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A research for Master of Arts in Political Science (MAPOL) Degree

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SOUTH AFRICA

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September 2020

DECLARATION

I, Andisani Mathelemusa, hereby declare that this dissertation for Master's in Political Science degree (MAPOL) submitted to the Department of Development Studies at the University of Venda has not been submitted previously for any degree at this or another university. It is original in design and in execution, and all reference material contained therein have been duly acknowledged.

Signature*Mathelemusa*..... **Date** 9 September 2020.....

DEDICATION

I sincerely dedicate this Master's Dissertation to my parents, siblings, and friends. Their encouragement played a vital role in this study. They have been the motivation behind the completion of this dissertation. In fact, they are God's greatest gifts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to several people and organizations for their invaluable, moral and material support during the period of the master's research. Dr Patrick Dzimiri deserves special thanks and appreciation for his invaluable support to realise this project. He was so patient with me and guided me from day one until I got it right. He did not only guide me as my supervisor; he went beyond the call of duty to provide me with parental advice. I would like to acknowledge the financial support from the University of Venda through the work-study programme. I also acknowledge financial support and handouts from friends during desperate times. Of the people whose patience I have taxed, my family comes first. My partner, together with my mother, has always supported me and had confidence in me. Mokobodi Desmond was there when I needed someone to talk to. Modiba RV gave me the support of a big brother. Without them, it would have been impossible to come this far. Again, thanks to all.

Most importantly, I thank the Almighty God for his omnipresence in my life and for giving me brainpower and strength to complete this research.

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ABSTRACT

Ever since its founding, South Sudan has not known peace because of the challenges that come with its existence as a state. The problems facing nation building in South Sudan are multifaceted. South Sudan is a newly independent state which came because of secession from Sudan. This research explored nation building initiatives underway in South Sudan. The civil conflicts that continue to hamper progress in building a prosperous nation in South Sudan are a cause for concern. This study, therefore, assessed the challenges that are faced by those who are tasked with building a coherent, stable, and vibrant nation in South Sudan. The study traced some of these aspects with a view to dissecting how they hinder the process of nation building in South Sudan. Peace-makers try to forge a deal with the belligerents, disputes remain, including the division of oil revenues, as 75% of all the former Sudan's oil reserves are in South Sudan. This research will identify factors which have led to the ongoing conflicts in South Sudan with the hope of coming up with suggestions on how the conflict can be resolved. To unravel the issues underpinning nation building in South Sudan, the study was guided by the following objectives: to identify challenges associated with nation building in South Sudan; to identify the causes of the challenges to nation building; to examine the strategies employed by the state in its nation building; and to assess the effectiveness of these strategies. The study was guided by the qualitative research paradigm. The method of data collection is a desktop research. Data were collected from books, journals, newspapers, letters, online books and articles without necessarily engaging the researcher in physical contact. Data were analysed using the thematic methodology and the main themes identified as impediments to nation building were explained.

Keywords: Peace; Democracy; Nation building; South Sudan; Conflict.

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Over the years, concepts such as peace, democracy, nation building, and conflicts have been debated and their applicability and relevance to Africa have been questioned. Specialists have differed in explaining some of the recurring political, economic, and social phenomena that characterize the African continent. The African continent is home to contrasting ideologies. There is controversy over the definition and implementation of democracy, decisions on economic models, whether to implement socialist policies or US foreign policy embedded in the neo-capitalism. In recent years, globalization and neoliberal policies have grown to become defenders of international relations, portraying conservative ideologies in garbage cans. The conceptualization of nationality and nation building have been problematic in Africa and the rest of the world. Scholars differ on the use and applicability of the concept of nation building. Peace and stability on the continent will largely depend on the conceptualization of nation building. The ability of academics, policymakers, civil society organizations, governments, and regional institutions to harmonize the contours of nation building is the only currency that guarantees the dawning of a new era in African politics.

Barely ten years after the process of decolonization and the wave of democracy, the euphoria of the 1960s in Africa dissipated when the continent degenerated into a political decline. Africa has been ravaged by ethnic conflicts, particularly in Rwanda and Sudan, to name but a few. The continent is home to different ethnic groups who, during colonialism were assimilated into the cultures of the colonisers resulting in hatred being embedded among . The result of this betrayal has been worsened and hatred among Africans themselves while artificial boundaries designed by the colonialists remain a curse that hinders nation building to this day (Meredith, 2005).

Clarkson (2013) describes the contours of building a nation in Southern Sudan and centres the debate on citizenship, a very broad and interesting phenomenon in African politics. The issue of belonging and legitimacy occupy a very important place in many conflicts that take place in Africa, with the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the protracted DRC and Sudanese conflicts, being examples (Clarkson, 2011). Clarkson identifies citizenship as posing the main threat to nation-

building. He argues that the sustainability and long-term health of South Sudan as a nation will be determined by its success in establishing South Sudanese citizenship. He gives an account of chronicling how and when challenges on citizenship started and how historical experiences such as colonialism, civil wars and marginalization shaped the sense of belonging in South Sudan.

Clarkson contends that "nation building" in Southern Sudan has been bedevilled by a serious lack of political reforms. This is an interesting dimension, as are issues of government legitimacy and inclusion of the previously marginalized population. Clarkson argues that the first step towards nation building in Southern Sudan is the creation of a permanent constitution to legitimise government and citizenship through inclusion and acceptance. There is also a need to address the harm caused by the war fought with Sudan to provide closure to the victims of the war, an issue which the Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed to recognise. Closure, whether material or psychological, is one of the pillars of the national healing processes.

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has faced a nation-constructing challenges. One of the methods this has manifested in is the battle that arose between southern Sudan and the capital, Khartoum, which culminated in two civil wars (the primary lasting from 1955 – 1972 and the second from 1983 – 2005). The reasons for these conflicts are numerous and emerge from inequality, political exclusion, the "resource curse" and historical enmities (Ayers 2010; Martin 2002; Thomas 2015). During the second one, predominantly among the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Khartoum authorities, the conflict was regularly narrowly framed as an Arab-African or Muslim Christian battle among North and South, in spite of an extra complex identity landscape (Ayers 2010; Zink 2014). As a result, a unified Sudan became nearly not possible, despite SPLM/A leader John Garang's preference for this solution, main to southern Sudan's secession in 2011 (Young 2003). South Sudan's independence from Sudan observed the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which prioritised a unified Sudan however supplied for a referendum to secede (Thomas 2015).

1.2 Nation Building in Sudan: A Historical Perspective

Although the history¹ of South Sudan is not directly linked to the challenges of South Sudan, it provides useful insights on the challenges faced by country's nation building project. Heleta (2010) provides an outline of the history of South Sudan showing how the Sudan nation evolved as an oppressed people from the days of slave raids, colonialism and independence. Matt Wells notes that British apartheid policies, which were enshrined in the *Southern Policy*, gave an impetus to tribalism and ethnicity the major stumbling block to "nation building" in South Sudan. An account, which is very unique, well informed and divorced from the Eurocentric, view that the North and South divide was influenced by the quest of the Sudanese government to Islamize the whole country and has been proffered by Dagne (2006) in the report "Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism and US Policy". Heleta gives a rich historical background on the genesis of ethnicity in South Sudan, noting that ethnicity in Sudan was nothing but a by-product of Britain's divide and rule tactics (Heleta, 2008; Dagne, 2006).

Heleta (2008) argues that ethnicity was part of the colonial legacy which has hindered nation building. This view is well articulated by the Journal of Pan African Studies in an article titled "Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors Marring African Socio Economic and Political Development". Alemazung (2010) identifies the colonial legacy to explain the recurring conflict in the Sudan region. He points out that the colonial legacy corresponds to the entire political structure and politics left to the elite nationalist leaders left behind by the colonial administrators who have an impact on contemporary African states and politics (Alemazung 2010).

Cesar (2012) argues that border disputes are amongst several issues posing as threats to nation building in South Sudan. He explains how the Constitutive Peace Agreement failed to address the problems of borders between Sudan and South Sudan in hotly-contested and strategic areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan states endowed with strategic resources such as oil which provide revenue for both the North and the South. Cesar gives an insight into how the disputed border region of Abyei will continue to shape and influence relations between South Sudan and

¹ History here refers to the period when oppression began in the Southern region of Sudan, that is the advent of the Trans Saharan Slave Trade through British colonialism to oppression by the Northern Islamic elite till independence of South Sudan in 2011 (Hussein 2006)

Sudan as it is a catalyst for hostile relations. The lack of commitment and political goodwill in holding referendums to decide the future of these states also contributed to instability in the region. On a different dimension, nation-building, according to Caio Cesar Paccola Jacon *et al.*, will largely depend on the resolution of disputed regions which were previously marginalised, religiously and culturally, by the North in its bid to Islamise the whole region (Cesar *et al.*, 2012).

The European Institute for Security Studies (2011) gives an account of how oil is a challenge to nation building in South Sudan. The report notes that oil largely influences the uneasy relationship between the North and South, with South Sudan owning the resource, but not having the technical capacity to utilise it effectively. Furthermore, literature exposes how both countries rely heavily on oil revenue noting that oil represented 90% of the total exports of Sudan. The paper is very insightful in positing challenges associated with oil in South Sudan. Tajani (2011) also highlights the problems that come with oil in Sudan. Nour (2011) argues that there has not been a consensus on how to share oil revenues between Khartoum and Juba, and this alone is a recipe for tension between the two states. Moreover, Juba's heavy reliance on oil as a source of revenue is a recipe for disaster (Nour, 2011).

Field (2000) devotes a great deal of time in unpacking the role played by the discovery of oil in Sudan as an accessory to the civil war. Field's work is very insightful in accounting for how oil was used to compliment the war efforts and attracted international players such as China. The piece is very important in the sense that it unpacks different contours in African politics among them the politics of resources, also known as 'the resource curse'. The work points to the nexus between resources and conflict. However, Deng (1995) laid the basis for contention in Sudan and asserted that the homogeneous tendencies embedded in assimilation are the basis of the conflict in Sudan, emphasising domination of the 'Arabized' over non-Muslim and non-Arab majority.

In a bid to unpack Islamic fundamental ideologies in Africa and the way they have shaped the politics of both yesterday and today, Funke & Hussein (2006) outline the history of Islam in Africa and devote a chapter expounding on the dominance of Islamic ideology in Sudan. The chapter is very important in accounting for the role played by religion as an accessory to Africa's longest conflict. Funke and Solomon (2006) further complement Deng's view on the role played by

religion in Sudan by examining how religion fostered the search for a new identity in the South and the subsequent civil war.

One cannot discuss Sudan without mentioning the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. Various works have been extensively done in trying to analyse the successes and failures of the CPA agreement. (Cesar 2012) *et al.*, give a brief assessment of the contents of the CPA, mainly identifying its key objectives such as: identifying the root causes of the conflict, security, distribution of power and wealth. However, Caio Cesar PaccolaJacon *et al.* did not adequately account for the need to protect Southern Sudan given her history of marginalisation from the North's counter insurgency.

Similarly, Iyekolo (2011) gives a background to the CPA in a manner that gives the audience a clear understanding of the agreement. Iyekolo further strikes a balance between the successes and failures of the CPA and the effects on the independence of South Sudan; demonstrating how outstanding issues such as border disputes, oil and other matters remain at the centre of the conflict.

Issues of security and insecurity have been explored in connection with the challenges of nation building in South Sudan. The Brookings Institution/Africa Growth Initiative (2011) report titled, "*South Sudan One Year after Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country*" illuminates on the insecurity in South Sudan linking it to constitutional deficiencies in matters regarding property rights. It points out that most intrastate conflicts in South Sudan relate to land disputes, grazing and water rights amongst the communities. Although the report provides great insights on the multiple causes of insecurity in South Sudan it does not account for the contribution of factors such as armed militia, ethnicity and the impotency of the security sector towards insecurity in South Sudan.

In a report by the International Alert (a peace organization) Reeves (2012) and Angus Clarkson (2011) illuminate on the dynamics of insecurity in South Sudan. (Reeves 2012) attributes the insecurity in South Sudan to intra-communal violence, politically inclined rebellions and cattle raiding; while Clarkson blames the impotency of the security sector, particularly the army which operates and is pitted along ethnic lines resulting in mutiny by high ranking military officials as a

major cause of insecurity in South Sudan. Although the two scholars wrote extensively on insecurity, they did not critique the role played by the United Mission in ensuring security in South Sudan. The role played by international organisations in providing security in South Sudan was also not fully explored by both these authors. In addition, the Sudanese factor as an accessory to insecurity to South Sudan, given Sudan's long history of counter insurgency in the South for decades, was also not adequately accounted for in this literature (Reeves 2012; Clarkson 2011).

1.3 Problem Statement

The formation of the newly independent state of South Sudan in 2011 marks a significant development that resolved Africa's longest civil war between North and South Sudan. Since 1955, the North and South Sudan ruttet each other for several economic, political and social reasons. While the formation of South Sudan is revered as the solution to the north south conflict, the new state of South Sudan came with costs. Internally, the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 presented Africa with a new problem on the continent. Before the gains of independence were realised, South Sudan emerged to be another trouble zone for Africa. Fundamentally, the outbreak of the conflict revealed the challenge of forging a unified nation of South Sudan. Considering administration, power politics and ethnic tensions, there is an imperative to examine how the issue of nation-building has been addressed.

The negative development that the country plunged into civil war before consolidating the gains of independence triggers the quest to examine how nation-building can be instituted in the midst of the civil war in South Sudan. The main question therefore is: What are the challenges faced by the South Sudanese Government in its nation-building efforts?

The main question gives rise to the following subsidiary questions:

1. What modalities were instituted to ensure nation-building in South Sudan?
2. What are the factors undermining South Sudan's government in its nation-building efforts?
3. How has the international community engaged the contending parties in South Sudan?
4. What is the efficacy of the strategies utilised to resolve the civil war in South Sudan?
5. What more should be done to ensure that South Sudan exists as a unified state?

1.4 STUDY AIM AND OBJECTIVES

1.4.1 Aim

The overall arching aim of the study is to examine the process of nation-building in the newly established state of South Sudan that has found itself in conflict in the wake of independence.

1.4.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES

- To examine the modalities that were instituted as part of nation-building in South Sudan;
- To examine factors undermining nation-building;
- To find out how international community has engaged with conflicting parties in South Sudan;
- To interrogate the effectiveness of the conflict resolution approaches instituted so far;
- To proffer possible recommendations for nation-building and unification of South Sudan.

1.6 Significance of the Study

1.6.1 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND SECURITY

This study that explored the notion of nation-building in the newly established state of South Sudan contributed to the body of knowledge in post-conflict societies in Africa. The study acknowledges the significant contribution by the international community through the United Nations in fostering the establishment of the independent state of South Sudan as a resolve to the North -South Conflict that has presented policy-makers, politicians and technocrats with a challenge of finding a lasting solution. A nation bringing dimension advanced in this study helps to reveal fractures in conflict resolution on the African continent, especially if piece-meal solutions are adhered to. By embarking on a study on South Sudan, the study brings more nuanced insights on ethnic, resource, power and administrative challenges to African politics. By engaging, theories as analytical lenses to the study on nation building in....., the study demonstrates the challenges associated with instituting or forging nationhood in a politically and fragmented society.

The study is very relevant for the understanding of nation-building, state building in South Sudan and is key in understanding the challenges which Africa's newest state faces and how they came about.

1.7 Definition of Key Terms

1.7.1 Nation building

According to Bendix (2017), nation-building is the process whereby a society of people with diverse origins, histories, languages, cultures and religions come together within the boundaries of a sovereign state with a unified constitutional and legal dispensation, a national public education system, an integrated national economy, shared symbols and values, as equals, to work towards eradicating the divisions and injustices of the past; to foster unity and promote a countrywide conscious sense of being proud citizens of that particular nation committed to the country and open to the continent and the world. On the other hand, Willner (2015) argues that “nation building” is a process which leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel enough commonality of interests, goals and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other. Tolz (1998) defines nation-building as the processes of establishing civic order and governmental functions in countries that are emerging from a period of war or other types of upheaval.

From the above definitions it becomes clear that nation-building is a collective effort which involves different stakeholders. For the purpose of this study, Tolz’s definition of nation building will be adopted because it speaks to the objectives of the study.

1.7.2 Democracy

Edozie (2002) suggests that a society supported by a wide range of associations and institutions capable of articulating the interests of their members as well as being able to mould and constrain the power of the state is a democracy. Munck (2016) states that the statement “democracy is about more than elections” and captures a crucial insight that is by now common wisdom. Munck further expands that democracy is about the value of freedom., the value of equality in the sense that every person who lives under a government has the same claim to freedom and thus should have his or her preference weighted equally. For the study, democracy is defined as a form of political organisation guided by the idea that political domination and government should be grounded in the will of the people. The ruled should also be the rulers and political power should be rooted in and legitimated by the will of the people (Van Beek & Rusen, 2006).

1.7.3 Peace

According to Cook (2008); Page *et al.*, (2013), peace, as understood in the United States of America and some European countries, is the absence of violent conflict. However, different opinions have been presented in some surveys conducted in Africa, for example, Ghana and Botswana, (Perez & Salter, 2019). The definitions of peace in Ghana and Botswana include more definitions related to equality, such as access to resources (Dalley *et al.*, 2013); Page *et al.*, 2013). The definition of peace as the absence of violence seems to be a separate construction of peace. However, despite the arguments of these concepts as competing concepts, both are necessary for lasting peace (Albin 2009; Lederach 1995). However, this does not guarantee that peace in tandem with justice will be applied equally or even in ways that benefit it. According to the racial contexts of the nation, the definition of peace based on justice is different. In Western countries, the concepts of peace primarily cite peace as the absence of violence while, at the same time, most African countries defending human rights also cite social justice as an important component of peace. In the context of South Sudan, peace might mean the absence of war and the access of resources to the citizens of Sudan for nation-building to be realised.

1.8 Methodology

1.8.1 Methodology

The study adopted the qualitative research methodology. The research aims to decipher the challenges of nation building in Southern Sudan from 2011 to 2013. According to Given (2008), a research method is a systematic way to solve a problem. It is a science to study how to do research. Essentially, it is the procedures by which researchers describe their work of describing, explaining, and predicting phenomena. This study employs a qualitative research approach aimed at understanding the complex processes within societies that lead to the construction of social reality, in this case a sense of "nationality". A quantitative approach would not serve the purpose and would not follow the epistemological foundations of this research. For example, surveys can be useful for collecting quantitative data. However, this study is a study of the subject, that is why

such a perception of belonging or not belonging to a nation exists and how this feeling of belonging changes over time?

The qualitative methodology is also established as the study of methods by which knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research. In trying to conduct the current research, it was important to adopt a qualitative research methodology, because the qualitative approach is interpretive and as such addresses the objectives and questions of the study as the demands of the study require generating and unpacking of themes and concepts on nation and state building (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). The qualitative approach is also adopted because it is non-numerical but descriptive in its application, where events and themes surrounding nation and state building initiatives in South Sudan are explored.

The study adopted a qualitative research method, which is primarily exploratory, and aimed at gaining an understanding of the reasons, opinions and motivations for the ongoing conflict and nation building in South Sudan. Existing secondary data were analysed on the processes involved in rebuilding a state which was marred by conflict for decades. The role of regional organisations in the promotion and upholding of peace and protection of human rights in South Sudan were also explored.

For the method of data collection, the study is a desktop research. de Vos *et al.* (2005) argue that desktop research can also be viewed as the use of literature to collect data. It describes a process where a researcher reads more around the selected problem in textbooks, journals, newspapers, letters, online books and articles without necessarily engaging the researcher in physical contact. These sources of information are usually secondary sources wherein information was collected by other researchers, analysed and then stored in textual, or virtual format. The reason for using desktop research is because of the distance between the researcher and the area of study. In addition, time limitations also dictated that the desktop research would be the best method of research.

The researcher relied on academic documents on nation-building in the context of Africa, particularly locating South Sudan within the paradigms of African Renaissance. Mbeki (1998) declares that the African Renaissance is the reawakening of the continent and a “third moment” in Africa’s post-colonial history. State building is an appendage to nation-building in the sense that

it aims at creating and strengthening institutions and state apparatus paying special attention to political democracy, economic growth and infrastructural development. There has been a tendency to downplay the building of a cultural identity while focusing more on the technical aspects of building state capacity.

The study also conceived nation building as the processes of constructing a national identity with the aid of historical, cultural, and religious realities. It was noted that central to the process is the role played by the indigenous people in forging an identity where an all-inclusive participation is a prerequisite to downplay leftist tendencies which find fertile ground in the politics of the marginalized that define human rights and obligates member states to adhere to international human rights law. Furthermore, documents that provided a definition of state building were consulted because the definitions are highly contested.

According to Monette *et al.* (2008) data analysis refers to the process of analysing data that have been collected by means of data gathering, mind-mapping which can also be used during the process of data collection, with a view of eliminating irrelevant data. Bless et al (2006) define data analysis as a process that allows the researcher to generate the findings from the sample used in the research and the larger population in which the research was conducted. After the collection of data and literature, data were analysed and interpreted using the inductive approach. Data analysis in qualitative study means transforming data to produce findings. This is significant in the reduction of the scope of information, identifying significant patterns, and constructing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveal (Monette, 2008). Thematic analysis is a way of identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2001). This was the proper method of data analysis as it is the simplest form which is used in qualitative data analysis. It enabled the researcher to analyse from a broad reading of data to discovering clear patterns and themes that would shed light on the research problems.

Data analysis involves making sense of text and image (Creswell, 2014). The data analysis enables the researcher to prepare data moving deeper into understanding the data, representing the data, and making an interpretation of the larger meaning of the data (Creswell, 2009). The study was predominantly qualitative. Data were analysed through Thematic Content Analysis (TCA), and document analysis. The themes which emerged in the study were categorised, grouped and then

analysed. Data analysis was also done through document analysis to validate the findings of the study.

1.9 Research Ethics

Scientific research is strictly conducted following ethical considerations. Therefore, each study must be guided by ethics within the context and relevance of the research being conducted. Studies by Marshal & Rossman (1999) note that research ethics are related to the term morality. This study used writing and publication ethics like, avoidance of plagiarism, ethics in analysis and reporting, such as the avoidance of fabrication and falsification of data collected. Given (2008) defines ethics as the general responsibility of researchers to be truthful and respectful to all individual participants who may be affected by research studies or the outcome of these studies. Thus, any research project should conform to moral, ethical and legal standards of a socio-scientific inquiry. Against this background, the study will be guided by the listed ethical considerations. To avoid bias, the aim of the study is to produce findings that conform to thorough research inquiry in order to minimize the possibility of the findings to be misleading. Thus, data collection and interpretation were very academic in producing well-presented and constructive academic outcomes. The research also upheld ethics in writing by ensuring that the research refrained from reporting mere suspicions and personal feelings and plagiarising previous works and efforts done by other researchers. Ensuring that the research is original, value-free and unbiased per the dictates of the researcher's affiliations, is the basic tenant of ethics in writing a research.

1.10 Limitations of the Study

The cognisance of studies on nation-building and statehood is yet to shift from one that focuses on failed states and useful resource effectiveness to one that interrogates governance structures in submit-war and fragile situations. This shift is very critical due to the fact the research schedule on statehood and state-building is confronted by a powerful and properly-developed afro-pessimism, informed via the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and donors who are sceptical and dismissive of the social blocks as venues for constructing sustainable and resilient states in fragile and submit-conflict international locations. In addition, donor studies on country-constructing continues to be closely stimulated by strategic pursuits and concerns of the improvement community and NGOs – those continue to be the principle funders of research on state-building with constrained involvement of the academia. This has ended in much less

theorisation because the improvement groups and NGOs awareness, mostly on sensible aspects rather than the essential linkages among practice and idea the volume to which the latter informs the former. Western governments have tended to be more geo-strategic in their campaign of building an international democratic gadget. The US authorities, for example, has been criticised for singling out handiest Sudan and Ethiopia for its transitional initiative to encourage democratisation in fragile and post-war states, leaving out states like Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo. The study focused on nation building in South Sudan. Therefore, there is an incapability to conclude on country nation building in Africa after just studying one country.

1.11 Theoretical Framework

The trajectory and process of nation building in post-colonial Africa has been a complex and tricky affair especially in countries that inherited highly fragmented society divided along racial and ethnic fault lines. This was the case in Zimbabwe where the British colonial system exploited ethnic divide to pursue a divide-and-rule policy (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). In a country like South Sudan that was created after a protracted civil war based on ethnicity, religious, politics and economic reasons, it follows that attaining fluent nation building is a mammoth task.

To unpack pertinent fundamental questions regarding nation building in the context of South Sudan, the study deployed Social Integration, Cultural assimilation, diversity theory. The triad theoretical approach helps to unearth and reveal salient aspects of nation building especially in post-conflict societies.

1.11.1 Social Integration Theory

Social integration has many facets and has been used interchangeably with social inclusion, social cohesion, social capital and social democracy in different circumstances, yet in unison with the aim of producing an all-inclusive society. Integration is a very broad concept involving political, economic and social indicators. This implies that social integration can vary, and systems performances have been used as a yardstick to measure social inclusion. These include democratic, material and citizenship performance.

In trying to conceptualise the study, the Social Identity Theory was used in aiding a better explanation of the challenges faced by South Sudan. Tajfel & Turner (1986) developed the Social

Identity Theory. They did not only use the theory in accounting for some of the societal challenges but went on to account for the basis of ethnic conflicts which fits well with the study of the challenges of nation building in South Sudan. The theory is important in explaining the civil war between the North and Southern Sudan, where ethnicity played a very important role as an accessory to the conflict. The theory also exposes some of the challenges relating to group and ethnic competition.

Haslam (2001) clarifies the social identity theory with the aid of the Marxist social class perspective where exclusion is based on political power, wealth and resource. Haslam's contribution sustains the argument that the civil war fought in Sudan was as a result of politics of marginalisation which is a very important argument for the research (Haslam 2001).

1.11.2 Cultural Assimilation Theory

Integration is best explained from two approaches; that is assimilation and diversity. Assimilation literally suggests acts of forcing and imposing a superior ideology and culture on the weaker sections of a given society. The concept of assimilation was popular during the earliest epoch of colonialism where Francophone states, such as Ivory Coast, Senegal and the Central African Republic (CAR) were forcefully assimilated into the French culture with the aim of creating a black *French*. However, John Stuart Mill, in *Consideration on Representative Government* explicitly casts assimilation in the most favourable light, citing historical antecedents that have highlighted the viability of fusing weaker and inferior cultures into superior as an end to social inclusion and the subsequent building of the nation. According to Mill (1946), if the end is the furtherance and protection of these minority cultural groups, then the means is justified.

1.11.3 Diversity theory

Diversity of culture in the context of Africa stresses on the need to take consideration of physical features, historical realities, economic systems, religious beliefs and mostly language spoken to avoid some cultural groups viewed through colonialist lenses as primitive and backward or inferior (Bashir 1979). In line with this concept, it is important to note that since independence in 1956, the government of Sudan failed to implement diverse policies which would promote national integration. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS)'s success on national integration will largely depend on learning from the errors made by the previous Sudanese government and pursue

diversity in integration as opposed to assimilating other different tribes such as the Misseriya who are culturally linked to the North.

To comprehend the complexities of nation building in the newly established state of South Sudan, the next chapter discusses relevant literature related to the subject of nation building in general and the history of nation building in post-colonial Africa, specifically.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the comprehensive review of literature related to the study and covers key thematic areas namely: The formation of South Sudan, The North and South conflict, the role played by external factors in the nation establishment, the resource dimensions of the conflict and literature on the sources of tensions in South Sudan. The chapter seeks to conceptualise nation-building as it relates to the present study, the ultimate objective being to provide a better understanding of the road travelled by South Sudan from 1956 through the attainment of on the 9th of July 2011. The chapter concentrates on the current state of ideologies in Africa as preliminary thoughts.

There has never been a clear definition and consensus amongst scholars on these issues, in that Africa has been home to a conflicting wide range of discourses, ideologies and paradigms, as such concepts such as nation-building are highly contested. The lack of consensus on the definitions mirrors serious challenges around nation-building in South Sudan. In order to understand better the concept of nation-building, the chapter is devoted to outlining the following: the genesis of nation building and the three types of nation building that have been used throughout history. There has been a standoff between state building and nation building, and as such, the chapter also seeks to explain the thin line between the two developmental concepts. Lastly, the chapter will also focus on the preferred definition of nation building to be adopted in Africa, particularly in the case of South Sudan.

2.2 History of Nation Building

Nation building is one of the most sensitive topics in the broader discourse of African politics. It is sensitive in the sense that it encompasses issues relating to ethnicity, politics of marginalisation, and colonial legacies such as artificial boundaries, among other issues troubling the continent. In this study, three explanations will suffice in accounting for the origins of nation building. First, nation building as a political science theory gained prominence in the decade after the Second World War and its main proponents were Karl Deutsch and Reinhard Bendix. Scholars argue that nation building is an evolutionary process and not an abrupt event and this is based on the examples of Italian city states Rome, Milan, and Sicily, which morphed into a nation and the development of China from warring which was possible due to development in political, economic and cultural cohesion (Stephenson, 2005).

Various cities and warring states existed in isolation with one another, but due to interaction sub-states and cultural loyalties eventually were superseded by loyalties toward larger entities. This has also been explained in the social integration theory which explains the origin of Western nation states through the fusion of societies through processes of assimilation or amalgamation (Mills, 1946).

Secondly, in non-Western societies, nation building became popular following the period of decolonisation in Africa. The new wave of independence was accompanied by the need to forge an all-inclusive policy that would accommodate societies with various ethnic, religious and racial loyalties to form a national identity. Ethnic division was one of the leading legacies handed over to the elite nationalist leaders after decolonisation and was very influential in the discourse of nation building. Lastly, nation building originates from a neoliberal thinking based on the premise that advanced democracies such as the United States of America, Britain and France have a “moral burden” to democratise the unknown world. This explanation was used during the Cold War where the US intervened in Vietnam’s holy crusade war in a bid to export democracy in its ideological war with the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, nation building has retained different components following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US and the subsequent war on terror and its victims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. In relation to the US foreign policy, nation building has been described by scholars as the use of armed forces in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy. With globalisation, nation building has adopted a new

approach, centred on failed states, weak economies and the subsequent of foreign intervention to help in the context of development (Dobbins, 2003).

2.3 Debates on nation building and state building

There has been a lot confusion over the relevance and applicability of nation building vis-à-vis state building concepts. In some cases, both concepts have been interchangeably used and this has brought undesirable consequences in the context of Africa, especially in the fact-finding research and missions. The application of state building and nation building interchangeably has led to the recurrence of issues such as ethnic related conflicts some 50 years after independence in countries such as Kenya where 1200 lives were lost in the post 2007 election crisis.

Nation building refers to the process of constructing a national identity with the aid of historical, cultural and religious realities. Central to the process is the role played by the indigenous people in forging an identity where an all-inclusive participation is a prerequisite to downplay leftist tendencies which find fertile ground in the politics of the marginalised. On the other hand, state building is an appendage to nation building in the sense that it aims at creating and strengthening institutions and apparatus of the state, paying special attention to political democracy, economic growth and infrastructural development. There has been a tendency to downplay the building of a cultural identity aspect focusing more on the technical aspects of building state capacity (Scott, 2007).

2.4 Nation building and globalisation

Since the Westphalia settled norms of state sovereignty and intervention in 1648, nation building has been the responsibility of sovereign states based on their unique history, culture and identity, and this was interpreted as state sovereignty. However, following the wave of globalisation, there have been radical changes in international political, economic, and social relations. The logic behind the phenomena of globalisation is that, everything is related and interrelated in the current world system.

Whilst globalisation has wrought significant strides in the political sphere in the sense of democracy and human rights, economic prosperity as a result of neoliberal capitalist policies and cultural diversity has also led to new dynamics in international relations such as the erosion of

state sovereignty, ethnic culture and untold suffering to developing regions. The result has been the emergence of fundamentalist groups as a response to modernity.

Components required for nation building, thus have significantly changed the idea that a strong nation entails history. The involvement of the indigenous people and culture has been replaced by the post-Cold War consideration of the consolidation of democracy and strong state institutions. It is reasoned that nation building is at its best when a country pursues liberal economic policies and good governance. The US has intervened in Iraq and Afghanistan under the pretext of nation building after the countries fell into the category of failed pariah states, and as such, foreign intervention was necessary for nation building. However, the results have been a significant loss of nationhood in Iraq and Afghanistan through the imposition of alien cultures. Whilst some countries in Africa enjoy economic prosperity courtesy of capitalism, the sense of nationhood has since vanished subsequently paving way for ethnic related conflicts like in the case of Kenya in 2007.

In the context of South Sudan, a typical African nation with a history of previously marginalised people and a common hatred toward Sudan, is therefore necessary for the Government of South Sudan to reconsider and identify the place of national identity in a globalised world.

State building initiatives such as infrastructural development, a positive economy and strong state apparatus and institutions are very important given the underdevelopment of the state, but they can only complement and thrive in a united nation, thus avoiding the politics of the marginalisation.

2.5 Nation Building and the African Renaissance

Nation building in the context of Africa, particularly South Sudan must be located within the paradigms of African Renaissance. Mbeki (1998:210) argues that the African Renaissance as developed by former President Thabo Mbeki is the reawakening of the continent and a “third moment” in Africa’s post-colonial history. Vusi Mavimbela, Mbeki’s former political advisor, the first moment was the decolonisation process and the second was the 1990s’ democratic upsurge. Nation building in South Sudan should represent a change in Africa’s capacity to deal with problems ravaging the continent.

Hardly ten years into the decolonisation process and the wave of democracy, the euphoria of the 1960s in Africa was hijacked when the continent degenerated into political decay. Africa was ravaged by ethnic related conflicts, notably in Rwanda, Sudan, to name but a few. The continent is home to different ethnic groups which during colonialism and colonial masters played off one side against the other with the aim of effectively assimilating Africans into the colonial empires of Western countries. What came out of such treachery was deep seated and entrenched hatred amongst Africans and the erection of artificial boundaries which have remained a curse haunting nation building in Africa up to date (Meredith, 2005).

2.6 Nation building in South Sudan

While in stable political systems, state-building is concerned with rebuilding state institutions. In the case of South Sudan, it is mostly about establishing and building state institutions and their legitimacy. The idea of a central authority in the form of state which depends on her citizens for survival and provision of social services in the form of taxation, is not only foreign to some of the communities of South Sudan, but also new to some of the leaders. The idea of being constrained by the bureaucratic red tape, procedures and guidelines, are entirely new to some leaders and communities. The period of the conflict and the marginalisation of the South by the government in Khartoum and internal marginalisation within the South itself, affected forms of political organised administration. Whereas traditional authorities existed in some locations, their efficacy and reach was limited by many factors, including the fact that the populations were usually trekking, running away from combat operations. Some territories were administered by different warlords with different forms of organisation. South Sudan has a long history of conflict, stretching from colonial, through the post-colonial period. This history shapes the current narrative and approach to state-building. But more importantly, it is similar to the American liberation narrative. The American liberation puts emphasis on the English tyranny from which the Americans liberated themselves. The narrative of liberation in South Sudan is that of the black Africans liberating themselves from their Arab tormentors – who not only marginalised the black Africans but looted their natural resources to aid their development in the Arab north.

Since the 1970s when regional autonomy was introduced in South Sudan, there have been contradictions between the Equatorians and the Dinkas over control of administrative structures, a process that usually caused displacement of the former by the latter (Branch & Mampilly, 2005).

With the recognition of traditional authorities, Equatorians have since the 2002 conference, demanded self rule free of Dinka dominance. In a follow-up conference in 2011, the governor of Eastern Equatoria state, Louis Lobong Lajore, called upon the South Sudan government to grant the region; a) two Positions in supreme Federal Ministries, b) a second vice President, c) thirty ambassadors, and d) equal representation in ministries/political appointments and civil service (Sudan Tribune, 2011).

The violence that is taking place in South Sudan at the local level, has much to do with how traditional authorities are handling the process of access to land, which is considered by citizens to be in the traditional geographical spaces. In the absence of a functional state apparatus to redress historical injustices, those populations are using their traditional authorities to settle scores in particular, with those considered ethnic foreigners in their native administrations. Violence targeted against the ethnic foreigners is justified and is remorseless because its target is not kith and kin. Some of the traditional leaders played significant roles during the liberation. The reluctance to reform the traditional authorities while emphasising sharing of power between these institutions and the local governments, is part of a broader post-conflict reward process.

This has spilt over to other groups who also contributed to the liberation struggle but are yet to be compensated for their contribution. It makes the state an institution for settling war debts. The SPLM, although reformist in its initial stance towards governance, changed along the way during the liberation struggle. Factors for this change, mostly stem from the internal dynamics within the movement, and the way these internal changes shaped the SPLM's approach to statecraft. The triumph of the separatist faction within the SPLM gave birth to the ideology of power sharing rather than democratisation as a mechanism for elite inclusion. But this mechanism is very elitist and tends to individualise complex political and socio-economic problems; it has more to do with political co-option rather than political reform. Applied to traditional authorities, power sharing has hardly made governance inclusive, participatory, or accountable and legitimate, because these institutions are hardly inclusive and participatory.

By incorporating these institutions into the local governance system, the new republic risks instability at the grassroots. Despite the rhetoric of a civic South Sudan citizenship, a territorialised

citizenship and a rights discourse is burgeoning at the local level. There are also concerns about power sharing and competencies between the local governments and the traditional authorities, at least at the level of the Bomas. Whereas local governments are elected, the traditional authorities are mainly populated by selected persons. Elections subject local government leaders to public scrutiny, but such a process does not exist for most of the traditional authorities.

It is also true that the SPLM leadership finds itself inclined not to reform the traditional authorities because of their political influence and role in the liberation struggle. Debate on reforming the traditional authorities is blurred within the current discussion on state-building because, any attempts at reforming the traditional authorities threatens their survival and power. However, if traditional institutions are to remain part of the governance matrix as stipulated in the Local Government Act, 2009, then they may need to be brought into the fold of governance reform and restructuring. Some of the reforms within the traditional authorities will have to comprise, a) inclusion of women and youth in their leadership structures; b) subjecting them to open and competitive periodic election of their leaders; c) de-territorialising and de-ethnicising the customary domain under which the traditional authorities operate. Some of these reforms will undoubtedly make traditional authorities more inclusive, predictable and accountable, but will also make them lose much of their traditional aspects.

The desire to retain traditional authorities mirrors a concern for the preservation of cultures; and to do so, the political leadership in South Sudan may need to separate culture from politics and allow the traditional authorities to focus on the former, rather than the latter. This may be a difficult, but not impossible choice. Some of the traditional leaders are political as well and want to keep that status quo. Ethnic clashes exemplified by the contest between the Equatorians and the Dinkas over control of administrative structures, a process that often caused displacement of the former by the latter (Branch & Mampilly, 2005; Sudan Tribune, 2011).

2.7 The Essential Steps of Nation Building

Experienced nation-builders say that in addition to enough financial resources, international political will, and time, the priorities are:

- Security: guaranteeing citizens a safe environment;

- Political reform: building a civil society, developing strong local and provincial governments, and ensuring freedom of the press and other civil liberties;
- Economic reconstruction: restoring economic infrastructure by establishing lines of credit for business, restarting industry, and creating jobs, especially in the agricultural sector which accounts for most of developing countries' gross domestic product; and
- Strengthening legal institutions: ensuring a functional and independent judiciary.

These and other issues are addressed in the January 2003 report, "*Play to Win*," from the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction sponsored by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army.

This crisis is very complex as it involves equity in resource, wealth and power sharing in the country. There is always a struggle in the way wealth and resources are distributed, like in the context of South Sudan, in relation to question of oil (Roskin, 1988).

2.8 Some Scholarly Views on the Nation building in South Sudan

2.8.1 Predominant Islamic ideology

Islam is defined as a voluntary “submission” or “surrender” to the will of God and is derived from the word “*salaam*” meaning peace. The predominant Islamic ideology was a decisive factor in the history of the relations between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan after independence in 1956, and was the main cause of the civil war in Sudan. The ideology stems from the fact that regardless of hundreds of years of intermarriages between Africans and Arabs, the latter viewed themselves as explicitly Arabs and dominant, thus framing nation identity in Sudan along Arab-Islamic lines (Nantulya, 2003). The National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan’s attempt to establish a theocratic state by “Arabizing” Southern Sudan through the introduction of *sharia*² laws and its subsequent holy wars against infidels, rebel groups in the South who are traditionally known to be of African origin constitutes a major source of conflict in South Sudan.

Deng (1995) factors out, through historical analysis, how the line among Arab and African in Sudan is a way extra blurred than believed by using the populace. In addition, it has additionally been argued that a lot of the South Sudanese and African identity turned into built in reaction to

²Refers to the moral and religious code of laws of Muslims

guidelines of Arabisation and other sorts of oppression and exclusion from the north (Deng 1995, Sharkey 2008). This has caused some assertions that there may be little uniting the residents of South Sudan aside from their collective competition to the North (Martin 2002). Similarly, diverse commentators have pointed out the lack of social concord and team spirit in South Sudan (Gerenge 2015). However, few have engaged extensively by means of what strategies a sense of team spirit can be constructed or even systemically reviewed, and which tactics resulted in the failure to construct a feel of network.

2.8.2. Colonial legacy

Colonialism has been subject to different interpretation and explanation; however, it is commonly understood as the establishment, exploitation, maintenance, acquisition and expansion of colonies of one territory by people from another country. It can be interpreted as the practice of domination which involves the subjugation of one people to another (Kohn, 2012). Colonial legacy can be defined as the sum of the political, economic, social, cultural structures and handed over to the nationalist leadership by colonial administrators which affected post independent Africa. In Sudan, the British played one side off the other, thus creating a rift and hate between the Northerners and Southerners. The legacy created a case of elite domination in which the North would religiously pursue racism against the Southerners (Field, 2000; Alemazung, 2010).

2.8.3 Resource curse

According to Neumayer (2004), the resource curse refers to a state in which *“being richly endowed with natural resources can threaten a country’s long-term prosperity as natural resource-intensive economies grow slower over time than economies that are less natural resource-intensive”*. Oil was discovered in the 1970s in Southern Sudan and became one of the major sources of conflict in the country. The government used oil revenue to fund its campaign against the rebels in the South. Oil was one of the factors prolonging the conflict in Sudan, as international players such as China with stakes in Sudan’s oil backed the government and blocked any resolutions at the United Nations, which would find a lasting solution to the crisis. Oil has been a curse to Sudan even after

the independence of South Sudan and has been identified as one of the obstacles to nation building and the mending of relations between Sudan and South Sudan.

2.8.4 Politics of Marginalisation

Marginalisation is a social concept found in the discourses of sociology and psychology with its components ranging from individual, ethnic, national and regional considerations. Marginalisation can be political, economic and cultural, and in Africa it has resulted in unprecedented challenges such as civil wars and genocides.

The politics of marginalisation have been the bane of African politics. This is an asymmetrical relationship within a state where undesirable actions are directed at those perceived as undesirable or have been removed or excluded from state activities and resources. In Sudan, racism was at the centre of relations between the North and South, with the South being excluded in political, economic and cultural activities of the state. In the post independent South Sudan, nation building will depend heavily on the ability of the government and the nation to coexist with minority groups to discourage feelings of resentment.

2.8.5 Structural crisis

Structural crisis is best understood as a situation created in Sudan as a legacy of colonialism and the policies of the ruling elite. The system of governance in Sudan is opposed to development and democratisation, but enriching and preserving the elitist government. The political, judicial and economic systems are bent on consolidating the predatory nature of the government.

2.8.6 Cultural Assimilation

The process of integration perceived minority, cultural and religious groups into higher cultures. Assimilation is an integration theory propounded by John Stuart Mill who argues that the idea of fusing cultures will create homogeneity in a society in order to promote social fibre. Cultural assimilation is the social process of absorbing one cultural group into harmony with another. In the context of the research, cultural assimilation occupies a central position in the Islamic government ideology. The Sudanese government policy of trying to forcefully integrate non-Arab

cultures into an Arab-Islamic from 1956 to 2005, is an example of an attempt at cultural assimilation.

In the post 2011 independent, South Sudan cultural assimilation is an end, which brings stability to the new state given the multicultural setting of the state. It is different from the amalgamation of the Sudanese government which was based on assimilation.

2.8.7 State Building

State building is an appendage of nation building in the sense that it aims at creating and strengthening institutions and apparatus of the state by paying special attention to political democracy, economic growth, and infrastructural development. There has been a tendency to downplay the building of the cultural identity aspect focusing more on the technical aspects of building state capacity.

2.8.8 Nation Building

Nation building refers to the process of constructing a national identity with the aid of historical, cultural, and religious realities. Central to this process is the role played by the indigenous people in forging an identity where an all-inclusive participation is a prerequisite to downplay leftist tendencies which find fertile ground in the politics of the marginalized.

2.9 The formation of South Sudan

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has faced a nation building challenge which culminated in two civil wars (the first lasting from 1955-1972 and the second from 1983-2005). The causes of these two conflicts are diverse and emerge from inequality, political exclusion, the "resource curse" and historical enmities (Ayers, 2010; Martin, 2002; and Thomas, 2015). During the second conflict, predominantly between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM / A) and the Khartoum government, the conflict was often narrowly framed as an Arab-African or Muslim - Christian conflict between North and South, despite a more complex identity (Ayers, 2010; Zink, 2014). As a result, a unified Sudan has become almost impossible, despite SPLM / A leader, John Garang's preference for this solution, leading to southern Sudan's secession in 2011 (Panozzo, 2011; Young, 2003; Zink, 2014). South Sudan's independence from Sudan, followed by the

signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which gave priority to a unified Sudan, provided for a referendum to secede (Thomas, 2015).

While the moment of secession gave the impression of unity, southern Sudan has been fragmented and divided on economic and ethnic grounds before and after independence. Thus, the conflict that erupted in December 2013 suggests that the nation building process has proven more difficult than expected. Racial framing is being replaced by ethnic framing in the power battles between the current president, Salva Kiir and his rivals (Zink, 2014). These ethnic tensions are not new as they were often dramatised during earlier conflicts as well, especially as some ethnic groups were utilised by Khartoum to engage in proxy wars (Hutchinson, 2001; Martin, 2002; Thomas, 2015). During the conflict and since the eruption of violence once again in 2013, many international actors and bodies have been involved in peacebuilding in the country (Ajak & Hirsch, 2015; Gatimu, 2014; Kisangani, 2015). This is despite the significant amount of resources allowed.

The conflict in South Sudan is well-studied and provides an important foundation for understanding the conflict. While different authors argue for an emphasis on different aspects of conflict and crisis in Sudan, these varying works highlight some of the key challenges of nation building and state-building in the postcolonial era. Francis Deng, South Sudanese author and politician is a key authority on the conflict. In “War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan: A Historical Perspective” (Deng, 1995). Amir Idris (2005) similarly provides a historical analysis of the politics of identity in Sudan, linking it with processes of colonialism and state training. Copnall (2014: 9-40) also provides some insights into the identity landscape of Sudan. While many of these works focus on the division between Arab and African identities (Deng, 1995; Idris 2005; Sharkey 2008), some works discuss the ethnic differences in southern Sudan, both before and after secession (Frahm 2015; Hutchinson 2001; Jok & Hutchinson 1999).

2.10 Conclusion

The chapter discussed the conceptual underpinnings of the study focusing on the notion of nation building by situating it within the broader context of theory and literature. Literature was reviewed thematically in relation to the issues surrounding nation building. Theories such as social integration and social identity were explored to expose the diverse perspectives from which the concept of nation building is understood. It emerged that nation building, and state building are contentious terms which are used interchangeably in some instances. The role played by oil in the

politics of the Sudanese region rendered the resource as a “curse” because it furthered the never-ending pursuit of the North’s hegemony over the South in ways that separate development emerged. This leads to the next chapter which will focus on the causes the challenges of nation building in South Sudan were the scope and nature of the crisis will be analysed and the human security implications of the crisis, social fragmentation along party politics, electoral related violence and the influence of external factors in intensifying the conflict are explored.

THE FOUNDING OF SOUTH SUDAN AS AN SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE

CHAPTER 3

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided extensive review of literature, paying attention to scholarly debates regarding the founding of South Sudan. Key terms and concepts such as nation building, nation building were also explained. This chapter dissects the North-South conflict since the independence of Sudan, the Sudanese civil war from 1955 to 1983, the various manifestations of the conflict in Sudan, the social and economic landscape leading to the formation of South Sudan, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Kenya, as well as the role played by the African Union and the East African countries in the resolution of the conflict. The role played by the multinational corporations and non-governmental organisation in the civil war in Sudan will also be discussed.

3.2 Colonial Inequalities and its legacy in Sudan

Sudan, like the rest of the African continent, was not spared during the colonial conquest – a period of separate development known as colonialism. Sudan gained independence from Britain in 1956 with Ismail al-Azhari of the National Unionist Party (NUP) as prime minister. It was developed separately in the sense that colonial powers such as Great Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium fraudulently divided Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1886 and resulted in the expropriation of resources and the land. Potholm (1979) argues that colonialism spread in Africa according to the

following basic principles: colonial systems were imposed or at least maintained using force; the colonial systems were authoritarian, of undemocratic form and substance; colonial systems were disruptive; colonial systems were racist; and settlements were a source of income. In the Anglophone sphere of influence of the British protectorates, the indirect rule was used to promote total control and to negate the political, economic and social rights of the indigenous people in question. The result was not only a denial of these rights, but also a deep resentment among the natives of each other.

Mamdani (1998) traced the roots of tribalism in South Sudan back to the British colonial era. The British solution to ruling a multi-ethnic state with mobile populations, he argued, was to draw hard territorial boundaries around identity. The system held ethnicity as an exclusive, as opposed to permeable, identity within a bounded homeland. The result, Mamdani asserted, was the politicisation of ethnicity and fragmentation among groups, which directly contributed to structural tension and mass violence. Similar sentiments are shared by Ottaway and El-Sadany (2012) who concur that, Sudan had been officially divided into two areas: The North and the South.

The South, African and “heathen,” appeared to be a remote region without resources, was best left to its own devices and those of missionaries, but also to be protected from slave raiders. Therefore, the divide and rule strategy by the colonisers still plays a major role in the problems of Sudan even to date. Mamdani (2011) has argued that ‘colonialism began with a programme of ethnic cleansing’. To make sense of the post-colonial crisis of citizenship, it is imperative to go beyond the paradigm of viewing colonialism simply as a system of economic exploitation to viewing it as a legal project. This expands the scope of inquiry and enables one to understand how the colonial state uses law to de-nationalise individuals, thereby depriving them of their political rights. The colonial legacy of developing the North created a Sudan which was unequal, hence the political and economic contestations between the North and the South was conceived. The case of the conflict in the Sudan project is a typical scenario of African politics; first Sudan stands as a case of the challenges inherent from colonialism, the divide and rule tactics used by the British to gain leverage over the Sudanese through the infamous Southern Policy (1914-1946).

Apartheid in South Africa developed out of geographical and numerical quarantining of populations based on tribes (Mamdani, 1996). The tendency in South Sudan is to justify traditional authorities because of recognition of tradition; but two questions are not addressed. The first one, is what tradition is being recognised? The second one is, whose tradition is being recognised? Inherent in the notion of recognising tradition is a broader desire to fight either those who fraudulently acquired land or those who have settled in geographical spaces considered not their homelands. The other tendency, at least outside the political leadership, is to justify the traditional authorities as vehicles for reconciliation, peace building and development, where the formal state institutions are weak or non-existent. Let us focus on the relationship between migration, citizenship, and geographical quarantining in the name of recognising traditional authorities and its implication on state-building in South Sudan

3.3 THE EXCLUSIONIST COLONIAL POLICY OF 1914-1946

The Southern policy was a colonial policy designed to exclude Arabs from administration, commerce and colonisation in the south of the country (Mayo, 1994). Henderson (1965) concurs with Mayo (1994) that in Sudan, prior to the British invasion, the British attempted to mitigate dissonant relations between South and South by creating a protectorate in the South.

Before the European encroachment of the Southerners on the trans-Saharan slave trade (1840-1900) and later against the British from 1900 to 1920, the southern policy was a colonial policy aimed at excluding Arab Muslims from northern Sudan, economics and social activities in the south of the country. The Southern policy was enforced by the Passport and Permit Orders of 1922 and strengthened by the 1925 Permit and Trade Order. The Southern policy, according to Mayo (1994), is one of the main causes of disunity between Arabs and Africans in Sudan. However, Henderson (1962) argues that British policy was aimed at protecting the rather submissive and innocent non-South Arabs from the Northern war monger, given the asymmetrical previous relations of invasion and slave trade by Northerners. A cliché that tolerates colonialism while minimising the profound effects it has on the stability of the continent.

Scholars such as Heleta (2008) and Mayo (1994) share the view that the Southern Policy Isolated Southern regions from the rest of the country and slowed down the economic and social development of these regions. Ironically, the British invested in the Northern region, which was

Muslim dominated through the implementation of liberal economic policies and political strengthening of the Muslims. They argue that Islam was developed through building mosques and other related Islamic teachings whilst Christian missionaries concentrated on the South, converting Southerners and introducing English as the medium of instruction as a way of containing the spread of Islam. As highlighted before, the policy gradually divided Northerners and Southerners, and in 1956 the remnants of the Southern Policy developed into deep-seated creationistic tendencies which gradually assumed the shape of armed insurrection.

Furthermore, as mentioned by Heleta (2008) and Mayo (1994), the southern policy isolated the southern regions from the rest of the country and slowed the economic and social development of these regions. Ironically, the British invested in the northern region, dominated by the liberalisation of liberal economic policies and the strengthening of Muslim politics. These developments or administrative deficiencies propelled Islamic hegemonic tendencies. Islam was developed through building mosques and other related Islamic teachings while Christian missionaries who concentrated on the South, converted the inhabitants of the South and introduced English as a medium of instruction as a means of containing the spread of Islam. According to Benjamin (2004), the origins of Islamic hegemony tendencies can be traced back to the early years of Arab encroachment in Sudan, during the Trans Saharan Slave Trade and the subsequent Turko-Egyptian invasion from the 1820s onwards. As highlighted before, the policy gradually divided Northerners and Southerners and in 1956 the remnants of the Southern Policy developed into deep-seated creationistic tendencies which gradually assumed the shape of armed insurrection. It is clear from the above discussion that there was bound to be conflict as the North and the South were diverse in language and religion.

Religion was a pivotal factor in the conflict in Sudan Deng (2001). Islam was not only a religion and a way of life, but also a culture and ethnic identity associated with Arabism. The Southerners viewed Islam as a religion embedded in racial and cultural phenomenon that excluded black Africans. Throughout the colonial period, Britain worsened the situation as an accessory to the crime through developing and furthering the Islamic North politically, economically and religiously.

3.4 Political Islamisation

The period after 1956 was characterised by the structural crisis that saw massive Islamisation of the country. According to Oguda (1973), the greatest achievement of Arabism in Sudan was the unreserved acceptance of the fact that it is an Arab state because only about 40% of the population was Arab. Indeed, the predominance of Sudanese Arabs in the culture, politics, administration, commerce and industry sectors of the country made it a *de facto* Arab state. Makinda's (1993) argument that the supremacy and self-confidence of the Arabs has promoted the hegemony of the North against the South. South conflicts were to be almost insoluble while their economic and political dominance, even though northern Muslims began to assert themselves, were traditionally aimed at fostering assimilation into Arab culture. Since independence, the country's main political parties have failed to reach agreement on a united and inclusive constitutional system while promoting the adoption of *Sharia law*. Islamisation was based on two external forces or actors, that is; Government of the United States and Great Britain. The policy of assimilation in Sudan suffocated Christianity and other secular religions. Apart from political exclusion, after 1962, under General Abboud who took power through a coup, there was an attempt to dilute the influence of Christianity on a model of civilisation of the South by regulating missionary activities under various restrictive laws. In 1964, Christian missionaries were banned in Sudan.

Deng (1995) notes that the political and historical landscape of Sudan has inevitably cultivated leftist politics between Southerners. Political and religious marginalisation, as part of the policy pursued by the many Islamic governments after independence, militated against the North in the sense that it paved the way for the search for an identity among Southerners. As further presented by Deng (1995), the Southerners were convinced that they shared a common oppression during the times of slavery, colonialism and Arab-dominated politics, which threatened the dreams and hopes associated with independence. In a restrictive political, cultural and religious environment, such feelings have turned into armed conflict. Scholars such as Oguda (1973) and Deng (1995) view such radical Islamic fundamentalism as a means of assimilating Southerners to this ideological assimilation of Arabism to African religion and culture, as the basis for the ravaging conflict.

3.5 The Civil Wars in Sudan and the Legacy of the Conflicts

Typologies of the civil war as presented by De Waal (2014), Daly and Sikainga (1993) as well as Makinda (1993), show that the roots of the war are deep. After the imperial conquests of the nineteenth century, the peripheries of Sudan were ruled by the authorities and militarised tribalism and were clearly underdeveloped. The inhabitants of the southern periphery were considered second-class citizens and, at worst, as commodities (De Waal, 2014). Following a violent pacification which was not concluded until the 1920s, colonial governance was limited to "maintenance and upkeep". Makinda (1993) states that after independence, the successive governments of Khartoum ruled on behalf of the commercial and military elites, creating a governing system characterised by extreme economic inequality and tribalised counterinsurgency.

As Ottaway and El-Sadany (2012) have argued, Sudan was a former Anglo-Egyptian colony. After independence in 1956, the country plunged into an internal conflict. The civil war was largely a war of secession, a result of the Southern government's ongoing economic and political neglect, which was an extension of the country's colonial legacy (De Waal, 2014). After a period of relative peace, lasting eleven years following the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, regional marginalisation persisted at the outbreak of the second civil war. De Waal (2014), notes that absolute independence was largely a training war in the "New Sudan", where inclusive governance would become normative. A group of rebel groups in the south fought the government under the banner of SPLA / M. According to Human Rights Watch (1999), the civil war has devastated the country, particularly the South, leaving an estimated two million Sudanese dead and twice as many displaced.

According to Daly and Sikainga (1993), in September 1983 the infamous 'September Law' was enforced reinforcing *Sharia law* as the basis of the Sudanese legal system. This government decision was resented by secular Muslims and non-Arabs in Sudan. The resentment ran concurrently with a rise in the price of basic commodities such as food and fuel. This paved way for the second civil war. De Waal (2014) asserts that although some Southern Sudanese leaders recognised the need for the transformation of the entire political economy of the country early, most focused on their racist exclusion from the spoils of government and sought to be members of the ruling clique on the same terms as their northern peers.

Garang accused the southern rebel leaders, during Sudan's first civil war (1955–72), of being "jobbists", intent solely on gaining political posts for personal ends. The 1972 peace agreement

brought the leaders of the Anyanya rebel movement back to southern Sudan, along with returnees from East Africa and “insiders” who had worked with the Khartoum government. Furthermore, these groups competed fiercely for jobs in the new autonomous South Regional Government, in which ‘a high political or administrative positions were a very important foundation of wealth and a basis of conversion of value into political support and clientelism’. The above statements bring to light that the Southern part of Sudan was underdeveloped, hence the political elite were hungry to amass wealth which is a time bomb as it creates an unequal society and exacerbating poverty between those without political ties and the rest of the people. The Human rights watch (1994) concurs with the above view, arguing that during the 1970s in northern Sudan, the established mercantile class of traders and farmers was overtaken by a middle class that was parasitic on the state and used government contracting as a route to enrichment. In southern Sudan, there was no indigenous middle class apart from government office holders. Thus, the second civil war in 1983 was premised on politics or marginality and the quest for political representation.

It was no mere coincidence that oil was discovered in Sudan at the same time as the return of civil war (Patey, 2007). In 1983 the Khartoum government, at that time led by President Jaafar Mohammad al-Nimeiri, violated the standing Addis Ababa Agreement and continued along historical lines of political and economic marginalisation of the South. In addition to establishing *sharia* law in the entire country, including the Christian and animist South, and dissolving the Southern Regional Assembly, Nimeiri moved to alter southern state boundaries to ensure the North would have access to future oil earnings. Hutchinson (1998) asserts that the rising influence of the Islamic Brotherhood, led by the then Attorney General, Hassan al-Turabi, realised the significance of Chevron's findings that the South would later succeed in changing state boundaries once in power of the government as the National Islamic Front (NIF). These ongoing political and economic violations inflamed grievances among southerners to the point civil war re-emerging in South Sudan. Khartoum's political manoeuvres to capture oil reserves would also be accompanied by on-the-ground tactics that contributed to existing processes of the economically related violence that would eventually characterise the North – South civil war. Johnson (2003) asserts that from the outbreak of the North – South civil war in the early 1980s until its formal end after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) greed, retribution, poverty, external intervention, and religious and ethnic divides all motivated violence. However, the overarching cause for the civil war remained the same as the one before it: a

historical consistency of oppressive governance from Khartoum, promoting regional marginalisation and exploiting social divisions.

The next section focuses on one other conspicuous dimension of the conflict; that is oil as a resource curse.

3.6 The Discovery of Oil, and its Impact on the Political and Economic Landscape in Sudan

The discovery of oil worsened the relations between the North and the South. According Collier & Hoeffler (2011), the exploration of oil in Sudan began in the late 1950s and was largely conducted offshore in the Red Sea. Furthermore, Collier and Hoeffler (2011) postulate that Chevron first discovered natural gas in 1974, 120 km south east of Port Sudan. Oil changed the political landscape in the sense that it brought an end to the Addis Ababa Accord of 1973. A study by Le Billon & Savage (2016) reveals that Sudan's history of oil development stems in part from the Yom Kippur war and the oil crisis of 1973, which led oil companies to look for new reserves outside the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries and the US to reach for new allies.

The discovery of oil in Sudan is reflective of how a resource can be a trigger for political instability in a country and an impediment to democratic good governance on the part of the government. The discovery of oil unleashed the second civil war and blocked any resolutions to meaningful peace between the North and South as both sides wanted a stake over the oil (Yates, 2006). As alluded to by Field (2000), the discovery of oil came at a time when conflict in Sudan was deeply rooted in the context of the economic system of the nation. Oil was discovered at a time the nation was grappling with economic problems. The country's debt was at US\$20 billion and the government was in no position to secure loans.

The Addis Ababa Accord of 1972 was signed between the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) under the leadership of Joseph Lagu and the then incumbent President Nimeri to end a 17-year civil war in which the Southern region of the country would retain a degree of autonomy. As noted by Collier & Hoeffler (2011), the discovery of oil in the South led to Nimeri interpreting the Addis Ababa Accord in his own way and redrawing boundaries of the South to include the Bentiu region where oil had been discovered. According to Switzer (2002),s the move by the government to redraw boundaries was calculated as another typical example of the Northern elite's

quest to profit at the expense of the South. Under the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement, the central government-controlled oil exploration and production, but the southern regional government had rights to all government profits on exports from the region and taxes from private businesses there. In 1980, Numeiri redrew the borders between North and South, creating a new province unity state around the town of Bentiu. This state was allegedly to be shared as an asset for both regions, but in practice brought the oil provinces under central government jurisdiction, effectively disenfranchising the South.

Furthermore, Hery (2003) argues that oil will undoubtedly be a decisive factor in the politics of Sudan. However, oil has brought untold sufferings to the people of Sudan. It was ironic that a resource which was meant to resuscitate the economy at a time the country was debt-ridden was used to fuel and fan the civil war efforts by the government. The government used oil revenue to purchase military equipment and it is estimated that each day the Sudanese government accrued close to a \$ 1 million in profits from oil (Large, 2018). The NIF in power was determined to control the oil industry and this meant the forcible removal of the people who were settled in oil regions, thus sparking a humanitarian disaster. A case in point was in 1999 when the government forces uprooted civilians in the Ruweng County, which borders the oil field in the Unity state.

Nyaba (1999) explains that the government of Sudan exacerbated the conflict by using oil revenues in developing the North at the expense of the South. Different oil magnets such as the Talisman Energy of Canada (TEC) and the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) heavily invested in building oil pipelines in the North at the expense of the South and the upshot was the dependency of the South on the North economically, even in the post 2011 independence era of South Sudan. The distribution of oil and its revenue almost threatened the CPA agreement and even in the post-independence era of South Sudan, oil related issues have resumed hostility between Sudan and South Sudan, threatening peace between the two nations.

It has been generally agreed across the academic and political divide that oil occupies a very significant position as an accessory to the conflict in Sudan as noted in studies conducted by Yates (2006), Patey (2017) and Large (2018). The discovery of oil was significant to the survival of the

Sudanese government in the late 1970s (Field, 2000). Similar sentiments are shared by Lind (2001) who argues that given the role played by oil in sustaining the civil war efforts and the economy of Sudan would be easy to understand how and why it was difficult to implement the CPA in terms of sharing oil resources equally. Generally there was fear based on Sudan's experience that sharing oil and revenues equally would elevate the previously incapacitated Southern region economically and would in the process pose a threat to Sudan.

As noted by Goldsmith (2001), the government of Sudan had granted only limited access for humanitarian organisations to the oil field regions, arguably allowing hunger to complete the work of land clearing. The World Food Program Report of (2010) notes that the town of Bentiu experienced a 24% malnutrition rate in 2000. Sudanese government officials regularly blocked relief assistance to about 15 locations including to the Nuba mountains; and in 1999 many humanitarian organizations were forced to evacuate from Bentiu (United States of America Committee for Refugees, 2001). What worsened the humanitarian catastrophe is that the Sudanese military also frequently targeted humanitarian vehicles and civilians gathered for food distribution, a practice condemned recently by the UN Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Commission. As noted in the Commission on Human Rights (2001) on April 16, 2001, a plane carrying relief for the Nuba mountains was bombed at Kawda airstrip when hundreds of civilians had gathered at the airstrip to receive food aid. This blocking led to many deaths from famine and diseases which could have been avoided had there been no disturbances to humanitarian work.

Lind (2001) asserts that oil development exacerbated the North – South civil war by representing an economic prize. The control of oil therefore, widened the rift between the north and the South and escalated the tension. As the government advanced to capture territory in oil-bearing regions and the SPLA moved to disrupt exploration and extraction activities, the economic logic of the conflict rose substantially.

As in other cases of civil wars in the developing world, Sudan demonstrated that Multinational corporations (MNCs) in the extractive industry were essential as economic vehicles that allowed domestic actors to realise value from natural resources. This detrimental influence underlines the urgent need to find solutions that ensure that extractive industry corporations indeed 'do no harm'

in conflict-affected countries. However, without understanding the forces that govern corporate decision making, it is a futile task to attempt to influence their movements and practice.

A thorough examination of the civil war shows elements of the invisible role of external actors this create an imperative to discuss the role of external actors. The next section pays special attention to this aspect, specifically the role of the US.

3.7 External Stakeholders and the Scramble for Oil in Sudan

Narratives on the civil war show that the strategic behaviour of international oil companies in war-torn Sudan was overwhelmingly driven by political pressure from governments (Patey, 2007). After almost 20 years of operating in Sudan, the US giant Chevron was pushed to withdraw as a result of deteriorating relations between Washington and Khartoum. According to Krobrin (2003), the Canadian flagship oil company, Talisman, which helped kick-start oil development after Chevron's exit also fell victim to Washington's ire. On the other hand, Patey (2007) asserts that the European junior oil companies, protected by the European Union's political standpoint of 'constructive engagement' in Sudan were free to profit.

Finally, the eastern parastatals, led by a surging China, eager to capture international energy resources to fuel their budding economies and supported by the plural relationships fostered between their respective governments and the ruling, riverine elite in Khartoum, tactfully established a dominating presence. While fervent international human rights advocacy alone seemingly drove susceptible Western firms out of Sudan, the real power behind corporate movements came from the rules dictated by states. Furthermore, Patey (2017) argues that Sudan and South Sudan played an instrumental role for the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in increasing its competitiveness in the international oil industry, most noteworthy in developing its strategic thinking and organisational capabilities on political and security risk.

As asserted by Sulliman (1997), non-governmental organisations (NGOS) seemingly drove susceptible Western oil companies out of the war-stricken country. Paradoxically, Western abandonment allowed state-owned corporations from China, Malaysia and India, largely invulnerable to human rights pressures, to form a stranglehold on Sudan's oil industry.

The scramble for oil in war-torn countries like South Sudan brings to light that politics in the international arena is a zero-sum game. A study conducted by Reeves (2002) postulates that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) played a significant role in some of the most destructive civil wars of the developing world. From Colombia, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Azerbaijan to Burma, MNC engagement has aggravated conflict and fed pervasive corruption through the extraction of lucrative natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, timber, diamonds and other precious minerals. The case of Sudan is yet another example where economic development spurred on by MNC activity has had deadly consequences, benefiting but a few amid an impoverished population.

Patey (2010) states that the involvement of foreign powers in the oil industry of Sudan produced interesting scenarios in the political landscape of the country as well as internationally. Whilst the consensus is that the presence of China's CNPC and Canada's TEC wrought significant developmental changes in the infrastructure and economy, the same cannot be said about the arms deal between Khartoum and Beijing. According to Patey (2007), China was accused of arms transfer to Sudan, something interpreted as Beijing condoning the civil war in Sudan. These activities attract international criticism from pressure and interest groups such as the Christian Solidarity International (CSI) as this was perceived to have prolonged the civil war because of Beijing aiding the Khartoum government.

Oil and the crisis in Sudan gave an insight into the ideological animosity of the time shaping international politics. Sudan was an extension of the Cold War; an ideological battle fought pitting socialism against capitalism, where the government of Sudan was a loyal ally of socialist states like China and Russia in their ideological struggle against the capitalist states such as the US (Field, 2000). In that regard it is easy to understand why China religiously defended the domestic and foreign policy of Sudan even at the United Nations.

To China, Sudan was a strategic political and economic partner whose internal instability was not a basis for foreign intervention. It should be noted, therefore, that powerful UNSC members like China blocked any international effort to bring about significant resolutions to the crisis in Sudan.

The role of external actors has continued to influence the conflict in South Sudan as noted by Patel (2007), Patey (2017) and Moro (2017). The failure of the Troika (EU, US, and Norway) to broker a lasting peace with the 2005 peace agreement strengthened the armed dictatorship of the North and created an armed dictatorship in the South (Mamdani, 1996). “Only those with the capacity to wage war have the ability to determine peace,” Mamdani stated, asserting the role of external actors in creating an environment where impunity flourishes, and both external and internal actors become “too big” to be held accountable for their actions. If the demand for accountability is not enforced against the “big players” like the Troika, argued Mamdani, there can be no criminal accountability in South Sudan (Mamdani, 1996).

3.8. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)-Prospects and Challenges

The CPA was an epic historical agreement which was viewed as one of Africa’s success stories. Signed between Dr John Garang, chairman of the SPLM, and Sudan’s First Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammed Taha, the CPA was remnants of the IGAD Declaration of 1994 and the Machako Protocol of 2002. The CPA received international recognition and legitimacy as a legal provision in two regards: Firstly, the agreement united the hawks and doves in Sudan’s political and cultural landscape, thereby ensuring an official end to Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil war which claimed more than two million lives, displaced more than four million, and forced half million into neighbouring countries – threatening stability in the Greater Horn of Africa. Secondly, the CPA was remarkable in the sense that it paved way for the formal and subsequent independence of South Sudan on the 9th of July 2011, officiating the self determination of the Southern region. In a nutshell, the CPA was a landmark in the pursuit of African Solutions to African Problem, a legacy of the revived pan Africanist ideology of former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, with the concerted efforts of the Inter governmental Authority on Development(IGAD).

Some highlights of the agreement are:

- Machakos Protocol, Machakos, Kenya, 20 July 2002;
- Power-sharing Protocol, Naivasha, Kenya, 26 May 2004;
- Wealth-sharing Protocol, Naivasha, Kenya, 7 January 2004;
- Protocol on Resolution of Abyei Conflict, Naivasha, Kenya, 26 May 2004;

- Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States Naivasha, Kenya, 26 May 2004; and
- Agreement on Security Arrangements, Naivasha, Kenya, 25 September 2003 (UNMIS2006).

As much as the agreement enjoyed international legitimacy it should never be treated in isolation with the previous failed peace initiatives such as the Addis Ababa Accord of 1972 which formally ended the first civil war and other efforts made by the IGAD. However, the CPA in line with the previous peace efforts, was premised on three major concerns which had generated into armed conflicts. Firstly, it was agreed that fair distribution of power and wealth between the core and periphery would be a major step in attaining national stability. Secondly, the country since independence in 1956 underwent a deepening structural crisis; the political system included as such democratic reforms were vital. Lastly, the Southern question, that is the right to self determination of South Sudan would help in the cessation of traditional hostilities which had ensued for more than 40 years. The future of Sudan rested on an effective solution to the Southern cause.

The CPA is composed of six partial agreements that have been signed by the parties. CPA is indeed a comprehensive agreement and some important stipulations in the CPA are: The South is given the opportunity to become independent through a referendum in 2011; until the referendum, the South will have autonomy; the leader of the SPLM shall be FVP of Sudan, 28 percent of the seats in the GoNU should be given to the SPLM; revenues from the oil in the South are to be shared on the 50-50 basis between the North and the South; Sharia law is to be applied only in the North and only to Muslims; the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) should be the only legal armed groups in the country; they should remain separate, but some integrated units are to be formed; the government will withdraw 91 000 troops from the South in two and a half years and the SPLA has eight months to withdraw its troops from the North; furthermore the North and the South shall have separate banking systems and currencies. The above-mentioned points deal with North-South relations.

3.9 The Challenges of the CPA

Whilst this comprehensive peace agreement was celebrated in 2005 as a new dimension in the Sudanese political landscape and reflection of the will of the people; the euphoria was soon emptied by serious concerns; the very same causes for the long protracted civil war. There was

serious lack of political, economic and cultural consideration and consultation on far deep-seated irreconcilable differences between the two parties. International actors failed to iron out fault lines and the CPA was seen by many as a marriage of inconvenience in the sense that it did not alter much on the government's stake in the political, economic and cultural landscape of Sudan. If any changes were made, the NCP still had much leverage in the structures of Sudan. As asserted by Iyekolo (2011), in the light of the report made by former President Mbeki as the AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHLIP), there were four outstanding issues which analysts foresaw as threatening the independence of the nation of South Sudan in the post July 2011 era, amongst them the Abyei question; North-South border deadlock; the stalemate over consultations in the Blue Nile and the Southern Kordofan states and the security arrangement dilemma between the North-South divide.

The conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Ugandan rebel movement Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is the one that has had the strongest impact on the conflict in southern Sudan, as much of the fighting has taken place on Sudanese territory. The LRA is still present in the South. The Ugandan Government supported the SPLM in its war against GoS, and GoS supported the LRA in their war against the Ugandan Government, effectively using the rebel group in its conflict with SPLM. Hence, the LRA is an integrated factor to consider when dealing with the security problems in southern Sudan.

According to the International Crisis Group (2006), a major factor that has strongly affected the implementation of the CPA is the death of John Garang in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005 (an event that investigations have found to be accidental). John Garang was the leader of the SPLM, from the founding of the organisation until his death. Three weeks before his death he was sworn in as the first Vice President of Sudan. The CPA was generally seen as the personal achievement of John Garang, and his personal relationship with the then first vice President, Ali Osman Taha was a sizeable reason for the signing of the agreement

Attention was paid to inter-ethnic tensions and too much emphasis was placed on the mechanics of power sharing among the executive and military institutions, leading to the proliferation of 'organised political movements (Onditi & Wassara, 2018). On the other hand, De Waal (2016)

noted that from the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, South Sudan functioned as an oil-based rentier political marketplace, in which the ruler (President Salva Kiir) provided access to oil rents in return for political allegiance. Thus, he was able to bring most armed groups into the SPLA's 'big tent', but only based on spending most government revenue on an unreformed security sector. This maintained a façade of unity among the political elites. It secured independence. However, the viability of the system was entirely dependent on a continued inflow of oil funds, and when that was shut off in January 2012, it was only a matter of time before the system crashed.

In principle, the CPA, backed by the IGAD member states and international community should create a monopolistic political marketplace in which there is a single coordinated purchaser of loyalties (De Waal, 2016). This would reduce uncertainty and competition, reducing the price of loyalty, and allowing the political class to focus on longer-term issue. Mamdani (2016) argued that the African Union and the United Nations' response to the violence in South Sudan, the brokering of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, were inadequate, and questions remain about how to create accountable structures which fight instability within a state. On the other hand, Deng (2011) applauds the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as one of the rare achievements, not only in the Sudan, but indeed in Africa as it offers a unique resolution of one of the most complicated and protracted civil wars in Africa.

Young (2012) strongly critiques the CPA and subsequent peace processes. He characterises the process as that of "liberal peace-making" and provides an extensive critique of its shortcomings and failures in South Sudan. For example, he argues that the priority placed on holding elections after the signing of the CPA sacrificed true democratic transformation (Young 2012). The counterargument to this is that ending the violence was illustrating the complex debates and trade-offs that need to be considered in peacebuilding

3.10 The formation of South Sudan

Sudan became an independent state in 1956. A historical background on South Sudan is detailed in chapter two of the study. The establishment of South Sudan as a sovereign state was guided by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which was signed on January 9, 2005 between the central

government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement resulted from the efforts of the regional peace initiative to end the civil war.

South Sudan declared independence on July 9, 2011. International recognition followed promptly, and on July 14, 2011, South Sudan became a member of the United Nations (Deng 1995). Unlike in the recent example of Kosovo, South Sudan's acquisition of statehood is a generally accepted licit fact and its licit status not subject to controversy (Vadmir, 2011). The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS) was established through the Security Council resolution 1590. The main task of UNMIS was to fortify the implementation of the CPA, to facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and to contribute towards international efforts to barricade and promote human rights in South Sudan. In 2011 the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan through resolution 1996 mandated UNMISS to consolidate peace and security, and to establish the conditions for development with a view to invigorating the capacity of the regime of the Republic of South Sudan to govern efficaciously and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours (Murphy, 2011). It is interesting to note that from the above resolutions tasked by the United Nations, the International organisation was available in the establishment of South Sudan. However, one questions the capability of the United Nations to ensure the establishment of South Sudan as an independent state, but when it comes to the Palestine independence this cannot happen. This demonstrates the United Nations' unfairness might also as a fair ambassador of world peace.

South Sudan's path to independence was marked by a lengthy civil war, atrocities, and a grave humanitarian situation. However, these circumstances did not engender a right to independence under international law. In terms of international law, South Sudan did not become an independent state until the central regime formally acceded to holding a binding referendum on independence at which secession was fortified by an inundating majority. Unlike the example of Kosovo, South Sudan is a state engendered with the approbation of the parent state (Vadmir, 2011). The mechanism for secession was rooted in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the constitutional arrangement that resulted from this assent that South Sudan is thus a rare example of a right to independence being exercised under domestic constitutional provisions. Its example further affirms that such constitutional provisions incline to be implemented exceptionally, as a

political compromise and an interim solution aimed at peace as provided for by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the subsequently adopted Interim Constitution of Sudan. In accordance with these legal instruments, South Sudan became a self-tenacity unit with a constitutionally ensured right to secession. This right was operationalised by the 2009 Referendum Act. While no right to independence subsists under international law, practice shows that where the parent state waives its claim to territorial integrity, the international community promptly accepts the emergence of an incipient state. Sudan waived its claim to territorial integrity by enacting a clear mechanism for secession and by a prompt recognition of the South Sudanese state.

The consent of the parent state is the reason, unlike in the situation of Kosovo, the new legal status of South Sudan is undisputed. The controversy pertains to the new international delimitation. In principle, the border between Sudan and South Sudan follows the colonial boundary in subsistence on January 1, 1956 (the day of Sudan's independence). Practice of the new state shows that new international borders are confined along the lines of the most recent internal boundary arrangement, although territorial agreements can be made. What is at issue here is not belated decolonisation, but the emergence of an incipient state outside the process of decolonisation Vadmira (2011). The 1956 boundary is consequently not pertinent because it was applicable in 1956, but because it was, in principle, adopted in the latest internal arrangement of 2005 as a boundary delimiting the self-tenaciousness unit of Southern Sudan. In 2005, the 1956 line was not adopted. The dispute over the Abyei Area remained unresolved and the referendum on its future status is still outstanding under the applicable licit regime of 2005.

Consequently, the colonial boundary from 1956 is not directly applicable. What matters is the latest internal boundary arrangement. In the Abyei Area, this arrangement can only be resolved by the revised, yet never conducted, popular consultation. South Sudan emerged as a state with the approval of its parent state. Its status under international law was not subject to controversy, although its incipient international delimitation remains controversial (Derso, 2012). Therefore, South Sudan needs explicit legal frameworks to finalise the status of the Abyei region. This article demonstrates that the applicable law requires a referendum on the future licit status of the Abyei Area and thus the final resoluteness of the incipient international border lament of the contested entity's licit status.

South Sudan's independence was granted reluctantly by Khartoum. This is wholly understandable considering that South Sudan's secession occasioned the loss of a quarter of Sudan's territory and three-quarters of its export earnings amounting to approximately \$13 billion at the time of independence. After the partition, Sudan was coerced to issue a new currency as the economy struggled with the permanent loss of more than a third of its revenue.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) role in South Sudan dates to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was negotiated under its auspices. IGAD also played a critical mediation role in the negotiation of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), the blueprint for the resolution of the crisis in South Sudan that carries international support (Pinaud, 2014). IGAD was also mandated by the African Union (AU), with the support of the Troika countries (Britain, Norway, and the United States) and the broader international community, to lead the implementation of the ARCSS through the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC).

Since the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, violence and tension have increased. In 2013, violence erupted in Juba and spread, taking with it the lives of thousands in a matter of weeks. As a member of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS), Mahmood Mamdani, along with other members of the commission travelled the length and breadth of the country to assess the activities on the ground. In its report, the commission classified the violence in South Sudan as mainly criminal. However, Mamdani (2016) offered a minority view arguing that the violence was political. This division of conceptions between criminal and political violence, and what each requires from the state and constituencies in terms of seeking justice, provided the conceptual foundation of Mamdani's lecture.

3.11 Tensions between the North Sudan and South Sudan

According to Deng (2007), conflict broke out again almost immediately after the South became independent. At first, this involved clashes along the border region between the northern Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and liberation movements in regions that preferred incorporation into the South. By April 2012, the fighting had degenerated into war between North and South, with the southern Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) crossing into the North and the SAF bombing villages across the border in the South. Both North and South, despite their formally federal,

decentralised structures, were *de facto* single-party states, and neither side was truly interested in making the agreement work. As highlighted by Ottaway and El-Sadamy (2012), the North deluded itself into thinking that the South would not dare secede and so did nothing to make unity palatable.

The South was determined to secede no matter what the North did; most of its leaders thus saw the six-year period imposed by the CPA before a referendum on independence could be held, not as an opportunity to make unity possible, but rather as a waiting period to be endured before independence could be attained. John Garang, the leader of the South who had negotiated the CPA and wanted to give unity a second chance, was killed in a helicopter crash six months after the agreement was signed. He was the last major southern leader to truly believe that unity might be both possible and desirable for both countries. The failure of the conflict resolution effort represented by the CPA leads to many questions about the past. For one, why did the attempt fail? Was it because eager negotiators essentially managed to convince the two sides to sign a set of agreements that they neither believed in nor intended to respect, or was it because the international community did not exert sufficient pressure to ensure that the agreement would be implemented?

Key questions, to be sure, but the most important unresolved issues concern the future rather than the past. Mamdani (2012) argues that the dismal failure of the CPA project shown by the renewed state of war between North and South, does not bode well for the chances of avoiding new decades of conflict and the countries' continued impoverishment. Past experience could either act as a facilitator or a hindrance to a new agreement, and it is not clear whether international intervention, without the parties to the conflict committed to a peaceful settlement, is an indispensable instrument of peace or just a temporary respite from fighting that the two sides will unescapably resume with renewed vigour. Is war simply inevitable because it represents, for both countries an escape from internal political and economic problems that appear to have no solution? Therefore, South needs to champion nation building as the foundations for building a state has collapsed and the citizenry is divided.

While the AU has a clear mandate to deepen the process of economic and political integration on the continent, its predecessor was run on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. However, the OAU did originate some of the standards that are at the foundation of the AU's conflict resolution approach. One such standard is contained in the Lomé Declaration which criminalises unconstitutional changes of government. The AU now has a wider

legal mandate for internal conflict resolution than its predecessor. This mandate is set out in its Constitutive Act and in its Peace and Security Council Protocol. Thus, the implementation of this mandate is still work in progress.

3.12 Conclusion

The colonial legacy in Sudan of developing the North which was Islam and under-developing the South foreshadowed the division of Sudan into two countries. The division in developing two different cultural and religious groups was exacerbated by the Southern policy which treated the South as the inferior race in Sudan. This led the North to cease power and forced its religion on the Southerners, hence the first civil war in Sudan could not be avoided because the South was being undermined. The tension between the South and the North was further fuelled by the discovery of oil. Superpowers played a major role in the Second civil war in Sudan. The political, economic and social development of Sudan is intended to foster a vivid memory of concepts in question and not to narrate a story of Sudan. The historical political landscape provides insights into the origins of the problems facing South Sudan. Had interested groups and political leaders been committed to the Sudanese cause, South Sudan would have become an African success story. However the utopia was compromised, where in and through several opportunities intended to respond to challenges of the country, where the IGAD and the AU failed to attend to serious structural fault lines in Sudan. The CPA was more of a cosmetic solution in Sudan's political and cultural crisis because it failed to tackle fundamental problems such as who; gets what and how in Sudan. Such deadlocks had a spill-over effect³ in the post independence era in South Sudan as shall be explored in the next chapter.

³ Is a term developed by scholars such as Ernest B Haas (1958) in accounting for development of international organisations were cooperation in one area will lead to cooperation in another area which is spilling over. However, in the South Sudanese context lack of cooperation in addressing issues before 2011 led to the development of problems in the post independence South Sudan.

CHAPTER 4

THE FOUNDING OF SOUTH SUDAN AS AN SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHALLENGES OF NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the North versus the South conflict, paying special attention to how the British colonial policy of divide and rule was perpetuated by the Arabic government in Sudan. More importantly, the Islamisation policy, and its segregating elements, was identified as the cause for the civil wars in Sudan. As noted and discussed in the previous chapter, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not bring a lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan. The tension raged on and had serious human and development costs. Through the United Nations resolution 1996, South Sudan was established. The mission was established by Security Council Resolution 1996 and extended to 15 July 2013 by Resolution 2057.

Against the profiled background on the formation of the independent state of South Sudan, this chapter examines the process and complexities surrounding nation building in South Sudan. This is discussed against the backdrop of the civil conflict that erupted in the aftermath of the formation of Africa's youngest state in 2011. The whole notion of nation building in South Sudan is discussed in relation to the precepts of national building theories as espoused by scholars such as Nantulya (2003), Dobbins (2003), Bendix (2017) and Willner (2015). By examining nation building in South Sudan, the chapter tries to address the main research question of the study, that is: What are the challenges faced by the South Sudanese Government in its nation building efforts?

South Sudan was too divided internally, insecure, and essentially incompetent to engage in a successful negotiation of outstanding issues (Mason, 2017). Thus, the separation took place while a host of major problems remained unresolved. Furthermore, Deng (2007) highlights that the CPA has achieved not only the establishment of an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan but also the right of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan to determine their future status. In fact, the right of self-determination is what the people of Southern Sudan value most as it would allow them to express their views for the first time about the future of the Sudan. However, the fruits of self-determination are muddled with a lot of challenges. In the process, subsidiary

questions regarding the causes of the challenges faced by South Sudan's government; strategies used by the state in resolving the crisis or solutions of such strategies; and the role played by the international community in resolving tensions in South Sudan are addressed

This chapter will be guided by the thematic analysis approach. From the review of literature, several themes have been identified regarding complexities to nation building in South Sudan. Impediments to nation building include economic and religious marginalisation, the land question, the question of pastoralists and citizenship, ethnic complexity, persistent poverty and inequalities, border disputes, power politics, and conflict in the great lakes regions that have been identified as undermining nation building in South Sudan.

4.2 Factors impacting on nation building in South Sudan

4.2.1 Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

The African Great Lakes region is one of the most unstable regions in Africa. It has an opulent diversity of natural resources, diverse freshwater systems, savannah grasslands, temperate highlands, subtropical rain forests with astronomically immense extractive and diverse agriculture (Omeje, 2013). The Great Lakes region is culturally and linguistically diverse. Countries in the Great Lakes region include Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Tanzania. Intricate political conflicts define the region. Genocide in Rwanda, civil wars in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, flared democracy and violence in Kenya, ethnic hostilities and pastoral conflicts in most states, boundary disputes, cross border and revolt incursions and interest driven political intervention (Khadigala, 2017). Internal displacement and subsequent migration across the border in search of safety and livelihoods in the Great Lakes region can be traced to the conflicts over natural resources (Aguilar, 2019). Some of the conflicts are to pillage and plunder, and such conflicts are often fuelled by external actors that partake in the appropriation in collaboration with local elites and verbally express functionaries – as illustrated in the case of violence, war and plunder in the DRC. External potent and industrialised countries sponsor conflicts to destabilise the region and in turn the natural resources in exchange for weapons.

Another phenomenon that drives large-scale displacements and conflict-induced cross-border/regional mobility in the Great Lakes is the violent intrastate and proxy interstate conflicts. The complexity is exacerbated by population mixes that cut across national borders (ethno-regionalism), and insurgencies launched from several neighbouring countries by both state and non-state actors (Ong'ayo 2018). This is demonstrated in the case of the DRC and the involvement of military forces from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda in different periods; and phases of the internal conflict, but also in the case of South Sudan and Somalia. Internal strife within states such as Ethiopia, Central African Republic, and Congo continue to generate high numbers of refugees that cross borders into neighbouring countries. The conflict in the Great Lakes region has serious impacts on peace and security in South Sudan. Spill-over impacts of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region impacts South Sudan in that The Lord's Resistance Army created a lot of internally displaced people in Uganda, in northern Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan. This has compounded the complexities of land distribution and citizenship in South Sudan. The socio-political and economic crises in surrounding countries are interlocking factors that inevitably aggravate the desperate humanitarian security situation in different parts of the region. Cross border raids between guerrillas and combatants in the DRC and Rwanda, Uganda and DRC, Uganda and DRC, Uganda and Sudan have occurred repeatedly. These raids in South Sudan cause internal displacement of citizens, loss of life and loss of resources, thus exacerbating the humanitarian crises which was inherited from the prolonged civil wars. Nation building starts with the citizens of the country but if they are starving and living in poor conditions the state loses a workforce which should rebuild the country.

4.2.2 Power politics

South Sudan is struggling with maintaining peace in the incipient state and building a viable state. The independence of South Sudan is undermined by power politics and ethno-centered conflicts. Political security in South Sudan, since the establishment of the SPLM/A during the days of the civil, war primarily reposed in the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. However, there has been a historically contested power between these groups, and this has been the major source of security dilemma and a case threatening the country plunging in intrastate conflicts. The split between Dr Garang de Mabior a Dinka and Dr ReikMachar, a Nuer in 1991 over the SPLM/A leadership, not only threatened the SPLM cause in fighting al Basher's regime, but also resulted

in the death of 2000 Dinka ethnic group thereby paving way for South Sudan's irreconcilable political fragmentation which culminated into a failed usurp of potency in Juba in 2011 (Chol, 2012).

After South Sudan got its independence in 2011, it only took two years afore the world's most incipient nation again was at war. In December 2013, violence erupted in the capital, Juba and spread across the country. The conflict was spurred by competition for power between the two bellwethers, President Salva Kiir (Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the former vice President Riek Machar (SPLM-IO, in opposition), but turned increasingly ethnic, as the two warring leaders mobilised their own ethnic constituencies – the Dinka dominated groups under Kiir, and predominantly Nuer fighters under Machar (Aalen, 2019). The two leaders, additionally, had different approaches to how South Sudan should be governed. At independence in 2011, South Sudan had 10 states. The SPLM opposed a subdivision of the country into a federal system from the commencement, arguing that it would undermine national unity. The two warring parties, SPLM and SPLM-IO, both had leaders who promoted their own agenda of potency and resource accumulation (Aalen, 2019). Apart from their personal agenda, Kiir and Machar had neither a political programme and ideology, nor vision for a placid South Sudan. Lack of visionary and competent leadership was a huge obstacle to nation building in South Sudan.

The SPLA was continuously susceptible to mutiny and break away of the soldiers. The major fallout between high ranks in the SPLA in the early 1990s created a major fault-line which defined the SPLA. The SPLA was deeply divided along ethnic lines and provision and security was therefore problematic. Considering this reality in 2011, the SPLM adopted a strategy of elite inclusion and reintegration to manage the extremely destabilising armed factionalism. Integration of forces loyal to ethnic and individuals was a concerted effort to promote national loyalty through incentives and lobby in Clarkson, (2011).

However, violence and mutiny had been the only viable currency to express political frustration in situations where some were not rewarded politically, a case in point being the armed militia led by David YauYau, a once highly ranked official within the ranks of the SPLA, former SPLA, General George Athor Deng, General Peter Gadet Yak Robert Gwang and Captain Olonyi. The

incapability of the army to provide security and stability led to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 in 2011 in which the UNMISS was initiated to help the country in addressing the problem of The Lord Resistance Army (LRA).

A study conducted by Francis (2016) pointed out major challenges to nation building and peace in South Sudan. The analysis yields several insights. Firstly, the stakes in the elections in South Sudan were extraordinarily high since a position within the regime is principally the only way to safeguard political and economic influence. Secondly, most of the actors involved in the elections were associated with the revolted forms of leadership during the civil war, which increased the peril that they would choose a violent path over non-violent politics. Thirdly, key institutions – including election management bodies and political parties – were very impotent and in some cases non-existent. That caused manipulation of institutions to further partisan fascinate, and the competency of institutions to avert or mitigate the jeopardy of violence was extremely low. From the above analysis by Francis, South Sudan had major challenges to nation building. As highlighted in Cultural Assimilation Theory, discussed in the literature review section, the absorption of South Sudan by Khartoum should have taken place before the cessation of South Sudan from Khartoum for the nation building project to succeed. It is evident that a plethora of issues were at stake when the nation was composed. The cultural diversity was downplayed, though it had major contributions to nation building in the incipient state.

By incorporating these institutions into the local governance system, the new republic risks instability at the grassroots. Despite the rhetoric of a civic South Sudan citizenship, a territorialised citizenship and a rights discourse is burgeoning at the local level. There are also concerns about power sharing and competencies between the local governments and the traditional authorities, at least at the level of the Bomas. Whereas local governments are elected, the traditional authorities are mainly populated by selected persons. Elections subject local government leaders to public scrutiny, but such a process does not exist for most of the traditional authorities. It is also true that the SPLM leadership finds itself inclined not to reform the traditional authorities because of their political influence and role in the liberation struggle. Debate on reforming the traditional authorities is blurred within the current discussion on state-building because, any attempts at reforming the traditional authorities threatens their survival and power. However, if traditional

institutions are to remain part of the governance matrix, as stipulated in the Local Government Act, 2009, then they may need to be brought into the fold of governance reform and restructuring. Some of the reforms within the traditional authorities will have to comprise, a) inclusion of women and youth in their leadership structures; b) subjecting them to open and competitive periodic election of their leaders; c) de-territorialising and de-ethicising the customary domain under which the traditional authorities operate. Some of these reforms will undoubtedly make traditional authorities more inclusive, predictable, and accountable, but will also make them lose much of their traditional aspects. The desire to retain traditional authorities, mirrors a concern for the preservation of cultures; to do so, the political leadership in South Sudan may need to separate culture from politics and allow the traditional authorities to focus on the former, rather than the latter. This may be a difficult but not impossible choice. Some of the traditional leaders are political as well and want to keep that status quo. Ethnic clashes exemplified by the contest between the Equatorians and the Dinkas over control of administrative structures, a process that often caused displacement of the former by the latter (Branch & Mampilly, 2005; Sudan Tribune, 2011), and recent clashes between the Equatorian and Dinka Students at the University of Juba, underscore the fact that there are internal tensions and dynamics in South Sudan that may be worsened by the existence of traditional authorities.

De-politicisation of the military also involves limiting the influence of ethnic politics in military affairs, akin to retention of military autonomy in civil-military relations lingo, so that internal rules of military institutions apply to their officers and men without being prejudiced by ethnic competition and ethno-political struggles in society. Once the military is de-politicised, different identity groups accept it as serving a national role, not promoting narrow ethnic/group interests. Even if elite groups and elite competition arise within the military, they are not based, or perceived to be based on ethnic identity, but on such issues as attachment to training institutions and periods. De-politicisation of the military reduces incentives for resorting to militaries, especially ethnically divided militaries, to settle political differences. But when militaries are ethnically divided and politicised, they become centres of ethno-political competition. Each political group seeks allegiance from co-ethnics within the military to augment its competitive position. De Waal reveals this ethnic dimension of civil war in South Sudan.

4.2.3 The Role of Languages

Language Policy Challenges in South Sudan realise the challenge of national integration. But it has yet to properly embark on the race to nation building. The country lacks a unifying [indigenous] national language. Nuer dominates in Upper Nile region, Dinka the greater Bahr el-Ghazal while in the Equatorial region; Bari, Latuka, and Zande are spoken by majority of the people (Jok 2003). Swahili also has a certain percentage as a language learned by many of the country's young returnees who lived in East Africa as refugees. English is also appearing as equally important especially in government circles (Deng, 1995). Arabic, which was the official/national language of the united Sudan, is also prevalent. There are also other small sociolinguistic groups which can be considered minorities.

The choice of a language, or set of languages, which can be used in education, government, and every-day communication between people, remains difficult due to ethno-linguistic competition. Competing language groups are difficult to mobilise to agree on a certain language specific to a sociolinguistic group. Yet having a national language would lessen feelings of exclusion, domination by specific group(s), and disproportionate pride and power. As Shepherd argues, the extent to which national consensus and public order are present determines national unity and internal Shepherd (1996).

National consensus is about loyalty to national values, institutions, and policies. It includes loyalty to one political authority system. The development and consolidation of this consensus is achieved via cultural fusion, including language adaptation and the evolvement of a sociocultural infrastructure around it. Regarding language policy, the young country has few options: (i) it can decide to become trilingual by adapting English, Arabic, and Swahili as national languages; (ii) the country can make its major languages – Nuer, Dinka, Bari, Zande, Latuka – the national languages taught in all schools at a certain grade; or (iii) South Sudan can decide, through a national process, like a referendum or parliamentary legislation, to adopt Swahili as its lingua franca in line with its recent interests in joining the East African Community. This should erase racialism and ethnic pride. While racialism, as characterised North-South relations before South Sudan's secession, "can confound human reason even among those recently freed from western

imperialism”, intergroup antagonisms within the South are potentially “the most destructive of consensus.”

Amid ethnic competition over language Ethno-linguistic conflicts towards national consensus are mistrusts and suspicions between/among language groups. These fissures create competing demands upon the state to adopt one’s language as against others, or to adopt many languages—multilingualism— thus placing greater burdens upon the state to teach as many languages as can serve the purposes of meeting the demands of all sociolinguistic groups. According to one observer, the lack of a common language does not imply that South Sudan cannot become a unified nation, but a failure to address the issue would certainly hamper its growth. A national language would diminish feelings of exclusion or the perception that one or few ethnic groups dominate the others. In addressing this issue, South Sudan may follow the example of other countries with similar problems. A solution could be a hybrid tongue that draws on local languages, like the Indonesian model, or the adoption of English as the language of government and education.

Others have suggested that five languages from the three main regions should be selected. However, developing a national language or languages does not mean that the smaller languages would disappear; rather it would encourage literacy and their use at a local level. If language policy were linked to education, indigenous languages could be taught at primary school level after which English would become the medium of instruction. Whichever choice is made, a common language will ensure the emergence of a common citizenship.

As Tanzania’s experience demonstrates, language policy, like any other policy, is not unproblematic. Neither is it cheap to teach one language countrywide amidst low levels of literacy nor to convince political or other ethnic elites to adopt a single language unfamiliar to them or distinct from their mother tongues. Even though, a choice must be made. Few approaches are worth trying, firstly a countrywide survey can be conducted to obtain the people’s choice of language. Secondly, where deemed necessary, a referendum may be held on whether to choose a non-indigenous language like Swahili or Arabic. Finally, legal and politico-administrative requirements for deliberate promotion of the chosen language(s) by public and private entities alike can follow.

4.2.4 Political Violence

Groups in South Sudan use violent conflicts to rebalance power cognations with other groups following interruptions in the negotiations of the balance of power. Tribalism, impunity, and violence engendered an environment where political violence flourished. One of the most troubling characteristics of governance in much of north-east and central Africa is that the contending elite use violence as a means of bargaining. A commander or a provincial leader can lay claim to a stake of state resources (rents) through a mutiny or rebellion. The government then attacks the leader and his constituency to press him to accept a lower price. After several people have been killed, raped, and displaced, and their property looted or destroyed, as an exercise in ascertaining the relative bargaining strengths of the two parties, a deal will be reached (De Waal, 2014). In South Sudan, these cycles have become known as “rent-seeking rebellions”. Defining violence in this scenario as malefactor, will not engender any lasting political reform (Mamdani, 2016). Mamdani, (2016) further highlighted the peril of the “one size fits all” mentality that truncates all violence to malefactor violence. Economic marginalisation is one of the major factors which led to the secession of South Sudan from the North; and the fact that it is being perpetuated in the incipient Sudan is a major challenge to nation building as this may engender another revolution. If all violence is treated as criminal, justice is abbreviated to a question of crime and punishment. One needs not sacrifice context or principles to engender a solution that addresses issues of political reform.

A salient problem observed by Jok (2012) is that the failure to maintain - or engender - an emancipating pluralist nationalism might be considered the central constraint of the nation building process in South Sudan. South Sudan should pursue a nation building approach that accepts, embraces, and cements pluralism. The perpetuating violent conflicts in South Sudan in the post-CPA era may seem to be an impeccable illustration of the consequences of a lack of state institutions which are functional, hence the resources and efforts to redress nation building are channelled to redress violence. Mamdani (2016) buttresses the above assertion by arguing that violence is perpetuated by mismanagement of the diversity of South Sudan.

The most prevalent violent actors in political incidents after the independence of South Sudan in 2011 were regime and revolt forces who often fought with each other (Anderson & Rivera 2018). Government forces were involved in two-thirds of battles and one-third of violent events against

civilians, whereas rebel forces were involved a little over half of battles. Limiting the number of violent incidents will enable the economy recover and make it easier to provide external and internal aid to South Sudanese citizens suffering due to the violence and famine that has resulted from the conflict. Addressing not only the violence, but also the underlying political, economic, and social issues, will contribute to prospects of sustainable peace for South Sudan.

4.2.5 The land question in South Sudan

Many contemporary conflicts, just like conventional conflicts have land at their epicentre. In the context of South Sudan, competition over land and natural resources has long been a source of tension between different groups (Parker, 1994; Pantuliano, 2007). The land factor in conflict stems from the fact that rights to land are intimately tied to membership in specific communities, ranging from a nuclear or extended family, clan, or ethnic group to the nation-state. Contemporary South Sudan has serious land issues which threaten nation building. Similarly, Deng (2011) agrees with Parker that Sudan is among the global ‘hotspots’ for large-scale land acquisitions. Although most of this investment activities were thought to be focused on the Northern part of the country, recent research indicates that a surprising number of large-scale land acquisitions have taken place in the South as well in recent years. Komey (2015) notes that nothing evokes deeper passions – or gives rise to more bloodshed – than disagreements about territory, boundaries, or access to land and related resources. Parker (1994) states that from the national governments’ perspective, land in its entirety is a physical basis of political sovereignty and power, as well national economic wealth. However, most rural communities see land as a symbol of their collective socio-cultural and political identities, as well as a basis for their economic survival. The relationship between land and identity, identity and livelihood imply that access to land is a fundamental human right.

The land question is one of the most tested in South Sudan as noted by Zambakari (2012) and Komey (2015). Zambakari argues that the citizenship question and the land question are related. The definition of citizenship is either based on ethnicity or residence. These two claims converge in representation in the state as well as claims made to access land and resources. Leonardi (2011) attests that those who claim citizenship also claim access to land based on ethnicity, which is

defined as those who are indigenous to the country. According to Zambakari (2012), when one asks the question: who these indigenes are, the immediate answer is ‘those of us who have always been here’, in other words, the natives. The second claim comes from migrant workers, immigrants, refugees, and IDPs. These groups claim that citizenship based on ethnicity is unacceptable. They claim that every citizen should have similar rights.

Anyone with the remotest background on African history will notice something which is consistent throughout the continent. In addition to the resource dimension of the conflict, the discovery of oil at Muglad basin, which extends from South Sudan to north into Sudan and is rich in oil deposits has the potential conceive an oil-induced conflict. As noted by scholars, Schomerus (2011) and Mohamed (2008), monopolisation of access to means of production has always been a serious concern. Since the early 1980s, oil discovery in Sudan has forcibly displaced tens, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of local communities by military means in order to obtain land for the international oil companies.

Direct responses to gross human rights violations have involved both violent reactions and legal measures by the local communities against the government and the oil companies in the region. Land expropriation for mechanised schemes monopolised by wealthy outsiders, with no consideration for the rights and interests of local peoples, brought about new political and economic dynamics, not only along the centre-periphery line, but also along ethnic lines within the region. Local communities resist the encroachment of mechanised farming, and violent conflicts often erupt between them and the absent landlords supported by the government.

State-induced local conflicts are inclined to escalate into immensely colossal-scale war (Komey, 2015). Land is South Sudan's second most immense resource, and less and less of it is under the control of communities (De Waal, 2014). Like in many resources of the world, it is proven that while access to land can be pivotal to poverty alleviation, land can form an intrinsic cause of conflict because of its intricacies thereby minimising the possibility of managing, resolving and, ultimately, transforming it in a way that emboldens broader nation-state affiliation. Zambakari (2012) recommends that South Sudan must institute land reform laws that reconcile the question of rights with that of equity, and find a political solution to resolve the conflict in the disputed regions. The task ahead demands that South Sudanese mobilise to build their country. It demands political imagination to transcend the colonial state and build unity in diversity among the many

nationalities in the South. Without resolving the crisis of citizenship, reforming land tenure laws, and resolving the conflict in the border regions; South Sudan will remain in a perpetual state of war Komey (2015). Prosperity hinges upon those unresolved, yet cognate, issues: citizenship and access to land (Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile State). Zambakari (2012) argues that more than land, at the core of post-colonial violence, the political question is: who has right to participate in the political system; who has the right to rights?

Having tackled the issue of land which features profusely in debates about nation building in South Sudan, one aspect that deserves critical interrogation is citizenship. This is because it is intimately connected with resource allocation. The next section therefore discusses the question of citizenship in South Sudan.

4.2.6 The question of citizenship in Sudan

A broader analytical perspective proffered by Zambakari (2012) shows that the question of citizenship in Africa is not a recent challenge as it has its genesis during the early phases of the post-colonial dispensation. According to Zambakari (2012) the post-colonial period in Africa has been marked by an acute crisis of citizenship that unleashes political violence and takes a terrible toll on civilians. The main issues that link Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, all the way to the event that led to the breakup of Africa's most immensely colossal country, Sudan; are those of citizenship and nativity, the institutional legacy of the tardy colonialism, and numerous failures to reform the political system in the postcolonial period (Taiwo, 1993; Mamdani, 1996), Nzungu-Ntalaja, 2004 Adolescent, 2006). The dilemma and political challenges for post-colonial Africa is the question of who has the right to participate in the political system. These questions centre on the legitimacy to have a native ascendancy to advocate for one's rights. They revolve around the issue of belonging and the rights and entitlements that go with civil citizenship (Sall, 2004). Every post-colonial African state deal with the question of building an effective plural society and managing diversity within an inclusive framework. Failure to do this has resulted in the proliferation of ethnic violence/cleansing and numerous civil wars in Africa. The violence experienced in the postcolonial period, predicated on the ordinate dictation for citizenship, reposes

on a colonial edifice inherited at independence, which was not prosperously reformed. From this vantage point, the colonial legacy must be understood as a legal project.

In the context of South Sudan, the government needs to develop a licit framework to address the question of citizenship concretely, as well as the problem of nomads and pastoralists in Sudan and elsewhere (Zambakari, 2011). It demands the political imagination of de-accentuating descent and emphasising residence as the substructure of a prevalent citizenship. In the first instance, this is a shift from omission to inclusion, which broadens the definition of the political community. The need to reform citizenship laws in the post-CPA era was pointed out in a report by a scholar based at the Open Society Substratum, who indicated that ‘Non-discrimination on ethnic, racial and religious grounds is the substructure for a stable state while omission and discrimination sows seeds of political unrest, economic collapse and war’ (Manby, 2011).

It is imperative to explain the concepts nationality and citizenship as they are at the core of nation building and nationhood. Fundamentally, what actuates nationhood status is the whole aspect of having citizens who reside or belong to the nation. Shafir (1998) notes that the terms nationality and citizenship, while sometimes used as synonyms, have different meanings in different contexts. Citizenship has a precise legal definition and provides access to specific rights. Nationality is often defined more broadly, with reference to origin and to membership in a culturally defined community (Komey, 2015). The terms nationality and citizenship, while sometimes used as synonyms, have different meanings in different contexts. Citizenship has a precise legal definition and provides access to specific rights. Nationality is often defined more broadly, with reference to origin and to membership in a culturally defined community (Baubok, 2006).

In all these cases, law has emerged as the tool that distinguishes between two types of persons: those said to be natives and thus entitled to political rights and access to resources, and those considered non-native for whom political rights and access to resources are withheld. For those forcefully displaced by conflict (IDPs and refugees) or those who move in search of a better future (migrant workers and immigrants), the modern state is less accommodating. IDPs, refugees, migrant workers, and immigrants often find themselves outside the realm of protection and legal framework of citizenship because they do not have the right to protection and entitlements that accompany civil citizenship (Manby (2011)).

The term South Sudanese or Sudani implies that nationality entails equality before the law and equal rights; inequality has long been part and parcel of socio-political formation in South Sudan (Assal, 2011). There are hierarchies between the north and the south and between different groups within both north and south, based on religion, ethnicity, and regional or geographic origin. Similarly, Zambakari (2015) explains that these distinctions sometimes make it difficult for persons belonging to certain ethnic groups to obtain certificates of nationality, particularly among those whose loyalty to the central government is in doubt (Abdulbari, 2010). While ethnic identity is not specifically included in the legal definition of nationality, in practice the standards of proof required are higher for members of ethnic groups which are remote from the capital region, overlap national borders, and/or have a history of immigration from neighbouring countries.

The existence of cross-border ethnic groups also complicates the question of South Sudanese nationality and citizenship (Assal, 2011). These groups include the Nuer, Annuak, and Gumuz, along the Sudan-Ethiopia border; the Azande (Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo); the Zaghawa (Sudan and Chad); the Beni Amer (Sudan and Eritrea); and the Bishariyyin and Ababda (Sudan and Egypt). These border-straddling groups represent challenges not only for South Sudan, but also for neighbouring states. A related problem has to do with population movements and shifting identities (Ahmed, 1979), as some of groups are nomadic herders who often move in and out of the political and geographic space of South Sudan. Cross-border groups, mobile populations, and loose ethnic affiliations have implications for citizenship rights in a divided South Sudan.

Recent amendments to the Nationality Act in 1994 and 2005 give more rights to nationals and foreigners when they apply for citizenship. But these amendments are not enough to remove historically entrenched problems related to the hierarchical ordering of Sudanese society based on ethnicity, religion, and regional origin (Saeed, 2011). As revealed in interviews for this study, belonging to a certain ethnic group or being born in a certain region influences a person's access to social services and official documents. This inequality is rooted in the history of inequality between the centre and other regions in South Sudan, which were not well integrated in the national order.

4.2.7 Persistent poverty and inequalities

Even granted the possibility that South Sudan addresses the above challenges, from insecurity, national identity and the Sudan-South Sudan divide, there are persisting and resurfacing challenges

internally which the country is facing; some are economic and social in nature (Belloni, 2011). Despite international legitimacy and the influx of donor community activities, the state of South Sudan remains one of the poorest and least developed states in the world. Jok (2011) buttresses this point by stating that South Sudan is almost the size of Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi combined, but a quarter century of war has left the country with a legacy of destruction that manifests itself in some of the worst human development indicators in the world.

The country needs a road network – currently it has only forty miles of paved roads, and extension of electricity to all corners, along with a host of other services. Reports from international observers suggest that the international community is engaged in an already failed state. Firstly, the South Sudanese government is kleptocratic, both in the everyday sense that national leaders use every opportunity to steal public funds, and also in the original social-scientific sense used by Stanislaw Andreski with reference to Nigeria when he notes that; ‘the essence of kleptocracy is that the functioning of the organs of authority is determined by the mechanisms of supply and demand rather than the laws and regulations.’ Secondly, it is militarised in that contending members of the elite at all levels use force or the threat of force as an instrument of bargaining. Thirdly, governance transactions are highly monetised, and the cashflow to the ruler is the heartbeat of governance. Fourthly, it is a dynamic and “turbulent” (De Waal, 2014).

The United Nations Mission in Sudan in 2010 compiled a report, titled “*Scary Statistics*”, a chilling revelation of the extent of the nightmare in South Sudan. The report revealed that half of the population in South Sudan lived on less than US\$2, 5 a day; the infant mortality is at an all-time low, standing at 102 per 1000 births, 50% of the population does not have access to proper drinking water, 92% of the women are illiterate and in 2010 alone, 215,000 people were newly displaced by armed conflict (UNMIS, 2010). Considering the Millennium Development Goals, the government of South Sudan is facing a volatile situation which may escalate into possible humanitarian disaster as the social context of the country remains erratic.

South Sudan is rich in untapped oil and gold deposits. 90% of the land is largely fertile and the country is rich in water resources, but the prevailing socioeconomic conditions make it difficult for state building and development. In other words, the greatest challenge of development is that the economy is largely subsistence and rural with limits in food surpluses (Lacher, 2012). The government faces enormous challenges in turning the country into a more viable asset owing to the structural crisis of the state. Infrastructural deficiencies such as the lack of properly paved roads, whereby out of 7000km roads only less than 100km are paved, hinder basic service delivery.

The economy of South Sudan relies heavily on oil as a pool of revenue, and the government has been struggling in the past two years to successfully and equitably allocate the national budget. This problem can be explained in the context of national security issues. The government annually budgets 40% towards the security sector in a bid to buy loyalty and stability within the country, thereby neglecting other sectors in the country.

The agricultural sector, which was a potential alternative to the oil industry, is severely incapacitated owing to its own structures. The sector is still largely subsistence and cannot suffice to the national problem (Blanchard, 2012). Over the years the involuntary migration of South Sudanese was a result of the Lord Resistance Army, intrastate conflicts within the faction of the SPLM and the long civil war with the North. About four million people were displaced during the civil war and 2011. During the civil war people fled to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, DRC and Kenya, and in 2011 prior to independence, more than 270 000 people fled South Sudan in the wake of resumed counter insurgency by Sudan. However, from late 2010 more than 300 000 homeless South Sudanese, began returning from the North in search for citizenship and legitimacy (Varma, 2011).

As highlighted before, the government of South Sudan faces not only the influx of people and citizenship challenges, but the contended issues of equitable distribution of land and other resources. Zambakari (2012) argues that government's success will depend on striking a balance in redistributing the land to IDPs and maintaining popularity among the Dinka ethnicity, whom the SPLM had given land belonging to the Equatorians who had fled during the war. Currently, the government is embroiled in conflict with the Equatorians who demand repatriation and land taken from them and view the SPLM as an entity controlled by the Dinka ethnic group. Jacob *et al.* (2012) note that the government is already cash-strapped and does not have alternative

accommodation for these people except for aid and handouts from NGOs and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which unfortunately is controlled and given to the Dinka instead of the IDPs. This again is a source of conflict between the government and the Equatorians.

4.2.8 Border Disputes

Relations between Sudan and South Sudan are characterised by different dimensions, including disputed border regions such as the Abyei region (Belloni, 2011). The CPA had included legal provisions for the future of Abyei allowing for a separate referendum. However, the following years after the CPA saw intensive lobbying and fighting between the NCP and SPLM through their proxies in the zero-sum realist politics. Given the fact that Abyei is richly endowed with oil, the NCP and SPLM have been at loggerheads in trying to gain dominance over the border region. It is also interesting to note that Abyei is home to the largely Dinka ethnic group which is loyal to the SPLM, though a considerable number of the Misseriya cleavage also claim to belong to Abyei pastoralist who supported the NCP in exchange for grazing rights in the South .

Abyei is an oil-rich area alongside the North–South border, with a population of around 50,000. The CPA included a separate agreement on Abyei, allowing the territory to hold a special administrative status under the Presidency, and foreseeing a separate referendum to be held simultaneously with the southern referendum in order to decide whether the area would remain in the North or join the South. The referendum, however, did not take place, because of a lack of the necessary technical preparation – including a census of the population eligible to vote. According to Johnson (2008), much of the fighting between South Sudan and Sudan to date has taken place in the oil-rich Abyei region, which is being monitored closely by both nations’ military forces. Technically, the region is in a legal limbo because it is still a part of both countries, but it is governed by Khartoum. This was yet another failure of the CPA, which delivered on the promise that a separate referendum would give the population of Abyei the chance to decide their own fate. Both North/South and local tensions intertwine in Abyei, make the area a trouble spot. In particular, the government in Khartoum was reluctant to permit the referendum to take place and,

as a result, the Abyei Area Referendum Commission, prescribed by the CPA, was never set up. The prospect of losing control, in total or in part, over Abyei's oil wealth proved to be an important deterrent for the NCP.

The hotly contested Abyei region is a case in point where it can be argued that the agreement was arrived at based on bargaining positions on both sides. Abyei is home to two different ethnic groups, namely; the Missriya and the Ngoka Dinka, who both continue to dispute over legitimacy and primacy to the region (International Crisis Group 2007). Abyei is an oil rich area of about 10,460 square kilometres, whose problem has threatened the durability of the peace agreement as contested grazing rights, which are significant to the economy and culture of the two tribes and the availability of oil, are factors to reckon with in the political set up of Sudan. The boundaries of the Abyei area are a much-contested issue and the decision on the status was not included in the CPA. The presence of SAF and SPLA troops is high in and around Abyei and a demilitarised zone could reduce the risks of clashes between the two parties (Brosché, 2008).

Ideally, the whole border between the South and North should be a demilitarised zone, but Abyei should be the focal point to start with. The CPA has recognised this thorny conflict by according the people of Abyei dual citizenship in the South and North, special administrative status under the Presidency of the Republic and a referendum to determine their future administrative status (Deng, 2005). Therefore, the citizenship of the Abyei people does not belong either to South Sudan or Sudan. This is another problem considering that part of the population are pastoralists who would need to cross borders into Sudan or South Sudan for water and pastures. In addition, citizens of Abyei cannot access services because they were impacted negatively by the secession of South Sudan.

At the local level, tensions between the Ngok Dinka community – the majority of Abyei's residents and more broadly the backbone of the southern rebel army during the civil war, and Misseriya pastoralists – who bring their livestock into the region to graze during the dry season (January–May), have been escalating, in particular in the run-up to the January 2011 vote. In its 2009 ruling, the PCA argued that the principal intent of the Abyei Protocol was to give the Ngok Dinka the possibility to choose their status through the referendum. The Misseriya feared that they could lose access to valuable land if the Ngok Dinka voted to join the new southern state. Thus, they had been

threatening to restart the hostilities if they were not allowed to vote on the area's future. The government in Khartoum has backed the Misseriya's claim that Abyei remains in the North – both to preserve access to current and future oil revenues and to maintain the Misseriya who fought in large numbers for the North during the civil war on its side in the conflict in Darfur. Often overlooked by this set of claims and counterclaims is the PCA's ruling that traditional rights are not affected by boundary changes.

In the weeks just before and after the referendum, clashes north of Abyei left more than 30 people dead. The clashes were apparently caused by false reports in the northern press that the Ngok Dinkas were planning to annex Abyei to the South during the referendum days. Such a prospect provoked a reaction by the Misseriya. In the referendum aftermath, intermittent clashes have continued. The SAF has increased its presence in the area, while the government in Khartoum has been recruiting and arming Misseriya fighters just north of Abyei. The reasons for this recruitment may have more to do with Darfur – where Khartoum is losing some ground *vis-à-vis* the Justice and Equality Movement.

These developments are worrisome for those international observers and Sudanese citizens alike who fear that a military escalation may further complicate finding a compromise between the North and the South. The government in Khartoum has been proposing to split Abyei and divide the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka between the two states. This scheme has some international support, including that of the High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and of the US Special Envoy to Sudan, (Scott Gration, ??). However, it is problematic and has been resisted by the South which feels that it is a violation of previous reports and rulings such as that of the Abyei Boundaries Commission and of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Instead, in its Transitional Constitution adopted when the region became independent on 9 July 2011 constituting a temporary Charter until a permanent constitution is drafted, the South has reaffirmed that ‘the territory of the Republic of South Sudan (includes) the Abyei as defined by the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal Award of July 2009’.

Under these circumstances, violence flared up even in the post South Sudanese independence over which country rightfully owns Abyei, the situation deteriorated to the extent that each country deployed forces along the border in a bid to secure its sovereignty. In an unofficial referendum

held late in 2013, over 90% of residents in Abyei voted in favour of uniting with South Sudan, a vote unrecognised and condemned by the AU as threatening to further exacerbate tensions between Juba and Khartoum. The failure to hold an official referendum can only be explained by the lack of commitment by both the NCP and SPLM to the future of the people of Abyei. Moreover, the question of Abyei will continue to pose as a threat to nation building in that South Sudan has to define a clear policy on citizenship and Abyei is still divided between citizens who enjoy dual citizenship.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMATIVE EVALUTATION OF THE STUYDY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Summative observations of the study

. Objectives

The following constitute the study objectives:

- To examine the modalities that were instituted as part of nation-building in South Sudan;
- To examine factors undermining nation-building;
- To find out how international community has engaged with conflicting parties in South Sudan;
- To interrogate the effectiveness of the conflict resolution approaches instituted so far;
- To proffer possible recommendations for nation-building and unification of South Sudan.

5.2. The major findings of the study

Discussions and analysis revealed certain findings from the study. Using the research questions posed in the introductory chapter, the findings of the study are highlighted as follows:

5.3. Findings regarding research question One

Question: What modalities were instituted to ensure nation-building in South Sudan?

Findings show that national building is an approach to redress systematic or massive violations of human rights that provides amends to victims and creates or enhances opportunities for the transformation of the political systems, conflicts, and other conditions that may have been at the root of the conflict in Sudan. However, in the case of South Sudan, the land question, the question of citizenship, ethnic complexity and the social setting in South Sudan are huge obstacles to nation building.

Critics argued that the narrow focus of the field, operating as it does as a sub-branch of international law and predominantly focused on individual criminal responsibility in which

remedies are sought within criminal justice, has often resulted in the inability of transitional justice mechanisms to articulate a detailed understanding of the sources of conflict and from there, elaborate remedial actions that comprehensively address grievances in societies emerging from the conflict. The first question was answered on the basis that South Sudan's recurrence of conflict is because nation building has not been realised.

Scholars posit that competition over land and natural resources has long been a source of tension between different groups in Sudan. The centrality of the land factor in conflict stems from the fact that the rights to land are intimately tied to membership in specific communities, ranging from a nuclear or extended family, clan, or ethnic group to the nation-state. Contemporary South Sudan has serious land issues which threaten nation building in Sudan. According to the national governments' perspective, land in its entirety is a physical basis of political sovereignty and power, as well national economic wealth. However, most rural communities see land as a symbol for their collective socio-cultural and political identities, as well as a basis for their economic survival. This relationship between land and identity and livelihood implies that access to land is a fundamental human right. This becomes clear whereas its denial does not only deprive the affected communities from livelihood, but the rights of citizens of South Sudan. Closely linked to the land issue is the question of citizenship, i.e. who is a citizen in South Sudan?

Citizenship has a precise legal definition and provides access to specific rights. Nationality is often defined more broadly, with reference to origin and to membership in a culturally defined community (Zambakari, 2012). Citizenship has a precise legal definition and provides access to specific rights. Nationality is often defined more broadly, with reference to origin and to membership in a culturally defined community. The question of citizenship in South Sudan is problematic. It was noted that problems surrounding nationality and citizenship have not been addressed. Belonging to a certain ethnic group or being born in a certain region influences a person's access to social services and official documents (Sall, (2004). This inequality is rooted in the history of inequality between the centre and other regions in Sudan, which were not well integrated in the national order. In South Sudan, any policy designed to bring lasting peace in former colonies must begin with the question of citizenship around which much violence revolves. The existence of cross-border ethnic groups also complicates the question of Sudanese nationality

and citizenship. Cross-border groups, mobile populations, and loose ethnic boundaries will all have implications for citizenship rights in a divided Sudan (Komey, 2015). This means that local communities must be allowed to organise their lives in line with their needs and aspirations. Borders or boundary posts mean very little to pastoralists and imposing a strictly defined border regulation will most likely lead to conflict. A look at the post-colonial crisis of citizenship reveals that law remains the instrument used to de-nationalise individuals, thereby depriving them of two key rights: namely, right to participate in the political system and the right to access land.

The current ethnic composition of the country could be a liability if it is not carefully managed, especially as it influences everyday governance. How far this worry runs through all sectors of the population, including top political leadership, will depend on how future national policies address diversity and the behaviour of public officials. South Sudan is home to two main ethnic cleavages; the Dinka and Nuer whose narrative of the war with Sudan landed them the right to govern the nation (Aalen, 2011). There is an aspect of a culture entitlement like the Zimbabwe war veteran's system. The Sudanese government must distribute the nation's resources and in governance generally, the government has gone on record to state that the whole country must address itself to identifying, documenting, preserving, displaying, promoting, and celebrating the cultural practices that are common to all South Sudanese. Ethnicity occupies a central position and it is the most contentious issue (Chol, 2012).

Nation building is not just about physical reconstruction, service provision, or material wealth. It is also about using the country's shared customs to prevent further escalation of conflict, as well as upholding values, customs, and traditional practices that can be enshrined in national identity. In other words, a nation is not the sum of its material possessions.

The Sudanese government suffers from the impact of a long civil war which destroyed infrastructure and many people are illiterate. The country needs a road network, currently it has only forty miles of paved roads and extension of electricity to all corners, along with a host of other services. South Sudan is facing a volatile situation which may escalate into a possible humanitarian disaster as the social context of the country remains erratic. The unfavourable socio-economic challenges pose a threat to nation building. The main challenges on the first section were identified, thus the question was successfully answered.

5.5. Conclusion to Sub-question Two

Question: What are the factors undermining South Sudan's government in its nation-building efforts?

In response to the second question, the legacy of the colonial inequalities, the Southern policy in 1914-1916, the political Islamisation, the legacy of the civil wars in Sudan, the discovery of oil and its implications, particularly its impact on the political and economic landscape led to the formation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2011 which meant that South Sudan would become a newly independent state. Amongst the complex pressing political and socio-economic challenges, nation building was among the issues that needed attention. The causes which led to nation building are summarised in the next section.

Tribalism in South Sudan was attached to the British solution to ruling a multi-ethnic state with mobile populations, whereby hard territorial boundaries were drawn around identity (Potholm, 1979). The system meant that ethnicity became an exclusive, as opposed to permeable, identity within a bounded homeland. The politicisation of ethnicity and fragmentation among groups, directly contributed structural tension and mass violence (Ottaway and EL-Sadamy (2012). The result was not only a denial of these rights, but also a deep resentment among the natives to each other.

The colonial legacy of developing the North created a Sudan which was unequal, hence the created political and economic contestations between the North and the South. The Sudan project is a typical scenario of African politics; first Sudan stands as a case of the challenges inherent from colonialism, the divide and rule tactics used by the British to gain leverage over the Sudanese through the infamous Southern Policy (1914-1946). The Southern policy, according to Mayo (1994) and Heleta (2008), is one of the main causes of disunity between Arabs and Africans in Sudan Islam. The policy gradually divided Northerners and Southerners and in 1956 the remnants of the Southern Policy developed into deep-seated cessationistic tendencies which gradually assumed the shape of armed insurrection. The North and the South were diverse in language and religion and religion was a pivotal factor in the conflict in Sudan. Within the Northerners circles, Islam was not only a religion and a way of life, but a culture and ethnic identity associated with Arabism. According to the Southerners, Islam was a religion, but also Arabism embedded in racial and cultural phenomenon that excluded black Africans Heleta (2008). Throughout the colonial

period, Britain worsened the situation as an accessory to the crime through developing and furthering the Islamic North politically, economically and religiously. At the 1947 Juba conference where the fate of the South was determined by the future political prospects of the North and at independence in 1956, the future of Sudan rested along Arabic-Islamic lines thereby sidelining the Southerners in the process as the Muslim elites of the north took power.

Political Islamisation of the state started in 1956 and the period after 1956 was characterised by the structural crisis in Sudan by the political Islamisation of the state. The greatest achievement of Arabism in Sudan was the unreserved acceptance of the fact that it is an Arab state because only about 40% of the population was Arab (Oguda, 1973). Indeed, the predominance of Sudanese Arabs in the culture, politics, administration, commerce and industry of the country make it a *de facto* Arab state. Since independence, the country's main political parties have failed to reach agreement on a united and inclusive constitutional system while promoting the adoption of *sharia law*. Islamisation was based on two ulterior motives; in 1964, Christian missionaries were banned in Sudan. The Southerners were convinced that they shared a common oppression during the times of slavery, colonialism and Arab-dominated politics, which threatened the dreams and hopes associated with independence. In a restrictive political, cultural and religious environment, such feelings have turned into armed conflict (Deng, 2005). Radical Islamic fundamentalism as a means of assimilating Southerners to this ideological assimilation of Arabism to African religion and culture, was the basis for the ravaging conflict.

The roots of the wars are deep. After the imperial conquests of the nineteenth century, the peripheries of Sudan were ruled by the authorities and militarised tribalism and were clearly underdeveloped. The inhabitants of the southern periphery were considered second-class citizens and, at worst, goods. After independence, the successive governments of Khartoum ruled on behalf of the commercial and military elites, creating a governing system characterised by extreme economic inequality and tribalised counterinsurgency. The civil war was largely a war of secession, a result of the Southern government's ongoing economic and political neglect, which was an extension of the country's colonial legacy (Makinda, 1993). After a period of relative peace lasting eleven years following the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, regional marginalisation persisted at the outbreak of the second civil war. The civil war has devastated the

country, particularly the South, leaving an estimated two million Sudanese dead and twice as many people displaced.

Coincidentally, oil was found in Sudan at the same time as the return of civil war. The discovery of oil in Sudan is reflective of how a resource can be an accessory to instability in a country and an impediment to democratic good governance. The resource curse, as it is traditionally defined (Collier and Hoeffler, 2011). Oil brought many dimensions to the civil war in Sudan. Its discovery unleashed the second civil war and blocked any meaningful peace resolutions between the North and South as both sides wanted a stake over the oil. The discovery of oil came at a time when conflict in Sudan was deeply rooted in the context of the economic system of the nation. Oil was discovered at a time the nation was grappling with economic problems, the country's debt was at US\$20 billion and the government was in no position to secure loans. Oil also brought untold suffering to the people of Sudan; a resource meant to resuscitate the economy at a time the country was debt ridden was unfortunately used to boost the civil war effort by the government.

The government used oil revenue to purchase military equipment and it is estimated that the Sudanese government accrued close to a \$ 1 million a day in profits from oil. The government of Sudan exacerbated the conflict by using oil revenues in developing the North at the expense of the South (Large, 2018). The distribution of oil and its revenue almost threatened the CPA agreement and even in the post-independence era of South Sudan oil related issues have resumed hostility between Sudan and South Sudan, threatening peace between the two nations. Oil development exacerbated the North-South civil war by representing an economic prize for Khartoum that held aggravating consequences for conflict dynamics at national and local levels. The involvement of foreign powers in the oil industry of Sudan produced interesting scenarios in the political landscape of the country and at international level (Field, 2000). Whilst the consensus is that the presence of China's CNPC and Canada's TEC wrought significant developmental changes in the infrastructure and economy, the same cannot be said considering the arms deal between Khartoum and Beijing. At an international level, oil and the crisis in Sudan gave an insight into how the ideological animosity of the time shaped international politics. Sudan was an extension of the Cold War; an ideological battle fought pitting socialism against capitalism, where the government of Sudan was a loyal ally of socialist states like China and Russia in their ideological struggle against the capitalist states such as the US.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was an epic historical agreement which was viewed as one of Africa's success stories. The CPA was a landmark in the pursuit of African solutions to African problems, a legacy of the revived Pan Africanist ideology of former South African President, Thabo Mbeki. Firstly, it was agreed that fair distribution of power and wealth between the core and periphery would be a major step in attaining national stability. Secondly, since independence in 1956, the country underwent a deepening structural crisis, and as such democratic reforms were vital. Lastly, the Southern question that is the right to self determination of South Sudan would help in the cessation of traditional hostilities which had ensued for more than 40 years. The future of Sudan rested on an effective solution to the Southern cause. Whilst this comprehensive peace agreement was celebrated in 2005 as a new dimension in Sudanese political landscape and a reflection of the will of the people, the euphoria was soon emptied by serious concerns, the very same causes of the long protracted civil (Mamdani, 2015). There was serious lack of political, economic and cultural consideration and consultation on far deep-seated irreconcilable differences between the two parties. International actors failed to iron out fault-lines and the CPA was seen by many as a marriage of inconvenience in the sense that it did not alter much on the government's stake in the political, economic and cultural landscape of Sudan

The conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Ugandan rebel movement, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), is the one that has had the strongest impact on the conflict in southern Sudan, as much of the fighting has taken place on Sudanese territory. The LRA is an integrated factor to consider when dealing with the security problems in southern Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is one of the rare achievements not only in the Sudan but indeed the rest of Africa as it offers a unique resolution of one of the most complicated and protracted civil wars in Africa.

Since the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, violence and tension have increased. In 2013, political violence erupted in Juba and spread, taking with it the lives of thousands. Within the five years since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the most common violent actors in political incidents were government and rebel forces, who often fought with each other (Aalen, 2019).

The colonial legacy of developing the North which practised Islam created divisions of Sudan into two countries. The division in developing two different cultural and religious groups was

exacerbated the Southern policy which treated the South as the inferior race in Sudan (Makinda, 1993). This led the North to cease power and forced its religion on the Southerners, hence the first civil war in Sudan could not be avoided because the South was being undermined. The tension between the South and the North was further fuelled by the discovery of oil (Deng, 2005). Superpowers played a major role in the second civil war in Sudan. The discussion on the political, economic and social development of Sudan is intended to provide an understabding of the concept of nation building. The historical political landscape provides an insight into the origins of the problems facing South Sudan. Had interested groups and political leaders been committed to the Sudanese cause, South Sudan would have become an African success story. However, because several opportunities intended to respond to challenges of the country were missed, whereby IGAD and the AU failed to attend to serious structural fault-lines in Sudan, the CPA was more of a cosmetic solution in Sudan's political and cultural crisis because it failed to tackle fundamental problems such as who gets what and how in Sudan. Such deadlocks had a spill-over effect⁴ in the post independence era in South Sudan.

5.4. Conclusion to Sub-question Three

Question: How has the international community engaged the contending parties in South Sudan?

In response to the last question, evidence shows that nation building the role played by the international community was very vital however there is still a process which needs to be prioritised as this is the foundation for peace in South Sudan. It has been observed in this study that nation building faces many challenges. The main challenges for nation building are multifaceted and deep-rooted in the history of the state. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was a success as it ushered in a new independent state even though it also had challenges strengthened by creating security sector systems to support.

5.5. Recommendations

- Nation building needs to be taken seriously in South Sudan. Accountability considerations must be prioritised when there is more democratic space and opportunities to discuss and carry out nation building. However, it has been observed in this study that South Sudan has serious challenges, like the issue of the land, and the question of citizenship which both posed serious political challenges like tribalism, poverty and corruption which might cause rebellion from different tribal groups. This brings to light the fact that the political environment in South Sudan is not favourable for nation building.
- The government of South Sudan must be responsible and accountable for their actions. Usually the leadership influences how the general populace think and perceive issues like nation building. Therefore, the leadership must be willing to be accountable and foster nation building.
- The conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Ugandan rebel movement Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has had the most serious impact on the conflict in southern Sudan, as much of the fighting has taken place on the Sudanese territory.
- South Sudan functioned as an oil-based rentier political marketplace in which the ruler (President Salva Kiir) provided access to oil rents in return for political allegiance. In this way he was able to bring most armed groups into the SPLA's 'big tent', but only based on spending government revenue on an unreformed security sector. This maintained a façade of unity among the political elites. However, the viability of the system was entirely dependent on a continued inflow of oil funds, and when that was shut off in January 2012, it was only a matter of time before the system crashed.
- The African Union and the United Nations' response to the violence in South Sudan, and the brokering of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, were inadequate. For its part, the South was too divided internally, insecure, and essentially incompetent to engage in a successful negotiation of outstanding issues. Thus, the separation took place while a host of major problems remained unresolved.

- The whole border between the South and North should be a demilitarised zone, but Abyei should be the focal point to start with.
- South Sudan must institute land reform laws that reconcile the question of rights with that of justice, and find a political solution to conflict in the disputed region.
- The crisis of citizenship must be resolved in South Sudan.
- The land tenure laws must be reformed.
- Resolving the conflict in the border regions will make it easy for development and nation building to be realised.
- Agreement on citizenship must consider the traditional lifestyles of pastoralists and border communities and the need to maintain access to livelihoods on both sides of the border.
- South Sudan and North Sudan will need to develop a legal framework to address the question of citizenship, particularly the problem of nomads and pastoralists in Sudan and elsewhere, in order to avoid stateless people throughout the region.
- It has been observed that the addressing the citizenship crisis should entail changing the criteria of how citizenship is defined, lest the political rights of citizenship be turned into an ethnically defined membership to a native authority.
- The starting point towards addressing the feeling of exclusion is for the government to state the obvious: that South Sudan belongs to all South Sudanese, despite their ethnicity, religion, or political affiliations.

- The government has gone on record to state that the whole country must address itself to identifying, documenting, preserving, displaying, promoting, and celebrating the cultural practices that are common to all South Sudanese to neutralise the ethnic complexities.
- To speed up the process of nation building, government will need to transform current discussions on language into practical decisions regarding the identification of the five national languages that represent the three greater regions of the country.
- Exclusion from the national platform, especially exclusion along ethnic lines must be discouraged in all government institutions.
- Infrastructural deficiencies such as lack of properly paved roads hinders on basic service delivery.
- The agricultural sector, which was a potential alternative to the oil industry is severely incapacitated; thus government must allocate more funds to the agriculture sector.
- Government must cautiously redistribute the land to IDPs and maintain popularity among the Dinka ethnicity whom the SPLM had given land belonging to the Equatorians who had fled during the war.
- The issue of nation building in contested settings involving the state and rebel's factions is outside the purview of the study, but for further research, the study recommends finding ways of engaging rebel factions in a non-military way in order to foster social and political cohesion in countries like South Sudan that still yearn for nation building.

5.6. CONCLUSION

Nation building is imperative for the prevention of the recurrence of conflict in fragmented societies. Rebuilding can be realised through measures such as political/diplomatic initiatives. The success of the nation building project will depend on how the government of South Sudan reforms

the colonial state inherited at independence and how both countries manage to build a more inclusive state which addresses the citizenship question. In today's context, that also includes a political solution to the problem of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile. It is important that the country prioritises the key issues that triggered the decades of war. It should be recognised that behind the clamour for the South's self-determination and self-rule were the people's expectations that independence would deliver economic, social and political progress. South Sudan must work to make these aspirations a reality if it hopes to succeed in nation building. This will translate to improving people's health, education and living. Cultural diversity as a national asset; representation of all ethnic nationalities and creation of a broad-based government is central to South Sudan's transition to nationhood. The immediate challenge involves creating programmes that promote citizenship in the nation over ethnic citizenship.

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