamitous situation in bush camps. Instead, potential recruits were fed falsehoods such as reflected in the following account,

> ZAPU guerrillas came home. They called us to a secluded place and told us that we are needed in Zambia for training to fight the RF government. They said that in Zambia, people are enjoying a lot because they are provided with everything. They said that for proof we should listen to the radio in the evening. We listened and heard them singing, making slogans and saying 'come people of Zimbabwe and fight the oppressors!' When we heard that we went the following day.[849]

Youths' singing and sloganeering, one may argue, were meant to portray joyous, content, thankful, and fulfilled refugee communities in Botswana and Zambia so as to lure more and more youths to join the struggle. True to the wishes of the party leadership, ignorant, devastated and desperate rural youths were fooled.[850] Beaming with false hope, youths

[846] Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015.
[847] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 203.
[848] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.
[849] Collen Nyathi interviewed by P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 20.
[850] Rural youths throughout the country were devastated by the demands of the war exerted on them by both sets of guerrillas on one side and, various security organs on the other. This is clearly illustrated by P. Hayes, 1992; K. Flower, 1987; K. Maxey, 1975; N.J. Kriger, 1992; L. Stott, 1990 and I. Staunton, 1990.

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allowed themselves to be recruited for guerrilla war purposes. As is clear from this recollection, 'I was really astonished to find tens of thousands of impoverished people of Zimbabwe in Zambia. Life in camps was tough because of overpopulation. I was not used in living under such conditions.'[851] When reality sunk in, it was too late to turn back.

Sibongile, a near casualty of the horrible living conditions in Botswana holding camps, applauded the important role the Botswana border played in enabling Bulilima youths to join the liberation struggle. She said, 'Yes, the border was helpful because those who liberated the country mainly crossed it to train as guerrillas.'[852] Sibongile insinuates that the Botswana border stimulated Bulilima youths to join the guerrilla war as it was easy to cross into Botswana unhindered. This was also raised by MaMoyo as she alluded to the fact that if it was not for the Botswana border, thousands of Bulilima youths would not have joined the liberation band wagon.[853] This goes to show the vulnerability of border communities to guerrilla machinations and manipulative tendencies then.

One common feature about the majority of Bulilima youths who joined the liberation struggle in Botswana and Zambia is that they started off as ZIPRA youths in their communities. Roughly sixty percent of ZIPRA's recruits were once youth functionaries in their communities' ZAPU YL structures before they joined the armed struggle.[854] Joining the armed conflict was an advancement of what they had been initially involved in with their rural communities. On this subject, Sibongile described youth roles thus,

> Youths provided guerrillas with moral support, food, intelligence, and the list is endless. Youths were important because without their support, the war would not have been won. We literally contributed or ensured the liberation of this country because we were the ones in the fore-front fighting the enemy, providing guerillas with food, clothes, shoes and other items of necessity for their survival in the bush and in training camps; we were the pool from where ZIPRA constantly recruited its

[851] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 68.
[852] Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015.
[853] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015.
[854] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.

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> fighters from. That is, we replaced dead guerrillas or those permanently incapacitated in action. We were the supply source of ZIPRA guerrillas.[855]

Bulilima youths, therefore, were heavily involved in every aspect of the guerrilla war. Through their versatility, youths were the vanguard of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

In Daniso Ngubhe Dube's (Gwambe) view, youths actively participated in the struggle as some of them hid guerrillas' ammunition in their homes and literally did anything and everything for ZIPRA guerrillas.[856] Generally, Daniso points to the fact that youths were involved in every aspect of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Specifically, Daniso admits that Bulilima youths fought the war as guerrillas proper and, as ZIPRA auxiliaries in Bulilima District.[857] In short, Bulilima youths became the liberation struggle's luminaries through their multi-faceted involvement and participation.

For Daniso, his participation in the country's liberation war began when he crossed the border in Tsetsebe from Embakwe Mission where he was schooling. His aim was to liberate his country. From Tsetsebe he went to Francistown refugee camp, then Selebi Pikwe from where a plane took him to Zambia. 'When in Zambia, I underwent some military training but before I completed, I was withdrawn and made to complete my schooling programme. ZAPU wanted us to be educated so that we could be trained as jet-fighter pilots, among other programmes of specialisation.'[858] Based on this, ZAPU had an ambitious programme for its refugee community. The above is reflected in the following words, 'We had already sent in 1976 young fellows to train as pilots, aircraft technicians, tank drivers and tank mechanics.'[859] The suspension of Daniso's guerrilla training programme underscores the importance ZAPU attached to education and also ZIPRA's continued systematic preparation of its prospective recruits for technically orientated programmes for its regular force. Overall, this underlines the urgent need for educated and skilled personnel within ZIPRA's rank and file.

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[855] Interview with Sibongile Tshuma, Kandana Village: 22nd July, 2015.
[856] Interview with Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village: 23rd October, 2015.
[857] *Ibid* and Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[858] Interview with Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village: 23rd October, 2015.
[859] Dumiso Dabengwa in an interview with N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. pp. 102 – 103.

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In light of the above, ZAPU could be portrayed as a forward looking party with divergent considerations for the future as opposed to being limited to the present. Such progressive planning and impressive preparations for the future is highlighted by Brickhill as ZAPU and its War Council's 'The Turning Point Strategy'.[860] It is within the ambit of this strategy that Daniso and all those considered advanced in their education, were relocated to undergo training in specialised fields. In other words, any ZAPU programme or strategy, be it for future or present purposes, revolved around the constant supply or availability of educated youths in bush camps.

Daniso's withdrawal from guerrilla training programme should be seen in the context of the critical shortage of educated youths in bush camps. This state of affairs should be attributed to the bottleneck education system purposely designed, implemented and maintained by successive settler governments to deny proper education to a black child.[861] In 1960 for example, only nine black learners throughout Rhodesia passed their 'A' Level studies.[862] This way, the door for a black child's education was completely and permanently shut. This also demonstrates the level of marginalisation black children were subjected to by the successive white minority governments, hence the need for youths to take up arms and dismantle white rule in Rhodesia. In explaining how black children were denied education, Atieno-Odhiambo crudely writes, 'Natives were getting exactly the type of education suitable for hewers of wood and drawers of water, the education of men, already impoverished economically, that would not qualify them for franchise and democratic government.'[863] Given this treatment, there was no way ZAPU could have had a lot of educated youths within its camps or among its recruits. On a similar subject, Chung blames Rhodesia's education system for Blacks' tensions that simmered between ZANU and ZANLA in Mozambique's bush camps. She says, 'These tensions were

[860] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[861] C. Ndebele, Socialist Curriculum Development and Implementation in Zimbabwe from 1980 - 2004: With special reference to Education with Production Model and Social Studies and History Curriculum. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Fort Hare University, 2007. p. 9.
[862] I. Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1980. p. 62. 'A' Level is the last High School qualification before entry into university in Zimbabwe.
[863] E.S. Atieno – Odhiambo, The Origins of the Zimbabwe Problem, 1888 – 1923, in S.E. Wilmer, (Ed.), *et al*., *Zimbabwe Now.* London, 1973. pp. 13 – 28.

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perhaps inevitable when only two percent of the population in colonial Rhodesia was allowed access to secondary education and less than one percent to any form of tertiary education.'[864] It is from this distorted educational set up in Rhodesia that ZAPU's emphasis on educating its youths can be fully understood and appreciated.

ZAPU embarked on an ambitious educational programme that cut across all age categories in bush camps in Zambia. ZAPU's 'bush curricula' were designed, drafted and implemented by youthful teachers who then spear-headed all the educational programmes as emanating from the curricula. 'I was a student doing 'O' Levels. I was enrolled at a local Zambian school as we did not have proper schools in our camps. During holidays we were brought back to camps to teach lower classes as we had established make-shift schools in camps. We formulated, designed and implemented curricula for our fellow refugee students. We taught very large classes, for example, my grade two class had more than a hundred learners.'[865] In the absence of secondary schools in bush camps, ZAPU organized schooling for its secondary bound learners with local Zambian schools. This shows that there was a cordial relationship between ZAPU bush camps and local Zambian communities that was pointed out earlier by David Hlabano. Embarking on a hands-on approach to the education of its refugees, ZAPU ensured that its numerous young refugees attained basic education. This was through the endless efforts of youths and a few teachers who had abandoned their professions at home and joined the struggle.[866] Daniso attributed his involvement and participation in the guerrilla struggle to the Botswana border.

Responding to questions on the significance of the Botswana border to those wishing to join the struggle, Daniso said, 'From our places, the border was near, hence convenient for me to cross and join the struggle. It was the nearest port of exit and entry to the country. The border was very helpful because of its proximity to Bulilima District. It was the port of exit and entry by ZIPRA guerrillas as well.'[867] Daniso's comment makes it clear

[864] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 213.
[865] Interview with Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village: 23rd October, 2015.
[866] *Ibid*.
[867] Interview with Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village: 23rd October, 2015.

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that it was easy to enter or exit Rhodesia through the Botswana border. There were no natural obstacles, only minimal and insignificant man-made ones such as the half-hearted patrols by the Rhodesian security forces.[868] A direct outcome of this lack of concerted border patrols by the security forces was the willy-nilly entry and exit into and out of the country by ZIPRA guerrillas and the resultant mass-migrations of Bulilima youths seeking to join the struggle in Zambia.

Finally, Daniso dealt with questions that sought to find out the extent to which Bulilima youths participated in the country's liberation struggle. His response was largely general, providing only a few specifics,

> Most of the ZIPRA cadres were from Bulilima District because of its proximity to the Botswana border as well as Francistown transit camps. Bulilima youths were responsible for the general welfare of guerrillas. Bulilima youths were very, very important because without them it was always going to be difficult for guerrillas to carry out their war mandate in Bulilima District. Without rural based youths, I can assure you guerrillas would have been wiped out by the Rhodesian security forces through ambushes or traps.[869]

Daniso's response generally points to the fact that ZIPRA guerrilla incursions of the 1970s were peasant compliant than the late 1960s ZAPU-ANC combined incursions that sought to project themselves as self-sufficient entities that had nothing in common with peasants. The 1960s incursions, therefore, were based on a trial and error basis, hence became experiments gone horribly wrong when they were obliterated by the Rhodesian security forces.[870] As Bhebe noted, at the beginning of the war ZIPRA were supposed to be self-sufficient in arms, clothing, medicine and intelligence.[871] This turned out to be a fiasco, hence the change of strategy and approach to ZIPRA guerrillas' operations.

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[868] Interview with Hloniphani Hlabangana (Ex-ZIPRA operative in Bulilima District. Not his real name), Ndolwane Village: 21st September, 2015.
[869] Interview with Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village: 23rd October, 2015.
[870] To understand fully how the whole episodes were just not meant for guerrilla activities, read a publication by two survivors of both Wankie and Sipolilo encounters, two Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) survivors who were arrested in Rhodesia and then deported to South Africa to face their crimes there. See; T. Bopela and D. Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*. Johannesburg, 2005.
[871] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 101.

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ZIPRA's alterations of its operational strategy were a deviation from the USSR biased 'operational ideology' by the newly formed ZIPRA guerrilla army to partly accommodate an operational ideology with Maoist trappings. To use Mao's 'academically exhausted' quote;[872] ZIPRA guerrillas, by virtue of relying on Bulilima youths, became fish that easily survive and become, in the process, inherently dependent upon their sea, the youths.[873] The allegorical fish- sea relationship in terms of ZIPRA's change of its operational ideology is noticeable in Brickhill's remark that the existence and influence of party structures certainly played a key role in the development of a military strategy by ZAPU.[874] Simply put, ZAPU officials realised retrospectively that ZIPRA guerrillas could not survive without the support of and material backing from youths and villagers. This is a strategy that was wholesomely and effectively embraced by ZANU and its ZANLA guerrillas in their operational areas while ZAPU guerrillas initially despised it.[875] Such marked differences in operational strategies were born out of the ideological differences between the chief sponsors of these two liberation movements, that is, ZANU/ZANLA was Chinese sponsored while ZAPU/ZIPRA, was Russian backed.

To enhance our understanding of the operational differences between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas, Moorcraft and McLaughlin wrote that ZIPRA's guerrillas were described as a 'mobile revolutionary vanguard' operating more like Soviet partisans rather than as Mao's fish.[876] Simply put, ZIPRA guerrillas were more concerned with scoring spectacular victories against enemy forces than petty peasant mobilisation. Bhebe concurs, 'In short, to ZIPRA the defeat of the enemy had nothing to do with the Maoist winning of hearts and

[872] Mao Tse-tung's 'Fish and Sea' symbolic explanation of the inseparable nature of guerrillas and peasants (masses) is used in almost every study that deals with guerrilla war from a Leninist – Maoist perspective. See, for example, N. Bhebe, 1999; L. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, 1981 and F. Chung, 2006, among others. In light of this, the 'Fish – Sea' doctrine has been over-used, hence exhausted. Unfortunately for this study as well, it finds itself using the same tired 'fish – sea' rhetoric due to the unavoidable need to explain ZIPRA's change of its operational ideology to partly embrace the Maoist one.

[873] For a full picture of how guerrillas survived in their operational areas, see N.J. Kriger, 2003 and 1992; A.S. Mlambo, 2014; K. Flower, 1987 and A. Trethewan, 2008, among other notable studies on Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

[874] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.

[875] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 121.

[876] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 - 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 92.

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minds of people by guerrillas but had to do with the attainment of a military superiority.'[877] This partly explains why ZIPRA had to have a regular army in the history of guerrilla conflict in Africa. It is in light of the above that Daniso assessed the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the country's guerrilla war. Given the majority of young people in ZIPRA operated areas in Rhodesia, particularly Bulilima, one can say that Bulilima youths displayed *esprit de corps* as they executed their duties in the service of their ZIPRA brothers. Indeed, these were good times for Bulilima youths when one considers that a few years back, most of them led idle lives, and faced a bleak and hopeless future.

Janet Kube of Mzwanyane (interviewee) calls those times 'mood of the moment' or 'a new trend in rural Bulilima then' to support and do as guerrillas said. 'I just felt like joining the struggle. We were carried away by the mood of the moment, everyone was rushing to join the struggle,'[878] said Janet in a happy mood. The picture painted by Janet is that of youths scrambling to join the guerrilla war out of the country. Describing the same atmosphere felt by the youths throughout the country at that time, Bhebe writes,

> By 1977 Radio Maputo and Radio Lusaka were beaming a lot of propaganda by ZANU and ZAPU concerning their escalation of their efforts and the success they were scoring and the two parties were urging sons and daughters of Zimbabwe to come forward and take up arms to topple the oppressive colonial regime. This propaganda and the inspiring liberation songs which accompanied it won the hearts of the young men and women so much so that they needed little prompting to cross the Mozambique and Botswana borders.[879]

Bhebe's observation is in line with what Janet said in terms of the 'mood' taking over Bulilima, creating a scramble that nearly swept the district clean of its youngsters.

Asked to explain her journey, Janet said,

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[877] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 103.
[878] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015.
[879] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 104.

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> I was with my young sister. We just traveled to the Botswana border. We had no money. Along the way we got lost and had to sleep in the bush. We gathered that there was a village called Madedede where people going to war in Botswana met with ZIPRA guerrillas. There was a gathering place across the border. We met a large group of young men from across Bulilima and other districts. We were the only females in the large group of young men. We were then taken to Francistown where we had our names registered upon arrival.[880]

Janet's account reveals that it was easy for any willing person to walk across the border without any hiccup. This is why two young girls who did not know the route to Francistown managed to find their way successfully. We also realise the cooperation of Batswana villagers, assisting Janet and her sibling to find their way to Francistown peacefully. Bhebe attributes the efficiency with which young people managed to reach Francistown to Tswana communities around the border and the Botswana authorities who assisted with transport to Francistown 'transfer camps'.[881] Bulilima youths, with the aid of their BaTswana cousins, established a perfect gateway route or what Bhebe calls the 'Botswana corridor'.

From Francistown, Janet was taken to Selebi Pikwe on her way to Zambia. In Zambia, she was sent to Victory Camp (VC) where they were graded according to physical appearance, that is, those who were big were taken for military training, while those small-bodied were sent to school.[882] Again, we notice the issue of one's physical appearance coming into play in determining one's candidature for guerrilla training. Mental strength and readiness were not considered most probably owing to ZAPU's lack of skilled personnel such as psychologists, psychiatrists or sociologists, among others. A refugee who did not qualify to train as a female guerrilla, Janet was confined to VC as a minor. She said of her time there, 'We spent a lot of time singing liberation songs, giving moral support to those fighting in Rhodesia and, praising countries that continuously provided us with material support, that sheltered us as refugees and that trained our guerrillas.'[883]

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[880] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015.
[881] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 103.
[882] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015.
[883] *Ibid*.

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This was meant to inspire youths to soldier on in the face of mounting difficulties that prevailed in refugee camps. Singing also made young girls such as Janet forget their horrible circumstances and unite in the same hope of liberating Zimbabwe.[884] This way, young guerrilla aspirants found joy in an unjoyful situation.

On problems they faced as young female refugees, Janet was quick to say, 'We had serious challenges such as hunger, being home sick, [and] shortage of qualified teachers in refugee schools. I had to repeat grade seven as I failed the first time due to lack of qualified teachers. There was a lot of thieving [and] torture by senior people, we had no clothes and sanitary ware among other specific female needs.'[885] Such challenges were not what youthful female refugees had bargained for when they decided to join the liberation struggle. These were party induced challenges that required innovative and creative party officials to resolve before they spiraled out of proportion.[886] In other words, lack of ingenuity among party officials running bush camps resulted in the party being incapacitated. This reflected a 'serial crises' of the ZAPU leadership. This manifested itself in mounting problems for ZAPU refugees in Botswana and Zambia.

Corroborating Janet's assertion, Gladys bemoaned her suffering in bush camps by saying, 'I had serious problems at VC. I was sleeping in pits with one blanket. No tennis shoes, I had one dress and I had no underpants for a full year. I had one meal a day.'[887] Such sad accounts are a reflection of miserable lives refugees such as Janet and Gladys experienced in bush camps. In spite of all this, these teenagers never gave up or deserted. Instead, they fully participated in the struggle with the hope of liberating their country from settler bondage. Reflecting on Bulilima youths' contributions to the liberation of Zimbabwe, Janet had this to say,

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[884] Focus Group Discussion one, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015.
[885] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015.
[886] Focus Group Discussions one and two, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village and Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 17th November, 2015 and 1st June, 2016. It is worth noting that liberation movements such as ZAPU had no sources of income as they were no income generating entities. As such, party leadership relied on donor organisations such as the UNHCR, OAU's Liberation Committee, friendly and sympathetic countries such as Sweden, Yugoslavia, Germany Democratic Republic (GDR) and the USSR for funds and other valuable commodities. If leadership was inward looking, selfish, irresponsible and insensitive to the plight of youths in general and female refugees in particular, problems such as mentioned by Janet persisted to dog bush camps. For a detailed account of donor countries, organisations and their assistance, see F. Chung, 2006.
[887] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 50.

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> The youths contributed to the liberation of the country through joining the struggle in large numbers. This made them contribute a large number of guerrillas in ZIPRA. Those who were unfortunate not to be drafted into the guerrilla army helped liberate the country through music, moral and logistical support. In fact their presence as youths speaks a lot, they inspired each other to continue fighting no matter how difficult sometimes it became.[888]

Janet's understanding here is that ZIPRA had more guerrillas from Bulilima District since several thousands of Bulilima youths had joined the liberation struggle. By virtue of contributing more fighters to the guerrilla army, Bulilima youths spearheaded the guerrilla fight against the Smith regime. In its 1992 report on the composition of ZIPRA guerrillas, the Mafela Trust indicated that seventy-five percent of ZIPRA forces were Kalanga.[889] This underscores the invaluable contributions and sacrifices Bulilima youths made towards the liberation of Zimbabwe. Conversely, by contributing large numbers of guerrillas, Bulilima District, therefore, had the largest number of guerrilla casualties in combat, hence lost the most in terms of young lives that perished in the course of liberating the country. Included here are those who died during Smith's cross-border raids in Zambia and Angola.[890] Bulilima families lost heavily during Zimbabwe's liberation war.

In addition, Janet saw the involvement of Bulilima youths in large numbers as good for publicising the guerillas' war efforts. She said that large numbers of miserable young refugees in camps attracted foreign journalists who took their pictures which helped to publicise their plight to the international community. In turn, the international community responded by providing refugees with logistical support, donations that went on to help everyone involved in the war in Zambia or Botswana.[891] This way, youths indirectly helped

[888] Interview with Janet Ncube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015.
[889] The Mafela Trust Report. Bulawayo, 1992. The Mafela Trust is a non-governmental organisation formed by former ZIPRA Commander, Lookout 'Mafela' Masuku and his former ZIPRA cadres that records and documents, among other issues, episodes of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle where it focuses on the role played by ZAPU and ZIPRA in the liberation of the country. www.sundaynews.co.za/mafela-trust-healing-wounds-of-the-liberation-struggle. T. Chakanyuka, Mafela Trust. Healing Wounds of the Liberation Struggle. Accessed: 11/10/2016; 15:26.
[890] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 53; H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980.* Gweru, 1989. p. 46 and P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970 – 1980.* Johannesburg, 1993. p. 232.
[891] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015.

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market ZAPU's needs and requirements internationally as far as the welfare and upkeep of its refugees were concerned. Their presence in large numbers, therefore, meant that grown up refugees also benefited from the food and clothing provisions supplied by donor organisations and nations.[892] ZAPU did not discriminate against grown up refugees although these items were specifically donated for young refugees. Mlilo (a former ZIPRA operative) was direct on this issue when he pointed out that they deliberately, systematically and purposefully recruited children, a strategy to solicit for sympathy and donations in cash or kind from international donor organisations and, sympathetic and friendly socialist nations.[893] ZAPU benefitted a lot from this deliberate manipulation of the recruitment system to suit its ends.

The same benefits were afforded ZANU bush camps where, for example, the United Nations Children's Education Fund (UNICEF) contributed about US$ 250 000, 00 towards the procurement of stationery, books and other related school materials for refugee learners.[894] This way, liberation movements benefited immensely from having several thousands of children in bush camps.

Joining the liberation struggle also benefitted youths at a personal level. Despite all the suffering, misery and untold hardships they faced in bush camps, female youths such as Janet gained tremendously from joining the struggle. In acknowledging her benefit from joining the struggle, Janet stated that life was difficult in refugee camps since it was war time. She repeated most of the problems she had stated earlier, adding what she regarded as the 'natural problem of staying with different people from different places'. Janet went on to describe how going to war became a blessing in disguise for her as she managed to do her 'O' levels, considering that, as she went on to explain, 'I had only done grade seven and my parents had no money to educate me further than that. Zapu helped me a lot in this regard by educating me up to 'O' level.'[895] Educating refugees

[892] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 60.
[893] Interview with Melusi Mlilo, Khalanyoni Village: 12th May, 2015.
[894] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 204.
[895] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2016.

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should be seen from a growing awareness by that time for the need to have youths that would fit in well with the demands of an ever changing social and economic society.[896]

As future leaders, it was imperative for the party to educate its tens of thousands of youths in its bush camps. Writing about a similar trend in Mozambique's bush camps, Chung observes that, 'By 1975, tens of thousands of Zimbabwean refugees, including thousands of children, had fled…the country to refugee camps in Mozambique. It was essential to provide…educational services for these refugees.'[897] Zimbabwe's two liberation movements went out of their way to provide an essential service that was not provided to Zimbabwean children by successive settler governments. This was in the face of mounting difficulties and challenges they encountered in Zambia and Mozambique bush camps. In this way, tens of thousands of child refugees benefited from the two liberation movements' educational programmes.

As beneficiary of ZAPU's educational innovation, Janet believed this became possible due to her joining the liberation struggle. She added that her district's proximity to Botswana border and the ease with which youths could cross into Botswana motivated them into joining the struggle.[898] Janet made an unconscious contrast between Botswana and Zambian borders. This is an indication that it would have been difficult for her to cross the Zambezi River with her sibling as they had done the Botswana border. This also explains why ZIPRA had to rely heavily on the Botswana border for their Southern Front incursions into the country if one considers Zambezi River as a natural barrier. ZIPRA infiltrations increased across the Botswana border, the new tempo of Nkomo's effort brought massive upswing in recruits, many of them school children who crossed clandestinely into Botswana.[899] The fact that school children could manage to join the struggle on their own speaks a lot about the role the Botswana border played in influencing and encouraging Bulilima youths to join the struggle. Similarly, primary school children in Gwanda had the propensity and zest to follow their teachers as they joined the

[896] P. Hayes, *et al., Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 60.
[897] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 203.
[898] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2016.
[899] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 190.

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liberation struggle in Botswana.[900] The use of the Botswana border was not only prevalent in Bulilima District, but in other districts along the Botswana border as well.

Janet stressed that the Botswana border was central to Bulilima youths joining the liberation struggle, [as] it was easy to cross, at the same time, 'BaTswana people were very helpful and kind to Bulilima youths going to war. They assisted us on crossing the border safely. In addition, they provided us with food on our journey to Francistown'.[901] Given BaTswana's pro-activeness in helping Bulilima youths cross and find their way to Francistown, one can say that their actions stimulated Bulilima youths to join the struggle in large numbers of varied ages. Under such stimulus, Bulilima youths such as Janet and Bessent found themselves involved in the country's liberation struggle within the confines of ZAPU's bush camps.

Bessent Zapu Gumpo of Tematema, Gonde, added his voice to the growing chorus of Bulilima youths who had joined the struggle. 'There was no border to talk of. We just crossed and entered Botswana. The significance of the Botswana border is that it enabled the youths and guerrillas to exit and enter the country for war purposes.'[902] Bessent's assessment of the Botswana border is that it was not yet developed, without proper fencing structures to prevent unlawful entry from either side. This lack of preventive structures inevitably led to uncontrolled movements across the border by Bulilima youths going to war. Bessent added, 'The border was very helpful to us youths and our guerrillas. It was porous. It was just too easy for anyone to cross in and out of the country. Again the issue of our relatives across the border played to our advantage. Our relatives living across the border aided our crossing as we joined the war.'[903]

Once again, we see the issue of BaKalanga communities across the border actively aiding Bulilima youths on their way to Francistown to participate in the struggle. This observation was supported by David who said, 'As I have already said, the border was porous and it was nearer to our homes in Bulilima. In addition, most of the villagers along

[900] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 165.
[901] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015.
[902] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28 August, 2016.
[903] *Ibid*.

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the border on the Botswana side were our relatives and they were obliged to assist us. My aunt, for example, lives across the border and they clearly understood our plight and therefore, came to our aid.'[904] Bulilima youths basked in the glory of having a porous border in addition to relatives on the Botswana side of the border who were only eager to assist them as they found their way to '*empini*'/war in Francistown.

There are a combination of factors that contributed to Bulilima youths flocking to Botswana to join the war. Prominent among these were the porousness of border and BaTswana communities' eagerness to assist travelling youths in any way possible to reach Francistown. The Botswana Kalanga communities' eagerness to assist Zimbabweans should be understood from the early 1900s construction and reconstruction of more solid Kalanga communities along both sides of the border.[905] Enjoying such privilege, Bulilima youths such as Bessent found it easy to reach Francistown holding camps undetected by the security forces and agents.

Bessent narrated his involvement in the war thus,

> I was motivated by events then to join the war. There were a lot of guerrilla activities in my community (Tematema). I also witnessed atrocities in my community. Some people were publicly hanged by the Rhodesian security forces, others were arrested and tortured. Worse, others were shot dead on the spot. Most of those people were ZAPU activists, including my father, who by luck managed to escape to South Africa.[906]

As said earlier by Janet, events taking place around Bulilima at that time seem to have influenced Bessent's resolve to join the armed struggle as well. A combination of guerrillas' over reliance on Tematema villagers and the Rhodesian army's brutality on those suspected of collaborating with ZIPRA guerrillas seem to have been too much for Bessent to bear. To him, 'terrorists' were also part of the problem as they were dependent on people for support and other logistical needs. To complicate matters, Rhodesian

[904] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2016.
[905] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 72 and N. Parsons, The Pipeline: Botswana's Reception of Refugees, 1956 – 1968, in *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 34, No. 1, June 2008. pp. 17 – 32.
[906] Interview Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.

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security forces had informers within the community.[907] This way, ZAPU activists were identified, tortured and killed by security forces. In turn, ZIPRA had to witch hunt, hence committed atrocities against alleged informers.[908] Constant guerrilla activity in Tematema sub-village should be ascribed to the border which made it easy for guerrillas to infiltrate Bulilima willy-nilly. On the other hand, the presence of the Rhodesian army was a direct response to the guerrilla activities that were taking place at Tematema.

Zimbabwe's guerrilla war created a highly militarised countryside, making life difficult for youths such as Bessent. The Rhodesian army's presence in Tematema was due to its 'search and destroy mission' against ZIPRA guerrillas,[909] in the process destroying whoever they perceived to be part of the guerrilla 'project'. Given this untenable situation, Bessent decided to join the war in Zambia with seven boys and an equal number of girls.[910] For three years, Bessent's life was spent in Zambia, the epicentre of ZAPU's efforts and attempts to destroy Smith's government and all that it represented.

Once in Zambia, Bessent and others were taken to bush camps on Russian built trucks, deep into the bushy forests of Zambia. Bessent's first port of call was J.Z. Camp where he was registered and given a *norm de guerre,* (his was Miyika Sibanda) officially becoming a youthful hopeful refugee to train as a ZIPRA guerrilla. Here, they were grouped into companies (military style). 'We were trained in all sort of forms, for example, judo, karate, military drills and political education. In fact we went for political classes.'[911] The emphasis on political education should be viewed from ZAPU officials' bid to attune these young minds to the rigours of life in bush camps, including the looming starvation, misery and hardships brought about by the Rhodesian army's air raids. Living under uncompromising conditions soon tested Bessent's resolve to help liberate his country. ZAPU officials' strategy was meant to make youths accept the unacceptable. This echoes claims by Ngwisa Nyathi who said, 'I was expecting to be living on the outskirts of Lusaka but to my surprise we boarded a lorry [Russian made] and reached a camp about eighty

[907] www.erudit.org/revue. Accessed: 12th June, 2014. 12:15.
[908] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.
[909] J. Ciment and K. Hill, (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II*. London, 1999. p. 1294.
[910] Interview Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.
[911] *Ibid*.

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kilometres west of Lusaka. I was taken aback when I saw people wearing tattered clothes and some were dirty. The following day we were given new names.'[912] Torn clothes and dirty refugees are a testament to the suffering of youths in bush camps, all in the name of becoming ZIPRA guerrillas.

The above is also an illustration that ZAPU officials had limited capacity to source basic commodities necessary for the upkeep of the party's multitudes of young refugees they recruited.[913] Further, the continued recruitment of youths despite the worsening living conditions and the fast deteriorating food provisions in bush camps underscores ZAPU officials' and their guerrilla commanders' lack of a posteriori. Facts at hand in bush camps demanded an end to further recruitment. Instead, available evidence suggests that recruitment was accelerated despite Zambian bush camps overflowing with starving, malnourished, miserable and perpetually insecure, vulnerable and constantly frightened masses of youths.[914] Given the two dichotomous developments, it is hard to understand, let alone appreciate ZAPU officials' and their ZIPRA commanders' logic behind the continued and accelerated recruitment of youths in the face of chronic food shortages and attendent famine in bush camps.

Joining the war had a lasting impression on youths such as Bessent and Ngwisa. This began by their acquisition of a *norm de guerre*. Providing recruits with *pseudonyms* was a sign that ZAPU's bush camps were infested with CIO, SB and SS agents spying on ZAPU activities there.[915] The use of one's actual name, Bessent argued, exposed one's family back home to arbitrary arrests, torture, constant harassment and even death from security forces as the said spies would supply such vital information to their handlers back

[912] Ngwisa Nyathi interviewed by P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1999. p. 48.
[913] ZAPU officials in exile in Zambia were the ones who directed through their lower party structures such as the commissars and ZIPRA guerrillas, for the recruitment of multitudes of youths to join the guerrilla war for the purposes of dethroning the Smith regime. It therefore stands to reason that by their failure to meet the very basic needs of a human being (clothes, food, clean water, among others) by implication, were responsible for the suffering of the multitudes of innocent souls who were recruited through their directives.
[914] P. Hayes, *et al., Children of History*. Harare, 1999 provide a detailed portrayal of youths' suffering in 'bush camps'. Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April 2015; David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015; Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village: 23rd October, 2015; Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2015 and Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016. The above interviewees also narrated how deep-seated misery, suffering, poverty and the general unbearable unhygienic living conditions they were exposed to in their God forsaken leaky camps were.
[915] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 105.

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home.[916] This means that youths' presence in bush camps was an indirect threat to families back home as much as it was a direct threat to their lives.

Explaining her decision to join the liberation struggle while lecturing at the University of Zambia, Chung echoes the above sentiments this way, 'Little did I know at that stage that my participation in the struggle would end in an attempt on my life by the Rhodesian security forces, and my subsequent flight from Zambia to Mozambique.'[917] Chung's remarks point to the vulnerability of all those who were in Zambia and later in Mozambique, engaged in activities associated with Zimbabwe's liberation, to Rhodesia's state security agents. Chung wrote that one of the reasons schools were bombed (in Mozambique, ZANU's case and Zambia, ZAPU's) so often may have been the infiltration of refugee camps, particularly schools, by Rhodesian security agents. They were sent in their hundreds to infiltrate the camps and found it easy to infiltrate refugee camps, but apparently more difficult to infiltrate military camps.[918] Youths in camps lived with enemies on a daily basis, hence death lurked everywhere around them.

In spite of the threat to their lives, youths in bush camps were occupied through various activities. Of these, Bessent said,

> There was no formal education when I arrived in Zambian refuge camps. As a result, we were made to do drills every day in the morning, hence we became a pool where ZIPRA commanders selected batches of youths for formal guerrilla training in camps designated for such. I was selected as well and taken to Maheba Training Camp in Zambia's Solwezi District, northern Zambia close to the Zaire border.[919]

Bessent raises an important issue here, that of youths serving as a pool from which ZIPRA recruited cadres to train in guerrilla warfare. Youths served as a continuous supply source of guerrillas.[920] Youths were thus important 'building materials' for ZIPRA.

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[916] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, 28th August, 2016.
[917] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 75.
[918] *Ibid*. p. 209.
[919] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28 August, 2016.
[920] Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April 2015.

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Part of the curriculum in bush camps was political education where youths were taught philosophies behind communism, socialism and ZAPU structures (that is, who is who in ZAPU and ZIPRA) among other indoctrination poison.[921] To spite youths' faces, ZAPU's top officials, the party president included, would visit bush camps from time to time accompanied by journalists who took pictures of the stage managed set up.[922] There are strong indications to suggest that in ZAPU's bush camps, youths were taught Leninist inclined communism and socialism as opposed to Maoist doctrine. This makes sense when one considers that the USSR was the top ZAPU benefactor in terms of guns and ammunition and other war materials.[923] In view of such benefits, the party was obliged to formulate and implement political curriculum with the Red Army's ideological traits.

ZAPU leadership's visits, accompanied by journalists, shows their total removal from and disregard of pressing social issues that afflicted youths in camps. To them, grandstanding in front of cameras with a few hand-picked healthy looking youths (most probably the recently arrived) was more important than urgently attending to youths' matters of life and death.[924] There was calamity in bush camps, exacerbated by such camps' inaccessibility in summer.[925] One astounding fact that might help explain ZAPU leadership's detachment from the realities in bush camps was their being domiciled in more than comfortable suburban houses and operating from plush offices at ZH in Lusaka. Such discrepancies resulted in ZAPU leadership having skewed facts and an esoteric interpretation of the dire situation facing youths in bush camps.

[921] This study sees ZAPU's indoctrination propaganda as poisonous to youths' reasoning capacities for the simple fact that young children were brainwashed with ZAPU/ZIPRA rhetoric to such an extent that they could not think for themselves in terms of what was right or wrong with their upkeep in bush camps, reasons behind their starvation as well as miserable living conditions. Youths were incapacitated to question all this as a result.
[922] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.
[923] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 89 and P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 76.
[924] That is, constantly and systematically sourcing, through engagement with the donor communities so as to provide basic commodities for starving youths in the form of food, clothing items and sanitary ware for female youths in 'bush camps'.
[925] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1999. p. 60; Interview with MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April 2015; Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2016; Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28 August, 2016 and David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015.

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Nonetheless, Bessent and other Bulilima youths endured the hardships throughout their guerrilla training programmes, as he recalled,

> Yes, I completed my guerrilla training at Maheba Training Camp in spite of numerous problems faced by a ZIPRA army operating under a zero budget. Our pass-out was officiated by George Silundika (ZAPU Publicity Secretary) and Alfred Nikita Mangena (ZIPRA Commander) in early 1978. I trained in guerrilla combat and a bit of conventional war fare. ZIPRA was not [a] static army. We also trained on conventional war fare as an alternative to guerrilla war fare if the going got tough.[926]

Bessent's account points to serious adversities faced by trainee guerrillas at Maheba Training Camp. Similarly, ZANLA camps in Mozambique also faced mounting problems such as concerted bombings by the Smith regime.[927] As a result of this, ZANU refugees were always on the move, pushing further into the interior of the country. To help counter such bombings in Zambia, youths such as Bessent were deployed to patrol the bush-veld surrounding bush camps. Said Bessent, 'After my training, I was not deployed in Rhodesia. We were a reserve side. ZIPRA wanted to storm Rhodesia. Our specific duties were to patrol the camps and their surrounding areas. We would, for example, go deeper into the bush in search of Rhodesian commandos.'[928] Bessent's role after completing training was to guard and protect those in camps. At the same time, he was waiting to be deployed under a regular army which was earmarked to invade Rhodesia towards the end of 1979.[929]

Collectively, Bessent saw Bulilima youths as having played a major role in liberating Zimbabwe. To him, Bulilima youths were actively involved in every aspect of the war, as evidenced by their not being spared by the enemy.[930] The presence of youths in both rural Bulilima and in bush camps in Zambia posed a great threat to the Rhodesian

[926] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.
[927] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. pp. 208 and 209.
[928] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.
[929] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[930] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.

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government. Bessent was of the view that Bulilima youths were militarily organised due to the constant presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima District, hence Smith viewed them as potential enemies, girls included.[931] This partly explains why the Rhodesian government targeted unarmed, vulnerable and poorly protected children in bush camps. As Chung argues, 'Throughout the war, the Rhodesians were either unwilling to attack military camps, but consistently bombed schools and refugee camps.'[932] It can be argued that the reasoning behind Smith's raids on bush camps was that youths contributed a supply chain to guerrilla ranks that were destabilising Rhodesia. Seen this way, pre-emptive strikes at sources of supply would help eliminate such threats, hence neutralise guerrilla infiltrations and their attendant activities in the country. This view is acknowledged by Auret when he writes that, 'Both Zambia and Mozambique suffered devastating raids by SS, ostensibly to clear 'terrorists' bases in those countries.'[933] Through such raids, thousands of Bulilima youths lost their lives.

The Rhodesian regime's incessant aerial and ground raids on both ZAPU and ZANU bush camps demonstrate how valuable and indispensable youths were to the two liberation movements and how insecure, vulnerable and threatened the regime felt over their presence there. As Chung puts it, 'The Rhodesian government refused to distinguish between schools, refugee camps, and military camps, regarding all of them as legitimate targets'.[934] For them, all bush camps harboured 'terrorists' who were a threat to the sovereignty of Rhodesia. To that effect, any bushy camp was subject to attack, regardless of its occupants.

As much as bush camps were besieged by the Rhodesian army on a regular basis, this did not crush Bulilima youths' resolve and determination to liberate their country. On this resolve, Bessent said, 'Bulilima youths contributed to the liberation of Zimbabwe in many ways. In the war front, for example, the Mafela Trust report reveals that three quarters of

[931] *Ibid*.
[932] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 209.
[933] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 53.
[934] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 209.

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ZIPRA forces were Kalanga. We can attribute this to the district's closeness to the border. That is, youths from Midlands, Bulawayo, Beitbridge and other inland places faced a lot of challenges such as road blocks, security forces and similar dangers associated with crossing districts where one was unknown, a total stranger.'[935] Providing the majority of ZIPRA guerrillas marked Bulilima District as one of the districts in the country which lost thousands of its youths during the course of the war as Nothando also pointed out.

Nothando Msimanga of Plumtree town said she was one of the female youths who had vowed to die for her country while in Zambia. Giving reasons why she joined the struggle, Nothando said,

> It became a natural instinct that time for youths to want to join the liberation struggle. I was motivated by guerrillas who were collecting youths to join the war. Guerrillas came to our place (Dingumuzi Township) and told us to be ready, they would come collect us. At that time, they had abducted Thekwane Mission students (1976). We were told that they abused young girls on the way to Botswana. Out of fear of such abuse, we organised ourselves, six friends to be precise and crossed the border to Botswana on our own.[936]

Nothando's account reveals that ZIPRA guerrillas infiltrated African townships in Plumtree town in their recruitment drives. Guerrillas' success in infiltrating Dingumuzi Township illustrates the vibrant nature of ZAPU structures in Bulilima District.[937] While the Smith regime faced mass exodus by Bulilima youths to Botswana to join the liberation struggle, youths such as Nothando celebrated when they safely arrived in Zambia, 'I was overjoyed when I finally reached Zambian refugee camps.' She continued, 'From VC, I was chosen to train as a female guerrilla in Mukushi training camp. One was chosen according to her intelligence.'[938] The issue of one's physical appearance being used as a yard-stick to measure one's maturity or eligibility to train as a guerrilla was also pointed out by other interviewees. This became a trend which resulted in very young but tall and heavily built children being trained as guerrillas, hence child soldiers.

[935] Interview with Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016.
[936] Interview with Nothando Msimanga, Zimbabwe Building Society Township (ZBS), Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.
[937] Focus Group Discussion One, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015.
[938] Interview with Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.

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Conversely, small bodied youths were sadly left out of the deal. Nothando was one such victim of her big and powerful body structure. Born in 1962, at age fourteen she was trained as a guerrilla although she did not complete her training due to the security forces' raids and bombardment of Mukushi camp.[939] In its editorial expressing its shock over the wanton killing of female refugees in Mukushi, the Zambian *Daily Mail* (1978) wrote, 'The whole idea of Rhodesians taking with them newsmen to witness the killing of girls at a ZAPU camp in Mukushi is too terrible to imagine.'[940] These air raids ended Nothando's dream of carrying a gun to fight for the liberation of her country.

She said regretfully, 'Yes, I trained as a guerrilla at Mukushi. We were the second group to be trained there. Unfortunately, our group was bombed during training. As a result, I did not finish my training. After the bombings, we were relocated to Solwezi, ostensibly for our safety.'[941] Ironically, ZIPRA commanders discontinued training of female guerrillas once they were relocated to Solwezi, opting for propaganda programmes at the expense of training them. Nothando added,

> In Solwezi we found life difficult. We were fed propaganda nonsense on a daily basis. We were treated harshly because '*empini akulabunandi*' (there is no joy in the war). We did not sleep.[942]

Propaganda indoctrination and the harsh treatment female youths faced in Solwezi were probably meant to condition them to harsh realities of a pogrom expected any time any day as Rhodesian security forces were busy raiding bush camps those days. ZAPU and ZIPRA officials expected airborne attacks on bush camps to continue, hence the anticipated massacre inherent in those raids.[943]

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[939] *Ibid*.
[940] G. Baumhogger, *The Struggle for Independence. Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975 – 1980)*. Vol. II. Institute of African Studies: Africa Documentation Centre, 1984. p. 714.
[941] Interview with Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.
[942] *Ibid*.
[943] P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970 – 1980*. Johannesburg, 1993. p. 232.

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With such thoughts, one may argue, sexist tendencies overshadowed the noble cause of training female guerrillas, hence their being denied a life changing opportunity of becoming female guerrillas proper.

Even though Nothando did not complete her guerrilla training programme, she had kind words for the role youths played in the liberation of Zimbabwe. Her view was that,

> Youths helped a lot here. In refuge camps youths were, among other professions, nurses, guerrillas, political commissars and a general supply pool of personnel to any position(s) that required manpower. In rural Bulilima, youths were the eyes, ears and legs of guerrillas. They were running all-over the district gathering intelligence information for ZIPRA guerrillas' use.[944]

Teaching and treating sick or wounded fellow refugees under difficult and awkward conditions and fighting the enemy forces were some of the major highlights of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. With reference to ZANU refugees, Chung echoes Nothando's sentiments thus, 'These young people were to be both the ready recruits into the guerrilla army as well as the nurses and teachers who would look after people…in the refugee camps in Mozambique.'[945] Youths were not, therefore, earmarked for guerrilla training only. They were also a part of the bigger picture in a free Zimbabwe. ZAPU had a two- thronged approach to the liberation of Zimbabwe. First, it mobilised youths for its guerrilla and regular armies where they were efficiently and professionally trained to protect civilians and the country after independence. Second, it invested heavily on educating its youths so that when independence came, well-educated and trained professional civil servants would take over from where the Smith government would have left.[946] Youths, be it under the ZAPU banner or ZANU's, liberated this country through so much dedication and so much loss of life.

Youthful and inexperienced guerrillas in the war front, for example, were pitted against the battle-hardened Rhodesian army who had seen battles in Kenya (Mau Mau rebellion)

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[944] Interview with Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.
[945] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 141.
[946] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. pp. 102 and 103.

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and the Malaya guerrilla conflict.[947] Emphasising the fact that guerrillas were young, Kriger writes, 'Eight years ago, Zimbabwe's mighty young freedom fighters brought down the fall of the colonial regime.'[948] This underpins the importance of Bulilima youths in liberating Zimbabwe.[949] If youths did not sacrifice their lives to liberate Zimbabwe, it would have been difficult if not impossible for this country to become independent. Writing about the power of youths to help liberate a country, Desmond Tutu said,

> The 1970s SOWETO Youths were the key that opened the door to popular anti-apartheid resistance in the 1980s that ultimately led to our negotiated settlement and democratic elections. Thinking back, those children taught me a very profound lesson. After June 16 I knew that young people are the people who drive change. They do not directly wield financial clout, or control the levers of political power. But they have a unique ability to see through the fog of the time, and the courage to confront demons that have us oldies diving under our beds. They have the power to persuade the powerful.[950]

Desmond Tutu in this statement, summed up the courage shown by both the South African youths (SOWETO) and their counter parts in Zimbabwe in helping liberate their countries respectively. There is no doubt, therefore, that Bulilima youths were pivotal in the destruction of the Smith regime, notwithstanding the human cost which accompanied such sacrifices and bravery.

Giving reasons for such sacrifice, Nothando said, 'At first we were forced by circumstances as guerrillas were recruiting youths to join the struggle. When in Zambia that is when I developed the desire and need to free my country.'[951] Nothando insinuated that her involvement and participation in the liberation struggle was due to guerrilla recruitment drives happening in Dingumuzi Township. Once in Zambia, however, she was extrinsically motivated by what was happening around her to fight for her country.[952] In

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[947] For more details on Rhodesian army personnel's involvement in these conflicts, read K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987.
[948] N.J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe. Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980 – 1987*. Cambridge, 2003. p. 209.
[949] See Chapter four for clarity on this.
[950] D. Tutu, Those Children taught me a very profound lesson, in the *Sunday Times*. June 12, 2016. p. 17.
[951] Interview with Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.
[952] *Ibid*.

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other words, Nothando would not have joined the struggle in Zambia if it had not been for guerrillas who were recruiting youths in Dingumuzi Township.

A similar but unrelated trend was observed in Thabamoopo District of Limpopo Province, South Africa. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) led to massive recruitment of youths to participate in the struggle against apartheid.[953] The point is, in the majority of cases, youths in Bulilima, those to the eastern districts next to Mozambique border and Thabamoopo District were recruited by well-organised institutions such as ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas and, UDF and BCM in the case of Thabamoopo.

Given such systematic forms of recruitment, no doubt propaganda and indoctrination of immature young brains played a central role. With reference to recruitment methods in Thabamoopo, Phaladi writes that,

> At workshops, the youths were told about the banned organisations (ANC, PAC, among others), [as well as] the black political leaders who were banned and the banned political literature such as the Freedom Charter. The youths were also conscientised about the government policy of apartheid. These leaders (Peter Mokaba, for example) convinced them that the government could not leave the policy unless militant action was taken against it. The conscientised youths were lobbied to join MK.[954]

Such blatant brain-washing of young minds became the norm in rural Rhodesia as well. Specifically, brain-washing of youths was prevalent in Bulilima District as well as in ZAPU's bush camps in Zambia and elsewhere. In this way, multitudinous youths were lobbied to join the liberation struggle in the promise of being trained to become ZIPRA guerrillas. Youths such as Nothando found themselves in Zambian bush camps participating in a war they initially did not comprehend.[955] Worse still, such female youths were left to rue their misfortune when their dreams were shattered as promised guerrilla

[953] R.S. Phaladi, The Role of the Youth in the Struggle against the Apartheid Regime in Thabamoopo District of Lebowa Homeland, 1970 – 1994: A Critical Historical Study. (Unpublished Master's Dissertation) University of Limpopo, 2010. pp. 83 and 84 -85.
[954] *Ibid*. pp. 84 and 85.
[955] Interview with Janet Kube, Mzwanyane Village: 3rd February, 2016 and Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.

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training collapsed right in their eyes. The bush camps inevitably provided a reality check for youths who had assumed joining the war would be easy.

Asked what exactly youths did in bush camps, Nothando answered, 'Some went to school, some were engaged in production activities such as sewing, knitting, while others were sent to further their education overseas.'[956] As already stated, self-help undertakings such as Nothando mentioned prepared youths to be self-reliant and sufficient as opposed to being idle and dependent on handouts that could take several months to come. Self-help projects seem to have been a prominent feature of bush camps in Zambia and Mozambique. Chung said of Sally Mugabe with regard to such ventures,

> A practical person, Sally supported the liberation struggle in simple and practical ways. She collected cloths and sewing machines from donors. These were distributed to every refuge camp for Zimbabweans. She provided cloth to enable tailoring workshops to be established in every camp. Young recruits in threadbare clothes, often exposing their back and buttocks, appreciated the clothes she sent. At our school in Matenje, we had a tailoring workshop equipped by Sally, and tailors worked every day to provide basic clothing for teachers and pupils.[957]

Leaders such as Sally Mugabe were what youths in bush camps needed.[958] Troubled youths needed a hands-on approach that tackled chronic practical problems. As much as there was action in ZANU run bush camps, the same was true of ZAPU controlled camps as well. Here, female youths were involved in sewing and knitting ventures, producing clothes and warm garments for male refugees. Male refugees were engaged in carpentry, construction and agricultural activities for their survival. Hayes, *et al.,* sum this thus,

> The party and donors thought up all sorts of projects, like knitting and weaving for women. At VC there was a big factory which made dresses and other items of clothing. In addition, the camp farm had piggery on top of crop production. Boys at

[956] Interview with Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.
[957] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. pp. 183 – 184.
[958] Sally Mugabe was the wife of ZANU's President, Robert Mugabe. She was also a refugee in Mozambique.

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> Solwezi and elsewhere did leather work and made shoes for school boys and girls…Schools mixed practical and academic subjects for immediate use.[959]

Such initiatives were but some of the many characteristics that shaped youths' daily lives in camps. Given the magnitude, character and scale of self-help ventures in bush camps, one is justified to conclude that the survival and wellbeing of refugees was one of the major pre-occupations of liberation movements' leadership. Ndebele concurs by commenting that, 'At one of these liberation camps, J.Z. Moyo Camp, which housed a school for young recruits, because of shortages of food and clothing, we had to make our own clothes and produce our own food as donor supplies were erratic.'[960] No doubt, such initiatives were the brainchild of ZAPU's top leadership in collaboration with innovative donor organisations. This was after the realisation that over reliance on donor provisions was likely to compromise the struggle when youths began to starve to death due to none availability of food and clothes. This way, donor supplies and what refugees produced complemented each other, hence their continued sustenance and some form of comfort in discomfort and hunger.[961] This, however, was not what youths bargained for when they decided to join the liberation struggle. They joined to carry guns not hoes, nor were they promised sewing machines during recruitment campaigns.

These adverse happenings in bush camps did not deter youths such as Nothando from diligently executing duties allocated them. About this aspect, Nothando said, 'I helped liberate my country guarding female camps, helping other refugees learn, protecting young people in camps. I was a guard.'[962] It is hard to accept ZAPU officials' sincerity to ensuring female youths' safety when one considers that they promoted Nothando to guard them when she was semi-trained. Nonetheless, participating this way in the struggle against colonial oppression ensured, to some extent, the safety of those who

[959] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1999. p. 60.
[960] C. Ndebele, Socialist Curriculum Development and Implementation in Zimbabwe from 1980 - 2004: With special reference to Education with Production Model and Social Studies and History Curriculum. (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Fort Hare University, 2007. p. 9.
[961] Little comfort in that at least youths managed to cover their bodies with some form of garments which generally made them move around half-covered. Discomfort in that youths were mostly half-dressed, with their buttocks exposed for all to see. Worse more, female youths had no panties, a situation that grossly undermined their womanhood, hence made them uncomfortable to move around during their monthly periods. For more additional information on this state of affairs, consult P. Hayes, *et al., Children of History*. Harare, 1999.
[962] Interview with Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016.

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were at school in bush camps. Joining the struggle enabled Bulilima youths to contribute universally in liberating Zimbabwe. 'There was a revolutionary or motivational wind that everyone had an obligation to join the war. Further, people were coerced to join the struggle in numbers.'[963] Samuel insinuates that guerrilla activities in Ngwana and radio propaganda were so rife as to create a conducive climate for youths to want to join the struggle in order to topple the colonial government. In true Fanonist fashion, therefore, the destruction of colonial rule in Zimbabwe was willed, called for, demanded from the youths by ZAPU leadership in exile through radio Zambia and ZIPRA guerrillas.[964]

Samuel further testifies that,

> The situation prevailing at the time forced young men of my age to join the struggle. That is, if one did not join the struggle, one was forced to join the Rhodesian army through national service [national call-up]. Here [Ngwana village] it was volatile. No one of my age [15 years] was left at home. Ngwana was a highly political area. At one point, for example, all teachers at Ngwana Primary School joined the struggle. Unfortunately, the Head Teacher failed to report the matter to authorities in Plumtree. When the army came, everyone was beaten up, homes burnt down, and prominent community members arbitrarily arrested and detained in Plumtree. It is within such situations that we developed a general feeling that those who had joined the struggle were better off where they were. In addition, those who had joined the struggle brought trouble for us. *Kwakubuzwa wena oseleyo ukuba ozibani bayengaphi* [The Rhodesian army demanded from us the whereabouts of those who had joined the liberation struggle].[965]

To Samuel, a combination of four factors contributed to him joining the liberation struggle. These were, guerrilla activity in Ngwana Village, radio propaganda, harassment by security forces, and the potential of being 'called-up' for national service by the Smith regime. Given the role of the Rhodesian army here, Ngwana youths, to use Franz Fanon's interpretation, had to call into question the colonial situation,[966] as prevailing in their

[963] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[964] Compare: F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963. p. 27.
[965] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[966] F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963. p. 28.

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village. The army, for instance, used brutal violence to intimidate Ngwana youths into providing them with information on the whereabouts of individuals they did not even know.

The Rhodesian army's hardline stance against Ngwana community only served to alienate it from youths. Nhlanhla (one of the interviewees) recalled,

> The soldiers were brutalising us each time they came here. As youths, we became tired of this. One day we sold them out to guerrillas after monitoring their daily activities where they were camped at Ngwana Primary School. That is, we observed that early in the mornings, around 05:00 they would go bath by the borehole. We provided this vital piece of information to ZIPRA guerrillas who in turn ambushed them and wiped them out while they were bathing. Unfortunately, when the army reinforcement came, they went on a rampage, on a killing spree, burning all Vikane homesteads around the borehole where the battle had ensued.[967]

This created fertile ground for Ngwana youths' resentment towards the Smith regime. This sad scenario depicts painful situations Bulilima youths faced as they grappled with the demands of the revolutionary war in Bulilima Districts.

Given such circumstances, Samuel was left with no option but to trek across the border into Botswana enroute to Zambia,

> I went with a young boy who apparently had followed me. By the Botswana border we met my friends. We travelled at night and, when we got lost, BaTswana villagers gave us directions. These people were very friendly to us. It was easy to lose one's way at night. The Botswana border was so helpful to us in that there was free movement because there were limited border patrols. In other words, there were no people or control mechanisms in place. In fact, from Mengwe Village to Francistown we were transported in BDF trucks.[968]

Samuel's testimony fits in well with what other interviewees said regarding the Botswana border and their journey to Francistown once they crossed the border. What is important to note here is that the situation that prevailed in Ngwana Village prompted hundreds of

[967] Interview with Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 23rd March, 2016.
[968] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.

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youths to join the revolutionary war. This follows a similar trend throughout the country where tens of thousands of youths crossed borders to train as guerrillas in Zambia and Mozambique due to the Rhodesian army's brutality.[969] Several thousands of Bulilima youths found themselves involved and participating in Zimbabwe's war of independence in foreign lands.

Samuel continued with his story this way,

> I only stayed less than two days in Francistown. Botswana was a stop-over for me. I flew to Zambia from Selebi Pikwe in a Denmark Airways plane. In Zambia, I was taken to Nampundwe, a military training facility. There, we were recruited for military training. Everything done there was pro-military. ZAPU had plans for its recruits, plans such as having them join engineering courses, education, nursing and guerrilla training, among other options.[970]

Generally, ZAPU intended distributing its recruits to various fields of civilian professions via education. This way, its multitudes of refugees would be engaged in career orientated and skills driven courses in various countries throughout the world. Amid accusations of tribal favouritism, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo (ZAPU National Treasurer) and George Silundika (ZAPU Publicity Secretary) prepared youths for future posts in a free Zimbabwe.[971] Bulilima youths were fortunate in that they had the opportunity to pursue their dream career-courses in large numbers. One of these fortunate ones was John Bugalo who trained as an electrical engineer in the Soviet Union.[972] In this regard, Bulilima youths were invaluable to ZAPU's quest to liberate Zimbabwe from colonial rule.

On training and higher education, Samuel reiterated that,

> Youths were the backbone of the struggle. In fact, Zimbabwe's war of liberation was fought by young people between the ages [of] fifteen [and] twenty. Elderly people were on the political side of the struggle. Those who had gone with some

[969] I. Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953 – 1980*. London, 1984. pp. 193 – 4.
[970] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[971] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 207.
[972] Interview with Thembani Dube, (ex-ZIPPRA operative in Bulilima District) Solusi Mission: 7th February, 2016.

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> bit of education were sent to do the technical side of the war such as engineering, driving, instructors, medical doctors and nurses, teachers and so on.[973]

Youths were made to pursue these diversified roles in bush camps, being sent overseas for specialised courses and being deployed in the war front to fight the enemy and so on, a proof that they carried the war on their shoulders. In fact, evidence shows that youths directly or indirectly liberated the country from colonial rule.[974] But the reasons for their involvement in the war differed. To Samuel, the situation that prevailed at the time (1970s) had a bearing on the future of the people then. There was a revolutionary feeling that the social, economic and political situations were unjust to black people, hence the mass exodus to join the struggle.[975] Bulilima youths' understanding and acceptance that the economic and political situation in Bulilima was not conducive for their future survival indicated their political maturity. This is contrary to Fanon's view that colonialism served to brain-wash youths into seeing their past as an 'oppressive darkness' empty of civilisation.[976] Instead, we see Bulilima youths (partly through ZAPU structures and partly due to the practically oppressive, discriminative and segregative nature of the colonial system) being conscious of their social, political and economic circumstances. This made them take a stand against colonialism. The failure by the white settler regime to reform or compromise led both ZAPU and ZANU to engage the government militarily.[977] The two liberation movements' change of strategy called for several thousands of youths to join the struggle so as to train as guerrillas to fight against the Smith regime.[978]

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[973] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[974] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015; Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 31st March, 2016; MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015 and Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village: 23rd October, 2015. Also consult the following; F. Chung, 2006; P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, Marshalltown, 1982; N.J. Kriger, 1992 and S. Rule, 2000, among a host of these, for additional information.
[975] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[976] F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963. p. 169.
[977] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 1914. p. 161.
[978] It must be said that both ZAPU and ZANU, upon their formation, did not engage the settler government in a fully blown guerrilla war. Their strategy at first was to persuade the regime through sporadic acts of economic sabotage activities such as attacks on key and strategic economic installations, (bridges, railway lines, farms, fuel depots, among others), to negotiate with black nationalists for majority rule. When this failed, ZAPU and ZANU resorted to a fully-fledged guerrilla war, hence the recruitment of several thousands of rural youths to partake in the armed struggle. For further details on youth participation here, see A.S. Mlambo, York, 1914; J. Brickhill, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) 1995; N. Bhebe, 1999 and P. Godwin and I. Hancock, 1993.

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In the context of an envisaged protracted guerrilla war, Bulilima youths joined the liberation struggle in order to face the Smith army back home. Samuel acknowledges that once in Zambia, youths prepared to form a new black government after the defeat of the white settler government.[979] The preparations to form a new government underscores self-belief, confidence and trust in the ability of ZAPU to defeat the Smith regime. Those that were not militarily engaged provided musical performances that served to provide moral support to guerrillas in the war front and those in training.[980] This way, ZAPU structured its bush camp activities in such a way that everyone was involved and participated in the liberation struggle one way or the other. Around 1979, for example, ZIPRA had about twenty thousand trained guerrillas with three thousand of these operating inside the country, with five thousand more undergoing training in various countries such as Angola, Libya and Zambia.[981] In this regard, Bulilima youths who had joined the struggle found themselves entrusted with and committed to liberating Zimbabwe. Samuel's view here is that most of Bulilima youths who had joined the liberation struggle executed it physically, hence youths were the backbone of the struggle without which the country would not have been liberated.[982] To Samuel, therefore, youths were the vanguard of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

Youths' unparalleled contribution to the liberation of the country should be seen from two different complementary angles. The first, in Samuel's view, is the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths who did not cross the borders to Botswana and Zambia. He regards them as youths who 'fought the war internally' as guerrilla informers, the eyes and ears of the fighting force; and some were abused in the process.[983] The non-combatant youths in rural Bulilima were guerrillas' 'auxiliary foot soldiers'. On top of this, female youths warmed guerrilla blankets at night each time they were around a village,[984] completing a vicious cycle of roles whose short term selfish benefits were realised by guerrillas only. All this served to exhibit various ways by which Bulilima youths contributed

[979] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[980] *Ibid*.
[981] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 1914. p. 166.
[982] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[983] *Ibid*.
[984] Lizzy Dube, interviewed by P. Hayes, *at al., Children of History*. Harare, 1999. p. 24.

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to the liberation of Zimbabwe. The second angle was the involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle by Bulilima youths who had joined the struggle in neighbouring countries.

Samuel concluded his testimony thus, 'I contributed a lot to the freedom of this country. The most important aspect was in terms of numbers. That is, the more we were, the more we got recognition from the international community. As a result, the party [ZAPU] counted on us youths for whatever it wanted to do. It had us as youths at its disposal.'[985] This partly answers why ZIPRA guerrillas continued with their massive recruitment exercises despite bush camps overflowing with refugees. This was a selfish strategy by party officials for self-aggrandizement at the expense of the multitudes of starving and miserable youths in bush camps. ZAPU officials' lack of altruism manifested itself when they took advantage of frantic youths facing a bleak future to make them join the struggle despite bush camps overflowing with malnourished ones.

The eagerness and zeal Bulilima youths showed in joining the liberation struggle reflected the desperate political situation that obtained in Bulilima District in the 1970s. Ngoni Malikongwa Dube of Tokwana said, 'Politics of the day forced me into exile because I was not proceeding with my education and the prospects of employment were bleak.'[986] A combination of political instability and the stagnation of his young life compelled Ngoni to join the liberation struggle in 1976. Ngoni's push factors came close to the Smith regime's belief that '…the war was perpetuated by 'communist-trained and inspired murdering scums, assisted by the unemployed youths who were victims of 'total moral weakness.'[987] The fact is, at that time, there was massive youth unemployment which fed into their desire to join the liberation struggle. The outcome was that Ngoni had to walk with two friends from the same village to Francistown.

Their journey too was facilitated by the BaTswana villagers settled along the border with Rhodesia. These villagers were very cooperative since they understood and appreciated

[985] Interview with Samuel Moyo, Ngwana Village: 6th May, 2015.
[986] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[987] P. Godwin and I. Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die. The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970 – 1980*. Johannesburg, 1993. p. 99.

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Bulilima youths' intentions.[988] In this case, Bulilima youths' intentions were to liberate their country from minority settler rule as much as they were to find something meaningful and worthwhile to do with their idle lives in Zambia. As Ellert sums it, 'many young men fled Rhodesia for Zambia to join the ranks of men and women who had already turned to undergo military training in Ghana, Algeria, the USSR, China and Tanzania, among other countries.'[989] This reflects a trend among youths throughout the country to trek to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia for guerrilla war purposes. This seemed to be the only solution for youths since, 'serious unemployment could no longer be disguised by the RF Government'.[990] The country's unemployment crisis played into the hands of ZIPRA recruiters, hence Ngoni and his two friends' journey to Francistown.

Concurring with the above, Gann and Henriksen point out that, 'Guerrilla recruiters drew heavily for rank and file on semiliterate youths from villages…Young Africans [had] many reasons for joining the guerrilla army. Unemployed youngsters, school leavers without prospects, saw new hope for advancement by fighting for a cause that promised present work and future careers.[991] In light of this, Ngoni found himself in Botswana headed to Zambia to train as a guerrilla operative. Similarly, unemployment is seen as yet another factor that forced youths to join the liberation struggle as a form of occupation.[992] Unemployment seems to be the dominant factor that reinforced Bulilima youths' resolve to join the liberation struggle.

Pressed for ZIPRA recruits, ZAPU officials in Botswana did not let Ngoni and company stay long in Francistown. A few days in Botswana, they were flown to Zambia under the cover of UN refuge. In Zambia, Ngoni went straight to a training camp- the Communist Guerrilla Training Camp (CGTC) where he trained in guerrilla warfare and administration for nine months. This included combat tactics, military engineering [especially] for bombs and fortifications.[993] The idea of Ngoni flying to Zambia as a UN refugee is an illustrative

[988] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[989] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*. Gweru, 1989. pp. 4 – 5.
[990] A. Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way*? London, 1983. p. 65.
[991] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 97.
[992] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 104.
[993] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.

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example of the international support and sympathy ZAPU received from the international community on its struggle against the Smith regime. It is an indication that ZAPU's war against the white settler government was a legitimate struggle for self-determination, hence a legal war in the eyes of the international community.[994] By engaging the settler government militarily, therefore, ZAPU was not breaking any internationally ascribed law governing the engagement and conduct of war.

In this sense, Bulilima youths' endeavours to liberate their country had international backing and blessings.[995] Such international support and backing is further realised when Ngoni was sent for further extended and expanded training in the USSR to train as a medical officer.[996] Ngoni became an asset to ZIPRA in terms of his medical expertise and leadership in that field. This was apparent when he said,

> Upon my return from the USSR, I became camp medical officer. After a few months in this position, I was sent to Yugoslavia for further medical training. On my return, I was deployed at ZIPRA Command where my duties basically involved, among other things, coordinating guerrilla movements and deployment. I regularly visited our guerrilla units deployed throughout the country in base camps.[997]

Ngoni rose fast through ZIPRA ranks to become one of ZIPRA's top officials in charge of operations. He owed his speedy rise in leadership to ZIPRA Commanders who granted him rare opportunities to further his military studies overseas. The issue is, after some initial training and most probably based on one's conduct, intelligence, expertise and leadership qualities exhibited during training, some were selected to go for specialist courses in different African and overseas socialist countries; some went to train in conventional warfare and the rest were infiltrated into the country to reinforce the fighting units.[998] Clearly, not everyone benefited from such opportunities as Ngoni and those few lucky ones. To Ngoni, this fulfilled what Gann and Henriksen regard as a recruit's ambition

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[994] Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*. Cambridge, 1988. pp. 67 – 68, 69 and 71.
[995] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Rhodesia since UDI.* London, 1975. pp. 17, 26 and 27 and, F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 84.
[996] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[997] *Ibid*.
[998] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 105.

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to hold a higher position within ZIPRA structures of command.[999] As a youth keen on liberating his country, Ngoni's dreams and hopes were falling in place, hence his mission was to a large extent, accomplished. His power, authority and position of influence was crystal clear when he remarked,

> In my visiting ZIPRA base camps/operational areas, I was more of an emperor. I established relationships between locals and guerrillas. I organised meetings, requested locals to give us information on the movements of Rhodesian security forces. I covered areas such as Tsholotsho, Hwange, Zvimba, Nkayi, Gokwe, and Lupane among others. I was a big guy, moving from unit to unit. I was monitoring the performance of our guerrilla army in their areas of operation, liaising with locals, ZIPRA guerrillas and ZIPRA top officials in Zambia.[1000]

Ngoni was a powerful commander in his own right, responsible for the coordination of guerrilla activities in their operational areas. Part of his job description was that of a liaison officer, linking guerrilla mandates with locals' aspirations, expectations and hopes in the context of ZIPRA guerrillas being their liberation army. In addition, Ngoni evaluated ZIPRA's operational strategies within the frame of the ever revolving and improving security forces' counter-insurgency strategies and accompanying tactics. Ngoni's role also helps clarify why ZIPRA guerrillas did not mobilise peasants to support their cause. Special tasks such as peasants' mobilisation were done by a special envoy such as Ngoni, leaving ZIPRA guerrillas to concentrate on fighting the enemy.[1001] This way, Ngoni played an essential role in facilitating good relationships between ZIPRA guerrillas and peasants, while letting his guerrillas do their duties with undivided attention. As Stott writes, ZIPRA were less dependent upon local population and thus placed less emphasis on mobilising peasants for their success, relying to greater extent on their military prowess.[1002]

On the issue of Bulilima youths and the liberation struggle, Ngoni was quick to point out that Bulilima youths' geographical location gave them added advantage over youths from

[999] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 97.
[1000] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[1001] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[1002] L. Stott, *Women and the Armed Struggle for Independence in Zimbabwe. (1964 – 1979)*. Edinburgh, 1990. p. 16.

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other districts in terms of joining the liberation struggle.[1003] It was easy for guerrillas to recruit from within Bulilima District and quickly cross to Botswana without being noticed by the security forces, compared to inland districts where they had to cover a lot of ground before reaching the sanctuary of Botswana. This was even known to the state's security organs that guerrillas' intentions were to concentrate more on border districts in order to have a foothold on the country's out-lying areas.[1004] Such guerrilla infiltrations contributed immensely to the joining of the liberation struggle by Bulilima youths.

Ngoni, emphasising on the high number of Bulilima youths in ZIPRA army pointed out that almost in every ZIPRA mission, there was a Bulilima youth.[1005] Given these high permutations, suffice it to note that Bulilima District proportionately lost a large number of guerrillas in combat as well as in bush camps when they were bombed. Described as scenes of slaughter, the magnitude, scale and the extent of killings in these camps were horrifying.[1006] The slaughter of youths in bush camps hit Bulilima District the hardest due to the presence of its youths in large numbers. Ngoni commented,

> It was easy for ZIPRA guerrillas to meet their fate [death]. We were in Zambia to train as guerrillas. After training, most of us were filtered back to the country to fight the enemy and mobilise villagers to support us. This was quite demanding as we travelled on foot. By the time we made contact with the enemy, we would be tired and [as a result] we lost many fighters. I saw colleagues losing their lives during Zambezi crossing. We had problems with diseases so pronounced in the areas like Zambezi Valley. We also were a burden to masses as they did not have much food to feed us. We suffered from hunger [as a result of that].[1007]

Ngoni raises three pertinent issues about endangered ZIPRA guerrillas then. First is the issue of the tedious and physically demanding journey from Zambia to Rhodesia which left many guerrilla fighters exhausted, hence vulnerable to enemy forces in case of contact. Second was the issue of the Zambezi River, a deadly obstruction to ZIPRA cadres attempting to cross. That the mighty Zambezi was a natural and uncompromising

[1003] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[1004] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 124.
[1005] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[1006] D. Caute, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*. London, 1983. p. 369.
[1007] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.

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killer to anyone crossing it has been pointed out by several scholars writing on ZIPRA's incursions through the northern border,[1008] including some interviewees in this study. Third, ZIPRA combatants suffered from diseases that naturally hindered their ability to defend themselves against their enemies when cornered. A combination of these three factors contributed to the 'loss of life within ZIPRA missions' in the war front. Going to war was to a point, suicidal on the part of Bulilima youths, yet they did that in their thousands.

Ngoni expressed his appreciation of the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. He pointed out that physically and materially, they were the fighters while others provided auxiliary support, mobilising masses [on our behalf] and working as couriers for guerrilla materials.[1009] Ngoni's assertion above is also noted by several scholars some of whom are Kriger, Flower, Trethewan, Mlambo, Staunton, Stott and Hayes, *et al*. They generally point to the fact that youths provided invaluable services to the two guerrilla armies operating inside Rhodesia, in addition to the fact that guerrillas themselves were youths.[1010] Recollecting those years when Bulilima youths embarked on a symbolical 'gold rush' to join the struggle, Ngoni was perturbed,

> It was illness at its best. On average, Bulilima youths went to war when they were fourteen – fifteen years old. I went to war when I was fourteen years old. Nonetheless, those who remained at home acted as our messengers, eyes and ears where they informed us on the whereabouts and movements of Rhodesian forces. Those involved in military operations lost their lives while still young. In fact, it was ZIPRA policy that those above thirty-five should not be in the warfront.

[1008] Some of these scholars are, *inter alia*, L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981; A.M. Chambati, Africans and the Struggle for their Rights in Rhodesia, 1923 – 1972, in S.E. Wilmer (Ed.), *et al., Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973; A. Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way*? London, 1983; N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999 and E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012.

[1009] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.

[1010] Additional and detailed information on this aspect is available from, among other sources; L. Stott, *Women and the Armed Struggle for Independence in Zimbabwe. (1964 – 1979)*. Edinburgh, 1990; J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995; F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006; N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992; K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987 and A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008.

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> Anyone not [a] youth was not fit for war. Youths carried out military campaigns [as a result of this policy].[1011]

Based on Ngoni's account, Bulilima youths' contribution to the liberation struggle was immense and ought to be acknowledged as such, particularly in the context of Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War historiography.[1012] Bulilima youths' unsung heroics and sacrifices more than brought this country's independence. Those youths had their unifying '*empini*' (war or going to war) concept that saw several thousands of them defying all odds to cross the borders, going '*empini*' to fight against the Smith regime. In the same way that Black Consciousness unified youths in South Africa, the '*empini*' concept unified youths in Bulilima District. The '*empini*' concept thus galvanised Bulilima youths into joining ZIPRA's rank and file in Zambia.[1013] That is, during the war, the catch word in Bulilima was '*empini*'. Those who had gone '*empini*' were heroes and heroines in the eyes of those who were yet to go.[1014] This way, every youth was motivated to go '*empini*'. Bulilima youths were inspired by youthful guerrillas operating in their areas as well.

On the number of Bulilima youths who joined the armed conflict in Zambia, Basikana Mlalazi of Madlambudzi (interviewee) acknowledged that there were so many of them from this district. To her, youths were very important in the struggle because they were physically involved.[1015] Bulilima youths' numerical advantage in bush camps contributed to their forming the bulk of ZIPRA forces. This, however, should not be construed to mean Bulilima youths were more interested in fighting more than youths from other districts. Their involvement and participation in large numbers should be viewed in light of Bulilima District being a convenient, safe and thus vulnerable district to ZIPRA guerrillas' recruitment errands.[1016] Furthermore, Bulilima District provided the bulk of senior ZAPU officials both in exile and those operating underground within the country. These were,

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[1011] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[1012] See Chapter two for a detailed discussion on this aspect.
[1013] Focus Group Discussions One and Two, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village and Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 17th November, 2015 and 1st June, 2016.
[1014] Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[1015] Interview with Basikana Mlalazi, Madlambudzi Village: 5th September, 2015.
[1016] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016; Bessent Zapu Gumpo, Tematema, Gonde Village: 28th August, 2016 and Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 31st March, 2016.

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inter alia, George Silundika (Gala Village), Masotsha Ndlovu[1017] (Ndolwane Village), Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo (Madabe Village) and Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo (Malaba Village, Kezi, but had relatives in Bulilima District) and Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu (Dombodema Village).[1018] Politically, this meant that Bulilima villagers were highly informed and active during the early 1960s by virtue of having influential leaders running nationalist politics in Rhodesia.

These leaders' political ideas filtered down to grass-root levels in Bulilima and were embraced by BaKalanga people to show their displeasure with settler rule and its inherent hardships.[1019] Given BaKalanga's early political maturity, it is no surprise that the majority of Bulilima youths pro-actively responded to calls for them to join Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Basikana attributed her joining the struggle to her village's closeness to Botswana border and ZIPRA's 'hunger' to net as many youths as they could in 1975.[1020] Madlambudzi Village is close to the Botswana border and that made it an easy target for ZIPRA recruiters. Generally, border districts were vulnerable to massive guerrilla recruitment drives due to the desperate situation that prevailed with regard to the need for more and more guerrillas to fight the Smith regime.[1021] Basikana found herself netted by ZIPRA recruiters. Recollecting her experience, she said,

> I was busy cleaning our yard one Sunday morning when, from nowhere, I heard an unfamiliar female voice calling me. When I checked, I saw this young girl standing by *ibhakasa* (wooden poles surrounding the homestead that serve as a fence). I went to her and she told me that '*Obhuti bayakucela laphayana*' [guerrillas are asking for you over there]. As I went out to check, I was confronted by this gun-wielding man who told me in no uncertain terms, simply, politely but firmly that

[1017] Masotsha Ndlovu was one of the pioneers of pressure politics in Southern Rhodesia from the 1940s right through the federation years. His political activities were more pronounced and prominent in trade union pressure and compromise politics that characterised the 1940s – 1950s African Political Trade Unionism. For a further understanding of such politics and Masotsha's role here, see E. Msindo, 2012; T.O. Ranger, 1985; A. Astrow, 1983; I. Hancock, 1984; G. Baumhogger, 1984 and T.O. Ranger, (Ed.), 1968.
[1018] E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. pp. 180 and 189 – 90.
[1019] *Ibid*. p. 189.
[1020] Interview with Basikana Mlalazi, Madlambudzi Village: 5th September, 2015.
[1021] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 141.

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> *Ngicela usijoyine khathesi, siya empini*, *asambe* (Please join us, we are going to war in Zambia, now]. That was that, I joined them and off we went '*empini*'.[1022]

During the 1970s recruitment fever, the term '*empini*' literally meant going to Zambia to train as a ZIPRA guerrilla.[1023] The concept 'empini', therefore, was a fashionable catch word that roused young people's fighting spirits, zeal and enthusiasm to join the struggle. To hear that someone has gone '*empini'* provoked natural feelings among the listener(s) to do like-wise.[1024] This is in line with how Basikana joined the struggle. Recounting her journey to Botswana, she said, 'We were a group of about thirty youths and four guerrillas. I was so excited to be part of this group. We reached Mengwe Village in Botswana where we were treated so well by the locals. The following day we were transported in BDF trucks to Francistown. After two days I was airlifted to Zambia for guerrilla training.'[1025] Basikana raises issues that were raised by all interviewees about the cordial and respectful way Bulilima youths were treated by their BaTswana neighbours. This explains the accessibility of the Botswana border by Bulilima youths as they crossed to join the armed struggle.

Ngoni concurred with Basikana, 'Yes, the Botswana border was more than helpful to Bulilima youths attempting to join the liberation struggle. It was accessible, no natural obstacles. We could easily filter into Botswana communities because we shared common language and culture.'[1026] Ngoni referred to the Zambezi River when he raised the issue of the Botswana border being obstacle-less. An almost identical situation is observed in the eastern districts of the country along the Mozambique – Zimbabwe border. Gann and Henriksen write that, 'The boundary between Rhodesia and Mozambique follows no recognisable ethnic natural features. Shona speaking people live on both sides of the frontier. The Shona had been used to crossing the border in peace time, they continued to do so with equal facility in time of war.'[1027] This way, old harmless tendencies and

[1022] Interview with Basikana Mlalazi, Madlambudzi Village: 5th September, 2015.
[1023] Interview with George Ndebele (ex-ZIPRA operative, Bulilima District), Zuzaphi Village: 9th October, 2015.
[1024] *Ibid*.
[1025] Interview with Basikana Mlalazi, Madlambudzi Village: 5th September, 2015.
[1026] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016.
[1027] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 106.

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practices came to be a night-mare to the security forces when borders were now used by both guerrillas and youths to infiltrate and exit the country for war purposes.

This is one of the reasons why it was problematic for the Smith government to properly monitor and deter unsanctioned movements across the Botswana border. To the security forces, the Botswana border provided a 'hopeless patrol frontier'. This was despite the establishment of police stations and police posts in a bid to contain unofficial and guerrilla movements across the border.[1028] The security forces' failure to secure the border was a blessing to Bulilima youths such as Basikana. Her arrival in Zambia meant that her wish was to be realised. 'Upon our arrival in Zambia, we were taken to a temporary camp where we stayed for some time before being taken to Mkushi for guerrilla training. I trained for almost a year and after my training, I was deployed to guard women and children at VC.'[1029] Basikana's role in the war included protecting female refugees who stayed at VC. In addition, her duties included patrolling nearby bushes to check for any signs of Rhodesian commandos.[1030] Under Basikana's protection, it is presumed, female refugees developed a sense of security until they were bombed in 1978.

This way, Basikana found herself involved and participating in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle as a female ZIPRA guerrilla responsible for female protection in a bush camp. That ZIPRA had a female brigade is confirmed by Brickhill who writes that ten percent of ZIPRA soldiers were women, and they were largely incorporated into one unit, the ZIPRA Women's Brigade.[1031] As much as ZIPRA produced female combatants, it hardly deployed them in the war front. 'We were never sent into Rhodesia to engage with the enemy forces. Our duties were to patrol camps that housed females. Those who were lucky enough were promoted to female instructors and camp commanders. Otherwise we never saw the battle front as guerrillas proper,'[1032] said Basikana disappointedly.

[1028] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2016.
[1029] Interview with Basikana Mlalazi, Madlambudzi Village: 5th September, 2015.
[1030] *Ibid*.
[1031] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[1032] Interview with Basikana Mlalazi, Madlambudzi Village: 5th September, 2015.

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There are a couple of reasons that could be given to explain and justify ZIPRA Commanders' disinclination to have female guerillas deployed alongside their male counterparts in the war front. The obvious explanation is that ZAPU was patriarchal in nature. This was evidenced by the fact that ZIPRA's High Command structure was male dominated, while ZAPU's War Council had no female representatives.[1033] Given this exclusive representative system, it is clear that ZIPRA's High Command and ZAPU's War Council had little faith and less hope in female guerrillas' effectiveness in the war front.

With such a pessimistic and fatalistic mentality, ZIPRA Commanders confined female guerrillas to camp guard positions where they played 'mothers of the revolution' to camp children.[1034] Even former ZIPRA operatives in Bulilima such as George Ndebele and Kolema Tshuma could not provide satisfactory responses as to why female guerrilla cadres were not infiltrated into the country after their training. 'What I can say is that yes, ZIPRA trained female comrades, but we never operated with them in the front, nor saw them anywhere in Rhodesia during our missions.'[1035] The above responses indicate that female guerrillas were 'shut out' from operating in the country for reasons best known to ZIPRA Commanders.

One strategy ZIPRA Commanders used to block the deployment of female guerrilla youths in Rhodesia was to turn them into a conventional army. In this regard, Brickhill said, 'The 'Turning Point Strategy,'[1036] required that 'semi-liberated' areas,[1037] in Rhodesia needed to be completely liberated and protected from the government by

[1033] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 107 and E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. pp. 197 and 205.
[1034] Given facts from female interviewees who trained as guerrillas and the reality that ZIPRA guerrilla missions in Rhodesia did not feature any female combatant, one is justified to conclude this way given the fact that at the moment there is no plausible explanation for such gender insensitive treatment of ZIPRA female guerrillas.
[1035] Interview with George Ndebele, Zuzaphi Village: 9th October, 2015 and Kolema Tshuma, Thekwane Mission: 5th August, 2015.
[1036] ZIPRA's 'Turning Point Strategy' was the strategy where ZIPRA Commanders were to deploy a regular army into Rhodesia for the final assault on the settler regime. In addition, the regular army, complete with aerial firepower and artillery weapons was to defend liberated zones. Female combatants were supposedly earmarked for this.
[1037] In Dumiso Dabengwa's own words, 'semi-liberated zones' or the 'Green Zone' (in ZIPRA lingo-franca) were areas where the Rhodesian government had lost total control and ZIPRA guerrillas were in complete control. J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70 and N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 110.

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deploying a regular force to be established by turning guerrillas into a regular army, hence a conventionally trained infantry brigade of females, complete with its own engineers, communications and commanded by female commanders.'[1038] Their not being infiltrated into the country, however, does not mean that their contributions to the country's freedom as female guerrillas was negligible. 'We did a lot for the country, for ZIPRA, for the party, for our people in Bulilima in particular and Zimbabwe in general,'[1039] said Basikana in a thinly veiled protest.[1040] Indeed female youths contributed a lot towards the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, as much as male youths did.

Such contributions, for example, were in the form of youths being the supply sources of ZIPRA guerrillas in bush camps.[1041] That is, Bulilima youths in both Botswana and Zambian bush camps were guerrillas in waiting. This idea is borne from the fact that at any given time during the war, the number of guerrillas in the war front would decline drastically,[1042] hence the constant need to beef up the ZIPRA warriors operating in Rhodesia. This could only be possible with a sufficient supply pool of youths.

Youths also participated in the struggle through advertising the plight of refugees in bush camps when (as noted by David Hlabano earlier) journalists took pictures and published these in various media platforms. This way, donor countries and organisations managed to donate a variety of basic necessities of life, as stated earlier. Lizwe Mkhwebu (Dladla Village) saw the power of Bulilima youths' participation in the struggle in terms of large numbers in bush camps. Bulilima youths, together with those from the rest of the country helped ZAPU officials solicit food parcels and other essential commodities in order to

[1038] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[1039] Interview with Basikana Mlalazi, Madlambudzi Village: 5th September, 2015.
[1040] Going by her shielded protest, I realised that she believed that I was of the same view/idea that female guerrillas were useless, ineffective and a hopeless bunch, hence the protest was directed at me than anyone else. It was more of a pre-emptive protest, to rid me of any negative thought about how valuable female guerrillas were to the liberation of this country. Little did she know or accept that I was not there to 'play judge' as to whether female youths' contributions to the struggle were valuable or not. She grudgingly accepted my pleas that I was there to provide them with a platform to say for themselves their 'lived experiences' during the guerrilla war.
[1041] Interview with Lizwe Mkhwebu, Dladla Village: 24th March, 2016.
[1042] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.

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efficiently pursue its war objectives with content youths. ZAPU, by virtue of having large numbers of refugees in bush camps, qualified for assistance on humanitarian grounds.[1043]

Further, ZIPRA's use of thousands of Bulilima youths as combat guerrillas in the war front and as sentries in bush camps helped advertise ZAPU's war efforts internationally. This was done by ZIPRA Commanders when they presented concrete evidence (after a contact with security forces) to the OAU's Liberation Committee of ZAPU's active engagement with the Smith regime.[1044] ZIPRA guerrillas' battles with the Rhodesian security forces were used to market ZAPU's active involvement in the armed struggle so that the movement could be funded by the OAU's Liberation Committee.

The OAU, through its Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa undertook to support the liberation struggles that were on going in Southern Africa. The OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (CCLA)…decided to support the Dar es Salaam Declaration with tangible action so as to underline the seriousness of the OAU in its preparation for the intensification of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.[1045] In this case, the Liberation Committee required tangible material evidence from Zimbabwe's liberation movements as an indication that they were intensifying the armed struggle. Its support was on condition that both ZAPU and ZANU escalate their guerrilla war against the Smith regime. For ZAPU's War Council, their intensification of the war could only be ascertained by the OAU's CCL through the provision of material evidence as spoils of their successes in the war front.[1046] This way, ZIPRA determined to prove their mettle in taking the Rhodesian security forces head on to provide material evidence to the CCL obtained through the sacrifice of Bulilima youths and others in the battle grounds of Rhodesia as they engaged relentlessly with the Rhodesian security forces.[1047] Bulilima

[1043] *Ibid.*
[1044] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 106.
[1045] G. Baumhogger, *The Struggle for Independence. Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975 – 1980).* Vol. II. Hamburg, 1984. p. 17.
[1046] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 106.
[1047] Interview with Lizwe Mkhwebu, Dladla Village: 24th March, 2016.

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youths were practically involved in every aspect of the struggle that sought to end minority rule in the country.

Lizwe reiterated that Bulilima youths provided many guerrilla fighters who fought the Smith regime, while in rural Bulilima youths were guerrilla spies and providers of basic materials that enabled guerrillas to sustain their war against the government.[1048] Judged this way, Bulilima youths' invaluable contribution to the freedom of Zimbabweans cannot be over emphasised. In Lizwe's view, and those of Focus Group Discussants, Bulilima youths' contributions to the liberation struggle was very important because they helped liberate the country. If it was not for the youths, the country might not have gained its independence.[1049] Generally, as Lizwe insinuated, it is appreciated that youths played an essential role freeing the country from settler bondage. Youths' collective efforts from Mozambique and Zambian bush camps to Mashonaland and Matabeleland rural areas, provided a formidable, unyielding and uncompromising challenge to the settler forces.

Rural youths and guerrillas' combined efforts are acknowledged thus, 'But ZIPRA armies were larger than this [estimated figures by various scholars]. The system, which was crucial to the survival of combat guerrillas, encompassed tens of thousands of young people throughout the country.'[1050] In corroboration, it is noted that, 'To these forces arrayed against the Smith regime should be added countless thousands of Mujibas inside the country.'[1051] The survival and indeed the effectiveness of insurgency activities in rural areas was primarily dependent on the level of cooperation of youth structures with guerrillas. This way, insurgency forces counted their losses as much as counter-insurgents did. This was, despite the counter-insurgency forces' superior firepower, high level mobility, abundance of resources at their disposal (financial, human and material), advanced training as well as the application and use of modern counter-insurgency strategies.[1052]

[1048] *Ibid*.
[1049] Focus Group Discussion One, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015 and Interview with Lizwe Mkhwebu, Dladla Village, 24th March, 2016.
[1050] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 76.
[1051] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 166.
[1052] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. pp. 64 and 65.

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An example of the above was when a large contingent of combined ZAPU/MK, guerrilla groups entered the country in December 1967 and July 1968 respectively, but proved to be no match for the well-equipped and well-trained Rhodesian forces that also enjoyed the advantage of air support.[1053] Given that youths faced such odds in their bid to dismantle settler rule in Zimbabwe, their resilience and perseverance became the proverbial 'last straw that broke' Rhodesia's white supremacy. The escalating guerrilla pressure persuaded Smith and his cahoots to negotiate with the liberation movements to end the guerrilla war.[1054] The end of the guerrilla war meant freedom at last for the people of Zimbabwe, courtesy of Bulilima youths' involvement in the armed conflict.

This is in line with Melitha Matiwaza of Nswazi and Na Buhe of Zuzaphi's view that what they experienced in Zambia and Botswana could only be withstood by those with a lion's heart,[1055] emblematic of their bravery and courage. Needless to point out that in any armed conflict such as Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, only the determined survived. Despite all this [hardships and major set-backs] ZANLA and ZIPRA campaigns continued.[1056] This was the case with Bulilima youths. 'Once we crossed the Botswana border, there was no turning back. Our hearts and minds became focused on one issue only, to liberate our country from the Smith regime,'[1057] said Melitha, stressing the phrase 'Smith regime'. Bulilima youths had had enough of living under difficult conditions, stressful situations and their daily diminishing youthful hopes of a better future under the 'Smith regime'. To Bulilima youths, the Smith regime blocked their prosperity in rural areas.

[1053] It must be emphasised that ZIPRA was officially formed and inaugurated in 1971 as an official ZAPU armed wing. Before then there was no ZIPRA, but ZAPU's armed sub-structure referred to as the Department of Special Affairs, hence any reference to the Department of Special Affairs before 1971 as ZIPRA is grossly incorrect and a distortion of historical facts about the establishment of ZIPRA. For further clarity on this issue, see Stanley Nleya's interview with the *Sunday News*'s Deputy Editor on www.sundaynews.co.zw; N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 16; J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70 and A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 160.

[1054] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 160. p. 170.

[1055] Interview with Melitha Matiwaza, Nswazwi Village: 28th June, 2015 and Na Buhe, Zuzaphi Village: 15th April, 2015. Na Buhe refused to give her name and surname, preferring to be identified by her son's name Buhe, hence Na Buhe (literally Buhe's Mother).

[1056] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 163.

[1057] Interview with Melitha Matiwaza, Nswazwi Village: 28th June 2015.

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'Thinking back, I came to realise that our liberation movement ZAPU, and its ZIPRA guerrillas made us aware that the Smith government in particular and the white people in general had taken our land, in the process denying us the opportunity to live in big houses in towns and cities, driving cars just like them (white people), attending good schools and, basically living luxurious life styles such as lived by white people.'[1058] Based on this, it is obvious that Bulilima youths were promised that joining the liberation struggle would lead to the defeat of the white people. Independent Zimbabwe would bring endless opportunities,[1059] in a similar fashion to the Biblical Israelites and Canaan, the promised land of milk and honey. Such equivocal insinuations effectively wooed Bulilima youths such as Na Buhe into joining the struggle.

Within this 'bright future rhetoric', Bulilima youths sacrificed their lives in a quest to liberate Zimbabwe. 'For whatever problems we faced in refugee camps, we endured, innocently believing that the means justify the end.'[1060] It was apparent that Na Buhe, who at the moment of the interview worked in Johannesburg as a domestic worker, was a disappointed and troubled individual when one considered all the promises of a 'plentiful future in a free Zimbabwe' youths were regaled with by liberation movements. 'Youths sacrificed a lot for their country, but now the present government has notably forgotten about us,'[1061] asserted Melitha, decrying the present government for doing nothing for erstwhile youths who liberated the country. Melitha's understanding was that youths were conned into joining the liberation struggle and, as the situation in Zimbabwe stood, youths who had sacrificed and suffered a lot during the guerrilla war did not deserve the treatment they were getting from government. 'Youth camps were bombed and destroyed in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. We lost a lot of our comrades in the process of such bombings, others lost their limbs and as we speak, they are permanently disabled, they are beyond fending for themselves, for what, for this?'[1062] Melitha then sobbed out of

[1058] Interview with Na Buhe, Zuzaphi Village, 15th April, 2015.
[1059] Focus Group Discussion Two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[1060] Interview with Na Buhe, Zuzaphi Village: 15th April, 2015.
[1061] Interview with Melitha Matiwaza, Nswazwi Village: 28th June 2015.
[1062] *Ibid*.

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anger, bitterness and lack of comprehension as to why a black government they had sacrificed so much to bring into power would let them down the way it had done.

In short, Zimbabwe's two liberation movements created a misleading impression that a free Zimbabwe would provide better forms and options of life compared to what the Smith regime offered the majority Zimbabweans. Indeed bush camps in Mozambique and Zambia were bombed by the Smith government in a bid to destroy the very source of guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia.[1063] In view of the massive guerrilla infiltrations, particularly through the Mozambique and Botswana borders, such cross-border raids were a desperate measure by a desperate regime seeking to cling onto power despite the obvious signs that the centre could no longer hold. The so-called pre-emptive strikes devastated bush camps and left thousands and thousands of youths mortally wounded, incapacitated and some psychologically traumatized.[1064] It was through the recollection of this horrendous epoch that interviewees such as Melitha became emotional.

Writing on the same cross-border raids, Mlambo says, 'Military sorties were undertaken into neighbouring states resulting in massacres of people in refugee camps such as Nyadzonia in 1976, Chimoio in Mozambique 1977, and Mukushi and Freedom Camp in Zambia in 1978.'[1065] Such large scale bloodbath in bush camps exposed survivors to dreadful scenes of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, scenes that are permanently embedded in their memories, scenes that make them emotional if recalled.

In fact, all interviewees who were in Zambian bush camps during the war attested to the horrors they experienced during such raids. They all put the raids as joint top challenges they faced in Zambian bush camps with starvation and harsh living conditions they were

[1063] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator*. *An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 53.
[1064] D. Caute, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*. London, 1983. p. 369; L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 80; M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 9*. Harare, 1981. p. 22 and I. Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1980. p. 284. Cross border raids by the Rhodesian security forces are well documented and scholars present different but convergent views regarding their impact, magnitude, effects and casualties on refugees, guerrillas proper and the liberation movements' capacity to continue mounting serious challenges on the Smith regime through their guerrilla combatants.
[1065] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 163.

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subjected to by their parent movement, ZAPU.[1066] The Rhodesian security forces' raids on bush camps were informed by Israel's highly successful and effective cross-border bombardment of Lebanon and Palestinian territories in the Middle East.[1067] The adoption of foreign-inspired war strategies by the Rhodesian security forces for their counter-insurgency activities became prominent. This is one of the aspects of the security forces that made them superior to both ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas in terms of striking fatal blows during the armed conflict. 'Such raids brought alarm, terror, calamity, despondency, a sense of disillusionment and despair in our camps and those of defenseless women and children in Zambia,'[1068] stressed Jonathan Ngwenya of Malalume, echoing Melitha's sentiments. The nightmare of suffering, misery and fear experienced by Bulilima youths in bush camps and on the war front epitomises their unconditional sacrifice towards the liberation of their country.

Jonathan Ngwenya was one of Bulilima youths who trained as a ZIPRA guerrilla. He trained at Solwezi in 1976, after which he was deployed to Urungwe (now Hurungwe), Mashonaland West Province.[1069] Mashonaland West was one of the Provinces in the country that had the largest concentration of ZIPRA guerrillas. ZIPRA Commanders called it the Northern Front. In light of the above, ZIPRA guerrillas operating there established semi-liberated zones.[1070] Khanda Moyo of Ngwana is another Bulilima guerrilla youth who was deployed to the Northern Front, Sipolilo District (now Guruve) after his guerrilla training.[1071] These two guerrillas infiltrated (at different times) Urungwe and Sipolilo through the Zambian border, hence had to negotiate the Zambezi crossing, in the process experiencing its horrors. 'We were deployed in Mashonaland West which meant that our group had to cross the Zambezi River. It was difficult crossing. We used rafters to cross.

[1066] Interview with Melitha Matiwaza, Nswazwi Village: 28th June 2015; Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 28th March, 2016; Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 6th May, 2016; David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015; MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 27th April, 2015; Daniso Ngubhe Dube, Gwambe Village, 23rd October, 2015; Focus Group Discussions One and Two, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village and Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 17th November, 2015 and 1st June, 2016.
[1067] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 80.
[1068] Interview with Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 31st March, 2016.
[1069] *Ibid*.
[1070] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 106.
[1071] Interview with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village: 27th August, 2016.

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Our first enemy were soldiers, hippopotami, crocodiles and other small animals that lived deep under water. As we crossed, some of our dinges capsised and most of our comrades in capsised dinges were eaten by crocodiles,'[1072] narrated Jonathan. His outline of the difficulties and dangers inherent in crossing the Zambezi River projects one of the hardships ZIPRA guerrillas faced in their war to liberate Zimbabwe. Mlambo sums up ZIPRA's Zambezi dilemma thus,

> …the Rhodesian forces had to contend with nationalist infiltration from only one direction, namely from Zambia, whose border presented severe challenges to incoming guerrillas. Guerrillas had to not only cross the Zambezi River, but also to traverse dense jungles of sparsely inhabited areas where they could easily be detected and liquidated.[1073]

Given these difficult incursion conditions, ZIPRA guerrillas' infiltrations through the Botswana border were a walk in the park.

Both Jonathan and Khanda agree that crossing the Botswana border was nothing compared to the Zambezi River. As Jonathan put it, 'The Botswana border was very important because it helped us to cross freely to join the struggle and liberate our country.'[1074] Compared to the Zambian border, the Botswana border contributed greatly to the joining of the liberation struggle by Bulilima youths. 'We used it to cross to Botswana. Some guerrillas used it to re-enter the country to fight the enemy forces,'[1075] concurred Khanda. Bulilima youths found themselves involved and participating in the country's liberation war from various angles. That is, some were involved with guerrillas in rural areas as their 'youths', others were guerrillas proper, while others were the supply sources in Zambian bush camps.[1076] The involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the country's liberation struggle ensured that ZAPU sustained pressure on the settler regime until it capitulated towards the end of 1979. This was acknowledged by Jonathan who said, 'Bulilima youths helped liberate our country. Those in refugee camps, for

[1072] Interview with Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 31st March, 2016.
[1073] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 162.
[1074] Interview with Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 31st March, 2016.
[1075] Interview with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village: 27th August, 2016.
[1076] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 165.

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example, were ZIPRA's supply pool.'[1077] This ensured that ZIPRA maintained a steady supply of guerrillas in the war front to keep pressure on the security forces.

Responding to questions on Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the country's guerrilla war, Khanda said,

> Bulilima youths were in the war front, others were teachers in Zambia. We fought the enemy as guerrillas, we were bombed, we faced difficulties and hardships both in refuge camps and when we were in the war front fighting the Smith soldiers. In other words, Bulilima youths helped liberate the country by fighting, while those at home fed guerrillas. Youths fought the regime and made guerrillas survive throughout the war.[1078]

Khanda's narration is a summary of what all interviewees said regarding Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Jonathan concurred: 'I fought the enemy. I was a guerrilla fighter. We used to take care of villagers' animals when they were sent to PVs. We destroyed PVs and freed villagers.'[1079] Jonathana's account is to the effect that in addition to fighting the enemy forces, they were also 'herd-boys', herding villagers' livestock in their absence. In addition, Jonathan and his guerrilla gangs played public protector (not in the concept of South Africa's Chapter 9 Institute). They protected peasants after destroying PVs which kept villagers in collective semi-captivity, thus depriving guerrillas of the much needed food and other material supplies.

The tales of Bulilima youths contributions to the country's liberation struggle continued with Ntogwa Ndlovu of Nopemano narrating how she trained as a female guerrilla at Mukushi camp when she finally arrived in Zambia,

> I did not have any problem crossing the border. We were collected by guerrillas from our village and left across the Botswana border at a village called Mengwe. From Mengwe BDF trucks took us to Francistown where I was airlifted to Zambia.

[1077] Interview with Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 31st March, 2016.
[1078] Interview with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village: 27th August, 2016.
[1079] Interview with Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 31st March, 2016.

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> In Zambia I stayed at VC for some time before being selected for guerrilla training in Mukushi training facility.[1080]

Ntogwa's journey from Nopemano to Zambia was a replica of what other female interviewees said as well. Their narrations converge on the fact that through the Botswana border, ZIPRA guerrillas found it easy to recruit and subsequently drive their recruits to Francistown reception camps enroute to Zambia training facilities.

As Thulile Khupe of Nyele put it, 'I was easily recruited by ZIPRA guerrillas who promised us good life in Zambian camps where we would be trained as guerrillas then come back to fight the Smith soldiers. We easily crossed the Botswana border to Mengwe village where we met other recruits, from there we were taken by BDF soldiers to Francistown. After four days, because of my big body I suppose, I was flown to Zambia where I trained as a guerrilla at Mukushi.'[1081] Basically, the Botswana border, it seems, played a central role in enabling ZIPRA guerrillas to recruit youths in Bulilima District for guerrilla training purposes in Zambia. A worrying trend with ZIPRA guerrillas' recruitment was the lying 'gimmick' they used to portray life in Zambian bush camps as glorious. The issue is, they preyed on young innocent minds, who by that time were immature to comprehend that 'war' was an ugly and highly dangerous phenomenon.[1082] Once in Zambia, Ntogwa and Thulile discovered the ugly side of the war when the Rhodesian security forces bombed Mkushi during their training sessions. In fact, they had already realised that life in bush camps was not magnificent and gratifying when they were subjected to rigorous and grueling combat training that left a couple of female trainee guerrillas dead.[1083] There is no doubt that after completing their training programmes and the bombing experiences by the Rhodesian security forces, Ntogwa and Thulile became wiser to the realities of war than when they first arrived in Zambia.

Recounting one horrific experience, Ntogwa said,

[1080] Interview with Ntogwa Ndlovu, Nopemano Village: 27th February, 2015.
[1081] Interview with Thulile Khupe, Nyele Village: 2nd August, 2015.
[1082] Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*. Cambridge, 1988. pp. 11 and 12.
[1083] Interview with Ntogwa Ndlovu, Nopemano Village: 27th February, 2015 and Thulile Khupe, Nyele Village: 2nd August, 2015.

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> My stay at Mukushi made me realise that I could die any time of the day from whatever cause. My brother, (referring to the interviewer) war is not a picnic I assure you. Look… after training I was deployed to guard children and women at VC. One day I was relaxed with my AK 47 on my lap when all of a sudden and from nowhere bombs exploded everywhere around the camp. Thousands of innocent young lives were lost in the pandemonium. There were chilling screams of terror, agony and horror everywhere. I had never seen human slaughter in my live, never before. That is the day I will never forget in my entire life.[1084]

After this, Ntogwa could not hold back her tears. Her account is one of the horrors of the war that Bulilima youths were subjected to and experienced as they performed their duties to liberate the country.

Thulile also shared the same experience, expressing her horror and disgust at the way the Smith government conducted its war against ZIPRA guerrillas in Zambia,

'Even today I cannot understand, let alone accept the logic behind the killings and maiming of young innocent children and destroying their makeshift tents in the name of destroying ZIPRA training and camping bases. Those young defenceless children did not deserve that. I was a guard of those children. I was mandated to protect them, but how do you protect children against jet fighters and helicopter gunships?' [1085] Thulile cried and then proceeded to blame ZIPRA's inefficiencies that led to her inadequacy and inability to fully protect VC and its young occupants. (Sensing that she had been completely overcome by emotion, the interviewer adjourned the interview for the afternoon). Narratives such as Thulile's make us realise that it is imperative to acknowledge that Bulilima female youths who joined the liberation struggle in Zambia contributed to the liberation of the country as much as their male counter parts did.

Mabula Ndlovu of Ntunungwe Village added his voice,

> As a young boy of fourteen years then, I crossed to Botswana in 1976 when ZIPRA guerrillas intensified their recruitments in our district. My village of Ntunungwe is not that far from the border when one considers distances we used to cover on

[1084] Interview with Ntogwa Ndlovu, Nopemano Village: 27th February, 2015.
[1085] Interview with Thulile Khupe, Nyele Village: 2nd August, 2015.

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> those days in the context of non-availability of public transport in rural communities then. Guerrillas recruited us and by sun-set, we had crossed into Botswana, Mengwe Village. When I reflect now, it is clear that ZIPRA forces had created a district wide recruitment network with well designated routes that met [converged] at Mengwe from our side of the district (Bulilima) and Tsetsebe from the other side (Mangwe) from where we were driven by Botswana Government trucks to Francistown refugee camps.[1086]

Mabula reveals that ZIPRA recruiters had established a clear and elaborate recruitment network with well-defined routes and meeting stations to consolidate their recruits for group transportation to Francistown holding camps.

His views were echoed by Manka Ncube of Nopemano when she stated that guerrillas took her early in the morning when she was going to fetch water from a nearby stream. Manka traced her journey from Nopemano to Mengwe across the border which, according to her, was incident free until their arrival in Francistown aboard BDF trucks.[1087] Manka's account illuminates the veiled cooperation between Botswana government and ZAPU in as far as aiding ZIPRA's recruitment errands was concerned.

From Francistown, Mabula and Manka were transferred to Selebi Pikwe from where they were flown to Zambia (at different times since they were not recruited around the same time). In Zambia the two were recruited for ZIPRA guerrilla training, Mabula in Mwembeshi and Manka at Mukushi.[1088] As was the case with other interviewees who were selected for ZIPRA guerrilla training, Mabula and Manka also claimed that their physical appearance was their license to being recruited for guerrilla training. With regard to ZIPRA training facilities in Zambia, Bhebe lists them as Mwembeshi (the first to be established in Zambia) Communist Guerrilla Training Camp I (CGT I), CGT II, and Koimba for men and Mukushi for female combatants.[1089] The ratio of male training facilities to females' suggests that ZIPRA female guerrillas were not a priority for ZIPRA

[1086] Interview with Mabula Ndlovu, Ntunungwe Village: 7th July, 2015.
[1087] Interview with Manka Ncube, Nopemano Village: 19th January, 2016.
[1088] Interview with Mabula Ndlovu, Ntunungwe Village: 7th July, 2015 and Manka Ncube, Nopemano Village: 19th January, 2016.
[1089] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 105.

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Commanders. This means that female guerrillas were not of much use to ZIPRA Commanders, hence their allocation of one training facility compared to five male training facilities in Zambia in addition to those scattered throughout Africa (in Angola and Libya, for example).

Some of this bias can be gleaned from Manka's recollection of events,

> After completing my training, I was given a further three months training as a female guerrilla instructor. Our instructor courses, to my surprise, heavily leaned towards conventional tactics and organisation as opposed to our expectations of guerrilla orientated ones. Nonetheless, I completed my instructor courses and lucky me, I was promoted to a commanding post within Mukushi camp. My role was to coordinate training programmes within the camp in preparation for the establishment of the first female regular ZIPRA brigade.[1090]

Manka's role in the liberation struggle involved training female ZIPRA combatants and the implementation of programmes that led to the establishment of the only female regular army brigade in the history of a guerrilla war in Africa. Brickhill attests to the fact that ZIPRA was composed of a female infantry brigade that was waiting to be deployed in Rhodesia's semi-liberated areas.[1091] One of the architects of the said brigade was Manka, a Bulilima female youth by then.

On the other hand, Mabula was deployed to Gokwe District, Midlands Province where he operated until ceasefire at the end of 1979. Mabula's duties involved fighting the Rhodesian army, blowing up bridges, dip-tanks, railway lines and any other vital economic installations that might help cripple the smooth functioning of the Smith government.[1092] The deployment of Mabula in Gokwe underpins ZIPRA's near country-wide infiltration of Rhodesia. Towards the end of 1978, ZIPRA guerrillas were operating in a wide arc, from Sipolilo and Urungwe in the North, through Gokwe and Silobela in the centre of the country, to Lupane, Nkayi and Tsholotsho in the West to Plumtree and Kezi in the South-

[1090] Interview with Manka Ncube, Nopemano Village: 19 January, 2016.
[1091] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[1092] Interview with Mabula Ndlovu, Ntunungwe Village: 7th July, 2015.

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West.[1093] Based on facts at hand, all these ZIPRA operational areas had several Bulilima born guerrillas fighting to liberate Zimbabwe. Of importance to note here is that some Bulilima born guerrillas operated in their home district. Some of these were Thembani Mangoye of Ganda Village (section commander, popularly known by his *norm de guerre*, Dlamini) George Ndebele and Toboka Nleya of Masendu Village (the latter commonly known by his *pseudonym*, Mangarangara).[1094] Given the wide range of ZIPRA's operational areas in the country, Bulilima's youthful guerrillas left a firm mark on the history of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

As much as Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was largely executed collectively by rural youths, guerrillas and refugees, there were unique individual roles of note played by Bulilima youths in Zambia. One of these was Moketsi Ndlovu of Dombodema Village whose account went like this; 'I was abducted by ZIPRA guerrillas in 1976 from Thekwane Mission School. They took all male students and left girls. We crossed into Botswana and were taken to Francistown transit camp. Due to my small body, I was kept in Francistown while others were flown to Zambia. Later on I was also sent to Zambia and housed at Nampundwe.'[1095] Moketsi raises two important aspects about his recruitment to Zambia. First, guerrillas who recruited them were gender selective in their recruitment. They did not take female students, leading to an assumption that during early ZIPRA recruitment drives female combatants were not part of ZIPRA Commanders' plans. Second, because of his small 'frame' (body) Moketsi was delayed to go to Zambia despite ZIPRA's high demand for new recruits, underscoring the fact that at first, ZIPRA Commanders' aim was to slowly build a formidable guerrilla army (after its depletion to near extinction due to the James Chikerema – Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo fiasco) hence had no time for child soldiers (small framed youths were generally regarded as children by ZIPRA officials, contrary to their age).[1096] This also underlines the observation by several scholars that the mid-1970s were years ZAPU desperately needed to rebuild its army after the early 1970s saga which

[1093] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[1094] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 26th March, 2016 and Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 28th March, 2016.
[1095] Interview with Moketsi Ndlovu, Dombodema Village: 3rd January, 2016.
[1096] Interview with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 20th March, 2015; Moketsi Ndlovu, Dombodema Village: 3rd January, 2016 and Manka Ncube, Nopemano Village: 19th January, 2016.

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saw ZAPU guerrillas reduced from one thousand to a mere eighty or less cadres.[1097] Faced with such a self-destructive crisis, it is understandable but unacceptable that individuals were discriminated against because of their body size or sex.

Moketsi finally trained as a guerrilla in 1976. Fondly, he narrated his break-through as follows,

> In Zambia, I became lucky and got selected to a 'thousand battalion',[1098] then sent for training. The Director of Training, Can Malaba, came to inspect us before we resumed our guerrilla training programme in 1976. I must emphasise here that most of the ZIPRA instructors were Kalanga speaking comrades. We were sent to different training camps to resume with guerrilla training. By virtue of my small body, I was called a 'Kijana', a Cuban name referring to a young soldier.[1099]

Moketsi brings yet another key factor in Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's armed conflict. BaKalanga are said to have dominated the instructorship structures of ZIPRA training programmes, a fact that fits in well with the school of thought that ZIPRA forces had more BaKalanga people than any other ethnic tribe in Zimbabwe. As already noted, Bulilima's closeness to Botswana border exposed its young inhabitants to ZIPRA recruiters, thereby making it the leading supplier of recruits to ZIPRA.

After training, Moketsi was deployed at Nampundwe, then VC and eventually to ZH (ZAPU's HQ).[1100] The way Moketsi was shuffled speaks of an uncertainty on the part of his commanders regarding his suitability to any permanent posting in view of his small size. This uncertainty was confirmed when, in his words, 'The ZIPRA Commander, Comrade Alfred Nikita Mangena adopted me as his son. I moved around with him doing various guerrilla demonstrations. I was a guerrilla model, doing rehearsals for ZIPRA.'[1101]

[1097] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. pp. 25 – 26.

[1098] Moketsi explained a 'thousand battalion' as ZIPRA's selection process where youths were chosen according to set procedure, further screened for security purposes, until they numbered one thousand. This group of one thousand youths was then sent for training, hence the phrase a 'thousand battalion'. In other words, the procedure was, 'ZIPRA enrolled one thousand guerrilla trainees per given time'; translating to 'ZIPRA produced one thousand guerrillas per pass-out parade at a given time'.

[1099] Interview with Moketsi Ndlovu, Dombodema Village: 3rd January, 2016.

[1100] *Ibid*.

[1101] Interview with Moketsi Ndlovu, Dombodema Village: 3rd January, 2016.

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That Moketsi was turned into a demonstration figure-head shows that his commander had no intentions of using him constructively in their war against the Smith government. ZIPRA commanders accepted the belief that only big bodied guerrillas were worth deploying in Rhodesia's war front. These commanders, in a naïve case of their lack of understanding of the dynamics behind child soldiers, shamelessly used children as guerrillas while boasting that ZIPRA was not a children's army.[1102] Given this official position and attitude bordering on ignorance, small bodied guerrillas of the proper age such as Moketsi were indirectly disqualified from deployment in the war front.

Moketsi's case became one of being sidelined from proper participation, reduced to tag along with the ZIPRA Commander whenever he visited ZIPRA's base camps. By not deploying small bodied guerrillas to the war front, ZIPRA Commanders were avoiding a situation where they would be accused by the watchful international community of recruiting and using child-guerrillas. To underline ZIPRA's fear, regulations that strictly forbade anyone under the age of eighteen years to be recruited, trained and deployed in the war front were adhered to (albeit wrongly) giving the false impression that only seven percent of ZIPRA guerrillas were below the permitted cut off age of eighteen years.[1103] Nonetheless, Moketsi found joy and pride in his new role and made the most of it.

This was apparent when he rose through the ranks to first, company commander, then parade commander (where his duties involved, *inter alia*, giving out reports) and, eventually landing a rare scholarship for further training at a military academy in Yugoslavia.[1104] Rising through the ranks until his eventual recommendation for an academy training course in Yugoslavia is illustrative of his invaluable contributions to ZIPRA's war efforts in Zambian bush camps. Given Moketsi's unique contribution to ZIPRA's efforts to liberate the country, one is made to appreciate Bulilima youths' diversified involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

While this country's liberation cannot and should never be credited to an individual district, region, liberation movement, specific ethnic group or tribe, and most importantly a specific

[1102] J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.) *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[1103] *Ibid*.
[1104] Interview with Moketsi Ndlovu, Dombodema Village: 3rd January, 2016.

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category of people within liberation movements, the unique contributions of any of the above entities should not and would not go unnoticed. It is with such an understanding that this Chapter was done. Its major focus was to highlight the extent to which Bulilima youths were involved and participated in the country's armed conflict that played itself out fully in rural areas. In the heat of the war, some of its sparks torched bush camps in Mozambique, Zambia and Angola, in the process burning all and sundry.

The extent to which ZIPRA guerrillas' use of Botswana border influenced Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in their war of attrition was measured from what those involved and participated had to say for themselves. In presenting and discussing data this way, the Chapter let participants speak for themselves, in their own words, how they were involved and participated in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war, their experiences, challenges and specific and general, individual and collective roles performed in the course of delivering Zimbabweans from structural oppression. This way, the stories, once told, ask of the listener or reader to judge for himself/herself the extent to which the use of the Botswana border by ZIPRA guerrillas influenced Bulilima District youths' involvement and participation in the country's guerrilla war. In light of the inexhaustible data collected, some of which is presented and discussed here, it was imperative to put a lid on this Chapter by providing concluding remarks that lead to Chapter six.

5.3 Conclusion

The foundation for Bulilima District's uncompromising support for ZAPU and its insurgents was laid solidly by successive settler governments' inconsiderate systematic destruction of Bulilima communities' subsistence economies. With nothing to offer peasant youths, the Rhodesian economy drove thousands of these to urban centres where they were exposed to Zimbabwean nationalism which they in turn transmitted back to their rural folks in the form of ZAPU. The advent of the guerrilla conflict thus found a politically ripe district which became highly receptive of ZIPRA guerrillas.

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When guerrilla recruitments began in earnest, Bulilima youths were more than ready to heed a call for them to join the struggle in Zambia. ZIPRA guerrillas recruited massively and nearly emptied the district of male youths. In all this, the major player was the porous border, facilitating every clandestine move ZIPRA guerrillas so wished to undertake.

Meanwhile, bush camps suffered huge losses through the horrendous aerial strikes of Smith's army. Coupled with relentless starvation, Bulilima youths in bush camps did not throw in the towel. Instead, the massacre of their fellow refugees solidified their resolve never to surrender. The Smith regime finally succumbed to guerrilla and rural youths' pressure and agreed to a negotiated settlement.

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CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

6.1 Introduction

This study was conducted under the premise that Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was mainly due to the district's proximity to the Botswana border. Data collected from more than fifty former Bulilima youths and discussed in the preceding Chapters confirmed this assertion. The essence of this Chapter is analysis and interpretation of the consolidated responses from the previous Chapters. Data analysis and interpretation was done in the framework of a few selected theories of revolution, namely the structuralist, the voluntarist, and Fanon and Cabral's socialist theories of revolutions. These were selected based on their adaptability and applicability to Bulilima District's case. The Chapter is divided into five key themes: the introduction, theories of revolution, major events 1960 – 1976, analysis and interpretation of consolidated data, and conclusion. The following section is on the theoretical foundation of this study.

6.2 Theoretical Foundation of Study

6.2.1 Conceptual Explanation

Zimbabwe's revolution had its roots in urban areas but had a profound growth and intensity in rural areas.[1105] To provide an illustrative case of the importance and huge impact districts such as Bulilima had in influencing the outcome of the Zimbabwean revolution, the study relied mainly on direct former peasant youth voices. What these former Bulilima youths had to say for themselves about their life experiences in this peasant revolution helped determine the extent to which they were involved and participated therein.

[1105] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 5.

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The concept 'revolution' has several explanations and interpretations.[1106] The study concerned itself with relevant and appropriate conceptual explanations to Bulilima youths' revolutionary experiences. A revolutionary situation is a kind of restoration whereby the insurgents attempt to restore liberties and privileges which were lost as a result of the government's temporary lapse into despotism.[1107] Revolution is interpreted in terms of dictatorship, oppression, and discrimination which sees ordinary citizens denied their freedoms and liberties and other benefits due to them as citizenry. Such denials prompt them to embark on a revolution to seek justice to their grievances. Zimbabwe's anti-colonial revolution which had Bulilima as its signature appendage is amenable to this interpretation.[1108] Given the colonial nature of Bulilima youths' problems, seeking recourse the way Bulilima youths did justified their revolutionary undertaking.

Skocpol sees a 'social revolution' as both a change in state institutions (a political revolution) and a change in social structures. To her, the American Revolution was a political revolution, not a social one, since it did little to change social structures. The Chinese Revolution, on the other hand, was a social revolution. Not only did the state institutions change, but the entire social order changed with it.[1109] From Skocpol's point of reasoning, a social revolution brings wholesome changes to both social and political structures. Anything less is not regarded as such. In view of this, the Zimbabwean armed struggle was a social revolution, with Bulilima District as one of its tributaries.

Generally, revolutions can be said to be violent disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support.[1110] For whatever reasons, such violent civil disturbances indicate a state that has lost political

[1106] These are available on www.deepblue.lib.umich.edu. R. Tanter and Midlarsky, *A Theory of Revolution*. Accessed: 9th June, 2015. 08:37; H. Arendt, *On Revolution*. New York, 1965; C. Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*. New York. 1952 and Aristotle, *Politics*. New York, 1962. The problem with explanations and interpretations of the concept 'Revolution' as provided in the above studies is that they are generally either Eurocentric, Asia centric (Chinese Revolution) or Americanised to the detriment of Africa's anti-colonial revolutions that took place during the second half of the 20th century.

[1107] H. Arendt, *On Revolution*. New York, 1965. pp. 34 - 40.

[1108] See www.deepblue.lib.umich.edu. R. Tanker and Midlarsky, *A Theory of Revolution*. Accessed: 9th June, 2015. 08:37.

[1109] T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979. pp. 16 and 18.

[1110] J.C. Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution, in *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 27. No. 1. February, 1962. pp. 5 – 19.

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legitimacy to rule over its citizens. This culminates in common grievances that galvanise citizens into collective efforts that push the ruling elites out of power. By joining the liberation struggle in large numbers, Bulilima youths exhibited common grievances that transformed into a collective undertaking to replace the Smith regime with their popular ZAPU orientated government. In comparative terms, Bulilima's political instability and social injustices were felt by youths throughout the district.[1111] Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, therefore, fits in well with the above clarification.

To Fanon, 'A revolution is part of a process of the regeneration of man and society, of self-liberation and rebirth. Only through a revolution could a suppressed people undo the effects of colonisation.'[1112] Fanon understood revolution as a process whereby colonised Africans undertook to free themselves from the yoke of oppressive settler rule. Revolutions, therefore, were the only means by which colonised people could obtain justice to their unjust domination by the colonial masters. This 'domination is visible when, in the colonial countries the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge.'[1113] This was the case with Bulilima youths as revealed during data discussion in Chapters four and five.

For Cabral, revolution is 'The national liberation of a people, the gaining of historical personality of that people, its return to history through the destruction of the imperialist domination to which it was subjected.'[1114] Cabral's views on revolution are that revolutionary processes bring freedom to colonised people, thus restoring their lost liberties, customs and traditions that identify them with their pre-colonial society. To Cabral, the revolutionary processes completely destroy systems that keep natives in colonial slavery or bondage.

[1111] Compare: *Ibid*.
[1112] R. Blackey, Fanon and Cabral: A Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa, in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 16. No. 12. (1974). pp. 191 – 209.
[1113] F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963. p. 29.
[1114] R. Blackey, Fanon and Cabral: a Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa, in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 16. No. 12. (1974). pp. 191 – 209.

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From the above, an attempt is made to conceptualise revolution in Bulilima District's circumstances. A revolution, (in the general sense of Zimbabwe's armed struggle and with particular consideration of Bulilima youths' participation therein), is a process where youths (structure and individual agency), due to their limited schooling and job opportunities in the country, were victims of guerrilla mobilisations and recruitments. This made them join the struggle in order to topple the oppressive and racial settler government (structure) perceived to be the cause of their suffering. Viewed this way, Bulilima youths' drive to undertake this revolution slightly deviates from Cabral's conceptualisation of the term.

While Cabral emphasises the return to history and historical personality, former Bulilima youths who were interviewed stressed their reasons for joining the struggle as the attainment of a status befitting that of white settlers. That is, they wanted better, improved schools, ownership of material assets such as cars, big houses, shops, almost any of the capitalistic commodities. In short, they wanted to identify with western culture as opposed to theirs and tradition.[1115] Pre-colonial society, therefore, was not their idea of liberty. In other words, Bulilima youths joined the revolution in order to destroy the oppressive structures (the Smith government, its police force and the army) and maintain the structures that benefited white people (education system, means of production, modified political system and universal suffrage).[1116] These were the driving motives behind Bulilima youths' involvement in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. That prompts the study at this point, to provide an analysis of the theories of revolution and what they purport to be people's motives for partaking in social revolutions, beginning with Skocpol's structuralist theory of social revolution.

[1115] Interview Two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016 and Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016.
[1116] Interview Two with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016 and David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 25th September, 2016.

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6.2.2 The Structuralist Theories of Revolution

The structuralist theories of revolution are basically an off-shoot of Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*, a study that laid the foundation for similar studies on structures and revolution.[1117] An analysis done in this sub-section is based on Skocpol's theory of revolution since it is an apotheosis of the structuralist thought.

Skocpol derived her theoretical assumptions by arguing that the voluntaristic (rational choice) theories common in political science miss something about revolutions: by focusing on how purposive action brings about revolutions, such theories fail to perceive the structural forces that create a revolutionary situation.[1118] To fill this supposed gap, Skocpol approaches revolutions from a structural perspective. To her, the most important aspect is what she regards as the 'Revolutionary Situation'. That is, two variables cause a revolutionary situation. These two variables are jointly sufficient for a 'social revolution' to occur. If both structural variables are in place, a revolution should always occur.

First, there must be a 'crisis of state' often provoked by international factors, such as increasing economic or security competition from abroad. It is a crisis, not merely a challenge, because the state cannot do anything given its current institutional constraints. As a result, the elites (and the army) become divided over what to do and loyalty to the regime weakens. This crisis of state creates a revolutionary situation. Second, patterns of 'class dominance' determine which group will rise up to exploit the revolutionary situation. The result is a social revolution, the patterns of class dominance merely determine who will lead it.[1119] Within this context, Skocpol has rejected the voluntarist views on revolutions as insufficient to start a revolution.

For Skocpol, revolutions emanate when systems within a given society fail, causing disharmony and confusion. This way, individual actions and intentions are irrelevant and

[1117] Theda Skocpol is one of the most influential proponents of the structuralist theories of revolution. This study drew heavily from her work with regard to structuralist theories. For a detailed and explicit analysis of this theory, refer to T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979; N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 9.
[1118] T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979.
[1119] *Ibid.*

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inconsequential. The state has to weaken first for a revolution to be possible.[1120] As such, structures are not to be identified with people's actions as opposed to the voluntarist approach that emphasises the values, beliefs, intentions, and goals of actors.[1121] Her rejection is based on her argument that actors in a revolution are not always clear about their motives and goals because they are often complex and poorly formulated, making it difficult for individuals to start off a revolution.[1122]

6.2.3 Voluntarist Theories of Social Revolutions

Voluntarist theories of revolution posit that human agency determines revolutions. They assume that individual actors' attitudes and behaviour are central to sparking a revolution.[1123] Revolutionary movements must, therefore, win popular support if they are to come to power.[1124] This might be closer to Bulilima's case where ZAPU was very popular. When ZAPU's guerrillas infiltrated the district, youths openly welcomed them despite dangers associated with that. Voluntarists stress the importance of individual participants' ideas and actions in a revolution.[1125] This tallies with the interviewees' responses in this study as they emphasised their individual wishes to join the struggle.

In other words, revolutions are launched purposefully, for specific goals and must be deliberately institutionalised and consolidated if they are to succeed.[1126] Proponents of this theory are, *inter alia*, Eric Selbin, Joel Migdal and Samuel Popkin. It should be noted that voluntarist studies dealt with European, American and Asian cases to the exclusion of Africa's anti-colonial revolutions. This way, their assumptions should be cautiously considered. Not that there are no theoretical assumptions that are purely African. Torch bearers of note here are Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral. These two propounded their

[1120] www.let.rug.nl. Skocpol's Theory of Revolution. Accessed: 13th August, 2015. 11:20.
[1121] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 6.
[1122] *Ibid*.
[1123] J. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics and Revolution. Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World.* Princeton, 1974. p. 25.
[1124] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. pp. 5 and 7.
[1125] S.L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasants. The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. Berkeley, 1979. p. 47.
[1126] www.academia.edu. M. Kamrava, Revolutions Revisited: The Structuralist – Voluntarist Debate. Accessed: 7th July, 2015. 12:17.

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own socialist theories of revolution based on Algerian and Guinea-Bissau's anti-colonial revolutions. These are briefly outlined below, starting with Fanon's.

6.2.4 Frantz Fanon[1127] and Amilcar Cabral[1128]

Fanon and Cabral are two African revolutionaries who studied Africa's decolonisation processes from within. Fanon's thoughts on revolution were based mainly upon his knowledge of and experience in much of Africa, especially Algeria.[1129] On the other hand, Cabral's assumptions were a result of his experiences, beginning as a student in Lisbon, continuing as an agronomist in Guinea-Bissau and concluding as a nationalist and revolutionary.[1130] The two revolutionaries thus became influential with their decolonisation theoretical frameworks based on their revolutionary experiences.

Basing his revolutionary ideas on personal experiences borne out of his participation in the Algerian revolution, Fanon said of a revolution, 'For true revolution to occur, independence must be taken not merely granted; it must be the work of the oppressed themselves.'[1131] Fanon suggested violence when he said that independence must be taken, not granted. By a granted independence, he was indirectly referring to countries such as Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Ghana, among others, whose independence was obtained through non-violent means, given on a silver platter, so to speak. Violence is

[1127] Frantz Fanon was a psychiatrist by profession. He was a native of Martinique but his ancestry were Africa. He studied medicine in France but practiced in Algeria where he found himself involved in the Algerian Revolution. R. Blackey, Fanon and Cabral: a Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa, in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 12, No. 2, (1974). pp. 191 – 209.

[1128] Amilcar Cabral was the revolutionary socialist leader of the national liberation movement that freed Guinea – Bissau from Portugal colonialism. After his education in Lisbon, Cabral worked in Guinea as an agronomist for the colonial service and directed a nationwide agricultural survey. This work gave him an extensive and intensive knowledge of the socio-economic structure of colonialism in Guinea – Bissau. He then helped organise the African Party for Independence for Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Cabral's revolutionary strategy emphasised the political mobilisation of the masses around practical material issues rather than grand theoretical ideas. *Ibid*.

[1129] P.A. Beckett, Algeria vs. Fanon: The Theory of Revolutionary Decolonisation, and the Algerian Experience, in the *Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 26, No. 1, (March, 1973). pp. 5 – 27.

[1130] R. Blackey, Fanon and Cabral: a Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa, in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 12, No. 2, (1974). pp. 191 – 209.

[1131] P.A. Beckett, Algeria vs. Fanon: The Theory of Revolutionary Decolonisation, and the Algerian Experience, in the *Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 26, No. 1, (1973). pp. 5 – 27 and R. Blackey, Fanon and Cabral: a Contrast in Theories of Revolution for Africa, in *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 12, No. 2, (1974). pp. 191 – 209.

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therefore central to a revolution, as it is violence that necessitated the urge for independence. On this, Fanon said,

> Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and demanded by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there is nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There is nothing serve a minimum of re-adaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving; while down there at the bottom masses continue to suffer due to imperialism.[1132]

Here, Fanon gives a warning on the need for colonised people to be wary of independence that is easily given when one considers problems that tend to bedevil those countries whose independence was merely negotiated. In this case, negotiated independence creates a fertile ground for neo colonialism. Violently gained independence totally eradicates imperialistic symptoms before they even develop. Fanon suggested that colonised people must fight and violently oust colonisers from their land. To him, true liberation and freedom is only realised through the barrel of a gun. Mass participation in violent decolonisation – revolutionary decolonisation, lays the basis for true revolutionary decolonisation after independence.[1133] To this end, violence plays a crucial role in Fanon's theoretical assumptions, as opposed to Cabral's moderate theory.

Cabral's philosophical thoughts on revolution are based on his understanding of the social and economic situations in colonised Africa. Colonial economies and agricultural policies dramatically changed the internal situation of the colonies through the concentration of land ownership. This led to the destruction of rural subsistence agriculture in favour of the commercial one. This way, social classes became anchored in private ownership. Colonialism resulted in the denial of indigenous cultures and identities and the absorption of European ways of life.[1134] This way, a revolution can take place if masses unite. Cabral posited that real social change involved winning indigenous control over the forces of

[1132] P.A. Beckett, Algeria vs. Fanon: The Theory of Revolutionary Decolonisation, and the Algerian Experience, in the *Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 26, No. 1, (March, 1973). pp. 5 – 27.
[1133] *Ibid*.
[1134] http://libcom.org/library/amilcar-cabrals-theory-class-suicide-and-revolutionary-socialism-toms-meinhelder. Accessed: 3rd March, 2016. 20:24.

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production. To this end, there is no single class agent capable of a successful revolution. Cabral argues that the main social class contradiction in the peripheral societies was between internal and external supporters of imperialism and the masses as a 'nation class'. The potential for revolution lies in the formation of an anti-imperialist alliance of various social classes such as peasants and petty-bourgeoisie.[1135] Once this alliance is in place, then a revolution can take place.

For Cabral, this can only be successful if colonised people regardless of social status, unite to form a 'nation class' capable of starting a revolution. This unity is fundamental if colonised people are to retake and gain full control of all means of production for them to be fully independent. The need for the ownership of the means of production provides fertile ground for the 'nation class' to start a revolution. Cabral's theory has strands that resonate with Bulilima youths' endeavours during the Zimbabwean revolution. Through alterations, the above theories of revolution were comparatively applied to this study's analyses as captured in the following sections and subsections.

6.3 Overview of Major Events, 1960 – 1976

Zimbabwean revolution took the form of a guerrilla war. It was a process characterised by endless spasms that rendered it directionless and ineffective from 1960 to 1976.[1136] Prominent here was the constant interference by the clueless self-styled FLS Presidents.[1137] They sought to impose their ideas on the liberation movements without first seeking to understand the finer details that underpinned ZANU and ZAPU's

[1135] http://libcom.org/library/amilcar-cabrals-theory-class-suicide-and-revolutionary-socialism-toms-meinhelder. Accessed: 3rd March, 2016. 20:24.
[1136] One of the studies that clearly but subjectively deal with these events is that of F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006.
[1137] For a detailed discussion on how all this unfolded and how this created animosity amongst liberation movements in exile, particularly in Botswana, refer to W.G. Morapedi and B.G. Gumbo, Schisms in Zimbabwean's Anti-Colonial Movements in Botswana, 1959 – 1979, in *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3, (2016). pp. 361 – 379.

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differences. In their quest to bring sanity, the FLS Presidents brought more confusion and unnecessary loss of life to innocent youths.[1138]

As such, the revolution had no clearly defined course. There were no coordinated and consolidated efforts from all those involved, particularly exiled liberation movements' leaders in Zambia and Mozambique. As a result, there is no consensus by scholars regarding the exact date the revolution began. Different dates are provided and vigorously promoted for personal exaltation.[1139] What is of no doubt is the fact that the 1960s were characterised by 'terroristic' activities dubbed the 'sabotage campaigns' by the liberation movements' leadership and their underlings.[1140] By 1969 it was clear that the so-called 'compromise politics' had failed. The 1970s ushered in a supposedly new era in the Rhodesian saga, that of the beginning of a serious and deadly armed confrontation, so it was believed.[1141] The cycle of confusion and repeated confusions started off as follows.

The year 1960 kicked off with the formation of the NDP from the banned SRANC. The NDP was a popular mass movement throughout the country and was subsequently banned for its success and noticeable progress in mobilising Africans against the oppressive settler rule.[1142] In December 1961 (a month after NDP was banned) ZAPU was formed from the remnants of the outlawed NDP.[1143] ZAPU's formation brought hope that the revolution would be intensified as opposed to what was transpiring then. These

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[1138] Go to pp. 307 and 308 for a clarification on this matter. But for a detailed discussion of this incident and the formation of ZIPA, see F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. pp. 146 and 147; http://www.google.co.zarhodesia.orgABriefOperationalHistory.htm and M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed, in *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 1, (January, 2004). pp. 65 – 83.

[1139] Those politically aligned to ZANU (PF) promote 1966 as their official date for the start of Zimbabwe's Second Chimurenga (as they call it). Those rooting for ZAPU (never mind the 1987 ZANU-ZAPU Unity Accord) would want us to accept 1963 (when the party sent its first recruits for training overseas) as the year when they launched their armed struggle. Die hard supporters of the RF would scream 1972 as the genesis of the 'terrorist bush war' to make us accept their lame theory that anything before that was nothing more than mischievous natives trying to test their patience. The so-called 'neutrals' would tell us 'mad dates' such as 1982 when the infamous Gukurahundi officially invaded Matabeleland region with their own callous agenda about citizens living there. With this confusion, it is difficult to place the exact date for the start of the country's armed conflict.

[1140] D. Dabengwa, ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe's War of National Liberation, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 24 – 35.

[1141] Several studies provide a detailed analysis of this transition. Of particular note are, for example, P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, 1982; N. Bhebe, 1999; E. Msindo, 2012; A.S. Mlambo, 2014 and F. Chung, 2006.

[1142] A.M. Chambati, 'Africans and the Struggle for their Rights in Rhodesia, 1923 – 1972', in E.S. Wilmer, (Ed.), *et al*., *Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973. pp. 29 – 43.

[1143] *Ibid*.

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hopes were extinguished when in 1963, ZAPU split. The splinter group immediately formed ZANU, thereby setting the gains of pressure politics backwards. That is, the aftermath of ZANU's creation was characterised by self-destructive inter-party bloody fights between these two parties' shameless youths in major cities and townships.[1144] This brought problems to the two parties as they were both banned in 1964. During 1963 – 1964, partly because of violence on a scale hitherto unknown in Rhodesia and, as a need to curtail nationalists' persistence in their one-man-one-vote calls, and the Garfield Todd inspired No Independence Before Majority Rule (NIBMAR) rhetoric, most of these leaders were arrested, detained or imprisoned.[1145]

ZAPU officials (J.M. Nkomo and J. Musika, for example) were detained in Gonakudzingwa National Park while those of the ZANU faction (R.G. Mugabe and N. Sithole, among others) were either jailed or confined to Wha Wha and Sikombela in the Midlands Province.[1146] Not all top officials, however, were netted by the authorities' drag-net. Quite a number of these managed to escape to Zambia where they re-organised party structures in exile.[1147] Efforts at armed intervention were ignited by these exiled leaders with full cooperation and assistance of Tanzanian and Zambian Presidents.[1148] Tanzania in particular offered its territory for the opening up of guerrilla training facilities in Mugagao and Murogoro among such camps. The arrests, imprisonment or detention of the nationalist leaders potentially deprived liberation movements of informed guidance.

In a regional perspective, this arbitrary arrest and detention should be seen in light of the same arbitrary arrests, detention, trials and subsequent incarceration of both the ANC and PAC in South Africa by the apartheid government. The 1961-1964 demolition of the ANC leadership resulted in the famous Revonia Trial that saw the likes of Nelson Mandela

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[1144] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. p. 14 and F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. pp. 58, 59 – 60.

[1145] Garfield Todd was the former Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He was pro-liberation movements in Rhodesia and advocated for the enfranchisation of black people, hence his NIBMAR campaign. Todd and his daughter, Judith, were outspoken critiques of the Smith regime.

[1146] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 62.

[1147] For ZAPU, some of these officials were James Chikerema (vice-president), J.Z. Moyo, G. Silundika and G. Nyandoro and, ZANU's crew were, among others, Hebert Chitepo and Dzingayi Mutumbuka.

[1148] C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*. London, 1989. p. 22.

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receiving life jail-terms.[1149] This effectively killed ANC and PAC's venomous attacks on the apartheid regime when party activists either went underground or were exiled as well. Not to be outdone by their cousins to the south of Limpopo River, the Smith government unleashed its dragons and the liberation movements were dealt a fatal blow to their ambitious plans for a fully-fledged guerrilla war, as were ANC and PAC in South Africa.

Meanwhile, basking in the glory of the political suppression of Zimbabwean nationalism and in a show of defiance over Britain's authority, Smith and his hangers-on unilaterally declared independence in Southern Rhodesia (November 1965).[1150] This not only angered Britain, but also flabbergasted and incensed the remnants of the nationalists who had managed to miraculously escape Smith's drag-net. Out of frustration and anger, ZAPU activists managed to smuggle into Rhodesia small arms and ammunition for the purposes of sabotaging the country's economic system. Writing on ZAPU's tendency and undertaking, Ellert points out that 'ZAPU then tried a different tactic and with the aid of a group of European and Asian university lecturers at both the University College of Rhodesia and the University of Zambia, they conspired to smuggle explosives and hand-grenades into Rhodesia.'[1151] The ZAPU guerrilla activists targeted Rhodesia's essential economic installations and sites such as bridges, farms, power lines, power stations and railway lines among other infrastructure.

This was a show of distaste over Smith's UDI. This followed a similar Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) venture in South Africa where, 'Several considerations influenced the movement in its first stage of development, to restrict itself to sabotage of the economic installations and targets of symbolic political significance'.[1152] 1965 saw the official opening of ZAPU's limited and resource-starved attacks on the country's economic installations. After training, small units of two- three men and 'women' were deployed inside Rhodesia to infiltrate different parts of the country in order to carry out further recruitment, and reconnoiter and sabotage small economic targets such as post offices, communication

[1149] T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. London, 1989. p. 237.
[1150] P. Bond and M. Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge. Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice*. Pietermaritzburg, 2002. p. 6.
[1151] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-Insurgency and the Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*. Gweru, 1989. p. 11.
[1152] T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. London, 1989. p. 234.

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net-works and electricity supplies.[1153] While ZAPU's economic terror proved ineffective, one important aspect stands out. This was the official formation of ZAPU's 'armed wing' in 1965,[1154] once more following in ANC's footsteps who had formed their MK in 1961.

1966 saw a group of seven ZANLA guerrillas infiltrated into the country where they made a nuisance of themselves by being led by an SB agent who was planted in their organisation. Ken Flower mockingly says of the group,

> The Chinhoyi incident would have been a 'non-event', like all other ZANLA incursions at that time, had it not been for a rare disagreement within the Operations Coordinating Committee (OCC) … The issue was whether to wrap up the incursion as a 'police action' or to allow SB to continue to accompany the group to determine what contacts they might have at their ultimate destination. Three of four of us in OCC believed it would be better not to make martyrs of seven men who, since crossing Zambezi, had tried ineffectively to blow up an electricity pylon, had made half-hearted attacks on a police station and were now dependent on CIO agents for food and succour.[1155]

This nonetheless, marked ZANU's official launch of its guerrilla war, the so-called 'Second Chimurenga' in 1966.[1156] The problem with such subjective and self-serving statements is their tendency to distort, twist and influence history for one's personal gain. According to official records in Zimbabwe, the armed conflict in the country was initiated by ZANU in 1966 at the Battle of Chinhoyi.[1157] Yet facts at hand prove that guerrilla incursions

[1153] Dabengwa says they trained and deployed 'women' guerrillas in the mid-1960s. This is doubtful given that by then, it was even difficult if not impossible to recruit male youths to join their rank and file. In this view, Dabengwa's assertion should be cautiously considered as there is no evidence that point to ZAPU's use of such cadres, neither have scholars elucidated to such an undertaking by the party. These are some of the issues that tend to embarrass Zimbabwe liberation struggle's historiography. D. Dabengwa, ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe's War of National Liberation, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 24 – 35.

[1154] *Ibid*.

[1155] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1989. p. 106.

[1156] *Ibid.*

[1157] According to official documents such as Grades six and seven Social Studies Syllabi and their accompanying teaching/learning materials, Zimbabwe's war of independence official began in 1966 with the Battle of Chinhoyi. For true facts about the whole incident and as to when actually the guerrilla war began and who started it all, consult Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1989.

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began in 1964 with ZAPU's seven guerrillas who were infiltrated for recruitment and sabotage purposes,[1158] as were the seven ZANLA guerrillas later in 1966.

ZANLA incursion was followed by a massive combination of ZAPU and MK infiltrations in 1967 and 1968. This displayed and confirmed ZAPU leadership's frank ignorance of a guerrilla war. On both occasions, within a space of a month, large groups of a supposedly trained guerrilla army were intercepted and easily killed on Rhodesian terrain.[1159] This shameful display of a lack of guerrilla tactics, qualities and survival skills, was not only disgraceful to politically informed Zimbabweans, but a treasonous act in the eyes of their sponsors and backers. This contemptible and ignominious act of sheer incompetence by the joint ZAPU and MK guerrillas directly fed to the cracking and eventual splintering of ZAPU in 1971.

The early 1970s ZAPU disintegration incapacitated the party organisationally and in terms of strategically positioning itself to challenge the powerful security forces. ZAPU was in a state of disarray. The party was in no capacity to carry on with its revolutionary agenda partly because of decisive defeats within Rhodesia, and largely due to the degrading internal squabbles centred on James Chikerema and Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo.[1160] The split left ZAPU a seriously disabled organisation, with little hope of surviving.

Consequently, 1971 saw ZAPU officials, after soul searching, reorganising the movement's armed struggle in Zambia by launching ZIPRA, ZAPU's armed wing. In 1974, John Vorster (South Africa), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) and Henry Kissinger (USA's Secretary of State) initiated *détente* which was grudgingly and unintentionally accepted by the warring parties. This brought a false atmosphere of ceasefire, thus suspended the revolution which was mainly pursued by ZANU and its ZANLA guerrillas. ZAPU and her ZIPRA activists were still finding their feet into the arena, in addition to licking their self-inflicted wounds.

[1158] http://www.google.co.zarhodesia.orgABriefOperationalHistory.htm. Accessed: 5th June, 2016. 08:56.
[1159] C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*. London, 1989. p. 22.
[1160] http://www.google.co.zarhodesia.orgABriefOperationalHistory.htm. Accessed: 5th June, 2016. 08:56 and E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. pp. 203, 204 and 205.

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Further, 1974 became disastrous for ZANU and its insurgency when their leader in exile, Hebert Chitepo was assassinated by the CIO,[1161] although at that time suspects were those around him.[1162] In an uncalled for and overzealous reaction, the Zambian authorities rounded up most top ZANU and ZANLA officials during Chitepo's burial.[1163] This automatically removed the wheels off ZANU's revolutionary wagon. ZANU was rendered useless and ineffective. In frustration and total lack of discipline, the few ZANLA guerrillas in the war front mobilised each other and vacated Rhodesia,[1164] heading for Zambia, smelling blood. The revolution's ambers were extinguished, what with ZAPU still baby-sitting itself in semi-luxurious offices in ZH.[1165] Its few refugees were languishing in bush camps, cursing the day they decided to join the war.

December 1974, in accordance with *détente* provisions, saw the release of all nationalist leaders who had been languishing in solitary confinements since 1964,[1166] to engage in peace-settlement talks with the Smith regime. The talks, however, collapsed due to Smith's arrogance as he refused to accede to nationalists' demands for black franchise in the country. These would have led to black majority rule. The ramifications of this were the release of nationalist leaders and the total withdrawal of South Africa's paramilitary police contingent stationed in camps dotted along the Zambezi River.[1167] The period was disastrous for ZANU,[1168] while of limping benefit to ZAPU as it used the opportunity to formalise and finalise its intended assault on the Smith regime.

Finally, 1975 saw yet another misfiring attempt by the FLS to bring sanity to the country's liberation movements. This was the ill-conceived, ill-advised, ill-fated, illogical and

[1161] See K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. The Rhodesian CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987, on Chitepo's murder.
[1162] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 95 and K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1989. p. 106.
[1163] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 95
[1164] *Ibid*. p. 91.
[1165] Zimbabwe House was ZAPU's Head Quarters in Zambia, situated at the outskirts of Lusaka. It had modern offices, fully furnished and thus was comfortable compared to make-shift offices in bush camps. For additional details on ZAPU officials' life style and operations in the ZH, see A. Mazinyane, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo: Father of the Revolution, in the *Sunday News*. Bulawayo, 17th August, 2014.
[1166] http://www.google.co.zarhodesia.orgABriefOperationalHistory.htm. Accessed: 5th June, 2016. 08:56.
[1167] *Ibid*.
[1168] A. Mazinyane, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo: Father of the Revolution, in the *Sunday News*. Bulawayo, 17th August, 2014. p. 9.

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untenable attempt by Presidents Nyerere, Machel, Kaunda and Sir Seretse Khama to create a unified guerrilla army (the Zimbabwe People's Army, ZIPA) from the amalgamation of two sworn enemies, ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas.[1169] This FLS initiative died before it even developed into an embryo. That is, these two enemies, instead of focusing their energies in fighting the common enemy, conspired to provide a respite to the security forces by turning against each other at training in Mugagao and Murogoro, Tanzania. Figures of wasted guerrillas (majority of whom were ZIPRA), were four hundred and two hundred in those two camps.[1170] This way, revolutionaries turned anti-revolutionary, much to the embarrassment of the FLS Godfathers, but to the amusement and satisfaction of the security forces and the Smith regime.

At this stage, ZAPU resumed its revolutionary war in earnest despite the above set back. ZAPU was told in no uncertain terms by the OAU's Liberation Committee that unless they played a more active role in the war, they were likely to be cut off from funding.[1171] Given this veiled threat to expel ZAPU from FLS territories, the party woke up from its self-imposed slumber and squarely faced the Smith regime. This was done mainly through the use of the Botswana border, thereby opening the flood gates for Bulilima youths' massive involvement and participation in the country's revolution.

The 1970s marked an epoch in Bulilima youths' participation and prominence in the war. ZIPRA guerrillas began their endless infiltrations into the western and southern ends of the country through the district. In the process, they sucked youths into the conflict until the 1979 December ceasefire that brought an end to Smith's arrogance.[1172] Based on the above events, the period from 1960 – 1975 saw little impact from ZAPU and its ZIPRA guerrillas to warrant the massive involvement of Bulilima youths in the armed struggle. The analysis and interpretation of the consolidated outcomes of data presented in

[1169] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. p. 145.
[1170] http://www.google.co.zarhodesia.orgABriefOperationalHistory.htm. Accessed: 5th June, 2016. 08:56.
[1171] *Ibid*.
[1172] Some of the stipulations of the 1979 December ceasefire were that all warring factions should immediately stop the war, all guerrillas to move to designated assembly points, (Madlambudzi Police Station and Thekwane Mission were some of these in Bulilima District), and one man one vote principle to apply to all citizens of the country during the February 1980 general elections. For more details on guerrilla assembly points and the Lancaster House Conference resolutions, see N.J. Kriger, 2003; F. Chung, 2006 and K. Flower, 1989.

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Chapters four and five that follows helped shade light on the extent of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war.

6.4 Youths who were at Home during the Liberation Struggle

6.4.1 An overview of Youths' Involvement and Participation

The above section has presented a hollowed period for the majority of Bulilima youths in as far as active involvement and participation in the armed struggle is concerned. Those who were actively involved then such as G. Silundika and J.Z. Moyo are dead. Their involvement and participation in the struggle is well documented.[1173] Of Bulilima District's former youths from the elite who participated in the struggle between 1960 and 1974, Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu is a notable survivor. This study is based on peasant youths. Interviewing S.G. Ndlovu would have compromised the purpose for which the study was done, to present history from down up; to capture peasant youths' direct voices; to provide a platform for peasant youths to say their lived experiences during the troubled years, hence give voice to the voiceless. As Kriger rightfully notes, 'The Zimbabwe case [Bulilima District in particular] points to the need to deal with youth as a distinctive category.'[1174] This is what this study sought to do, given Bulilima youths' tremendous roles.

During data presentation and discussion, seventeen former youths who were at home attributed their involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle to the presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in their communities. Two, Nhlanhla and Abraham said that they were requested by their communities to form youth league structures that served as both the guerrillas and communities' eyes and ears.[1175] Shadreck indicated that his involvement in the guerrilla war stemmed from his father's position as one of ZAPU's top

[1173] Studies that detail some of these Bulilima heroes are, among others, E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012; N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999 and A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014.
[1174] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 168.
[1175] Interview with Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 23rd March, 2016 and Abraham Moyo, Joko Village: 23rd March, 2016.

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officials in the district. Coordinating guerrilla activities in Bulilima between ZAPU officials in Bulilima and Bulawayo, and those in Botswana, Shadreck's father used his son as a courier of such information.[1176]

First and foremost, guerrillas' presence in Bulilima District should be traced from 1971 after the formation of ZIPRA. As has been noted in the previous section, serious personality-borne misunderstandings between J. Chikerema and J.Z. Moyo disrupted all ZAPU programmes and structures.[1177] This incapacitated the party from effectively waging its war against the settler government. The end game was the split which left the party with a small contingent of guerrillas, not more than eighty to be precise.[1178] This was a wake-up call for ZAPU. A combination of arm-twisting from the OAU and ZAPU's zeal not to be outshined by ZANU and its ZANLA guerrillas saw the party embarking on serious measures to rejuvenate itself. As Bhebe notes, 'After the split ZAPU had to start from scratch, by introducing new party and military structures, and by engaging in an aggressive recruitment and training programme of the military personnel.'[1179] For the 'aggressive recruitment' drive to be practical, fruitful and progressive guerrillas had to be infiltrated in large numbers into the country.

Bulilima District, by virtue of its location along the Botswana border was opened for ZIPRA's Southern Front. Guerrillas were thus infiltrated for recruitment purposes.[1180] Guerrilla missions were not to engage with security forces. They were instructed never to engage with the enemy unless otherwise cornered. Instructions were clear, they were to avoid any contact with the enemy as much as possible. Guerrillas went into the district to recruit as many fighters as they could come across.[1181] Guerrillas' instructions 'never to engage the security forces' meant that their targets were Bulilima youths. For them to

[1176] Interview with Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 11th September, 2016 and Melusi Zaba, Gala Village: 12th September, 2016.
[1177] N.J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe*. Cambridge, 2003. p. 28.
[1178] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. pp. 25 and 26, and A. Mazinyane, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo: Father of the Revolution, in the *Sunday News*. Bulawayo, 17th August, 2014. p. 8.
[1179] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 26.
[1180] Interview two with Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 11th September, 2016 and Melusi Zaba, Gala Village: 12th September, 2016.
[1181] Interview two with George Ndebele, Zuzaphi Village: 7th September, 2016.

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access their targets, they had to use the Botswana border to enter the district. They had to exit the district through the same border, this time with their recruits.[1182] The emphasis on never to fight the enemy meant that ZIPRA Commanders were pressed for recruits. Engaging with the security forces would jeopardise chances of ZIPRA recruiting as many youths as required to build a strong guerrilla army. It would also lead to the security forces beefing up border patrols, making it impossible to join the war. The Botswana border was poorly guarded at that time of the struggle. In this way, the border facilitated ZIPRA guerrillas' recruitment drive, hence their continued presence in Bulilima for more recruits.

The guerrilla presence in Bulilima District stimulated Bulilima youths to join the struggle. It directly influenced seventeen of the youths while indirectly doing so to three.[1183] Guerrillas, by their very nature of survival and upkeep, depend on villagers. Once they began serious incursions into the country through the Botswana border, they had to blend with the Bulilima population. Their first port of call were youths, who they dispatched to villagers to announce their presence and then organise food and shelter.[1184] From the very beginning, youths became involved with guerrillas in an organisational capacity.

Guerrillas, on the other hand, exhibited their dependence on peasant youths as soon as they entered the district. As long as there were guerrillas in Bulilima, therefore, youths were bound to help them one way or the other. Another interesting aspect to note is that by immediately involving youths, ZIPRA guerrillas seem to have learnt from their previous mistakes, the Wankie and Sipolilo fiascos. Also, by playing organisational roles, youths automatically became the link between guerrillas and villagers. This developed out of the fact that ZIPRA guerrillas, for whatever reasons, avoided villagers and their homesteads.[1185] By keeping away from villagers, ZIPRA guerrillas, it is assumed, did not intend to interfere with peasants' general patterns of life. The best way to deal with villagers was through their off-spring.

Guerrillas' presence in Bulilima District was subject to the border's continued accessibility. As long as the border was accessible, allowing for the continued uninterrupted

[1182] *Ibid*.
[1183] See Chapter four, section 4.2 for data discussed on this aspect.
[1184] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1185] Interview two with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.

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crisscrossing, guerrillas would always be present in Bulilima executing the war. Central to Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's armed struggle, therefore, was the presence of ZIPRA guerrillas in the district.[1186] This, in terms of guerrillas' incursions and exit purposes. Once in the district, guerrillas required youths' assistance and, youths obliged to assist. This establishes the fact that the border directly influenced Bulilima youths involvement in the country's liberation struggle.

ZIPRA guerrillas, as part of ZAPU structures, directly influenced Bulilima youths' participation in the armed conflict. Their influence partly speaks to the structuralist assumptions that structures cause and sustain a revolution.[1187] ZIPRA guerrillas, as part of a larger structure, caused the revolution by revolting against the incumbent government of Ian Douglas Smith in 1971. As they pursued their guerrilla cause, they enlisted the services of Bulilima youths to sustain the revolution.[1188] The alliance of these two structures to sustain the guerrilla war is key to Skocpol's revolutionary assumptions.

The weakness inherent in Skocpol's analysis is her failure to interrogate the nature or forces behind such an alliance. Guerrillas infiltrated Bulilima District as a fully developed structure and they encountered youths. At first youths acted individually and were disjointed, but as the war progressed they gradually developed into a powerful complementary structure to guerrillas' revolutionary endeavours. Skocpol's dismissal of individual agency here is problematic as it fails to account for the individual's significance in any revolution. Her failure to confront the nature of this guerrilla-youth alliance at different stages of its existence has led to a serious omission, the role of individual agency in enabling this alliance work. Male interviewees categorically stated that they assisted guerrillas willingly.[1189] On the contrary, female youths did so under duress.

Another critical point to note is that early guerrilla incursions in Bulilima District found no youth structures in place. Youths formed structures following both guerrilla and parental

[1186] Focus Group Discussion two, Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[1187] T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge, 1979. p. 5.
[1188] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1189] For an understanding of how willingly male interviewees assisted guerrillas, consult Chapter four, section 4.2.

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advice (in the case of Abraham and Nhlanhla). Personal beliefs, feelings, goals and attitudes influenced young people to form youth structures to serve guerrillas,[1190] hence voluntarist assumptions. Those who did not believe in the guerrilla cause ran away to the sanctuary of towns and cities. This was the case with Mahwa Moyo (not his real name) of ko Sa Thekile, Mbila Village.[1191] Bulilima youths made choices to either support the insurgents or migrate to urban areas based on personal goals and beliefs. This corroborates voluntarist line of revolutionary thinking. Roles female youths undertook during the guerrilla war, for example, are a reflection of the choices they made in consideration of the war situation.[1192] Individual agency was influential in decisions made by youths with regard to their participation. A detailed analysis and interpretation of what Bulilima youths at home actually did is provided below.

6.4.2 Youths at Home: Their Involvement and Participation in the Struggle

Youths at home became involved and participated in the guerrilla war due to the increase in guerrilla activities in the district. As guerrillas intensified their recruitment activities supported by ZAPU's radio campaigns, more youths were flown to Zambia.[1193] More guerrillas were trained, produced and deployed into the country through the Botswana border. For Bulilima, this meant that the more guerrillas were infiltrated, the more youths were involved with them.[1194] A point to note is that more guerrilla incursions through the Botswana border necessitated the permanent deployment of some in the district to wage their guerrilla war against the Smith regime. The availability of guerrilla gangs in Bulilima District on a permanent basis translated into full-time attachment of Bulilima youths to

[1190] Interview two with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 7th September, 2016.
[1191] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1192] L. Stott, *Women and the Armed Struggle for Independence in Zimbabwe (1964 – 1979)*. Edinburgh, 1990. p. 53.
[1193] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 26.
[1194] Interview two with Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 11th September, 2016.

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those guerrillas.[1195] Once guerrillas attained a state of permanence in the district, youths' servitude to them doubled many fold.

Forty individual interviewees and twelve focus group discussants provided youths' core duties during the guerrilla war as, among others:-

Being guerrillas' and communities' eyes and ears; *ukuhlala sitsheka umumo* (always monitoring the situation); guerrilla messengers; couriers, moles or smugglers of arms and ammunition; custodians of guerrilla arms and ammunitions; holding meetings to, *inter alia*, review, strategise and appraise each other on the war situation; gathering of intelligence information and relaying it to guerrillas; caring for sick and wounded guerrillas; smuggling seriously wounded guerrillas out of Bulilima to Botswana for specialised treatment; burying dead guerrillas and black soldiers; collecting accused sell-outs and witches; guarding such suspects over night; guarding guerrillas when feeding/having either lunch or supper; destroying deep tanks; planting landmines on roads; patrolling communities; spying on the security forces in Plumtree and Madlambudzi garrison; presiding over villagers' petty squabbles; collecting monetary donations from villagers; buying cigarettes for guerrillas; organising villagers to prepare food for guerrillas; cooking, washing and ironing for guerrillas; and female youths being guerrillas' 'wives'.

The above duties were categorised according to frequency with which youths performed them, namely permanent, semi-permanent, situational, periodic and female orientated ones. This categorisation facilitated data analysis and interpretation to determine the extent to which Bulilima youths were involved and participated in the country's guerrilla war. Within each classification, only one or two role(s) were analysed and interpreted due to time and space. The analysed and interpreted role(s) were randomly picked as opposed to their being more paramount to the study than others. These were attended to in the order they were classified, starting with permanent duties.

Bulilima youths' permanent duties were, but not limited to; being guerrillas and communities' eyes and ears; gathering of information on guerrillas' behalf; patrolling

[1195] Focus Group Discussion one, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th September, 2016.

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communities, and doing anything and everything for guerrillas.[1196] Performing duties such as being eyes and ears of everyone in the district was no easy task for them. They were turned into permanent guerrilla spies, working for guerrillas from dawn to dusk and vice – versa. Their daily activities were dedicated and devoted to monitoring, patrolling (sectorial areas to observe any situation, individual(s), stranger(s) who might be a threat/harm to their '*Obhuti*'), in addition to keeping a watchful eye on villagers (their parents and relatives) for any signs that might be anti-guerrillas and their cause. Everybody was a suspect and this called for close watch and intense monitoring.

Bulilima youths became guerrillas' life savers 'since an outcome of any successful military encounter is determined in large part, by accurate gathering of intelligence and dissemination of information'.[1197] If youths had not played detectives and consistently and systematically supplied such intelligence information to '*Obhuti*', the situation might have been disastrous for ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima. Youths' participation in the struggle this way enabled '*Obhuti*' to evade security forces in the majority of cases.[1198] This is true when one considers that security forces had their own sophisticated methods of gathering information,[1199] about insurgents' activities, movements and general patterns of behaviour, most importantly their operational strategies. Without material resources to counter those at security forces' disposal,[1200] (high tech radios, professionally trained spies, for example) ZIPRA guerrillas turned to Bulilima youths for salvation. Guerrillas' survival in this war depended on help provided by youths.[1201] In Bulilima youths' case, this was full time occupation when everything else is considered.

Bulilima youths' enthusiastic acceptance to be permanent guerrilla assistants should be viewed from their need to find something to do with their lives.[1202] Evidence from interviewees is to the effect that thousands of Bulilima children completed their minimum

[1196] To understand how Bulilima youths performed the said duties, refer to Chapter four, section 4.2.
[1197] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 144.
[1198] M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga! An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 1979*. Harare, 1981. p. 6.
[1199] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 144.
[1200] *The Chronicle*. Bulawayo, Friday, 2 July, 1977. p. 3.
[1201] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London, 1975. p. 84.
[1202] M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed, in *Journal of Pearce Research*. Vol. 41, No. 1, (January, 2004), pp. 65 – 83.

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schooling years (Grade 7 or lower) from around 1975 onwards. Cumulatively, these became redundant, idle, hopeless and useless in their communities.[1203] Without employment prospects, guerrilla calls for youth assistance in the aforementioned areas of their concern were God sent to Bulilima youths. This was one call Bulilima youths could not reject. At least guerrillas afforded them opportunities to be productive with their lives, as there were no viable economic undertakings in Bulilima District. The district was no longer economically viable, hence was poverty stricken.

Basically, rural areas' failure to provide viable economic opportunities for youths should be traced from the inception of 'anti-rural development policies' by successive settler governments. Colonial policies led to the decline and eventual collapse of rural economies.[1204] Laws that came to bear are, among others, the LAA, 1930, the Maize Control Amendment Acts (MCAA 1934), and the LHA, 1951. In combination, these policies created 'impoverished subsistence villagers in overcrowded reserves, practicing the supposedly traditional (yet imposed) agricultural techniques often in-appropriate to the unfamiliar harsh environment'.[1205] To cap the destruction of Bulilima communities' survival strategies, the latter policy forced them to destock, cull their livestock at the same time compelling them to terrace their fields (unpaid forced labour).[1206] As a result, Bulilima communities were economically sabotaged, driven into economic ruin such that when their children completed grade seven, they graduated into sustained economic poverty.

The subversion of Bulilima's means of survival fits in well with Cabral's revolutionary assumptions that social revolutions have their beginnings in the colonial system's destruction of peripheral areas' traditional agricultural practices. Cabral posits that this destruction is necessitated by colonialists' pursuit of agriculture for commercial purposes, hence the need for intensive labour. The only way to obtain such labour is to disrupt natives' means of production so that they automatically become dependent on the new

[1203] Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1204] M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed, in *Journal of Pearce Research*. Vol. 41. No. 1. (January, 2004), pp. 65 – 83.
[1205] C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economic and Society*. London, 1989. p. 12.
[1206] *Ibid* and T.O. Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. A Comparative Study*. Harare, 1985. p. 121.

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economic order.[1207] This way, people in peripheral areas become discontented, hence resort to revolution to reclaim their history. This is exactly how successive settler governments presided over the systemic destruction of Bulilima's agricultural potential, in the process rendering Bulilima youths vulnerable to guerrilla manipulations. Bulilima youths' revolutionary undertaking relates well with Cabral's thoughts on social revolutions.

Bulilima's volatile situation was compounded by the 1975-1979 African population explosion where, for example, more than fifty thousand youths were leaving school each year.[1208] Given this scenario, the pressing need for Bulilima youths at that time was to occupy themselves one way or the other. Born into poor peasant families, powerless and with no hope for their future, Bulilima youths found solace 'working' for 'Boys with guns'. This not only provided them with the opportunity to 'redeem themselves'. It also conferred them with 'power and authority' over the traditional system that betrayed them.

Hungry for power, Bulilima youths were highly committed to ZIPRA guerrillas' agenda. As Kriger notes, some youths (particularly females) seized this opportunity to fight against the oppressive nature of African patriarchal traditions. In no time, partly because of the break-down of law and order in rural areas,[1209] and partly due to youths' insatiable appetite for power, Bulilima communities (this was most prevalent in Bambadzi, Mbimba and Wuwana) degenerated into havens of youth thuggery. Guerrillas enhanced youths' power of authority by symbolically identifying with them. They did this by bringing a culture of '*ubuhlalo*' (small beautiful fashionable beads) to the district among youths.[1210] Beads became a part of life in Bulilima District as they symbolised power, freedom and identity with the guerrilla cause. Youths became the most powerful group in Bulilima District then.

[1207] http://libcom.org/library/amilcar-cabrals-theory-class-suicide-and-revolutionary-socialism-toms-meinhelder. Accessed: 3rd March, 2016. 20:24.

[1208] M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed, in *Journal of Pearce Research*. Vol. 41, No. 1, (January, 2004), pp. 65 – 83.

[1209] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. pp. 195 and 196. One of the guerrillas' assignments when they entered a district was to disrupt and eventually destroy colonial administration and its attendant structures in rural communities. In the case of ZIPRA which did not involve itself much with villagers' lives, it was befitting for its 'auxiliary force' (youths) to be in charge and control of communal administrative affairs. N.J. Kriger in her *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices* provides an in-depth analysis on how Mutoko youths rebelled against tradition.

[1210] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016 and Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016.

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Being guerrillas' eyes and ears, guerrillas' mouth pieces and guerrillas' spies, *inter alia,* translated to youths being ZIPRA guerrillas' permanent 'civil servants'. The provision of intelligence information to guerrillas on a regular basis, guarding guerrillas while eating and relaxing, organising villagers to prepare food for '*Obhuti*', and spying on security forces' activities in Plumtree and Madlambudzi from time to time confined youths to a status of being ZIPRA guerrillas' contract employees. These duties, according to the informants, were not permanent but semi-permanent. Instead of doing these duties on a daily basis, youths found themselves doing them at one or two week intervals, depending on the availability of guerrillas in a community.[1211] Guerrillas would send youths, for example, to either Plumtree or Madlambudzi to 'spy' on the security forces' activities to ascertain their intentions, both immediate or long term. Interviewees gave guerrilla availability in their communities a one or two week space.[1212] Similarly, their stay in a community was given a maximum of two weeks.[1213] These guerrilla orientated activities were subject to '*Obhuti*'s wishes, what they wanted done for them at that particular time.

Guarding guerrillas while they were eating and visiting Plumtree town and Madlambudzi garrison to spy on security forces was a risky undertaking on the part of youths. Guerrillas put youths' lives in mortal danger in the event that security forces pounced on them while feeding.[1214] Youths were not trained to escape tight contact situations between guerrillas and security forces as guerrillas were. As such, any sudden attack by the security forces would render them vulnerable and defenceless. Defenceless also, in that once guerrillas realised they were cornered, they would disappear without trace.[1215] This was a characteristic of their elusiveness (applying escape skills acquired during their guerrilla training), leaving youths on their own, at the mercy of the Rhodesian rifle men.

Where 'terrorists' were concerned, Rhodesian security forces tended to fire indiscriminately anywhere, anyhow and everywhere with mortars, grenades, machine-

[1211] Interview two with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016.
[1212] Interview two with Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 7th September, 2016; Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 20th September, 2016; Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September, 2016 and Mrs. Moyo. Khame Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1213] *Ibid*. and Interview two with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016.
[1214] For a comprehensive illustrations on how fatal guarding feeding guerrillas was, check with A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008.
[1215] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.

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guns and helicopters. The intended effect being that anyone and anything within that vicinity was killed.[1216] In ignorance, Bulilima youths paraded themselves for security forces to sharpen their shooting skills. A testimonial explanation of a similar case as analysed above is provided by Trethewan who in the aftermath of his group's contact with guerrillas, counted seven dead bodies and six mortally wounded ones, none of which were guerrillas.[1217] This way, guerrillas selfishly enticed youths to guard them to the detriment of their safety. It seems that youths sacrificed their lives in exchange for unproductive and unprogressive power and authority.

On the other hand, guerrillas' failure to protect youths indicated that they cared less about their welfare.[1218] To them, youths were pawns in a game where they were sacrificed to save the King (guerrillas) as Trethewan's case illustrates. Youths' vulnerability in such situations is also realised when soldiers could not protect them as well, opting instead to shoot to kill.[1219] As much as Rhodesian security forces opened themselves to accusations of civilian massacres, one should understand that it was difficult for them to distinguish real guerrillas from youths. This was because guerrillas dressed like civilians as their attire was generally supplied by villagers.[1220] Given this identity puzzle, security forces would be forgiven for youths' murders. Guerrillas were simply inconsiderate by having youths play 'watchdogs' in war-charged environments where only those with guns survived.

If indeed guerrillas were a revolutionary army as they made youths to believe and villagers confused, logic has it that the safety of those they purported to liberate would come first. The only logical way to act under the circumstances was for youths to deliver food and leave guerrillas feeding by themselves, then come back later to collect plates. Guerrillas, to ensure that they ate in relative security, should have taken turns to guard each other

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[1216] A. Mazinyane, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo: Father of the Revolution, in the *Sunday News*. Bulawayo, 17th August, 2014. p. 9 and A. Ndlovu, *Zimbabwe Struggle. The Delayed Revolution. An Auto Biography*. Bulawayo, 2014. p. 35.
[1217] Trethewan was a police Ground Coverage Operator, a section of the BSAP that dealt with gathering of intelligence information at grass-root level (rural areas). In his case, they threw a surprise visit to a guerrilla gang having lunch in a Filabusi rural community. After an intense battle, guerrillas ran away, leaving youths and females who had brought food on their own. A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 69.
[1218] M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed, in *Journal of Pearce Research*. Vol. 41. No. 1. (January, 2004), pp. 65 – 83.
[1219] *Ibid*.
[1220] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. pp. 167 – 8.

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while eating since they were trained to deal with contact situations.[1221] This way, no unnecessary loss of life would have occurred. At the same time, this would expose security forces' brutality and cowardice in as far as the murder of youths was concerned.

In Bulilima's case, revolutionaries shot themselves in the foot by employing anti-revolutionary tactics that had the potential to destroy the foundations of their survival there. In Maoist tones, the fish were polluting the very water in which they were swimming. This is contrary to structuralist leanings, that alliance structures are founded on the understanding of mutual benefits from the revolution.[1222] Guerrillas' intentional use of youths as the proverbial 'guinea pig' to gauge the security forces' destructive tendencies exposes Skocpol's inconsistences and inconsideration of finer details that matter the most in rural based anti-colonial revolutions. Little details such as ZIPRA guerrillas' use of Bulilima youths as their guards and how this negatively affected the struggle when youths were either killed or arrested in large numbers by security forces are difficult to account for. The said theory misses the point, hence its inadequacy in explaining some aspects of Zimbabwe's anti-colonial revolution, particularly Bulilima as a test case.

On the other hand, the voluntarists' claim that individual actors matter the most for a successful revolution seems to fall by the way side as well.[1223] This, when we consider the fact that ZIPRA guerrillas (as a collective) connived to eat as a group, preferring to be protected by unarmed youths. In the process, guerrillas seem to have ignored trained wisdom that the best guard is an armed one, particularly in a war situation. As much as Bulilima youths fronted themselves as a collective,[1224] the reality is that when guns start blazing, bullets whizzing high and low, untrained youths were bound to act individually. Their immediate thoughts when attacked by the security forces, no doubt, would be their safety first, a personal consideration that the voluntarists so emphasise.[1225] Guerrillas' failure to take this into consideration shows some of the contradictions inherent in rural

[1221] Interview two with Kolema Tshuma, Thekwane Mission: 15th September, 2016.
[1222] www.let.rug.nl. Skocpol's Theory of Revolution. Accessed: 13th August, 2015. 11:20.
[1223] For a detailed analysis of the voluntarist theoretical assumptions, see N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992.
[1224] Interview two with Abraham Moyo, Joko Village: 4th September, 2016 and Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1225] J. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics and Revolution. Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World*. Princeton, 1974. p. 95.

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based anti-colonial revolutions. These are glaring omissions found within the voluntarist studies such as Samuel Popkin and Joel Migdal's.

It should be accepted and appreciated that security forces had their own informed methods of tracking and approaching any guerrilla gang they were pursuing.[1226] One of the most effective, and one which accounted for many guerrilla deaths in Bulilima, was their use of 'sell-out' villagers.[1227] The alleged 'sell-outs' lived among villagers and were villagers themselves. They also studied, observed and noted most of the happenings when guerrillas were feeding, including the positioning of the supposed 'guards', a vital piece of information to the security forces. Armed with such 'productive information', it is a forgone conclusion that surprise attacks were effectively carried out. This rendered 'guards' ineffective in warning '*Obhuti*', hence guerrillas and youths' retributive attacks on villagers.[1228] This is arguably one of the major failures of the voluntarists when it comes to dealing with negative effects of individuals' anti-revolutionary tendencies and orientations that caused so much suffering and death of innocent individuals in Bulilima. This way, voluntarist studies are found wanting with respect to addressing anti-colonial revolutionary situations as they happen in rural settings.

While Bulilima youths were contracted to guard guerrillas at any given time when they were available in a community, their terms of temporary employment involved, among others; taking care of wounded and sick guerrillas; burying dead guerrillas and black soldiers; transporting wounded guerrillas (in scotch carts) to Botswana for treatment; collecting and guarding those accused of selling out and witchcraft; mediating over villagers' squabbles, and assisting guerrillas in murdering 'sell-outs and witches'.[1229] Bulilima interviewees acknowledged that in their services to ZIPRA guerrillas' cause, they

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[1226] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. pp. 144.

[1227] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Interview two with George Ndebele, Zuzaphi Village: 7th September, 2016; Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016; Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 20th September, 2016 and Thembani Dube, Solusi Mission: 7th September, 2016. Villagers who 'sold out' guerrillas, as stated in Chapter four, section 4.2, subsection 4.2.1 were given R$ 5000, 00 Reward for all their troubles and, potential death penalty by guerrillas if caught/discovered. D. Caute, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*. London, 1983. p. 331. R$1 was equivalent to US$1, 50 then. *The Chronicle*. Bulawayo, Friday, 16th July, 1977. p. 12.

[1228] M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed, in *Journal of Pearce Research*, Vol. 41, No. 1, (January, 2004), pp. 65 – 83.

[1229] Refer to Chapter four for a detailed discussion on these.

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performed the above duties when called upon by guerrillas or when there were wounded guerrillas around or from other districts. Bulilima was a transit district for wounded guerrillas from inland.

Caring, nursing and transporting seriously wounded guerrillas to Botswana for specialised treatment was one of the temporary but basic duties Bulilima youths did for guerrillas. It was temporary in that these said duties were not guaranteed; they were situational, mostly dependent on the contact between security forces and guerrillas.[1230] Given their nature, volatility and level of incriminating evidence when caught, it is bad enough that they were not a permanent feature. These duties tested the elasticity of Bulilima youths' loyalty to '*Obhuti*'. That is, a seriously wounded guerrilla could not be transported over night from Ntunungwe, for example, to the Botswana border.

The wounded insurgents had to be temporarily kept hidden somewhere in one of the homesteads, where only a very few highly trusted youths and elders would know of his whereabouts.[1231] Keeping a wounded guerrilla came with its potential temptations, notwithstanding the consequences that befell one who sold out. Youths tasked with nursing and guarding the immobilised cadre might have been tempted to sell-out and pocket the R$5 000, 00 reward that went with that act.[1232] True to the spirit of 'brotherhood' (*Obhuti bethu*) and unity in 'inequality', Bulilima youths and their villagers never sold out a wounded guerrilla or those tasked to oversee his temporary upkeep and treatment.[1233] This exemplifies the general cooperation between youths and their parents, a unity and cooperation driven by fear of death.

An illustration of how rural communities rallied behind a wounded guerrilla is provided by Andrew Ndlovu,[1234] a ZIPRA Commander who had one side of his face blown off by

[1230] Interview two with Nhlanhla Siqhoza, Mlomwe Village: 20th September, 2016.
[1231] Focus Group Discussion one and two, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015 and Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016 and P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 175.
[1232] D. Caute, *Under the Skin. The Death of White Rhodesia*. London, 1983. p. 331.
[1233] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016; Bigboy Ncube, Kandana Village: 7th September, 2016; Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village; 17th September, 2016 and Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1234] Andrew Ndlovu was the Commander of ZIPRA guerrillas that were operating in Lupane District. After independence, he rose to prominence when he and Chenjerai Hundzvi led the War Veterans Association (WVA) that demanded and was granted by the government Z$50 000. 00 once off payment in 1997 for their roles in the

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security forces in a battle. Andrew Ndlovu was kept at Seka Mbiko's homestead in Lupane. He received medical treatment from a nurse, Rita Ncube from St. Luke's Mission Hospital under the care of Seka Mbiko and his wife, MaDlamini.[1235] Villagers cooperated with middle class professionals to heal and ultimately save a ZIPRA guerrilla on the verge of death. In a quest to nail him (Ndlovu), helicopters bombed the bush randomly while the infantry battalion combed the bushes and fired at every thicket in their desperate quest to capture or finish him off.[1236] The way wounded Andrew attracted security forces' 'follow up operations' (as described above) is the same way wounded guerrillas in Bulilima attracted security forces' responses when they smelled blood. Any wounded guerrilla brought an awkward and deadly situation to youths. Despite all the risks associated with a wounded guerrilla, youths remained steadfast in doing their duties.

Apparently there was no mission hospital in Bulilima District,[1237] where wounded guerrillas would get professional help as was the case with Andrew Ndlovu in Lupane. In the absence of professional help, injured guerrillas' fate was left in the hands of unprofessional but traditionally orientated local youths and their parents. They administered traditional herbs to guerrillas' raw wounds. In cases of broken bones, the treatment done was similar to that applied to their beasts when they suffered injuries of broken limbs.[1238] Critical cases were thus referred to Botswana.

The closure of Brunerburg Mission Hospital indirectly forced Bulilima youths to practise their primitive nursing skills on injured guerrillas. This potentially put those guerrillas' lives on an extended risk of death due to contamination and infection of the said wounds. Wounded guerrillas were treated under unhygienic conditions by individuals who were equally unhygienic as they knew nothing about proper hygienic practices. By closing Brunerburg hospital, ZIPRA guerrillas had a taste of their own way-ward actions. Sadly

liberation of the country (and other benefits such as monthly pensions of Z$2 000. 00). This is significant in that it marked the genesis of Zimbabwe's economic crisis. Since then, the country never recovered from that unplanned economic hullaballoo.

[1235] A. Ndlovu, *Zimbabwe Struggle. The Delayed Revolution. An Auto Biography*. Bulawayo, 2014. p. 34.

[1236] *Ibid*. p. 35.

[1237] The only mission hospital was Brunerburg which was unfortunately shut down by guerrillas following their own logic. Interview two with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September, 2016.

[1238] Interview with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016 and Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September.

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though, wounded guerrilla cases compromised Bulilima youths' lives as they became practically involved and personally attached to those guerrillas until they fully recovered.[1239] In districts where mission hospitals were functional, badly injured guerrillas were referred there for treatment. A case in point was the Swedish Lutheran Mission Hospital (in Mnene) where a black Doctor treated injured guerrillas until security forces clandestinely killed him.[1240] The death of the 'young black doctor' at the hands of the security forces fuels the argument that guerrillas were a curse in society.

Given the said doctor's profession, it was difficult for him to ascertain whether a person was a 'terrorist' or not. To him, and anyone in his profession, all who visited a hospital to seek treatment were patients.[1241] Killing him was meant to send a strong message to villagers and their children to desist from assisting guerrillas in whichever way. In spite of that, youths and their parents cooperated in nursing wounded guerrillas. Their alliance 'thinly' relates to Cabral's theory of social revolution in that he urges all social classes in peripheral areas to form what he regards as a 'nation class'.[1242] The weakness though, is that Cabral fails to explain what happens to the revolution when other social classes in the periphery such as petty-bourgeoisie do not commit themselves in forming the said alliance as was the case with Bulilima District. Bulilima's petty-bourgeoisie distanced themselves from such an alliance mainly because guerrillas shut down their only sources of livelihoods, at the same time attacking purchase area farmers.[1243] Out of frustration due to loss of their livelihoods, the petty-bourgeoisie migrated either to Plumtree town or

[1239] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016 and Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1240] M. Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator. An Insider's Account of R. Mugabe's Descent into Tyranny*. Claremont, 2009. pp. 37 – 8.
[1241] *Ibid*.
[1242] http://libcom.org/library/amilcar-cabrals-theory-class-suicide-and-revolutionary-socialism-toms-meinhelder. Accessed: 3rd March, 2016. 20:24.
[1243] Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016. Ngoni's father was a petty-bourgeoisie (owned stores and was a purchase area farmer). Purchase areas were plots specifically set aside for supposedly 'wealthy Africans' to do commercial agriculture. These farmers unfortunately became targets of guerrilla attacks and destruction of their properties. This was because they were provided some form of assistance by the Smith government in seeds, crop chemicals and fertilisers by the Agritex (Department of Agricultural Extension) and regularly trained by agronomists. Since insurgents were fighting against the Smith regime and anything associated and connected to it, it is not surprising that BaKalanga Purchase Area Farmers fell victims to ZIPRA guerrilla attacks. The scheme sadly disintegrated in Bulilima District. For general information on purchase area farmers then, consult A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2009.

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Bulawayo. ZIPRA guerrillas perpetuated class conflicts that were a deliberate creation of the settler authorities in Bulilima District. To Cabral, this was anti-revolutionary.

Another contradictory factor with Cabral's theory is the issue of guerrillas in Bulilima District closing schools, shops, clinics and grinding mills. Such actions did not bode well for the spirit of a single 'nation class'. Guerrillas' actions were in fact divisive, leading to clashes between and among social classes in peripheral areas. Truth is, no one would be pleased, let alone appreciate a system that does not respect his existence as a social class. This further calls into question some of the said theory's tenets in as far as their suitability to Bulilima's case is concerned.

The situational engagement of Bulilima youth was linked to their periodic participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Bulilima youths' duties that defined their seasonal appointment by guerrillas were, *inter alia*; being guerrilla porters, moles, couriers, smugglers of arms and ammunition from Botswana into the country; providing warehouses for these arms and ammunition at home; holding meetings; collecting money for guerrilla needs; and planting of land mines on roads.[1244] These roles were done in certain specific periods. Land mine planting was mainly done during the dry season to prevent planted mines from being washed away by run-off water or exposing them to the surface after heavy rains. The arms and ammunitions were collected when and if guerrillas wanted to replenish their supplies.[1245] Given their nature, these duties were classified as Bulilima youths' seasonal employment by guerrillas.

By smuggling guerrilla arms and ammunition, storing them in artificial 'warehouses' (*eziphaleni*/granaries) and planting landmines on dust roads, Bulilima youths became ersatz guerrillas in the eyes of the security forces. Involving themselves this way in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle meant that youths were an auxiliary guerrilla force.[1246] This automatically marked them as the security forces' enemies. This was an unenvious category to be classified under. Working as guerrilla underlings, Bulilima youths became

[1244] Chapter four best explains how youths did all these tasks without being caught by the authorities.
[1245] Interview two with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016; Melusi Zaba, Gala Village: 12th September, 2016.
[1246] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 76.

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involved in acts of sabotage,[1247] and fund raising for guerrillas' upkeep in the district. While they enjoyed playing such roles, youths seemed oblivious of the dangers they were drawing to their communities.

One of such dangers was that the blowing up of army trucks attracted violent reaction from the security forces. This often came in the form of a search and destroy operation,[1248] a manifestation of the security forces' displeasure in having their trucks blown up by booby traps set up by 'terrorists'. The deployment of a High Density Force (HDF) meant the use of large numbers of soldiers, a company of 100 to 120 men. These would cordon and search the affected area thoroughly.[1249] This way, youths brought destructive violence, intimidation and brutal murders to their communities through their ambitious and daring acts of 'terrorism' against the security forces.

Literature on the security forces' retributive and retaliatory violence on rural villages where incidences of guerrilla related attacks on them occurred abounds.[1250] For Bulilima youths to court disaster through involving themselves on matters military, hence way beyond their mental, tactical and organisational capabilities shows their naivety, overzealousness and uncontrolled fatal ambitions. An explanation for such calamitous undertakings may be Bulilima youths' selfish and boundless intentions of becoming guerrillas. These were nothing but grandstanding and illogical acts meant to impress guerrillas. Kriger wrote of youths' 'exalted notions' making them feel equal to great things and hence their disposition to seek revolutionary change.[1251] This is so when one considers that guerrillas themselves were youths' idols, local heroes and their mentors.[1252]

Emphasising on youths' deep-seated zeal to do anything for guerrillas, it is observed that, 'Particularly effective was the guerrilla youth system, which mobilised young males from

[1247] On this aspect, Lungisani and Melusi indicated that they would always wait by the dusty roads in their communities for any sound of the approaching army trucks. Within minutes upon detecting the approaching army trucks, they would have completed planting the mines and boom, the convoy would be hit hard, mission accomplished.
[1248] J.R.T. Wood, *The War Diaries of Andre' Dennison*. Gibraltar, 1989. p. 54.
[1249] *Ibid.*
[1250] These are, among others, P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, 1982; N.J. Kriger, 1992; P. Hayes, *et al*., 1992; K. Flower, 1987; J. Frederikse, 1982 and A. Astrow, 1983.
[1251] Aristotle quoted by N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. 1992. p. 164
[1252] Interview two with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016 and Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September, 2016.

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age of five who were romantically attracted by the admiration combat guerrillas enjoyed among Africans.'[1253] Due to their brainwashed reasoning, youths failed to make a simple connection that white civilian morale, for the loss of their sons, likewise was buoyed by retaliation for 'terroristic' acts of guerrillas.[1254] What a better way of impressing their kith and kin than killing a couple of black youths and claim 'killed in cross-fire', in front of news cameras,[1255] to appease their white civilians while perpetuating government propaganda. This was precisely put by Ken Flower thus, 'Phrases 'Killed in Crossfire whilst Running with Terrorists', in official Communique had been used accurately to start with, but as violence mounted they became code-language for death that should not have happened.'[1256] With this understanding, Bulilima youths were marked for death.

Given a slight opportunity to impress '*Obhuti*', Bulilima youths were set to do anything regardless of the consequences their actions would bring to their communities. Such consequences were exemplified by Bob North in these words,

> Security forces used some strong arm methods, torture. Some of the skull bashing was heavy, but try to tell a unit that has lost a couple of its men not to skull bash locals…Force appeared to be the best thing. To get locals to indicate landmines- it got [to] a stage where locals were burying landmines- we and a few others would go to a kraal, latch a *piccanin* [a small boy] onto a Land Rover, and drive him around. You would soon know if there was a landmine in the area. I know it is not a nice thing to do but nor is hitting a landmine.[1257]

Credit must go to youths though, the use of landmines was acknowledged as one of the most effective and indiscriminate weapons.[1258] Their efforts were not in vain. ZIPRA guerrillas excelled at landmine warfare as they employed a great variety of Soviet-designed anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.[1259] Given the destructive nature of

[1253] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 126.
[1254] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 80.
[1255] *The Chronicle*. Saturday, 2nd July, 1977. p. 1.
[1256] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 204.
[1257] Bob North interviewed by J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses vs. Media in the making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 126.
[1258] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 144.
[1259] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 107.

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landmines, youths' pernicious activities attracted security forces' wrath, a situation that saw innocent villagers punished callously as well.

In as much as Bulilima youths' insatiable appetite for power, control and the attainment of social status similar to '*Obhuti'* are to blame for their apathetic participation in 'terroristic' activities, guerrillas' laziness should also be apportioned blame. That is, guerrillas usually carried heavy loads of weapons and ammunition. Landmines were an unpopular burden because of their weight, hence guerrillas could often dispose of them.[1260] Guerrillas left these under youths' care, with instructions to plant them when the enemy forces were around.[1261] To shed off their load, guerrillas shifted their responsibilities to youths.

Provided with instruments of violence, youths unleashed terror on the security forces at an alarming rate. In turn, security forces devastated Bulilima villages where their colleagues had met their fate. Given this cycle of violence in rural Bulilima, such incidences correlate with Frantz Fanon's theory of social revolutions. Fanon's assumptions on revolutions call for violent means to end colonial domination.[1262] Taking a leaf from Fanon's assumptions, Bulilima youths were justified to violently react to the security forces' presence in their communities. Based on Fanon's thoughts, security forces were present in Bulilima communities to bring violence to the oppressed villagers, hence violence begets violence.

Further, the brutal retributory actions of the security forces as outlined above were not surprising based on an analysis of Fanon's revolutionary beliefs. To him, the fact that security forces served an oppressive system is an indication of their violent tendencies as colonialism is mainly based on and is backed by violence. Colonialist forces use violence to intimidate the oppressed and make them conform to their colonial ways.[1263] The application of violence by Bulilima youths in a bid to dissuade colonial forces from operating in their communities is in line with the violence that Fanon calls for in his theorisation of revolution.

[1260] *Ibid*. pp. 124 and 125.
[1261] Interview two with Melusi Zaba, Gala Village: 12th September, 2016.
[1262] Check this Chapter's sub-section 6.2.4 on Fanon's theoretical assumptions on social revolutions.
[1263] F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963. p. 29.

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Based on Bulilima youths' hazardous endeavours, guerrillas operating in Bulilima had profound influence on those youths' involvement and participation in the country's guerrilla war. Due to guerrilla influence, Bulilima youths found themselves deeply involved and participating in the country's guerrilla war. From time to time, and when necessary, youths would fight alongside guerrillas.[1264] Generally, the mid 1970s saw Bulilima youths participating in the armed struggle as loosely organised youth structures.

Female youths though, provided gendered services to guerrillas. These female orientated duties were almost done on permanent basis.[1265] That is, the female-specific duties were performed whenever guerrillas were within a specific community. Guerrillas made increasing use of young women, itself a revolutionary departure in a society where sexual divisions of labour had been accepted as part of nature, as a social arrangement hallowed both by tradition and ancestors' wishes.[1266] The issue of female youths doing the gendered tasks should be attributed to a general trend by their willingness to participate in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Their being involved in such activities must be seen in light of female youths' contribution to the liberation of the country given that almost every youth in rural Rhodesia was involved one way or the other.[1267] What female youths did for guerrillas was within their moral and traditional obligation.

The problem, however, appeared to be the shortage of both financial and material resources. As pointed out in Chapter four, Bulilima villagers were living in abject poverty. They did not have money to buy soap, clothes for guerrillas, food and other essential commodities necessary for guerrilla army devoid of financial resources.[1268] To understand Bulilima female youths' dilemma, it is necessary to briefly deal with the district's economic woes during this period.

[1264] Interview two with Melusi Zaba, Gala Village: 12th September, 2016 and N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices.* Cambridge, 1992. p. 151.
[1265] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1266] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York. 1981. pp. 100 -1.
[1267] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*. Gweru, 1980. p. 146.
[1268] Interview two with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.

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When ZIPRA guerrillas established themselves in the district, they seriously required youths' services. These were obtained, systematically exploited and became entrenched. Guerrillas relied on youths' services for their survival in the district. Bulilima, a rural district whose economy was agriculturally based,[1269] also relied heavily on its able-bodied young people for performing these activities. This created two dichotomous situations in Bulilima communities. One where guerrillas constantly required baby-sitting and nursing, another where fields needed to be tended if communities were to survive. Guerrillas' wishes prevailed over activities that brought food on their laps. In combination with the destructive colonial policies, Bulilima's war economy completely collapsed.[1270] Nobody tended the fields anymore since all efforts were channeled towards serving guerrillas. Instead of cultivating in the fields, youths were always busy '*betsheka umumo*' (monitoring the situation in case of enemy forces) while grown-ups were left to till the land alone.

Production suffered due to shortage of labour. Lack of agricultural production meant that villagers were under-resourced in terms of commodity availability. This negatively affected female youths when it came to guerrilla provisions. To aggravate female youths' precarious situation, guerrillas became choosey on what they ate.[1271] They refused to eat *isitshwala so nyawuthi* (stiff porridge prepared with finger-millet mealie-meal), preferring instead maize meal, a rare commodity during those years.[1272] They demanded that they be served starchy food with either meat or chicken.[1273] Through such demands, Bulilima villagers' resources were severely depleted by '*Obhuti*'. To sustain guerrilla demands, Bulilima villagers slaughtered beast after beast, chicken after chicken while they survived on fast diminishing traditional foods.[1274] This way, Bulilima villagers' resources were stretched to the limit.

[1269] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. pp. 112 – 3.
[1270] E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, The Origins of the Zimbabwe Problem, 1888 – 1923, in S.E. Wilmer, (Ed.) *et al*., *Zimbabwe Now*. London, 1973. pp. 13 – 28.
[1271] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1272] In fact, guerrillas refused to eat all traditional food stuffs such as *umbida/nlibo (manyadzigwa), mahonja/amacimbi, nnopi, nnxanxa, hanga/inkobe* and many more. Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016 and Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1273] Interview two with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1274] *Ibid*.

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In addition to killing their livestock and fowls to feed guerrillas, female youths and their parents were required by guerrillas and their side-kick male youths to donate/contribute money to buy cigarettes.[1275] Drained of resources and exhausted due to endless cooking, fetching water and washing guerrilla clothes in addition to theirs, female youths hobbled on as more guerrillas infiltrated Bulilima District. More guerrilla infiltrations increased pressure on female youths to provide corresponding services and food resources, yet these services and resources were correspondingly declining. Kriger notes that, 'As the guerrilla army expanded, its growing food requirement impelled it to broaden its bases for logistical support.'[1276] Under immense pressure to feed guerrillas and attend to their other needs speedily, female youth system incorporated young girls in their early teens as were the Bambadzi, Mbimba and Wuwana cases.[1277] Stabilising female resources did not translate to an increase in commodities to feed guerrillas.

The situation became worse when the government introduced punitive measures and cut food supply in rural areas by closing shops and grinding mills.[1278] The idea behind this was to deny guerrillas access to food supplies. Guerrillas, instead of using logic, decided to compound female youths' woes by their excessive demand for luxuries such as tinned foods (beef, condensed milk, fish).[1279] Added to this was their insensitive insistence that youths provide them with cigarettes. This way, female youths bore the brunt of the guerrilla war in Bulilima District.[1280] Guerrilla demands helped cripple Bulilima's subsistence economy in addition to morally destabilising female youths' enthusiasm to participate in the armed struggle. The problem with ZIPRA guerrillas was that their decisions were not negotiable. They imposed themselves upon BaKalanga people disguised as liberators yet their actions on the ground confirmed them as oppressors of the already oppressed. Guerrillas operating in Bulilima District were living off the misery and suffering of Bulilima female youths.

[1275] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War*. *Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 171.
[1276] *Ibid*.
[1277] Refer to Chapter four, section 4.2 for details on this.
[1278] CIIR. *Rhodesia after the Internal Settlement*. London, 1978. p. 19 and A. Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way*? London, 1983. p. 64.
[1279] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1280] A. Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way*? London, 1983. p. 64.

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Guerrillas' insensitivity to female youths' plight created doubt about their legitimacy as a liberating army. Their conduct towards female and Bulilima communities seemed to compete with that of the security forces. They also closed shops, banned rural buses, thereby aiding the regime's wish to completely shut down rural economy to starve guerrillas. Bulilima's female youths such as Mrs. Moyo, Nomusa and Nana had to travel long distances to urban centres such as Plumtree and Tsholotsho for food provisions to feed guerrillas.[1281] Involving female youths this way had repercussions of its own. It exposed them to danger of being caught with bulk food parcels and cigarettes by the authorities. It should be noted that there were severe consequences for anyone caught feeding guerrillas.[1282] Several people from Plumtree, for example, were charged and given varied sentences for feeding and harbouring guerrillas by a Plumtree Magistrate.[1283] Of what use to guerrillas would incarcerated female youths be, given that there was no way they could explain their way out if they were caught with their incriminating luggage?

This put female youths in an awkward position. They managed to do as guerrillas required of them despite the overwhelming odds staked against them. Generally, female youths were less suspicious compared to their male counterparts.[1284] Taking advantage of this weakness on the part of security forces, Bulilima female youths frequented Plumtree town for guerrilla provisions in addition to spying on the security forces' activities.[1285] Female youths were heavily involved and participated fully in ZIPRA's upkeep in Bulilima District.

Guerrillas' huge appetite for meat and cigarettes should be considered in relation to their starving years while in bush camps. As discussed in Chapter five, ZAPU refugees were seriously starving. After training, guerrillas' deployment in their home areas was quickly turned into an opportunity to embark on a feeding scheme, a feeding frenzy that traumatised villagers, more so female youths. Using the power of a gun, intimidation and other despicable horrors, they cowed Bulilima female youths into providing them with

[1281] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1282] A. Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way*? London, 1983. p. 47 and *The Chronicle*. Bulawayo, Thursday, July 28, 1977. p. 9.
[1283] K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London, 1975. p. 96.
[1284] J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses vs. Media in the making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 70.
[1285] Interview two with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.

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luxuries that were way beyond an impoverished peasant's financial capabilities. By forcing female youths to provide them with white *isitshwala/hadza/pap* (thick porridge) and meat/chicken for relish, ZIPRA guerrillas were indirectly punishing them for all those years they spent starving in Zambia. To guerrillas, it was pay-back time.

This shows ZIPRA guerrillas' propensity to take advantage of soft targets to fight their silent battles against those who had starved them during their years in the Zambian bush camps.[1286] Surprisingly, what guerrillas operating in Bulilima District subjected female youths to was contrary to how ZIPRA operatives in Belingwe (Mberengwa), Filabusi, Sipolilo, Gokwe and Urungwe treated their female youths.[1287] In Belingwe, for example, ZIPRA guerrillas were not choosey, they ate anything provided to them by villagers.[1288] Comparatively, Bulilima female youths suffered under the hands of their 'liberators'.

The conflicted involvement and participation of Bulilima female youths in Zimbabwe's liberation war clearly contradicts the four theories of revolution outlined in sub-section 6.2.4. This is so in that the said theories are silent on passive-cum-forced participation of structures, individuals, social classes as well as lack of violence in their timid behaviours. The said theories' silence here is an illustration of their inherent weaknesses in as far as dealing with finer details in anti-colonial revolutions in Africa is concerned. These theories, therefore, require modification and re-examination if their tenets are to suit salient features such as the above analysis of female youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

On top of their helpless situation, female youths were subjected to another level of fear and insecurity. The grain of limited satisfaction that Bulilima female youths might have had through their involvement in the country's liberation struggle was crushed when ZIPRA guerrillas turned them into their sex slaves. All female youth interviewees who were at home during the liberation struggle attested to their being turned into 'unofficial

[1286] Focus Group Discussions one and two, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015 and Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.
[1287] Interview two with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village: 26th September, 2016 and Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 15th September, 2016.
[1288] J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 172.

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guerrilla wives'.[1289] This was without their consent, a situation that brings to question ZIPRA guerrillas' disciplinary traits. Sleeping with unwilling female youths directly affected ZIPRA guerrillas' credibility as a genuine liberation army when one considers that their actions were as oppressive to female youths' freedom and liberties as were the colonial laws they sought to dismantle. Within this paradigm, ZIPRA guerrillas' actions and attitudes towards female youths are subject to various interpretations.

One of such interpretations is, by forcefully having sex with female youths, some of them as young as thirteen to fifteen years old,[1290] guerrillas exhibited their wildness. Their statutory rape of young girls was representative of their sorry and sad behaviour, which at that time was not impressive to female youths and their parents. The bottom line is that guerrillas, through such abhorrent behaviour could not be tamed and sadly, female youths had to embrace them.[1291] Guerrilla actions on female youths were an indication that they were not prepared to embrace the spirit of civilisation as offered by Bulilima female youths. As such, Bulilima female youths were faced with conflicting or competing imperatives, to support and feed guerrillas on one hand, or to report their presence to authorities and face certain death as 'sell-outs'.

Another is, by forcing female youths to submit to their dastardly demands,[1292] guerrillas' presence in Bulilima District, therefore, did not have any positive impact on their lives. In Bulilima District, as far as female youths were concerned, guerrillas were an epitome of raw brutality and an embodiment of fake liberators. This, when one considers the fact that their actions stretched the bounds of credibility.[1293] Contrasted with the way male youths were treated or pampered by guerrillas, one is justified to acknowledge that female youths were the down trodden, the neglected and the forgotten lot in Bulilima District. Given this

[1289] Refer to Chapter four, section 4.2 for a detailed discussion on how this became the case.
[1290] This was clearly illustrated in Chapter four, subsection 4.2.1 when discussing data on Bambadzi, Mbimba and Wuwana interviewees.
[1291] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1292] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1293] That is, demanding to be fed with either meat or chicken, thereby indirectly forcing poor and desperate villagers to regularly and systematically slaughter their livestock and chickens in addition to sleeping with little girls on a daily basis in the presence of their parents was barbaric to say the least.

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situation, Bulilima female youths found themselves in the most regrettable situations in the district. Hundreds fell pregnant, such as, for example, Nomusa and Sithokozile in addition to other hundreds of married young women. To this end, Kriger points out that guerrillas themselves fathered many children during the war.[1294] In this context, ZIPRA guerrilla operatives in Bulilima District presided over the destruction of several family institutions when marriages collapsed in cases where migrated husbands found their wives pregnant upon their return.

Furthermore, guerrillas as a supposed liberation army were supposed to be the instrument of peace, tranquility and prosperity to Bulilima in general and female youths in particular. Instead, they created emotional insecurity and crisis among Bulilima female youths. Their conduct, if we are to embrace Fanonism, was to be expected from the security forces as they were the representatives of violence and brutality upon the colonised people.[1295] To guerrillas, female youths were the objects of their sexual desires. Yet, female youths were centrally involved in every task that ensured guerrillas' survival in the district. Instead of creating and maintaining a harmonious alliance with female youths' social class as encouraged by Cabral, through exemplary conduct and behaviour, guerrillas were loathed and feared by female youths and elderly people but adored by male youths.[1296] Given the above, Guerrillas were divisive in their approach, conduct and dealings with Bulilima's different social groups.

Last, female youths, by succumbing and adhering to guerrilla demands was a reflection of their cultural upbringing, that is, respect for their male counterparts. Given this social relationship, however, we should not interpret their tolerance as a sign of weakness. Instead, it should be understood that female youths were silent not for lack of words to question guerrillas over their wayward behaviour, but for lack of understanding as to why a liberation army should conduct itself in a shameful manner. What female youths' hearts bore, their lips could not utter for fear of death.

[1294] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 193.
[1295] F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963. p. 29.
[1296] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.

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The systematic abuse of female youths by ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima District has no theoretical suppositions from the four theories that inform this study. Basically, such maltreatment of female youths underscores the general weaknesses associated with theories of revolution as they fail to account for the negative or retrogressive actions of structures, social classes, individual agency as well as nonviolent behaviour of the colonised peoples. That is, there are no theoretical explanations offered by these theorists to help explain negative guerrilla conduct that had the potential effect of derailing or forestalling the anti-colonial revolution in Bulilima District. Within this context, the said theories are irrelevant to this analysis. Particularly disappointing is Fanon's theory of violence which fails to deal with violence as perpetuated by colonised people against each other, such violence as was brought to Bulilima District by ZIPRA guerrillas against 'sell-outs and witches' which is the subject of the following sub-section.

6.4.3 The Issue of 'Sell-Outs and Witch craft'

The most contagious and controversial issues during Zimbabwe's armed struggle were issues of 'sell-outs and witch craft'. Bulilima District, as one of the most affected districts in terms of the concentration of both the insurgency and counter-insurgency forces, had a large share of these controversial cases. Bulilima youths, as the iconoclast in the guerrilla war here, were also involved and participated in this struggle by identifying and arresting 'sell-outs' on one hand, and collecting and guarding those accused of practicing 'witch craft' on the other.[1297] These two are given prominence here because of the social segment they affected – the elderly men and women of the communities. On the other hand, they are symbolic of how deadly violent the combination of guerrilla and youth systems were against elderly people. Married young women also factor in as they ganged up with guerrillas to perpetuate violence against their in-laws.

A 'sell-out' (*umthengisi/ntengesi*) in both guerrilla and youths' logic was a local male (often mature middle aged to older people) who was believed (correctly or wrongly) to

[1297] Interview two with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016; Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September, 2016; Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016 and Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.

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have reported guerrilla presence or movements to security forces/authorities or were their informers.[1298] To be labelled a 'sell-out' meant certain death.[1299] Guerrillas and youths' abuse of the term drove shivers down Bulilima villagers' and their girl-children's spines. On the other hand, a witch (*nloyi/umthakathi*) was an elderly woman suspected of killing someone through the practice of magic.[1300] To be accused of *ukuloya* (witchcraft) by guerrillas/youths/villagers was a serious offence just as was being accused of harbouring, feeding and associating with guerrillas by the security forces. Bulilima youths were involved and participated in issues that concerned 'sell-outs and witches' in the district. Youths were principal players in identifying suspected 'sell-outs and witches'. In certain communities, 'witches' were identified using traditional methods.[1301] Once someone died in a community, villagers sought to know what killed him/her. Respected elders were thus chosen within that community and sent to consult with a 'reputable' traditional healer (*nnganga/inyanga/isangoma*) on the causes of the deceased's death. Communities used 'bush autopsy or post mortem' to determine their fellow villager's death.

The 'bush pathologist' (*inyanga/nnganga*) would (in consultation with his magic) inform the community messengers as to what led to the death of their dear departed. More often than not, the cause would be a jealous neighbour, husband's second wife in a polygamous marriage, or an innocent poor old lady who lived alone near the deceased's homestead. This way, the community, through the youth system, informed guerrillas about the troublesome old witch who had terrorised the community since time immemorial. Once this reached guerrillas' ears, the fate of the accused was sealed.[1302] Many elderly women violently lost their lives this way. Some, for example, Na Toki and Na Mathe of ko Ngozi Village were publicly lynched by youths under the command of guerrillas.[1303] Violence has never been women's disposition. In the face of the escalating onslaught on 'witches' in Bulilima District, elderly women became desperate and helpless.

[1298] A. Trethewan, *Delta Scout. Ground Coverage Operator*. Johannesburg, 2008. p. 145.
[1299] *Ibid*.
[1300] Interview with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1301] Interview two with Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1302] *Ibid*.
[1303] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.

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Youths were key role players in all accusations heaped on elderly people. As the communities' 'watchdogs' they knew what went on in their communities, who went where, when, and when the individual returned. Through their vigilance, youths were able to detect potential spies as they would track and monitor the movements of suspects into the village or of villagers into town and other areas where the security forces were based.[1304] As noted, when ZIPRA guerrillas established themselves in Bulilima District, they set up a vibrant youth system. The youth system as was noted by SB, enabled all able bodied youngsters to actively help guerrillas throughout the country. Youths were used by guerrillas as locally trained guerrillas.[1305] The involvement of youths this way meant that it was easy to discover whether someone was a 'sell-out' or not. Tracking and monitoring people's movements was not an easy task.[1306] Youths devoted their time and energies in following different people at different times at the expense of other chores they were to do on behalf of their families.

Once local guerrilla scouts confirmed their target as a 'sell-out', the unfortunate elder was collected from his homestead, beaten severely by youths for 'selling' their '*Obhuti*'. Depending on the availability of '*Obhuti*' at the time of collection, the suspect was quickly handed over for the pronouncement of his fate. In the presence of cheering male youths and bemused female ones, the suspect was killed in a cruel and most despicable way. Some, for example, were beaten by guerrillas, burnt with plastics, bayoneted, had their tendons cut to inhibit their escape, while some were dipped in boiling water. When all was done, they were taken to a dip tank, tied on a log together with a slightly big bolder for weight, and then thrown into the dip tank alive.[1307] In addition to being destroyed, dip tanks also served as murder chambers-cum-burial sites for suspected 'sell-outs'.

This was a demonstration of cruelty to BaKalanga villagers.[1308] Guerrillas were prepared to use the power of a gun together with its technics to further their grip on Bulilima villagers. With the aid of youths, guerrillas reacted unnecessarily violently against 'sell-

[1304] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 117.
[1305] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*. p. 46.
[1306] Interview two with Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1307] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1308] This, when one takes into consideration how kindly and respectful Khanda Moyo and Jonathan Ngwenya treated villagers in their operational districts of Sipolilo and Urungwe respectively.

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outs'.[1309] This way, youths were guerrillas' most priceless assets. Some people, however, were falsely accused of selling out. Several studies on Zimbabwe's guerrilla war have pointed to this aspect of the war as one of the major violations of human rights principles by the liberation armies.[1310] Guerrillas themselves did not bother to investigate thoroughly cases of individuals accused of 'selling out'. This was left to Bulilima youths and some naughty young married women who had a knack for coquetry with guerrillas.[1311] The issue was, the coquette's in-laws (*ubabazala lo mamazala*), following tradition, would complain about their son's wife's intimate relationship with guerrillas. In order to silence these old busy-bodies, guerrillas would be fed falsehoods. The bone of contention being the alleged affectionate relationship guerrillas had with their sons' wives.[1312]

Guerrillas, acting on their lovers' influence, would pounce on the unsuspecting in-laws, falsely accusing them of either selling out or witchcraft.[1313] Without any shred of evidence, innocent elderly people were summarily executed such as was Scotch Ndlovu of Ntunungwe Village who was murdered at Mbila village.[1314] *Omalukazana* (Daughters in-law) connived with guerrillas to get rid of their husbands' parents in order to enjoy their cozy relationships with guerrillas undisturbed. Married women formed new alliances with guerrillas, associations born out of evil intentions. Using the code-term 'witch or sell-out', *omalukazana* had their husbands' parents executed by guerrillas.[1315] Nana provided an example of how an evil *malukazana* nearly had her in-law, (Nana's step-mother) killed.

Gogo Na Khiwa's (of ko Nyubi, Mbila Village) *malukazana*, having found herself a guerrilla lover, plotted to silence the 'old witch'. With the assistance of a local youth leader (his name supplied) *umamazala* (mother in-law) was falsely accused of practicing witchcraft (*ukuthakatha*). Youths collected her at night and took her to guerrillas who were at Maduke's homestead, where they presided over her case. Without any evidence to make

[1309] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 83.
[1310] See, for example, P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History.* Harare, 1992 and N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992.
[1311] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016 and Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016.
[1312] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1313] Interview two with Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016.
[1314] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1315] N.J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 195.

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a case against her stick, guerrillas acquitted her but not after having thoroughly and severely beaten her to a pulp.[1316] Sometimes guerrillas applied conventional wisdom when dealing with witchcraft issues as the case above indicates. In the majority of cases, guerrillas' imaginations were their inspiration for horrendous crimes against suspected 'sell-outs and witches'.

It is accepted that 'sell-outs' existed in Bulilima District during the guerrilla war. As a result, this created an atmosphere of fear and distrust among villagers and guerrillas. Guerrillas' position on 'sell-outs' was aggravated by the fact that their most dangerous enemies were not clearly identified.[1317] That is why they distrusted grown-up people and favoured youths. In addition, rewards given by authorities to those who passed on information made guerrillas even more nervous, hence were bound to frighten potential traitors into not betraying them through the brutal killing of those suspected of such crimes.[1318] It should be appreciated that ZIPRA guerrillas did not have a judicial system to charge and try those suspected of crimes against their cause. As a result, they had to make prompt decisions there and then based on mostly subjective evidence provided by youths. Given guerrillas' operational existence, they had no time to investigate in order to determine the authenticity of such accusations.[1319] Unfortunately for some, such decisions were against them, hence their executions despite their innocence.

Crude violence against 'sell-outs' characterised guerrillas' relationship with Bulilima villagers. As much as there was no evidence to substantiate the validity of claims of selling out or practices of witchcraft against certain villagers, guerrillas went ahead and ruthlessly murdered those suspects. Given such systematic crusade against perceived guerrilla opponents, and by implication enemies of the decolonisation processes, guerrilla violence on 'sell-outs' and 'witches' conforms to Fanonist traits of anti-colonial revolutions. In Fanonist sermons, 'sell-outs' are colonialists' allies and sympathisers and, through such associations, they should be violently eliminated in order to clear the revolutionary

[1316] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016.
[1317] K. Maxey, *Fight for Zimbabwe. The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London, 1975. p. 135.
[1318] *Ibid* and Interview two with Lungisani Moyo, Dombodema Village: 21st September, 2016.
[1319] Interview two with George Ndebele, Zuzaphi Village: 7th September, 2016 and Thembani Dube, Solusi Mission: 7th September, 2016.

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course.[1320] ZIPRA guerrillas' attempt to eradicate 'sell-outs' in Bulilima communities is in agreement with Fanonist logic on anti-colonial revolutions.

On the other side, guerrillas' attempts at eliminating 'witches' and their practices through traditional and cultural means, links properly with Cabral's views that indigenous people should denounce European forms of life and revert to their cultural ways of life.[1321] Guerrillas, by encouraging BaKalanga villagers to consult a *sangoma* or an *inyanga* to determine the causes of a villager's death, reflects an adherence to Cabral's philosophical thinking on revolutionary processes. Culture should determine our ways of life, how we solve and resolve issues that affect us as a 'nation class' if we are to succeed with our revolution.[1322] This way, guerrillas' extermination of 'witches' was part of a wider struggle against colonialism, hence an unconscious way of embracing Amilcar Cabral's fabrics of his theoretical thoughts. 'Witches' were enemies of masses, hence anti-revolution.

This sub-section has determined Bulilima youths' (who were at home) involvement and participation in every aspect of the country's liberation struggle in Bulilima District. Next is an analysis and interpretation of consolidated data concerning Bulilima youths who joined the liberation struggle in Botswana and Zambia, including those who became guerrillas. This is done below, beginning with those who were in bush camps.

6.5 Bulilima Youths who joined the Liberation Struggle in Botswana and Zambia

Introduction

Bulilima youths who joined the liberation struggle are categorised in two. There are those who were refugees and those who were guerrillas. Those who were refugees spent most of their time in bush camps while guerrillas were deployed inside Rhodesia to fight against the country's security forces. This section analyses and interprets data from the said

[1320] F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963. p. 33.
[1321] http://libcom.org/library/amilcar-cabrals-theory-class-suicide-and-revolutionary-socialism-toms-meinhelder. Accessed: 3rd March, 2016. 20:24.
[1322] *Ibid*.

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categories. It starts off by looking at the Botswana border as an influential agency in enabling Bulilima youths to join the liberation struggle.

6.5.1 The Botswana Border's Influence

Data collected from more than fifty former Bulilima youths and that from a variety of secondary source materials confirmed that Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was anchored by youths. Youths' involvement in the struggle was through liberation movements and their armed wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA. Bulilima youths who joined the struggle in Botswana and Zambia did so through the direct and indirect involvement of ZIPRA guerrillas. This section analyses and interprets consolidated data as discussed in Chapter five to determine the extent to which ZIPRA guerrillas' use of the Botswana border influenced their joining the liberation struggle in Botswana and Zambia.

All those interviewed on this aspect indicated that when they joined the liberation struggle, they crossed through the Botswana border.[1323] The use of the Botswana border by ZAPU as its people's gateway corridor began in earnest after 1971 when the party reorganised and revamped itself after its second internal split.[1324] The use of this border was necessitated by the difficulties ZAPU recruits and its guerrillas experienced when crossing the Zambezi River.[1325] In order to understand the importance of the Botswana border to Bulilima youths' joining the liberation struggle, it is necessary to provide a brief analysis of the difficulties ZAPU recruits and guerrillas experienced trying to cross the Zambezi.

The Zambezi River is a big and wide natural land form bordering Zambia and Zimbabwe to the north. It is infested with crocodiles, hippopotami and an assortment of water-bound small carnivorous animals that delighted in devouring guerrillas whose rafts capsised.[1326] The river presented a natural obstacle to guerrillas as they attempted to infiltrate Rhodesia from the north. First, ZAPU, as a poor non-profit making liberation movement

[1323] See Chapter five, subsection 5.2.1
[1324] Refer to section 6.3.1 of this Chapter for a brief on this. Meanwhile, ZAPU's first split was in 1963 when its break-away members formed ZANU thereafter.
[1325] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 49.
[1326] Interview two with Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 10th September, 2016.

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had no financial capacity to procure modern speed boats as were possessed by the Smith government. Second, crocodiles, hippos and the said little creatures were a formidable challenge to those attempting to cross, especially when a raft capsised.

Third, the Zambezi River was always patrolled by the BSAP on high-powered speed boats. Assisted by the SAP, the BSAP had camps dotted along the Zambezi River, specifically established for the purposes of preventing ZAPU guerrillas and later ZIPRA incursions.[1327] Summing up difficulties they encountered when infiltrating the country through the northern border, Andrew Ndlovu said their most direct enemy were the Rhodesian forces, followed by the crocodiles that teemed the Zambezi River and would feed on the bodies of comrades shot dead by the Rhodesian Forces while trying to cross the mighty Zambezi. The third enemy were the anti-personnel landmines planted by Rhodesians along the border and, the last was the river itself. The river was treacherous to ZIPRA guerrillas to cross, hence an obstacle.[1328] Added to these was the journey across the torrid Zambezi Plain, after which one had to clamber up the desolate Zambezi escarpment where food and water could not be found.[1329] Faced with all these difficulties, ZAPU could not do much in terms of infiltrating its guerrillas into the country for recruitment purposes.

With a trickle of recruits, it became hard if not impossible for the movement to develop and expand its guerrilla army until after 1972 when the party took the initiative to use the Botswana border. The Zambezi River was too formidable a barrier across which to mount sustained guerrilla operations.[1330] Although ZIPRA groups infiltrated across it throughout the war, the major inversion routes into the country had to develop around its flanks, through Mozambique (ZANLA) and through Botswana for ZIPRA.[1331] For ZIPRA guerrillas this began from around 1972 onwards.

[1327] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980.* Gweru, 1989. p. 15.
[1328] A. Ndlovu, *Zimbabwe Struggle. The Delayed Revolution. An Auto-Biography*. Bulawayo, 2014. p. 25.
[1329] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 49.
[1330] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980.* Marshalltown, 1982. p. 81.
[1331] *Ibid*.

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From thereon, the Botswana border played a crucial role in enabling Bulilima youths to join the liberation struggle. This was acknowledged by interviewees in their responses concerning the issue of how they joined the struggle. They all pointed out to the border being accessible, thus making it easy for anyone and everybody who wanted to join the struggle to do so uninhibited. However, because the border allowed anyone and everybody to cross willy-nilly, then the same facility was open to such use and abuse by the SB agents to infiltrate ZAPU structures in exile. As much as ZIPRA guerrillas were eager to use this border, the same border was treacherous in as far as its easy accessibility to security forces' agents was concerned. No doubt, the CIO implanted their agents who, unknown to ZIPRA High Command, trained in the Soviet Union as ZIPRA guerrillas.[1332] These became cancerous to ZIPRA's war efforts as they tended to supply vital information about the inner workings of the guerrilla army from within. This seriously compromised most of the guerrillas' missions as they were intercepted by the security forces before doing much damage in the country.

As much as Bulilima communities were politically informed due to their migrant male workers, their taste of guerrilla insurrection had its beginnings from 1972.[1333] ZAPU began to experiment with guerrilla infiltrations through the western side of the country as opposed to the north. In serious need of recruits to expand its guerrilla army, ZAPU dispatched ZIPRA guerrillas to Bulilima District via Botswana border. As pointed out earlier, 1972-5 guerrilla incursions were mainly for the purposes of recruitment.

Partly due to ZAPU guerrillas' defeat in 1967 and 1968, and partly due to ZAPU emerging from a devastating split, ZIPRA guerrillas had little success in their recruitment endeavours.[1334] With time, however, ZIPRA guerrilla presence in Bulilima District began to be felt by locals. BaKalanga people's political maturity became an added advantage to ZIPRA recruiters as parents offered their children's services in politicising the masses on the need to join the struggle. Young men began to respond positively to guerrilla appeals for able bodied youths to join the war. With more recruits, ZIPRA guerrillas expanded and

[1332] For a detailed version of how the CIO agents infiltrated guerrilla organisations, see K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987.
[1333] Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1334] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 110.

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by 1976 they began to mount an offensive against the security forces, having opened the Southern Front.[1335] Guerrillas began to flood Bulilima as they established themselves.

As ZIPRA guerrillas set themselves up in Bulilima for both war and recruitment purposes, the security forces mounted their COIN operations (commonly known thus in defence force corridors), headquartered in Plumtree town. This was to counter ZIPRA guerrillas' operational activities that were intensely concentrated close to the border,[1336] as were ZANLA's to the east of the country.

The map below (**Figure 4**) shows ZIPRA guerrillas' main infiltration areas through Bulilima-Mangwe District as it was known then. It also shows the security forces' 'Operation Tangent', as it was code-named by the Joint Operations Command (JOC) in 1976.[1337] COIN was a strategy to contain the influx of ZIPRA guerrillas in these parts of the country. What this meant was that Bulilima District became inundated with both guerrillas and security forces purportedly hunting each other. The side effect was that the Botswana government was drawn into a fracas of words with the Smith government.

This was when the Botswana President, Sir Seretse Khama complained in Geneva (1978) that the Rhodesian security forces had made 'about thirty-five' incursions into his country in the past two years. He accused them of 'shooting up' Botswana civilians in border villages. President Khama qualified his allegations by saying that the Rhodesians crossed into Botswana apparently in pursuit of terrorists. 'They do not bomb', he said, 'They gang line and shoot up villagers, shoot up people. They attack border villages, not towns', concluded President Khama. In response, the Minister of Foreign Affairs spokesman said, 'The only times Rhodesian forces have crossed into Botswana have been in the course and legitimate hot pursuit operations', adding, 'As soon as these have been completed, the troops have been withdrawn.'[1338] In short, the two countries agreed that Rhodesian security forces did 'invade' Botswana Kalanga communities situated along the border in

[1335] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 81.
[1336] *Ibid*. 92.
[1337] M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 9.* Harare, 1981. p. 16. 'Operation Tangent' covered the whole southern and western parts of the country.
[1338] *The Chronicle*. Bulawayo, Tuesday, May 25, 1978. p. 6.

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search of ZIPRA guerrillas. Indeed, ZIPRA guerrillas operated from the Botswana border. This is clear from the following;

> The Rhodesian and Botswana Governments today seem to have defused a tense situation on the south-west border following a major build-up on the Botswana side, of more than one hundred terrorists belonging to Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA, who were armed with mortars and automatic weapons, were involved in the border confrontation and at dusk a large number of them attempted to advance across the border.[1339]

This shows how contested the Botswana border was. The reaction of the security forces across the Botswana border shows their frustrations with Batswana people as they were heavily involved in assisting and aiding Bulilima youths on their way to join the struggle. The Batswana were thus punished for assisting Bulilima youths this way. This angered the Smith government which then allowed its forces to act aggressively against its neighbour. In so doing the Smith regime violated international law.[1340] The picture illustrates the relationship between Bulilima and Batswana Kalanga people that incensed the Smith regime as ZIPRA guerrillas exploited such good relationship to their advantage. Further, it should be known that the security forces had agents who pretended to join the struggle, hence were innocently assisted by Batswana.

[1339] *The Chronicle*. Bulawayo, Monday, June 26, 1978. p. 2.
[1340] Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*. Cambridge, 1988. p. 84.

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

Figure 4: Map of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) showing ZIPRA's main infiltration routes in Bulilima-Mangwe District from 1972 onwards.

Source: https://images.search.yahoo.com/operation+tangent+maps+Rhodesia.

In all this, ZAPU officials within Bulilima communities, most probably acting on instructions from Zambia via Bulawayo structures, were actively involved in recruiting and transporting

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(those with vans) recruitees across the Botswana border.[1341] Bulilima petty-bourgeoisie's participation in recruiting youths for war purposes demonstrates the unity that existed between the party and ZIPRA operatives in the district. This ties in well with Cabral's ideas on socialist revolutions where peripheral petty-bourgeoisie are encouraged to unite with other social classes in order to challenge the colonial system. The involvement of ZAPU officials this way testifies to ZAPU's desperate need for recruits to drastically swell the ranks of ZIPRA guerrillas for its guerrilla war. Zimbabwe's liberation movements were under pressure from both the OAU and the FLS to convince them that they were seriously waging a guerrilla war to end minority rule in Zimbabwe.[1342] ZAPU was, therefore, a desperate movement in every facet.

The party was totally dependent upon its host, Zambia. In addition, the OAU's special fund for liberation was allocated according to results and number of guerrillas in the army.[1343] ZAPU's desperate measures in Bulilima District did not go unnoticed by the SB who had infiltrated its membership. ZAPU's frantic search for recruits manifested itself when ZIPRA guerrillas abducted (twice in 1976 and 1978) all male students at Thekwane Mission School and took them across to Botswana.[1344] In 1977, they struck at Dombodema Mission School, abducting thirty young boys for war in Zambia.[1345] These outrageous acts enraged the Smith government, hence the deployment of a large contingent of security forces within the border communities. This created a volatile situation for Bulilima youths. The upshot was that youths were forced to choose between supporting the incumbent government or ZIPRA guerrillas' cause. Informed by the security forces' propensity for violence on one hand, and the guerrillas' propaganda (through Radio Mthwakazi and Radio Lusaka) on the other, Bulilima youths were psychologically motivated to join the struggle in Zambia.

[1341] Interview two with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village: 3rd September, 2016 and Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1342] D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London, 1981. p. 23.
[1343] *Ibid.*
[1344] Interview two with Moketsi Ndlovu, Dombodema Village: 7th September, 2016 and Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 18th September, 2016. Moketsi is one of the students who were abducted at Thekwane Mission in 1976 and taken to Zambia via Botswana.
[1345] Department of Information, Abductions from Rhodesia. Salisbury (Harare), 17th August, 1978.

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Increased guerrilla propaganda in rural Bulilima radicalised local youths and by 1977 the majority of those still at home were more than eager to go '*empini*'.[1346] In as much as Bulilima youths were highly motivated to join the struggle, the defining factor became Botswana border's accessibility and the direct assistance those hoping to go '*empini*' received from local Batswana settled along the border.[1347] ZIPRA made the most of this opportunity, recruiting thousands of Bulilima youths to Zambia for their supposed guerrilla training. With escalated infiltrations, so was the increase in recruitment tempo. By 1979, Bulilima District was full of guerrillas, most of whom were Bulilima children, utilising Bulilima youths as young as twelve years old.[1348] In this way, Bulilima youths found themselves working in tandem.

Through the Botswana border's accessibility and the massive cooperation by Batswana Kalanga communities, ZIPRA guerrillas easily infiltrated Bulilima District. Once inside the district, the mobilisation of youths through propaganda machinery spearheaded by political commissars was speedily done. This was ably facilitated by BaKalanga ZAPU officials within Bulilima communities.[1349] This unlocked the Bulilima-Botswana corridor which saw thousands of Bulilima youths converge in Botswana enroute to Zambia for the promised guerrilla training.

The freedom to use the Botswana border meant that all ZIPRA guerrilla operations in the Southern Front were incursioned through the said corridor.[1350] The free access to the border led to the frequent movement of guerrillas into and out of the country undeterred. This encouraged more and more guerrillas into the country while more and more youths were encouraged out of the country.[1351] The cycle continued until Bulilima District became militarised, with garrisoned police camps such as Madlambudzi.

[1346] Interview two with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 25th September, 2016 and Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 11th September, 2016.
[1347] Interview two with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 25th September, 2016 and Shadreck Nkobi, Matshinge Village: 11th September, 2016.
[1348] J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses vs. Media in the making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 70.
[1349] T.O. Ranger and M. Ncube, Religion in the Guerrilla War: The Case of Southern Matabeleland, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, (Eds.), *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Harare, 1996. pp. 35 – 57.
[1350] ZIPRA High Command's war jargon referring to all ZIPRA operations within areas to the south and western parts of Rhodesia. See map on page 346.
[1351] Focus Group Discussions one and two, Malopa Primary School, Malopa Village: 17th November, 2015 and Tsukuru Primary School, Tsukuru Village: 1st June, 2016.

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Bulilima's militarisation was borne out of the presence of two competing armed forces. The security forces, in reaction to ZIPRA guerrillas' subversive activities within Bulilima communities, regularly patrolled the communities in a bid to contain such incendiary activities. The security forces' counter-insurgency activities directly affected local people, particularly the youths who had been discovered by the SB agents to have been heavily involved with guerrillas.[1352] The resultant antithetical political situation that confronted Bulilima youths stimulated them to leave the country as life in Bulilima became unbearable.[1353] Reinforcing this stimulus was the border that nudged even young girls to embark on a long but relatively safe journey going '*empini*'.

Bulilima youths' joining the liberation struggle had serious implications for the district's survival strategies. By joining the struggle, youths disrupted the agricultural activities as they created labour shortages, thereby negatively affecting agricultural out-put. It should be remembered that due to the discriminatory colonial policies, BaKalanga women tilled poor quality soils in less watered areas such as Bambadzi, Makhulela, Mbimba, Ndolwane and Zuzaphi. As such, agricultural activities in these areas were labour intensive. Collective labour had sustained BaKalanga communities' livelihood. It is after the departure of youths such as Janet Kube, Sibongile Tshuma, MaMoyo and many others that Bulilima's survival strategies completely crumbled when only old people were left to till the hard to till soils.

At the same time, when guerrillas established themselves, they compounded BaKalanga villagers' miserable lives by being additional mouths to feed. Worse still, guerrillas did not help villagers with production, yet they ate and demanded a lot. They were ungrateful for what villagers did for them.[1354] In addition, guerrillas' appetite for luxurious commodities did not help matters for female youths who administered food logistics.

The influence of the Botswana border in enabling Bulilima youths to join the guerrilla war is thus apparent when contrasted with the Zambian one. That the Zambian border was

[1352] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 176.
[1353] For full details of this situation as it prevailed then, see Chapter five, section 5.2.
[1354] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 4th September, 2016; Nomusa Mlalazi, Tshangwa Village: 17th September, 2016; Mrs. Moyo, Khame Village: 5th September, 2016 and Cosmas Ncube, Hingwe Village: 5th September, 2016.

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very difficult or near impossible to cross is clear given the above analysis. In such a case, therefore, an alternative route into the country for ZIPRA guerrillas was welcome news to ZIPRA and their recruits. That the Botswana border became this alternative route meant that guerrillas were to be always present in the district. An added attraction to guerrillas was Francistown's close proximity to the border, about eighty kilometres to be precise. Given all this, it would have been folly for ZIPRA guerrillas to continue relying on the Zambian border. In fact, its war efforts would have collapsed as most of the guerrillas they had conscripted or press-ganged to join the struggle deserted as soon as they were deployed in the country.[1355] On the other hand, individuals such as Janet and her sibling could not have managed to cross the mighty Zambezi River on their own to join the struggle as they had done with the Botswana border. In addition, the Zambian border was too far for Bulilima youths to have even thought of the idea of joining the war. In this regard, the Botswana border enabled them to join the struggle in large numbers.

The joining of the liberation struggle by Bulilima youths through the Botswana border has traces of all the four theories of revolution as outlined in section 6.3. That is, there was cooperation between ZIPRA guerrillas and villagers in mobilising youths to join the struggle. This agrees with Skocpol's structure rhetoric as the guerrilla structure influenced both peasant and youth structures to cooperate in pursuit of their revolution. On the other hand, violence unleashed by guerrillas on security forces as they tried to contain insurgency activities follows Fanon's arguments that only violence can dethrone the oppressive colonial system. Added to this was the cooperation between Bulilima communities and their Botswana counterparts in facilitating the smooth movements of youths as they trekked to Francistown to join the struggle.

This is well within Cabral's imaginations of peripheral societies uniting to face the common enemy, the colonial regime. That being so, Janet and her younger sister, Samuel, Ngoni, Khanda, Bessent, Nothando, David and Daniso voluntarily and individually joined the

[1355] These were mostly Zimbabweans working and living in Zambia. The methods through which they were recruited made them bitter against the party and its guerrilla army, hence they ran away soon as they entered Rhodesia after their guerrilla training. To add salt into ZAPU guerrillas' bleeding wounds, most of these deserters joined the security forces where they were 'turned' into 'pseudo gangs'. To find more about these guerrillas, read K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. Rhodesian CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987.

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liberation struggle. Their actions were typical examples of voluntarist assumptions that emphasise on individual actors with regard to the perpetuation of revolutionary processes. In all this, the Botswana border created an enabling environment for Bulilima youths to act in tandem with the four theories of revolution as they appear herein. Having voluntarily or conveniently allowed themselves to be recruited by guerrillas, Bulilima youths found themselves either stuck in Botswana or miserably surviving in Zambian busy camps doing what they did not enlist to do. Their involvement and participation in the country's liberation struggle is analysed and interpreted below.

6.5.2 Youths who were Refugees

Once in Botswana transit cells and Zambian bush camps, Bulilima youths' participation in the liberation struggle was determined by age. In Zambia, youths were sorted according to age and sex. Male children were housed at J.Z. Camp while girls were domiciled at VC. Grown-ups were kept at various camps such as Mukushi female training facility and Mwembeshi for male guerrillas. Those that were incapacitated in one form or the other had their own camps. Adult females lived in FC while males resided at Mulungushi Camp, for example. These were adults who could not be considered for guerrilla training.

Adults were given various tasks depending on one's physical capabilities. Children were made to attend school (in fact they are the ones who constructed those structures).[1356] Generally, there were no sharp differences between male and female youth roles in bush camps. What they commonly did though separately was singing or the provision of moral support to those who were in training camps or war front. Singing inspired those who were fighting. It served as a motivational catalyst to ZIPRA guerrillas to soldier on especially as the going sometimes became unbearable.[1357] Bulilima musicians of note in Zambian bush camps were the late Solomon S'Kuza of Ntoli Village, a guerrilla retired

[1356] Interview to with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 25th September, 2016 and MaMoyo, Nyabane Village: 10th September, 2016.
[1357] Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.

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due to wounds sustained in the war front,[1358] and the famous Light Machine Gun (LMG) Choir. The LMG are well known for their tantalizing '*S'khokhele Nkomo, Sithath' iZimbabwe* (Lead us Nkomo, To wrestle Zimbabwe from colonial rule) which was a hit during the struggle years. These were Bulilima youths inspiring the Zimbabwean nation to rally behind all those fighting or whose efforts were directed at liberating the country.

Further, music through its melodious lyrics, captivating language and tantalising effects, inspired a lot of Bulilima youths to join the liberation struggle.[1359] Music provided boldness and longing for the future. This way, Bulilima youths in bush camps were used as mobilising tools by ZAPU officials. In addition, youths' singing provided a united front to the world, particularly to hard-to-please OAU and the biased FLS.[1360] Bulilima youths' participation and involvement in the struggle this way enhanced ZAPU's chances of funding and material assistance from the OAU's Liberation Committee. At personal level, however, most of the singers were disappointed as they had joined the guerrilla war solely for guerrilla training, then going back into the country as '*Obhuti*' to fight against the security forces.[1361] Continued singing was a waste of their time and fast diminishing

[1358] That Solomon S'Kuza was a guerrilla, there is no doubt; that he was a talented Kalanga Musician, evidence is abound (he released several albums such as the popular *Banolila Banabangu*/My children are crying); that he was retired due to injuries sustained in the war front, there is no proof; that rumours to that effect are all over Bulilima communities, the study confirmed.

[1359] Refer to Chapter five, section 5.2, subsection 5.2.1.

[1360] The FLS were openly biased to such an extent that those presidents deliberately sided with either of the country's two main liberation movements. President Julius Nyerere, for example, undoubtedly favoured Robert Mugabe and his ZANU movement to such an extent that he allowed his soldiers to assist ZANLA guerrillas murder unarmed ZIPRA guerrillas during their ill-fated ZIPA training programmes at Mgagao and Murogoro camps, Tanzania in 1975. M. Preston, Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed, in *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 1, (January, 2004), pp. 65 – 83. On the other hand, President Kenneth Kaunda sided with Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU party to such an extent that he ordered the arrest of all ZIPRA guerrillas in Zambia who were alleged to belong to a Shona faction that was anti-Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo. These were deported to Rhodesia where they were hanged. E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012. p. 206 and N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 25. In addition, the FLS Presidents were openly biased against the Muzorewa led faction of the African Nation Council which they regarded as a sell-out entity bent on pushing Smith's agent. To this end, they tried to influence Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana to be hostile to it as well. However, the Botswana government remained neutral, in the process attracting repeated visits from ZAPU Officials who sought to influence it to ban Muzorewa's representatives from entering Botswana. For a detailed analysis of this, see W.G. Morapedi and B.G. Gumbo, Schisms in Zimbabwean's Anti-Colonial Movements in Botswana, 1959 – 1979, in *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3, (2016). pp. 361 – 179.

[1361] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 24 and N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 104.

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energies due to permanent starvation. It only reminded them that they would not be guerrillas anytime soon, a sad reality to their egos.

Bulilima youths were also involved in the liberation struggle through teaching other refugees in bush schools. Youths such as Daniso Ngubhe and David Hlabano were instrumental in the establishment of such schools.[1362] This was in the form of curriculum formulation and construction of make-shift classrooms. These were the highlights of ZAPU's education programme envisaged for child refugees. Youths displayed the power of cooperation, unity and solidarity for a common purpose. Through ZAPU's schooling programme, youths such as Janet Kube attained the much coveted 'O' Level qualification. This achievement would not have been possible had they not joined the struggle.[1363] The education programme also assisted the party to recruit the now educated youths for ZIPRA's various technical fields. ZAPU's education programme had a two way beneficiary system. The party benefited by having at its disposal educated youths for further training overseas. Educated and trained personnel meant that the party's programmes, activities and resources were controlled by skilled and knowledgeable personnel.[1364] This made ZAPU an effective movement when it came to executing its war aims.

The last issue on common involvement of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe's struggle was their being the supply pool to ZIPRA guerrillas. Bulilima youths combined with others from the rest of the country to provide ZIPRA selectors with pools of human resources from where to select those to replenish its dwindling ZIPRA manpower resources at any given time.[1365] The majority of the youths were said to be too young to be trained as guerrillas when they arrived in Zambia. With time, these young children grew to acceptable levels where they could be trained as guerrillas. This was advantageous to the party as it no longer struggled for human resources to train as guerrillas as was the case before 1975.[1366] This also meant that youths recruited from within the bush camps were not

[1362] Interview two with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1363] P. Hayes, *et al*., *Children of History*. Harare, 1992. p. 25. See Chapter five, section 5,2 as well for details on why it would have been impossible for Janet Kube and her likes to get educated up to 'O' Level then.
[1364] A typical example here was that of Ngoni Malikongwa Dube and Daniso Ngubhe Dube.
[1365] Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1366] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 104.

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compromised by the SB, hence reliable guerrillas. They were not likely to desert as were those press-ganged during the dry years of the 1960s and early 1970s. ZIPRA became a relatively clean guerrilla army free of treacherous cadres.[1367] This had the positive effect of strengthening ZIPRA as a united army, devoid of cracks and saboteurs.

Large pools of refugees also enabled the party to fulfill its long term goals some of which were the formation of a regular or conventional army. With adequate human resources at its disposal, ZAPU managed to establish an army that was ready to defend liberated zones.[1368] The establishment of this army also meant that several hundreds of Bulilima youths' dreams of carrying a gun were fulfilled. This way, Bulilima youths helped strengthen ZAPU's two armies as sources of internal recruitments.

Conversely, being kept in refugee camps as sources of supply had its weaknesses. One such short-coming was youths' vulnerability to aerial attacks by the security forces. Youths in bush camps were not adequately protected.[1369] Whether young, old or incapacitated, bush camps' occupants needed heavy protection from trained and experienced guerrillas. In Mukushi, for example, raiders killed several tens of trainee female guerrillas and had the audacity to occupy the bombed site for two days.[1370] This illustrated a defective protection system which indirectly contributed to the demise of hundreds of prospective female trainee guerrillas. Failure by ZAPU and ZIPRA officials to sufficiently protect bush camps was in itself anti-revolutionary, hence a treasonous act to those who had sacrificed their lives and committed themselves to liberating the country. All interviewees firmly expressed their displeasure in the way they were let down by those who were supposed to provide them with sufficient protection.[1371] Expressing their anger this way was a measure of how devastating and inhumane those raids were. Human error cost hundreds of innocent lives. No doubt, one of the top ZIPRA High Command was a double agent, bent on destabilising ZAPU and ZIPRA from within.

[1367] Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1368] N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. pp. 108 and 109, and Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1369] Interview two with Nothando Msimanga, ZBS Township, Plumtree: 18th September, 2016.
[1370] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 202 and K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. The Rhodesian CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 214.
[1371] See Chapter five, section 5.2.

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The successful raids on several bush camps in Zambia by security forces reveals ZIPRA's sloppy intelligence system headed by Dumiso Dabengwa. Had the system been effective, no doubt, it would have detected security forces' reconnaissance activities around its bush camps,[1372] hence there would have been pre-emptive strategies to scuttle the large scale assaults before they occurred. With effective intelligence, ZIPRA would have been adequately prepared to repel raiders, hence limit/minimise loss of life and damage so inflicted. That the reconnaissance was carried out successfully by a lone SS agent, Chris Schutenburg,[1373] indicated lack of constant, thorough and systematic patrols of bushy areas surrounding bush camps. Had there been such thorough-going patrols, SS lone operatives would have been flushed out before doing extensive damage in as far as their supply of critical information to their handlers was concerned. ZIPRA had a defective and sloppy security system in place, a clear sign of deliberate sabotage by those in authority.

ZAPU and ZIPRA officials had no concern for the safety of thousands of refugees in bush camps. This is so when one considers their failure to take precautionary measures to safeguard youths under their custody. In short, their lackadaisical approach to ensuring proper protection and safety of defenceless refugees is to blame for their massacre and the atrocities committed by the said cross-border raiders.[1374] The sloppiness with which security matters were handled and managed by ZAPU and ZIPRA officials deprived Bulilima families of their beloved children.

On the other hand, the power, efficiency and ferocity with which the bush camps were demolished by the security forces was a clear demonstration of the Smith government's military capabilities, its strength and power. This show of force, therefore, contradicts the structuralist studies that for a revolution to occur, a state must weaken and the army become divided over what to do and its loyalty to the regime weakens as a result.[1375] This was totally opposite to the Smith regime which had all the support of its institutions ranging from the police force, air force, the army to the CIO. Its electoral constituents were solidly

[1372] H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War. Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962 – 1980*. p. 46.
[1373] *Ibid*.
[1374] J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves. Masses vs. Media in the making of Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg, 1982. p. 172.
[1375] T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Massachusetts, 1979. p. 18.

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behind the regime as well. This major dichotomy illustrates the primary weakness of Skocpol's revolutionary assumptions; her failure to deal with anti-colonial revolutions. Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle exposes yet another major defect in Skocpol's theoretical explanations of social revolutions.

Human agency played an influential role in the establishment of schools and the formulation of the curricula for primary school programmes in bush camps. As interviewees put it, individual former Rhodesian teachers volunteered to design, formulate and produce curricula to be used in primary schools.[1376] Thereafter, the same individuals oversaw the implementation of the said bush curricula to the benefit of all primary school-going children. By volunteering, these individuals expressed their personal feelings towards the helplessness of thousands of children starved of education in bush camps. This corresponds with the voluntarist thinking on the revolutionary processes. Acting on individual basis, which is in line with the voluntarist traits, individual teachers volunteered to teach fellow guerrilla hopefuls. Their voluntary undertakings were sustained by collective actions that in turn maintained the bush camp schooling system.

A similar trend was also observed in ZANU operated bush camps where individual agency was seen driving related educational programmes through curricula formulation, implementation and resource sourcing.[1377] Individual agency played a critical role in the enlightenment of the 'educationally deprived'.

While refugees toyi-toyied, sang revolutionary songs for revolutionary solidarity, and generally went about their daily misery of schooling under starvation and deprivation, youths in guerrilla training facilities underwent grueling training programmes. This was to prepare them for possibly fatal days that awaited them at the war front. Immediately after completing their training schedules, those new ZIPRA guerrillas were deployed in different provinces and districts of Rhodesia. Their involvement and participation in

[1376] There were many youthful Bulilima teachers who produced and managed curricula implementation in bush schools. Some of these were, *inter alia*, David's father, T.T. Mpofu, J.C. Moyo and S. Moyo. Interview two with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1377] F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006. pp. 203 and 204.

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waging a guerrilla war in their districts of deployment is the subject of analysis and interpretation below.

6.5.3 Bulilima Youths who were Guerrillas

In their responses to a probe on why they had joined the liberation struggle, all respondents indicated their wish to liberate their country from colonial rule as the overriding factor. It is doubtful whether most of those youths knew what was meant by '*ukukhulula ilizwe lethu*' (liberating our country) when they left their villages. Time spent suffering in bush camps, in addition to the security forces' bombardment, might have opened up their minds to the realities of '*empini*'. Lucky to be chosen to train as guerrillas, these ex-combatants listed some of their duties as guerrillas thus; fighting the Smith regime, sabotaging Rhodesia's economy through the destruction of vital economic infrastructure, coordinating guerrilla activities and movements in operational areas, guarding and protecting refugees in bush camps, patrolling forests surrounding bush camps, protecting peasants from security forces' harassments, and destroying PVs. The guerrilla range of activities, if split into specifics, were enormous.[1378] For the purposes of time and space, two major activities are analysed and interpreted.

ZIPRA guerrillas' main duty as they were infiltrated into Rhodesia was to fight and defeat the security forces, thereby ending the white minority rule in the country.[1379] The aim and purpose for this was to establish a state based on black majority rule.[1380] Given this massive role, it is imperative to make a brief analysis of Rhodesia's security forces to determine what ZIPRA guerrillas were up against as they were infiltrated into the country.

First and foremost, the security forces in Southern Rhodesia,[1381] anticipated major problems from the nationalists around 1956, hence their preparations for the eventuality

[1378] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 127.
[1379] Interview two with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016 and P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 72.
[1380] P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965 – 1980*. Marshalltown, 1982. p. 72.
[1381] The name of present day Zimbabwe before 1970 was Southern Rhodesia. In 1970, the Smith regime declared the country a republic, subsequently renaming it Rhodesia until 1978 when Smith connived with black elite politicians such as Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole to run shameful elections that were boycotted by the

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began then.[1382] The bulk of the Rhodesian forces were inherited from the Federation break up. The following composed the Rhodesian armed forces:-

- The Rhodesian Air Force (RAF)
- The Army, composed of an all-white Special Air Services (SAS); two regular infantry battalions, namely an all-white RLI; an all-black but white officered RAR; and an Armored Car Regiment.[1383] Racism existed even in the armed forces, as illustrated by this setup.

Complementing these were two Special Forces, the SS (founded in 1974) and the GS. The SS were the Army's elite long-range tracker and clandestine operations unit. They were Ken Flower's creation, hence part of the CIO's Branch Two.[1384] Due to the Rhodesian Armed Forces' involvement, participation and their constant studying of counter-insurgency strategies and tactics in Malaya, Vietnam and Kenya (Mau Mau insurrection), the SS 'pseudo-gangs' were thus very similar to Major Frank Kirtson's 'counter-gangs' created by the British Army during the Mau Mau campaign in Kenya.[1385] The SS became a major factor in the armed forces' COIN strategies and a thorn in ZIPRA guerrillas' operations and training facilities.

The GS were a mounted infantry battalion which used Boer commando tactics against guerrillas. These were divided into three 'Sabre' (combat) squadrons and proved invaluable in silent-pursuit operations and cross border raids.[1386] Collectively, all these segments of the Rhodesian forces were called the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSFs), the term that has been used consistently throughout the study to indicate actions of either

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exiled two main liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU. Muzorewa won those elections and the country became Zimbabwe – Rhodesia. In 1980, after the first multi-party democratic elections, the country changed names and became Zimbabwe.

[1382] I. Martinez, The History of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Agents during Zimbabwe's Liberation War of 1965 – 80 by Rhodesian Forces, in *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 23, No. 6, (December, 2002), pp. 1159 – 179. Accessed: 24th February, 2015.

[1383] *Ibid*.

[1384] Ken Flower was the CIO Boss reporting direct to the Prime Minister, Ian Douglass Smith only. For a detailed discussion on the operations of the CIO and the SS, consult K. Flower's *Serving Secretly. The Rhodesian CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987.

[1385] M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 1979*. Harare, 1981. p. 15.

[1386] *Ibid*.

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of these segments. BaKalanga guerrillas deployed in Rhodesia were up against these in addition to the BSAP.

The BSAP was turned into a paramilitary force when the guerrilla war began in the early 1960s. When the war intensified, two active units were created, the PSU and PATU. The purpose for which these were formed was to conduct anti-guerrilla missions.[1387] BaKalanga guerrillas faced this formidable COIN force as they made their incursions into Rhodesia, beginning from the Zambezi River where these always lay in wait.

Infiltrated to destabilise the country, ZIPRA guerrillas such as Jonathan Ngwenya and Khanda Moyo found themselves operating in Mashonaland West Province. Within their respective districts of Urungwe (now Hurungwe) and Sipolilo (Guruve), BaKalanga guerrillas found themselves destroying PVs, bridges and attacking garrisoned police camps.[1388] In addition, they cared for villagers' livestock left stranded when villagers were rounded off to PVs. When ZIPRA guerrillas destroyed PVs, they served villagers from mass confinement.[1389] ZIPRA guerrillas applied conventional wisdom to deduce that villagers were in their present predicament because of guerrilla operations in Urungwe and Sipolilo. That being so, their confinement was detrimental to ZIPRA guerrillas' cause. Guerrilla bands relied on peasants for their survival. In their absence, therefore, guerrillas were virtually grounded, hopeless and above all ineffectual and vulnerable to the security forces' firepower. They would be fighting the enemy under unrelenting danger, deprivation, loneliness, and at times the fearful onset of despair.[1390] As a liberation army, ZIPRA guerrillas were obliged to protect villagers from collective confinement by destroying the mechanisms that enslaved them.

To further assert their strength and capabilities, ZIPRA guerrillas in Urungwe and Sipolilo attacked and destroyed garrisoned police stations that harboured the security forces.[1391] This resulted in an uncomfortable situation for the security forces who had to withdraw to

[1387] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 46.
[1388] See Chapter five, section 5.2, subsection 5.2.1.
[1389] M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 – 1979*. Harare, 1981. p. 12.
[1390] B. Davidson, *The People's Cause. A History of Guerrillas in Africa*. Essex, 1981. p. 117.
[1391] Interview two with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village: 22nd September, 2016 and Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 27th September, 2016.

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more secure major towns,[1392] where they resorted to launching sporadic and half-hearted raids on communities with the view of catching guerrillas off guard. Guerrillas' destruction of garrisons and their neutralisation of the notorious PV system in Urungwe and Sipolilo Districts were a huge relief to villagers there. ZIPRA guerrillas' actions showed their concern for suffering villagers. Guerrilla bands' incessant attacks on garrisons generated semi-liberated zones. This necessitated the formation and subsequent deployment of ZIPRA's regular battalion.[1393] The establishment of semi-liberated zones meant that villagers in these two districts were relatively free from the clutches of colonial rule.

Semi-liberated zones meant that guerrillas and villagers were running their own affairs, hence semi-independent. The destruction of garrisons and PVs drove security forces away, thereby exposing all those who supported the Smith regime to guerrilla and villagers' vengeance. In recognition of the staling work of guerrillas such as Khanda, Ngoni and Jonathan in Mashonaland West, Dabengwa said, 'The reports we got from the Northern Front … were particularly encouraging to the extent that in 1979 our strategy was to send in regular units into the entire northern part of the country.'[1394] The destruction of garrisons, therefore, initiated the crumbling of Smith's rural administration.[1395] In ZIPRA *lingo*, semi-liberated areas were Green Zones where ZIPRA guerrillas had pushed the security forces away. These were areas where ZIPRA guerrillas moved freely without any fear of encountering enemy forces, areas where, even if security forces happened to be present, would not start a fight for fear of being overwhelmed by ZIPRA guerrillas.[1396] Villagers were under the direct protection of ZIPRA guerrillas there.

The collapse of rural civil administration left Urungwe and Sipolilo villagers stranded in terms of documentation of their newly born babies (birth certificates). This shows ZAPU and its guerrilla officials' lack of preparedness to complement the guerrillas' good work in

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[1392] *Ibid*.
[1393] N. Bhebe, *ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 108 and J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 to 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.
[1394] Dumiso Dabengwa in an interview with N. Bhebe, *ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 108.
[1395] N. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War. Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, 1992. p. 109.
[1396] N. Bhebe, *ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 109.

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the war front. It appears that ZAPU's War Council and ZIPRA High Command were not taking their guerrillas' achievements in the Northern Front seriously. This is evident when they kept on postponing the deployment of the regular army that would have effectively sealed the Rhodesian security forces' fate and ushered in ZAPU's new administration in Mashonaland West Province.[1397] Why ZAPU procrastinated over the deployment of its regular battalions in Mashonaland West Province boggles the mind. The movement's vacillation on this issue was at variance with its aims of completely liberating the masses from colonial rule. This exposed Nkomo and his top leadership's lack of foresight, hence questionable leadership qualities and capabilities.

There is a marked difference between ZIPRA guerrillas' operations in Urungwe and Sipolilo on one hand, and those operating in Bulilima District on the other. Those in the former were disciplined, respected and protected villagers against security forces harassment. Those in the latter, from evidence provided by the interviewees who were youths during that period, had poor operational relationships with female youths and villagers.[1398] Their actions towards locals were partly due to their being law unto themselves. They could not destroy Madlambudzi garrisoned camp which was used by the security forces as a spring-board for their attacks on villages such as Wuwana (where they razed to ashes Hlengiwe's homestead), Mbambadzi, Gonde (Tematema where Bessent experienced horrors they committed) and Ndolwane, among others. Yet, they were village champions in as far as the destruction of young girls' womanhood was concerned. Years spent confined in bush camps created monsters out of the lazy 'freedom fighters' operating in Bulilima District.

Instead of demolishing security forces installations, they opted to indulge themselves in luxuries of life thereby neglecting their duties and responsibilities for which they were deployed in the first place. Guerrillas in Bulilima District highly abused young girls with impunity yet it was a different case in Urungwe and Sipolilo. In Sipolilo where Khanda operated, for example, one Kalanga guerrilla did force himself onto a local teenage girl.

[1397] N. Bhebe, *ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 109 and J. Brickhill, Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 to 1979, in N. Bhebe and T.O. Ranger, *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London, 1995. pp. 48 – 70.

[1398] See Chapter four, section 4.2 and Chapter six, section 6.4 subsection 6.4.2 for such evidence.

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He was severely beaten by his commander and had his gun temporarily withdrawn from him for two weeks. He was made to apologise to the teenage girl's parents.[1399] This way, guerrilla commanders maintained discipline among their gang members. A highly disciplined guerrilla force meant peaceful co-existence with villagers. Peaceful co-existence meant undivided support for guerrillas by villagers.

Also, ZIPRA guerrillas' disciplined approach towards villagers should be seen from an ethnic perspective. ZIPRA guerrillas were largely Kalanga from Matabeleland region who operated in Mashonaland region dominated by Shona speaking peasants. It would have been folly for ZIPRA guerrillas to antagonise these communities. Antagonising them would have made them hostile, hence a serious threat to guerrillas' survival as they would have paid allegiance to the incumbent government. This would have created a grave situation for ZIPRA guerrillas, hence they would have found it impossible to operate in those 'foreign' districts.

On the other hand, ZIPRA guerrillas operating in Bulilima District were among their own kith and kin, hence behaved like spoilt brats. That is, it would have been difficult for BaKalanga villagers to turn their back on their own children as opposed to Urungwe and Sipolilo villagers. These would not have hesitated to revolt against the revolutionary army considering that they were alien in their districts. It should also be noted that during that time, nationalist politics was polarised on tribal lines as was exemplified by ZAPU's two splits.[1400] ZIPRA guerrillas operating in Mashonaland were bound to be more disciplined compared to those operating in their own Bulilima District.

Be that as it may, the violent destruction of garrisoned police camps by ZIPRA guerrillas in Urungwe and Sipolilo Districts corresponds to Fanon's call for a violent response to the violent colonial system. By violently dealing with those representing Smith's civil administration in Urungwe and Sipolilo, ZIPRA guerrillas were true revolutionaries in the

[1399] Interview two with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village; 22nd September, 2016.
[1400] Studies detailing ZAPU's two splits (1963 and 1970) are many. Some of these that are readily available on library shelves are, *inter alia*, E. Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Transformations in Kalanga Ndebele Societies, 1860 – 1990*. New York, 2012; N. Bhebe, *ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999; F. Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm, 2006 and N.J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe. Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980 – 1987*. Cambridge, 2003.

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eyes of Fanon. In conformity with Fanon's revolutionary thinking,[1401] the colonial system in these two districts capitulated under intense guerrilla violence that led to the end of rural traditional administration that was tailor-made to perpetuate the colonial agenda in rural areas. In addition, sustained guerrilla violence on the guard force also led to the collapse of the PV system in Urungwe and Sipolilo Districts. Their failure was an indication of the success of the revolutionary process as theorised by Frantz Fanon.

In addition, the solidarity between ZIPRA guerrillas and villagers corresponds positively with Cabral's socialist revolutionary thinking. This solidarity is clearly marked when guerrillas took it upon themselves to destroy garrisons that were sources of constant harassment for villagers. Next to fall were PVs whose destruction liberated villagers who were collectively confined in those militarised camps.[1402] Rendering PVs unsustainable in Urungwe and Sipolilo, ZIPRA guerrillas exhibited their undivided belief in the protection and freedom of villagers. Free villagers meant the continuation of the revolution.[1403] Given the above, Cabral's thought on the peripheral communities uniting to defeat the colonial system and its attendant functionaries is fulfilled here.

In all this, guerrillas such as Ngoni Malikongwa Dube played a very prominent role in the liberation of this country. Coordinating guerrilla deployments and their movements within designated areas, he established an efficient and effective machine that paralysed most of the security forces' activities and movements in the Northern Front. In addition, Ngoni's liaison role resulted in cordial relationships between guerrillas and villagers.[1404] By traveling throughout ZIPRA operated areas in the Northern Front, Ngoni sacrificed his life for the freedom of oppressed villagers.[1405] His role became critical to ZIPRA guerrillas' success as he mobilised support from villagers. It became critical in that his presence linked guerrillas with ZIPRA High Command in Zambia.

[1401] For a detailed narration of Frantz Fanon's revolutionary thoughts, use F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. London, 1963.
[1402] A.S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*. New York, 2014. p. 167.
[1403] Interview two with Khanda Moyo, Ngwana Village: 3rd September, 2016 and Jonathan Ngwenya, Malalume Village: 10th September, 2016.
[1404] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1405] Consult Chapter five for a detailed discussion of Ngoni's roles and responsibilities and the areas he covered on his field trips as ZIPRA coordinating official.

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The effect was that guerrillas felt important as they recognised that their superiors were constantly checking on them. To an ordinary guerrilla operative, Ngoni's checking on them amounted to their superiors caring for them, acknowledging the tremendous job they were doing in the war front. This indicated their appreciation of what guerrillas were doing in war zones. As such, the Northern Front was a highly successful ZIPRA front.[1406] Ngoni's role is an illustration of individual agency in the pursuit of a revolution. His wish, zeal and commitment not to abandon the struggle even if his lone travels sometimes offered such opportunities and temptations reflect traces of the voluntarist assumptions on the important roles played by individual actors in a revolution.[1407]

To voluntarists, it is individual commitments such as shown by Ngoni that define and win revolutions.[1408] Ngoni's commitment to the revolution was obvious when he travelled throughout Mashonaland West, Midlands and Matabeleland North regions coordinating and drumming up support for ZIPRA among peasants. Voluntarist thinking was influential in Ngoni's participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle as it did to others as well.

While Ngoni's coordinating skills and abilities rejuvenated guerrillas' fighting spirits, hence the destruction of garrisons and PVs, those not deployed in the war front were given duties such as guarding bush camps and to patrol bushy areas around those camps.[1409] Most of those given the task of guarding or protecting refugees were mostly female guerrillas and a few male ones such as Bessent Zapu Gumbo. As has been discussed, female guerrillas were made camp guards to deny them the opportunity to fight in the war front. ZIPRA guerrillas' attitude was typical of the Zimbabwean traditional system that thrived on male dominance over women. This is visible from the following extract,

> I remember once the issue of the 'role of women after independence' was the topic. Comrade Makhokhoba's (J.Z. Moyo's nickname) contribution was that women

[1406] N. Bhebe, *ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*. Gweru, 1999. p. 108.
[1407] Interview with Ngoni Malikongwa Dube, Tokwana Village: 25th September, 2016.
[1408] Refer to section 6.2, subsection 6.2.3 of this Chapter on Voluntarist theories of revolution.
[1409] For a detailed explanation of such guerrilla roles consult Chapter five, section 5.2, and subsection 5.2.2.

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> would be part of the industrial workforce. There were a few protesting voices to J.Z.'s contribution.[1410]

If men who were in position of power and authority within ZAPU and ZIPRA structures had such thoughts about women, then the promotion of female ZIPRA cadres was doomed. The above text is an example of the male mentality within ZIPRA structures where they believed that women guerrillas were best suited for homely roles, hence their confinement in bush camps supposedly guarding female refugees.

Be that as it may, female guerrillas diligently performed their duties without protesting publicly. This was particularly realised when the Mukushi training facility was bombed. 'A proportion of those killed in Mukushi were women under military training who gave a fair account of themselves,'[1411] wrote Ken Flower in apparent reference to women guards who fought hard in defence of their camp. This implies that when it came to a battle, female guerrillas such as Nothando were equally as capable as males. After all, they were products of the same system. Seen this way, female guerrillas' lack of deployment in the war front undermined their fighting capabilities. Their capabilities in the war front were in doubt hence the feeling in ZIPRA High Command that female fighters were likely to bring embarrassment to the organisation if deployed.[1412] This underpinned the patriarchal attitude of male cadres within ZIPRA structures.

Also worthy of note is that those deployed to guard refugees were ill-equipped to deal with the aerial firepower of the security forces. They were armed with standard rifles such as the Avtomat-Kalashnikova, commonly known as AK 47.[1413] Such assault rifles were no match for helicopters and high speed jet fighters as they were meant for human targets only. Choppers and jet fighters needed anti-air guns and rocket launchers. This weakness was exposed when the security forces landed in Mukushi training facility, JZ and VC bush camps. Poorly armed and starving, guerrilla-turned-guards could do nothing but watch in

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[1410] A. Mazinyane, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo: Father of the revolution, in the *Sunday News*. Bulawayo, August 17, 2014. p. 8.
[1411] K. Flower, *Serving Secretly. The Rhodesian CIO Chief on Record*. Johannesburg, 1987. p. 214.
[1412] For an understanding of how this feeling alluded to here manifested itself within ZIPRA's High Command, see A. Mazinyane, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo: Father of the revolution, in the *Sunday News*. Bulawayo, August 17, 2014. p. 8.
[1413] J.R.T Wood, *The War Diaries of Andre' Dennison*. Gibraltar, 1989. p. 42.

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hiding when the properly armed and prepared security forces ravaged, rummaged and ransacked and bomb shredded tents in search of vital documents. The enemy did this after having massacred several tens of guerrillas-awaiting-training and school-going children. It was only after the first of such massacres that ZIPRA High Command improved their security set-up in bush camps.[1414] This became a case of 'too little, too late' for those injured, and those who lost their limbs, and particularly the dead.

Based on the fact that all female guerrillas were not deployed inside Rhodesia, in addition to being poorly armed to guard refugees, it is fair to say that female guerrillas were given a raw deal by their superiors. Revolutions are processes that create uncertainties, surprises, making them certainly unpredictable event-wise. This is in view of situations such as ZIPRA female guerrillas faced after graduating from training facilities. Hoping to be infiltrated into the country to help liberate the masses, female guerrillas found themselves care-givers to multitudes of malnourished-home-sick children. Theories of revolution seem unable to unlock the jig-saw puzzle that characterised female guerrillas' lack of deployment in Rhodesia to fight side by side with their male counter-parts.

This underlines their inadequacies to fully explain anti-colonial revolutions that engulfed Africa in the second half of the twentieth-century. This is more evident when one considers these theories' failures to address finer but salient revolutionary issues such as faced by ZIPRA female guerrillas in Zambian bush camps. This becomes even more salient when one considers that such finer details nearly led to the defeat of the revolutionary movement (ZAPU) due to human technical errors. Some of these errors were over-looking the need to put in place a perfectly and suitably armed guarding system to protect, defend and repel any form of attack, be it aerial or otherwise. While this study did not expect spectacular responses from interviewees, it is hoped that Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the country's liberation struggle will be appreciated. The following section brings this Chapter to its end.

[1414] Interview two with David Hlabano, Mangubo Village: 25th September, 2016.

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6.6. Conclusion

Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was characterised by scandalous acts both in rural Bulilima and bush camps in Zambia. But before the onset of these public embarrassments from the mid-1970s onwards, there was a vacuous period, from 1960 to around 1974 where Bulilima youths' influence in the struggle was centred on the elite. This is the period this study calls a 'crisis phase'.

The 'scandalous phase' dominated Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the struggle. In Bulilima District, guerrillas' use of the Botswana border created a favourable environment for male youths to exhibit inhumane tendencies and traits as they took over control of rural life. The war established three sets of dichotomous structures – the male youths aligned to and coddled by ZIPRA guerrillas, at the exclusion of female youths; the peasant villagers that were abused by guerrillas and their youths; and the petty-bourgeoisie class that was hated by guerrillas and their youths.

The guerrilla war exposed ZAPU War Council and ZIPRA High Command's inefficiencies in dealing with revolutionary issues in a progressive manner. This was clearly marked in the way Bulilima guerrillas operating in Urungwe and Sipolilo fought the war compared to those who lazed in Bulilima District. Despite all these shortcomings, Bulilima youths were heavily involved and participated in the country's liberation struggle.

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CHAPTER SEVEN: FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS

7.1 Introduction

This study described and explained how and to what extent Bulilima youths were involved and participated in Zimbabwe liberation struggle is. In order to determine the extent to which Bulilima youths were involved and participated in the liberation struggle, the study was guided by the main research question and its subsidiary ones in conjunction with its objectives. As the Zimbabwe Revolution involved thousands of Bulilima youths, it was imperative for this study to deal with their involvement and participation in two categories. These were youths who remained at home and those who were either in Botswana or Zambia. Reciting their lived experiences as peasant youths in the service of ZIPRA guerrilla operatives in Bulilima District, former Bulilima youths provided deep insights into their involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation war.

Those who were refugees had different experiences from those who had remained at home. Their involvement and participation in the country's liberation struggle was quite different from those who were at home. Equally different from the two above were the experiences of those fighting on the war front. As much as there were such marked differences, Bulilima youths participated in liberating the country. The extent of their involvement and participation is presented below as study findings.

7.2 The Study's Findings

Following data discussed in Chapters four and five, and data analysed and interpreted in Chapter six, the study found that the Botswana border was central in Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Based on Chapters four, five and six, it is clear that Bulilima youths' participation in the country's guerrilla war was quite different. This necessitated the presentation of the study findings in the following

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two main categories; youths who were at home, and youths who had joined the struggle. The findings were informed by the study objectives and their corresponding subsidiary research questions as illustrated below.

7.2.1 Youths who were at Home

i) Objective one and subsidiary question one[1415]

The study revealed that Bulilima youths who remained at home were drawn into the war by the massive presence of ZIPRA guerrillas. ZIPRA guerrillas' presence in large numbers was itself a manifestation of the border's easy accessibility. In this way, Bulilima District became a strategic point of entry and exit in and out of the country for them. The use of Bulilima District as a strategic crossing point into and out of Rhodesia by ZIPRA guerrillas contributed heavily towards Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. The use of the district in this way led to the continued availability of guerrillas in Bulilima. The study discovered that guerrilla availability in the district called for youths' assistance since guerrillas could not survive without peasant support for their logistical needs and wants. Guerrillas needed food in their stomachs, they needed shelter over their heads.

In addition, the study revealed, guerrillas deployed in the inland districts such as Mzingwane, Insiza and Bubi, among many, used Bulilima district as a transit zone. As they made stop-overs in Bulilima, they required youths' services. Rendering such services indicated how guerrillas' use of the district contributed to Bulilima youths' participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war. Further, guerrillas launched their sporadic attacks on the security forces from bases along the border. The border was their safe haven as they could easily slip into Botswana when under heavy attack from the security forces. This meant large guerrilla concentrations in communities such as Nswazwi, Malalume, Malopa, Mangubo, Hingwe, Bambadzi, Mbimba, Jutshume and Dombodema. These guerrilla operatives relied entirely on youths for their upkeep and survival.

[1415] Check with Chapter one, sections 1.5 and 1.6 for study's objectives and subsidiary questions.

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It was apparent from Chapter four that guerrillas used Bulilima District as a gateway facility for their injured comrades on their way to Botswana for medical treatment. Bulilima youths were used by guerrillas to transport these to their destination across the border. This way, the use of the district by guerrillas as a strategic exit point for their wounded comrades contributed to Bulilima youths' involvement in the country's struggle. Worse for Bulilima youths, guerrillas' large presence in the district attracted intensive counter-insurgency operations. Youths found themselves 'always monitoring' the 'situation' (*behlala betsheka umumo*) on behalf of '*Obhuti*'/brothers (guerrillas as they were affectionately called by youths).

ii) Objective two and subsidiary question two

In the context of these two, the study noticed that guerrillas' use of Bulilima District for their insurgency activities was openly welcomed by Bulilima's male youths. Guerrillas' presence in the district was influential in youths' involvement and participation in the country's liberation struggle. That is, Bulilima male youths admired youthful guerrillas cradling guns. Guerrillas became youths' mentors in sabotage activities, sometimes even training them on how to use small firearms and plant landmines. In turn, male youths idolised guerrillas. This directly influenced youths to partake in guerrilla activities against the Rhodesian security forces as ersatz guerrillas.

Further, the study uncovered that guerrillas pampered male youths to the exclusion of female ones. They made male youths their closest friends in a hostile war environment. This encouraged youths such as David Hlabano, Lungisani Moyo and Cosmas Ncube to work extra hard in order not to disappoint their role models. In addition, the study unearthed that guerrillas introduced a new culture of identity among Bulilima youths. This was the culture of *ubuhlalo* (small multi-coloured beautiful beads). *Ubuhlalo* became a symbol of identity in the district where youths identified themselves with guerrillas. In this way, youths were heavily influenced to be part of guerrilla life.

Guerrillas from time to time required replenishing their arms and ammunition. Youths were thus periodically called upon to smuggle guerrilla consignments into Rhodesia from

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Botswana. Carrying and handling arms of war was influential in Bulilima youths' involvement in the country's guerrilla war. In addition, guerrillas made youths keep some of their excess arms and ammunition at home. In this way, youths saw themselves as guerrillas in their own right.

On the other hand, the study observed that security forces indirectly influenced youths' participation in the struggle by their use of excessive force. Searching for the elusive guerrillas, security forces beat up youths and villagers, hence their allegiance to guerrillas.

iii) Objective three and subsidiary question three

Here, the study identified the nature of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the liberation struggle as being guerrillas' eyes and ears. This meant that youths checked, observed and gathered information about the whereabouts of security forces, 'sell-outs' and anyone who could be a threat to their '*Obhuti*'. Youths were also guerrillas' spies, spying on security forces' activities in Plumtree town and Madlambudzi garrisoned camp. Youths were further involved and participated in the liberation struggle through 'terroristic' activities such as planting mines on roads that constantly blew up army trucks in Bulilima communities. Youths' involvement this way attracted retributive measures from the security forces who responded by burning villages where their trucks had been blown up.

Female youths had additional roles to those they did with their male counterparts. They cooked, washed and ironed guerrilla clothes and provided them with warm bathing water. Worse more, guerrillas forced them to be their unofficial 'wives'. That is, female youths were always guerrillas' bed mates each time guerrillas were around their communities.

iv) Objective four and subsidiary question four

In view of this objective and the related question, the study found that male youths became emotionally and personally attached to guerrillas. Taking advantage of the chaotic situation created by the war, youths became law unto themselves. They rebelled against the traditional governance system in Bulilima communities, rebuking parental

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authority in the name of '*Obhuti*'. Guerrillas became the epicentre of Bulilima youths' power, authority and influence. With such backing, youths became disloyal to parents and community elders. Youths enforced their authority over villagers through falsely accusing them of being 'witches' and 'sell-outs'. Youths indirectly controlled villagers' movements, monitoring every move they made. Villagers lived in constant fear, anger, anguish and utter disbelief over their children's wild behaviour. In all this, guerrillas were behind youths. While youths at home were brutalising their parents, those in Botswana and Zambia were home-sick. The subsection that follows presents what the study found out about youths in Botswana and Zambia's participation in the country's liberation struggle.

7.2.2 Youths who had joined the struggle in Botswana and Zambia

i) Objective one and secondary question one

The study noticed that youths' involvement and participation in the country's guerrilla war was a direct result of guerrilla recruitment while a few were indirectly influenced by guerrillas. Guerrillas abducted youths from Mission schools. They also recruited thousands of Bulilima youths to train as guerrillas in Zambia. In this way, guerrillas' use of the district as their recruitment zone directly contributed to Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

ii) Objective two and secondary question two

The study observed that for recruitment purposes, guerrillas used the Botswana border to enter Bulilima District. Once in the district, they propagated propaganda information that indoctrinated youths. This influenced youths such as David Hlabano, Daniso Ngubhe Dube and MaMoyo to join the guerrilla war in Zambia voluntarily.

The study also unearthed the issue of ZIPRA's heavy presence in Bulilima and its subversive activities that drew the unwelcome presence of the security forces. This was immediately after the introduction of 'Operation Tangent' to counter insurgency activities in the district. The untenable situation that obtained influenced youths such as Samuel,

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Janet and her sibling, Khanda and Bessent to trek to Botswana on their way to Zambia for war purposes. Some of them were trained as guerrillas once in Zambia.

iii) Objective three and secondary question three

The study identified the following as the nature of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the country's liberation struggle. Those languishing in Botswana transit camps and those in Zambian bushy ones toyi-toyied and sang a lot. Their participation in the struggle in this way was a moral boosting endeavour meant to raise the spirits of those in the war front. It was the silent voices of the oppressed that these youths expressed in their contribution to liberate Zimbabwe. This was meant to unite and solidify refugees' spirit in the face of mounting problems in bush camps. Others such as David and Daniso formulated, designed, produced and implemented curricula for schools in bush camps. Youths in camps also embarked on self-help projects to support ZAPU's war efforts.

For those who were trained but not deployed in the war front such as female guerrillas, the study revealed that they were made to guard bush camps. They also patrolled bushy areas surrounding bush camps in search of commandos. In the war front, the study noticed that the nature of guerrillas' involvement and participation differed from those who were in bush camps. That is, guerrillas recruited youths to join the struggle. They also directly engaged with the security forces in countless battles. They blew up bridges, fuel storage tanks in Salisbury (Harare), downed civilian aeroplanes and, attacked and destroyed garrisoned camps and PVs.

In addition, guerrillas operating in Urungwe and Sipolilo looked after villagers' livestock when the security forces had rounded up villagers and taken them to militarised PV camps. The destruction of garrisoned camps and PVs saved villagers from unnecessary detentions and mass confinements. This liberated villagers from systematic enslavement by authorities. The study also found out that top commanders such as Ngoni Malikongwa Dube constantly visited ZIPRA guerrillas' operational areas in the Northern Front. This was to coordinate guerrilla operations and at the same time drumming up support and cooperation from the rural masses on behalf of ZIPRA guerrillas.

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iv) Objective four and secondary question four

With regard to guerrilla-villager relationships, the study noted that guerrillas who operated in Urungwe, Sipolilo and Gokwe had sound relationships with villagers. Former guerrillas interviewed admitted that they were fed by villagers whatever food they could provide. These guerrillas were not choosey. They did not demand food beyond villagers' capabilities to organise. This created a level of understanding between these two revolutionary structures. In addition, Bulilima guerrillas operating in Urungwe and Sipolilo enhanced their good relationship with villagers by herding their animals during the PV crisis. Peasants were very happy when they discovered that their livestock were cared for upon their return after guerrillas had destroyed PVs.

On the other hand, guerrillas operating in Bulilima District had a very bad relationship with villagers who they systematically harassed through youths. The study established that guerrillas in Bulilima abused their power and authority, falsely accusing villagers of unfounded crimes against them. Youths worsened the situation by beating villagers for any minor suspicion of crossing guerrillas. Guerrillas, as the ultimate authority in Bulilima communities in the absence of formal administrative structures, failed to bring youths to order over their misdemeanour. This created animosity between guerrillas and villagers. The study uncovered a situation where guerrillas in Bulilima were always suspicious of villagers. They then used youths to intimidate and cow villagers into submission.

The study also discovered a scenario where married youthful women ganged up with guerrillas to brutalise their in-laws. This created animosity between villagers and their youthful daughters-in-law that mostly ended with the death of the former. Bulilima villagers lived in constant fear of guerrillas, youths and their daughters-in-law. These were the study's major findings in relation to its objectives and subsidiary questions. With regard to the main research question (see Chapter one, section 1.6), the study determined that Bulilima youths were heavily involved and participated fully in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. They did so under varied and diverse circumstances though. Whether as youths at home, refugees in bush camps or guerrillas in the war front, Bulilima youths' involvement and participation was on full-time basis. Their lives were entirely spent pursuing revolution related activities until the ceasefire in December 1979. In short,

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Bulilima youths were one hundred percent involved in the country's liberation struggle. This way, the study has adequately addressed issues pertaining to its main research question, subsidiary ones and its objectives. The following section concludes the study.

7.3 Study Conclusion

Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was a phenomenon that presented multiple problems to Bulilima youths and villagers. Generally, Bulilima youths' problems emanated from their involvement and participation in the liberation struggle either at home, in bush camps or in the war front as guerrilla fighters. Due to their association with ZAPU as a liberation movement and guerrillas as insurgents, while others were insurgents themselves, Bulilima youths automatically became the state's enemy. Hardest hit by the country's liberation war were Bulilima villagers. They lived traumatised years without knowing anything about their children's well-being in Botswana and Zambia. The war emotionally traumatised them as they lived in hope of the safe return of their children after the war. Their agony was exacerbated by the fact that nobody knew when the war would end. In addition, rumours flew that their children were dying like flies in Zambia due to Smith's aerial bombardment of bush camps.

Bulilima District, due to its polygamous nature, had several households whose children crossed the Botswana border to join the liberation struggle. On average, each household had three to four children joining the war in Botswana and Zambia. In some unlucky households, for example, all children were made to join the war by guerrillas. Unfortunately for some of these households, for instance, *konaka* Ndofa of Mbila area, all her three children died in Zambia when the camps were attacked.[1416] The war was tragic to Bulilima families and horrendous to youths in bush camps.

The massive uprooting of Bulilima youths to join the struggle was not a matter of the district being more special than others. Bulilima was a district that became a victim of the Smith regime's racially induced laws that made travelling for youths very difficult. That is,

[1416] Interview two with Nana Nkomo, Mbila Village: 5th September, 2016.

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various pass laws controlled the movement of Africans,[1417] particularly youths from inland districts. Youths were confined to their districts, hence could not travel to Bulilima District easily as there were roadblocks everywhere. These deterred and curtailed youths' movements as they were apprehended each time they were caught travelling to border districts. In light of this, ZIPRA guerrillas had no option but to clean Bulilima of its youths.

Another problem that confronted Bulilima youths and villagers was the issue of landscape. This was so particularly in winter when trees lost their leaves and tall grasses were reduced drastically, thus exposing youths and guerrillas as they tried to hide from the security forces. Bulilima is an open grassland district, hence guerrillas were open to observation from air.[1418] As such, guerrilla presence in the communities could be easily established from the air, posing danger to youths and villagers. The problem with security forces was the collective punishment they meted out to whole villages suspected of harbouring 'terrorists'.

As much as ZAPU officials in Bulilima might have played a major role in making Bulilima youths turn their backs on the Smith regime, the overriding factor was the security forces' brutality on rural civilians. This pushed youths to join the liberation struggle in Zambia. To those who had crossed borders, the struggle presented massive challenges most of which became matters of life and death. For those in bush camps, challenges so experienced ranged from the appalling living conditions, chronic starvations to vulnerability to aerial attacks. These manifested themselves in the form of diseases such as cholera, dysentery, kwashiorkor, malnutritioned children and countless dead bodies after each aerial bombings.

On a lighter note, joining the liberation struggle in Zambia empowered quite a lot of Bulilima youths. Some of them acquired High School qualifications they later used to enroll in Zimbabwe's institutions of Higher Learning. Such life-long benefits are exemplified, *inter alia*, by David Hlabano (teacher), Daniso Ngubhe Dube (Head-teacher/Principal), Bessent Zapu Gumbo (Head-teacher/Principal), Janet Kube (retired

[1417] I. Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953 – 1980*. London, 1984. p. 17.
[1418] L.H. Gann and T.H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Battle in the Bush*. New York, 1981. p. 103.

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teacher due to ill-health) and a lot of professors working either at home, South African or overseas universities.

For those who were guerrillas, their involvement and participation in the country's liberation struggle had glaring discrepancies. Those who operated in the Northern Front were an epitome of ZIPRA's achievement as they liberated villagers from security forces bondage. Those who operated in the Southern Front, particularly Bulilima District, were an embodiment of a failed guerrilla war in as far as the protection of villagers was concerned. Instead, the guerrilla war corrupted youths, turned them into monsters and destroyed the most revered traditional Kalanga institution, the family.

One obvious contradiction of Zimbabwe's guerrilla war was the failure by the security forces to establish PVs in Bulilima District. Most probably this was due to ZIPRA guerrillas' aggressive, efficient and effective fighting strategies that revolved around the use of youths. Given this, the force created to guard PVs (the Guard Force – GF), and later the DAs were no match for ZIPRA guerrillas. As a result, it was pointless for the authorities to create PVs that would be easily destroyed as was the case in Urungwe and Sipolilo.

On the other hand, non-erection of PVs in Bulilima District should be understood from ZIPRA guerrillas' attitude on matters concerning peasant mobilisation. That this guerrilla army had a negative attitude towards its involvement in this regard might have influenced authorities to employ a 'wait and see' attitude before rolling out the PV system. This in itself was the result of the regime's stretched human resources. Added to this were ZIPRA guerrillas' systematic attacks on farms that forced authorities to prioritise farm protections.

The guerrilla war depleted both Bulilima District's human and material resources. Thousands of Bulilima children died during this war at the hands of security forces at home, as guerrillas in the war front and in bush camps. Materially, guerrillas exhausted Bulilima villagers' food reserves, cattle, goats and chickens. In addition, villagers' extra financial resources were wiped clean in their endeavours to meet guerrilla requirements and demands such as clothing and cigarettes. In all this, guerrillas were the beneficiaries while youths were the mobilisers and villagers the providers. Zimbabwe's liberation struggle exerted enormous pressure on Bulilima youths either at home or in the war front

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to act irrationally. That said, the liberation struggle practically drew Bulilima youths into active participation. In all this, the Botswana border played a central role, aided by Batswana Kalangas. The involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in the struggle had its own controversies some of which are outside the scope of this study. That being so, the most glaring issues were addressed as either recommendations or suggestions for future research. These two sections follow below.

7.4 Recommendations

Studies on the involvement and participation of youths in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, particularly those on Bulilima must also involve youths who did so on the side of the Smith regime. This should be so in view of the fact that youths' involvement and participation in this revolution was circumstantial. Thus, to fully understand and appreciate Bulilima youths' contributions and sacrifices during the struggle, all sides to the conflict must be given an opportunity to voice their lived war experiences.

The study also recommends that similar studies should also deal with both material and financial cost of the war to villagers. Villagers sacrificed all they had to feed guerrillas over a period of eight years in ZANLA operated areas and five years for ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulilima District. Added to this was the callous destruction of villagers' livestock by security forces on suspicions of harbouring, feeding and supporting guerrillas. BaKalanga villagers fed hundreds of guerrillas nonstop, in addition to clothing them, providing them with cigarettes as well as tinned foods. This, on the backdrop of poverty and deprivation.

Another important issue that requires urgent attention is the human cost of the Zimbabwean revolution to Bulilima youths. As the district that was hardest hit by guerrilla recruitments in Matabeleland region, it had the highest number of refugees in Zambia and guerrillas in the war front. It also had the highest number of youths lost during the security forces' aerial attacks on bush camps and those who died in the war front. Studies to quantify Bulilima youths who lost their lives during the struggle would go a long way in determining the impact of the guerrilla war on human life.

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It is further recommended that studies on Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war should also focus on the impact of the war on neighbouring Batswana Kalanga communities as they were also brutalised by the security forces. This should be done urgently as people who experienced that war through assisting Bulilima youths and ZIPRA guerrillas age and die, leaving behind no written records for future use. Their death would mean loss of a vital piece in Zimbabwe liberation struggle's jigsaw puzzle in as far as Bulilima youths' involvement and participation is concerned. In addition, studies that deal with the destructive impact of the war on rural marriages in Bulilima District should be done to assess the damage caused by married youthful women's 'infidelity'. Married women's 'promiscuity' spread sexually transmitted diseases among guerrillas and other women. This impacted negatively on their marriages when their husbands came home unannounced. Further investigations along these lines would definitely highlight some of the liberation struggle's questionable 'imperatives'. As an extension of the above, there need to be investigations on children born out of such illicit relationships. These are a stand-alone social group in Bulilima District. Studies on how society treats them, how they fit in within family establishments, and how they regard themselves in relation to the established family order must be done.

Last but not in any way the least, the study recommends that studies on guerrilla attacks on white civilian farmers in Bulilima should be conducted as well. This is in view of the fact that guerrillas killed a lot of these farmers. Commercial farmers were the backbone of Rhodesia's economy. Disrupting farming activities had a negative impact on the country's economy particularly when viewed against the backdrop of economic sanctions imposed on the country by the UN led by Britain. A study on this theme would go a long way in determining guerrillas' effectiveness in forcing the Smith regime to negotiate.

These are generalised observations on some of the issues that need to be addressed if there is to be a wholesome picture regarding Zimbabwe guerrilla war's impact on the district. There are, however, specific suggestions that pertain to this study that should be done for it to be truly reflective of Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in the country's guerrilla war. These study-specific observations are presented below.

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7.5. Suggestions for the study's future improvement

The study observed that it has mainly and largely presented a one-sided story to Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. That being so, there is no doubt some of the information discussed, analysed and interpreted herein is subjective but valid. We have only heard the former youths' voices, particularly on thorny issues such as raised by female youths.

There are no former guerrilla voices to answer for themselves to the allegations leveled against them. This is a serious omission on the part of this study. Considered in the context of a balanced, fair and objective study, the following suggestions are to be done to improve this study in future;

- The study should incorporate guerrillas who operated in Bulilima District to hear their side of the story since they face serious and credential damaging allegations from former Bulilima female youths. In addition, what their colleagues who operated in Urungwe and Sipolilo said about their operations further erodes what little respect those in Bulilima had left after being accused by former Bulilima female youths.
- Bulilima youths accused the security forces of genocide in the district. Literature also accuse them of similar crimes against humanity. It is high time these are afforded a similar platform to tell their lived experiences while operating in Bulilima. This study inferred from secondary sources who had also inferred from similar sources for their studies. Including former security forces' personal views and experiences would, therefore, go a long way in bringing balance to this study.
- Youths brought to this study's attention misery and suffering they experienced while in bush camps. This was their side of the story. There is an urgent need to get other stories as told by those who controlled bush camps to understand the difficulties they faced and experienced as they battled to bring sanity to such camps. It should be understood that ZAPU and ZIPRA faced serious logistical needs in foreign lands. We

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need to hear how these leaders coped with such situations on a daily basis under a war-charged environment.

- There is also a need to clarify salient issues such as the failure by Bulilima authorities to implement PVs in Bulilima District. The failure to do so has led to speculations by this study, an unhealthy way to deal with salient aspects of an important study such as this one.

As much as the above observations reflect this study's short-comings, it is important to note that the study has fulfilled its aim and objectives. It has determined the extent to which the use of Bulilima District by ZIPRA guerrillas as a strategic entry and exit point into and out of Rhodesia contributed to and influenced Bulilima youths' involvement and participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. The above suggestions are thus a testament to this, hence the importance of this study as a step for future similar studies.

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Ncube Hlengiwe:

5th October, 2015

Ndlovu Koziba:

9th December, 2015

Nkobi Shadreck:

31st March, 2016 and

11th September, 2016

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Nkomo Nana:

24th June, 2015;

26th March, 2016 and

4th September, 2016

Sibanda Khuli Mathulela:

2nd January, 2016

Siqhoza Nhlanhla:

23rd March, 2016 and

20th September, 2016

Zaba Melusi:

21st May, 2015 and

4th September, 2016

Zaba Sithokozile:

1st March, 2016

INTERVIEWS: YOUTHS WHO HAD JOINED THE STRUGGLE

Dube Daniso Ngubhe:

23rd October, 2015.

Dube Ngoni Malikongwa:

28th March, 2016 and

25th September, 2016

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Gumpo Bessent Zapu:

28th March, 2016

Hlabano David:

20th March, 2016 and

25th September, 2016

Khupe Thulile:

2nd August, 2015

Kube Janet:

3rd February, 2015

MaMoyo:

27th April, 2015

Matiwaza Melitha:

28th June, 2016

Mkhwebu Lizwe:

24th March, 2016

Mlalazi Basikana:

5th September, 2015

Moyo Khanda:

27th August, 2016 and

3rd September, 2016

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Moyo Samuel:

6th May, 2016 and

10th September, 2016

Msimanga Nothando:

6th May, 2016 and

18th September, 2016

Na Buhe:

15th April, 2015

Ncube Manka:

19th January, 2016

Ndlovu Mabula:

7th July, 2015

Ndlovu Moketsi:

6th May, 2016

Ndlovu Ntogwa:

27th February, 2015

Ngwenya Jonathan:

31st March, 2015 and

10th September, 2016

Tshuma Sibongile:

22nd July, 2015

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INTERVIEWS: FORMER BULILIMA YOUTHS WHO WERE GUERRILLA OPERATIVES IN BULILIMA DISTRICT

Dube Thembani:

7th February, 2016 and

7th September, 2016

Hlabangana Hloniphani:

21st September, 2015

Mlilo Melusi:

3rd November, 2015

Ndebele George:

9th October, 2015 and

7th September, 2016

Tshuma Kolema:

5th August, 2016

15th September, 2016

INTERVIEWS: ELDERLY BULILIMA VILLAGERS WHO PROVIDED MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Gogo Na Sudze Moyo:

18th December, 2015

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Gogo Na Happy Ncube:

23rd February, 2016

Gogo Na Nkosana:

27th August, 2016

Khulu Solomon Hikwa:

29th December, 2015.

Khulu Mathanda Ndlovu:

13th May, 2016

Khulu Sa Mosi Ndlovu:

28 August, 2016

Khulu Sa Madodana:

9th February, 2015

Mkandla Senzeni:

13th February, 2016

Mrs. Angelina Ngwenya:

17th July, 2015

Nkomo Sipho:

11th May, 2015

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NATIONAL ARCIVES OF ZIMBABWE: BULAWAYO AND HARARE

NAZ S2806/1/8, Harare. Bulilima District:- Land Husbandry Act.

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Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1960. Government Printers, Salisbury (Harare), 1961.

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28th July, 1977

2nd July, 1977

16th July, 1977

25th May, 1978

26th June, 1978

The Sunday News: Bulawayo

17th August, 2014

Sunday Times: Johannesburg

12th June, 2016

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APPENDEX 1

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ONE

YOUTH WHO WERE AT HOME DURING THE ZIMBABWE GUERRILLA WAR, 1960 – 1980

1. What is your name, where and when were you born?
2. Where were you during Zimbabwe's guerrilla war?
3. Which guerrillas were operating in Bulilima District during the war?
4. How did those guerrillas enter Zimbabwe during that time?
5. How often guerrillas were present in your area and where did they come from?
6. Tell us about your involvement in the struggle, how did you become involved?
7. What did you do that make you feel you were involved in the struggle?
8. What made you get involved in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe?
9. Why did you do what you did during the guerrilla war?
10. Who made you to help in the struggle?
11. List the things that you did as youth during the war?
12. Did your parents or other elders like what you did, if not how did they show this?
13. List the things that you did to either help guerrillas or soldiers?
14. What happened to those who supported guerrillas and those who supported soldiers?
15. How did you support guerrillas or soldiers?
16. What type of help did guerrillas ask from youth, what about soldiers?
17. Were guerrillas always present in your area? What support did you give to them?
18. Tell me about the Botswana border, was it helpful to you as a youth? How so?
19. How was the border used by ZIPRA guerrillas?
20. Were there any soldiers operating in your area during the struggle?
21. How did they treat you and older people?
22. What about guerrillas? How did they treat you?
23. What did the guerrillas teach you to do if you see soldiers?
24. List all the security forces that came to your area during the war, e.g. D As, Selous Scouts.

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25. What were they doing and how did you recognize them from guerrillas?
26. Why do you think guerrillas or soldiers always came to your place?
27. What did you do when a fight broke out between guerrillas and soldiers?
28. Please, tell us what you feel youth in your area did to show that they were involved and participated in the war and all what you believe made them get involved and participated.

Sir/madam, thank you so much for your time. If ever there is anything that we believe you need to further clarify here we will definitely come back.

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APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE TWO

YOUTH DURING THE STRUGGLE IN BOTSWANA, ZAMBIA AND ELSEWHERE 1960 - 1980

1. What is your name, when and where were you born?
2. Did you join the liberation struggle in Botswana, Zambia or elsewhere?
3. What made you join the liberation struggle?
4. How did you go to Botswana, Zambia, how did the Botswana border influence you here?
5. When in Botswana, Zambia what did you do?
6. How were you treated by ZAPU officials while in refugee or training camps?
7. Did you train as a guerrilla, if so where and how?
8. Where were you deployed after your training and what were your specific duties?
9. If you did not train as a guerrilla what were your specific duties as in the refugee camps?
10. How did you relate with locals where you were deployed as a guerrilla?
11. Where and how did you cross back into Rhodesia to your deployment area?
12. What can you say about the involvement and participation of youth in the struggle?
13. Why did you join the liberation struggle and what did youth do in refugee camps?
14. How did youth in refugee camps participate in the liberation struggle?
15. Were you in camp when they were bombed, if so what did u do?
16. What was the significance of the Botswana border in helping people join the struggle?
17. Who gave you food, clothes and items of necessity during the struggle?
18. Do you think the Botswana border was helpful during the war? How so?
19. What challenges did you experience during your years in the camps or in the bush?
20. In what ways do you think Bulilima youth contributed to the liberation of Zimbabwe?
21. May you please tell us about your experience of the war/engagement with the enemy.
22. What do you think were youth's contributions in Zimbabwe's guerrilla war?

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23. How important were youth's contributions in this war?
24. How would you say youth were involved and participated in this guerrilla war?
25. How did you deal with those you suspected of being sellouts?
26. May you please tell us about the issue of witches and witchcraft?
27. How did you protect youth and parents from security forces?
28. Kindly tell us more about your involvement and participation in this war?

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APPENDIX III

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE THREE

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

1. What are your names, where and when were you born?
2. Where were you during the Zimbabwe's guerrilla war?
3. What made youth join the liberation struggle?
4. Let us discuss about youth at home. How were they involved and participated in the country's liberation struggle?
5. How did the ZIPRA guerrillas enter and leave Bulilima to and from Botswana?
6. What are your views regarding the usefulness of the Botswana border to ZIPRA guerrillas?
7. Were youth at home helpful to guerrillas? Let us discuss about what these youth did to help guerrillas.
8. How was life in refugee camps in Botswana and Zambia? Let us talk about the situations youth in refugee camps faced, i.e, problems, difficulties.
9. How did such youth participate in helping liberate the country? Let us discuss what they did in camps.
10. What about those who were trained as guerrillas. How did they help liberate the country? Let us list some of the activities they did as guerrillas.

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