

# Challenges Related to Capacity in Local Government Administration: The Continuing Tussle Between Insulated and Non-Insulated Local Government Public Service Leadership

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**Abstract:** This paper reports on the extent to which an insulated or non-insulated public service leadership in local government in South Africa is a relevant determinant of stability and service delivery. This analysis was done in the context of a high turnover of local government leadership and poor service delivery. The author posits that there is adequate and capable leadership available to successfully steer development in local government. However, the inability of political leadership to find a balance between an insulated and non-insulated public service has led to unstable local government. The paper used a comparative desktop methodology to compare the tenure of municipal managers of three metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng province since 2001. The study analysed documents that are in the public domain, such as newspapers, legislation, regulations and records of Council resolutions, according to the applicable theories. The conclusion is that the tussle between insulated and non-insulated leadership is ongoing. The tussle is evidenced by overbearing political influence that limits the space for public servants to be fully efficient. The controls against such influences are neither adhered to, nor adequately enforced.

**Keywords:** Leadership stability, Local government, Insulated, Non-insulated, Political influence

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## 1. Introduction

Since the advent of a democratic, all-inclusive government in South Africa, the demand for quality services for all citizens has increased. Local government is at the frontline of the service delivery that citizens expect. Studies have investigated the standards and conditions that are needed in local government to provide good service delivery. Many scholars argue that good governance entails proper municipal organisation design, human resources management, material resources management, financial resources management, long-term city development strategic planning, and effective organisation for implementation (Keivani & Mattingly, 2007).

A capable public service is a fundamental requirement for delivering quality services. The National Develop Plan (NDP) (Republic of South Africa National Planning Commission, 2012) Outcome 13 calls for building a capable and developmental state as a prerequisite for its implementation. The NDP identifies some of the issues that cause uneven development: tensions in political administration, unstable administrative leadership, lack of requisite expertise, and a decrease in accountability and authority. It also notes a trend characterised by politicians exercising too much influence in the appointment of senior staff.

This results in high turnover in such positions. Achieving a capable state calls for a public service that is immersed in the developmental agenda, but insulated from political interference. Where the public service is too insulated from political pressures, there is likely to be concerns that it is failing to serve the interests of the government of the day and, therefore, not fulfilling its democratic mandate (Republic of South Africa National Planning Commission, 2012:407). The struggle to maintain that insulation and the extent to which it is, indeed, a sine qua non for efficient and effective delivery, is the core thrust of this paper.

Studies on local government refer to capacity issues, as evidenced by high vacancy rates in senior management positions, as one of the main causes of poor performance. The *Municipal State of Capacity Assessments 2011-2016* reports that 41% of technical services positions were occupied by unqualified people who did not possess minimum competencies and qualifications (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2018). This paper does not intend to play down the dearth of technical and managerial skills of municipal staff; instead, it will examine the context and underlying causes of the high turnover and vacancies at the levels of Sections 56 and 57. If we can assume that the technical capacity can

be outsourced to the private sector – as Japan did successfully (Kudo, 2016) – there would still be a need for a capable administrative leadership to provide strategic guidance for quality service delivery. We argue that, over the years, significant capacity has been built up in senior local government leadership, and there should be an adequate pool to draw senior and skilled leadership from to drive the development process. However, tensions remain between, on the one hand, the desires of political leadership to control the state, and, on the other, public servants' desire to get the space needed to function; this tension affects the performance of local government, because of a high turnover rate for senior administrators.

By 2015, there was a noticeable improvement in filling executive vacancies. However, the vacancy rate was still high for municipal executives: 18% at executive levels, 12% for municipal managers (MMs); 13% for chief financial officers; and an overall vacancy rate of 13% at municipalities. It took, on average, 18 months for these vacancies to be filled (Auditor General, 2015). Many interventions, such as laws, regulations and training programmes, have been adopted to address some of the problems that lead to an unstable senior-level public service. Laws have been passed to ensure that the country builds enough capacity to support the goals of a developmental state. At national government-level, the National Schools of Government was created to oversee capacity building for government at national and provincial levels. The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) is an autonomous association of all local governments, and has the mandate to build capacity of municipalities, although it does not have a centralised school. However, minimum competencies and standards of local government have been adopted and are being enforced through the supervision of the Treasury, the Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), and SALGA.

The National Treasury introduced the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) No. 56 of 2003, Circular 60, 2003, as a first attempt to enforce uniform requirements for municipal officials. This was followed by the Minimum Competency Level Regulations (Republic of South Africa, 2003; 2007). The regulations stipulate the minimum qualifications of s56 and s57 incumbents. Municipalities were given time to ensure that they addressed the skills shortage, while avoiding disruptions to service delivery, and taking the sizes, budgets and location of every

particular municipality into account. Municipalities were given up to 2013 to comply. The regulations also stipulated the minimum financial and supply chain competency requirements for core and managerial competencies. Between 2010 and 2016, a cohort of approximately 100 s56 and s57 100 officials per municipality (the numbers were lower at district and local municipalities, depending on organisation structures) underwent training to acquire the MFMA minimum requirements; this training has since become compulsory when recruiting senior managers for all municipalities. This means that there is, at least, a group of qualified officials who form a pool for all municipalities. Furthermore, improved recruitment strategies and procedures are now in place, to ensure the best candidates are attracted. The paper posits that there is, at least, a significant pool of capable administrative leadership to successfully steer development delivery by local government. However, other factors affect government's ability to perform; among them is the failure by local government in South Africa to balance the two extremes – insulated and non-insulated public service – especially at local government level, where there has been a high turnover in senior leadership positions as a result of changes in the political leadership. There is an ongoing battle between professionalisation and politicisation, which leads to the high turnover of senior managers, and affects the performance of the municipality. The paper seeks to answer the following questions:

- What is the effect of an insulated or non-insulated public service on the stability of local government leadership?
- How does the political-administrative interface affect administrative leadership stability and resulting service delivery in a developmental state?

These questions will be explored using case studies of past performance and practices of MMs and top executives of three metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng over the past 20 years.

## **2. Theoretical Underpinning: The Developmental State: Insulation Versus Non-Insulated Public Service**

According to Evans and Heller (2013:5), the concept of the developmental state became popular in the development discourse as result of the ability of East

Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, to rapidly transform into developed economies. The concept became popular, in part, as an acknowledgement of human capital accumulation as a driver of economic growth over capital accumulation. These countries had well-resourced state machinery that could implement a transformative development agenda that was contrary to the neoliberal narrative. Evans and Heller, therefore, argue that the bureaucratic capacity of the developmental state is more important than classic analysis suggests. Evans and Heller (2013), furthermore, argue that, in the past, analysis of the developmental state tended to focus on technocratic political issues that are internal to the state, but that the focus should, instead, be on how the state apparatus is connected to civil society. In my view, it is possible that the solutions to this impasse lies in strengthening state-civil society relations, and the internal dynamics are worth paying attention to.

Podger (2016) traced how modern governments (using 10 Asian and Australasian case studies) strike a balance between public interest to achieve development and capacitate public servants, and avoiding the strong urge to stifle public servants and expose them to undue influence by politicians when making appointments. He argues that political institutional arrangements and the relationship between politics and administration can determine the effective execution of required roles and competencies of the public service leadership. He also shows that, even where there was clear separation between politics and administration, in many cases, political norms determined behaviour and attitudes towards senior public servants. He used the example of Singapore, which (like post-1994 South Africa) has a long history of a dominant party in power, which made heavy investment in leadership development possible. In contrast, democratisation in Taiwan lead to a decline of its public service, which became more submissive and no longer sequestered from electoral processes. The Philippines did not have political backing for their programmes to build a professional public service, while Hong Kong struggled to uphold political neutrality. These diverse experiences show that the insulation and non-insulation debate is real and ongoing, and that no conclusive evidence has been obtained.

In South Africa, the deployment of political cadres has also been blamed for failing to achieve an insulated state. Maimela (2021) contends that government must, of necessity, contend with political deployment,

as it is a globally practiced phenomenon – even in the United States. The question that must be raised is, at which layer of the public service must cadres be deployed? There must be consensus on the definition of political deployment, as well as a rigorous process for selection – performance and competence must be key criteria for choosing deployees. There are sufficient instruments in place to assess performance. Maimela argues, furthermore, that:

*it is dangerous to assume that "depoliticization" of the public service or state, is an achievable goal or that it can improve the country's fortunes. The state and state bureaucracy are not blunt instruments which are value-free and uncontested by various political interests (2021:3).*

I believe that, if we accept that the state and political leadership are intertwined, we must then accept that, political instability in the ruling party can lead to instability in the leadership of the public service. This has been more evident in local government than at provincial and national levels, as the case study will show.

Evans (1995) proposes what he calls an "embedded autonomy state in which the state and its bureaucracy must be insulated enough to avoid being captured by sectional interests. At the same time, the state must have networks with and trust by society". Maimela (2021) also supports this notion of an embedded autonomy state in which, he says, the state should be neither partisan in a narrow sense, nor apolitical.

Opinions in South Africa vary between those who support political neutrality (insulation), and those who support non-insulation. Insulation is generally considered to be a premium attribute to aspire to. SALGA's professionalisation framework describes insulation, in practice, as a situation where "appointed local government officials [should] be disengaged from political activity that otherwise could diminish public confidence in the neutral performance of their functions and duties" (2013:10).

### **3. The Context of the Local Government Tussle Between Insulated and Non-Insulated Local Government Public Service Leadership**

In South Africa, studies have exposed the problems that have beset local government since 2001; some

are still prevalent more than two decades later. Among these problems are tensions between the political and administrative interface; poor ability of councillors to deal with the demand that local government provides services; insufficient separation of powers between political parties and the municipality; inadequate accountability measures and support systems and resources for local democracy; and poor compliance with the legislative and regulatory frameworks for municipalities (Ndevu & Muller, 2017).

In May 2021, the auditor general of South Africa, in presenting the National and Provincial Audit Outcomes, 2019-2020 (2021), listed the necessary institutional requirements for state institutions as good governance, resilience, accountability and transparency, and also referred to the role of administrative leadership. The audit findings had revealed a discernible pattern of characteristics among those institutions that receive clean audit outcomes, namely strong, professional and stable leadership, especially of the accounting officers and chief financial officers, which enabled the inculcation of an ethical and efficiency culture. She argued that there is compelling evidence that there is a link between tenure and audit outcomes. She also hailed the proposed *National Implementation Framework Towards the Professionalisation of the Public Service*, as a step in the right direction to enhance performance.

In the view of the auditor general, a capable state requires skills, ethics, space for public servants to do their work and accountability for performance and non-performance. In my view, the space mentioned by the auditor general is a key component of ensuring accountability and good performance. The number of settlement agreements that are entered into with accounting officers, chief financial officers and other s57 officials are indicative of the existence of a silent administrative and political tension, and is not accorded sufficient weight in debates on local government inefficiency.

De Visser (2009) identified the probable causes of the tensions between politicians and officials. In his view, the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 introduced new aspects to the political leadership of municipalities. The mayoral position changed, from being ceremonial to being executive. In the past, municipalities were run by "strong town clerks" – the equivalent of present-day MMs, while

Councils today have executive mayors and Mayoral Committees. MMs are appointed by Council and are expected to work closely with the executive. The new councils also have powers to formulate policy, by-laws and community engagement. They have oversight on decisions made by the administration. This relationship has to be navigated cautiously, because, sometimes, changes in political leadership impact senior administration, and can lead to dismissals or buying out of their contracts. This has a domino effect, of causes lack of continuity at senior management level (De Visser, 2009:8).

The professionalisation of the public service has been touted as a necessary panacea for improving the quality of performance of public servants and ensuring that the public service is "neutral". South Africa has not been an exception to this demand, and a *Professionalisation Framework* has been adopted in response to barriers that were identified as contributing to perceived lack of professionalism. Current recruitment criteria, qualification requirements, performance agreements and terms and conditions of employment for Section 56 and Section 57 managers have been tightened sufficiently to guarantee optimum results. It can, therefore, be assumed that, if accounting officers, chief financial officers and other Section 57 managers are competent and qualified, they should be able to serve full terms with positive results.

In the past, there has tended to be higher stability for provincial heads of departments (HoDs) and directors general (DGs), who have generally served their full terms regardless of changes in ministerial and Member of Executive Committee (MEC) appointments. The pattern of political instability that affects the tenure of HODs and DGs is said to have started during former President Zuma's tenure between 2009 and 2018. Zuma made 126 changes to the national executive which comprised 74 people (the highest number of executives ever.) On average, he made changes to the cabinet every 8.6 months. Furthermore, 172 people had held the DG position in 38 departments, resulting in an average tenure of 4.5 DGs per department; they served only 22 months, on average. According to Makhasi (2019), these frequent changes are indicative of strained and broken aspects of public administrative leadership and governance. It can be summarised that these patterns of instability at national level filtered through to local government, and mirror and respond to party dynamics.

Whenever factions emerge nationally, the cracks are also likely to appear at the lower structures.

Kanyane and Koma (2014) argue that some of the causes of strong political interference is self-interest. They claim that there is excessive political interference by Councils in, for example, the awarding of procurement projects and appointment of staff – which is actually a domain of MMs. Administrators are custodians of financial regulations, which stipulate what items can be spent according to the budget; however, councillors ignore these stipulations, and this leads to conflict.

These challenges do not go unnoticed, and the realisation that there is, indeed, instability in local government, has led to debates about improving the appointment of s56 and s57 employees, and improving the capacity and stability. The proposed solutions can be divided into legislative, political, and transparency and accountability solutions.

**Legislative solutions:** The COGTA and Human Settlements Portfolio Committee (Gauteng) on 13 April 2021 debated the Municipal Systems Act 2011 Regulations of Appointment and Conditions of Employment of Senior of Managers. (The Bill is now referred to as the 2019 Bill.) It is regarded as important legislation that can stabilise administrative leadership in local government. Among its stipulations are:

- Procedures and competency criteria for appointments, among other matters; and
- Consequences for appointments made in contravention of such procedures.

The Bill was formulated with the aim of professionalising local government by attracting qualified and competent managers, through measures such as limiting of political rights of MMs and direct reports, as these measures were regarded as justifiable and important for good governance, and the separation of politics from administration.

The role of MEC concurrence for the appointment of MMs is another indication of increased political oversight on the appointment of MMs. In the proposed amended 2019 Bill, a new inclusion is that, if the MEC does not give concurrence within the stipulated 90 days' period, the Municipality may proceed with the appointment, so that no further delays are caused.

MEC concurrence was also cited as an obstacle that sometimes leads to good candidates being lost due to excessive delays in decision-making.

**Separation of political and administrative roles:** COGTA's contribution to the review was that a clause on the exclusion of political office bearers from holding official positions must be extended to all municipal staff, and that municipalities would be given 12 months to comply with the clause. It also proposed that s56 employees' terms of employment must end with the political term (depending on the circumstances of the municipality, and after consultation with Council).

The need to separate official roles and political office was also emphasised by the chairperson of SALGA (2021), who called for a review of the double-role practice, which meant that someone could hold a senior position as a public servant, and also as a senior committee member of a political party. She lamented the way oversight is conducted in local government, which is less effective than at provincial level (Dlamini, 2021).

**Public advocacy to demand transparency and accountability:** Corruption Watch called for public participation in the appointment of MMs, to assure community members that the MM would serve in accordance with existing parliamentary processes of the appointment of state-owned entities (SOEs) (though this is not a requirement for all SOEs). However, this process is determined by the schedule of the Constitution by which the SOE was established, and does not apply to municipalities. This change would require the presence of a highly organised civil society, as suggested by Evans (1995) in his embedded autonomy state theory, which, in his view, has been weak since 1994.

Public servants are directly accountable to political and administrative superiors, the courts and other internal government authorities. They are not directly accountable to the legislature, pressure groups, media or the general public, although they might generally be required to explain their decisions and actions (Kuye & Mafunisa, 2003).

#### 4. Findings: Case Study: Gauteng Metropolitan Municipalities

There are 257 municipalities in South Africa, seven of which are metropolitan, three of which are based in

Gauteng province, namely City of Ekurhuleni (CoE), City of Johannesburg (CoJ) and City of Tshwane (CoT). Since 2001, of the three metros, only CoE has had a MM who has served more than one full term. All three metros had ANC-majority-lead Councils for more than 15 years, until the last term (2017–2021), which saw a shift towards DA-led coalitions in CoJ and CoT in the current term of office. CoT has had the highest turnover, with one MM having served a full term in the last 20 years. CoT has also had the highest number of mayors (six), and an administrator. CoE has been the most stable, with the ANC leading all five terms and four out of five MMs serving full terms; this metro also had only one change of mayor in the middle of a term.

In 2003, CoT suspended and paid out its MM, who had been appointed in 2001. His successor was suspended, and then resigned just two months before the end of his term in 2006. This second MM was replaced by a third, who was also given a settlement agreement in 2010. The third 2010 MM was subject to allegations of maladministration, irregularities and misconduct. After an investigation had cleared him of these accusations, Council offered him a settlement agreement. In a statement to the media, he said he was suspended to prevent him from questioning the awarding of lucrative tenders worth millions of rands (IOL, 2010). Masondo (2011) reports that, nationally between 2002 to 2011, at least 10 municipalities had offered settlement agreements to MMs. Their settlement packages were, on average over R2 million each. In other provinces, the DA bought out the contacts of two MMs who had been appointed by the ANC, in Stellenbosch and Knysna.

In 2019, the DA entered a settlement agreement with the MM of the CoT. The central issue of contention was the appointment of Glad Africa to implement infrastructure programmes. Although the MM was initially suspended pending investigation, a settlement was finally entered into without any plan on how the irregular expenditure would be recovered, or exposing the role of political leadership in the awarding of the tender. The DA-led coalition in CoJ appointed a new MM in 2017 who had previously served as a deputy city manager in Tshwane for five years and had also served as divisional head of Infrastructure for five years prior. It can be assumed that the DA appointed him on merit, and were not biased against his previous employment in an ANC-led Council. This MM served

the City of Johannesburg for 4.5 years. There were no complaints of poor performance during the DA-led government. Three years into his tenure, there was another change in government, which went back to ANC control, though, this time, with a coalition of other, smaller political parties. It is of interest that it was the ANC-led coalition that proceeded to oust the MM due to allegations of fraud relating to PPE (personal protective equipment) expenditure, although no fingers were pointed to the MM, but rather to politicians and their families and friends who, it is claimed, had fraudulently gained from irregular expenditure. It is no surprise that irregular expenditure in Gauteng amounted to R1,7 billion for municipalities; a further R3,3 billion was reported for audits finalised subsequent to the cut-off date for the 2020 audit report, with the CoT accounting for R2,9 billion of this amount (Auditor General, 2021).

The references to political party leadership are pertinent for the analysis, because there has been an impression that municipalities were failing because of poor governance by the ruling ANC. Among the reasons that are sometimes advanced, especially by opposition parties, is that appointments of municipal executives have been largely determined by party/cadre deployment, which has not necessarily been in the best interests of local government effectiveness. One could argue that the NDP also partly subscribes to a view of the problematic nature of an insulated versus a non-insulated public service in a developmental state. However, deployment, on its own, is not the cause of the insulation or non-insulation.

The probable causes of the instability lie in political leadership failing to accept and trust in the administrative leadership that is in place, especially if they did not appoint these staff themselves. This tendency was particularly glaring with the release of the last MM for Johannesburg. If we are to refer to Podger's analysis that political traditions affect approaches towards public service leadership, the tradition that is evident in the case studies is that, whenever a new government (even one of the same party) enters power, there are changes in the administration, the logic for which is sometimes not evident.

This type of illogical change was evident in the defence by the national chairperson of the ANC, Minister Gwede Mantashe, of the cadre deployment

policy in state institutions after calls by the opposition for it to be scrapped. Critics alleged that cadre deployment had aided state capture, and involved the deployment of ANC loyalists to head SOEs – who later facilitated their looting. Mantashe argued that:

*It was aimed at ensuring that those who occupied key positions within the state were not hostile to the governing party's transformative agenda and the implementation of its election manifestos. The ANC's strategy had been to deepen its hold on the levers of the state, including SOEs. Unashamedly, the ANC wants to govern and therefore you cannot govern without a state. We are a governing party, but the state which is continuous must be made ready to execute programmes of the governing party (Feketha, 2021).*

This statement contains contradictions: Mantashe mentions continuity, and appointing people it trusts in one statement. Continuity would be difficult to achieve if each administration that is elected decides to appoint people it can work with, without giving due consideration to those who are already employed within the public service. In the case of the CoJ 2017 MM, he had worked for an ANC-led metropolitan Council, so it could be assumed that he was not hostile, however, the decision of the ANC-lead Council indicated otherwise.

In the Tshwane and Johannesburg metros, the departure of the MMs was not due to non-performance, and the reasons for awarding settlements were not recorded anywhere in Council resolutions. The CoJ MM who was terminated in 2021, 10 months before the expiry of his contract, had been given performance bonuses in two financial years. COGTA should have demanded reports from the mayors, to determine who gave permission to approve such settlements. The Auditor General's 2020 MFMA report notes a changing trend in Gauteng, where municipalities that had both attracted and retained staff with the right skills had benefited from this continuity and had managed to maintain good audit outcomes. In contrast, municipalities characterised by instability in political or administrative leadership, such as the CoT and CoJ, were unable to improve their outcomes (2020:3). The unstable and poor performance of these two metros can be attributed largely to the constantly shifting political leadership dynamics, which, in turn, affect administrative stability. This shows that political stability, and giving merit-based administrators the space

to implement the political mandate of Integrated Development Plans (without too much political interference) are key to good service delivery.

## 5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Experiences in Asia's developmental states suggest that the performance of the state machinery should not be affected by whether a bureaucracy is insulated or non-insulated. The machinery should exist to serve the interests of the public, and implementing the development agenda. While political dominance and instability may play a role in determining the nature of the bureaucratic political interface, where there are criteria in place, based on merit, regardless of party affiliation, for the recruitment, retention, performance assessment and accountability of public servants, there is likely to be administrative stability.

The case studies presented in this paper show the changing political landscape in South Africa, from a dominant ANC-led majority, to DA or coalition-led political leadership, has introduced a new dynamic, that of navigating the need to avoid instability caused by different party interests, while establishing effective governance coalitions. Such coalitions do not always have the advantage of a long-term history of working with whichever administration they find in place, and they may be tempted to replace the MMs and other s56 and s57 employees they find in place, without trusting that they had been appointed on merit, or referring to their past performance. If the administration is insulated, that long-term history would be irrelevant.

The ruling party has been inconsistent on its stated intention of establishing insulated public services, as prescribed by the NDP. This inconsistency undermines the effectiveness of the administrative leadership. In the long term, it should not matter which political leadership appointed which administrator, provided they are competent and appointed on merit, but the temptation and tradition of political parties – who want their own appointees – is manifest. Whichever party is governing, attempts to control the state machinery and, thus, erode the insulation that is touted.

Performance scorecards could serve as indications of performance, and, in the case of an irretrievable breakdown, the reasons must be disclosed as a matter for public concern. If there are other reasons,

not related to work performance – such as political incompatibility or differences – the public has the right to know. When conflict between Council and administrators arise, the MMs and other s56 and s57 staff become sacrificial lambs, and settlement agreements are entered into at taxpayers' expense. This practice does not encourage the best candidates to apply for positions – the high turnover gives the impression that local government is an unstable career environment.

It is evident that the problems that were identified in the NDP such as tensions between the political and administrative interface; insufficient separation of powers between political parties and the municipality; inadequate accountability measures and support systems and resources for local democracy; and poor compliance with the legislative and regulatory frameworks for municipalities, are as pervasive now as they were 10 years ago. De Visser's (2009) argument about the changed profile of mayoral positions and executives, from ceremonial to executive, has been brought to bear where battles for control in the political chambers spill over into administration.

Evans (1995) asserts that South Africa is a cautionary tale of what happens when there is a decline in civil society, which has significant capacity for collective action. Before the new democracy, the anti-apartheid movement was a vibrant civil society. In his view, the dominant party status of the ANC has insulated the state from civil society, which has resulted in an absence of a feedback to the state. When considering the state of civil society in South Africa, dominant institutions in the governance space, such as Corruption Watch, Solidarity and AfriForum, do not represent the majority of communities, and are perceived as representing narrow minority interests. Save South Africa is a possible black-based civil society formation that could take up the leadership in calling the state to account to its electorate, however, it too suffers from the weakness of not having a strong local (non-elitist) base.

Other proposed solutions are that the administration should be insulated and implement policies in a non-partisan way, as desired by the NDP. Council should formulate policy, and the administration must implement it. The two – policy formulation and implementation – should not be confused. In the case of disputes between the political leadership and executive management, existing human resources policies must be adhered to, instead of the current

practice of settling disputes in courts and awarding settlement amounts that are inexplicable and probably unwarranted. COGTA should apply its mandate, and ensure that municipal political leadership that oversteps guidelines, are called to account.

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