University of Venda
Creating Future Leaders

Politics of Belonging in South Africa Since 2008

Ekanade Israel Kehinde 11621811

PhD Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political Science

In the

School of Human and Social Sciences

University of Venda

Promoter: Dr P Dzimiri

Co-Promoter: Dr I Ndlovu

March 2021

Declaration

I, Israel Ekanade hereby declare that the thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of Venda, hereby submitted by me, has not been submitted previously for a degree at this or any other university, that it is my own work in design and in execution, and that all reference material contained therein has been duly acknowledged.

Ekanade. I: **Date: ....**

Dedication

I dedicate this study to JESUS CHRIST the one who saved me from my sins and gave Himself for me.

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACAA	Aliens Control Amendment Act
ACJHR	African Court of Justice and Human Rights
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AI	Amnesty International
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AsgiSA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
AU	African Union
AXASA	Anti-Xenophobia Action-South Africa
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
CORMSA	Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPF	Community Police Forum
CRAI	Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative
DA	Democratic Alliance
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EDD	Economic Development Department
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EU	European Union

EWN	Eye Witness News
FBO	Faith Based Organisations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMSP	Forced Migration Studies Programme
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSRC	Human and Social Sciences Research Council
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRR	Institute of Race Relations
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LSP	Lesotho Special Permit
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MTN	Mobile Telecommunications Company
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NAP	National Action Plan
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

x

NGP	New Growth Path
NHRI	National Human Rights Institutions
NHS	National Health Service
NP	National Party
NPC	National Planning Commission
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCB	Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Business
PMG	Parliamentary Monitoring Group
PRI	Policy Research Initiative
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SAMP	Southern African Migration Programme
SANCO	South African National Civics Organisation
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARB	South African Reserve Bank
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SRG	Special Reference Group
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDHR	United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations Human Commission for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT	Value Added Tax
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZDP	Zimbabwean Dispensation Permit
ZEP	Zimbabwean Exemption Permit
ZSP	Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit

Abstract

Notions of belonging are problematic and they influence the behaviour of citizens in a nation-state. Politics and nationalism to a very large extent determine the participation of locals in every sector of the economy of a nation. Several groups crave for publicity and press home their demands by challenging government to improve on service delivery and improve their conditions of living. This is the present situation in post-apartheid South Africa, which has been embroiled in a series of anti-foreigner violence carried out by locals whose primary targets were Black African nationals and a few Asians, excluding white foreigners. These violent activities have been mainly confined to informal settlements. In 2008, South Africa sent strong signals to Africa and the rest of the world that the idea of belonging has to be redefined. Human mobility triggers contests for space and facilities-here social cohesion, social trust and social peace are compromised. This study examines certain factors which fuel acrimony between nationals and foreign nationals in South Africa and the wider socio-cultural meanings and implications of these incidences for their mutual coexistence. This thesis interrogates government's response to the tensions before, during and after crises periods. The success or otherwise, responses elicited, and how outsiders have been treated will also be explored. Methodologically, a mixed method involving discourse analysis and qualitative analysis will be employed. Purposive sampling will be used to get participants for the study and would be drawn mainly from academicians, civil society, church leaders, diplomats, locals/ political leaders and foreign nationals.

Keywords: Belonging, economic opportunities, human mobility, nationalism, service delivery, social cohesion

1 Background

The protection of people on the globe has been of utmost concern to the international community. The United Nations (UN), as indicated by Article 24 of the United Nations (un.org) and the African Union AU) as shown in Article 3F of the Constitutive Act of the African Union ((au.int) have committed themselves to rescuing vulnerable populations who migrate outside their countries of origin due to human security threats like violence, civil wars, economic recession and the like. As migrants settle in countries of destination, the local populace tends to reject or resent foreign migrants. In some instances, government policies do not favour migrants, thus, making resettlement chaotic. Immediately after decades of apartheid rule, South Africa became a prime destination for other African nationals, consisting mainly of Zimbabweans, other Southern African Development Community (SADC) nationals and a few Europeans and Asians (Segatti and Landau 2011).

During the years of apartheid, migrant workers were hired on contractual basis mainly to work in the mining sector of the economy; at the expiration of their contracts, they were expected to return to their respective countries of origin. Their families hardly visited them as they were confined to the workplace. Many locals' who worked work in cities during those years also resided in impoverished settlements as the then apartheid regime made sure they applied for passes which gave them access to cities (Tevera 2002; Crush 2005; Stewart 2012). The aliens act was put in place to restrict black movement in cities (Klaaren 2010; Lephakga 2013). Black nationals during this era revolted against White minority rule through violent protests culminating into loss of lives; the 1960 'Sharpeville' Massacre and the 1976 Soweto uprisings are examples of this. Most of the belligerent rebellion were carried out by locals belonging to different political organizations. The apartheid government, in a bid to crackdown protesters, arrested, incarcerated and killed some henchmen of these movements (Nasson 2012; Forsee 2019).

As part of the contribution to the post-colonial discourse of belonging, politics of belonging does not does not just focus on anti-foreigner violence, it also explains the reasons or otherwise of animosity towards foreigners by locals. During crises periods, the responsibility of the state is to bring such situations under control. However, the state has not lived up to this expectation as it has allowed miscreants to hijack such situations leading to looting of properties, killings and

displacement of the foreign populace who reside mainly in informal settlements. Civil societies and the Christian community took it upon themselves to provide succour for victims of such violent attacks through the provision of relief items including food, clothing and minimum shelter (Pillay 2008; Everatt 2011).

Politics of belonging manifests itself in various forms. This study focuses primarily on South Africa and will only refer to politics of belonging on the globe where necessary. As this study strengthens the body of literature on post-colonial discourse of politics of belonging it intends to unearth the connectedness of migration, identity, nationalism, xenophobia/ Afrophobia and the intersection of these and other factors in the mix with the pursuance of nationalist projects and difficult work of boundary maintenance by locals in post-colonial South Africa. Anti-foreigner violence is rife in South Africa because of a strong economy which has attracted many black non-South Africans creating competition for jobs and housing between locals and foreigners. The economic downturn amongst other factors in many African states has influenced the decisions of migrants to choose South Africa above other states as their destination (Massey 2006; Akinola 2014; Dinbabo and Nyasulu 2015; Northcote 2015). Mass migrations outside of the African continent due to civil wars occasioned by socio-economic, and political crises and lately terrorism which has engulfed the continent, has motivated youths to embrace sea transport to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. Some migrants have survived the horrendous journey to Europe while others die on sea terminating their dreams of making the trip to Europe (Kassar 2014; Albahari 2018; Fiore 2018; Baubock 2019).

The first reported incident on anti-foreigner violence in South Africa occurred between December 1994 and January 1995 as angry youths in Alexandra Township in Johannesburg expelled foreigners residing in the informal settlement (Harris 2001; Pillay 2008; Pierre 2010). In September 1998, two Senegalese and one Mozambican citizen were thrown off a moving train by protesters returning from an anti-foreigner rally (Matsinhe 2011; Mkandawire 2015). These incidents reoccurred in 2008, 2015 and 2017 accompanied by destruction of properties and fatalities. Some African states facilitated the repatriation of their nationals whilst other African nationals relocated to makeshift shelters (Fayomi, Chidozie and Ayo 2015; Crush 2018). The South African government adopted a self-reintegration policy (Green Paper on International Migration 2015) and those who were not satisfied were advised to return to their countries of origin

(Magquibelo 2016; Hiropoulos 2017). This culture of violence attracted the attention of the international community and other stakeholders calling on the state to restore normalcy and bring perpetrators of these heinous acts to book. South African citizens have repeatedly blamed foreigners for job losses, spread of diseases like tuberculosis and HIV, and the increase in crime rate and other associated vices in post-colonial South Africa (Danso and McDonald 2000; Dube 2000; Valji 2003; Maina 2011). Citizens are often mobilised by the elite class to chase foreigners away. The elite use this as a political tool to win the heart of locals to promote nationalist projects and unleash terror on non-South Africans (Pineteh 2017).

Another contentious issue is the issue of rising expectations based on the promises of a better life made by the African National Congress (ANC) to the teeming population in 1994 (Padayachee and Desai 2013). However, the present generation seems to be disillusioned as the promises made by the ANC-led government in 1994 seem unattainable over two decades after the end of apartheid. South African nationals have assumed that the state has failed to deliver and the only way to show their displeasure is to protest against government's seeming insensitivity to the plight of the downtrodden (Managa 2012; Swart 2013; Reddy 2016). Xenophobia or Afrophobia as the case may be, has been highly contested and politicised even in academic circles (Tshishonga 2015; Amusan and Mchunu 2017; Thela 2017; Dube 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019). Therefore, the discourse of the politics of belonging needs serious intellectual focus. However, as used in this study, the expression politics of belonging is not another name for xenophobic violence, but it is a multidisciplinary approach in resolving issues centred on 'Black-on-Black' violence, racism, ethnic/religious conflicts, identity, nationalism and related issues on belonging. On this regard, the study intends to examine reasons behind anti-foreigner violence in South Africa and determine the extent to which harm has been inflicted, roles played by the state, civil society, traditional leadership, political class and responses of the AU, UN, SADC and the affected states.

In the 21st century, there have been increases in the incidences of anti-foreigner violence globally. These include the Roma in Europe (Ram, 2014); foreigners in Russia (Kovalev, 2011); refugees in Germany (Bencek and Strasheim, 2016); the Serbs in former Yugoslavia (Gagnon, 1995); the Rohingya in Myanmar (Rahman, 2015); the Banyarwanda in Tanzania (Gasarasi, 2012) and the concept of the 'Ivorite' in Ivory Coast (Collier, 2009). Post-apartheid South Africa has been occasioned by anti-foreigner violence in 1998 and 2008 (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). These

attacks have been repeated in 2015 and 2017. These anti-foreigner sentiments caused are by migration from other countries into South Africa due to socio-economic crises, political instability and natural disasters on the African continent has led to locals resenting foreigners. This situation has made foreigners vulnerable to attacks during strikes, with some being forced to return to their countries of origin (Black, 1998).

It is based on the above that this study seeks to explain the politics of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa. This study investigates widespread xenophobic attacks in contemporary South Africa. Since 1998, these attacks have been occurring frequently with some been under the guise of service delivery protests, leading to loss of lives and property. In these violent attacks, foreign black African nationals have been the prime targets (Crush 2001; Saleh 2015). South Africa has been a migration receiving country due to its political stability and buoyant economy. Nationals from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, as well as those from other parts of Africa and a few Asian countries are the sending countries. Zimbabwe has the highest number of foreigners residing in South Africa, with figures ranging between 1 and 5 million (both legal and illegal immigrants). However, these figures have been challenged (Polzer, 2008). Apart from its proximity to South Africa, another reason for the dominance of Zimbabwean migration into South Africa is due to the political and economic problems in that country (Bloch, 2008).

Violence has been used as a tool to distinguish between locals and foreigners in post-apartheid South Africa (Jason, 2014). For the purpose of this thesis, a foreigner will be defined as an individual or group of individuals who are non-nationals of South Africa (non-citizens, refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and temporary residents); naturalised citizens and Permanent Residence permit holders. These people groups are being vilified and disparaged on grounds of ethnicity and nationality due to issues of entitlement and negative stereotyping by government officials and policies, the political class, traditional authorities, media and locals. South African citizens have also used these 'strikes' to show their displeasure against the state (Booysen 2009; Habib 2010) because, as they claim, the state has reneged upon its promise to provide the masses a better life through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) embarked upon by the government in 1994. South African nationals believe that the state has failed to provide affordable homes to the majority of the 'downtrodden'. This has led to the complaint

that foreigners are the primary beneficiaries of most of the RDP houses, thus leading to a 'theory of rising expectations' (Burger 2009; Cronje 2014).

Although, the state and civil society have often intervened during these strikes through the deployment of specialised units, humanitarian assistance and social cohesion programmes (Misago, Freemantle and Landau, 2015), these civil disturbances keep recurring despite these interventions. This trend has given rise to scepticism amongst prospective travellers to South Africa which may negatively impact the tourism sector of South Africa's economy and lead to a decline in the rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Adeleke, Omitola and Olukole, 20008). Foreigners have also become disillusioned because they have not received adequate protection from law enforcement agencies, thereby becoming vulnerable, whilst being extorted and harassed frequently (Masuku 2006; Konanani and Odeku 2013). There is also the issue of the porous land borders which facilitates illegal migration, with the immigration and police personnel being accused of facilitating this (Hadland, Kondlo and Chiroro, 2008). This has allowed criminal activities like drug and human trafficking and other related vices to thrive in the Republic of South Africa (Crush, 2001). As a result, crime rates have soared, with the influx of immigrants and immigrants have repeatedly been blamed for these social ills. Occasionally, some South African nationals have taken the law into their hands killing some foreigners in the process (Mafukata, 2015).

There has been an increase in the number of foreign migrants and refugees into South Africa since 1990 (Posel, 2003). This has led to competition for scarce economic resources and locals feel threatened by the presence of foreigners because of competition for economic opportunities (Harris 2001; Valji 2003). While in most post-independent Africa there was the notion of political reconstruction, in South Africa, one finds the new naming, identity construction and decolonisation in action and it probably defines who is "African" (Nkurunziza, 2008). However, there has been a significant shift in the 21st century concept of belonging in South Africa (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). Afrophobia is all about belonging and what designates identity is the question of belonging (Everatt 2011; Matsinhe 2011). During the apartheid era, the politics of belonging was racially-operated and subsequently, blacks revolted against minority whites telling them that they did not belong here (David, 2009). However, the generation born after 1994 seems to be disjointed from the older generation because contemporary identity construction has deviated

from the lines of liberation struggle; rather it is fashioned along the lines of modernity and access to means of livelihoods (Swartz 2009; Vincent 2011). In post-apartheid South Africa, ethnicity defines belonging, resulting in black South Africans attacking other black Africans from other parts of the continent as well as some Asians (Bond, Ngwane and Amisi 2010; Nyamnjoh 2010; Rukema and Khan 2013).

The discourse of politics of belonging accounts for the trends and trajectories in the recurrence of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa in 1998, 2008 and early 2015 (Bekker,2015). Some South African nationals have been complaining that the state has not been providing the quality service delivery needed (Booysen 2007), amongst other statutory functions, due to reduced government spending orchestrated by human migration into the country. This has created a culture of animosity as locals are competing for jobs with foreigners with the former thus calling for repatriation of foreigners to their respective countries (Neocosmos, 2006). It is from this perspective that this thesis explores the politics of belonging and examines how the state has been managing the situation. This situation has serious implications for South Africa, considering her "big brother" role in Africa and her place in the comity of nations.

1.1 Problem Statement

A lot of research has been conducted on insider-outsider relations in post-apartheid South Africa. This research has centred mainly on migration (Croucher 1998; Leslie *et.al,* 2008), integration, xenophobia and nationalism in South Africa. However, these studies have excluded politics of belonging and the clamour for nationalism. Identity politics has led to questions about belonging, sentiments of entitlements, and questions of 'insider-outsider' which have often led to xenophobic or Afrophobic violence. It is the recurrence of this violence which motivated this study. During service delivery strikes, some South African nationals attack black African from other countries, including those of Asian descent, looting their "spaza shops" and killing people in the process. Many documented incidences of Afrophobia have been recorded and only few perpetrators were brought to book. The low level of tolerance persists in spite of the advocacy for peaceful coexistence. However, it seems that the culture of tolerance is fast eroding in post-apartheid South Africa. The question of belonging has been a harbinger of repeated violence, which if not properly addressed, may result in dire consequences for the continent and may affect South Africa's intra-Africa and global relations.

1.2 Aim of the Study

The aim of the study is to gain a balanced understanding of the relationship between nationals and foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa. The broader aim is to understand the politics of belonging in South Africa at the current historical juncture by going beyond the surface of acrimonious outbursts and seeking answers through more comprehensive methods that gain greater proximity to true life situations.

1.3 Objectives

- To examine the root causes of animosity towards foreign African nationals in South Africa.

- To analyse insider-outsider relations in post-apartheid South Africa.

- To analyse the influence of migration to the politics of belonging debate in South Africa.

- To assess the efforts of the government in ensuring peace and harmony between locals and foreigners in South Africa.

1.4 Research Questions

- What are the causes of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa?

- In what ways have insider-outsider relations affected South Africa?

- How has migration affected the politics of belonging in South Africa?

- To what extent have the approaches employed by the government to ensure peace and harmony between locals and foreigners in South Africa been effective?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This thesis fills a gap in the knowledge on anti-foreigner violence in post-apartheid South Africa by revealing low levels of consultation with nationals who target foreigners during crises periods. The study presents the insider-outsider relations in order to add a new dimension to comprehending social cohesion in the area of identity politics and the politics of belonging. In this regard, the thesis contributes to the post-colonial discourse of belonging by arguing that Afrophobia is all about belonging and what designates identity is the question of belonging. The thesis observes that during the apartheid era, politics was racially operated but in post-apartheid South Africa, ethnicity

seems to define belonging. The thesis argues that the discourse of politics and belonging accounts for the trends and trajectories in the recurrence of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa.

1.6 Assumptions of the Study

The migration of African foreign nationals into South Africa, especially after the 1994 period, has increased and this trend has contributed to the scramble for economic opportunities in an already saturated informal sector of the national economy. South African nationals have used the politics of belonging as a tool to distinguish themselves from those perceived as foreigners from other African countries. Also, the levels of socio-economic disadvantages and inequalities have increased with the disadvantaged class responding to this situation through service delivery strikes which have targeted mainly blacks from other African countries. These attacks on vulnerable African foreign nationals have raised deep concerns and questions about protection and safety in contemporary South Africa.

1.7 Justification of the Study

Anti-foreigner violence has increased Since 1998 post-apartheid South Africa has witnessed a large influx of immigrants and an increase in anti-foreigner violence. African foreigners have been accused among other things of drug peddling, fuelling substance abuse, prostitution and of committing other crimes. This situation coupled with the jostling for jobs between South Africa nationals and foreigners from other African countries has led to a culture of which has resulted in the recurrence of violence.

1.8 Definition of Operational Terms

Belonging

Belonging is a concept where the sociology of emotions intersects with the sociology of power. It also serves as a point of collision for identity and citizenship (Yuval Davies, Kannabiran and Vieten, 2006). Yuval-Davis (2006) elucidates further stating that "belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling 'at home' and … about feeling safe". Belonging occurs when self-identification is emotionally attached to different objects or the giving of identity by others. However, this could be stable, contested or transient depending on the situation or prevailing circumstances (Yuval-Davis, 2006). I define belonging as a situation when an individual or group of individuals are accepted in a community that is not theirs. It is the ability of a host community to welcome migrants irrespective of religious beliefs, ethnic affiliation or gender guaranteeing

these migrants a haven; a place they can call home they are thousands of miles away their countries of origin. In other words, tolerance towards others is the hallmark of belonging.

Migration

It is the movement of people from one place in the world to another for the purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political boundary. An example of "semi-permanent residence" would be the seasonal movements of migrant farm labourers. People can either choose to move ("voluntary migration") or be forced to move ("involuntary migration") (National Geographic Society, 2005). Kok (1999) describes migration as an activity which connotes the crossing of a spatial boundary by a person or group of persons engaged in a change of residence. The International Organization of Migration defines migration: "The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification" (IOM 2011).

Most scholars who define migration reiterate the crossing of a political or administrative boundary for a certain period of time in their analyses (Castles 2000; Richard and Sabine 2012). The evolution of new states and creation of borders implies that the definition of migration becomes more complex and politicised (Castles 2000; King 2012). The definition of migration is relative and that of a migrant differs from state to state as this is shaped by the socioeconomic and political interests, rules and regulations which bind migration (King 2012).

Migration denotes movement of human beings from one place to another. This could entail travelling, locally, regionally or internationally by people for reasons ranging from economic to social or political. In some cases, it is motivated by reasons to flee from political persecution while in other cases, it is related to a bid to live a better life.

Identity

Stryker (1980) asserts that self can be referred to as the reflection of the society that one belongs. Taking it further, Stets and Burke (2003) argue that in as much as different selves exist in society, we ought to have something that surpasses the self. Identity is also presented by scholars to describe and account for the variations in the selves in society. Stryker (1980) explains identity as

the social position acquired and adopted by the self. In other words, identity is always connected to each social status acquired by the self. It is no misnomer that self and identity are two separate entities, but self always precedes and fabricates identity. Individuals utilise their identities in the course of interaction with other people. Identity describes the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language and culture (Deng, 1995). Warren (2010) argues that identity is multifaceted, we can have racial, cultural, ethnic, personal, territorial, moral and religious identities depending on the context. In the context of this study, I contend that the issue of identity arises when full-blooded citizens of a country perceive non-nationals enjoy certain rights, benefits or privileges. These could be in the area of commerce/trade or critical sectors like education and health where special skills and expertise are always in high demand.

Nationalism

Nationalism is a political phenomenon that manifests itself in different forms: it is interpreted differently and executed by detailed agents. Kellas (1998) views nationalism from the angle of international relations and it has emerged as a cause of conflict, source of opposition to the existing state system, opposition to international or supranational institutions and cooperation and as a determinant of a state's power in international affairs. While some schools of thought see nationalism as a way of creating and preserving a nation. Scholars have been of the opinion that the reason behind nationalism is state creation (Davidson, 2000:13). Spencer and Wollman (2002) explained nationalism as "an ideology which sees the community in a certain way (as national), asserts the dominance of this collective identity over others, and pursues political power in its name, ideally (if not exclusively or everywhere) in the form of a state for the nation (or a nation-state). Smith (1989) like Spencer and Wollman also reiterate the ways in which nationalism as an ideology intends to create nations: nationalism is an ideological movement for achieving and preserving the sovereignty, unity and identity of an existing or potential nation, and "as a movement, nationalism often predates, and seeks to create, the nation, even if it often pretends that the nation previously existed" (Smith 1989:343). Smith (1989) highlights that nationalists cannot, however, create nations out of nothing. In order for nationalists to achieve their goals of autonomy, unity and identity, some essential links of association and culture ought to be in place as this will stand as a foundation on which nations can be built.

I posit that nationalism is an ideology founded upon pledging allegiance to one's own nation and nationalists will do anything to confront or ward off any infiltration by perceived outsiders. Nationalism thrives on national or even on ethnic basis. For example, we have *"Zulu"* Nationalism in South Africa and "*Ijaw"* Nationalism in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria.

Service Delivery

Kickert (2002) states that "service delivery is concerned with the provision of a product or service by a government or government body to a community that it was promised to or which is expected by that community". Service delivery includes a series of highly localized actions by representatives of public departments or the private sector to provide needed goods and services to citizen beneficiaries "in a way that meets their expectations" (Kim 2012). In relation to South Africa, Hemson and Owusu—Ampomah (2004:512-513) state the following about service delivery:

> In South Africa the definition certainly is more encompassing and includes not only
> the ability to provide users with services needed or demanded, but also a sense of
> redress; that the services should raise the standard of living of the majority and
> confirm their citizenship in the new South Africa. In a society of growing inequality
> and uneven advances in education and training, service delivery is seen, at times,
> as an instrument for leaping over the contradictions and ensuring a 'social contract'
> with people.

I aver that service delivery is the provision of public goods and services by government to its citizens. This is done to satiate the citizens at local/municipal, state/province and federal/national level. It could also be said to be a commitment or an agreement entered into between the state as provider and its inhabitants as beneficiaries in the fulfilment of obligations especially in social terms. Due to its sensitive nature, this undertaking is tied to time; it ought to be carried out judiciously, assiduously and promptly.

Social Cohesion

McCracken (1998) avers that social cohesion is typified as that part of a society which handles the links and relations between different entities in a society like groups, individuals, association and territorial units. Emile Durkheim was the proponent of social cohesion. Durkheim saw social

cohesion as a collective trait of a society and defined it as interdependence existing between society members, having common allegiance and camaraderie (Jenson 1998). Social cohesion derives from common values, the power of social relations and interactions, communities of interpretation, sensation of a unified identity and a sense of belonging to the same community, trust among members of the society including, levels of inequality and disparities (Woolley 1998; Jenson 1998). The Canadian government through its social cohesion network policy defines social cohesion as the continual process of building a society that has common values and challenges and same opportunity within Canada, hinged on feelings of trust, confidence and mutuality amongst all Canadians Policy Research Initiative (PRI 1999:22). In a bid to determine the dimensions of social cohesion, the policy documents of the Canadian government, French government, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Club of Rome were examined. Jenson (1998) discovered 5 dimensions: belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy. Woolley (1998) further asserts that social cohesion includes the non-existence of social exclusion in which discussions and links founded on social capital and common values and communities of interpretation hinged on group identity. Social cohesion depicts how a society provides all its members with a system of popular norms, beliefs, traditions and institutions. In such a society, there's inclusiveness as people belong and are not permitted to be excluded (Dahrendorf et al. 1995). Wilkinson (1996) defines social cohesion as participation in public affairs, civic responsibility, or involvement in public life.

I consider social cohesion as the degree of bonding and companionship amidst groups in a community (country). It consists of a two major facets: the sense of belonging of a community and the connectedness exhibited by the same group of persons.

Afrophobia

In South Africa, Afrophobia is defined as attacks perpetrated by poor black South Africans on foreign black Africans due to perceived loss of economic opportunities. Afrophobia is an off-shoot of service delivery protests and this often reinforces the issue of "black consciousness" and nationalism in South Africa (Cronje, van Wyk and Botha, 2010). However, Ncube (2015) totally dispels the notion that Afrophobia is executed by poor black South Africans. The social critic posits that these attacks were not spontaneous; rather they were orchestrated by the unguarded utterances of Zulu Monarch and top-notch politicians in the country. Similarly, well-constructed

messages on social media on WhatsApp and other social media platforms were circulated to achieve their aim. Xenophobia occurs from the streets, to the boardrooms, and the state.

Afrophobia denotes a variety of ill feelings, deleterious perceptions and biases towards dark-skinned people or those of African extraction across the globe. It manifests through racial slurs, derogatory speeches and bodily harm against black peoples.

Xenophobia

Harris (2002) suggests that "Xenophobia as a term must be framed to incorporate practice. It is not just an attitude: it is an activity. It is not just a dislike or fear of foreigners: it is a violent practice that results in bodily harm or damage. More particularly, the violent practice that comprises xenophobia must be further redefined to include its specific target, a foreigner". Monson (2011) connects xenophobia to nationalism and ethnocentrism. Xenophobia connotes ethnocentric syndrome, a belief system premised on national superiority (Mapokogole 2014; Landau 2015).

Xenophobia is an intense dread and loathing of people who are non-nationals of a country. This involves a calculated attempt and intent to oppress non-nationals, vilify and possibly cause bodily damage. It is a feeling of encroachment by strangers who must either be made nonentities (stripping them of their fundamental human rights) or exorcised by any means to their countries of origin.

Negrophobia

Fanon (1952) defined negrophobia as a neurosis characterised by an uneasy fear and disdain of black people and black culture. Fanon further states that negrophobia which is the hatred of black people and black culture by black people.

Negrophobia is a type of animosity targeted towards blacks and everything their tradition or beliefs represent. It includes malicious plans to viciously attack or destroy anything connected to black culture or heritage. Founded on disparagement, this ideology asserts or ague that black civilization is utterly primitive and that Western civilization is at the fore and dictates the pace of development.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One: Background

Background: this chapter introduces the study by setting out the research problem, providing conceptual demarcation, and outlining the propositional constructs that inform the study. The objectives and expected outcome of the study are also critically explained.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Discourses on Politics of Belonging: A review on the construction of politics of belonging in contemporary South Africa. This chapter discusses the meaning of discourse of the politics of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa and how it has impacted on foreigners. The chapter also discusses how the escalation of service delivery strikes is culminating into xenophobic violence in South Africa. This, the chapter observes, redefines citizenship and or nationalism.

Chapter Three: Manifestations of Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

The chapter examines the manifestations of xenophobia violence in South Africa by looking at the socio-economic conditions during apartheid period and tracing it to what obtains in the current dispensation. Examined also are socio-economic policies such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) which were adopted by the South African government at different intervals as palliatives to compensate for the years of discrimination by colonialism and apartheid vis-à-vis the migrant influx and the responses of locals to it.

Chapter Four: Research design and Methodology

This chapter discusses the research design and methodology that is employed in this study. Data collection methods, design and instruments, population, sample size are also stated and discussed. The chapter also discusses research ethics and study limitations.

Chapter Five: Discussion, Analysis and Presentation of Study Findings

This chapter is concerned with the discussion, analysis and presentation of study findings.

Chapter Six: Study Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions

In this chapter, the preliminary propositions of the study are assessed, and the outcomes of the other chapters are also brought to bear on the subject matter. The chapter also offers recommendations that will likely enhance peace and unity among South African nationals and foreigners.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the aims and objectives and the various parameters of the study. There has been a plethora of research conducted on insider-outsider relations in the post-1994 period in South Africa. Most of these studies examined xenophobia, integration, migration and nationalism and excluded politics of belonging. Discussing identity politics in South Africa involves revisiting questions related to belonging, entitlements, nationalism and nativism. Reactions to these questions have been shown to inform violence known as Afrophobia or xenophobia. In spite of the prevalent nature of violence, perpetrators of these inhumane acts have not being prosecuted. This chapter provides a broad review of literature and covers thematic areas of the study namely: problematizing the notion of belonging, connection between belonging, social cohesion and identity politics, globalization, understanding belonging in a global context, Afro-conception of belonging, ethnicity and belonging, xenophobia in the global context, xenophobia on the African continent, xenophobia in South Africa, triggers to identity construction, othering, perceived threat, grievance and the construction of social identity in South Africa. The review of literature is critical to the study as it gives the basis for understanding the dimensions and manifestations of belonging. The next section problematizes the whole notion of belonging from a globalist perspective.

2.2 Problematizing the Notion of Belonging

Belonging as a notion or ideology is very difficult to understand because it cuts across many facets of life, disciplines and cultures. Belonging has different definitions based on the prevailing situation in which people find themselves. As people seek for belonging, the narratives change due to complexities in the international system. War situations, climate change, human security threats, socio-political and economic crises, terrorism and other related issues prompt migration of people to other countries. As people migrate to other countries, their right to belong is challenged and redefined in the receiving countries. In any given society, citizens are entitled to many benefits while non-natives cannot access all rights and privileges which accrue to citizens. This insider-

outsider nexus now raises questions on who, what, where and how to belong. In the course of defining or redefining belonging, violence is used to exclude non-natives from the benefits accruable to natives.

Belonging as a concept has been widely used in the social sciences and humanities for a long time. It has been applied across many disciplines to explain changing phenomena of the individual, collective or nationalistic behaviour or reaction to the influx of people into their countries. Belonging has explained and elicited lots of responses to concepts like Aborigines, aliens, migration, integration, refugee, asylum seekers, population, transnationalism, populism, globalisation, diaspora, multiculturalism, nationalism, citizenship, indigeneity, relationship, identity, autochthony and the likes. Reed-Danahay and Brettel (2008) give a background to the use of this concept re-emerging in the forefront of the twenty-first century migration research. Globalization has added to the belonging debate and the movement of people has led to a lot of changes in immigration laws and conditions to attain citizenship in countries of destination. A globalist view of belonging presented by Vasta (2013) contextualises rapid globalisation in the face of increasing migration and transnationalism leading to drastic changes in connotations of belonging. Often times, in migration research, belonging has been explained as contestations between marginal and mainstream groups over political representation, small scale businesses, multicultural education and citizenship matters. Despite being multicultural, in some cases, inhabitants of the United States of America are treated on the basis of race and colour. Mexican migrants are seen as criminals and are often maltreated.

Belonging has different meanings to different people depending on the context which it is defined. It is applied to many situations in the arts, humanities and social sciences. The concept has been defined by social scientists and core scientists without taking into consideration prevailing circumstances leading to such definitions. Vasta (2013:198) argues that belonging is further compounded as it manifests in emotional, symbolic or material facets of life. As a result of its complex nature, the term belonging is used vaguely by scholars without proper clarification. It is often vaguely viewed as 'affinity, togetherness, recognition, acceptance and security in social relationships'. Belonging can be used to depict possession of certain properties within the confines of a particular nation-state when the government imposes indigenisation policies to wrest ownership from perceived non-nationals and transfer it into the hands of indigenes.

Belonging is connected to human behaviour and May (2011) says it is the way people conduct themselves in a society without any stiff opposition from others. However, the issue of belonging has changed over the years. Instead of fostering oneness, it promotes othering, bringing about a lot of crises as immigrants being discriminated against either on the basis of race or religion. A case in point are Syrians and other nationalities from the Middle East flooding Germany. Another perspective on belonging presented by Bruner (1990) looks at it from a psychological angle, saying that belonging serves as a basis and the necessary platform upon which interpersonal relationships among people are built as they interact. Socialisation brings people together by means of social cohesion. May (2013) argues that as social beings, people socialise and one of the ways in which socialisation is effected in a community is through a sense of belonging or linkage to places, people and ethos. Human beings cannot live in isolation, hence the need to socialise by getting into relationships with people around them irrespective of race, colour, gender, nationality or religion. However, in the process of socialisation, emotions or feelings are attached and acceptance by the people of the particular area will positively affect migrants and some form of rejection will make such people fearful. Another dimension on belonging connects the whole notion with identity. For example, Antonisch (2010) defines belonging as a feeling of being at home anywhere an individual finds him or herself and also a medium by which people obtain inclusion into specific societies. There is a strong connection between belonging and home. A closer look at Indians in the diaspora reveals that they do not lose connections to their home country. In many countries where Indians are found, their food, culture, festivals, and other things are observed. There is a strong attachment and feel at home in places far away from home. Belonging and home are intertwined and Yuval-Davis (2011:10) notes that belonging is concerned with 'an emotional attachment, about feeling at home'. There is a strong connection between identity and belonging and individuals cannot be made to feel at home everywhere. Belonging is relative depending on the location, cultural and language similarities, prevailing socio-economic and political circumstances. For example, in ancient times, the Israelites did not feel at home in Egypt as Pharaoh ruled over them with an iron fist. In other instances, linguistic and cultural similarity can open doors for a migrant community to be accepted and integrated by locals. Perhaps due to the similarity of language and culture, between the *Zulu* clan of South Africa and the *Ndebeles* of Zimbabwe, the *Ndebeles* appear to find a soft landing; finding it easier to integrate and settle in South African cities than the Shona ethnic group with linguistic and cultural differences.

A globalist perspective on belonging presented by Calhoun (2003) posit that belonging to a group is common among people globally and is a criterion for human relationships. People affiliate themselves to groups so as to find a common ground for political, military, social, economic and religious cooperation. Many countries of the world meet regularly at the level of the United Nations to deliberate on issues threatening global peace. Regional and intercontinental relationships also exist both at the bilateral or multilateral levels to boost education and trade, reduce drug and human trafficking, promote cultural values, increase military strength and tackle the menace of terrorism across the globe. Belonging to a group makes it easy for such groups and their members to be easily identified and it can be wielded as a powerful tool to command global followership by motivating individuals, groups or nation to partake in a particular project or activity. From a psychological angle, Baumeister and Leary (1995:497) explain that belonging is 'a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation'. Belonging can be used to garner support for a particular cause. The issue of terrorism has become a global phenomenon in the 21st century as jihadists employ cyber jihadism to recruit unsuspecting young Muslims globally, indoctrinate them effectively and later make them foot soldiers of Islamic extremism. These youths are being wooed and told that their roots are originally in the Arab world, not anywhere else, hence the need for jihad. Through this medium we can see a rising number of terrorists denying their nationality and taking up arms to fight for their beliefs. The essence and inevitability of belonging was further stressed by Miller (2003:218) who argued that as humans needed food for survival, so also, belonging of some sort is inevitable for every human being. Here, the need to belong cannot be overemphasised. Belonging is the basic foundation upon which relationships are built and the absence of this will lead to a demise or breakdown of such relationships. Sense of belonging is not homogenous as it is determined by events happening per time in different locations and it will elicit responses or reactions in various ways. It also implies the way someone is being received in a community as Tilley (1994:15) and Leach (2002:286) contend that sense of belonging is multifaceted, as it manifests in connectedness to places, material objects, cultures and people. The way Christians are received in a Muslim community will definitely be different from the way and manner fellow Muslims from elsewhere would be received. May (2013:74) is of the view that belonging is a complex phenomenon because it provides a platform for investigating connections between society and self. The complexities surrounding this concept are vast, unstable and can change surreptitiously. During the years of apartheid, black South Africans saw other black

African nationals as one of them with no form of discrimination carried out against them. But the changing circumstances has led to the perpetration of different forms of discrimination against people who were once called brothers. Belonging can start on a street-to-street to, to ethnic, and different levels even beyond national borders.

Belonging allows for self-discovery of an individual and then some form of interaction with the society. It is a construct through which bridges of relationships are built and it allows one to interact freely in a given community. This is in agreement with Miller's (2003:220) definition of belonging as a feeling that gives 'a sense of ease or accord with who we are in-ourselves' and 'a sense of accord with the various physical and social contexts in which our lives are lived out'. In Miller's words, belonging connects people on different platforms and this plays out on a daily basis. Sports are used as a unification tool cutting across different facets of life in many countries in the globe. As people grow, belonging responds to the stages of growth in life and manifests at every level through the way individuals relate with each other. This is similar to Game's (2001:228) explanation of belonging as a self that is not distinct but is connected through the different phases of life. This section problematizes the notion of belonging by locating it as a multifaceted idea which cuts across many disciplines. The definitions of belonging were also highlighted. In the next section, power, traditional authority, religion and belonging are discussed.

2.3 Power, Traditional Authority, Religion and Belonging

The role of power, especially with monarchies or religious institutions, affect belonging by defining those who belong those who do not. In pre-colonial Africa, the kings exercised much power over their subjects and banished those termed aliens in their kingdoms. Issues concerning belonging and or belongingness caused a lot of wars in Africa and other continents across the globe. The influence of a religious leader like the late Ayatollah Khomeini the supreme leader of Iraq or the Pope in Italy has far reaching implications on people in other continents who have the same or divergent beliefs. Yuval Davies, Kannabiran and Vieten (2006) locate belonging within the confines of power hierarchy in society that define people's belonging or lack of it. Power in many cases could be in the hands of traditional rulers or politicians and it can be used to either build unity or foster divisions. For example, statement made by King Goodswill Zwelithini in Durban in 2015 sparked off xenophobia displacing many foreign nationals in KwazuluNatal.

Comments made by political leaders can also incite violence against perceived outsiders in a given society (Pineteh 2017; Akinola 2018). The allegations of criminality levelled against foreign nationals by Herman Mashaba, the Mayor of Johannesburg in 2016 led to xenophobic violence against black non-South Africans (Jamal 2017). Most Africans had a culture of oneness and togetherness by giving one another warm receptions. However, migration in the 20th and 21st centuries has resulted in wars, climate change, human security threats and in the African continent.

Belonging can also be defined at the level of social relationship obtainable within a group or society. As newcomers move into a community, the tendency to build social relations with inhabitants of such societies heightens. Social clubs, parties and other associations are formed to ensure relationships. Vasta (2013:198) argues that belonging is a 'social relationship in which a person's membership in a group is based on the person's identification with the group or society, acceptance or recognition by the group or society'. Social relationships can be threatened in the wake of extremism. Australia once prided itself as a multicultural society, but the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism has made it difficult for people feeling hardship to access Australia by water. In a move to control extremism, the Australian government has turned back boats full of people and set up camps for them in neighbouring islands. The government of Australia also reviewed its immigration policies and reiterated English as her language and Christian as the country's religion, stating that other languages like 'Urdu' are not welcome. This measure was taken in an attempt to reduce infiltrations and the influence of foreign cultures.

In a historical context, belonging could be connected to a place of origin. This has a lot of effect as people define belonging along lines of history which are passed from generation to generation. The Indian population in South Africa still maintains close contacts with their place of origin. Some even have dual citizenship and hold Indian festivals and other things related to Indianness (culturally, socially and spiritually). Cohen (1982:22) argues that when belonging is tied to a place, people fuse their history with current happenings and different parts of the community and within the community as a whole. In the sphere of transnational studies, migrants in many instances have different forms of local belonging. Various types and hierarchies of belonging are numerous and diverse depending on prevailing conditions in such environments. Belonging takes on different forms depending on the circumstances at a particular point in time. Colonial South Africa had a notion of oneness especially with black people from other parts of the continent, but the current

trend of events has changed the face of belonging from brotherhood to resentment and violence. Thus, the meaning of belonging that characterised pre-1994 has changed. Migration, socio-economic and political crises are part of the reasons that have changed attitude towards belonging. Yuval-Davis (2011:12) points out that belonging can be stable, contested or transient. Today, there are many forms of what Vasta (2013) terms controversial forms of belonging. Controversial forms of belonging can also exist when an individual hold more than one citizenship. Those having dual nationality in some cases may have issues to contend with; especially in matters of allegiance to each nation where they have acquired citizenship status. A person holding Israeli and Palestinian citizenship will have hurdles to face. Some countries like Saudi Arabia, Swaziland and Japan do not even offer non-nationals citizenship.

To belong in a particular society could imply owning a particular trade or means of livelihood with the government backing it up. When the government perceives that the economy is being run by foreign nationals at the expense of the citizens, indigenisation policies are put in place to ensure that foreign ownership of businesses are reduced to the barest minimum. This allows citizens to run the country and give them the opportunity to administer major sectors of the economy. Dada Idi Amin of Uganda used this policy to expel Ugandans of Asian origin in the 1970s. Gammeltoft (2014:20) argues that belonging means ownership and membership. This implies that to become a member and own means of livelihood, one must fulfil necessary citizenship requirements and not that of citizenship by naturalization. In some countries, legibility for presidency include both parents to be full-blooded citizens of such country. A sense of attachment or connectedness of an individual to the society matters a lot. This dictates the mode of behaviour and concern for the particular society such individuals find themselves. This attachment gives individuals acceptance or rejection in such societies. Vasta (2013) argues that belonging relates to the sense of attachment existing between individuals in particular and the broader society in general. Contested belonging has wrecked a lot of havoc in recent times. It has led to religious, socio-economic and political violence. Skrbis, Baldassar and Poynting (2007) contend that the term "belonging" has been at the centre of debates culminating into disorder and problems facing the world today. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was formed in response to what was perceived as the undue interference of the West in their local affairs. Other allied groups like Boko Haram and Alshabab were formed in Africa to reject what are seen as unacceptable Western values. Skrbis, Baldassar and Poynting (2007) point out that the administration of various ethnic and religious groups by states especially

23

in Western societies has been controlled by Western principles. Such principles have come under criticism because in most cases, they are fashioned along Christian values. In multicultural and multiracial societies, Muslim communities have advocated for religious rights and the use of Arabic as medium of expression while governments of such countries have stuck to the use of English and an imposition of Christianity as the major religion. The use of veils by women have also been banned in some countries, these are apparently moves to curb religious contamination by migrant communities in these countries. Belonging changes from time to time because globalisation has made it impossible for information and people to be confined to a particular geographical area or location. This in turn changes people's definition of belonging.

Arriving at an acceptable definition of belonging is difficult because belonging is viewed from many angles. Scholars have defined it depending on the event, context and prevailing circumstance in that particular situation or society. However, Skrbis, Baldassar and Poynting (2007) advocate the need for a proper definition of belonging because in order to understand relationships at any level, an understanding of belonging is essential. Belonging is very crucial as it determines the course of relationships and can be very unpredictable in some instances. A friendly relationship can become hostile with the passage of time. The American-Libyan relationship was once cordial, but it later turned sour. This was largely the result of the springing up of nationalist movements in Libya to ward off American or Western dominance and a call for total Arab nationalism to rescue Arab culture, norms and value from being eroded.

In the field of migration studies, belonging and requirements for membership in a given community have been at the centre of serious debates as people move from one country to another. Migrants from some particular regions are carriers of certain diseases and conditions which makes locals vulnerable to such diseases. An example that readily comes to mind was that of the 'ebola' virus which emanated from Democratic Republic of Congo and spread to the West Africa sub-region. This resulted in many deaths and the restrictions of citizens of the affected countries from moving to other states within and outside Africa. In places like Britain, the National Health Service (NHS) was reviewed and non-Britons were made to pay for health services that were formerly free. Actions of this nature were referred to as 'politics of belonging' by Yuval-Davis (2011) while Favel (1999) described agitations of this nature as the 'dirty work of boundary maintenance'. Boundary maintenance implies a redefinition of things that were formerly accessible by all and

sundry in a country but subsequently have restrictions placed on their accessibility and become readily available to citizens only. The government can even change legislation to limit participation of noncitizens in core areas of the economy or in joining the military. In maintaining boundaries, limits are either set by government, the political class or ordinary citizens just to protect nationals and minimise the influence of non-nationals in matters. Most of these measures are aimed at increasing the wellbeing or quality of life of citizens, controlling the influence noncitizens have in the local economy.

More often than not, the political class in many instances propagate issues of nationalism as an escapist route for dwindling economic fortunes of a state instead of tackling economic and social problems headlong. The Brexit campaign was subtly masterminded by political elite making comments in favour of Britain exiting the European Union and sold the idea to the British public. Vasta (2013) observes that anti-immigrant activities in some cases are motivated by political elite and executed by foot soldiers. It seems as if ordinary citizens are hoodwinked by politicians for their own selfish interests, especially when elections are fast approaching in the country. Belonging in most cases includes issues surrounding national identity, entitlements and citizenship: where citizens feel they belong to and owe allegiance to their country of origin. However, non-nationals are seen as outsiders, hence they are not entitled to many things in the country of destination. This study will utilise Antonisch and Yuval-Davis's definition which sees belonging as connected to emotional attachment whereby someone feels at home. During the years of struggle against apartheid regime, many black non-South Africans felt at home in South Africa as their countries helped in the cause against oppression. However, the attainment of black majority rule black South Africans started turning against black people from other African countries.

The foregoing shows that belonging is politicised concept and both on the local and international scenes often leading to wars, genocides, terrorism and a change in migration policies in many receiving countries. Moreover, belonging as a concept is subject to a lot of changes. The multifacetedness of belonging could be attributed to globalization which affects the means of movement of people from one country to another and the rate at which information is being disseminated globally through modern inventions that have become known as Information and Communications Technology (ICT). Belonging has affected the psyche of the common South African who sees an African from elsewhere as a stranger and a strain on national resources. This

anti-foreigner sentiment is fuelled by the political elites through comments made so as to garner support during elections. As result, the question of belonging has created a new order of violence in post-apartheid South Africa. Violence existed in apartheid South Africa largely due to the repressive regime. Violence perpetrated by those fighting the regime and by the regime itself against ordinary citizens. This culture of violence maybe responsible for the easy way in which citizens seem to use violence against those they feel do not belong to South Africa and have no right to enjoy its national resources. The next section will discuss belonging in the traditional context by exploring the views of scholars on how it was shaped in the traditional era.

2.4 Belonging in the Traditional Context

Belonging as it relates to the traditional context is traceable to the writings of Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory (1971) cited in Allen and Kern (2017). Maslow itemises four basic needs of an individual: physiological, safety, belonging and esteem. About belonging, Maslow contends that it comprises things that pertain to the social sphere of a person like intimate friends and family. A closer look at these four basic needs suggests that they are intertwined and if one of the needs is missing, an imbalance is inevitable. In order for a person to function effectively, freedom from fear, inclusion into the society and respect for that person will determine how far that person will go or relate with people around him or her. For an individual to be inspired, certain criteria need to be fulfilled. Glasser's choice theory (1986) identifies five basic needs that inspires a human being. Belongingness, power, freedom, fun and survival are the basic needs. Psychological needs are tied to the first four, while survival, the last one is more of a biological need. Traditionally, belonging was only narrowed to psychology, sociology and probably biology. It was viewed as just a mix of feelings of acceptance in a society but it did not cut through other disciplines like political science, geography, literature, international relations and history. In modern times, belonging shapes debates on religion, politics, government, identity, migration, and a many other things in the international system. In the traditional context, migration was minimal and as such it did not affect belonging. However, with the numerous socio-economic and political crises across the globe, migration has been on the increase, necessitating contestations and redefinition of the notion of belonging in many countries of the world. In the traditional context, belonging was narrowly defined. However, belonging in contemporary times has left the traditional domain hosting several debates on a global platform as human needs have gone beyond the four basic

needs to multifaceted needs in an ever changing society. Maslow did not factor in globalization in his thesis. The next section explains contemporary contexts of belonging.

2.5 Belonging in the Contemporary Context

Belonging in our time has changed from the traditional context to a modern one fusing components of social science, humanities and sciences. It has also been greatly affected by migration across the globe. Migration has changed the way the notion of belonging is understood. There is a connection between belonging and migration due to happenings both locally, regionally and internationally. Locally, it is more of rural-urban migration involving the working population. They move to the urban areas in search of better economic opportunities and get involved in unskilled or semi-skilled labour. However, in some instances movement may be influenced by the desire to go into farming and this is rural-rural migration which could lead to crisis later on. In the remote parts North-West Kenya, the Pokot-Turkana 'cattle rustling' or 'livestock raiding' dates back to the precolonial era as both ethnic groups kill each other during cattle raids. The British and Kenyan police intervened as it became an armed conflict. Both communities competed for scarce resources with grazing and herds as the scare resources and the use of age-sets to carry out operations in a militarised manner (Bollig, 1990). Another example is the Modakeke-Ife faceoff which dates back to 1846. The Modakeke people in Southwest Nigeria relocated from the old Oyo Empire to Ile-Ife as subsistence farmers. Over the years, their farms flourished greatly leading to resentment against them by their hosts. This has led to violence at different intervals culminating into loss of lives, property and forced relocations (Oyeniyi, 2010).

On the international scene, migration is largely prompted by political instability and economic problems. The civil strife engulfing the Middle East, especially Syria and Iraq, have propelled mass movements of citizens of these nations into Europe with many of them settling in Germany. In 2015, millions of migrants arrived in the European Union with Germany receiving about 1.1 million asylum applications (Juran and Broer, 2017). This did not please some sections of the German society who felt that their culture, values and beliefs might come under serious threat. True to their reservations, there were exportations of extremism and violence showing a correlation between terrorism and migration. This also led to Islamophobia in Germany and other parts of Europe and the globe. In Africa, most of the migration occurs within the continent. In most

instances, Africans migrate to nearby countries. Employment opportunities and the quest for better living conditions motivate such migrations.

A 2013 International Monetary Fund report confirmed that about 13 million of the 19.6 million sub-Saharan Africans residing outside their own countries travelled within the region (Gonzalez-Garcia, et al. 2016). African intra-migration is common because of the transformation of the borders from the precolonial era to date (Herbst 2000), making migration within Africa a normal occurrence. However, migration within Africa is fraught with a major challenge of intensifying sentiments against migrant communities. This has led to xenophobia in places like South Africa with the execution of violence against African foreign nationals and few Asians (Charman and Piper 2012; Gordon and Maharaj 2015). The influx of migrants into a country may exacerbate prevailing economic conditions or access to economic opportunities by citizens. When locals in a particular country depend on the state for many things without having a backup plan in creating business opportunities or jobs for themselves, migrants will use the opportunity to create jobs for themselves especially in the informal sector of the economy. Antiforeigner bias in Ivory Coast fuelled a ten-year civil war in the country (Whitaker 2015). This implies that migration has the ability of fostering hatred towards foreign nationals and it can snowball into a crisis situation if not carefully handled. Contemporary belonging has been shaped by migration due to global crises and this has also fuelled tensions leading to xenophobia. Afro-conception of belonging will be examined in the following section.

2.6 Afro-Conception of Belonging

Pre-colonial Africa adopted the concept of frontiers which can be referred to as border regions or zones (Asiwaju, 1983). Anene (1971) cited in Asiwaju (1983) and Gbenenye (2016) posit that three major types of frontier were conspicuous in pre-colonial Africa. Firstly, a "frontier of contact" in which differing political and cultural groups resided on contiguous lands in relationships termed as neighbours. Frontiers of contact occurs between states that had same or different cultures. An example of this frontier was the one that existed between different Yoruba, Hausa and Jolof states of West Africa. It could also be the rule between the Yoruba and Dahomeans or between the Buganda and her East African neighbours. The second type was the "frontier of separation". This traditional frontier type has states that were visibly separated by a "buffer zone"

which no state claimed or used any authority. This was depicted by vivid natural barriers like forests, deserts and mountainous regions. Examples include the Sambisa forests and deserts in Nigeria, Sahara Desert and the central Sudan states of Air, Borno, Darfur, Wadai and the Sokoto Caliphate. The zone demarcating Borno from her Hausa neighbours like Katsina and Kano witnessed persistent invasions by both states leading to a capture of slaves to show dominance in such territories. "Frontier of transition is the third type which existed in pre-colonial Africa. This was characterised by an intersection of several cultures, making it complex to locate or maintain any clear boundary or distinguish between interwoven socio-political units. An example of this type manifests between the Yoruba and her neighbours like the Aja to the West, Nupe and Igala to the North East, the Bariba in the North West and Edo in the East. All within the confines of Nigeria. These frontiers were not static. Migration, pastoralism, commerce, wars, revolutions and the like redefined these frontiers. The Fulani Jihads in West and Central Sudan states, the Yoruba, Dahomean and Asante-Fante disputes in West Africa and the Mfecane revolutionary movements from Southern to Central Africa led to the creation of new states or a massive enlargement of existing ones (Asiwaju ,1983; Gbenenye 2016). Indeed, pre-colonial African states had borders and any perceived invasion or incursion by another group definitely led to war or crisis situations. The issue of border demarcation problems still persists today, no wonder the multiplicity of intra and interstate conflicts abound in Africa. International boundaries have separated people of the same ethnic affiliation across countries. Vendas reside in South Africa and Zimbabwe; Yorubas in Benin Republic and Nigeria; Somali in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and the list goes on. Ethnic groups spilt along borders in many instances tilt towards irredentism by dismissing boundary lines and continue with social relations like it existed in the pre-colonial African setting. These movements pose security threats paving way for trans-border crimes and other criminal syndicates to flourish. However, the border problems look exacerbated by the neocolonial interests of colonialists; having negative effects on social cohesion and nation-building in Africa.

Ajala (1983) defines a boundary as "the imaginary line which separates two pieces of land from each other so when these boundaries emerge between two or more national states, they are usually defined from point to point in a treaty". For study purposes, I define a boundary as a point where two or more communities are partitioned for easy recognition, identification and administration. Macdonald (2014) conceives "Delimitation" as the description of a boundary line enshrined in a legal agreement such as a treaty. On the other hand, Macdonald (2014) also defines "Demarcation

as a field exercise embarked upon after delimitation in which a group of surveyors and administrators physically mark the boundary meticulously at local and national levels excluding arbitrariness, ambiguity or confusion in the marking of boundary lines.

The periods preceding African colonization involved the sale of about 20 million slaves being from the continent to other continents (Nunn, 2008). The end of slavery was followed by the scramble for Africa which began with the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference where the continent was divided into colonies and protectorates. In spite of the irrational manner in which these borders were constructed, they remained intact after African states obtained independence. A consequence of this is that a large proportion of an ethnic group can be scattered across different African states (Asiwaju, 1985). For example, the Fulani people are present in about 21 African countries from Mauritania to Sudan, although a larger percentage of them reside predominantly in West Africa (McGregor, 2017). Confining the Fulani to a single location would be an impossible task because they have been inhabiting these areas since the 1800s. Unpacking belonging in any context is incomplete without explaining debates on nationalism because nationalism is directly linked to the notion of belonging. It is used as a weapon to mobilise compatriots to stand against any form of imposition of values or belief on a community or nation as the case may be. Colonisation was the main driver of nationalism in Africa (Dorman et al, 2007). Anderson (2006:6) states that "a nation is an imagined political community…. It is imagined because the members of the smallest nation will never know their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion". Gellner (1964:169) argues that nationalism is not a call for nations to self-consciousness, rather nations are created where they are non-existent. Young (1975) reiterates that the oppressive rule of the colonialists served as a tool of unification of African states as their feelings were nationally shared. The issues of decolonization and the quest for emancipation were implanted and manifested through the formation of national liberation movements. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) contends that African nationalism took different paths from the late 1950s to the 1960s, with the trademark of rebellion against colonial rule thus resulting in nationalism. Africans utilised nationalism as a tool to wrestle power from her colonial masters. It became evident that black people were exploited by colonialists and they craved autonomy so as to minimise foreign or colonial influence on their nations. The continued exploitation would imply the extension of Master-servant relationship and further silencing of black voices. Little wonder the sustained tempo of activism by black activists calling for an end to colonialism on the African

continent. The relinquishing of political power by the colonialists birthed African political and administrative systems although some of these were inherited from the colonialists. However, economic power still lies in the hands of colonialists after years of independence. This is evidenced by the control of many African economies by Western and imperial powers to date.

Similarly, Welsh (1996:477) observes that Ghana championed the cause for African independence as other African states followed suit. One striking feature of the 1950s and 1960s was the quest for nationalism, with education adduced as a major reason for the advancement of nationalism in Africa. Coleman (1954) agrees that education played a significant role in liberating Africa from the grip of colonialists. Coleman states that educated Africans in the diaspora led the struggle for emancipation. This class of Africans were knowledgeable and accepted the Western norms of democracy, diversity and sovereignty which gained momentum globally. The liberation struggle was spearheaded by Africans who were schooled in the western world. Education largely contributed to the emancipation of Africans from the hands of their colonial hegemons. Western education gave them the much needed exposure to relate with their peers in advanced societies. The level of development the saw in the Western climes could not be compared to the local standards in Africa. The independence struggle embarked upon by many African nations brought colonialism to an end but not with consequences. For example, South Africa was the last outpost of the colonialists who held on tenaciously to power until 1994 when South Africa became a truly independent state. In all of these, Blacks believed that Whites do not belong here; hence the need for Africans to administer their own states with little or no interference from her colonial masters.

Nationalism can be traced to the writings of Niccolo Michiavelli in the 16th century. Machiavelli appealed to Lorenzo Medici, the administrator of Florence to liberate Italy by putting an end to infiltrations or incursions perpetuated by the Spanish, French and Germans (Ebenstein and Ebenstein, 2000). Nationalism is seen as a response to repudiate all forms of colonialism in a given society. Nationalism as a concept denotes a situation in which indigenes rely on their history, culture, institutions, beliefs or values as being peculiar with the intention of being governed by their own people. The political climate ought to be a favourable one that would preserve the basic features of such a society (Synder, 2000:23-24). In the 21st century, Gellner (1983) highlights the differences between ethnic and civic nationalism. For ethnic nationalism to take place, language, religion, similar values or communal kinship are prerequisites that must be fulfilled before such

group of persons can be included in the society. Civic nationalism differs from the former in that before a person can be included in a society, he must have residence status and must obey the constitution and political ideology that prevails in such society. Many states have changed from civic to ethnic nationalism as shown in the attitudinal change or implementation of policies with the purpose of protecting citizens from different types of anticipated vulnerability. For example, the Brexit is meant to protect British interests and control migration into that country. African states also have had their own methods of protecting their respective citizens against perceived "foreign invasion" of the local space. These nationalistic projects tend to cause diplomatic rows between and among states.

In the African continent, belonging has largely been shaped by migration. Historically, transnationalism was celebrated among Africans as one's country of origin was not emphasised. In colonial South Africa, neighbouring countries served as suppliers of (cheap) labour especially in the mining and agricultural sectors. Many males were actively engaged in this sector, housed in male hostels within the confines of the workplace and were expected to return to their respective countries at the expiration of their contracts (Crush and Tshitereke 2001). However, the continent was later confronted with challenges like the multiplicity of civil wars, economic recessions, socio-political crises and climate change among other causative factors of inter-African migration which have reinvigorated debates about the notion of belonging. Hence, natives feel that African migrants are crowding their space and limiting their chances of getting jobs, creating the 'us' and 'them' discourse. In South Africa, the outcome of these polarised notions of belonging has been xenophobia of different forms. In the light of the foregoing, the next section will discuss belonging in the South African context.

2.7 Belonging in the South African Context

South Africa attained constitutional democracy status in 1994. This was a huge relief for the majority black population that had suffered colonial and apartheid racist oppression for a long time. Before 19994, South Africa was divided along hierarchical racial lines where white people occupied the highest position and the black people the lowest, with Indians and coloured people occupying the in between position. Migration has played a significant role in determining and shaping the issue of belonging in South Africa. The period between April 1994 and December

1996, South Africa had a migrant population of about 5 million from the rest of Africa (Akokpari 1999b:79). In some other instance, the figures are as low as ranging from 500,000 – 850,000 for both legal and illegal migrants (Landau, 2004a:5). White people have been privileged to be at the helm of migration with their countries of origin supporting them to relocate to the underdeveloped world. These movements became successful through colonial administrators, businessmen, teachers and journalists (Cohen 1997:66-81). White people from different backgrounds became united as they engaged in economic, cultural and political rules of their parent-states (Chinweizu 1987). The Dutch were the earliest to arrive in South Africa in 1652 making the Cape their abode. This opening motivated other Europeans to freely come into South Africa. However, migration was strictly controlled, giving the whites priority and the blacks were allowed to access the country only on the grounds of providing labour as determined by the white minority (Elbourne 2003:380-388).

White skinned people were accorded warm reception into the country, while non-whites mostly from Africa were prejudiced as the apartheid government utilised the homeland system to keep them under servitude. Only few black migrants with requisite skills and some Asians of white descent were permitted to enter South Africa. Black men were made to live in hostels and mines while their female counterparts worked on farms and also as maids in homes, coming alone without family members accompanying them (Crush and McDonald 2001a:2, 7-8). African migrant workers were confined to the mines, camped in same gender accommodation and were compelled to work under hazardous conditions with little remuneration (Crush and Tshitereke 2001:50). Many of them who worked in the mines or on the farms never got the opportunity to acquire permanent residence in the country due to the casualization of labour on contractual terms which made migrants return to their respective countries at the expiration of their contracts (Crush and McDonald 2001a:3). Many of these hired migrants in the mining and agricultural sectors made the return journey home either with physical damage done to their bodies or contracting cardiovascular diseases (Crush and Tshitereke 2001:50). The way in which they were hired made them feel less human, as they classified them foreigners thus unable to claim belonging to South Africa, neither were they reckoned as citizens of their own countries. The discovery of mineral resources in commercial quantities had a great effect on migration as white people made inroads not only in South Africa, but other African states became colonies and many countries across the globe were also ruled by the white colonialists. These colonies became sources of economic wealth for white

people as the resources were being exploited and shipped overseas to boost western economies. Some of the resources like crude oil were refined, shipped back to African economies and sold at higher prices thereby entrenching capitalism as the mode of production.

The mining industry employed a lot of cheap labour from countries in the SADC region. (Crush and Tshitereke 2001). It seems as if the rules binding migration have not changed considerably with the change of guard from apartheid to democratic rule in 1994. The way in which immigration is being handled makes South African blacks favour white migration above black migration (Morris 2001a).

Southern African nations have to tackle the menace of border crossings in order to regulate of both documented and undocumented migrants. It is difficult to get accurate figures of foreigners in South Africa since many migrants are illegal and in some instances e figures are inflated so as to push political agendas. Figures are often contested, and exaggerated by research institutes as the political class also take advantage of this situation to promote propaganda in their quest to win over the locals. Intrastate and interstate migration has caused a lot of panic in the SADC region with states discussing how to contain the issue (Akokpari 1999a; Landau 2004a). The menace of migration has led to an increase in security at the border posts with states spending more on security to reduce illegal migration as migrants are often regarded as exporters of vices of all sorts and diseases into countries of destination.

However, there are positive sides to migration as it helps improve the economy through the generation of more taxes and improvement in the qualities of lives of the citizenry. It also gives migrants the opportunity to bring in scarce skills into such economies as there are sectors in which certain skills are needed for economic growth. Education, health and engineering are some sectors that need such skills because they are vital for economic growth.

Globalisation has enhanced unpredicted migration of people to places where they were least expected (Cohen 1997:162) as South Africa in the post-apartheid era has attracted new ethnic groups of migrants from other African states (Crush and McDonald 2002). This new wave of migration was propelled by the stable economy of South Africa and the untapped opportunities in the country. Coming from a closed economy to an open one, several sectors of the economy seemed viable as Africans from other states trooped in to cash in on the opportunities that existed in the informal sectors and others like education, health and other services. In some instances, a

34

large part of cities (e.g, Hillbrow in Johannesburg) have been densely populated by black African migrants derogatorily labelled as *Makwerekwere* (Mpe 2001; Morris 2001b). This category of migrants accessed South Africa as students, asylum-seekers, professionals, businessmen, traditional healers and clergymen, mainly of Pentecostal origin. Increasing levels of migration which are directly connected to speedy globalization of consumer capitalism is generally vivid to the populace (Castles and Miller 1998; Castles and Davidson 2000).

This section explained belonging in the South African context by initially looking at the composition of the South African society with migration playing a crucial role in the belonging discourse in South Africa. The opening up of the economy also attracted a lot of migrants from other African states who came to South Africa to explore job opportunities. During the apartheid era, males were employed in the mines with restrictions placed on their movement, under contractual labour terms and onward return to their states of origin at the expiration of their contracts. Females also worked on farms and as maids in homes under similar conditions as their male counterparts. They were exposed to health hazards especially those in the mining sector, even with lower remunerations. White migrants are favoured while black migrants are denigrated by the indigent population. It is noteworthy that African migrants have brought certain scarce skills into South Africa and this has enhanced economic growth. Foreign migrants are often referred to as *Makwerekwere* by South African citizens. The next section focuses on the construction of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa.

2.8 Labelling in General

Labelling of migrants is a common phenomenon across the globe. Desperate migrants fleeing the crises in Syria and regimes in the Middle East or those fleeing from the violence in North Africa have taken long and risky journeys to Europe. The Latino population fleeing their countries to the United States of America is a common feature in the media. This has prompted the sitting American president to introduce strict measures aimed at controlling illegal migration into the United States of America. The Australian government has also stepped up controls at sea to settle boatpeople from elsewhere in Islands outside of the Australian territorial waters. The migrant population in some instances pose a threat to the host community as they tend to introduce their culture, norms and religion which breeds violence. For instance, Islamic fundamentalism has

increased because of these movements. Zetter (1991) explains labelling as a situation that defines people who are seen as objects of policy into available images. Gupte and Mehta (2007:67) suggests that "experience has shown top-down labelling policy to feed on such labels to deliver primary needs-driven interventions, limiting efforts therefore to physical protection at best". Additionally, the operationalisation of labelling breeds violence as a person is labelled, they become victims of social exclusion and positioned to enact the role that has been assigned to them by the label. The problem that arises is that these labels and categorizations create different interpretations for the people charged with policy making and implementation on the ground, communities and labelled groups. African migrants have been categorised and labelled not only as criminals but as a threat to South Africa's economy and livelihoods when in reality, the African migrants themselves are the ones prone to violence and most in urgent need of protection positive labelling can provide. Jenkins (1994:197) says that categorisations are instrumental in creating and reproducing social identities and have the capability to change lives materially. Jenkins (2000:7) attest, "the impact on identity of categorisation depends not simply on cognitive internalization, but also on its consequences and the capacity of actors to make their identifications of others count". In the same vein, Goffman (1963:11) also contends that "society establishes the means of categorising persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories". This implies that how a group identifies is dependent on how actors acknowledge their identities.

Hence, when contending with migrant populations and their corresponding social identity, the deconstruction of social stigma is central for a host country to be able to in fact provide the kind of safety they are obliged to provide. While it is extremely easy to identify a person, who does not 'belong' to a particular space as a dangerous outsider, this only creates stringent definition of persons based on the fears of the entitled population. Zetter (1991:44) in describing labelling says that "it involves defining a client group in stereotypical, clear-cut ways and then prescribing its assumed set of needs". An example may be that of a Zimbabwean and how the South African population perceives how a South African is supposed to 'look' like. During crises periods, traits like skin colour, hair texture, dress mode, vaccination marks could easily differentiate a South African from an African migrant. These visible traits increase the probability of attacking a fellow African from any state other than South Africa. Law enforcement agents are laid back during such periods, making it easy for the locals to violently react towards immigrants. This situation has

created scepticism in the minds of prospective travellers to South Africa, thus affecting the tourism sector of the South African economy.

2.9 Construction of Belonging in Post-Apartheid South Africa

So many narratives have dominated the public sphere in post-apartheid South Africa due to the influx of African migrants. Political speeches, influence of traditional authority and articles circulated on print media amongst other factors, have led to a construction and intersection of public messages that are xenophobic about African foreign nationals. This has led to increased attacks on the migrant communities in South Africa. Although, post-apartheid South Africa has become a top migration destination, the nation's economic and psychosocial challenges have inspired the way locals frame narratives about African migrants from other African states. These narratives are frequently characterised by images and metaphors that vilify and attempt to support violence against African migrants. Xenophobia and its effects are ubiquitous in many societies undergoing rapid social change. Notably, not every stranger or foreigner is a target. Citizens are very careful in selecting those that will be treated as inferior or not belonging to the South African society on basis of race, culture, nationality, class and gender. Anti-immigrant sentiments are very rife in South Africa, cutting across almost every facet of society.

The use of 'alien' or 'foreigner' implies that migrants do not belong to a particular society and also indicates difference, strangeness and otherness (Peberdy 2001:23-24). This perception is shared among government employees, the media, immigration officials and the general public who believe that blacks from other African states are not welcome. The former South African Home Affairs Minister was of the opinion that the Aliens Control Act, which stresses regulation and exclusion is too soft (Crush and McDonald 2001a:6-7). According to Landau (2004a:13) about 90% of the foreign populace residing in South Africa is in possession of false immigration documents and are involved in criminal activities. To authenticate that illegal migrants are of no value to their society, black South Africans similar to the Boers who called their black neighbours hottentots meaning stammers, categorise African migrants as those who have a useless language. They claim that African migrants speak gibberish, a crude and savage form of stuttering denoted by the term *Makwerekwere* which is an onomatopoeic reference to the unfamiliar language spoken by them (Bouillon 2001b:113-122).

Makwerekwere has different meanings in different situations, but in South Africa, it means more than an inability to speak the local languages of South Africa. It also implies that those who are citizens of other African states are economically and culturally retarded when compared to South Africa. In terms of civilisation, the *Makwerekwere* would be bushmen or barbarians of this modern era. This term is used by those pushing the agenda of citizenship in Southern Africa. The *Makwerekwere* are usually discriminated against on the basis of skin colour; referring to them as those who have the darkest skin colours in the midst of blacks and are not informed despite being in possession of higher educational qualifications than fair-skinned South African blacks. There is another notion that paints *Makwerekwere* as migrants from very distant communities in the very rural and isolated parts of the 'Heart of Darkness' especially in the northern part of Limpopo province. Most South Africans have little knowledge about such communities and are not ready to locate such areas, except to proceed with the 'civilising mission' of harkening to 'The Call of the Dark Continent' (Walker 1911 cited in Nyamnjoh 2006) started by European missionaries and colonial masters in Southern Africa in the 17th century (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997).

The new South African constitution which is supposedly liberal hardly accommodates migrants and immigrants' rights. Citizenship is majorly built around rights, entitlements, and interests of locals, some non-South Africans were lucky to have acquired South African citizenship. A small proportion of migrants who worked in mines without necessary permits during the apartheid regime became citizens in the new South Africa. The recent xenophobic attacks aimed at migrants are a good example of narrow nation-state-based citizenship. Except for the rare interference of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the inability of the South African constitution and relevant authorities to shield and prevent non-citizens from abuse does not tally with the claim that South Africa is building a culture of human rights. In South Africa, only national citizens are entitled to benefits like grants from the state. The state has succeeded in shutting out those who do not belong and hindering any other person from joining, mainly those who do not have South African citizenship (Peberdy, 2001:28-29). South Africa does not make provision for the setting up of refugee camps which the country can do because of its stronger economy in relation to other African countries. For example, Kenya is not as buoyant as South Africa, but it has the second largest refugee camp in the world. As of the end of January 2018, Dadaab camp had 235, 269 registered refugees and asylum seekers with a little discrimination of the Muslims as they are being alleged to be affiliated to Al Shabaab (an Islamic extremist group

primarily based in Somalia) which has infiltrated Kenya and has carried out attacks in that country (UNHCR 2015). In South Africa, there has been gross violations of human rights of the migrant community which has gone unchallenged in some instances. Issues of non-natives being necklaced in townships and shown on the pages of newspapers are common sights in South Africa. The government has not fared well in the area of bringing culprits to justice.

The justice system in South Africa seems not to have lived up to expectation as perpetrators of xenophobic violence are arrested in some cases with the state discharging them by lessening or minimising the gravity of offences committed. This could be due to the constant fragile nature of governmental and institutional arrangement has impeded the timely intervention of the state to the violence. The inability of law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system to meticulously investigate the violence and culprits has given such culprits the liberty to move freely. Although, governmental and non-governmental agencies had achieved some level of improvements in a bid to stemming the tide of xenophobia in the country (Muchiri 2016). South Africa is championing the course of human rights on the continents with the country being a signatory to many human rights conventions within the African continent and on the international scene. The South African foreign policy as shown in the in the strategic plan of defunct Foreign Affairs Department, now International Relations and Cooperation Department indicate the state's pledge to the practice of human rights, democracy, rule of law, justice and international law in the pursuit of international peace between nations and internationally recognised instruments for conflict resolution, Afro-centred image promotion globally and economic development through regional and intercontinental pacts in a global village and a symbiotic world (Madue 2015).

South Africa's immigration law which promotes exclusion in its framework and execution has been found liable for sustaining xenophobia in the country. The immigration law is modelled in a way that makes the public, hotels, businesses, schools, institutions of higher learning, hospitals and other locals to detect and inform paperless migrants. The Act stipulates that non-nationals must present their valid papers in the country on every occasion even to non-state actors like property-owners, schools, hospitals, banks, businesses and other educational institutions. The impact of this law is that all non-citizens are regarded as "others" who, in a bid to make use of government and private services, ought to repeatedly show and validate their legal status in the country. These forms of institutionalized xenophobia orchestrated by state agencies denigrate

foreign nationals in the country, making them simple and soft targets for non-state actors (Odiaka 2017).

The print media, political class, government functionaries and local South Africans have promoted the notion the African migrants are the cause of all type of woes in the country. This has formed the basis of framing African migrants in a particular fashion to provide an in depth understanding on the discourse of migration and xenophobia in the post-apartheid period in South Africa. In spite of South Africa being a choice place of destination for African migrants, the economic and psychosocial challenges encountering the country has contributed to the denigrating of African migrants living in metropolitan cities like Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Many assertions especially from populist politicians, local tabloids contain idioms, images and metaphors that substantiate, and attribute all forms of vices to the presence of African migrants (Crush 2008; Nyamnjoh 2010; Patel 2013; Pineteh 2017; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019).

This research concentrates on idioms, images and metaphors commonly used in defining African migrants and to instil anti-foreigner discrimination or motivate and work on the mind-set of locals to resent African migrants. Tafira (2011) contends that labels such as *AmaKalanga, MaNyasa, Ngwangwa, Padrao, Omotswagai, Mkwevho, MaShangani, and MaZimbabwe* are used to categorise other Africans residing in Alexandra while other labels are utilised in other parts of South Africa. Other derogatory names used to refer to foreigners include: '*MaNigeria'* and '*Broder'*. *'MaNigeria'* presents the socio-geographical descent of the Nigerians in South Africa. *'Broder'* is a replication of Nigerian language: "my broder from anoder moder", simply implies, 'my brother from another mother'. Generally, speaking, these labels pose no threat as they look innocuous, it becomes hurtful and harsh when the aim of the user is meant to ridicule a foreign national. These communications fortify the socio-linguistic discourse as people interface. Moreover, words like *'Maforeigner'* and *'AmaXenophobia'* are labels that were invented in the aftermath of the May/June 2008 xenophobic crisis. Instigators of xenophobic violence, particularly those based in Alexandra usually refer to displaced migrant communities as *'amaxenophobia'* whenever xenophobia is in the news (Tafira 2011).

For example, Comaroff and Comaroff (2001, 2002) employ the use of metaphors like images of wildfire, zombie and economic vultures to explain the subject matter of illegal aliens and anger shown by local South Africans when it comes to competition for jobs, housing and other scarce economic resources. Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) say: "Of late, the phobia, which started out

as a diffuse sense of misgiving, has congealed into an active antipathy to what is perceived as a shadowy alien-nation of 'illegal immigrants'; the qualifier has become all but inseparable from the sign, just as, in the plant world, invasive has become locked, adjectivally, to alien. Popularly held to be 'economic' vultures who usurp jobs and resources, who foster crime, prostitution and disease, these doppelganger anticitizens are accused-in uncanny analogy with non-indigenous flora-of spreading wildly out of control. And of siphoning off the rapidly diminishing wealth of the nation". Comaroff and Comaroff (2002) submit that: "We shall argue that half-life of Zombies in South Africa, past and present, is linked to that of compromised workers of another kind: immigrants from elsewhere on the continent, whose demonization is an equally prominent feature of the postcolonial scene". Authors like (Geischiere 2009; Landau and Freemantle 2010; Sandwith 2010) explain the many ways political institutions and the South African public construct and disseminate information about immigrants and the concepts of autochthony and belongingness most importantly at a time where globalisation has contributed a lot to peoples' movements.

2.9.1 Narratives on African Nationals at the Street Level

Research on migration and xenophobia by Landau (2011) and Hassim et al. (2008) have summarised opinions held by locals on what they view who African migrants are coming from their respective states, bringing all sorts of vices and moral ills into contemporary South African society. The idioms used to describe African migrants in South Africa denote that they indulge in ways of gathering wealth through illegitimate means at the detriment of the populace (Hickel 2014). Street level narratives about African migrants and xenophobia are often built around the derogatory term *makwerekwere*. This narrative around *makwerekwere* indicate that local South Africans believe that they own spaces and that African migrants are aliens and intruders that must be exorcised; hence the latter do not belong in the country (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Nyamnjoh 2010; Pineteh 2017). Belonging has become a major tool for distinguishing between locals and migrants in post-independent South Africa. This has been birthed by widening gap between the poor and rich, dwindling job opportunities in a growing but shrinking economy. As migrants flock in, they create wealth for themselves by establishing personal businesses or using the skills acquired in technical vocations from their home countries to develop the South African economy. Some migrants have scarce skills in medicine, pharmacy and other fields which are in

41

high demand in the country. Other classes of migrants have accessed the country illegally through porous borders and with the connivance of immigration officials. This is the more reason why they are being referred 'illegal immigrants' by locals, some politicians and top government functionaries. As the businesses of immigrant entrepreneurs expands, locals are also employed by such entrepreneurs which not only contributes to the development of the economy but reduces the growing surge of unemployment in the country. A major factor that has contributed to this street level narrative is the high rate of illiteracy amongst the populace which has further exacerbated negative stereotypes and propaganda against migrants; especially those from other African states. Years lived in isolation by South Africans, apparently built a wall of divide between the locals in the country and other Africans, giving them the impression that Africans from elsewhere were inferior.

The high levels of unemployment which is a common development among black youths in South Africa is blamed on the influx African migrants who compete for scarce economic resources. However, this situation is not limited to South Africa alone, but it has become a global phenomenon. The huge contribution made by African migrant traders in the informal economy cannot be underestimated as shown by research. The construction of damaging messages about Africans permits a situation that has the capability of brewing social conflict which can be used to validate the reasons for xenophobic attacks (Piper and Yu 2016). The narratives used in framing African migrants as job stealers denotes the African migrant as a foe, denying citizens the opportunity of enjoying their natural right to employment (Landau 2011). These narratives transcend beyond the informal sector. In the public sector, some skills are in high demand with few South African nationals having requisite skill to fill the void created by the situation; hence the recruitment of professionals in areas like healthcare services where doctors from other African states are hired to mitigate the shortfall in this field. The negative stereotypes being propagated against African migrants discredits a provision made for other Africans in the constitution which states: "South Africa belongs to all those who live in it" and the immigration laws have given many African migrants the right to belong. Since the South African constitution gives African migrants legal cover, framing of Africans as job stealers, criminals and illegal aliens in the media and political space gives an excuse to prevent foreigners from belonging to the South African society. This has promoted the ideology of "the insiders and outsiders" or inclusion and exclusion defined along the lines of autochthonous implications of nationality and citizenship (Geschiere 2009;

Nyamnjoh 2006). Citizens who were promised free education and massive job creation at the inception of democracy through the ANC (African National Congress) led government seem disillusioned as unemployment rates keep soaring with no mitigating policies to address the perennial issue on the part of government. The issue of unemployment has led to increase in poverty levels and violent crimes, hence scapegoating African migrants for government failures (Harris 2002, 2003). The purveyors of this stereotypes are sometimes ANC politicians who have fallen out of favour with the majority of the electorate and are losing elections in areas they previously controlled. They disseminate these messages in order to paint African migrants in bad light with the aim of absolving government of any blame. This narrative is built on disputes on autochthony, social inclusion and the rights to live and partake in the economy of the new democratic South Africa. When there are outbreaks of xenophobia, African migrants "are attacked because of their not being thought to be South African" (Hayem 2013; Landau and Freemantle 2010). The language of isolation is still a deciding factor in the way and manner in which locals speak against the presence of other Africans in South Africa (Gqola 2001).

The attitude of local South Africans is manifested in the tales spoken by them when foreigners of African descent are being attacked and this measure is meant to expel foreigners mainly African migrants. During violent attacks, the print media contains messages and statements like "this is our country and we do not want foreigners here", "makwerekwere you must go back to your country" and "hamba makwerekwere hamba". Utterances of this nature display animosity which "conceals itself in the language of autochthony and alien in nature" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001:651). Idioms of this nature support local narratives which show bias attitudes South Africans have about immigrants and a strong belief based on their rights to space and housing. In a bid to exclude African migrants, foreign-owned businesses are deliberately attacked and looted in many townships across South Africa.

At the street level, migrants are accused applying mystical powers and witchcraft to attract customers through the use of "muthi". The term "foreigners" denotes non-nationals residing in South Africa irrespective of race, ethnicity or nationality. However, due to low levels of knowledge, the term has been used to refer to illegal Africans. Therefore, the attacks on Africans are constructed as wiping out unwanted illegal aliens. In light of these happenings, what is regarded as xenophobia is actually "Afrophobia" or "negrophobia". Except for Pakistani nationals who also

43

engage in businesses around townships, there is no visible evidence of looting or attacks on European-owned or Asian-run businesses in South Africa. European or Chinese owned businesses are mostly situated in metropolitan areas and have not been targeted or looted during xenophobic attacks.

The 2015 xenophobic violence which started in Durban before spreading to other parts of South Africa was blamed on the utterances of the Zulu king based on negative stereotypes calling for the deportation of African nationals. He is reported to have said:

> "The influx of foreign nationals, makes most government leaders do not want to speak out on this matter because they are scared of losing votes. As the king of the Zulu nation, I cannot tolerate a situation where we are being led by leaders with no views whatsoever. We are requesting those who come from outside to please go back to their countries, Zwelithini said. The fact that there were countries that played a role in the country's struggle for liberation should not be used as an excuse to create a situation where foreigners are allowed to inconvenience locals. "I know you were in their countries during the struggle for liberation. But the fact of the matter is you did not set up businesses in their countries," (citizen.co.za, 2015).

The Zulu king is a well-respected and renowned traditional leader of the Zulu clan, his pronouncement about foreign nationals does not befit his high status. This statement can be said to be a street level narrative because it shares the same sentiments and beliefs with indigent South Africans. The king was rebuked for his speech because it endorsed popular street level fallacies about Africans. The king only tendered an apology saying he was being misconstrued and the human rights community voiced out their dissatisfaction and tried to seek for social justice, but in the end the king was absolved of all charges.

Instead of finding ways to reduce the occurrence of violent attacks against fellow black Africans, in the aftermath of the 2015 xenophobic attacks, the government decided to launch operation *fiela* to weed out criminality across the nation. However, the operation fiela swung into action by arresting scores of alleged illegal immigrants. This action seems to validate the notion that bias towards non-South Africans is not only at the street level but have been brought to the fore of public opinion by bureaucrats and politicians. (Landau and Freemantle 2010). The launch of

operation *fiela* intended to rid the country of criminals was now being used to persecute African migrants. The portrayal of African migrants by the state will be discussed in the next section.

2.9.2 Narratives about African Nationals by the Government

The political class, mainly ANC stalwarts during crisis periods use electioneering campaign to construct narratives that African migrants are responsible for societal ills like crime, unemployment, illegal migration which often lead to service delivery protests. The interpretation of xenophobia as an act of criminality, a severe result of illegal migration, hate crime or the involvement of a third party shows the state's ploy to dodge societal challenges thereby negating its inventions of Ubuntu and African renaissance (Hayem 2013; Landau and Freemantle 2010). Politicians in South Africa have failed to come to terms that democratised South Africa is an immigration region in dire need of foreign skills and labour (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Geschiere 2009). The attitudes of South Africans highlight the "us" against "them" narrative, which depicts African migrants as freeloaders. Political narratives in post-apartheid South Africa seems to treat xenophobia as a part of the history of the liberation movement. Xenophobic attacks have been invented by the masses batter the image of leaders and ruin the political achievements since South Africa attained democracy. The entry of African migrants into South Africa after 1994 heralded the beginning of xenophobia in the state. Hence, African migrants are referred to as illegal aliens, with hatred, marginalization, and accusations became rife in political discourse (Morris and Bouillon 2001).

The then Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi in 1997 allegedly put the figures of illegal migrants residing in South Africa between 2.5 and 5 million. The minister further said that the presence of illegal aliens in the country caused a strain on socio-economic resources of the country (Buthelezi 1997). Promises of a better life for indigent South Africans now seemed threatened by the presence of migrants from other African states. This set the stage for the propounding of different narratives about African migrants in post-apartheid South Africa. Since the provision of legal cover for all residents within the republic is enshrined in the South African constitution, a diversionary narrative is needed to back up unconstitutional state actions against foreigners. African migrants are used as scapegoats because the government has not been able to deliver on its promises. Migrants are framed as illegal aliens, presenting them as parasites to the

South African economy as they have caused government spending to increase. This is a political patronage thesis in which African migrants are being accused for the ills and adversity facing South Africans which prepared the platform for black on black violence (Gibson 2011; Matsinhe 2011). This is a nativist political rhetoric where the poor are being made to believe that aliens are responsible for the unpalatable state of affairs in their economy (Gibson 2011). African migrants are discriminated against and made to pay for the malaise in the system that has not been able find lasting solutions to socio-economic and political challenges plaguing the former apartheid enclave.

Foreigners are repeatedly accused of criminality and imbalances in the political system which South Africa has not been able to control. This is further amplified by Landau (2011: 9-10) who quotes James Modise, the then Minister of Defence who made the comment below about African migrants:

> As for crime, the army is helping the police to get rid of crime and violence in the county. However, what can we do? We have one million illegal immigrants in our country who commit crimes and who are mistaken by some people for South African citizens. This is the real problem (Landau, 2011: 9).

Modise's analysis presents post-1994 South Africa as an immaculate state that has been infiltrated by African criminals and drug barons. This explanation of crime depicts the division of body politics into legal and illegal nationals, that is, responsible South Africans against unscrupulous people (Sandwith 2010). Buthelezi and Modise popularised the use of street level idioms to legalise xenophobia starting from 2008 to date. These narratives show that beginning from 1994 onwards, South Africa started building on the values inherited from the colonialists, which had negrophobia on its list (Gibson 2011).

Another top government functionary, Lindiwe Zulu who was the Minister of Small Business Development reacted to the 2015 looting spree and attacks on foreign shop owners in Soweto saying that foreign business owners in South Africa's townships could not expect to co-exist peacefully with local business owners unless they shared their trade secrets. Zulu said:

> Foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy and our priority is to
> the people of this country first and foremost, … A platform is needed for business

owners to communicate and share ideas. They cannot barricade themselves in and
not share their practices with local business owners. (News 24.com, 2015)

The above is another fault-finding narrative that gives credence to the looting of black-owned businesses. Narratives at the street level used to portray African migrants in bad light are upheld and propagated by political gatekeepers who perceive the presence of African migrants as a threat to democracy. Even with concepts like Ubuntu and African Renaissance which signify African communalism and brotherhood, the political class has undermined them by shying away from the truth which is replicated in their biased attitudes towards African migrants with statements credited to them.

The Minister of Home Affairs Mr Malusi Gigaba in 2015 in his speech to the victims of xenophobia in Durban builds on the narrative of the burden of migration and the need to deport alleged "illegal aliens" back to their countries of origin. In a satire fashion with a feeling of indifference, Gigaba was willing to readily assist migrants who wanted to return home as a solution to the vicious violence experienced by African migrants. Gigaba stated:

> "The important thing for them in that case is to then register their names with their community leadership so that we can know how they are, which countries they come from and then we will facilitate their return to their home countries." He added "It also allowed the department to root out illegal immigrants". (enca.com 2015)

As the victims endured the pains and agony of rejection and discrimination, Gigaba highlighted the authentication of existing permits in the continued search for illegal immigrants, thus stimulating the narrative of illegality which appealed to many local South Africans. The Minister's comments express the tendencies of exclusivity by locals not only on the street level, but at the level of the highest government functionaries (Landau 2007). Mr Gigaba also backed up stringent immigration laws to quietly frustrate African migrants who tried to obtain permits that would allow them to legally reside in South Africa. Both students and skilled professionals of African origin are now boxed into a corner that Achille Mbembe calls "a kafkaian" situation in which foreign students who accessed the country through legal means, having no hitches in renewing their visas but are now illegal as result of new immigration laws. This has made it impossible for them to register at universities and have been denied the opportunity of accessing money in their bank

47

accounts. The government has employed the new anti-immigration system to make legal migrants paperless (Nyamnjoh 2006; Mbembe 2015). As Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) contend that "black foreigners-are the object of consternation and contestation across the new nation, from politicians and their parties, through the media and trade unions, to street hawkers and the unemployed" (2001: 647). Political propaganda and calumny against the migrant community by the political class was highlighted. The ANC-led government has adopted this method as a diversionary tactic from addressing socio-economic problems in the society. Comments made by three former ministers immediately after 1994 and the one made by a serving minister against the backdrop of migrants in South Africa were uncomplimentary. This section also discussed the implementation of stringent laws intended to frustrate African migrants and a new anti-immigration system which made legal migrants paperless. The role of the print media in the framing discourse of African migrants will be discussed in the next section.

2.9.3 Print Media Style of Labelling African Migrants

The print media has contributed to the negative stereotyping of African migrants in the belonging debacle rocking South Africa. This has increasingly heightened tensions among local South Africans and foreign nationals leading to series of xenophobic violence in many parts of the country. Images of people being molested or necklaced appear on the front pages of newspapers across the country. Such images tend to promote a culture of violence which was inherited from their apartheid past One of the dividends of true democracy is a free atmosphere for media practice and freedom from any form of undue interference by government. In many climes, the media often serves as a voice of the masses, that which amplifies the plight of the disenfranchised and the most vulnerable of the society. The media also to a great extent handle many debates centred on governance, social security, social justice and many other challenges confronting a society.

However, the nature of modern media and the way information is being disseminated has been challenged because an array of literature reveals that the media has deviated from being fair to compromising reporting standards by supporting different types of political propaganda and information that has the capacity to spark off demonstrations and deadly violence (Hadland 2010; Mkandawire 2015). The movement of African migrants into South Africa has become common knowledge in the rural areas of the country. The use of words such as illegal migrant, criminal or

alien to depict African migrants on the cover pages of both electronic and print media in the local and international scene has become a common feature in the twenty-first century. These words have been used to construct a common identity for African migrants residing in South Africa (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). The bad reportage of African migrants is popular in informal settlements where criminality and unemployment levels are high; a condition that allows locals to conclude that the presence of African migrants who are small business owners is the cause of woes in these areas.

It is out of place for journalists to intentionally publish stories with derogatory language like aliens as done by some media houses during the 2008 xenophobic violence. The use of such language could be permissible, only if it subscribes to the general public opinion, but it must be shaped within the context of the story being published, so that it does not come across as offensive. An example was found in (The Citizen 2008:4). It looks difficult to determine whether the headline was offensive or derogatory. Coliver (1992) expressions like aliens could be termed as hate expression and unpleasant to a particular segment of society, which may be equated to the violation of human rights. I concur with Coliver (1992) that hate expression or some words used in the media might be regarded a manifestation of xenophobia, may become frightening, abusive and offensive to some tabloid readers if not cautiously enunciated in the media. Duncan (2003) concurs that, intentional xenophobic expression is morally wrong, it also has the tendency of demeaning people in the eyes of readers of certain daily tabloids. News of this nature may also bring vulnerable migrants under physical attacks. However, in a research embarked upon by the South African Migration Project (SAMP) discovered that South Africans displays levels of intolerance and hostility to outsiders unlike practically anything witnessed in other parts of the globe (SAMP 2008). It be inferred that any terminologies that may purposely reduce a category of people or provoke physical violence must be clearly avoided in the media because it may be against the code of ethics. Additionally, such expressions negate (Section 16) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996).

The media was implicated of promoting violence in the aftermath of xenophobia in 2008, 2015 and 2016. The role of the media worsened the crisis as locals were incited the more to carry out attacks against African migrants through the reports disseminated to the public, especially the indigent populace. The way the print media portrays or conveys messages during crisis periods in the squalor settlements is demoralising as locals and African migrants complained bitterly that

49

such reports promoted stereotyping, leading to an increase in the level of violence. In the local print media, tabloids like the Sowetan and Daily Sun inflamed violence in local areas and also constructed messages that showed that the ANC-led administration were incapable of handling the situation. The Guardian, an international paper had the following statement:

> The profound shame that xenophobia brings on this nation is the same kind of shame that apartheid brought on the people of this land. What is so shaming is it alienates us from our neighbours and calls into question the integrity of our entire constitution. It exposes the systemic violation of justice: today it is foreign nationals and tomorrow it will be Indians and after that it will be whites. There is anger and hatred growing among us. (The Guardian, 2015)

The above excerpt from an international newspaper portrays what happens in both white and black tabloids that will be cited in this piece. The Daily Sun adopted captions like 'war on aliens'. Its war on aliens – 20 bust for attacks' (13 May 2008). In this piece, Dikgari Ramothata, the newspaper reporter said that violent attacks on aliens continue. Alexandra was the area of focus in which two non-South Africans were shot killed. The reporter captioned it as "two men said to be aliens were shot and killed on Sunday night". Although the police authorities identified one of the deceased as a South African national. Alien in this parlance sounds insulting because it was used in profiling the victims. A proper way would have been 'a non-national' or a 'non-citizen' of this country lost their lives in the attacks. Alien was used to profile the dead immigrant (s), implying they don't belong here.

Again the Daily Sun had this headline the following day. 'War Against Aliens! Thousands Forced to flee Alex' (14 May 2008). Rifumo Maluleke, the reporter writes: "A Third man has been killed in the war against foreigners in Alexandra, outside Joburg. He was shot dead in the road on Monday night. On Sunday night, two other aliens were also shot dead by angry crowds. More than 1000 aliens, including women and children, living in the squatter camp next to *Madala* Hostel in the township have been forced out of their homes". The reporter further explained "The violence started on Sunday when a group of local people armed with sticks and guns attacked aliens, mostly Zimbabweans and Mozambicans". A headline of this nature used 'aliens' repeatedly in describing the violence at Alexandra Township; painting foreign migrants in bad light, giving a bad impression which will further reduce their humanity in the society.

The Sowetan had this caption: "Aliens Find Refuge at Methodist Church" (13 May 2008). The Sowetan has also used the word alien when presenting stories in their reporting on the xenophobic attacks. However, the newspaper used the term minimally when compared to Daily Sun in the reportage of the 2008 xenophobic violence. In advanced climes, the word Alien is hardly used when nationals from states within the same continent migrate to other countries. The French will not call the English alien, rather they refer to them as Europeans, except for ethnic minorities like the Roma who migrated from the Indian subcontinent many centuries ago.

The term "Aliens" carry negative connotations because it is commonly associated with stories related to theft, criminality and xenophobic violence. The frequent use of aliens and their correction to a kind of deleterious, frequently illicit and criminal tendencies, would obviously evoke reservations if not resentful attitudes towards non-nationals of South Africa. These press reports create an 'other' who does not belong in South Africa. "Othering" is used to basically differentiate locals from foreign nationals in South Africa. Gomo (2010) frowns at the use of the word aliens, explaining that it was used to dehuumanise migrants. Alien was previously used in the Alien Control Act in the apartheid era; but the same word has crept in to the present dispensation and its frequently used by media houses in South Africa. Since the abolition of the Alien Control Act of 1991 which was aptly substituted by the Immigration Act in 2002; it seems that there has been no ban or government memorandum on the use of the term "Alien", when referring to non-citizens of South Africa. Actually, it does not imply that the media have discontinued the use of the word, nor is it intrinsically erroneous to do so.

These negative reports have shaped the relationship between locals and African migrants and have created other levels of relational animosity; scaring those who are migrants to have a rethink whether to stay in South Africa or make the return journey back home. The media has contributed in shaping xenophobia as an extension of apartheid bias by those (media, government and the political gate keepers) who ought to know better (Sandwith 2010). The print media displays xenophobia crisis situation and South Africa as a fragmented state because the state reneged on its promise to give the masses a better life after apartheid rule (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). The actions of white-owned media houses have excessively demonised African migrants thus giving locals more reasons to execute sustained violence against this category of migrants. They engage in activities that ridicules the ANC-led government, giving the world a notion that nothing new has

happened in South Africa after apartheid rule. This type of vindictive journalism during crisis periods has equated xenophobic violence to gang violence in the country (Pineteh 2017).

Normalising a culture of violence does not augur well for South Africa's image both regionally and globally. That violence was used to settle scores during the apartheid era does not imply that it should be brought to the post-apartheid period. The media has failed to use its power to report impartially on xenophobic issues. Instead, negative stereotyping has been adopted by the print media through captions that portray African migrants as criminals and aliens. This has nurtured a culture of violence against the migrant community. The next section examines belonging in the context of xenophobia.

2.10 Belonging in the Context of Xenophobia

President Trump's speech documented in the National Interest review, saw Trump defining his vision of world politics and those posing serious threats to US core areas of influence. A gloomy picture of the contemporary international order viewed as a very lop-sided and precarious play ground on which the US has been paying "the total financial political and human costs of the security burden", and its associates have been stylishly "not paying their fair share". In a bid to defend US security and economic interests, Trump adopts a neo-isolationist and neo-sovereigntist approval motivated by his "America First" strategy, which was firstly declared in his National Interest review speech: " 'America First' will be the major and overriding theme of my administration' " (The National Interest 2016). Trump's "America First" strategy totally discards multilateralism and globalism which are the two main building blocks of the liberal grand strategy and substitutes them with "Americanism", which translates into economic nationalism and protectionism- "Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo" (Republican Nomination Acceptance Speech 2016).

Trump seems to have first used the phrase "America First" in the course of an interview with The New York Times, when he was asked if he was taking an isolationist position (Calamur, 2017). This mantra has greatly assisted Trump garner massive support, but it has bad memories in that it is closely related to anti-Semitism and isolationism during the Second World War (Bennett, 2017). Trump's America First policy preaches the gospel of obvious economic nationalism. As Trump averred in his inaugural speech, "From this day forward, it's going to be only America first,

America first. We will follow two simple rules: buy American and hire American." This policy will deceive some sections of the American society into believing that their woes were caused outside the country and can be resolved by implementing stiff primarily originate abroad and can be resolved by harsher trade policies. Instead of pursuing an open agenda, Trump intentionally used this policy to inspire his allies (Gui 2017). Economic nationalism appears dicey because it will eventually culminate into trade protectionism. Trump intends to use protectionism as a tool to protect "American borders from the ravages of other countries" and bring employment opportunities, wealth, and dreams back to America. Yet Trump is ignorant to the fact that emphasis on open trade will not only strengthen prosperity, it also tries to promote unity among nations, thus promoting global stability (Samuelson, 2016).

At the launch of the ANC's manifesto in 2013 at Wits University, Zuma responded to questions about the proposed e-tolling system in Gauteng. He said "We can't think like Africans in Africa. It's not some national road in Malawi" (Mail and Guardian 2013). Utterances of this nature, being pronounced by a sitting president portray non-South Africans in bad light. It evokes populism in the hearts of locals who may not want anything to do with foreign nationals from other African states. In 2015, Jacob Zuma tasked all South Africans to promote social cohesion, peaceful co-existence and good relations in the wake of renewed xenophobic violence in many areas in KwaZulu-Natal. The government condemned the attacks and promised to look into some genuine concerns raised by locals, mainly socio-economic problems plaguing the country. Zuma, reiterated that complaints had been lodged on the presence of illegal and undocumented immigrants in the country, the subsequent surge in the number of shops or small businesses allegedly overthrown by foreign nationals and opinions that foreign nationals indulge in criminal activities. The president stated further that although some foreign nationals have been apprehended for various crimes, it is erroneous and fallacious to categorise or brand all foreign nationals in the country as criminals (Mail and Guardian 2015). The use of the term "illegal immigrants" by the president is a slur to migrant communities across South Africa. There are government agencies which determines the status or otherwise of immigrants, hence the number one citizen cannot make statements like this knowing what such comments can cause in various communities across the country. The alleged takeover of small businesses by foreign nationals too is an unguarded statement that has created bad blood between locals and African migrants. Many migrants have lost their lives and properties to careless and reckless comments of this nature.

2.11 Xenophobia in South Africa

Xenophobia may not affect an entire state, but the aftermath or consequences of xenophobia could leave a dampening effect on the society. Globalization, advances in technology and migration due to socio-political and economic crisis on the African continent, issues of drought, climate change amongst other factors have made post-1994 South Africa a prime destination for many Black Africans especially those from the SADC block and those from other sub regions. Migration during the apartheid years was closely monitored and regulated by the then hegemonic administration. Citizens of neighbouring countries provided the much needed cheap labour mainly in the mining and agricultural sectors of the economy not only because it was the last colonial outpost, but it also boasts of a robust economy, often called the 'America of Africa'. Migrant influx tends to limit the opportunities of locals in a given clime most often in the informal sector of the economy. The operationalisation of xenophobia seems to be inherited from the culture of violence used by black people during the years of oppression under white minority rule.

At the international level, there is no universally accepted definition of 'xenophobia' as stated by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Although it can be described as attitudes, prejudices and behaviours that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity. One thing that stands out from the definition is that xenophobia includes different forms of violence. Some incidences of attacks against African migrants were not documented until xenophobia became historicised in South Africa. Research clearly indicates that the earliest incidences of attacks on foreigners happened between December 1994 and January 1995 when armed-youth gangs in Alexandra Township vandalised homes and properties of undocumented migrants and took them to the police station where they said they were granted a persona non grata status and as result demanded that they be evicted immediately (Croucher, 1998).

In the month of May 2008, xenophobia got to its climax, as xenophobic occurrences which originated from Johannesburg and Pretoria spread to Cape Town, Mpumalanga and Kwazulu-Natal. At the end of the violence, 62 persons had been killed with two-thirds of the victims being Zimbabwean citizens, thousands of internally displaced persons (Hadland, Kondlo and Chiroro 2008). The May 18, 2008 necklacing in Johannesburg of a Mozambican national, Ernesto Alfabeto

Nhamuave, a father of three who arrived South Africa three months prior to the attacks in search of a job in the construction industry, was one of the high points of the violence (Desai 2010:99). The episodic xenophobia in 2008 was said to be the devastating form of anti-foreigner sentiment in South Africa's post-apartheid history and the state had to dispatch soldiers to the streets to restore normalcy (McKnight, 2008).

2.12 Theoretical Frameworks

2.12.1 Social Identity, Political Identity and Framing Theories as a Basis for Understanding the Notion of Belonging

Politics of belonging cannot be explained by a single theory because of its complex nature. It is multidisciplinary in nature because it cuts across disciplines, hence the need for comprehensive theoretical frameworks to understand the study from humanities to social sciences. It is spread across a spectrum of disciplines like international relations, history, political science, languages, economics, psychology, sociology. These disciplines complement each other to give a wider coverage of comprehending the topic under study. Identity originated from the Latin word 'identita', which is the root word idem, translating to the same of identical (Rummens, 2000). Gleason (1983) argues that the term identity has been ill defined and that it is more complex than a mere social construct. Although identity is a common concept on a daily basis and it is complex because of its multifaceted nature since identity and identities are not restricted to only one discipline. Authors just generalise their definition of identity without taking into cognisance the people, situation or audience concerned (Calhoun 1991). Gleason (1983), reveals that our present notion of identity has metamorphosed over time based on the work of Erik Erikson, a psychoanalyst who developed the concept of an identity crisis.

Fearon (1999) contends that identity is defined along social lines and social categories championed by expected behaviour and characteristics as laid out by the code of conduct by group members. Of relevance is that identity not only shows individual identity, but it also reveals identity with others (Lawler, 2008). Rockquemore and Laszloffy (2005) submit that identity facilitates the understanding of human relationships between themselves and their immediate social environment as their identities are being constructed via a vivid process including interaction between them and others in the environment. Identities defines a person based on typical features like social relations,

roles and social group memberships. Identities can be viewed on things in the past, present and future. Identities creates a platform for understanding people uniquely and instantly but not holistically (Oyserman 2007). Identities also comprise one's self-concept and it shows one's thought through self-thought (Steets and Burke 2003; Tajfel 1981), the theory of one's nature (Markus and Cross 1990), and one's self belief is true personally (Forgas and Williams, 2002).

Similarly, identity as a concept has received a lot of attention from scholars most especially in the field of human and social sciences. In the sphere of political science, for example, identity is a keenly contested subject. Identity politics is at the centre of international politics as scholars are committed to research on identity politics of gender, race, religion, and sexuality. Comparatively, with specific reference to nationalism and ethnic conflict, identity occupies a predominant role (Horowitz 1985; Deng 1995). State identity in international relations is central to studies on state sovereignty and constructivist analysis of realism (Bierstker and Weber 1996; Wendt 1999). In political theory, questions bordering on identity gave rise to several contestations on gender, nationality, sexuality, race and culture with respect to liberalism and other options (Young 1990; Miller 1995). Political scientists have not done much research compared to extensive research carried out by historians and other scholars in the humanities. This could be attributed to issues of multiculturalism, criticisms from Foucault, cultural and historical modelling of identities which is been dealt with by historians and students of culture and literature.

Three theories namely, social identity, political identity and framing theory will be employed to explain individual, general and state responses to foreigner influx into South Africa. As the belonging discourse in post-1994 South Africa widens, there is a need to put these issues into proper perspective by looking holistically into sustained attacks on foreign owned small scale businesses on the one hand, and the provision of accommodation for indigents as the inequality gap expands and locals take the laws into their hands. Contestations for scarce economic resources, failed expectations on the part of the state, citizenship debates, nationalism, ethnic riots (in form of service delivery strikes) and scapegoating will be examined.

2.12.2 Social Identity Theory

Social identity, as propounded by Tajfel and Turner (1979), advances reasons in explaining and understanding human perceptions and behaviour with the aid of group-processes. Tajfel (1981)

asserts that identity gives the basis on how to comprehend relationship types that occur between groups, as self-categorisation explains that human beings can be understood by characteristics like identity categories, human thoughts, feelings and actions which are decided by whatever identities are "salient" in such conditions.

History gives us the meaning of identity and related human behaviours. Identity theories explain how human behaviour can be activated or made ineffective in a given circumstance. This shows rational actions embarked upon by people in a "social environment which is in a constant flux" (Tajfel 1981:131). Billig (2002) explains that social identity theory evolved as a theory of social change, psychological conditions which permits lesser groups to resist material, economic and realistic disadvantage.

Tajfel and Turner (1979:38) suggests that when marginalised groups reject the low status accorded to them, a revolt in terms of unified action will be "reawakened" as they begin to view their exploitation as unfair and build cognitive alternatives to the status quo. Tajfel and Turner (1979) notes the rise of ethnocentrism among black Americans after the Second World War. In spite of the rejections meted out to African Americans, they faced the challenges which made them resilient and successful against all odds. Social identity theory is founded on the premise that one's self concept includes both personal identity and social identity aspects. The theory further states that in conditions where a particular in-group identity become salient, individuals will as a cognitive and behavioural pattern seek to maintain, protect, or enhance that group identity (Tajfel 1978:64). Tajfel (1978:63) defines social identity as: "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership".

Social identity theory suggests that identity is a derivative of the social aspect of people according to the groups which they belong. When a comparison is being made on the basis of our own groups and those belonging to out-groups, Tajfel (1978:63) advices that we "acquire both a positive sense of who we are and a clear understanding of how we should act toward in-group members". It assumes the in-group behaviours like solidarity and discrimination against out-groups is manifested as a part of the social identity processes, having positive self-esteem and self-enhancement as purposes to be attained (Abram and Hogg, 1988). The theory deals with social groups and not the individual. A social group comprises a number of people who feel and perceive

57

themselves as belonging to a particular group and others referred to as members of the group (Tajfel and Turner 1979:40). This theory is characterised by four basic principles namely; social categorization, social comparison, social identity and self-esteem.

2.12.3 Political Identity Theory

Identity politics is connected to a set of political actions which include multiculturalism, feminism, homosexuals and contemporary religious sectarianism and violent ethnic conflicts (Cressida, 2009). It has received more scholarship in the western world and identity politics is at the centre of three fundamental issues. The nature of identity is pivotal to understanding identity politics. This implies groups and individuals having multiple identities (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996). Also, 'subjective' self-identification may differ from one's 'objective' characteristics (Friese 2002; Appiah 2005) and the existence of a complex relationship between objective and subjective identities based on the circumstance and the status of practitioners and researchers (Moya, 2006).

Secondly, causative factors of identity-based political actions. Some scholars have focused on material causes (Sanchez, 2006), while others concentrated on socio-cultural, linguistic, technological and religious factors (Sawyer, 2006). On a final note, contestations on the relevance of identity politics in the society is on-going. There are different schools of thought on identity politics. Some refer to identity politics as politics of 'recognition' (Brunt, 1989) and politics of 'differences' (Young, 1990) with the possibility for 'mutual' recognition of self and other and taking due cognisance of social, cultural and ideological differences (Honneth, 1995). There are scholars who also maintain that identity politics is a 'political space' which prompts the emergence of a change agent against hegemonic rule (Sanchez, 2006). But one of its criticisms is that it is a 'negative' force which further propels social divisions and social exclusions (Brown, 1995).

Identity politics as a western nation is studied on the basis of its localised culture, historical traditions and social conditions. The western world has highly stable economies and political systems, in many cases the welfare and safety of citizens are well catered for. Operational legal frameworks are made readily available for their citizens (Herring and Rangwala; 2006:4). Identity politics builds on the current state of insider-outsider relationship in contemporary South Africa which has resulted in a spate of crises. The extent to which identity politics has been vigorously pursued will be evaluated from the body of literature on the topic. This applies to South Africa as

locals (in-group) mobilise against foreigners (out-groups) in many cases blacks from other African states and occasionally other races due to competition for scarce economic resources at the informal level. This situation became pronounced in 2008 through xenophobic violence and has been happening sporadically since then.

Radkiewicz (2003:5), suggests that ethnocentric syndrome and xenophobia have similar characteristics with two distinct features: opinions of national supremacy and unfriendly unpleasant disposition to outsiders. Identities are relevant to state building as social cohesion is employed by individuals to build trust and identify with each other against foreigners who reside in the community. Contestations of these nature abound on the globe and as identities are constructed, migrants are excluded from the decision making process in the society so as to confirm their alien statuses. Several factors triggered the construction of identity in South Africa especially during the apartheid era as other nations rallied around them, especially the SADC block and other African states as transnationalism was the order of the day. Other African states provided the much needed labour for the mining sector and discrimination in form of Afrophobia was not in the picture because many black people of diverse ethnic affiliations practiced communalism. However, the post-2000 era saw that communal virtue ebbing as groups began clamouring for better living conditions and blaming foreigners especially fellow black Africans for the increase in crime rate, unemployment, spread of diseases and loss of jobs.

2.12.4 Framing Theory

Framing theory is employed to explain how anti-African migrant sentiments and xenophobia. This theory is embedded in Media Studies, but other disciplines borrow from it to give a more nuanced meaning to their studies. Its occurrence on the scene is often credited to the epistemological belief that an incident can have many interpretations and the formation these interpretations has effects on a wide range of happenings in the society. Framing involves the way by which people create a certain meaning or reshape their minds about an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007: 103). Advocates of this theory allude that framing as a concept symbolises people's beliefs and attitudes and it employs these human traits to arrive at opinions about societal issues and events. It is also connected to how messages are constructed in newspaper coverage events for example, affects

public opinions about such events (Iyengar 1991; Scheufele 1999). Within the purview of Media Studies, framing theory is not all about political preferences of winning support or of learning, information processing and other intellectual processes (Brewer and Gross 2005; Iyengar 1991). It is about message construction and the impacts on human behaviours and activities.

The way messages are framed brings about framing effects, which has to do with results of the behaviour or attitude emanating from how messages are constructed and communicated to diverse audiences (Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Druckman 2001). These are human responses to how information is passed on to people or framed in public treatise. The theory is based on the idea that the meaning of a message does not solely rest in the message but also in the way the message is constructed, disseminated and situated in the public sphere. Basically, it is not what a person says; it is the way and manner it is being said. This theory is very important because bias towards African migrants and the resultant xenophobic attacks are mainly the outcomes of the negative images and metaphors that several institutions and South Africans have employed in coming up with views about the African migrant population (Hadland 2010; Sandwith 2010; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). African migrants are tagged criminals, aliens, illegal migrants, fraudsters, demons and parasites, on the premise that "by the time of the May 2008 attacks a powerful xenophobic culture had been created and state organs were geared to hounding African migrants" (Desai 2010:6).

This chapter highlighted issues of porous borders, uncontrolled migration, corruption of government officials and inability of the state to address issues of housing and access to amenities by indigents who are mostly affected by these issues. The chapter also reviewed vast literature by problematizing the notion of belonging and looked at belonging in both the traditional and contemporary terms. The African concept of belonging, South African concept of belonging and how is being constructed, multiculturalism and xenophobia in South Africa were explained. The chapter emphasised that South Africa has a culture of violence inherited from the apartheid past. The faulting of African migrants for economic woes and labelling them in derogatory terms as *amakwerekwere* was also discussed. If not properly addressed, the label of *Makwerekwere* can easily be equated with the negative connotations of a dependant, hopeless, helpless or even a criminal person. The role of government, media and political elites were also highlighted. The Social Identity Theory, Political Identity theory and Framing Theory were used to explain the study. The next chapter is titled: Manifestation of Xenophobic Violence in South Africa.

CHAPTER 3: Manifestations of Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed extant literature on belonging in South Africa. The politics of belonging was viewed from a global perspective with reference to the 7/7, 2005 and 9/11, 2001 bombings in Britain and the United States of America which took the two countries and the world by surprise thereby calling for a redefinition of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2011). It also took a thorough look into the politics of identity in South Africa culminating into revisiting questions related to belonging, entitlements, nationalism and nativism. The consequence now manifests in the form of violence known as Afrophobia or xenophobia. The notion of belonging was problematized, as well as the connection between belonging, social cohesion and identity politics, globalization, which gave us an understanding of belonging in a global context. The Afro-conception of belonging, ethnicity and belonging, xenophobia in the global context, xenophobia on the African continent, xenophobia in South Africa, and triggers to identity construction were also examined. The questions of belonging and politics of belonging are serious issues confronting our contemporary world today. It concluded by introducing the theoretical frameworks of identity politics and social identity that was used in the study.

Presently, outsiders are not only perceived as dangerous to the cohesion of political and cultural community, but also as terrorists, with special reference to the younger men among migrant communities. The question of who an insider or an outsider is; a stranger or who does not belong experiences modifications and contestations on a daily basis amidst increasing cultural, religious and ethnic conflicts between and within societies and states (Yuval-Davis 2011). Politics of belonging has become a central theme in the political plan in many countries of the world. Nyamnjoh (2005) maintained that in Africa and other places on the globe, belonging has attracted much scholarship, eliciting new inquiries on common assumptions on citizenship and nationality. African communities were militarised by colonial administrations, birthing traits of violence upon the state thus leading to the normalization of a violent culture within the state and society. This inheritance of violence lends credence to the multiplicity of uprisings, political instability, terrorism, civil strife and other forms vices or social ills inherent in African states.

Colonialism militarised African societies and imposed a violent character upon the state, leading to the institutionalization of a culture of violence within the state and

society. This explains the diverse forms of political instability, insurgency, terrorism and civil war experienced in many African countries. Recently, xenophobic violence has become part of the African story. Although this is not a new phenomenon, its destructive nature is cause for concern among stakeholders in African peace, security and development projects. From Ghana to Nigeria and Zambia to South Africa hostility has been directed against 'the others' and non-nationals of African descent. While there is a rich literature on the violent manifestation of xenophobia in Africa, few studies have explored the non-violent expression of xenophobia in countries like Botswana (Akinola 2018). The next section examines the socio-economic conditions during apartheid.

3.2 Socio-Economic Conditions during Apartheid

The present-day South Africa was inhabited by the Boers, British, black Africans of various ethnic affiliations and immigrant workers from India in the mid-1860s. The discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in 1867 and the discovery of huge deposits of gold in 1886 in Transvaal changed the economic fortunes of the country (Sonneborn 2010). South Africa experienced an unprecedented economic transformation growing at over 5% per annum between 1946 and 1968. At the same time, the South African Reserve Bank captioned the relatively high growth rate as remarkable placing it at par with Japanese economy which had the fastest growth rate at that point in time. Researchers attributed South Africa's alleged economic success to prosperous white entrepreneurship and good economic policies although, the tensed political climate threatened the economic growth of the nation. The rapid industrialisation, urbanisation and technological advancement also boosted South Africa's economic growth (Moll 1991).

Modise and Mtshiselwa (2013) traced the socio-economic conditions of blacks during the apartheid era to the Natives Land Act of 1913 which was used to economically disempower the black majority population, plunging them into poverty which still remains unresolved to date. Land dispossessions by the whites literally deprived blacks a means of livelihood making them inactive in the economy. Socio-economic injustices and landlessness of many black South Africans was linked to the colonial and apartheid legacies has been the root of bitterness and calls for compensation on behalf of those who were affected by forceful removals by the apartheid government. The state conceived the idea of land redistribution through a land reform programme

aimed at alleviating poverty. Research indicates that Black South Africans are the most impoverished among the racial groups in the country. On the aggregate, 61.4% of blacks are poor compared to 4.35% of whites in 2012. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, the White Paper on South African Land Policy and Green Paper on Land Reform have attempted to undo the ills of colonialism and apartheid, notwithstanding these policies have failed to mitigate the pervasiveness of poverty especially among South Africans. Hofmeyr and Govender (2015) assert that some structural socio-economic legacies inherited from the years of colonial and apartheid administration like the marginalisation of the majority black populace with reference to accessing financial resources, economic opportunities, qualitative education and political participation still persists. Apart from these, apartheid's regime of systemic racial exclusion has orchestrated and government's failure to tackle racism encountered by locals and hatred of other racial groups is a major characteristic of post-1994 South Africa. From the socio-economic conditions during apartheid, the next section focuses on the transitory period from apartheid to a non-racial of constitutional democracy.

3.3 Transition from Apartheid to a Non-Racial Constitutional Democracy

Vora and Vora (2004) avers that the decision of the National Party to unban the African National Congress and the release of Nelson Mandela from incarceration after spending 27 years in solitary confinement were two remarkable events signalling the end of apartheid rule in South Africa. The ANC members who were in exile also had their persona-non-grata status reversed; meaning they could come back from exile without any further harassment, persecution or clampdown on them. This was a welcomed development as peace was pursued by the whites and blacks. The ANC and the NP leaders sat on the negotiation table to establish an Interim constitution, thus paving the way for a smooth transition from apartheid to democracy. This was stated in the final clause of the Constitution:

> *The Adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions of strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation,*

a need for ubuntu (the African philosophy of humanism) but not for victimization. In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. (Krog, 1998: vi)

Despite attaining democracy and constitutionalism, South Africa emerged from a violent past which continued into the democratic dispensation (Endoh 2015). The need to create a non-racial, non-sexist society was topmost on the agenda of the new democratic state. The major problem the Mandela administration had to battle with was to undo apartheid which came with bitterness and reproach especially to the indigent black populace. Based on the agreement between the white minority government and the African National Congress between 1990 and the first democratic elections in 1994, the formation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 1995 was instituted to address gross violations of human rights perpetrated under the apartheid regime. The South African TRC toed the path of previous commissions, but, a new dimension it added on the need for national reconciliation distinguished it from other commissions. Consequently, the commission was created on the basis of provisions made in the constitution stated as the *Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act*, No. 3of 1995. The commission was saddled with the responsibility of examining human right crimes executed from the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre in until 1994. The commission consisted of 17 duly selected commissioners, with Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu and Dr Alex Boraine as chairman and vice-chairman respectively as contained in the December 1995 Government Gazette (Mamdani 2002; Vora and Vora 2004; Kobe 2017; Lephakga 2017). The operation of the TRC was subdivided into three committees namely: The Human Rights Violations Committee which investigated human rights abuses that happened between 1960 and 1994; The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee was given the mandate of restoration of victims' dignity and preparing proposals with the intent of aiding rehabilitation; The Amnesty Committee accepted applications from individuals who sought for amnesty in line with the provisions of the Act (Doxtader & Salazar 2007:14–27).

The nation-building challenges were quite enormous in that there was a wide inequality gap, uniting homelands that were separated by colonial rule, extra judicial killings and looting of the state (Baloyi 2018). The Mbeki administration was to continue with the pursuit of a government

of national unity and national reconciliation from where Mandela left off. Mbeki explained that reconciliatory efforts would not yield success except a total overhaul and transformation of the socio-economic terrain of the South African nation (Gevisser 2009). The government was to handle a lot of persisting issues which needed urgent attention to win the hearts of South Africans by ensuring that the days of apartheid rule was truly over. Among other things, the state had to establish democratic institutions that would adequately tackle inequality, poverty, rising levels of crime and unemployment, HIV pandemic, better housing, qualitative healthcare and education (Morris 2013; Khotso 2015; Mosala, Venter and Bain 2017).

Nation-Building involves a lot of things and processes to be duly followed if the desired result was to be achieved at the end of the day. In order to get a better understanding of nation-building, borrowing from Gagiano (1990:32) who defined nation-building as 'the integration of communally diverse and/or territorially discreet units into the institutional framework of a single state and the concomitant transfer of a sense of common political identity and loyalty to the symbolic community defined by the founding ideology of such a state'. Thus, the integration of the white, coloured, Indian and black communities was a herculean task for the new democracy owing to the existing problems of racial and ethnic divisions/boundaries plus the disadvantageous position of the black community in South Africa (Irobi 2005; Kagtla 2013; Hampton 2014; Lues 2014). The years of neglect, ridicule and oppression by the white minority government could not be compensated for in just 5 years which is the mandatory tenure for the president. There has to be policies set in motion to achieve goals like economic development and access to basic amenities in the state (Clarke and Bassett 2016; Gumede 2017).

3.4 Post-Colonial Redress Measures by the South African Government

At the global and national spheres role of government in providing good governance which includes, rule of law, transparency, provision of public goods and services cannot be overemphasised. In all of these, the government is accountable to the citizenry by providing conducive atmosphere for the people in order to realise these goals (World Bank 1992; Pillay 2004; Lues 2014). Years of chronic widespread poverty and inequality among the black populace affirmed by the relative deprivation theory had confined them to informal settlements located in various cities around the country. The supposed response of the state in redressing the ills

occasioned by apartheid legacies has probably led to frustration and disillusion, thus becoming a major motivation by deprived masses in resenting foreigner presence in the country (Matsinhe 2011). The apartheid system perpetuated black disempowerment both politically and economically, as the white minority government strengthened its grip on the main sectors of the economy (Southall, 2007:66). Several pieces of legislation were introduced to annihilate blacks. Among them were: Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953), the Group Areas Act (1950), the Bantu Education Act (1953), the Asiatic Land Tenure Act (1946), the Illegal Squatting Act (1951), the Native Building Workers' Act (1951) and others. This move further enhanced the white supremacist fashion, leaving the blacks in an impoverished state (Davids, Theron and Mapunye 2005:18). Three main categories of people were vulnerable in the process and they were: migrant workers, long distance commuters and rural women. This resulted into the formation of squatter camps which were: same sex hostels for migrant workers in white urban areas, the displaced urban settlement or dormitory towns in homelands, and the rural homes where women were restricted to. The then apartheid government used stringent measures to control the single-sex hostels, housing migrant workers. The hostels were in a deplorable condition because they were not built for human comfort, rather it was meant to accommodate lots of black migrant workers and locals. Section 2 of the Native Urban Areas Act 25 of 1945 gave constitutional backing to the construction of hostels. There has been a connection between hostels and the migrant labour system from the time they were created in 1923. The Johannesburg municipality made a vivid differentiation between hostels and compounds when the Second World War ended. Single men or women who had dual or more employers were housed in hostels called 'Bantu' areas, implying that these crops of people made up an amalgamation for all employers of labour in a particular area, while those engaged in the mining and essential services sector were accommodated in compounds. A compound could be likened to a kind of bachelor barracks that workers reside when they are off-duty; such accommodation has bunk beds in shared halls of residence and are served food in carefully constructed general kitchens. The state used this submerge possible belligerent behaviour emanating from workers in the event of forming unions to discuss better wage and living conditions. Men who resided in compounds were employed in one organisation, meaning that they can be monitored and put under check if insurrection occurs. The conditions of living in hostels and compounds greatly differed based on prevailing circumstances (Rex 1974; Segal 1991; Mamdani 1996; Thurman 1997; Lalloo 1998; Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2011; Xulu 2014).

Education is one sphere that was negatively impacted by the apartheid government. Thompson (2000) allude that the education of black children was handled by Missionaries during the era of colonisation and could not be properly funded because of the large black population of students. The apartheid government took over the management of black education through the establishment of the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Education was racialized, with the whites having higher educational standards and the blacks had low educational standards. The operational curriculum in black schools differed from the one in white schools; the black educational curriculum was made to limit them so that their aspirations will not be attainable (Davenport et al., 2002; Thompson 2000). The youths in 1976 embarked on protests due to the declining level and segregation in the educational sector in which black schools were not properly funded by the state, some schools were even packed full of learners being unhappy and the continuous use of Afrikaans in many black schools. Steve Biko one of the prominent leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) led the popular Soweto uprisings calling for an end to Bantu Education and a decolonisation of the educational system in South Africa (Simbao 2007; Mamdani 2011; Morgan 2018).

Lalloo (1998:36) explains that the land and housing policy in South Africa was introduced in post-1994 to address the legacy of apartheid and deprivation of black citizenship through the loss of property rights and restrictions on access to white settlement areas. This showed how settlements and forms of citizenship was generated during apartheid rule. These included the townships inhabited by Africans, the migrant labour hostels, the displaced border towns of the African reserves, and the rural homesteads. It was in the light of this that the post-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) government prioritised these issues to utilise them for the redemption and restitution of citizenship.

The end of the cold war witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union the fading away of communism in the late 1980s, and the emergence of the United States as a global superpower which almost assumed a unipolar status dictating the pace in the international system. America was a proponent of market economics and liberal democracy, thus minimising and reducing the influence of other types of government administration and economic systems (Gee 1994; Hobson 2015). This ideology influenced the ANCs policies in South Africa because the party needed to provide panaceas to mitigate the huge inequality gaps perpetuated by the apartheid system. The

adoption of the Freedom Charter of 1955 by many of the ANC leaders, which had the agenda of nationalising major sectors of the South African economy, happenings in the global economy made the ANC to come up with a mixed economic system which encouraged the intervention of the state in some instances and also a free market economic system. The ANC seemingly departed from its communist manifesto which could be open up future political and economic debates (Nattrass 1994; Tshishonga and de Vries 2011). There is vast literature on economic measures adopted by the state in a bid to mitigate the incidence of poverty in the post-1994 era. Lewis (2001:4) elucidated the RDP was a successful welfare mechanism initiated to meet the needs of senior citizens, physically challenged, vulnerable kids, foster parents and the like. Peberdy (2001:26) sees the Growth Employment and Reconstruction strategy (GEAR) as a state-perceived intervention through which indigenes could gain access to economic and related resources to reduce imbalances and inequalities in contemporary South African society. Maree (2007:5) avers that the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) was established with the aim of reducing unskilled or semi-skilled labour by increasing the pace of economic growth to 6% annually. Kretzschmar (2014:6) list the six pillars on which the National Development Plan (NDP): active citizenry, building capabilities, capable state, growing economy, responsible leadership and unity.

In a bid to adjust to challenges globally, the ANC as a ruling party responded with policies to make life better for the black populace. However, these socio-economic inequalities initiated by colonialism and apartheid still persists to date. In order to give the masses a beacon of hope, the Mandela administration set up its own Marshall Plan for reconstructing the country from the remnants of its apartheid past. It was named the Reconstruction and Development Programme founded basically apportioning topmost priorities to education, health and social development. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was built on the tradition of the 1955 Freedom Charter typically based on six principles namely: an integrated and sustainable programme, a people-driven process, peace and security for all, nation-building, link reconstruction and development and democratisation of South Africa. These were being used to compensate for the imbalance during the years of segregation in education, health, welfare, transport and employment which created deep scars of inequality and economic inefficiency (ANC 1994; Corder, 1997; Wessels 1999; Karriem and Hoskins; 2016).

The RDP had its shortcomings as Makgetla (2008) argued that the ANC through the RDP ceded the leading and empowering role to the state as it executed the economic and social transformation plans in the country. The RDP saw the need for a central planning unit which would regulate the bureaucratic bottlenecks that in some instances culminate into divergent decisions made by different public departments. On this note, the RDP office situated in the Presidency, was formed in 1994 to take the lead role in actualising the plan of the ANC. However, the office was short-staffed, thus incapacitating the effective coordination of government schemes. The RDP office was eventually shut down in 1996, placing the state in a helpless situation without a supervisory agency. The cessation or non-existence of the social democratic-aligned RDP office indicated a move towards a market-based GEAR macroeconomic programme, with the Finance Ministry (mainly Treasury) taking control and got busy with the sustenance of fiscal discipline other than supporting developmental goals (Cosatu 2005; Makgetla 2008). The RDP concentrated on the government's social responsibilities but fell short of creating jobs meant to eradicate poverty totally. Seekings (2014:4) posits that the poor were not empowered by the RDP in utilising opportunities through engagement in productive activities meant to equip them with the state providing better access to housing, public education, health, social security and related services.

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) policy of 1996 (Department of National Treasury 1996) was the second initiative adopted by the state to ensure a growth rate that exceeds 3% per annum. Government discovered that it failed to live up to expectations in poverty reduction, income redistribution and provision of social services. The GEAR scheme was introduced by the state to revamp and reposition the economy so as to attain the goals set for the RDP (Moyo and Mamabolo 2014; Munyeka 2014; Naidoo and Mare 2015; Kgatle 2017). The substitution of RDP with GEAR showed a change from intervention to redistribution on the part of the government to a wide neoliberal framework. The RDP promoted growth through redistribution while the market-based GEAR was implemented within the confines of redistribution through growth approach, prompting Pillay (2007:201) to contend that the state was torn in-between two ideologies: a neoliberal framework where a democratic state becomes the organiser of a market driven development marred by fiscal deficit and on the other had a purely democratic developmental state that deliberately take decisions to eradicate social deficit. Targets like fiscal deficit, government consumption and inflation were marginally met under the GEAR strategy with 2.2%, 18% and 5.4% were achieved in the year 2000, thus validating improved

reporting, better macroeconomic stability and increased accountability. Although the Organised Labour Unions dismissed the GEAR economic policies, it showed its strength in the 1997 and 2008 global economic crises as South Africa was not affected in any way (Khotso 2016). A major problem encountered by GEAR was its inability to create job opportunities. Another problem was that the projected 6% economic growth was not attainable. These two culminated into GEAR's shipwreck (Kgatle 2017).

The government was disappointed with the GEAR policy, as it failed to meet the estimated growth rate thus prompting it to establish the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). The AsgiSA evolved from a promise made by the ANC in her 2004 manifesto to reduce unemployment and poverty by half come year 2010. (AsgiSA, 2006:3). The government set up a committee that contacted both organised business and labour, international stakeholders and civil society and came up with concretised plans with a set of ideas to promote shared growth. A major worry was that despite an economic average growth of 3% per annum between 1994 and 2004, 4% in 2004 and 5% in 2005, unemployment and poverty levels remained pervasive, estimated at 26% in 2004. Deliberately, the topmost priority of AsgiSA was Shared growth' (2006:3-4). Projections for GDP from 2005 to 2009 were to put on an average of 4.5% during 2005-2009 while that of 2009 to 2014 was pegged at 6% annually. The rate of unemployment was to be reduced to below 15% from 26% in 2005. AsgiSA also intended to reduce poverty by half to less than one-sixth of households (AsgiSA, 2006:4-5). AsgiSA also had a plan to establish infrastructure programmes, investment indifferent sectors, skills acquisition and development, for instance, the Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), was saddled with the responsibility to detect critical skills needs and advice, recommend speedy and potent solutions (AsgiSA, 2006:3).

Six major constraints, hampering the projected growth rates were identified by the AsgiSA. They were: the relative currency volatility; the cost, efficiency and capacity of the national logistics system; shortages of suitably skilled labour, and the spatial distortions of apartheid affecting low-skilled labour costs; barriers to entry, limits to competition and limited new investment opportunities; the regulatory environment and the burden on small and medium enterprises (SMEs); deficiencies in state organisation, capacity and leadership. The AsgiSA also mandated that urgent action was needed in the following areas macroeconomy, infrastructure, sector and

industrial strategies, skills and education, the Second Economy and public administration (AsgiSA, 2006:3).

The ANC party convention in Polokwane in 2007 was a key contributor to the formation of the National Planning Commission (NPC) and the preparation of a long-term National Development Plan (NDP). The ANC, the South African Communist Party, COSATU, and other affiliates of the ANC mooted for a change from a free market to a more active one. One of the resolutions of the 2007 conference was the need to foster a developmental state having home grown or localised strategies with the ability of the state to intervene in the economy at any point in time to attend to the challenges posed by unemployment, poverty, and underdevelopment (ANC 2008, 17). The NPC prescribed set goal to be achieved by the NDP come 2030: eradication of poverty; reduction of inequality; increase in the level of employment from 13 million in 2010 to 24 million with the aid of proper economic coordination and policy execution; increase in per capita income from R50 000 in 2010 to R120 000; and the creation of one million jobs in the agricultural sector, giving land reform the leading role (NPC 2011). The Economic Development Department (EDD) presided over by Minister Ebrahim Patel, provided the New Growth Path (NGP) for the country in 2010 and the Industrial Policy Action Plan presented by the Minister at the helm of affairs at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Rob Davies has close similarities with the NDP. These were dedicated to attend to issues of poverty, inequality, and ubiquitous impediment posed by unemployment in the nation. The NGP fashioned after the neo-Keynesian model aims at getting more labour-intensive activities done in key sectors of the South African economy: the agricultural and mining value chains, manufacturing and services (EDD 2010, 9). In a bid to support rural development, the NGP proposed to improve the livelihoods of 300,000 smallholder households and create about 145,000 jobs in agro-allied industries by 2020 (EDD 2010, 11). There seems to be an existence of similarities between the goals set by the NDP and the NGP, the latter policy shows greater promises to in addressing inequality by 'expanding livelihood opportunities at the lower end of society and containing enrichment at the upper end' (Habib 2013, 105). However, the NDP seemed to favour the elite in the society who have interests in in industrial, financial, and agrarian investments.

The National Development Plan (NDP) was the brainwork of the government and consented to by Cabinet in 2012. It is a long-term plan involving the development of a vision intended to steer the

ship of the country's development starting from 2013 to 2030. One of those who instituted this plan was Trevor Manuel, the Minister of National Planning which oversees the National Planning Commission, presided over by the Presidency. The National Planning Commission explains that the plan describes a preferred path by spotting the part to be played by different segments of the society in order to attain the stipulated objective (NPC, 2011). The plan will be executed over a seventeen-year time frame which will be included in the financial plan of the country over that period. Inequality reduction and poverty elimination by the year 2030 were the major targets of the NDP. Qwabe (2013:2) posits that the plan is based on the awareness that despite the great gains realised after the 1994 era, the business as usual mentality may have the tendency to cause an obstruction in the attainment of meeting the state's aims of a wealthy, united, non-racial and non-sexist democratic country, typified by an egalitarian society. The plan stated that the country can realise these objectives by utilising the human capital of the citizens, nurturing an inclusive economy, encouraging abilities, improving the government's horizon South Africa can realise these goals by drawing on the energies of its people, growing an inclusive economy, building capabilities, enhancing the capacity of the state, and developing leadership and alliances all through the society. The modification of economic policies to suit the prevailing socio-economic conditions in society and eliminate poverty is laudable. However, these policies have failed to reduce inequalities and poverty in the South African society. Despite the good intentions of government, challenges like inconsistency and change in government affected policy implementation. Lack of political will and corruption also affected government's genuine intentions to emancipate the indigents from poverty and widespread inequalities.

3.5 Immigrant Rush to South Africa

Migration into South Africa has been an age-long practice and not a new occurrence. However, the discovery of diamond in Kimberly in the 1860s and gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s boosted the history of immigration into South Africa as the mining sector attracted lots of migrants from the neighbouring countries (Crush 2005; Kang'ethe and Duma 2013; Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2014). The vibrant agricultural sector also implied more supply of labours on farms necessitating large wave of migration into the country. The mining and agricultural sectors heavily relied on migrant labour from the SADC region as migrant workers in the mines were reputed to

have been largely responsible for provision of mineral and material wealth in South Africa (Sibanda 2008). Foreign workers were employed steadily by South African employers to augment the seemingly shortfall in local labour supply (Chirwa 1998). Despite enshrining constitutional democracy, with the end of apartheid rule, South Africa still experiences racism and minority rule even after over twenty years of freedom (Burger et al. 2017). The apartheid regime was typified by European or White immigrant influx and this was done to maintain and consolidate the white minority rule. A provision for the instant assimilation of immigrants with European settlers in the then union of South Africa was made available in the Aliens Control Act of 1937, section 4(3)(b) (Segatti 2011). The National Party (NP) tightened its grip on power politically and economically after 1961 by enforcing more racism and aided it with huge grants meant to the racial criterion was proactively pursued and complemented with substantial grants intended to encourage white immigrants in the country. This practice was christened the two-gate system in which the front gate permitted migrant influx from European and Western nations, and a back gate was used to recruit migrants on a short-term basis premised on bilateral negotiations signed with neighbouring countries which forbids permanent residence and family visits. In 1986, due to mounting pressure from the international community, there was a reduction in the level of racism and the government was advised to assimilate all racial groups in the country (Segatti 2011). The modification made in 1986 was insignificant as racism remained at status quo as racial selection was still rife in the polity (Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2006). As the apartheid government began to lose prominence or popularity, its power to regulate migration from other SADC states was reduced immensely. It became vivid that the two-gate system was no longer feasible following the period after 1986 because it failed to meet economic demands and couldn't find a way to cater for non-economic migrants like refugees from war-torn countries like Mozambique. The only thing that was done to immigration issues was the combining of all existing policy documents into a single act of parliament in 1991. Crush et al. (1991), highlights that the apartheid immigration policy was sustained by the migrant labour system mainly in the mining and agricultural sectors from SADC region states. Bilateral agreements were entered by South Africa and neighbouring states, the employers and the South African government were at an advantage while immigrants and their family members were at the receiving end. However, the colonial and apartheid period did not witness prejudice towards non-South Africans didn't occur both in the mining and agricultural sector, which employed so many African migrants and locals. The issue of immigration was not

73

topmost on the agenda of the African National Congress (ANC) upon ascension of power in 1994, rather economic transition was the focus (Segatti 2011). Not long after the advent of democracy in 1994, the gains associated with democracy were not achieved leaving the indigents in a state of delusion, (Akinola et al. 2015; Akinola 2014). Mamabolo (2015: 145) explains that in spite of deficient comparable data poverty and unemployment have soared greatly after 1994. Keeton (2014) posits that with the execution of post-apartheid social welfare schemes poverty and inequality remain ubiquitous in the polity and are manifested visibly along racial lines. Democracy in 1994 gave South Africa the opportunity to better the lots of the blacks which was restricted under apartheid. The nation believed that their newly elected political gatekeepers would bring them out from the abyss of poverty with an improved quality of a better life for all South Africans regardless of racial or ethnic affiliation and class. Apparently, the government reneged in fulfilling its promises to citizens after elections in 1994. They include the provision of better housing, welfare system, infrastructural upgrades and employment opportunities. The deplorable living conditions in which many South Africans have found themselves could be adduced as reasons for antagonism, violence and anger which defines the contemporary South African society. The new dawn of democracy has not been able to provide succour for many who are economically disempowered; living in poverty and despondency. The nation is still characterised by pervasive, squalid living conditions and service delivery problems (Institute for Security Studies 2009). The post-1994 South Africa constitution has been commended for fostering inter-group relations. However, it has failed to handle current challenges posed by migration, refugees and shortages in the supply of labour. The policies on immigration were reviewed in 2002 and 2004, with some allowance made to accommodate highly skilled migrants. The modifications made to the immigration act in 2007 and 2011 was unable initiate strategies that could assist in the recruitment of skilled workers (Nkomo 2014), and only strengthened means of implementing contrivances aimed at irregular immigrants but was generally applicable to all immigrants, which consisted of skilled workers who are in high demand in the economy needs, and the inability of the government to implement these rules. Post-apartheid immigration in South Africa is largely shaped by the policies put in place during the apartheid regime and are against immigration with the promise of seemingly recruiting skilled immigrants (Segatti 2011). Consequentially, seeking asylum is about the easy option in accessing European states and South Africa because migration to these countries through legal means is highly limited or restricted. Globally, South Africa boasts of one of the best

asylum systems, allowing asylum-seekers to work, live, become mobile and conduct their businesses unhindered in the country after applying for asylum through the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Amit (2015) contends that the DHA in some instances delay the processing applications of asylum-seekers with many of them being ill-favoured and they often resort to remain in the country while officials interrogate supposed denied asylum-seekers for identification and onward repatriation to their home countries. The delay in processing applications left many immigrants bereft of a means of identification, inactive bank accounts, thereby leaving them to embrace informal sector employment (Solomon and Kosaka 2013). Crush (2001) and Peberdy (2001) avers that the norm in post-apartheid nationalism manifested through nation-building project in South Africa was connected to negative stereotypes against migrant communities (Crush 2001; Peberdy 2001), simulated with contents of social distrust (Steenkamp 2009). It is widely perceived that bias against immigrants was meant to increase social cohesion amongst multi-racial South Africa groups. Aggression against immigrants is be said to be an inherited legacy from the apartheid regime (Harris 2002). As violence and negative perceptions towards immigrants become ubiquitous, this view has some form of face validity (Dodson 2010). However, biased feelings and violence against immigrants have not been accounted even though this practice is also found in Western nations, but nation-building project is absent. In South Africa and many states on the globe, the connection between violent behaviour and negative stereotypes is still shrouded in mystery: the relationship somewhat impervious (Carlsson and Eriksson 2016; Piper and Charman 2016).

South Africa was a prime destination for a plethora of migrants during the apartheid era (Crush et al., 1992) with many of them emanating from the SADC region and Europe (Peberdy, 1999). However, the post-apartheid period has witnessed a great reduction in the population of Europeans settling in South Africa while the number of immigrants from SADC region, other African states and Asia has increased tremendously (Standing, 1996). Transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy, nation-building motives, variations in migration patterns and a feeling that migrant presence intimidates and deprives locals of their rights and entitlements which has culminated to the harsh reception accorded migrants in South Africa (Peberdy, 1999). Odunayo, Asuelime and Okem (2017) posit that seemingly, South Africa's duties and responsibilities to the SADC region and the rest of Africa has increased, depicting that African migrants have adapted to be scapegoated by locals without much resistance from the former. These resentments are not from

locals alone. Government officials, politicians, health professionals and the like have treated migrants from the rest of Africa and some Asians with some form of discrimination in many instances as the country has become the Eldorado of Africa. South Africa reveals a candid picture of challenges being encountered by government in administering the affairs of the country riddled with a history of bias in terms of immigration, ignoring some ethnic groups and overlooking the existence of other migrants from African states. Simultaneously, the country had to deal with apartheid legacies and the need to build a reputation which presents her responsibility and new duty being rendered to SADC region and the rest of Africa in general. The encumbrances encountered in administering immigration issues in the country became more byzantine because the end of apartheid subjected South Africa to different migration patterns which included both regional, continental and international. Making the state to inherit and efficiently administer an immigration system constantly characterised by complexities.

Van Beek (2001) explains that since South Africa became a constitutional democracy, the country itself has struggled to manifest a democratic and political system which throws its weight behind the realisation of human rights. Sergio (1998) stated that the newly elected democratic government's strategy was to concentrate on assisting refugees by ensuring that she fulfils her pledge and commitment to receive and provide adequate protection for asylum seekers. Sergio (1998) further identified three major functions carried out by the in helping refugees. They are political, assistance and protection. Sergio (1998:10) posits that the political entails the proper positioning and application of appropriate measures in terms of legislations, policies, strategies and approaches needed to execute these strategies to ensure that refugees are truly protected in a convenient manner under internationally accepted standards. Assistance depicts the fulfilments of basic needs of refugees with the aim of integrating them and making them economically independent. While protection encompasses proper documentation, legal protection and status determination. Rutinwa (2002:32) also asserted that the refugee policy in use in South Africa was negatively affected by societal beliefs and public opinion. This implied that African migrants and refugees are usually depicted as loners in contemporary South African society.

Many skilled and semi-skilled workers form sister states migrated to South Africa, with the bulk of them emanating from Zimbabwe. The migrant influx compelled the state to enact a policy in regulating the movement of migrant workers. In June 2016, the Green Paper on International

Migration issued by the Department of Home Affairs agreed that although South Africa was still in dire need of migrant workers, but the government needed to impose measures to control the number of migrants entering the country. As South Africa taps into the gains of globalization, she is also careful in preserving her sovereignty, protecting the citizens and national security (DHA 2016:24). The White Paper on International Migration for South Africa (2017) indicated the state's response to humanity and a show of solidarity, as the South African government created an avenue for Zimbabwean and Lesotho nationals to have a legal means of residing in the country through the issuance of special permits. The white paper on international migration for South Africa (2017) gives a clearer picture on immigration and refugee in the country. The South African policy on international migration is based on the 1999 White Paper on International Migration which was implemented through the Immigration Act, 2002 (Act No. 13 of 2002) and partly through the Refugees Act, 1998 (Act No. 130 of 1998). More recently, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has amended the Immigration and Refugees Acts and employed the means of regulations and strategies in order to address visible gaps in legislation.

Ferreira (2015) argues that approximately 17 million South Africans are beneficiaries of recipients of one form of social grants, this represents a geometric increase from the 4 million beneficiaries documented in 1994. The major causative factor of the frustration suffered by South Africans was underdevelopment. The persistent strike culture and widespread violence because of shabby service delivery in South Africa are pointers to massive socio-economic challenges the South African state and its citizens are grappling with (South African Institute of International Affairs 2011). Research indicated that daily between 2013 and 2015, three service delivery protests were recorded (Bhardwaj 2016). Graca Machel portrays South Africa as an "angry and frustrated nation on the brink of something very dangerous" (Laing 2013: 2). The anger and frustration exercised by locals due to corruption and failure of the government to deliver electoral promises has led to the use of violence against African migrants. These migrants are being blamed for economic woes and other ills plaguing the country. Frustration-aggression theory best explains the reasons for violence perpetrated by locals against African migrants in contemporary South Africa. After explaining the reasons behind emigration to South Africa and the failure of the state to fulfil electoral promises, the next section looks at belonging as a tool of discrimination in post-apartheid South Africa.

3.6 Belonging as a Tool of Discrimination in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Belonging is widely becoming a pertinent issue not only in Africa, but in other continents on the globe. This raises questions on citizenship and nationality which cannot be swept under the carpet. The way and manner in which locals' conduct themselves and view fellow compatriots will be evident in the way they also relate with and treat immigrants and non-nationals residing in their country. The crisis of defining citizenship culminated into the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001; Baisley 2014), the violence in Ivory Coast was motivated by isolation and contending claims of Ivoirete (Akindes 2004; ICG 2004). All these suggest that with the advent of liberal democracy and global consumer capitalism, belonging is being redefined in violent terms across many African states (Nyamnjoh 2005). In a country like Botswana, there has been a revival of identity politics after many years of absence of belonging and ethnic citizenship during which nation-building, legal citizenship and single politics was the order of the day. Contestations on belonging has sparked off violence with different ethnic groups clamouring for egalitarianism, fairer representation and greater access to state resources and available economic opportunities (Werbner 2004). This creates classes in the society, as every citizen holds on to their legal status, others consider themselves or are viewed by some as having less citizenship rights. The creation of differences between insiders and outsiders is supported by the contemporary wave of identity politics and more restrictive forms of citizenship which concentrates more on cultural recognition, political representation, prospects and economic rights and privileges (Nnoli 1998; Nyamnjoh 2005).

South Africa has the most industrialised economy in Africa, but with a huge imbalance in the allocation of wealth. Embracing a liberal economic and political framework, which meant a constitution that permits people to own and control businesses even at the expense of those who were economically disempowered during colonialism and apartheid. The carryover of inequalities from the apartheid era to this dispensation has exposed indigent nationals to the deprivation of their rights in a constitutional democracy. A flourishing economy is meaningless to the economically disadvantaged South Africans who have had to compete with non-South Africans for jobs and scarce economic opportunities, these non-nationals made up their minds to abscond from their countries, instead of resolving their local socio-economic and political challenges (Peberdy 2001). Situations of this sort results into aggression and despondency creating an avenue to loathe migrants and pounce on other minorities in the country. This is the situation in

contemporary South Africa where African nationals and the Asian minority are being scapegoated and victimised (Nyamnjoh 2005). The same is rife in many places as xenophobia steadily increases globally, immigrants are labelled as the unwanted stock (Brochmann 1999), in spite of their inexpensive, dependable labour and denigration which is appealing (Anthias and Lazaridis 2000: Jureidini 2003).

The manifestation of violence against African foreign nationals evoke notions of belonging. This accounts for the nature of violence against non-South Africans manifested as Afrophobia or xenophobia depending on the prevailing circumstances. This revival of nationalism has played a major role in the execution of the politics of marginality; exalting the locals above other African foreign nationals. This also connotes citizenship in form of rights and duties connected to belonging in a certain nation-state within stipulated borders (Roche 1992). Lister (1997:7) contends that citizenship is explained as being comprising of rights and political responsibilities. The former is individual-centred while the latter takes into consideration the views and pursuits of the general society. The author further explained citizenship in status and practice. Citizenship could connote the possession of some particular privileges on the account of being a citizen and some demands which accompanies citizenship rights; like voting, paying taxes and obeying the constitution. Roche (1992: 3-4) posits that the status and practice of citizenship lies in political and social citizenship. Roche saw a connection between political citizenship and the membership of the political community while social citizenship relates to rights and duties of citizenship busy with peoples' welfare like work, education, health and the quality of life. So, citizenship consists of rights, duties and privileges connected with the affiliation of a political community. Consequently, for a democratic state to flourish, the quality of life of citizens, previously marginalised groups must get better under a democratic dispensation. The success of democracy is based on the democratic government's provision of enough socio-economic gains meant to satisfy the citizens both socio-economically and socio-politically. All citizens ought to benefit under a democratic government because it is a people-based government.

3.7 The Use of Violence to Establish South African Nationalism
Khonert (2009) acknowledges the new nationalism in Africa and other parts of the globe delineating it from what was obtained in the era of national independence struggles especially in

the 1960s. The first nationalism differs from the second in that the latter is characterised by isolation, xenophobia and a tool employed by politicians to garner votes at the expense of the local populace who are being made to believe that non-nationals were the cause of economic challenges facing their countries. This new nationalism prides itself in the aftermath of globalisation and by the increasing gap of inequality between the poor and the rich. Contemporarily, the modus operandi of nationalism and nation-states varies from the practices of the past. More often than not, new nationalism is built on grassroots populism whose ideologies are divergent from the political gatekeepers making it exclusively different with social obscurity and unexpected triggers.

Africa is currently enmeshed in a quagmire of new nationalism probably due to identity crisis supported by self-hate and consequently xenophobia. More precisely, Afrophobic violence (Black-on-Black violence) has been on the increase sequentially on the African continent (Nyamnjoh 2006; Prah 2001). Literature reveals that xenophobia is a response to contestation over scarce economic resources and opportunities, because of the relegation of Africa to the back seat in a highly globalised world due to the continuous dominance of the United States of America and other western nations (Ajulu 2010). Some authors are of the view that xenophobic attacks against African migrants are offshoots of miniature nationalism and intentional motives of the political class to blame foreigner presence for economic ills plaguing their countries in order to secure votes during electioneering campaigns (Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010; Oloruntoba 2016). Africans may be perceived as united people irrespective of the borders and ethnic cleavages that exists among them. The politics of difference fortified by political pragmatism, based on the belief which denies the existence of socio-economic and political crises, surrounded by dearth has continued to fuel differential politics of Africans as a whole and united continent considering her border partitioning, with different ethnic groups. The years of apartheid left South Africa in isolation from Africa and the rest of the world, as locals saw themselves as being different and exceptional Violence has been used as a tool to distinguish between locals and foreigners in post-apartheid South Africa (Masuku 2006; Misago, 2009; Habib 2010; Akinola 2014; Hickel 2014; Tella 2016).

The foremost documented scene of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa occurred between December 1994 and January 1995 respectively. Unemployed youths residing in Alexandra Township vandalised the homes and properties of illegal migrants and took them to the police station where they said they were declared surplus to the requirements of the Township and as a

result concluded that they be sent packing instantly (Croucher, 1998). Also, the hurling of a Mozambican national and two Senegalese off a mobile train and subsequent electrocution of the Senegalese men in a bid to evade the ire of a group of locals who were on a return journey from an unemployment procession in Pretoria in 1998 (Vale 2002). Other incidences include the killing of a Zimbabwean citizen in Diepsloot in Gauteng (Bearak 2011). In the month of May 2011, over 50 spaza shops owned by Somali nationals in Motherwell Port Elizabeth were attacked and emptied by rampaging locals. Some informal settlements in Cape Town witnessed the murder of over 25 Somali shopkeepers between May and June 2011 (Charman and Piper 2012). Cases of violence and cruel killings of African migrants abound in South Africa (Matlala 2011; Matsinhe 2011). The African Centre for Migration and Society in Johannesburg notes that since 2008, over 360 xenophobic killings of Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and Somalis have been recorded (Hiropoulus 2017). Hiropoulus (2017) continues by saying that African foreign nationals have either been killed, attacked, dispossessed of their businesses and displaced. From January 2015 to January 2017, 66 deaths, 116 attacks, 571 ransacked businesses and about 11,140 people displacements were recorded. The biocultural thesis also posits that skin colour and the failure to speak or understand South African languages has exposed peoples of African descent to vulnerability in the hands of angry locals as replete in literature (Matsinhe 2011; Isike & Isike 2012; Mamabolo 2015; Keohane and Maphunye 2015; Okyere-Manu 2016).

Beetar (2019) writes on necropolitics in South Africa stating that xenophobia is unavoidable in the nation-building project. The 2008 and 2015 violence could be traced to socially and politically ingrained behaviours that promotes hostility and intolerance which defines South Africanness. Violence is historically connected to circumstances or events and resolution portraying that discourses of denialism and exceptionalism are necropolitical because nationals are worthy of life and migrants are banished to areas of metaphorical and literal death. Beetar (2019) explains further on the dominant discourse of exceptionalism which expresses itself in constant tensions in South Africa through the implication of what is to be. Exceptionalism of this type is at variance with real life experiences manifested through the weakening of the country's socioeconomic status through high rates of unemployment and poverty, widening inequality gap, decay in the educational system, slow pace of development and high cost of living. The situation is usually aggravated by poor service delivery, comatose in the healthcare system and an understaffed police service. These incidences indicated that the 1994 hope for a better life, for all South African nationals seems to

81

have been dashed. The use of violence in establishing nationalism in South Africa includes locals differing in ideology from the ruling and political elite. As violence is perpetrated, nationalism is being defined along the lines of belonging. The next section considers service delivery, violence and the nature of the politics of rights and entitlements in South Africa.

3.8 Service Delivery, Violence and the Politics of Rights and Entitlements

The promise of a "better life for all" by the ANC indicated that the party was interested in delivering services especially to the poor. Electioneering campaigns after 1994 raised the hopes of the impoverished as politicians warmed the hearts of the electorate with many promises to entice them. This act gave rise to expectations that the promises made would be fulfilled, but after the elections, failure to make good those promises led to disenchantment and protests were used as a means of sending the message across to the government (Managa 2012). A major challenge that confronted the ANC after the 1994 elections was delivery of services to all South Africans on an impartial basis. It was not going to be an instantaneous one because a new constitution was in the offing and it only became fully operational in 1996, entrenching principles of human rights, democracy, quality service delivery and other changes targeted at ensuring an egalitarian society and the redistribution of resources (Munslow and Mc Lennan 2009). Service delivery protests in South Africa surfaced in the second term of President Thabo Mbeki when he was re-elected by the electorate in April 2004 (Veriava 2014; Alexander 2010), this trend was recurrent even during the Zuma regime (Alexander 2010). The first documented service delivery protest took place on August 31, 2004 in Harrismith, claiming the life of Tebogo Mkhonza a teenager (Veriava 2014). The term 'service delivery protest' was first used by Diamond Fields Advertiser on May 27, 2005 (Modiba 2005) and subsequently became a popular caption on both print and electronic media and also in the world of academia (Tapela 2012; Connolly 2014). Scholars have also contended that these service delivery protests go beyond service delivery in that protesters use such to occasion to register their grievance with the state's weak consultation (Mathekga and Buccus 2006) with demands for superior citizenship (Lau et al., 2010), challenges within the framework of local governments (Sinwell et al., 2010), and due to the fact of current disappointment of proper participation avenues and representation (Thompson 2011).

Simpson (2010) was of the view that the recurrent local government service delivery strikes happening in South Africa under the ANC-led government was likened to the violence which occurred in townships in the 1980s during the apartheid regime. Twala (2014) posits that service delivery protests are more of an interpretation of what is obtainable in the political crescendos of South Africa. However, Greenstein (2006) contends that the strong bond between political and social changes because of the exclusionary policies of apartheid in which rights and privileges were distributed based on racial affiliation. Many South Africans requested for prompt service delivery because the electorate was less concerned about the injustices or skewed developments perpetrated by the apartheid government, thus the enormous demands on the ruling ANC for quality service delivery by the teeming masses of the republic of South Africa.

Post-apartheid South Africa has been the centre stage of many service delivery protests as the less privileged register their displeasure at the underperformance of local government in responding to their pressing demands. Researchers, scholars, policy makers and other stakeholders have put forward several reasons for the underlying causes of such protests (Tsheola 2014). Manyaka (2018) situates some factors like poor service delivery, poor governance and insensitivity of the government at the local level among others as reasons for the persistent strikes rocking the country. A detailed analysis of the extant literature on service delivery strikes portrays that the underlying factors of these protests are much deeper that what is been seen at the surface level. These protests are founded on the apartheid legacy of black revolution against oppressive rule. The depravity extended to the black community which has plunged them into deep circles of vicious poverty continues to exist, hence the sustainability of protests in the country. The inability of the ANC to fulfil the electoral promise of a better life for all South Africans has been a major trigger of service delivery strikes in the country (Manyaka 2018).

Hocutt (2003) writes on social contract as propounded by Rousseau is an agreement between people and their government. Rousseau admits that different individuals will surely have specific interests as persons and that these interests will give rise to a conflict situation in the system. General will is not what people vote for, but what they would vote for if they knew it would favour them and satisfy their own personal interests. The moment the government fails to deliver as specified in the social contract; revolt is inevitable. The social contract entered into here is the vote cast by people and when franchise is breached by government, the masses slide into being entitled.

Rousseau also recognises the inexorability and threat posed by political corruption when issues of human welfare comes on board. There is a tendency for political leaders to exercise unlimited authority guided by selfish motives in which the citizenry is not being considered. Private interests supercede public interests in this case (Hocutt 2003).

In most cases, human rights without service delivery is contradictory. Iroanya, Dzimiri and Phaswana (2018) examined the range to which National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in Ghana and Uganda contributed to the strengthening of democracy and sustainable development in both countries. The authors argued that human-rights based service delivery method highlights that sustainable democracy and development cannot be separated from the recognition, respect and protection of fundamental human rights of people in any given socio-political territory. The post-Cold War era gave rise to barometers by which good governance and development was measured. This included the acknowledgement given to the respect and protection of human rights across the globe which promoted the creation of NHRIs by many African nations. Quality service delivery constitutes one of the dividends of democracy. Chaj (2008) opined that democratic states and genuine governments globally give topmost priority to the provision of welfare and basic necessities that will make life better and prepare its citizens for the challenge of nation building. Some countries that lack natural resources have devised means of taking care of their citizens in a meaningful way.

Inequality, poverty and unemployment are three evils confronting the South African society. The unofficial unemployment rate increased from 21.5% in 2008 to about 28% in 2018 while poverty level increased from 53.2% in 2011 to 55.5% in 2015. This put the figures of South Africans living in poverty at about 30.4 million during that period (Statistics South Africa 2018). Samson, MacQuene and Van Niekerk (2006) in a research on social grants in South Africa said the social security system in South Africa was the major policy of the state in addressing unemployment and poverty. Two main concerns were the immediate reduction of poverty among the low class and investment in health, education and nutrition, with a view to increase economic growth and development. These two objectives are shown in the state's 1997 White Paper on Social Development, which states that "a social security system is essential for healthy economic development, particularly in a rapidly changing economy, and will contribute actively to the

development process. It is important for immediate alleviation of poverty and is a mechanism for active redistribution."

The same is true of South Africa which adopted a social security system of targeted social grants inherited from the apartheid regime which favoured whites above blacks. Samson, MacQuene and Van Niekerk (2006) explained that one of the challenges faced by the 1994 democratic government in South Africa was the challenge of fulfilling the mandate I section 27, 1c of the 1996 constitution which states that: "everyone has the right to have access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance". The sustainability of the grant system is another area of contention among policy makers and academics. Mabugu and Chitga-Mabugu (2013) assert that in the long-term, huge socio-political on the national budget after social grants reform would still leave the government in a fiscally stable state. As social grants are targeted at the poorest of the poor, this poverty alleviating mechanism has improved the wellbeing of people especially in the rural areas. Apart from huge budgetary allocations on the health and educational sectors, effective job creation techniques should be put in place so that social grants will not become a permanent characteristic of the South African state. Violence emanating from service delivery comes at a cost to the state as budgetary allocation for defence increases simultaneously, damaged public utilities need to be replaced by the government. The next section examines government's response to xenophobic violence.

3.9 Response of the State

The response of the South African government to the xenophobia especially black-on-black violence which became largely pronounced during 2008 episodic attacks was somewhat and tenaciously sluggish, as the state faulted and labelled it as a criminal and anti-social activity. The state repeatedly denied the scope and the gravity of the xenophobic violence in 2008, and many government functionaries continuously accused criminals for the heinous crimes perpetrated (Bekker et al, 2008; Pillay 2008; Matsinhe 2011). President Mbeki maintained that the scourge of xenophobia did not affect the psyche of the South African people (Mbeki 2008). Bekker et al (2008:29) quoted the then Minister for Intelligence, who retorted that:

> *We cannot ignore… that there were reportedly meetings held in hostels, that this prairie fire of hate seemed to have move fast as if planned, and there were printed pamphlets*

85

President Thabo Mbeki was also an advocate of denialism contended that the attacks were criminally motivated and not as a result of xenophobic attitudes (Bekker et al, 2008; Sidiropoulos 2008; Everatt 2011; Hagensen 2014; Tella 2016). At the memorial service held for the 62 people who died during the 2008 xenophobic crisis, Mbeki stated:

> *Everything I know about my people tells me that these heirs to the teachings of Tiyo Soga, J.G. Xaba and Pixley Seme, the masses who have consistently responded positively to the Pan-African messages of the oldest liberation movement on our continent, the African National Congress, are not xenophobic. These masses are neither antipathetic towards, nor do they hate foreigners. And this I must also say—none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia. I know that there are some in our country who will charge that what I have said constitutes a denial of our reality. (Everatt, 2011, p. 9)*

Mukwena (2012) opine that lack of equipment to tackle crisis on the part of the police and refusal of community heads to protect African migrants from attacks were reasons that made foreigners became victims of the xenophobic attacks in May 2008. Nonetheless, the politics of denial being played by the state, Kamwimbi et al (2010) argue that of the culprits arrested during the mayhem, only70 of them were charged for breach of public peace and violence but none of them were brought to book for the gave crimes committed. This leaves people with an idea that South Africa has sacred cows that are above the law and that the South African constitution provides locals at the expense of non-nationals. Kamwimbi et al (2010) further posit that despite information gathering and early warning signals on xenophobia by the Scalabrini Centre at Cape Town, the government was not active in dousing the tensions that was gathering momentum prior to the 2008 attacks.

Beetar (2019:2) avers that "Denialism is a pervasive force that occasionally conflates xenophobia and racism". The political class has failed to acknowledge the existence of xenophobia as corporeal is hardly reported (Crush et al 2013) reminiscent of the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic occurrences. The humiliating treatment accorded Emidio Macia in February 2013, in which he was bound in fetters by the police to their operational vehicle and dragged down the street in a ludicrous and demeaning manner, this act was criticised by stating the inability of the government to handle police highhandedness. In policing, xenophobia hardly occurs as a discourse, this further validates

its denial even within the rank and file of the SAPS (Steinberg 2012). Not minding the AU and UN committees that highlighted denialism is 'misplaced in the extreme' (Crush et al 2013). From the ongoing, denialism has become an instrument of justification. Discourses on whether xenophobia is Afrophobia or negrophobia have evolved over the years or maybe it should be identified as a type of (xeno)racism (Flockermann et al 2010; Everatt 2011). Crush et al. (2013) gives a deeper exploration of behavioural attitudes in South Africa between 2006 and 2013. Their research indicates high levels of constant attitudinal changes which can be seen as xenophobia, which impacts negatively on the daily lives of migrants. Steinberg (2012) affirms the goodness of the South African government towards the migrant crises as they have been signatories to many conventions on migrants and refugees, coming back home the government enacted the Refugee Act in 1988. This is an indication that the state is committed to the protection of foreign citizens openly, but average attitudes shown in the law towards migrants constantly exposes favouritism through the notions of exclusion and control. Interestingly, in an irrational manner these have been enshrined into the constitution. As much as South Africa belongs to all those who live in it, the constitution draws a line between two categories of people; citizens and persons. This separation implies that not all inhabitants within the country are treated equally. Neocosmos (2010) contends that some people have rights which others do not have, calling for scrutiny in the analysis or examination of this detachment and the wider discourse of denialism tends to support a lasting state of exceptionalism or irregularity.

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the manifestations of xenophobia violence in South Africa. Looking at the socio-economic conditions during apartheid the country had a migrant-labour system traced back to the discovery of precious minerals in Kimberly and Witwatersrand and a booming agricultural economy. Neighbouring states provided the much-needed labour to support the apartheid system, although the wages paid them were little and most of them got employed on contractual terms which did not permit spouses or family members to stay permanently with them. They had to return to their home countries at the expiration of their contracts. Democracy opened up the country to migrant influx from the SADC region, African states and other countries on the globe. The new democratic state made efforts to improve the socio-economic status of the blacks who were

disempowered during the apartheid regime. The RDP, GEAR and AsgiSA were adopted at different intervals as palliatives to compensate for the years of discrimination by colonialism and apartheid. The migrant rush led to competition between locals and African migrants in an already saturated informal sector culminating into the manifestations and exhibitions of xenophobia in several ways through belonging. The concept of belonging has been redefined by xenophobic violence which came to the fore in 2008 with 62 deaths, destruction of life and property and displacements on a large scale. The government has taken a posture of denialism by blaming the nature of violence on criminals who use occasions like these to loot and terrorise African migrants. Locals have also used service delivery strikes to express their displeasure to the state and has turned violent in some instances with African migrants being blamed for an ailing economy, hence becoming vulnerable to attacks owing to distinct biological features. The fourth chapter is titled: Research Design and Methodology.

Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the research methodology and methods that were employed in the study. However, it is pertinent to note that methodology differs from methods. Research methods analysts contend that methodology conceptually differs from methods (Sandelowski 2000; Mouton 2009; Silverman 2013). Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) opines that methods are tools utilised by researchers to obtain data. These tools allow for data collection relating to social reality from individuals, groups, artefacts and texts in any form. Research method or methods for a specific project could consist of interviews, observation, or the collection of textual or visual data. The chapter also reviews research questions and the research design. It also discusses the primary research strategies which comprises identifying the target population, the selected sampling procedure, sample characteristics and sample size, the primary data collection instruments and instrumentation strategies, and the primary data analysis tools and strategies. This is accompanied by a description of the secondary research strategies, that integrated a discussion of the justification for the secondary research, the secondary data search criteria and the secondary data analysis process. Following a qualitative research paradigm based on the reactions and feelings of respondents the study adopted a case study design and then discourse analysis approach for secondary data based on human interaction, either verbal or non-verbal means.

This study explained xenophobia in contemporary South Africa through the concept of belonging as a contested notion. The study moves beyond the examining violence in South Africa as merely xenophobic, by analysing the study of belonging through the dynamics who are viewed as insiders and outsiders at different historical moments. As the debate on xenophobia heightens, there is a need to have a nuanced understanding of the issue from a belonging perspective and contested notions of citizen and non-citizenship. Historically, the black majority in South Africa employed violence as means of resolving issues of inequalities in the polity, thus the trend has been transferred to contemporary times. Belonging has been marred by alarming levels of violence against African migrants after the 1994 period. The study discussed the connection between notions of belonging and manifestations of violence in 21st century South Africa. The next section discusses the research's the methodological approach.

4.2 Methodological Approach of the Research

The study utilised a qualitative approach and is based on empirical evidence and fact-finding research which explains the way and manner in which non-South African citizens, especially black African nationals and few Asians, are treated in 21st century South Africa. Qualitative research is that which locates the observer or witness in their natural habitat. It comprises a set of interpretive, material practices which allows the world to be seen. The qualitative approach changes the world by turning it into different kinds of representation which consist of field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. Qualitative research includes a system that interprets the natural world (Berg 2007; Welman, Kruger and Mitchell 2012; Yin 2016). Qualitative researchers study things or events in their natural settings, trying to be logical, or interpreting phenomena according to human explanation (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). Thus, the questions asked are seen through the lens of a qualitative methodological approach. Vromen (2010) argues that qualitative research methodology responds to research questions that require explanation or understanding of social phenomena and their milieus. Qualitative research derives from the interpretive paradigm or social sciences meta-theory which gives interpretive explanation with the intention of augmenting the understanding of social and political realities in their natural settings (Newman 2011).

Creswell (2013:44) avers that "qualitative research starts with assumptions and the use of interpretive or theoretical frameworks which inform the study of research problems discussing the connotations individuals or groups give to a particular social or human problem confronting a society". In order to study this problem, qualitative researchers employ an evolving qualitative method to inquiry, obtaining data in their natural environment sensitive to the inhabitants and locations under review, and data analysis is inductive and deductive which leads to formation of patterns or themes. The final report of a research will include the voices of respondents, researchers' reflexivity, a deeper description and interpretation of the problem studied and its contribution to the body of knowledge or a demand to a change and overhaul of the system. As a result, this research sheds light on the meanings of politics of belonging in post-colonial South Africa, when xenophobia has been more pronounced and how it is being handled by the government and other political elites, the views of academics on the notion of belonging, the response of the indigents to African migrant communities, actions taken by civil society and the role of regional and international community during xenophobic occurrences in the country.

4.2.1 Phenomenological Research

To gain in-depth knowledge, a phenomenological research was adopted. Van Manen (2007) contends that phenomenological researches in the human and social sciences are true descriptions into the organisations of the human-life, their lived world experiences daily as they interact with other people in their environment. Hence, phenomenological research is hinged on the meaning that certain lived experiences hold for participants, that is to determine what an experience implies for those who have undergone such ordeals and are able to describe it in a vivid manner (Van Manen 1997; Creswell 2007; Mouton 2009). These individual descriptions allow for the collection of all their experiences and accounts leading to derivation of general or universal meanings (Moustakas 1994). The research is cognoscenti of the lived experiences of those who were victims of different forms of xenophobia and the views of academics and other with interest in the issue of belonging. The aim was to gather participants' experiences by deriving a generalised or universal meaning of the notion of belonging.

4.3 Research Questions

This thesis evolved from the following main research question: How are African migrants treated in contemporary South Africa? Put differently, the overarching research question which guided this study was: What are the economic, social, political, linguistic, cultural and associated factors that encourage discrimination or biases against African migrants? More precisely, the study sought to inquire about the economic, social, political, linguistic, cultural and associated factors that play prominent roles in the politics of belonging in South Africa since 2008. In order to answer the main research question, the following four additional research questions were posed:

1.What are the causes of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa? The years of apartheid saw other African states rallying around South Africa to fight the oppressive regime. African states used economic sanctions and other measures to clip the wings of colonial hegemonial administration in the country which turned out to be the last outpost apartheid rule on the African continent. During this period, *Ubuntu* was the norm as black South Africans saw other Africans as brothers and sisters. However, after the fall of the apartheid regime, Africans from other parts of the continent

and few Asian nationals, mainly Pakistani and Bangladeshi had travelled to South Africa to tap opportunities in the country. Most of them are engaged in the informal sector and small businesses commonly referred to in local parlance as *'spaza shops'*. It is rumoured that the mushrooming of these *'spaza shops'* led to a trade war between locals and foreign nationals with the former accusing the latter of overthrowing them in this small retail sector. Furthermore, social reasons like the snatching of South African ladies by African migrants and utterances made by political or traditional authority; where politicians blame the presence of foreign nationals for economic downturn in the country. Another school of thought cites deprivation as isolation triggers to anti-foreigner violence. The state and civil society has repeatedly denounced such attacks against foreigners. Whatever the causes, are these actions of violence against migrants in South Africa justified?

2. In what ways have insider-outsider relations affected South Africa? As alluded to above, Relations between insiders and outsiders in South Africa was cordial until the post-1994 period where violence against African migrants have gained momentum, reaching alarming heights with African migrants being demonised, accused of perpetrating crime, dealing in drugs and indulging in a plethora of other vices. *Ubuntu* and *Batho pele* principles which appeal to humanity have been adopted by the South African state but it seems not to have achieved the reasons why these principles were implemented in the first place. South Africa cannot live in isolation, hence the need for her to interact with the outside world. Can resentment against migrant communities affect the image of South Africa, both regionally and globally?

3. What is the impact of migration on the politics of belonging in South Africa? The history of migration in South Africa could be traced to the discovery of minerals in the 1800s when migrants were recruited to work in the mines. The agricultural sector has also attracted lots of migrants especially from the SADC who got employed to work in mines. These workers were hired on contractual basis and were expected to return to their respective countries at the expiration of their contracts. Their relatives were not allowed stay with them permanently as they were housed in single-sex hostels. Several pieces of legislation like the Alien Control Act were enacted by the apartheid government to restrict movement of locals and other Africans in the country. In 21st century South Africa migration has contributed to the politics of belonging debate as migrants

from even next door neighbours like Zimbabwe or Botswana are seen as not belonging here. How has migration affected politics of belonging in the country?

4. What are the approaches employed by the government to ensure peace and harmony between locals and foreigners in South Africa? The government and civil societies have embarked on anti-xenophobia campaigns. Roll back xenophobia, Anti-Xenophobia Action- South Africa (axasa) were some of the initiatives put in place to combat xenophobia. Presidents of the country at different times have issued statements condemning such attacks. Has the government not done enough in addressing xenophobia?

4.3.1 Chronological Discussion of the Research Questions and How the Research Systematically Answered Them

What are the causes of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa?

In response to the above research question, the study established that anti-foreigner violence was caused by a lot of factors. However, the current economic situation characterised by high unemployment rate was a major precursor to the violence. The failure of service delivery on the part of the government, increase in social vices like crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking and prostitution on the one hand and poverty, inequality and populism on the other have contributed to this trend. Some unguarded statements made by politicians and traditional authority have also orchestrated xenophobia in the country.

In what ways have insider-outsider relations affected South Africa?

The study discovered that insider-outsider relations which translates to relationship between locals and African migrants were cordial during the apartheid era, but the present dispensation has seen an erosion of African values of *Ubuntu* and *Batho pele*. The treatment meted out to foreigners either by government department employees like the Department of Home Affairs or the police has not been encouraging in some cases. The jungle justice system operated by locals and the looting of shops and businesses owned by foreign migrants, the murder of African foreign nationals at the slightest outbreak of violence, with many of the locals not being prosecuted for acts of violence. This gives locals a sense of impunity when they perpetrate acts of this nature.

93

This does not exonerate migrants who also indulge in acts of criminality and violence in the country.

What is the impact of migration on the politics of belonging in South Africa?

The study traces the age long history of migration into South Africa to the 1800s when mineral resources were discovered and how nationals of neighbouring states were recruited on contractual terms for jobs in the mining sector of the then Union of South Africa. Migrants were also recruited in the agricultural sector to maximise production. However, in both cases, legislations were put in place by the apartheid regime to curtail non-nationals from settling down in South Africa. But the influx of people from the SADC region, other African states and regions of the world after the 1994 period has limited the opportunities of locals to get jobs. The influx of migrants has birthed the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy in which migrants are being stereotyped and labelled in derogatory terms. Idioms like *amakewrekwere* are used to describe non-nationals of South Africa.

What are the approaches employed by the government to ensure peace and harmony between locals and foreigners in South Africa?

The study named government efforts and initiatives aimed at building peace among locals and foreign nationals in the country. The role of the civil society was also examined. Government at various times, denounced the attacks and in some instances denied the occurrence of xenophobia. Rather, it was referred to as criminal activities perpetrated by disgruntled elements in the society.

Alternatively, the study sought to explore the potential obstacles encountered by African migrants during crises periods. The main problem here was that of security of their lives, property, homes or places where their businesses were located. It also examined how foreign nationals who were mainly residing in informal settlements got assistance from the government and civil society. It also established why locals were seemingly exempted from partaking in the enjoyment of the national cake promised them by the ANC upon the enthronement of democracy. Taking the views of those involved in this belonging discourse, this research inquired how the state through its security agencies responded during the times of violence to bring the situation under control. The recurrence of violence against African migrants from the 2008 when xenophobia became more pronounced and has been continually sustained by disillusioned locals who felt betrayed as the government disappointed them in fulfilling the promise of a better life made by the ANC-led

government after years of isolation caused the white minority rule. In spite of the RDP intervention, majority of the locals still reside in squalor settlements in different townships across the country, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle of poverty (Akinola 2014; Misago 2017).

The overall case being studied here is belonging in the context of South Africa using selected study sites in three provinces namely: Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. Nyamnjoh (2006) presents reasons why South Africa has experienced xenophobic violence due to the massive influx of migrants from other African states and few Asians citing it as Insiders and Outsiders and the response of locals, affected states and the international community. Xenophobia as a problematic is located within the confines of global accumulation of wealth, with Africa occupying a disadvantaged position.

4.4 Research Design

Research design explains how the research knowledge is converted into a research strategy or plan that can be executed afterwards in practical terms by a researcher or research group. Conversely, research design extends beyond merely choosing methods or techniques employed in data collection for a specific study (Mouton 2009; Welman, Kruger and Mitchell 2012; Silverman 2014). Research design is concerned with and composed of decisions on the conceptualization of research, means about how the research itself is conceptualized, consequent subsequent handling of a particular research work, and finally the contribution made to the body of knowledge (Leedy and Ormrod 2001; Denzin and Lincoln 2005; Creswell 2013). A case study design was selected for this study. A case study design in which field work was carried out making it the vital 'building block' of empirical research (Pierce 2008). This permitted 'an empirical inquiry' that examines a contemporary phenomenon located in its real life context having more than a source of evidence are investigated to collect evidence from a particular area (Yin 2003). More importantly, a case study design was apt due to the contestations surrounding the notions of belonging in 21st century South Africa. A major advantage of a case study design is its ability to give "a thick description of a complex social issue embedded within a cultural context", which can probably lead to "rich and in-depth insights which no other method can yield" (Yin 2009).

The case study design gave this research various information sources, concurrently enabling the process of explaining and describing the study (Fouche 2002), the politics of belonging which has

led to increase in anti-foreigner violence in South Africa. This provided answers to the questions of the 'how' and 'why' of the study (Yin 1994). A case study comprises of a full and systematic analysis of a few cases (Bless and Higson-Smith 1995). This method of research is a case study of the politics of belonging which is being redefined at this critical juncture of South Africa's socio-economic and political history. South Africa has been plagued by anti-foreigner violence in form of xenophobia, Afrophobia, service delivery strikes, resentment of African migrants and other forms of injustices against migrant communities in the country. Successive administrations have encountered this problem while the present administration has also witnessed outbursts of xenophobia. A case study is highly favourable in doing an in-depth study of a rigorous analysis of a single case of a particular phenomenon (Perecman and Curran 2006). A case study approach also assists to obtain richer, more contextualized, and better accurate understanding of the phenomenon of interest than most other methods used in research, which is due to its ability to capture a vast collection of contextual data (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The choice of a case study, especially on the politics of belonging in the 21st century South African society gives a very profound picture of the relationship between locals and foreigners on the one hand and locals reaction to economic crisis on the other hand. The country has really attracted migrants because of the opportunities available and the growth it acquired economically on the continent. This made the country relevant in Africa in terms of high economic development. The study concentrates on investigating the insider-outsider nexus, and its impact on the attitudes and behaviour of locals towards migrants and how the state has handled the issue of xenophobia in general terms; hence, a case study offers the best method for such research.

This study employed phenomenology research in trying to understand the prejudice non-South Africans experience from the country's citizens. More significantly, the procedure of establishing a research design utilises a combination of three widely and symbiotic parts namely: the theoretical, methodological, and ethical considerations appropriate to the research study. Theoretical underpinnings and assumptions about research carried out by a researcher or the research group offers a central frame which forms and controls the research at every juncture (Cheek 2008: de Vos et al. 2012).

In this qualitative study, the researcher is obliged to and has noted the need for some type of real-life interpretive method of analysis in order to study or address the specific essential focus or

question (Cheek 2008:761; Nieuwenhuis 2017: 74). Although there have been several studies on xenophobia in many disciplines the fact that the problem persists justifies the need for more research in this area. This study is a modest contribution in this regard. The next section discusses the units of analysis utilised in the study.

4.5 Study Population

Study population is defined as the combination of elements from which a sample is obtained (de Vos et al. 2012; Babbie 2013; Creswell 2014). Researchers are rarely in a position to give an assurance that every element meeting the theoretical definitions prescribed has an opportunity of being selected in the sample. Population in this case is the totality of the group of people the researcher intends to interview and get information from (Mouton 2009; Yin 2009; de Vos et al. 2012). This is where the research data are extracted, to answer the research questions, conclusion and recommendations are then made. This study intended to obtain information from academics. Therefore, academics in the field of history, political science, international relations were interviewed during the data collecting period of this research. These participants are knowledgeable about the notion of belonging and how violence against migrants manifests itself in contemporary South Africa. Thus, academics from universities and research institutes were purposively selected to participate in the interviews section. The researcher selected only ten participants for their in-depth knowledge about the issue being researched. The units of analysis will be the focus of the next section.

4.5.1 Units of Analysis and Study Sites

This is composed of individuals, groups, organisations and institutions, social artefacts/cultural objects, social actions and interventions (Babbie and Mouton 2012; Babbie 2013). In this study, human actions in the form of patterned social action in which people at times collaborate with others to achieve their individual goals are analysed (Babbie and Mouton 2012: 88). Xenophobia is an expression of South African nationalism whereby South African nationals view black foreign nationals as unwelcome competitors for scarce economic opportunities. The research also analyses political or structural action whose intentions are to maintain or change the patterns and structures of a culture and society. Street marches, protests and violent campaigns are examples of this kind

97

of social action (Babbie and Mouton 2012: 88). Unit of analysis in this study comprised of individuals who were interviewed, books and newspapers (DailySun and Sowetan) consulted for research purposes, geographical units (provinces visited for data collection: KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Limpopo provinces), social interactions (arrests).

Table 1: Categories of Participants and Numbers Interviewed

Category	Numbers Interviewed
Academics	10
Civil Society	3
Foreign Nationals	5
Church Leader(s)	1
Diplomats	2
Locals	2
Political Leaders	3
Department of Home Affairs	1
Total	27

In Gauteng Province, the researcher visited Soweto and Sunnyside; Pietermaritzburg was the study site visited in the KwaZulu-Natal Province and two students on the campus of the University of Venda in the Limpopo Province. I collected data through one-on-one interviews with respondents. I obtained data from the following category of people: academics (10), civil society (3), foreign nationals (5), church leader (1), diplomat (2), locals (2), political leaders (3), Department of Home Affairs (1). I carefully chose my participants due to the sensitive nature of the study. For academics, those interviewed were academics from Universities, Council for Education and Human Sciences Research Council. Foreign nationals interviewed were from Ethiopia, Nigeria. Zimbabwe and Zambia. Those interviewed from the civil society cluster were specifically drawn from 3 different human right groups (Lawyers for Human Rights, Amnesty International and Africa Diaspora Forum). The political leaders were drawn from the EFF, ANC and the DA respectively. A church leader whose church- the Methodist Church of Southern Africa housed displaced migrants in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic crisis granted me an interview. Two locals,

undergraduate students from the University of Venda were interviewed by me. The diplomats interviewed were from the Zambian High Commission and one from the Consulate General of Nigeria were respondents in this study. Lastly, an official of the Department of Home Affairs was interviewed. The researcher wanted to understand the meaning of belonging and the resultant reasons for xenophobia between insiders and outsiders in South Africa. This process aided the researcher in developing a complex and more holistic view of notions of belonging. The next section discusses how the interviews were conducted and utilised in this study.

4.6 Data Collection and Analysis Methods

This section presents data collection mechanisms utilised in the understanding the politics of belonging in 21st century South Africa. According to Mouton (2009), Van Maanen (2011) and Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2012), data collection is the systematic way to collect data by making use of primary and secondary sources. Data collection methods employed were Participant Observation, In-depth interview in form of one-on-one and review of relevant secondary sources. All these methods were set to broader data analysis done later in the study. Primary and secondary data collection processes are further explained.

This thesis relies on primary and secondary data. Primary data was generated through semi-structured, one-on-one open-ended interviews, which were conducted on the basis of face-to-face, skype and telephonic interviews with accessible and relevant stakeholders in the belonging discourse. This enhanced the study greatly and through the cross-examination of data that allow for deeper extraction of information from the respondents. In other cases, similar questions were raised with different respondents to obtain clarity and data accuracy. Interviews were most suited for this study based on the premise that researchers were flexible due to the opportunity it gives to obtain important information from respondents, and due to what Perecman and Curran (2006: 146) termed 'letting the respondents tell their stories'. Apart from seeking information from interviewee, I engaged in personal observation. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996), Terre Blanche et al. (2010) and Silverman (2014) note that social science research is rooted in observation. The authors aver that the main advantage of observation has to do with its candour, which augments the proficiency of researchers to study behaviour as it occurs. It also empowers the researcher to gather first hand data, thereby averting distortion of the factors standing between

him or her and the object of research. The choice of observation was essential because I happened to be one of the objects of institutionalised xenophobia; in that I have been severally harassed by policemen in Gauteng because of my inability to respond to them in the local languages when approached. I have also partaken in academic activities on the xenophobia (conferences, twice interviewed and featured in a radio station-organised live programme in Nigeria – Faaji-FM programme and presented related papers in conferences) where the issue of xenophobia in South Africa and an x-ray of the relationship between South Africa and Nigeria and other African migrants residing in South Africa was the topic for discussion.

4.6.1 Interview

Interviews were utilised to gather peoples' views about notions of belonging which have had an influence in anti-foreigner sentiments in contemporary South Africa. An interview is a predominant mode of data or information gathering in qualitative research. The researcher gets information through direct discussion with an individual or a group that is known or expected to have the knowledge being sought (DePoy and Gibson 2008; Given 2008; Creswell 2014). The interview is a social relationship designed to facilitate means of interaction between a researcher and a respondent so that the researcher would obtain necessary information (de Vos et al. 2012: 342). Seidman (1988) contends that phenomenological interviews allow for people's behavioural attitudes to become expressive and understandable when put in the setting of their lives and the lives of others around them. Furthermore, interviews confirm the context of the respondent, allows participants to rebuild the details of their lived-experiences within the context in which it happens. Interviews also allow respondents to think about the connotation their experience holds for them. Semi-structured one-on-one interview was utilized in this study. This made the researcher gain a more precise picture of the participant's views and perceptions about specific issues. The interview method allowed the researcher and participants to be flexible. The researcher was able follow up new ideas or responses that emanated during the course of the interview and participants were able to provide a wider scope of the phenomenon. Semi-structured interviews were apt particularly with the complexity and controversial nature of violence against migrant communities in the country. The interview consisted of open-ended questions, thus making participants come up with issues unknown to the researcher. Since participants were knowledgeable on the subject at hand, the researcher gave them adequate space to relate their story (de Vos et al. 2012: 352). This method was adopted in order to study people in their natural setting to obtain much needed information

and understanding in the context. Interviews were used in this thesis to gather premium information from people about belonging and xenophobic violence perpetrated against the migrant community in contemporary South Africa, their experiences of xenophobia, their attitudes, views about it and the challenges they encountered.

Furthermore, the interview was used to compare and substantiate available information in literature. It was also used to clarify vague or conflicting positions. The interview method was useful in discovering themes that were unavailable in documented literature. Data was collected from 27 respondents stretching over a one-year period. In the course of conducting these semi-structured one-on-one interviews, the thrust was to see how politics of belonging have shaped present day South Africa with regards to the outbreak of xenophobic violence. One interview schedule was designed for each category of respondents. In all, seven categories were interviewed. The questions were formulated in a way that each respondent's responses indicated the perception of the politics of belonging in 21st century South Africa. The interviewees were carefully selected in order to answer the respond to the questions on the interview questionnaire. In order to know the reasons for migration, foreign nationals were the ones interviewed in this category. How manifestation of xenophobia triggered the debate on the politics of belonging was responded to by academics, a church leader and two members of human rights groups. Civil society perspectives and the role of inflammatory language had academics responding to questions in this area. Perspectives on government had a church leader and academics baring their minds on these issues. Academics answered questions centred on the role of political elites and the problematic of service delivery. With regards to RDP housing, academics were participants in this category. Foreign nationals were respondents to question on those who were victims of xenophobia and profiling of African immigrants by locals and government security agencies. A prominent member of lawyer for human rights responded to questions on wage disparities. A church leader responded to questions on role played by the church. Academics shared their views on the resurgence of xenophobia in the future. Most of the interviews were conducted by the researcher through face to face interviews with the respondents while three interviews were conducted via skype and two through telephone. The interviews were all conducted in the English language and a recorder was used to get information from the participants. Smith et al. (1995:17) posits that the use of tape recorder gives a much fuller record than writing down notes during the interview. It also implies that the researcher can focus on the route the interview would take. Respondents were not coerced

in anyway and as a result, respondents freely spoke about the current state of politics of belonging in South Africa.

4.6.2 Literature Review

Secondary data was obtained to add to the data collected by the researcher. McGinn (2008:803) states that secondary data is pre-existing data that has been collected for a different reason or by another person other than the researcher. This data may have been collected initially for another research study or for administrative purposes. Secondary data can be sourced from government agencies, researcher contributed databases, public or private archives, institutional records, or arrangements with individual researchers. Researchers may use secondary data to investigate new research questions, corroborate or extend the original analyses, or compare to other (primary or secondary) data sources. Secondary data for this study was obtained from textbooks, journal articles, government agencies and monographs discussing issues of belonging, migration, nationalism and xenophobia. Secondary data enriches one's research and makes it novel in comparison with other research done in the same field (Finn 2000). Literature review was used to check the coherence with accuracy and validity of the research. According to Creswell (2009), literature review enables the researcher to summarise and investigate major findings from other authors. Foucault (2002) posits that discourse analysis can be defined by activities embarked upon by participants, and the power enforced and replicated through them; thus, we can speak about feminist or nationalist discourse, doctor-patient or classroom discourse, the discourse of pity, whiteness, or science, or supremacy and resistant discourses. Van Leeuwen (2009:144) also substantiates Foucault's definition by saying that discourse has to do with social perceptions 'that serve the interests of particular historical and/or social contexts', represent social practices in text, and change the context. In this section, data collection methods were enumerated and the population, sample, sampling techniques and the interview conditions were also discussed. The next section discusses the sampling technique that was adopted in the study.

4.6.3 Sampling

Non-probability sampling technique was employed in this study. Samure and Given (2008:562) observe that non-probability sampling is a common technique in adopted qualitative research in which researchers use their judgment to select a sample. Unrau et al. (2007:280) posit that individual units in a sampling frame under the non-probability method hardly have an equal chance of being selected for a particular study. For this study, purposive and snowball sampling methods were used to locate respondents because xenophobia manifests itself in different forms; violent and nonviolent in order to get quality responses in the course of the interview with the respondents. Purposive sampling is the focus of the next section.

Purposive sampling which falls under the non-probability paradigm was utilised in this research. This sampling technique is also referred to as judgmental sampling (Rubin and Babbie 2005:247). De Vos et al. (2012:232) states that purposive sampling is based on the judgment of the researcher. A sample comprises of elements that possess the most important characteristic feature which represents or shows the typical attributes or qualities of the population that serves the intended purpose of the study in the best manner (Grinnell and Unrau 2008). This method is of great assistance to the researcher because it aids the researcher to determine the population needed for this study as it forms a core aspect when locating the particular categories of people to be included in the study. Academics (10) of this figure, I selected 4 locals and 6 African migrants, civil society (3); under this cluster, I chose one respondent each from Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), Amnesty International (AI) and African Diaspora Forum (ADF), political party representatives one each from the ANC, EFF and the DA , a church leader who was very active during the 2008 xenophobic crisis and opened us his church for foreign migrants who were displaced, diplomats from the Zambian (High Commission) and the Nigerian (Consulate General) were located through purposive sampling. The second sampling technique which is snowball sampling is explained in the next section.

4.6.4 Snowball Sampling

Snowball sampling which is also a non-probability sampling technique was used to locate victims of xenophobia who were foreign African nationals, an official of the department of home affairs and two locals. Snowball sampling is mostly used when there is zero knowledge of the sampling

frame and restricted access to the right respondents for the proposed study (Alston and Bowles 2003; Silverman 2013). Snowballing has to do with taking just one case that is involved in the phenomenon to be studied so as to get information or data about other similar people. Babbie (2013:129) avers that "snowball" has to do with the process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other subjects. Babbie contends further that snowball sampling is suitable when members of a special population are hard to locate, such as homeless people, migrant workers, or undocumented immigrants. The kind of information I sought for here was to know how African migrants became victims of xenophobia and the reasons behind their journey to South Africa. I interviewed the department of home affairs official to know how they treated migrants and challenges encountered by this government department especially with cases of immigration offences allegedly committed by African migrants. The next section explains the thematic analysis utilised in this study.

4.6.5 Thematic Data Analysis

Thematic analysis is a method that identifies patterns or themes within qualitative data. Braun and Clarke (2006) posit that it is the first qualitative method that should be learned as.. 'it provides core skills that will be useful for conducting many other kinds of analysis'. Another benefit, mainly from the perception of learning and teaching, is that it is a method rather than a methodology (Braun and Clarke 2006; Clarke and Braun, 2013). This implies that, when compared to other qualitative methodologies, it is not attached to a particular epistemological or theoretical perspective. The main aim of a thematic analysis is to identify themes, i.e. patterns in the data that are essential or exciting, and use these themes to address the research or say something about an issue. This goes beyond mere summary; a good thematic analysis interprets and makes sense of the data collected. A common mistake made by researchers is the conversion of the main interview questions as the themes (Clarke and Braun, 2013). Usually, this reveals the fact that instead of analysing the data, the researcher just summarises and organises it.

Thematic analysis is a commonly used concept, tool, process, method or approach in the analysis of qualitative data, nevertheless it is often poorly explained, acknowledged and defined (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is progressively regarded as a method in its own right and not merely a process within 'major' analytic traditions such as interpretative phenomenological

analysis and grounded theory (Braun and Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis is different from interpretative phenomenological analysis and ground theory due to the fact that it is not connected to a precise theoretical framework or epistemological position; hence, it can be used with many theoretical methods including critical realism, acting as a 'contextualist method' that is situated between the philosophical positions of positivism and relativism (Braun and Clarke 2006).

Thematic analysis is made to give structure and order on a huge chunk of qualitative or narrative data so that it can be arranged, interpreted and communicated in a logical manner to the research community (Polit and Beck, 2008). Thematic analysis also gives room for greater transparency of the approach because of the level of lucidity supported by Braun and Clarke (2006) in the form of many decisions that ought to be made by researchers so as to decipher and provide clarity of their theoretical position towards their own thematic analysis. The emphasis on transparency permits greater clarity for intending researchers who want to do research in the same field in the future (Braun and Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis displays the philosophical principles of this study in sustaining consistency between its epistemology, methodology, methods and data analysis (Crotty 1998). The study concentrated on meaning, depth, rich description and the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2011). Therefore, thematic analysis provided a sound analytic tool to explore the experiences politics of belonging in South Africa. Moreover, the analysis took a semantic approach, that is, the themes were identified from the "explicit or surface meanings of the data" (Braun and Clarke 2006). This is at variance to analyses at the latent level, where the researcher goes beyond the semantic content in order to recognise underlying beliefs or ideas that govern what people say. The study set out to give a robust thematic description of the entire dataset rather than provide a more presence account of one particular theme within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Hoonaard and Hoonaard (2008:186-187) define data analysis as an intrinsic aspect of qualitative research which helps in data collection and connects the researcher's findings with higher order notions. There are many variants of qualitative research with options which include other types of data analysis, like: interview transcripts, field notes, conversational analysis, and visual data, whether photographs, film, or observations of internet occurrences. Data was coded with emerging codes like: Belonging, migration, xenophobia, civil society, language, government, political elites, service delivery, housing immigrants, wages and church. The codes were developed into 13 themes

105

with the following sub-headings: reasons for migration, how manifestation of xenophobia triggered the debate on politics of belonging, civil society perspectives, role of inflammatory language, perspectives on government responses, role of political elites, the problematic of service delivery, RDP housing, victims of xenophobia, profiling of African migrants by locals and government security agencies, wage disparities, role of the church and resurgence of xenophobia in the future. Hoonaard and Hoonaard (2008), Creswell (2013) further discuss that the analysis of data consists of many pages of field notes, interview transcripts, and/or images. Irrespective of the view or paradigm being adopted, somethings are common in the analysis of qualitative data. Synchronised data collection and analysis writing of memos in the course of data collection and afterwards, application of coding, the use of writing as a tool for analysis, and consequent development of concepts which link the researcher's analysis to what is obtained in literature Hoonaard and Hoonaard (2008). I conducted all the interviews using English language as the medium, so there was no need for translation. Subsequently, I took down notes on the field simultaneously as I recorded the information which I obtained from the respondents during the one-on-one interviews. The interviews were manually transcribed by me. Data gathering, memoing in the form of transcription of interviews, coding, data writing and developing concepts that are similar to the ones found in literature were utilised by me to enrich this study. In this study, data was collected in a synchronised form, coded with concepts developed in a manner congruent with what is found in literature. The next section discusses categorisation

Chenali (2012) posits that the foremost part of qualitative data analysis is categorization, because it enables the researcher to group the patterns observed in the data into significant units or categories. This allows for lumping together, clusters of data that was formerly coded. The collection is founded on similar connotations between separately coded units noted by the researcher. Categories could be in form of abstract of concepts which will give room for clear demarcation to logic, theory, and the interconnectedness. The outcome of categorization will lead to creation of themes, constructs, or domains from the categories. For example, people migrated for several reasons; academic, political, economic and other miscellaneous reasons. All these reasons were now summed up into a theme like: Reasons for migration.

Preparing data for the purpose of analysis is very vital in the qualitative data analysis process. Qualitative data analysis should be carefully and properly organised, so that the researcher can

easily access information in the data set. Nieuwenhuis (2017: 114-115) noted that irrespective of the amount of data gathered, there should be a number of respondents, selection criteria, some biographic information of the participants (age, sex, occupation, education, marital status) and how the in-depth study was conducted. The field notes, interviews and observations, though lengthy should be understood and well read by the researcher. The researcher carefully transcribed the audio-recordings verbatim since all the interviews were conducted in English. The researcher gained an in-depth comprehension of the transcribed interviews given by the respondents. Nieuwenhuis (2017: 115) affirms the need to listen to the transcription of interviews several times, the researcher has to write down evolving themes and merge the ones that occur most together. This made it easier for the researcher to develop ideas for coding purposes as described by Nieuwenhuis (2017: 115). The process of transcribing data could be tiresome and arduous, but it allows the researcher to get acquainted with the data. Data coding and presentation are elucidated in the next section.

4.6.6 Data Coding and Presentation

Coding involves a careful and thorough reading and understanding of transcribed data delineating and explaining it more meaningfully and analytically. Salient themes are identified while ideas that recur or language and belief patterns that connect people and their environment together as the researcher goes through the data (DeVos et al. 2013:410). Categorisation and coding could either be said to be separate steps (Bodgan and Biklen 2007:173) or simultaneous in manner as (Grinnel and Unrau 2005; Flick 2006) explain that it could imply the reduction of data and categorisation into themes. For this study, data analysis was enabled by transcribing each piece of data from all the data sources and typing the text (from interviews, observational notes, memos, etc.) into word processing documents.

In the process of coding, data was divided into important analytical units (i.e., partitioning the data). Black (2009) states that in persistent contrast constant, data are collected, discreetly analysed at once through a process of coding, description and categorisation. Coding is said to be the marking of data sections, with symbols, explanatory words, or category names (Kawulich, 2004). Yin (2003) advises that the process of data analysis should produce codes. This research sought to examine existing theories, it was better to start with *priori* codes, although allowance was made

for the development of more codes as analysis advanced. *Priori* codes are codes that are developed before analysing current data. In concert with Yin (1994), the study depended on the research questions to classify the data into thematic areas according to the propositions connected to each area. Mills, Bonner and Francis (2006) observe that three forms of coding exist: open coding, which happens to be the preliminary stage of theoretical analysis and is concerned with code development from generated data and ends when a core category is identified; theoretical codes happens to be the link that uses concepts to build relationships between categories and their properties; and finds constant comparative coding which illustrates the method of constant comparison and fills both open and theoretical coding.

This research started by suspending propositions to enable unbiased data collection and understanding. This allowed the understanding of data to be theoretical as the main themes were always on the researchers' mind and were the determining factor on data classification and allowed unnecessary data to be discarded. The *priori* codes were a result of the social identity theory, identity politics theory and framing derived from reviewed literature which indicated factors fostering violence against African migrants and a few Asians. These were: belonging, xenophobia, nationalism, unemployment, access to housing, denialism, better life, migrant influx, access to education, stereotyping, poverty, inequality, transnationalism, crime, racism, drug peddling, prostitution, service delivery, corruption, porous borders, deprivation, social cohesion, language and labelling. As analysis progressed, other codes began to emerge and these included: impostors, white monopoly capital, fallist movements, black consciousness, political corruption/RDP housing racketeering, policing, victimisation, retaliation and the role of the church, among others.

The research adopted as Crowe et al.'s (2011) framework approach was which has five stages: familiarisation with the data; identifying a thematic framework which was done with constant reference to the propositions made on the social identity theory, identity politics theory and framing theory; coding; mapping; and, interpretation. Davies and Beaumont (2007) add that verifiable evidence obtained through phenomenology, discourse analysis and semi-structured one-to-one interviews was categorised using models that are similar and stored in formats (both hard copy and electronic) that were simple to access and retrieve. During the course of the study, the recurring behavioural models and relationships evolved with data tending towards a more context-sensitive research. Charmaz (2006) contends that the 'abductive' reasoning process commences

with data examination, give room for clarification for what is observed and connect it to the hypothesis in order validate or dispute until the researcher gets to a more credible explanation. The researcher reanalysed the data by searching for different codes and the more dominant themes. In order to sort out the codes into themes, the researcher made use of visual representation like mind-maps and tables. Cozby (2007) contends that the application of visual representation is of immense benefit at this phase of the research, as various codes are coded into themes employing tables and mind-maps. When this has done, then the researcher proceeds to think about the link between codes and themes.

As data was analysed and the predominant themes emerged, a major challenge was how to present the large evidence without altering the study structure. The collected data was presented narratively. Data sources like literature, interviews, phenomenology, discourse analysis and newspaper information were cited in the narrative where they were utilised. The narratives for the major themes which were connected to the research questions were accompanied by a summary of the higher order constructs which consequently discussed the consequences and meanings of the study.

Ponterotto (2006) avers that thick description denotes the duty of the researcher to describe and interpret discovered social action (attitude or behaviour) within its particular context. As need arises, thick description of the phenomenon was utilised to precisely illustrate the observed trends of social action and give purpose and meaning to the evidence obtained. Thick description in the study was also adopted to obtain the thoughts and feelings of participants as well as the complex network of relationships among them to give more clarity and provide explanations about higher order constructs. Shenton (2004) argues that thick description is a very significant tool in ensuring credibility as it assists in explaining the real events that happened, in the current context, not minding prevailing circumstances. This study utilised thick research to arrive at thick interpretation which ultimately results in thick connotations of the research findings. Drawing from Shenton (2004), it was also hoped that the thick description, interpretation and meaning of findings would provide clarity at the end of the research attesting to its credibility. Ethical considerations are addressed in the next section.

4.7 Ethical Considerations

Belonging as a notion fuels violence and it is hotly contested, making it a topical and highly sensitive issue not only in contemporary South Africa but in many countries across the globe. Obtaining information from respondents in a courteous manner cannot be overemphasised. Strydom (2016:114) and De Vos et al. (2012:127) define ethics as moral principles guiding the conduct of a researcher. The researcher did not in any way take undue advantage of the respondents before, during and after the interview. The necessary ethical clearance for this study was obtained from the University of Venda Research Ethics Committee on 17 May 2017. Researchers should pay close attention to avoidance of harm, voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality and privacy (Babbie 2010:64-67). This in consonance with the Helsinki Declaration of 1964 which makes it compulsory for anyone who intends to embark on research to get clearance or approval from the ethics committee in situations involving human or animal subjects (Wassenaar 2010). This denotes that any research carried out devoid of ethical clearance is invalid and against the Helsinki Declaration which gives the blueprint for ethics in research. This study followed the ethical issues listed below.

4.7.1 Voluntary Participation

Participation ought to be voluntary at any point in time during interviews and as such, nobody should be compelled to participate in a project (Rubin and Babbie 2005: 71). As a result, the participants' permission to participate in the study was sought and they were duly informed by the researcher that no one would be coerced to participate. They willingly accepted to be interviewed on one-on-one basis.

4.7.2 Informed Consent

Participants were informed about the topic under investigation and what it entailed. Consent forms were handed to them, and after they read through, some participants sought for clarifications before interviews commenced and after getting the much-needed information, they appended their signatures. Participants were also reminded about the freedom they had if they intended withdrawing from being interviewed anytime they felt like (Babbie and Mouton 2001:382).

4.7.3 Avoidance of Harm

Participants were fully assured of freedom from any type of harm, either physical or emotional. The researcher made sure that the participants were protected from harm by interviewing them in convenient places (Babbie 2007:27).

4.7.4 Privacy, Anonymity and Confidentiality

Participants were assured of the fact that their privacy rights would not be infringed upon or violated. The participants were shown the interview protocol in order to win their confidence. Creswell (2013:174) discussed that the relationship between the researcher and the participants, in that the informant's anonymity is protected by giving numbers to the individuals. Additionally, the researcher explained the purpose of the study in order to gain the support of the participants as they were not tricked in any form. The identities or names of the respondents were not disclosed, and all information acquired during the interviews was used strictly for study purposes.

4.7.5 The Researcher's Role

In line with the obligations of ethics the researcher was competent, honest and adequately prepared in the course of interviewing the participants (Walliman 2006:148). Plagiarism, which implies 'directly copying the work or using the ideas of others without acknowledging the source', should also be mentioned in this context, as should manipulating or creating false data (Druckman 2005:16; Welman et al. 2005:182). The researcher did not commit plagiarism as all sources of information are acknowledged. The researcher did not harm the respondents in anyway as respondents consented to participate and were not deceived. The code of ethics was adhered to according to the dictates of the Ethics and Research Committee of the University of Venda that approved the ethical clearance for conducting this study. The researcher made sure that the ethical standards in the study was duly followed going by the sensitive nature of the study and the changing faces of belonging that had been happening between locals and African migrants in the past years.

4.8 Study Limitations

Issues of trust were the most challenging during data collection. Some African migrants running spaza shops in Soweto declined to be interviewed because they assumed that the researcher was a secret agent or government informant. I was not able to interview DIRCO officials after sending emails which contained the questionnaire for the interviews to some top officials of this government department and following them up with phone calls, no reason was given for their refusal.

4.9 Conclusion

The research questions, research design, primary research strategies which comprises identifying the target population, the selected sampling procedure, sample characteristics and sample size, the primary data collection instruments and instrumentation strategies, and the primary data analysis tools and strategies were addressed in this chapter. Afterwards, the description of the secondary research strategies in which the discussion of the justification for the secondary research was integrated, the secondary data search criteria and the secondary data analysis were also discussed. This study followed a qualitative research approach based on the reactions and feelings of respondents which further led to the adoption of a case study design and discourse analysis approach for analysis of secondary data premised on human interaction. The qualitative paradigm was based on empirical evidence and fact-finding research which explicated the way and manner in which non-South African nationals, especially from the African continent and few Asians, were treated in 21st century South Africa.

How African migrants were treated in contemporary South Africa was the main question of this thesis. The study sought to explain the economic, social, political, linguistic, cultural and associated factors that encouraged discrimination or biases against African migrants. More precisely, the study sought to know how these factors influenced the politics of belonging in South Africa since 2008. Adopting a phenomenology research in a bid to understand the prejudice experienced by non-South Africans, theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations were used as research design appropriate to the study being undertaken. Individuals, groups, organisations, social actions, mediations and social artefacts/ cultural objects were the unit of analysis for research purposes. Data was collected from a total of 27 people in 3 Provinces in the country namely: Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. Snowball sampling and purposive sampling were used to locate respondents that were interviewed. Data coding and presentation

process were explained in this section. The issue of ethics which included ethical considerations, voluntary participation, informed consent, avoidance of harm, privacy, confidentiality and anonymity, the role of the researcher, and study limitations were clearly elucidated in this chapter. Chapter 5 presents findings gathered through the analyses of views of respondents about belonging and consequent xenophobia in the country.

Chapter 5 Discussion, Analysis and Presentation of Study Findings

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of data generated through the semi-structured one-on-one interviews conducted in Limpopo, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces from various respondents. Thematic approach has been utilised to categorise and arrange the findings. The following themes emerged: reasons for migration, how manifestation of xenophobia triggered the debate on politics of belonging, civil society perspectives, role of inflammatory language, perspectives on government responses, role of political elites, the problematic of service delivery, RDP housing, victims of xenophobia, profiling of African migrants by locals and government security agencies, wage disparities, role of the church and resurgence of xenophobia in the future. The biographical data of respondents is explained below.

5.2 Biographical Data of Respondents

Table 1 indicates the demographic representations of the respondents in the study. The demographic distribution of respondents consists of the following independent variables: gender, age bracket, marital status, country of origin, highest educational attainment, year of arrival in South Africa, years of residing in South Africa and occupation. The tables give insights into the sociodemographic features of the respondents in this study.

Table 2: Synopsis of Respondents

Respondent	Gender	Age	Marital status	Country of Origin	Highest Educational Attainment	Year of Arrival in South Africa	Years Residing in South Africa	Occupation
FN 1	Male	28	Single	Ethiopia	Matric	2017	1	Businessman
FN 2	Male	36	Married	Ethiopia	Matric	2009	8	Businessman
FN 3	Male	29	Single	Zambia	Masters	2009	8	Student
FN 4	Male	40	Single	Zimbabwean	Masters	2005	13	Student
FN 5	Male	41	Married	Nigeria	Matric	2013	4	Auto mechanic
AC 1	Male	53	Married	Nigeria	PhD	2012	5	Academic
AC 2	Male	37	Married	Nigeria	PhD	2010	7	Academic
AC 3	Female	37	Married	Nigeria	PhD	2010	7	Academic
AC4	Male	36	Married	South Africa	Masters	-	-	Academic
AC 5	Male	50	Married	South Africa	PhD	-	-	Academic

AC 6	Male	50	Married	South Africa	PhD	-	-	Academic
AC 7	Male	40	Married	Malawi	Masters	-	-	Academic
AC 8	Male	41	Single	Cameroon	PhD	2007	10	Academic
AC 9	Male	47	Married	Nigeria	PhD	2014	3	Academic
AC 10	Male	33	Single	South Africa	Masters	-	-	Academic
CS 1	Female	56	Single	South Africa	BA	-	-	Civil Society
CS 2	Male	43	Married	Congo DRC	Masters			Civil Society
CS 3	Female	46	Single	South Africa	Masters	-	-	Civil Society
CL 1	Male	67	Married	South Africa	PhD	-	-	Church Leader
DP 1	Male	55	Married	Nigeria	Masters			Diplomat
DP 2	Male	55	Married	Zambia	Masters	2016	3	Diplomat
LC1	Female	20	Single	South Africa	Matric	-	-	Local
LC 2	Female	19	Single	South Africa	Matric	-	-	Local
PL 1	Male	30	Single	South Africa	Honours	-	-	Political Leader
PL 2	Female	40	Married	South Africa	Matric	-	-	Political Leader
PL 3	Male	26	Single	South Africa	Honours	-	-	Political Leader
DHA	Female	26	Single	South Africa	BA	-	-	Immigration Officer

As alluded to in chapter 4, a total of 27 participants were interviewed. The respondents included twenty males and 7 females, with ages ranging from 19 to 67 years. The data collected shows that of those interviewed, 14 foreign nationals have resided in the country (Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo) between 1 and 12 years. Foreign nationals reside in many cities across South Africa but are highly vulnerable to xenophobia which exists in different forms both in the formal and informal sectors of the economy as attested to by Crush (2008); Freemantle (2012); Tella (2016); Beetar (2019) and Ngcamu and Mantzaris (2019). The distribution of the level of academic achievement is as follows: Matric 6, BA 2, Honours 2, Masters 9 and PhD 8. Belonging is manifested or expressed in different forms as Skrbis, Baldassar and Poynting (2007) contend that the term "belonging" has been at the centre of debates leading to disorder in the global system, thus increasing the challenges confronting our contemporary society. Yuval-Davis (2011:10) notes, belonging is concerned with 'an emotional attachment, about feeling 'at home'. There seems to be a strong connection between identity and belonging and individuals may not feel at home everywhere due to prevailing situations and circumstances. There was an influx of migrants into South Africa after 1994 (Maharaj 2001; Posel 2003; Crush 2005; Oucho 2006). This influx has brought about feelings of animosity among some South African citizens leading to series of violence by locals against migrants with several casualties emanating from the gory scenes

featuring on the front pages of daily tabloids (Morris 1998; Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010; Abdi 2013; Mudzanani 2016; Tella 2016). Beetar's (2019) exposition on xenophobia contends that xenophobia is an integral part and a compulsory characteristic of the South African nation-building project, linking the 2008 and 2015 attacks. Political and social attitudes which have been ingrained in people exacerbate a culture of belligerence and parochialism which connects the happenings to the necropower (Beetar 2019) that defines South Africanness. One may argue that belonging has been politicised as the findings reveal that non-South Africans are viewed as a surplus to the needs of contemporary South Africa. The next section presents the study findings.

5.3 Study Findings

Information obtained from participants in the course of interviews based on themes is illustrated using the "Fish Bone Diagram"

Figure 1 Fish Bone Diagram

5.3.1 Reasons for Migration

Regarding reasons for push and pull factors, findings reveal that many African foreign nationals in various parts of South Africa migrated because of several reasons. In the case of Zimbabwean

migrants, it was evident that the economic tsunami which hit the country in the early 2000s, coupled with high unemployment rate, hyperinflation and political persecution courtesy of the Mugabe regime motivated their migration to South Africa. Malawians were under the deluge of economic crisis, hence outward migration to South Africa. Many Nigerians fled their country because of harsh economic conditions, high rate of insecurity, incessant kidnappings, Islamic terrorism, human rights abuse and a very ferocious political climate. In the context of the DRC, it emerged that the protracted civil war centred on politics and mineral resources, the *ebola* virus and political instability. The civil war had a lasting damage on the DRC. A major factor that encouraged Zimbabwean migration was the country's proximity to South Africa. It was obvious that many Zimbabweans ran away from the economic meltdown in their country.

5.3.1.1 Push Factors

Push factors compels a person or group of persons to move voluntarily because the probability of their lives being in jeopardy remains high if they stay behind. Push factors include conflict, drought, famine or extreme religious activity. Poor economic activities, a dearth of employment opportunities, racism, cultural prejudice, political intolerance and the harassment of individuals who query the status quo (Krishnakumar 2014). Velazquez (2000) allude that supply push or expulsion forces motivates legal and illegal migration towards industrialised nations which manifests in form of lower wages, high unemployment and under employment rates, slow economic growth, economic downturn and poverty. South Africa is a highly industrialised society, little wonder many migrants from other parts of the African continent troop into the country on a daily basis.

The economic depression and political victimisation in Ethiopia led to the exodus of many Ethiopians to South Africa. These migrant group are mostly involved in the retail business commonly referred to as "spaza" shop in the local parlance in South Africa. Many Ethiopians are refugees and asylum seekers as most of them do not have the intention to return home because of better living conditions in South Africa. They encourage and assist relatives and friends to join them in the country after they have settled down.

> *I left Ethiopia for South Africa because of the dire and tense political and economic crisis that plagued Ethiopia (**FN 2**).*

117

The respondent explained the state of the Ethiopian economy and how the political climate has become apprehensive with the state becoming oppressive, clamping down on its opponents by victimising them in various ways. This response concurs with previous observation by Abbink (2011) who attests that the Ethiopian situation was aggravated by the 2005 elections which was marred by violence, food shortages, stagnation and financial challenges and inflation which spilled over to 2007. In 2005, anti-government protests led to the killing of protesters by government security agencies. The economic situation of Ethiopia pushed the country to seek help from international donor agencies and the IMF. This led to food insecurity, weak agricultural systems, imbalance between imports and exports, declining growth in commodity production and soaring unemployment. The seemingly fragile nature of the Ethiopian regime has rendered many civilians who reside in locations infested by insurgents vulnerable, making the state unable to deliver services, embark on abuses of the rule of law and fundamental human rights. There is also insecurity of lives and property, disrespect of the judiciary, extra-judicial killings and the like. All these served as push factors that influenced mass exodus of Ethiopians to other African states especially South Africa.

In many countries of the world, the youths are most active amongst the working population. Same applies to Ethiopia whose youths are actively involved in the labour market. An over saturated labour market has influenced Ethiopians to travel to South Africa in order to seek greener pastures. Gordon (2019) explaining xenophobic hate crime in South Africa discussed the position of two former heads of state; Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma who at different intervals openly denied the existence of xenophobia in the country and among its people. The media also took a swipe at the state for adopting denialism as a means to handling outbreaks of xenophobia, causing tensions on the general discourse on the issue. One may say that the current administration is accommodative with its readiness in admitting the scourge and struggle posed by xenophobia. In March 2019, ministers in cabinet instituted the National Action Plan (NAP) to deal decisively and mitigate racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and associated prejudice. The NAP is premised on a set of guidelines focused on immigrant integration, professionalization of migration management, with the aim of removing obstacles to accessing legal and constitutional rights. Trujano (2008:12) posit that Ethiopia is confronted by several migration patterns and dynamics, causing the youthful population to migrate formally and informally to other states in pursuit of job opportunities and livelihood. Molla et al. (2015) affirms that socioeconomic, demographic and political factors have

118

forced the youth to migrate out of Ethiopia through formal and informal means to countries such as South Africa. Formal and informal migrant entrepreneurs travel to South Africa for job and business opportunities. Cookson et al. (2015) contend that informal migrants from developing nations experiencing civil war and political strife, are frequently vulnerable to extreme socioeconomic problems in the quest to seek a better life in other countries. The trends of migration from the Horn of Africa have not changed since the mid-1990s as jobless youths seek better socioeconomic opportunities in other states that have vibrant and flourishing economies. The majority of the young adults who migrate to South Africa are economically active and are optimistic of improving their economic prospects. The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe affected many citizens of the country with many of them migrating to neighbouring countries in a bid to get a new lease of life. The situation was so terrible that many Zimbabweans preferred using illegal route to access South Africa. Many Zimbabweans migrated to South Africa because of its proximity and higher chances of getting employed. Education happens to be a form of empowerment that has motivated migration of people. The collapse of the educational system in some countries are very cogent reasons for people migrate. The Zimbabwean respondent affirmed that he enrolled for priesthood training in South Africa and the dire economic situation in Zimbabwe made him to register in a South African University because he believed that it was better for him to remain in South Africa. He noted that:

> *I didn't choose to come to South Africa I wanted to be trained as a priest that was why I came to South Africa. Economic reasons came in later that was why I didn't go back. But initially it was for my training for priesthood. But I was asked to leave in 2006 and that time the Zimbabwean economy was bad, so I had to make a choice either to go to Zimbabwe or to remain here, so I decided to move to the university here to study for a better life than going back to Zimbabwe (FN 4)*

Findings reveal that many Ethiopians embark on desperate journeys just to escape the harsh socio-economic and political conditions prevailing in their country. For the Zimbabwean, his intention to become a priest became a reality but looking back at his country's economy which was in tatters, he choose to pursue university education instead of returning home. Returning home could be an unwise decision which would eventually lead to frustration. For example, it can be argued that Zimbabwean situation was used as a stepping stone to migrate into South Africa because most

119

migrants are economic refugees than anything. They just want to find something doing so that they can support their families left behind at home.

The respondent explained that he initially travelled from Zimbabwe to South Africa in 2005 in order to become a Catholic Priest. However, when he was to return to Zimbabwe the following year, the economy of that country was crumbling and the respondent decided to further his studies in South Africa. The economic and political situation in Zimbabwe sparked off a wave of emigration ranging between 3 – 4 million people. From 2000 to 2008, the country's macroeconomic condition was shaped by reducing output, hyperinflation and mounting unemployment. The Zimbabwean Middle Term Plan (MTP) (2010), the country's economy nosedived to 50.3%. Inflation reached 231 million percent in July 2008, making the local currency valueless. The population of government workers reduced from 1.1 million to 990,000 between 1993 and 2004 while the country's poverty rating decreased from 0.654 in 1990 to 0.513 in 2005 (United Nations 2010). Zimbabwe's declining economic and political situation led to increase in emigration of skilled and unskilled labour, resulting in major inflows of remittances to the country. The bulk of Zimbabwean migrants' resident in South Africa is put at between 1 and 3 million while the United Kingdom (U.K) and Botswana accounts for 500,000 and 400,000 respectively (Bracking and Sachikonye 2006). Polzer (2008), posits that Zimbabwe accounts for the largest group of foreign migrants in South Africa; with an estimated population of between one to three million (Makina 2009).

This is in consonance with Castelli's (2018) research which estimated that as of 2015, 244 million international migrants live in a country other than theirs apart from internal migration. Additionally, a huge number of international migrants from the global South prefer to settle within their continent rather than embarking on journeys to Western nations. The author further explains the complexity tied to migration which combines macro, meso and micro factors that make individuals arrive at a final decision to migrate assimilating the push-pull theory. The macro factors include political, demographic, socio-economic and environmental constraints which further propels people to migrate. Communication technology, land grabbing and diasporic connections play a major role with respect to meso factors. Social media attracts migrants to the developed world. The micro factors like education, religion, marital status and personal responses to

migration also affect the individual's ultimate decision to migrate. The next section discusses the pull factors.

5.3.1.2 Pull Factors

Krishnakumar (2014) and Velazquez (2000) avers that higher wages, job opportunities, democratic governance, better welfare systems, economic prosperity and the promise of a better life are pull or attraction factors that draws people to new places.

The Nigerian situation forced many people to flee the country. The economy was rated as the fastest growing economy in Africa but had a huge proportion of unemployed youths who have taken to drugs, internet fraud and other illicit means to earn money. The local currency also crumbled against the dollar, this grossly affected the economy negatively. This occurred simultaneously with hyperinflation, crime, armed banditry, kidnapping, Boko Haram terrorism, restiveness in the oil rich Niger Delta region and the like. Many youths envisage a bleak future and had no option but to emigrate to African countries or Western world to live better lives and secure the future of their children.

> *I was an auto mechanic in Nigeria my country of birth. However, I decided to relocate to South Africa because of the good progress made by my friends who have the same skill as mine. The terrain was too rough in Nigeria, harsh economic conditions the struggle to survive. Besides, I had bills to pay and shouldered responsibilities. Since I arrived here in 2013, I have been able to play my role as a father by sending money home to my wife and for the upkeep of the children. I am hoping that they will join me soon in Polokwane (**FN5**)*

Despite transiting from military rule to a democratic one, corruption remained endemic in the Nigerian society. Funds meant for improvement of public infrastructure ended up in private pockets of top government functionaries and politicians. The economic conditions were awful, as able-bodied people were unable to fend for themselves, let alone cater for their families. In both formal and informal sectors, people hardly made headways because of high unemployment rate, poverty and a saturated labour market. The Structural Adjustment Programme introduced in the country in 1986 really affected the country. The state had to lay off government sector workers and reduced government spending on important sectors like health, education and housing. This

121

government strategy inspired her citizen to embark on international migration to wealthy and advanced countries in search of better living conditions. The political oppressions carried out by the military junta against its supposed enemies, increased the population of Nigerians who sought refuge abroad. Most Nigerian migrants were technocrats who travelled to countries where they will be receive commensurate remuneration for services rendered. The outcome is in agreement with two of four factors which influences migration choice as stated by Lee (1996). Factors related to sending and receiving countries. The push factor here is unemployment or under-employment in Nigeria while better job prospects is a pull factor to South Africa.

Since then, the country has been plunged into debt, especially external borrowings from the World Bank and other lending agencies. The respondent was of the opinion that his relocation to South Africa would better his lot as he found it difficult to fend for himself and family. However, his relocation to South Africa changed his condition as he was able to cater for himself and remit money back home for the upkeep of his wife and kids, something which he could barely do previously. The response above is an affirmation of Odorige's (2016) study which explained that harsh economic conditions like unemployment and under-employment generates poverty and contributes to international migration. Migrants tend to leave their home countries in pursuit of better living conditions and job opportunities for their families. The importance of social networks also aided him to have first-hand information from his friends in the same field; thus informing his decision to relocate to South Africa.

Many Nigerians migrated to South Africa because of a myriad of challenges which included economic, socio-political and religious extremism or terrorism unlike Zambians who were just faced with economic crisis and political victimisation. Zambia's economy has faced a steady decline from the 1980s to date. Although the country is rich in mineral resources, it has failed to translate into wealth for the general populace due to corruption in the country. This has affected many sectors of the economy and mass exodus of locals to neighbouring SADC states especially South Africa. The standard of education has declined; making many Zambians to come study in South Africa because of the high standards, sophisticated facilities and conducive learning environment.

> *Upon the completion of my priesthood training I went home to Zambia. In Zambia, I realised that the educational system was crumbling and that the school system in South*

Africa was better with modern equipment and better facilities were better. That prompted me to pursue an honours degree. Social reasons also facilitated my migration because I'd grown accustomed to South Africa. Back in Zambia, I left my own nuclear home at 18 and started working from elsewhere and moved to another location in Zambia for 2 years. I lived away from my family for a long time, so I'd grown accustomed to that and I came to South Africa as a young man, so when I came here, most of the things that I knew as a young adult were South African. When I went back home, it was very hard for me to fit in (FN 3)

The above comment shows that South Africa offers a lot of opportunities that is unavailable in Zambia. The participant came back to South Africa after an initial stint in a monastery because of harsh economic conditions and decaying educational structures in Zambia. He had to come back to South Africa because of the better educational standards in the country. The respondent also had a challenge to integrate back into the Zambian society having gotten accustomed to the South African system. Education happens to be a highly important tool of empowerment which greatly influences migration reasons. Loss of confidence in the educational system was a major reason for relocation. South African Universities have gained international reputation, with some of them being amongst the best in rankings across the African continent. This is in tune with Kerr and Kerr's (2011) study that a sizeable number of students from poor economies travel to advanced ones in the quest for better and qualitative education. The unavailability of basic research equipment for science based studies, courses, understaffed universities and a vote of no confidence in the educational system in sending countries trigger relocation to other countries.

This section looked at the reasons for migration based on the push-pull theory. The respondents explained the reasons they left their countries for South Africa. The socio-economic conditions of their respective countries grossly affected them, hence the reasons for their relocation to the country. Interestingly, the respondents were from countries that had been independent from colonial rule, having enjoyed some form of political and economic independence. However, the situation in these countries were not palatable; war, internal strife, fragile economy, issues of drought, climate change, religious extremism, political persecution all contributed to their exodus. The triggers leading to the debate of politics of belonging will be discussed in the next section.

5.3.2 Triggers to the Debate of Politics of Belonging

Respondents who were interviewed on the above question were mainly academics (See Annexure: 1 Question 1). The objective was to understand triggers to the debates on politics of belonging from the perspective of those in the academia in South Africa. Contestations around belonging has resulted in animosity towards African migrants and the resultant forms of xenophobia against migrant communities across the country.

The way and manner in which blacks were treated during the apartheid regime has built a behaviour of hatred towards African foreign nationals. Feelings of bias against African migrants is the order of the day. Many South Africans do hold nationalist ideologies; a depiction of African migrants not belonging to South Africa. Citizens of other African states also find it hard to participate or mingle with South Africans because they are labelled as *makwerekwere and* pariahs as they are excluded from the fabric of society. The approach, language, government rules and activities are pointers that they are foreigners in the country.

> *The memory created by apartheid has seemingly built a culture of resentment towards migrant communities in South Africa. The average South African is a nationalist in thought: having a high sense of belonging to their nation. To foreigners' resident here, the attitude of the people always reminds them that they are foreigners and that in terms of attitude and language, government policies and activities, it makes it difficult for foreigners to integrate effectively into South African society. The South African society is a closed one, an inclusive society that is resentful to foreigners who are being labelled 'makwerekwere' (AC 1)*

A culture of intolerance by indigents is explained by the action of locals towards African migrants. Akinola (2014) avers that xenophobia is not a new phenomenon. It is a protraction of other types of violence and intolerance. The different push and pull factors play a significant role in perpetuating the psychological and physical violence against Africans from other parts of the continent. The isolation thesis obviously derives its roots from the apartheid regime. This school of thought had scholars like Crush (2000), Dodson (2010) and Matsinhe (2011) who submit that the repressive rule exercised by apartheid isolated South Africa from the international community. Matsinhe (2011) notes that under colonial and apartheid rule, South Africa detached itself from the rest of Africa because of advancements made in areas of technology and infrastructure, among

124

other factors. South Africa assumed European state status in Africa. During this period, white immigrants easily accessed South Africa while black African immigration into the country was strictly controlled. This measure limited the communication between South Africans and Africans from elsewhere. However, the end of apartheid signalled South Africa's readmission into the international community which led to an influx of African migrants into the country. This migrant influx has exacerbated animosity and repugnance towards the migrant population, especially those from African states. South Africans now assumes colonial status over migrants from other states on the continent. Morris (1998) observed that the new dawn of democracy was associated with a surge of both legal and illegal migrants from African countries. Morris further adds that since South Africans were alien to hosting strangers, the probability of being friendly towards immigrants was very slim. This trend has given rise to South African exceptionalism in the current dispensation. Dodson (2010) affirms that the closed-door policy sustained by apartheid was deliberate in that it was meant to create segregation on a racial basis. As already noted, the term "makwerekwere" is a derogatory word, frequently used by South African nationals to label people who cannot understand or speak local languages or dialects (Oucho, 2006: 61). Matsinhe (2011) alludes that after apartheid rule, the term *'makwerekwere'* has been used in public circles to describe African migrants and is used to blame them for the socio-economic ills affecting the contemporary South African state.

Belonging is multifaceted in that it manifests in different ways and dimensions. Belonging makes a person have a feeling of acceptance into the society. However, the politics in present-day South Africa can be said to be unbelonging because of divisions, skirmishes racial tensions between locals and migrants and disagreements amongst politicians. This has taken a toll on different segments of the polity.

> *Belonging has different dimensions to it. Belonging means community, tolerance, respect, when an individual feels part of a process, community, society. It can be argued that the politics in contemporary South Africa is not one of belonging because there are so many divisions, conflicts, confrontational relationships, and one could say people are just barely existing, racial issues, issues between foreigners and host communities, politicians are in conflict. Tolerance, respect and community are possibly absent. The politics of belonging*

right now is one of no belonging or unbelonging. So, it's affecting the political, economic and social aspects of the society (AC 3)

From time immemorial the African society had a form communal relations in which people did not discriminate against each other. However, border partitioning, globalisation and crises has triggered migration to South Africa. Tolerance levels seem to have reduced drastically as fellow Africans are seen as the 'other', birthing tensions between locals and migrants in the country. The average non-South African feels rejection as they navigate the integration into the society. Violence against non-South Africans evokes sentiments of belonging as they regard non-citizens as parasites benefitting from the economy. Chabal (2009) argues that the politics of belonging has impacted greatly on the African political terrain since independence. An important feature of politics of belonging is that it naturally brings the question of the politics of non-belonging; this brings to the fore who is a 'native' and who is a 'stranger', who is a 'citizen' and who is a 'foreigner' on the African continent. This question is very key in neo-colonial African socio-political existence because it is at the centre of contention which influences power at both local and national levels of statehood. Chabal contends further that questions of identity in Africa are connected to the politicization of ethnicity which dates back to the colonial period and its eventual impact on socio-economic and political existence in contemporary times on the continent. Gordon (2010) posits that the politics of belonging in South Africa is nationalistic in nature in that African migrants are a threat to the country, thus it has affected the political, economic and social conditions in the contemporary South African society.

Ethnic cleavages in South Africa which was rife through the apartheid system of divide and rule; a trend that has continued in the post-apartheid dispensation. Locals believe that most African migrants are criminals, coming from war-ravaged countries to compete with them for limited economic opportunities available in the country.

When it comes to politics of belonging, South Africa is a fragmented society having elements of ethnic bigotry within the polity. This trend also affects their relationship with foreigners as they cling on to entitlements, which was birthed by apartheid and the painting African migrants in bad light. The masses should not be blamed for animosity, rather, the government since 1994 has failed to promote the spirit of Africanism. Not all foreigners

are being targeted during xenophobia, attacks were only carried out against African foreign nationals who belonged to the same class as indigent black South Africans (AC 4)

South Africa as a country is divided along ethnic and racial lines. Ethnicity thrives in the polity as BaPedi, VaTsonga and VhaVenda are regarded as ethnic minorities. During outbreaks of xenophobia, they were attacked and in some instances are not regarded as South Africans. Seemingly, apartheid had created classes in the society; with South Africa being alienated from Africa and the rest of the world. Pan-Africanism has been trampled underfoot while new forms of nationalism and populism have emerged. Locals have their own share of the blame because of the high levels of intolerance exhibited by them. They listen to negative stereotypes and are quick to take the laws into their hands without allowing the police and other security agencies to perform their roles as stipulated in the constitution. Supposedly, the values of Ubuntu have been eroded, giving into manifestations of Afrophobia in different dimensions; from latent to overt forms in which African migrants and even ethnic minorities have lost their lives during crisis periods.

Tshishonga (2015) avers that the socio-psychological dimension of xenophobia has a historical cleavage in South Africa, and this could be traced back to the apartheid era. Apartheid was based on racial and ethnic discrimination and divisions; and, as such South Africans were not only divided according to their different races but also partitioned along ethnic lines. In South Africa for instance, xenophobia invariably manifests itself through ethnic supremacy, racism and bigotry attitudes (Moosa, 2008). Landau (2005:4) contends that xenophobia may assume forms like "discriminatory attitudes towards non-nationals". Musuva (2014:382) explained that poverty, crime, unemployment and inequality triggered xenophobia. In most cases, xenophobic attacks are largely confined to urban informal settlements across South Africa (Pillay 2008; Maina 2011).

Eliastam (2015) talks about Ubuntu losing its value in postcolonial South Africa. Desmond Tutu's projection of a 'Rainbow Nation' was that in which a transformed and just society will emerge from the shackles of racism and apartheid. Tutu (1999:34–35) describes ubuntu as a situation in which 'a person is a person through other people. It is not "I think therefore I am". It says rather: "I am human because I belong". I participate, I share'. However, the multicultural South African society has failed to live up to the spirit of communalism with widespread violence against migrant communities despite the propagation of the notion of Ubuntu, African migrants are seen as the 'other'. Therefore, they have no place in the contemporary South African society, consequently,

migrants, especially those from African states, are vulnerable and are targets during crises periods. This is not to say that the state as not intervened, but the state only wades in when the situation escalates. It paints the country in bad light and raises security concerns over the lives of both locals and migrants residing in it. Xenophobia is ubiquitous in many townships and informal settlements in South Africa. These attacks are perpetrated against foreign nationals who are at the lowest rung of the society by locals at the same level as they are. More often than not, migrants are accused of selling drugs, being criminals promote prostitution amongst other allegations (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013; Pineteh 2017)

Belonging is highly contested as it has multifaceted meanings to different people or contexts. In South Africa the notion of belonging gave rise to xenophobia primarily because of the years of apartheid rule in which locals were economically disadvantaged. The division into 'Homelands' by the apartheid regime created tension among different ethnic groups, leading to tension in the multicultural South African state as different ethnic affiliations craved for recognition which was expressed through violence in many circumstances. The inequality gap has further led to internal strife among the indigent populace and transferred to the migrant community. Structural violence has become a constant feature in post-apartheid South Africa.

> *Belonging is a much-debated and divisive subject which lacks a lot of clarity partly because it was introduced by colonialism and we are trying to break out of that quagmire. In order to clarify the notion of belonging in South Africa research on boundaries, identity politics and identity formation are being done. However, scholars have argued that South Africa consists of many nations, dislodging Thabo Mbeki's claim that South Africa is a country of at least two nations. As we speak, South Africa is a completely fragmented society with people hanging on to sub-identities, like tribal identities created by colonial rule in the last 200 years. That is why the question of race, ethnicity, citizenship, access and inclusion, is a huge power scourge that faces South Africa could explode anytime. Serious violence, hatred of African migrants, interethnic and communal tensions are common sites in contemporary South Africa. (AC 5)*

South Africa happens to be enmeshed in some identity crisis years after the abolition of apartheid rule. Race, ethnicity, inclusion citizenship, entitlements and access to resources are keen areas of contested belonging in contemporary South African society. Contested belonging is relative,

depending on the situation and the economy of such a state. Beetar (2019) avers that the definition of South Africanness is controversial because after twenty years of democracy, national (un)belonging it has been in an unstable state. An environment of animosity is central in dictating the affairs, which is exhibited as a particular hatred of Africans from other states on the continent. This animosity usually operates in in form of judicial, conversational, social and physical violence, with the country being highly rated in the occurrence of xenophobic violence. In an interview (Citizen 2016), Thabo Mbeki said that South Africa is a country divided into two nations- the "relatively prosperous" whites, and the black and "poor" people living under grossly underdeveloped economic, physical and educational conditions. Kotze (2012) explains the fragmentation nature of citizenship and the notion of race is still prevalent in the socio-political life and experiences of citizenship. The advent of democracy has ushered the question of race which has featured prominently in the national question. The racial divide in South Africa is evidenced by two lasting legacies of the apartheid enclave: the seeming sustenance of apartheid-built socio-political identities and the pervasiveness of socio-economic poverty due to the imposition of apartheid strategy (Kotze 2012). Roche (1992) explains citizenship within the confines of rights and duties connected with belonging to a precis nation-state within the confines of a defined territory. The Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI 2009) contends that racial discrimination and isolation during the apartheid regime served as a strong foundation contemporary South African problems. Racial ideologies of identity and value were created, and black South Africans were not only made to see themselves as being inferior to whites but as different from the rest of the African continent. It also supported separation and categorization of many population groups as a means of administration and opposed integration or association between groups. It further established violence as a channel through which grievances expressed and political propagandas are attained.

The politics of belonging is topical and is interwoven in the socio-political and economic classifications in the South African polity. The state is contending with difficulties in providing for the black populace who are of the notion that life ought to be better for them after the 1994 period. Consequently, migrants are being scapegoated for the economic woes bedevilling the country. Interestingly, many migrants have better skills than the locals: although, the economy has a high unemployment rate which has motivated violence against migrants because of unabating poverty and inequality in society.

Politics of belonging is a very contextual issue that has to do with politics, economy and social categorisation of the society of South Africa. The government is challenged with meeting the aspirations of the citizens who feel that after independence, everything should be Eldorado especially the Black majority population. It seems that African foreign nationals are used as cannon fodder and are blamed for job losses by locals because they are in possession of greater skills than the local population. The South African black population is characterised by unemployment due to marginalization and exclusion under the apartheid regime. This perpetuates poverty and inequality which further reinforces a sense of resentment against other African population (AC 9)

In as much as the state ought to cater for its citizens, the state should not be totally depended upon. Citizens ought to think outside the box to see what they can do for the state, instead of the entitlements derivable from the state. Apartheid has come and gone; it should no longer be blamed for the non-competitiveness of locals in the labour market. The state has also failed to create jobs for the teeming population, hence animosity towards and an upsurge in crime across the country. Bobb (2008) and Rabkin (2015) discusses the inability of the state to fulfil its promise of a better to the indigent population after 1994 as a major trigger of anti-immigrant protests through the perpetration of violence against African migrants and few Asians majorly those of South Asian descent. The influx of migrants implies competing for jobs; making locals to often fault migrants for the economic woes befalling the country. Typically, xenophobia is a result of negative stereotype rather than crime based argument or foreigners steal available jobs (Hamilton and Bax 2018).

The politics of belonging in contemporary South Africa has triggered a serious debate on what citizens and non-citizens are entitled to. Apparently, the influx of migrants with special skills ought to be celebrate because it would resolve some issues in the economy. However, migrants are seemingly demonised, denigrated and are not well treated in some cases-giving a sense of (no) belonging. The carryover of discrimination from the apartheid era has grossly contributed to the violence against migrants in the country. The next section explains the reasons for migrant resentment in the present-day South Africa.

5.3.3 Why are Migrants Being Resented?

In many parts of the globe, migrants have assisted in building cities and economies. However, when migrants seem to progress at the expense of the local populace, some form of resentment will certainly set in. This is the same in South Africa as migrants are being resented for competing with locals for available economic opportunities, mainly at the informal level. These assumes different forms from quiet to violent forms of resentment.

> *It is very complex. I'm very sceptical of an assumption that all hundreds of them are just driven by hate. I think there is a large number of them that are driven by jealousy, competition over businesses, cultural violence that is widespread in South Africa (**AC 5**)*

Mogekwu (2005) and Classen (2016) posit that immigrants in South Africa are resented because they are viewed as potential threats to job opportunities meant for locals. Foreigners seemingly accept lower wages in a country characterised by persistent unemployment, poverty and rising levels of inequality. Locals have repeatedly accused owners of small businesses run in informal settlements by foreign nationals, often referred to spaza shops of snatching clients by lowering prices and using voodoo to attract them. The spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS has also been blamed on foreigner presence in the country. Locals often resent the presence of refugee, asylum-seekers or foreigners residing in various communities across South Africa. This suggests that African migrants are used as scapegoats to cover up for individual and government shortcomings (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Adepoju 2005; Nyamnjoh 2006; Solomon 2008). Gordon (2020) also contributes to the discourse in a bid to understand xenophobic hate crime in South Africa discussed about the growing number of violent incidents of anti-immigrant hate crimes that has been recorded in the country over the past two decades. The outcome was that most South Africans blamed foreigners for conflict in South Africa and that victim blaming led to anti-immigrant hate crime like mass expulsion of foreign nationals. In as much as there is jealousy, some migrants also indulge in unwholesome practices like selling adulterated or expired products. This has serious implications on the health and wellbeing of all those residing in the country.

Poverty is a characteristic feature in many African nations and the third world. Some have argued that the apartheid system of government perpetuated black impoverishment. The apartheid era had a buoyant economy with lesser unemployment rates. However, issues of inequality, poverty and

unemployment still persists after the 1994 period. These issues have continued to stir up anger in the minds of the locals.

> *The fundamental issue is that the government has not addressed the issues of poverty and inequality and unemployment in South Africa (AC 8)*

Poverty, inequality and unemployment have a way of creating tension between host and migrant communities in any state. If not attended to, it has the capability of escalating to serious or vicious levels of violence. When locals do not have a means of livelihood, the tendency of blaming foreign nationals presence is rife and the possibility of attacking the latter is very high.

Just like other African states, colonialism caused divisions among indigenes, with majority of them being denied educational rights; it was intended to keep them in the dark. However, the colonialists ensured that their colonies had some infrastructures such as roads, health facilities and rural development. Their departure did not translate into the sustenance of development as the political gatekeepers used neopatrimonialism to impede the development of the newly independent colonies (Olukoshi 2004; Mamdani 2001). African states were divided by the cold war, owing allegiance to the bloc they represented. States with competing ideologies got entrenched in the local politics of several countries in their bid to engage each other or increase the borders of their influence (Olukoshi 2004).

The political economy of many African countries at independence was mainly socialist (most of them military) but embraced democracy after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The adoption of democracy further plunged manty African economies into debt as they approached the Bretton-Woods Institutions-the IMF, World bank and other donor agencies as they embarked on austere measures (Sklar 1998). The multiplicity of crises on the continent due to political, socio-economic, the burden of diseases, protracted wars has increased migration into South Africa. The collapse of many African economies, drought, Arab Spring, the DRC conflict, new waves of terrorism and the like has further complicated the situation (Ukeje, Boukhars and Toga 2019). Large immigrant influx increased the demand for services by locals who felt their spaces were being occupied by aliens birthed identity politics based on socio-cultural and linguistic differences.

After years of oppressive rule, many black South Africans were economically disempowered with many of them confined to informal settlements across the country (Todes and Turok 2018). Despite attaining political freedom, South Africa still wallows and languishes in the quagmire of economic challenges. The whites still dominate the private sector and major means of production like land. Even with the demise of apartheid, about 87% of the land is owned by the whites (May and Lahiff 2007). Zondi (2008) historicizes the economy of South Africa tracing it from the apartheid to the democratic period as the different political dispensations has increased the country's history of inequality. The apartheid system left a legacy of abject poverty and affluence; this is evident by the congestion and growing levels of poverty in an area like Alexandra closing in on a wealthy suburb of Sandton. Many shanties located next to urban areas are crowded indicators of poverty, social neglect and hostile contestations for scarce resources having black youths as the main actors who are the poorest of the poor. Economic inequality indicates the presence of violent crimes; this makes the crime rate high in countries having differentials in income earnings (Nell 2009). Apparently, South Africa is not the only country with huge economic inequalities in Africa. But, the levels of violent crimes are not the same.

Akande, Musarurwa and Kaye (2018) assert that inequality and poverty are major triggers to xenophobic violence orchestrated against migrants in South Africa. This is further buttressed and more pronounced as the country grapples with economic decline, lack of social infrastructure and a shaky political terrain which contributes to levels of animosity against the migrant population. Bisrat (2014) also note that South Africa has a huge number of cross border and international migrants who travelled into the country to look in order to seek for job opportunities, education and also offer cheap labour. Everatt (2011) explains the invalid opinion that foreigners control the sphere of informal businesses in South Africa is common in both official and unofficial views of ordinary South Africans. This was evidenced by the comments made during a focus group discussion in a research carried out in Johannesburg in 2008: "Every foreigner who is employed has robbed a South African of that job and every foreigner who does not work commits crime." There is no data to substantiate claims that foreigners displace locals in the South African labour market (Grant 2014; Reddy 2012). Rather, it is premised on a fallacy of hasty generalisation which is based on imaginary tales. A huge difference exists between reality and fabrications, and this myth of foreigners taking jobs meant for South Africans has been accepted widely in the public sphere and a huge fraction of society agrees that this opinion is valid (Wilkinson 2015). In a study

conducted by the Observatory Group on the informal economy in Johannesburg, the head of the research team noted: "That the belief that international migrants dominate the informal sector is false. We found that less than two out of 10 people who owned a business in the informal sector in Johannesburg were cross-border migrants" (Wilkinson 2015). This research was done in reference to immigrants from African countries. The Observatory Group also discovered that black South Africa benefitted from immigrants through the payment of taxes, rent, etc. The findings were summarised in this fashion: "The evidence shows that foreigners contribute to South African economy and South Africans by providing jobs, paying rent, paying VAT and providing affordable and convenient goods" (Wilkinson 2015).

Initially, xenophobia was mainly confined to high density suburbs, which happen to be truly characterised by high rates of poverty and unemployment. Recently, there has been a sudden shift of violence from such suburbs to metropolitan areas. This implies that the spread of anti-immigrant protests from informal settlements to city centres calls for beefing up of security in such areas because locals embark on looting sprees during xenophobic violence and they may utilise opportunities like these to further perpetrate criminal activities. This does not come at a cheap cost as the state needs to upgrade and overhaul its security architecture which will ultimately affect annual budget with increased spendings on internal security. As enshrined in the South African constitution, the state is saddled with the responsibility of ensuring the safety of lives and properties of all those resident in the country.

Politics and politicians play important roles in a society because in many instances, politicians command the respect of the people. Utterances made by politicians has the ability to influence the behaviour of locals either positively or negatively. However, it seems that the behaviour of locals towards migrants is somehow negative. Unguarded statements made by high ranking politicians has led to violent behaviour resulting into loss of lives during xenophobic induced crisis periods.

> *The perceived causes of animosity are first and foremost political because many narratives focus on only on the economic aspects that because of exclusion and job opportunities. However, political elites have made comments inciting violence against African migrants (AC 9)*

Politicians certainly influenced the reaction of citizens to the increase in migrant population in South Africa. Findings from research articles, newspaper reports, policy briefs and other secondary

data sources indicated that high class politicians have painted African foreign nationals in bad light; when such comments are traceable to politicians or ministers in cabinet, then locals will not hesitate to act negatively on such inflammatory language. For example, Deputy Police Minister Bongani Mkongi alleged that most of the buildings in Johannesburg has been hijacked by foreigners. Sunday Times (2017) quoted him as saying "How can a city in South Africa be 80% foreign national? That is dangerous. South Africans have surrendered their own city to the foreigners." Mail and Guardian (2019) explains the ANCs implementation of anti-poor and anti-African immigration policy. Government's endorsement of the White Paper on International Migration in March 2017, categorises migrants into two: worthy and unworthy beings. The then Home Affairs Minister Hlengiwe Mkhize stated that foreigners who have money and skills are free to relocate to South Africa in order to reside there on a permanent basis. However, impoverished and unskilled immigrants from other African states, will be barred from entering and residing in the country "even if it is anti-African labelled an anti-African behaviour." Neocosmos (2010) and Murray (2013) contend that the ANC-led administration has been criticised for xenophobic violence pointing to its failure as the ruling political party. The party stalwarts now resort to populism in order to win the hearts of locals by claiming that illegal influx of migrants from other African states has grossly affected the government in delivering quality services to the teeming population in South Africa. In a bid not to lose political power, the ANC has used this propaganda in the course of service delivery protests to divert the attention of South Africans from the inability of the state to deliver its post-1994 promise of a better life for all. Minister of Home Affairs in 1997, Mangosuthu Buthelezi said that the numbers of illegal migrants residing in South Africa was between 2.5 and 5 million. The minister further argued that the presence of aliens in the country has negatively affected the socio-economic resources of the country compelling the government to undertake payment on behalf of illegal migrants living in South Africa (Buthelezi 1997).

Mutanda (2017) aver that the mass migration of many Africans into South Africa reveals the ability of the country's economy to sustain the occupation of those involved in both formal and informal sectors. A major reason why xenophobia is rampant in South Africa is attributable to bad governance which has resulted into in Africa as a whole. Research from Cape to Cairo, indicates that Africa is currently embedded in a Catch-22 situation. The ubiquity of conflicts at intrastate level in countries like South Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo; destabilization of

democracy in Zimbabwe and Egypt; active terrorism in Kenya, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Algeria, Cameroon, Niger; xenophobia in South Africa, Ethiopia and Zambia; sectarian violence in Central African Republic and the human rights abuses connected to these conflicts includes famine, hunger, disease and rape (Mutanda 2017).

Mutanda (2017) argues further that bad governance in Africa has birthed and sustained despots who have used violence to prolong their stay in power with the confidence that they cannot be challenged because of leaders who have the same ideologies. Robert Mugabe, Muammar Gaddafi, Paul Biya, Omar Bongo, Gnassingbe Eyadema, José Eduardo dos Santos, Yoweri Museveni, Hosni Mubarak, Blaise Compaore, Mamadou Tandja, Abdoulaye Wade, Omar al-Bashir, Yahya Jammeh, Paul Kagame and Pierre Nkurunziza, amongst other have all shown Africa's ability to foster dictatorship.

Pineteh (2017) elucidates the framing of African migrants in the post-apartheid dispensation, especially the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic occurrences which promoted the fortification of adverse feelings coupled with the exacerbation of aggression. The media succeeding in reducing negative stereotyping of African migrants through positive news coverage by educating the populace on what the country stands to benefit from the migrant influx. Cultural domination and inciting comments also play a major role in enhancing anti-migrant feelings and violence. Statements uttered by top government functionaries have created more tensions in the anti-immigrant discourse in South Africa. Members of the South African Police Service and officials of the Department of Home Affairs especially those under the migration section have displayed xenophobic feelings and attitudes towards migrants (Maina et al., 2015). Akinola (2018) posit that Jacob Zuma emulated erstwhile president, Thabo Mbeki who dismissed the existence of anti-immigrant violence, denouncing the word xenophobia, calling the attack visible acts of criminality. This can also be linked with Mitchell's (1981) Triadic conflict structure theory which explains the cause and structure of a conflict in a multi-dimensional way. Fundamentally, the framework is premised on three intertwined components: conflict situation, conflict attitudes and conflict behaviour (Mitchell, 1981). According to Mitchell (1981), these three key factors mutually reinforce each other to create a varyingly cohesive 'web' of conflict. The theory proffers that both International and National conflicts occur in any situation where two or more social entities or parties (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals.

Such goal incompatibility may be over resources ownership/control/rights or control of mineral resources (Darfur oil crisis), land conflict (Zimbabwean crisis) and control of political space, poor service delivery (South Africa). Conflict attitudes are those related to one's psychological state (common attitudes, emotions and evaluations, as well as patterns of perception and misperception) which commonly follows from partaking in a situation of conflict. Conflict attitudes and perceptions are presupposed to be factors which occur through the pressures of engaging in a conflict, instead of the reasons that basically orchestrate conflicts, while conflict attitudes which comprises of hostility, misperceptions and dehumanisation of the opposing party will certainly aggravate any dispute.

Kajee (2015) alleged that during the xenophobic violence in 2015, the then president said, "our people should treat those who are in our country legally with respect and Ubuntu". Legally implies that non-South Africans without proper documentation in the country should be treated with disdain. Jamal (2017) explains the position of the mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, during the February 2017 xenophobic attacks. The mayor made statements that could easily incite xenophobia, promising that all criminals in the city would be sent packing. Xenophobia seems to be episodic in nature. It does not have to be violent for it to be tagged xenophobia. Xenophobia could be latent or overt depending on the mode or situation. Jamal (2017) further posit that locals were of the opinion that foreigners are in charge of several criminal rackets like drugs, prostitution and abductions in the country. Mashaba blamed the Department of Home Affairs and the state for the uncontrolled influx of migrants and for turning a blind eye on the triggers of xenophobia. The presence of migrants in a community should not be seen as evil because there are gains from migrant presence. However, the issue of crime in any community should be handled by the police, locals should not take the law into their own hands. Migration dimensions of xenophobia will be the focus of the next section.

5.3.4 Migration Dimensions of Xenophobia

Issues of bad governance, corruption, civil wars, economic recession which abounds on the Africa continent has motivated the movement of people from one internationally defined boundary to another. Migration to South Africa could be understood from an economic perspective in that the country is Africa's most industrialised economy. The country attracts thousands of people

annually. Citizens of sending countries are primarily seeking refuge from war, government harassment, poverty and economic crises. The hosing of the 2010 world cup showed South Africa's economic prowess on the continent. Apart from being blessed with economic prospects, many African states are volatile, hence making South Africa a prime destination for migrants. Zimbabwe accounts for the largest group of migrants, which makes them the highest migrant community in the formal apartheid enclave. Cross border migrants are highly vulnerable owing to their desperation to cross into South Africa. In the process, women compromise by offering their bodies to drivers while the men are swindled or attacked by border bandits

> *The influx of migrants into South Africa has its prospects and challenges. Many migrants (both legal and illegal) have brought in their scarce skills to develop the economy while a few bad eggs are involved in criminal acts. However, not all South Africans are saints (**CL 1**)*

Migrants are primarily agents of displacement from their home countries, in most instances, they are economic refugees fleeing from harsh economic and political turmoil in their home countries. In as much as migration has its own benefits, it also has its shortcomings. Documented migrants have filled available recruitment slots in the South African labour market, by bringing in their expertise in most fields while some of the undocumented ones are involved in legitimate jobs and some fraction are into crime. Skills scarcity or mismatch has further encouraged migration into the country. Crime has no nationality, however, its prevalence differs from country to country.

After the attainment of political freedom in 1994, the number of immigrants in the country increased (Nyamnjoh 2006; Matsinhe 2011). Despite creating legal avenues for migration, the country still grapples with the scourge of illegal migration. Topmost on the government's agenda is the matter of handling illegal immigration. Top personalities, public office holders and the media have commented on the menace of illegal migrants in South Africa (Danso and McDonald 2000; Crush 2001). In a bid to regularise immigration and curb illegal immigration, the government enacted the Aliens Control Amendment Act (ACAA) in 1995 but this was a carryover from the apartheid regime. Progressively, the Green Paper on International Migration (South Africa 1997), White Paper on International Migration (South Africa 1999) and the Immigration Bill implemented by the parliament in 2002 were put in place to achieve a fair and humanistic immigration policy (Campbell 2006). Shava and Maramura (2016) described skills shortage in the

formal sector especially among South African youths as a barrier to youth empowerment in 21ˢᵗ century South Africa. This translates into a major impediment to socio-economic development of the country. Apart from this, it is also having negative effects on the economy giving rise to social ills mainly in the townships and squalor settlements simultaneously leading to rising unemployment levels, separated families and criminal tendencies. Adeogun and Faluyi (2018) discuss the economic contribution of African migrants to the South African economy especially the informal sector. Skills like hair dressing, embroidery, garment making and hairdressing have been transferred to locals under apprenticeship. However, during xenophobic violence, locals capitalise on the situation to loot shops and inflict injuries on African migrants (Everatt 2011; Landau 2011).

Migrants have aided the development of many nations across the globe. Across the globe, the importance of migrant populations cannot be underestimated. This stems from the part of aiding economic growth and development at countries of destination, they also intermarry; this leads to multiculturalism. In other instances, migrant populations have been of immense help to some countries. For example, American Jews have greatly developed the U.S army. Another example were Nigerian migrants who contributed largely to the cocoa industry in Ghana. Burkinabes' also contributed to agricultural growth in Ivory Coast. The Nigerian community and Burkinabe community in both countries were denigrated and expelled at some point.

> *Migrants have made significant and positive contributions in many countries on the globe, for instance migrants played important roles in building America and Great Britain and these migrants have a sense of belonging because its home to them. But here in South Africa, it is difficult a little bit for foreigners to have that deep sense of belonging in South Africa because you don't know what will happen the next time (AC 1).*

Migration has benefitted both migrant communities and receiving countries across the globe. However, migrants feel rejected at countries of destination because they are considered as outsiders despite contributing to the growth of such economies. In order to create boundaries between migrants and locals, the latter use violence on the former. Identity politics strengthen such attitudinal behaviours because migrants are easily identified and profiled or labelled due to visible bio-cultural indicators. The police in some instances have also carried out such acts against African nationals. The attacks cannot be predicted since it can be triggered by anything at any point in

139

time. The violence in 2008, 2015 (Amusan and Mchunu 2017; Beetar 2019) and (Akinola 2018) all serve as pointers to a growing trend of intolerance and manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiments, isolation, frustration-aggression and scapegoating. The tensions have been fuelled by the political class, the traditional authorities and indigents (Pineteh 2017). The "Rainbowness" has dissipated into thin air and the guiding principles of Ubuntu and Batho Pele have been reduced to mere rhetorics as the attacks assume frightening dimensions (Agyeno 2019; Amusan and Mchunu 2017). The fact that South Africa attracts economic migrants from other African states, does not conceal the unfriendly attitudes and behaviour exhibited by locals at migrant presence in their midst. This has degenerated into clamour for the return of migrants to their respective countries. Such acts have been accompanied by risky, abusive and violence. Some words like: "We don't want foreigners here. They must go back to their country"; "Phuma amakwerekwere, phuma:!; Foreigners must go away!" and "Go back to Zimbabwe!" (Hayem 2013). Akinola (2018) analyses the 24 February 2017 anti-immigrant march in Tshwane because it was the first of its kind conducted by the civic movement in South Africa. Concerned locals marched from the suburbs of the city of Tshwane, Atteridgeville and Mamelodi. A peaceful movement which initially entreated migrants to enlist their names with the government or better go home suddenly turned with foreign nationals fortifying themselves with arms and ammunition with the intention of self-defence.

Akinola (2018) further explains that community members in Pretoria West raided and burnt shops and homes predominantly owned Nigerians and Somalis, while shops owned by Indians, Chinese and Pakistanis' were looted and torched. Vorster (2008) posit that, the discourse on the notion of 'foreigners go home', can be categorised as a human rights issue. The contention against xenophobia has beyond a struggle for citizenship and belonging; it has to do with social justice-one in which foreigners are contesting for their dignity and survival-socially economically. Desai (2008) submits that migrancy ought to be a right, as harsh as it may seem to be handled economically and socially. It includes the struggle for survival. When basic services, evictions and modest housing are being commodified, it brews tension, opens up radical prejudices which normally reduces the danger to bare basic life orchestrated by the neo-liberal transition.

This history of migration into South Africa cannot be separated from colonialism as the Dutch made South Africa their first port of call, and afterwards the British. The Indians were brought into South Africa to supplement the shortage of labour in the agricultural sector, especially on

sugarcane plantations. Incidentally, the country was the first to be colonised and the last vestige of colonialism in Africa. The abundance of mineral resources attracted the Europeans and subsequently other Africans and a few Asians to South Africa. However, the migration pattern into South Africa after the1994 period increased tremendously; the migrants were refugees and asylum seekers fleeing from severe unpleasant conditions in their home countries. This influx has caused the indigent populace deprivation, as they competed for scarce economic opportunities with migrants; situation of this nature has given occasion to reactions and responses like Xenophobia, Afrophobia, and other attitudinal behaviours.

> *The arrival of the Dutch in 1652, the British in the 1820s, the Indians in the 1860s, other Africans in the 1880s and 1920s made South Africa a migrant receiving country. But the numbers that has come in the period after 1994 has been much bigger than before. This has generated competition over space, resources, insecurity, and has also pricked those raw homophobic, xenophobic, Afrophobic, lyophobic and Islamophobic elements within the South African society (AC 5)*

Migration aided the South African economy in that it helped to increase output in the agricultural and mining sectors of the economy. The growth of the economy can be tied to the skills brought into the country by migrants. But the inability of the country to provide more jobs for the indigent population after the demise of apartheid coupled with the widening gap of inequality, corruption and neo-patrimonial tendencies by the political gatekeepers have all contributed to the backward state of the economy. As a migrant receiving country, South Africa, has witnessed worse levels of anti-immigrant violence since 1994 in many provinces across the country (Gumede 2015). Harris (2001) and Nyamnjoh (2006) discuss causes and triggers of violence, the list includes poor service delivery, competition for scarce economic resources, spread of diseases, crime, prostitution and the like. South Africa is the most industrialised country in sub-Saharan Africa and thus attracts many foreign nationals annually. These people flee from their countries of origin because of poverty, socio-political and economic challenges, and victimisation by the government in their home countries (Hussein and Hitomi 2013). The majority of these migrants are from Zimbabwe, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia; others come from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most African migrants in South Africa are labelled as illegal migrants creating the 'us' and 'them' narrative (Matsinhe 2011; Akinola 2014; Kajee 2015; Tella 2016).

Research on xenophobia shows that resentment against migrants in any society can be tied to many reasons: the anxiety of losing social status and identity; an intimidation imagined or genuine; to the economic prosperity of citizens; a method of restoring confidence and national pride within the country during crises situations; superiority complex and lack of intercultural information (Danso and McDonald 2000). Xenophobia comes to being when non-nationals crowd the space of locals and pose some form of challenge that is capable of stripping them of their rights and is so closely knitted to the ideology of nationalism. A citizen is bound to the existing political structure in the society which translates to a sense of identity (Akindes 2009). Thus, notions of citizenship can breed xenophobia when the state fails to secure the welfare of its citizens. This happens mostly where poverty and unemployment are rife. Dodson (2010) discovered that violence against African migrants was prompted from allegations, media stereotypes, the society and the political gatekeepers. Everatt (2011) argues that inequality and the influence of social class are the harbingers of violence. According to Croucher (1998) and McDonald and Jacobs (2005), not all South Africans are Afrophobic but instead, xenophobic violence has become a clash between indigent South Africans and poor African migrants. Having looked at the migration dimensions of xenophobia and its effects on insider-outsider relations, with the level of violence against migrants, it could be argued that the state needs to do more in protecting vulnerable people from harm. The next section will discuss the effects of xenophobia in South Africa's image in the international community.

5.3.5 Effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's Image in the International Community

Xenophobia is a global phenomenon, one in which South Africa is not excluded from and because of globalization and migration; it has become a dominant feature in the discourse of local and international politics in the 21 st century. As enshrined in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Xenophobia is an abuse of fundamental human rights. The frequency of xenophobia attacks in South Africa has become worrisome within Africa and on the globe. The news and pictures on various media platforms depicting the intensity of the violence caught the attention of many people and the world beamed its focus on South Africa. The resultant effect displacements, deaths, and gory scenes were very disturbing; this made the A.U, U.N, international

civil society and other none-state actors condemn the violence and called on the South African state to restore law and order in the country.

> *This affects South Africa's foreign policy in several ways as it repels migrants from coming to South Africa. The friendly relationship that South Africa has with other states in terms of business and other areas are fizzling out because people are afraid and think twice before they come. For example, South African businesses in countries like Nigeria are being threatened because of the way Nigerians are being treated (**AC 1**).*

As much as xenophobia in South Africa became publicised, migrants have not totally botched their travel plans to South Africa. Many Africans still travel to South Africa, hoping to make a living. For the first time in many years, nationals of other Africans protested at various South African embassies, registering their displeasure at the way other Africans were being treated and attacked in the country. Reprisal attacks on South African businesses and investments in Zambia, Zimbabwe, D.R.C, Nigeria and some other countries were carried out by the angry citizens of respective countries.

Chibuzor (2017) comments on Nigeria-South Africa bilateral relations tracing it from the apartheid era to the contemporary times. Onuoha (2008) posit that about 55 South African companies were fully operating in Nigeria as in mid-April 2003. Nagar and Paterson (2012) posit that Dangote Group of companies and Oando Oil Company operated cement and crude oil businesses in South Africa respectively. At the African Union level, presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo implemented the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), with the aim of bringing economic relief to Africa as a whole (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003). Akuki (2012) notes that the xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa drew the ire of Nigerian youths under the egis of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS). The irate youths targeted the offices of MTN in Abuja. The parliament in a reciprocatory mood also proposed that MTN, DSTV and Shoprite be barred from operating in the Nigerian economy. The hostilities towards Nigerians and other African migrants residing in the country negate Mbeki's African renaissance. Ndujihe et al (2017) observed that between 2014 and 2016, about 137 Nigerian citizens have lost their lives in South Africa.

The media has exposed happenings of xenophobia, through various means to attract a global audience. Xenophobia seems to be happening at different levels in the South African society.

Locals have hardly been educated on the gains of migrant influx into the country because many of them see migrants as threats and parasites who have come to exert huge financial burdens on the state. The regular orchestration of xenophobia has given the international community sleepless nights as they have been brainstorming on how the violence can be mitigated.

> *The violence is sensational enough for media coverage because xenophobia is a daily activity which has been institutionalised in government hospitals, Department of Home Affairs, etc. There's no empathy and understanding what causes people to come into our country and we have failed to show solidarity to African migrants in this country. The international community is shocked and horrified because South Africa is meant to be the beacon of hope for respect for human rights of all people (CS 1)*

Xenophobia seems to be a norm in South Africa. Many government officials and departments engage in these acts of xenophobia with a plethora of African migrants experiencing rejections at Home Affairs offices, hospitals, universities and even in public places. Reasons why migrants travel to South Africa abound, but many South Africans are not aware of these reasons. The international community is not happy because South Africa and South Africans ought to have a culture of tolerance towards other Africans in the spirit of Ubuntu as put forward by the fathers of the nation. The human rights of migrants have been abused severally on many occasions and the state has not done enough to bring culprits to justice

In recent times, lethal forms of xenophobic attitudes have increased in post-apartheid South Africa, especially in state owned healthcare institutions. Many health professionals are of the opinion that undocumented migrants in South Africa should be deprived of HIV/AIDS treatment, especially those patients seeking for treatment through the administration of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) (Crush and Tawodzera 2014). Those health professionals are of a general view that undocumented migrants should be repatriated instantly – especially HIV-positive migrants (Crush and Tawodzera 2014). This general consensus places the wellbeing and health of African migrants in jeopardy. Likewise, other state employees (including police officers, Home Affairs Staff, refugee determination officers and customs agents) have adopted a harsh attitude in their dealings with non-South Africans (Crush and Tawodzera 2014). Cohen (1994), as cited in Crush and Tawodzera (2014), agrees that many government officials hold the view that foreigners should not be in South Africa in the first place. At the same time, citizens of South Africa have divergent

views when it comes to welcoming of foreign nationals. In some instances, numerous government employees have collected bribes or anticipated corrupt tendencies from non-nationals of South Africa. Put another way, many public officers have made a fortune by exploiting vulnerable migrants and refugees.

The way and manner in which immigrants especially the undocumented ones are being treated by public officials like those of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is frequently discouraging and contains bias (Pugh 2014). Immigrants are often abused by government employees in the course of applying for the documentation needed to make life better. Umezurike (2012) discovered that African migrants are being mistreated by DHA officials due to the Makwerekwere tag which has been in use in the country since 1994. Although the South African state is not anti-immigrant, some of state representatives assigned to carry out its functions fail to perform their duties with the highest level of professionalism.

Xenophobia was largely reported in both print and electronic media as tensions mounted between locals and foreign nationals mostly African migrants and few Asians. The media has deviated from basic principles of fair accurate and objective reporting by circulating political propaganda having the capacity to ignite mass demonstration and hostility (Hadland 2010; Mkandawire 2015). Many African migrants have been stereotyped and tagged as illegal migrants by the media. Metaphors of illegality, criminality or alien are tied to African migrants over the years in print and mass media. These allegories or images have been employed in building a similar identity for Africans residing in South Africa (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013; Danso and Mc Donald 2001). Although, xenophobia is rife in South Africa, some migrants who have engaged in criminal activities for survival have either been caught by locals or arrested by the police. Drug cartels, prostitution, possession of fake travelling documents and currencies are some of the vices in which migrants have indulged themselves in. On few occasions, some of these crimes have also been aided and abetted by South Africans. Some of these migrants have been assisted by government security agencies to escape prosecution. Corruption and compromise on the part of the police and immigration officials especially at the border posts have also aided immigrants to access South Africa through illegal means.

The image of a country matters a lot because it goes a long way determine her prosperity. Since 2008, South Africa has been enmeshed in xenophobic violence and it seems to be constant feature

in the country. The effect of xenophobia hindered the A.U commission chairperson who incidentally was South African from seeking for a second term in office because it might make her chances of returning very slim.

South Africa's image has been seriously tarnished. As a matter of fact, the chairperson of the AU commission Dr Nkosazana-Dlamini- Zuma herself being a South African did not bother to seek re-election for a second term in office because of xenophobia. This violence should be resolved, if not, it would cost the country a lot (CS 2)

The image of South Africa was battered as a result of xenophobic attacks against African foreign nationals resident in the country. The normalising of xenophobia in the country will affect the country's rating negatively as potential investors may likely shy away due to the volatile anti-immigrant posture adopted by locals, government security agencies, officials and politicians. Intending travellers also need to do a rethink before they embark on journeys to South Africa, the economy of South Africa will feel the impact of low tourism levels in the country due to xenophobic orchestrated violence. As a regional organization, the African Union (AU) seeks to promote the unity of the African continent. The United Nations (UN) on the other hand attempts to foster global peace amongst all nations of the world. The AU and the UN both decried the spate of xenophobic violence in South Africa. Brand South Africa (2015) expresses the views of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma the then AU Commission chairperson who happens to be a South African. Dlamini-Zuma revealed deep worries about the violence, calling it "unacceptable" and that it must come to an end. According to Dlamini-Zuma, irrespective of what the country was going through, attacking foreigners or locals were not justifiable. The AU Commission chairperson appreciated the efforts of the state at restoring law and order and noted that the ugly incidents happened when the Africa day celebrations were just about to take place noting that the Organisation of African Unity played an important role in the crusade against apartheid. Dlamini-Zuma admitted that the issues of poverty and unemployment was a continental problem and not a South African problem alone as other African countries are going through the same predicament. The chairperson pleaded with communities to embrace dialogue and tackle the issues by finding peaceful solutions to the problems (Brand South Africa 2015). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) expressed great dissatisfaction and strongly condemned the attacks. The

Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe all criticised the handling of the crisis situation by the South African state while Nigeria recalled her ambassador (Essa and Patel, 2015).

The international image and local image of South Africa are important as both will go a long way to determine the extent of progress of the country. Locals who belong to minority ethnic groups like Pedis', Vendas' and Tsongas' are prone to attacks in the hands of other ethnic majorities. If such ethnic minorities don't feel safe at home in South Africa, it could lead to the grooming of ethnic militia for self-defence purposes. Polarisation along ethnic lines have been responsible for civil wars in manty countries across the globe.

> *It does not impact on South Africa's image internationally alone, but also locally because it creates animosity among ethnic groups as well because there have been occasions where locals who were perceived to be foreigners were attacked. On the international scene, the impact was felt because you end up having a situation where people are scared of travelling to a country for business or tourist reasons because South Africa relies heavily on tourism (AC 4)*

Ethnic minority groups suffer rejection and affliction in the hands of locals who belong to major ethnic groups in South Africa. A proportion of the latter believe that the former are not full-blooded South Africans hence they are attacked in order to normalise ethnic politics in the country. The socio-linguistic politics has crept into the society with these ethnic minorities being discriminated against whenever the opportunity arises. Landau (2011) notes that of the 62 people who were murdered in the May 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa, one third of that figure were locals who were in marital relationships with African migrants, declined to partake in the barbaric acts, or were unfortunate to be members of ethnic minority groups and are not regarded as full-fledged South Africans worthy enough to press for their entitlements in the public arena. News 24 (2015) reported that the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Business (PCB) expressed concerns on the negative effects of xenophobia on business and tourism in the area as foreign-owned businesses closed down due to fears of looting by rampaging locals. The CEO of the PCB was quoted as saying: "Any attack on a foreigner as a result of his ethnicity is unconscionable and utterly deplorable. These actions erode civic pride and confidence in our country, and I have no doubt that the economic impact of this criminal behaviour will be felt by all of us in some way. The tit-for-

tat consequences are likely to be felt by local businesses with interests in Africa, which will negatively impact the economy". The attacks also affect South Africans who travel to other African countries as they will have to think deeply before embarking on such journeys (News 24 2015). The ill treatment of locals by locals could be likened to black-on-black violence which does not speak well for South Africa's constitutional democracy. Ugly incidents like these caused a civil war in Rwanda; ethno-politics has a way of dividing the society and could spell doom in future if not properly addressed from the root. South Africa's multicultural society faces a threat if this trend continues. Arguably, South Africa's image had been tampered with due to the skirmishes as other African nations had to re-evaluate their relationship and levels of cooperation. President Cyril Ramaphosa had to employ shuttle diplomacy to mend the relationship between South Africa and affected African countries. The rate of response and effectiveness of police intervention during crises periods is discussed below.

5.3.6 Rate of Response and Effectiveness of the Police During Crises Periods

The police in many countries across are primarily saddled with the responsibility of protecting the lives and properties of citizens and non-citizens' resident in it. The police are also expected to restore normalcy in crises situations. As enshrined in the South African constitution, the police must protect all and sundry residing in it.

"In Pietermaritzburg, I can attest that the police have been able to restore peace, also in Durban where there was an outbreak of xenophobic violence in 2013 and 2014 the police maintained law and order. But you also have instances when the police support locals to unleash terror against foreigners and looting of foreign owned shops and businesses" **(AC 4)**

The police in South Africa has protected migrants from being attacked during incidences of xenophobia. However, in other cases they have not lived up to expectation as locals embark on looting sprees or necklacing of helpless and defenceless migrants. Some migrants too have been victims of jungle justice because they were nabbed in the course of perpetrating one crime or the other. The police ought to be more proactive because their inability to quell violence speaks a lot about their commitment to their profession. It can be argued that some segments of society have lost confidence in the police, since they fail to discharge their duties effectively.

Bauer (2013) while referring to a statement made by a police representative said South Africans are not xenophobic and most of the reported cases are basically that of crime. Afrophobia is fortified by criminality. When children are on a looting spree and people are robbed of their goods implies that people hide under the cover of xenophobia to perpetrate crime. Crush et al (2017) in a study conducted on Zimbabwean-owned informal businesses in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Polokwane, asserted that the police have underperformed in the area of securing the lives and property of Zimbabweans involved in informal businesses in the three provinces. The police were also accused of slow response during instances of multiple xenophobic attacks. It was observed that in many instances, the police did not arrive on time, they only surface when people have died or dispossessed of their goods. In some instances, the police might also exploit migrant communities that are vulnerable especially in xenophobic hotspots by confiscating the goods of African migrants who trade in public places and refuse to pay bribes.

Violent situations are relative from country to country. However, the police are expected to be impartial in the discharge of their duties. The level of professionalism of the South African Police Service tells a lot about their ability to handle crises situation because the country happens to be the last outpost of colonialism in Africa. It is expected that the professionalism in the apartheid era be transferred to the current dispensation, but there seems to be some challenges in handling issues of outbreaks of xenophobia in the country. On some occasions, in order to beat security and surveillance, locals carry out attacks in the night; making it difficult for the police to operate properly.

> *In episodes of violence, there seems to be lack of intelligence around potential eruption of these episodes of violence since sometimes, there is no intelligence that it is going to happen. It just starts immediately whereas in some instances, investigations can show that it has been 3 months since this thing has been coming. SAPS has been able to disperse crowds as it is supposed to do, but the occurrence of events in the middle of the night, when they are understaffed etc, obviously it comes as a challenge (AC 7)*

The police in South Africa is facing a lot of challenges which happens to be mainly operational. The issue of surveillance especially in the area of xenophobic violence and bringing such situations under control has tested the strength of the police. Consistency in tackling violence has been a major headache for the police because casualties are recorded during violent attacks on migrant

communities. CORMSA (2011) contends that the South Africa police is handicapped when it comes to surveillance and security reports on early warning signs of xenophobia. This has reduced police effectiveness in quelling violence in the country. The police are in a hurry to call attacks on foreign nationals mere crime and not xenophobia. Mosselson (2010) and Misago (2016) argue that the police provide a form a cover for African migrants during xenophobic attacks. A lack of capacity has hampered police effectiveness and the fear of being attacked by youths in violent communities could also be a reason why the police are not swift in responding to distress calls in the event of xenophobic violence. A safe haven in most cases could be the police station like the case of Alexandra. However, migrants risk losing their belongings and businesses as the police only adopt evacuation approach in their response during crisis periods. They are taken to places of safety while in other instances police watch as locals ransack properties belonging to migrants. The state has also tried to mitigate fatalities during xenophobic orchestrated attacks, as they sometimes invite the SANDF to restore normalcy when tensions are very high.

The occurrence of xenophobic violence is rampant in many informal settlements where indigent locals and impoverished African migrants reside. The conditions of such places are appalling hence the contest for survival between both of them. Underdevelopment of informal settlements hinder the effectiveness of the police. A terrain unfamiliar to the police may be too risky for the police to maintain law and order.

> *To a certain extent, yes. However, in some other instances no because of the fact that these things are happening in informal settlements. Sometimes, these outbreaks occur at night and it becomes very tough for the police to walk into informal settlements where there are no streets to handle the situation. But where there are streets, the police have managed to really stifle the xenophobic attacks like in Alexandra (AC 10)*

The 'we' and 'them' discourse has gone beyond surface levels as locals resort to violence and African migrants also keep some weapons of defence with them for protection purposes. Police operations at night may not be feasible, but there are civic organisations like SANCO which are saddled with maintaining peace in communities across South Africa. It can be argued that SANCO ought to maintain social cohesion has abandoned its mandate to chase after other things which are inimical to the positive growth of relationship between South Africa and other African states. Ngcamu and Mantzaris (2019) in a study on xenophobic violence and criminality conducted in

Townships situated in Kwazulu-Natal observed that poor road networks and a dearth of much needed infrastructure has rendered the police inactive to quell xenophobic uprisings in xenophobic-prone communities. About the 2008 attacks which started in Alexandra, Steinberg (2012) states that a community policing forum had been established there so that inhabitants could relate with the police on the happenings in their respective locations. Steinberg also notes that Alexandra as one of the biggest informal settlements in the country is home to many foreign migrants especially Zimbabweans and is prone to crime and other types of vices. Zimbabweans were accused of criminality and were subsequently attacked by locals. Shacks owned by foreigners as well as Venda and Tsonga speaking South Africans were torched by the angry mob of locals. One of the major problems was that attacks were executed at night, hence making it difficult for the police to immediately intervene. The focus of the next section will be civil society perspectives.

5.3.7 Civil Society Perspectives

Popular opinion holds that civil society is generally believed to operate outside the confines of the family, market and state (WEF, 2013). The composition of civil society has metamorphosed over time since the term first became prevalent in the 1980s and it now implies a wide range of organised and organic groups comprising nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, social movements, grassroots organisations, online networks and communities, and faith groups (VanDyck, 2017; WEF, 2013). Civil society organisations (CSOs), groups and networks differ by size, organisation and policy stretching from international non-governmental organisations (e.g. Oxfam) and mass social movements (e.g. the Arab Spring) to minor, local organisations (e.g. Coalition of Jakarta Residents Opposing Water Privatisation). This research engaged non-governmental organisations like Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), Amnesty International (AI), Africa Diaspora Forum (ADF); Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) such as the Methodist Church of Southern Africa; and Epistemic Community such as academics. An amalgamation of these was to unpack the role played by civil society in advocating for social justice, dowsing tensions and creating a peaceful atmosphere intended to boost South Africa's image both locally and internationally. Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) both local and international, UN agencies and spirited individuals voluntarily gave out food,

clothing and other relief materials to the affected people during the eruption of xenophobic violence.

Civil society plays the role of activism in order to call the government or any erring party to order. The notions of belonging which has birthed animosity against migrants, manifested in form of xenophobia cannot be resolved by the government alone. It needs the assistance of other stakeholders like civil society to address the issue. Even, on the international scene, civil society has challenged despots, climate change, human rights abuse through various means. The UN also has its own section that deals with issues of human rights. All are done to make the world a better place to live in.

> *The main responsibility of civil society is advocacy and they have done a good job in advocating for certain policies in government (AC 10)*

The role played by civil society to arrest the violent situation associated with xenophobia in South Africa is highly commendable. Civil society has compelled the government to be more accountable to the migrants, civil society itself and the international community. Civil society has tried to mitigate the human rights abuses associated with anti-immigrant violence. Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG 2008) assert that civil society worked in concert with government in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic violence. The then Minister of Home Affairs Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula addressed the Committee on Home Affairs in parliament. On 14 May 2008, a Ministerial Task Team was established to unravel the immediate and remote causes of attacks in Gauteng, the minister informed the committee that 18 000 people had sought for refuge and were being protected at police stations. Also, a number of church groups and civil society organisations had willingly given assistance to the displaced people. Temporary shelters were erected although it negated integration principles enshrined in the South African constitution.

The civil society fills in the void created by the insensitivity or nonchalant attitude of government towards the plight of locals and African foreign nationals who reside in same squalor settlements. Dearth of basic facilities like toilets, potable water and good road network; increase in criminal activities, gangsterism, competition between owners of small businesses. Clashes between locals and migrants has necessitated the intervention civil society to maintain law and order in society.

The civil society has played a very positive role in mitigating the failure of the state at this period by providing shelter, counselling and organizing anti-xenophobic marches and going on media to say no, not in our name (AC 9)

The government too has shown some form of commitment through the establishment of the South African Human Rights Commission to attend to issues of human rights abuses. However, the government has been slack in attending to xenophobic attacks. Polzer et al. (2009) contend that the civil society filled the void created by the unresponsiveness of the state during the 2008 violence. Jara and Peberdy (2010) posit that in spite of being caught unawares, the civil society sector rose up to the challenge by attending to the violence. Cities like Durban and Cape Town that had not been affected by the violence felt the impact of civil society through the convening of town hall meetings to forestall impending violence there. Eventually, when Durban and Cape Town were engulfed in the crisis, civil society organisations intervened through the provision of food, shelter and other relief items. Volunteers were assembled and the state was coerced to assist. Jara and Peberdy (2010) contend that the vacuum created by indifference and unresponsiveness of the state when the xenophobic attacks were fresh was filled in by civil society.

Everatt (2010) suggest that various civil society organisations that came to the aid of vulnerable migrants had not been involved in such collaborative efforts before. The action of civil society was swift, varied and simultaneous. An umbrella of organisations like NGOs, social movements, community-based organisations (CBOs), civics, schools, women's groups, peace and justice organisations, academics, students, Christian, Jewish and Muslim faith-based organisations (FBOs), refugee and migrant organisations, school governing bodies, community policing forums, professional associations and trade unions all formed an amalgamation of a vibrant and formidable civil society. The convergence of these multiple groups was organised under different forums for different reasons, from humanitarian aid to political activism. These organisations also coerced political parties and constitutional authorities to wade into the situation (Everatt 2010). The impact of civil society was felt in the country as they played important roles to reduce the negative effect of xenophobia both regionally and on the international scene. Civil society has also contributed to the social justice system by advocating and making all stakeholders accountable to the people.

Civil society gets active most times when violence breaks out. The advocacy is huge and publicity becomes massive. A lot has been done in a short while to sensitise locals about the dangers of

attacking fellow blacks or few Asians in the country. Many town hall meetings have been held to foster peace between locals and migrants; often facilitated by the civil society fraternity.

> *They tend to organise relief, mediation, dialogues but the challenge is that it is intense during the time of intense violence and subsides and everybody forgets after a time. Only for the thing to explode again. Part of the problem is that our civil society community is very small. It has been decimated and declining since 1994 (AC 5)*

During the apartheid regime, civil society was large, confronting the colonial government on the local and international scenes. Their efforts paid off and apartheid was gone. However, the size of civil society community does not matter in this age of globalisation. The internet is enough to disseminate news which will spread across the globe in few minutes. The CSO sector basically functions to promote, strengthen and protect democracy (Malan, 2007; Patel 2012; Van Zyl, 2014), and that the sector plays a very crucial role in the delivery (or enforcing the delivery of) goods, social welfare services, and basic services (Patel 2012).

Weideman (2015) avers that prior to1994, the civil society in South Africa were active, effective and united in the war against apartheid rule. The 1994 democratic elections caused some ripples in the domain of the civil society as it tried to redefine its relationships (primarily with the government), roles, tasks, policies, and identity, within the confines of the newly formed democratic structure and associated civil liberties. Apart from the above, two other key factors, has caused a shrinking and consequent weakening of this sector. The huge decline in donor funding to the civil society sector became obvious because of the middle-income status of the country compelled civil society to obtain funds sent by donor agencies through the democratically elected government. Many civil society organisations had to were forced to reduce its workforce or shut down totally. Secondly, many skilled staff moved to government sector (particularly those in leadership positions) thus compelling the former CSOs were forced to reduce its scale of operations as a result of skills, leadership and general human resource shortfalls. Civil societies further shrunk in the late 1990s. Weideman (2015) further explains that the South African civil society is more complex than what is being revealed in literature, not in decline, has been affected adversely by changes in human resource capacity recruitment, is not really affected by the funding environment, can gain a lot from growing prerequisites for monitoring and evaluation, has assumed

different and serious dimensions after the year 2000 period, the ideologies have not changed and they still maintain a cordial relationship with the state.

Weideman (2015) avers that the CSO sector; (1) is more complex and diverse than much of the literature suggests, (2) is not in decline, (3) has probably been affected negatively by changes in human resource capacity distribution, (4) is less affected by changes in the funding environment than is claimed, (5) can benefit from increasing requirements for monitoring and evaluation, (6) has become more diverse and critical in the post 2000 period, but, in response to localised not ideological motivations, and (7) is, in general, in a positive relationship with the state. This also proves that the widely held belief that funding to South African civil society has substantially decreased is factually incorrect. The next section examines the role of inflammatory language.

5.3.8 The Role of Inflammatory Language

Having examined the role of civil society, especially those of the Epistemic Community who were mainly academics, this section investigates the role of inflammatory language. Utterances made by traditional authorities who are key pillars of local governance in South Africa has affected the country as locals acted on such comments to embark of attacks against migrants. Akin (2003) inflammatory language is one of the most common causes of conflict escalation. It has the tendency to stir up violence through the use of words that can cause violence in any situation. For instance, in America, people may get furious when addressed as "Oriental" instead of "Asian." The use of the term "Oriental" recalls old bigotries and insults. Newswire24 (2015) recalls the comments made by Jacob Zuma during the SADC summit in Harare, where he lamented that fellow African states should build their economies and prevent their citizens from travelling to South Africa.

Generally, traditional authority commands a lot of respect in Africa. Functionally, they operate at grassroots level evidenced by their interaction with locals. They have the ability to influence the attitude and behaviour of their subjects politically and economically. Communities in South Africa play hosts to migrants from Africa and Asia, as expected, traditional authority can build the much needed social cohesion in the rainbow nation.

Traditional authorities reinforce xenophobia or Afrophobia because when the Zulu king was saying that foreigners are like cockroaches you must remove them, and it led to what happened. Not all the traditional authorities were involved in this (AC 9)

The statement made by the Zulu monarch did incite violence, but the government at the local level did not try to manage the situation effectively, hence the escalation of violence in the area. This was a disappointment to many Africans because black-on-black violence has increased in the post-1994 period. Likening a human to a cockroach is demeaning and migrants had different reasons for travelling to South Africa. Some were economic, political, academic and other reasons. Seeing them as no humans is cruel. Kajee (2015) posit that the 2015 xenophobic violence in which five people were killed, hundreds injured, and several persons displaced was caused by pronouncements made by the Zulu monarch King Goodwill Zwelithini who likened African migrants residing in South Africa to "amazeze" (lice or fleas) ignited the flame of violence that led to a new wave of xenophobia against African migrants in Durban.

The Zulu king was of the opinion that South Africans were superior and that other Africans were criminals who were enjoying free state services in post-apartheid South Africa. The king complained bitterly about competition between locals and migrants and that politicians are only after votes because they are quiet about migrant presence.

[W]e talk of people [South Africans] who do not want to listen, who do not want to work, who are thieves, child rapists and house breakers…. When foreigners look at them, they will say let us take advantage of the nation of idiots. As I speak you find their unpleasant goods hanging all over our shops, they litter our streets with dirt. It is hard for us to distinguish between shops because of ubiquitous foreigner presence. I know it is hard for other politicians to challenge this because they are after their votes. Please pardon me but this is my responsibility, I must talk, I can't be mute for five years to say this. As king of the Zulu nation … I will not keep silent when our country is led by people who are clueless. It is time to say something. I beckon on our government to help us find home-grown solutions to our own problems. We call on foreign nationals to pack their belongings and go back to their countries of origin (Times Live 2015).

To blame migrant presence for economic woes in South Africa is fallacious. The country is also going through hardship as unemployment rate is close to 30%. Not every migrant is a criminal, the

country was experiencing crime, rape, drug trafficking and other social vices before migrant influx. Corruption has badly affected the state, thus hindering her from performing statutory functions to the citizens. Asakitikpi and Gadzikwa (2015: 227) note that the speech by the Zulu king led to xenophobic violence in Durban as 5 people were killed, and thousands displaced in a barrage of sporadic attacks which stretched for a two-week period. Anti-immigrant biases and labelling emanate from socio-economic, political and cultural delusion and divisions have been discovered to be triggers for aggression of this kind. Some studies have attested to the presence of stereotypes and anti-immigrant biases in the midst of the local populace because of their interactions with migrant communities (Crush and Pendleton 2004; Laher 2009; Tshishonga 2015). Crush and Ramachandran (2015) and Neocosmos (2010) posit that the prevalent nature of poverty and inequality has sustained anti-migrant feelings in post-apartheid South Africa. This becomes very obvious with the current economic challenges, poor service delivery, frequent showdowns in parliament and a tensed political atmosphere. In an attempt to exercise control and ownership of available scarce resources, locals form groups so as to get rid of competitors. Everatt (2011), Eliseev and Mkhize (2015) and Beetar (2019) all trace South African necropolitics to the prevailing conditions which reinforces the scramble for jobs and competition for housing in many informal settlements.

The speech made by the Zulu king caused a lot of pandemonium around Durban and its environs. The masses are yet to be enlightened about the gains of migrant influx. As long as a traditional leader is anti-immigrant, the followers will also be the same.

> *A statement made by a traditional ruler here in KwazuluNatal was said to have sparked xenophobic attacks and also looking at the area where I come from. Nothing has been done by the traditional leader of that area to educate masses about the positives that occurs when you have foreign nationals in your midst (AC 4)*

The anti-immigrant violence orchestrated by traditional authority ought to be criticised by the government. Truly, some African migrants engage in criminal activities but other African migrants are involved in legal businesses and have built up critical sectors of the South African economy. Cele (2015) notes that South Africa experienced a 'second' wave of xenophobic attacks on 23 April 2015, primarily targeting African foreign nationals and some Asians. The violence initially started in KwaZulu-Natal and afterwards made its way to Johannesburg because Johannesburg is

a melting pot of many nationalities hosting Africans from all over (Longari, 2015). Nkama (2015) contends that the 2015 xenophobic violence was similar to that of 2008 and advised the authorities of the country to formulate interventions to stem the tide of xenophobia in the long term so as to save the high rate of fatality during crisis periods. Navi Pillay (a South African national), who was formerly a United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, whilst reacting to the 2008 violence, criticised the South African government for the attacks launched on foreign migrants in South Africa describing them as 'gravely alarming'. Pillay counselled the South African state to formulate legislations that would minimise the chances of xenophobic violence recurring in the future (Zhou, 2010).

However, the slow response of the state to previous xenophobic violence made it happen again in 2015. In many cases xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2008 was characterised by murder, grievous bodily harm, banditry, robbery and extortion (Plus 94 Research, 2008). Migrant entrepreneurs have affected the South African economy positively in many ways. Some of the positives include: provision of employment opportunities (Fairliet, 2012), payment of rents (Dachs, 2015), the provision of goods and services to communities especially in many rural areas across the country (Tharpe, 2015), provision of support for formal sector businesses (wholesalers and retailers), (Southern African Migration Programme, 2017) and also promoting economic and cultural growth (Sahin, Baycan & Nijkkamp 2012). Maharaj (2002) dismisses the notion that immigrants are parasites. The author stated that they are actually net contributors to the economy. Many immigrants pay taxes and through their established business enterprises positively impact the local economy. Wilkinson (2015) also concur that foreign nationals have made positive impact on the South African economy through the payment of VAT, provision of employment opportunities, rental payment and the availability of goods.

Xenophobia often happens in informal settlements but cases of xenophobia are also being reported in rural areas. It seems that the congestion in the metropolis has made migrants opt for rural areas. This implies that xenophobia has shifted base from urban to the rural areas.

> *A lot happens by the way in urban areas, but the traditional or indigenous leadership systems would not be invoked. They command a lot of loyalty from old people especially in the rural areas. So, they can diffuse tension in the rural areas and help to build social*

158

cohesion at the local level. King Zwelithini's comment was bad although he corrected himself. Traditional leaders should solve problems and not incite violence. They command too much respect and their word is held in high esteem (AC 5)

Traditional leadership should use their influence to promote the ideals of Pan-Africanism and Ubuntu. If the urban areas lack traditional leadership, the rural areas should see this as a benefit, which can boost South Africa's image regionally and globally. The traditional leadership should also engage the government on how they can bring economic development to the rural areas. As shown in literature, xenophobia in South Africa is largely confined to urban informal settlements that are sited to rich neighbourhoods for example, Alexandra is sited next to Sandton (Pillay 2008; Maina 2011; Solomon and Kosaka 2013). However, the few xenophobic violence that has occurred in rural areas have led to deaths, loss of properties and displacements. The civil society and government has tried to address the situation by calling the locals to order and educating the populace through the media about the positive presence of immigrants in the country. After examining the role of inflammatory language by traditional authority, the perspective on government responses will be our next focus.

5.3.9 Perspective on Government Responses

The way government has handled the issue of xenophobia is a focal point of this research. The country is bound by a constitution which has to be obeyed by all and sundry. Foreign nationals have become victims in the hands of government officials. The Operation Fiela constituted by the state has seems to have derailed from its original purpose. Foreign nationals are being witch hunted instead of ridding the society of crime and criminals.

It's an ambivalent one. The government obviously has to uphold the constitution, so that it merges all sorts of politically correct ideals. The way most foreign nationals are being treated by officials at the Department of Home Affairs belies the progressive ideals of the constitution completely. Operation Fiela instituted by the government has lost its essence, hence operatives of this unit go after foreign nationals in a reckless and dehumanising manner (CL 1)

The abuse of the constitution by government officials is a violation of democratic principles as the country operates a constitutional democracy. Foreign nationals have lost their lives to government security agency personnel such as the police, who are meant to protect peoples' lives irrespective of nationality as provided for in the South African constitution. Home affairs department officers also treat foreign nationals with contempt; making them feel like they are not wanted here. The porous borders have also contributed to illegal migration. Fundamental human rights of migrants are abused and the justice system has not been too effective. This could be the reason why locals always feel they can go scot free after violent attacks, because many perpetrators have not prosecuted.

Extensive research on xenophobia in South Africa seemingly suggests that the government has been insensitive to anti-foreigner violence in the country (Hayem 2013; Bernardo 2015). The approach of the state on this issue has not been steady but enmeshed in a lot of controversy and confusion. Government functionaries have also been blamed for inciting locals to perpetrate violence against the migrant population in South Africa through careless and unguarded utterances (Dorukifa and Ijeoma 2017). Dodson (2010) and Laher (2009) aver that xenophobic violence against African migrants will not end soon because government employees adopted corrective strategies to deal with xenophobia without taking into cognisance the peculiarity of the South African situation. Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni (2011) contend that is negligence on the part of the officials of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) in promptly handling and approval of asylum seekers and refugee applications.

Matzopoulos Corrigall and Bowman (2009) admits that the disposition of DHA towards foreign nationals raises concern particularly the way and manner in which their legal status is determined. In many cases, migrant applications are not processed on time, thus causing the refugee status to be rejected. Prolonging the permit applications have allowed many African migrants to become victims of harassment at the hands of police and immigration officers with arbitrary arrest, detention and possible repatriation to their respective home countries (McKnight 2008; Hiropoulos 2017).

The politics of discrimination especially by politicians has encouraged the denigration of foreign nationals by locals in many communities spread across South Africa and this has caused sharp conflict between the state and civil society groups. The 2002 South African Immigration Act

clearly states the role of immigration control with professional standards of human rights protection. The state's integration policy stipulates that government and civil society ought to work in concert to mitigate xenophobia and safeguard the proper execution of immigration procedures (McKnight 2008). The relationship between the state and civil society which was meant to be cordial is not because of the tense atmosphere which has caused rancour between both parties. One of the probable reasons for this bitter relationship is the conduct of the DHA officials and other government agencies with the responsibilities of handling issues related to immigration, encouraging communities to take the law into their own hands against African migrants in their midst (Matsinhe 2011; Beetar 2019). Also, many South Africans are oblivious to the status of different migrants residing in the country. The general view is that immigrants are here to enjoy the dividends of democracy because they have fled from their respective countries due to socio-political and economic crises happening there (Nyamnjoh 2006; McKnight 2008; Neocosmos 2010; Akinola 2014).

In response to the 2015 xenophobic attacks, Mngxitama (2015); Nicolson (2015) and Naicker (2016) contend that the state instituted the controversial Operation Fiela (sweep) to mitigate armed banditry in South Africa, but with a hidden agenda of reducing the migrant population residing in the country. The government has always insisted that the main aim was the elimination of criminals in the country. But the conduct of Operation Fiela seems to be anti-immigrant in nature. After the 2015 xenophobic attacks, Operation Fiela consisting of the SAPS and SANDF members swung into action and arrested 889 migrants of whom 745 were paperless migrants, meaning that 144 criminals were apprehended in seven South African provinces. Barou, Aigner and Mbenga (2012) avers that Operation Fiela was a calculated attempt to flush out every undocumented immigrant in the country. It created opportunities for continued extortion, abuse and denigration of African migrants by government security agencies as shown in the 2008, 2011 and 2015 attacks. Nkosi (2015) states that an amalgamation of civil society organisations which included Africa Diaspora Forum, Corruption Watch, Section 27, *Medecins Sans Frontieres*, Lawyers for Human Rights and Awethu, have all condemned Operation Fiela for normalising xenophobia. The author posits that Operation Fiela was adopted to clampdown on foreign nationals and often associate these migrants with crime.

The government had adopted denialism to reduce the intensity or the magnitude of xenophobia to mere crime despite the loss of human lives involved in the violence. The media has publicised the scenes of the attacks and utterances made by top government officials in defending government position.

*The government is living in denial, it has some government backing because apart from direct inciting statements by politicians, the government is not taking decisive action (**AC 9***)*

The minimisation of xenophobia in South Africa to level of crime in the 21ˢᵗ century is worrisome, although some politicians have eventually agreed that it is a problem others see it as a norm in the country. The seemingly indifferent attitude of the state places it in a questionable position, despite being signatories to various human rights agreements and instruments on the globe. The state can be said to be culpable if she has not been able to abide by the provisions made in such agreements. The government has resorted to the use of denialism to scale down xenophobia and label it as crime. In 2005, President Thabo Mbeki called the xenophobic attacks acts of criminality, which depicts the degree of denialism in government circles. These findings agree with the outcome of HSRC (2008) which implies that denialism on the part of the state calling the attacks criminal activities has strengthened the locals to assault black African immigrants. These same words were echoed by President Mbeki's response to the attacks as 'the work of criminal and anti-social elements' (Crush et al., 2013), not related to xenophobic behaviours. Mbeki castigated the media when it covered naked criminal activity under the guise of xenophobia (Mbeki 2008). The inability of the political leaders to own up to xenophobia as a problem which exists although it has been recognised as a recurring decimal in post-apartheid South Africa is a source of concern on a wider spectrum (Crush et al., 2013). An example of that was the incident where Emido Macia was handcuffed by the police to their operational vehicle and dragged down the road in a dehumanising manner. The existence of xenophobia is minimised while the implications like denial and restructuring of the police architecture has received huge publicity (Steinberg 2012). The African Union and the United Nations committees criticised South Africa's stance on denialism instead of admitting the existence of xenophobia calling it 'misplaced in the extreme' (Crush et al., 2013). Denialism has also made the government disengage from its pact with civil society. In April 1997,

162

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the then Minister of Home Affairs in his parliamentary budget speech asserted:

> *With an illegal immigrant population estimated at between 2-5 million, it is obvious that the socio-economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is, are further being burdened by the presence of illegal aliens. The cost implication become even clearer when one makes a calculation suggesting that if every illegal cost our infrastructure say R1000 (US $ 200) per annum, then multiplied with what even number you wish, it becomes obvious that the cost becomes billions of Rands per year (Buthelezi 1997).*

The comments made by a cabinet minister in South Africa has the capacity to incite violence. The government hardly filters statements made by politicians that can trigger chaos. Political populism has taken stage as locals are made to believe the immigrants are responsible for the economic problems plaguing South Africa. Unsubstantiated figures of immigrants and their statuses keeps evolving all the time. Misago (2009) posit that Mangosuthu Buthelezi was contending with another challenge which is the SADC ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose your place of work or residence. Free movement of people will have bad implications for South Africa because our country will be jam-packed with opportunities becoming limited. Akinola (2018) submits that Jacob Zuma also alleged that South Africa's economic hegemony on the African continent describes the mad rush of foreigners into the country. The erstwhile president said the escalation of violence against migrants in Pretoria in 2017 was not xenophobic but happened because of the war against crime. This speech made Zuma legalise the grassroots movement of locals against a particular group of foreigners allegedly indulging in crimes like prostitution, drugs and social vices. Zuma retorted; "I think we are used to phrases in South Africa which at that point in time elicit a bad image about us. South Africans are not xenophobic; it is not the first time we are hosting foreigners here". Murray (2003) avers that the fictitious claim made by a former senior police superintendent, Johan Steyn who alleged that Zimbabweans consisted of 90% of those who rape women, burgle homes and indulge in armed banditry is a ploy to paint migrants as hardened criminals. Speculative claims of this nature depict foreigners, especially those of African origin, in bad light, as locals see them as rivals who pose a threat to their wellbeing

and economic livelihood. Jamal (2017) discusses the statement made by Herman Mashaba, the Johannesburg Mayor who vowed that the city would do all in its power to clean the city of criminals. Mashaba's comments was based on assumptions because Johannesburg is not only home to African migrants, but locals and citizens from other continents also inhabit the city. It is widely held that foreign nationals engage in sharp practices like drugs, prostitution and kidnappings in the country. The Mayor blamed the Department of Home Affairs and the government for being culpable in the migrant influx and downplaying the main triggers of xenophobia.

5.3.10 Role of the Political Elites

The political leaders of South Africa have in some instances adopted populism as a way of responding to the issue of xenophobia by inciting locals against migrants with the political class blaming them for the economic woes being experienced in the country. Instead of addressing unemployment, inequality and poverty, politicians have resorted to propaganda to shift the attention of indigents from the realities on the ground (Mosselson 2010; Durokifa and Ijeoma 2017; Pineteh 2017).

The political elites and government officials are assumed to possess leadership qualities which ought to be used to promote peace in the society. However, politicians have benefitted by pitching locals against immigrants; the former are used to garner votes and perpetuate violence against the latter.

> *The assertive role or statement expected of government officials and political elites to assuage the resurgence of these crises has not been there. In fact, the politicians have been using it as an opportunity to advance their own political interest. It is used to shore up public support, instead of telling the populace the reason why joblessness persists is because of the failure of government, they normally say it is the presence of the foreigners in the country (AC 3)*

The politicians ride on the docility of locals and the electorate, especially those who are illiterate to cause violence against defenceless migrants. South Africa is not the only country facing

economic hardships, palliatives could be put in place but corruption, ethnicity and populism are used as weapons to achieve their intentions. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of 1998 explained that "South Africa's public culture has become increasingly xenophobic, and politicians often make inflammatory statements that the "deluge" of migrants is responsible for the current crime wave, rising unemployment, or even the spread of diseases". These baseless allegations claiming that migrants are the causes of social vices in the country, has made them highly vulnerable in the hands of the police, the army, and officials of the Department of Home Affairs. It is also reputed that refugees and asylum seekers with idiosyncratic features from distant countries are specifically targeted for abuse (HRW 1998).

On the April 1 2019 at Western Cape, the EFF leader Julius Malema in a reaction to the xenophobic attacks in Durban in 2019, took a swipe at locals who were attacking Africans from elsewhere. Malema blamed high unemployment rate on white monopoly capital. He noted that the demarcation of Africa along borders by the colonialists was responsible for division amongst Africans. The political leader further noted that whites create animosity between blacks through payment of meagre wages for work done on farms. Malema concluded by advising Africans to sue for peace and be united. His speech in the Western Cape goes as follows:

> *Stop your self-hatred, stop attacking our brothers from Africa and our sisters from Africa. We are one thing. You say 'mathata umsebenzi' (high rate of unemployment), even if we expel them tomorrow, you will still not get a job. There are no jobs in South Africa because whites are refusing to invest money in South Africa. They have got to many savings in the bank, they have got trillions in the bank, they are refusing to take it out and build industries. There is no Nigerian who stole an industry and hired Nigerians only. There is no Zimbabwean who's got a farm in Knysna or Stellenbosch who hired Zimbabweans. It is your white people who hire Zimbabweans, pay them low so that you can fight amongst yourselves as Africans, see them for what they are 'bayasulise lababantu' (clean up these people). They are causing divisions amongst Africans. Don't glorify these borders kuthi, there is Zimbabwe, there is Nigeria, these borders were never here. These borders were imposed on us by white people who wanted to divide Africa and do what they wanted to do with this continent of Africa. I am ashamed today to call myself a South African. The images*

that are coming out of Durban makes me to be ashamed. You are beating blacks; you are slaughtering Africans. I've never seen you doing that to an Indian without papers. But once they say it's an African because you hate yourself, because white people taught you to hate yourself, you kill other Africans. Stop that nonsense! It ends today, we must unite as Africans (eNCA 2019).

It could be argued that the commodification of Africa by the Europeans divided Africa along ethnic and national lines. However, it does not justify black-on-black violence that is on the increase in post-apartheid South Africa. The white monopoly capital thesis accentuated and proposed by Malema as a causal factor for xenophobic violence in South Africa has not been validated because the state after 1994 has not done much to provide jobs and improve on infrastructures built by the apartheid regime. Misago (2011) posits that political gatekeepers and grassroots leaders in the country intentionally take advantage of tensed situations to profit economically or politically by prejudice and aggressively excluding those who are perceived as outsiders. Nel (2019:25) describes the rise of populism in South Africa as the outcome of youths who feel economically insecure, thus showing features that relate to the theory of economic "left behinds".

Contemporary South Africa is a materialist society in which millions of locals are contending with economic deprivation. A major reason for this is the existence of poor governance structure in spite of the constitutional democracy which the country prides itself in. Bulbulia (2015) explains the views of the leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), Mmusi Maimane who blamed the continued existence of xenophobia in South Africa on the collapse of public policy. The DA leader, decried the attacks and linked them to the repercussions of the continuing crisis of governance in South Africa. Maimane further traces the origin of this misfortune to the failure of the state to propel economic growth and the increase in inequality that is widespread in the polity. Maimane called for an end to these attacks because other Africans are not the enemies of South Africa.

Karim (2009) contends that xenophobic violence finds expression in the deeply rooted micro politics of South African Townships and ghettos. This view holds that local leaders mobilise locals to fiercely deal with migrants so as to exercise control or secure their political interests. In order to substantiate this, the political elite could not stop the 2008 xenophobic attacks and declined to help foreign migrants who were assaulted because of falling out of favour or becoming politically

irrelevant in the 2009 elections. Crush (2001) established that 61% of participants in his study were of the opinion that immigrants have affected their economy because of the high rate of unemployment. Dodson and Oelfose (2000) and Misago et al. (2009) in different studies posit that the contestation for jobs is an influential and prime factor that breeds resentment between locals and foreigners. Popular beliefs held by South Africans is that employment and other benefits derivable from the South African state is an exclusive preserve for the citizens and non-citizens are robbing them of the chance to get jobs.

Simply put, Foreigners must understand that they are here as a courtesy and our topmost priority is to satisfy the yearnings of South Africans. They cannot conceal their business secrets without teaching local business owners how they attract customers and profit (Pilane 2015). Biepke (2008) posit that with reference to the working class, refugees are basically used as political swings by the government due to the fact that they are diligent, and the government is not harsh with migrants when the country has a buoyant economy. But in the case of an economic meltdown, refugees become easy preys of transferred aggression (Nell 2009). Obiezu (2017) takes a deeper look into xenophobia by explaining how it reveals governance failure in both sending and receiving countries and the terrible dissatisfaction that follows. The bad motive and as a bizarre way of expressing their anger is revealed. It is obvious that the root causes of xenophobia are attributable to the sad failure of the South African state and its strategies which have led to poor living standards and a hopeless future for most of its citizens.

Obademi and Uadiale (2004) aver that economic disempowerment, decline of opportunities, bantusization of education and dispossession of black land for many years contributed to rising poverty levels especially among the black population. The execution of animosity through xenophobic attacks on African migrants and few Asians comes with consequences on the South African economy and her relationship with African states. In the same vein, Akinola (2018) states that foreigners tend to pose a threat to livelihoods which came as a result of democratic dividends, hence the need to eliminate immigrants from South Africa. Drawing from the experience of the apartheid regime, which was characterised by domination and deprivation, the onus lies on the new democratic state to give its citizens topmost priority for the socio-economic change. But years after independence, the majority of the population still wallow in abject poverty and the promises of a better life still remain unfulfilled. Maina et al. (2011) argue that tight migration policies, slow

pace of development coupled with the extreme poverty and inequality seemed to have provided the foundation for the execution of xenophobia

Herman Mashaba's comment evoked xenophobic feelings in that he blamed the presence of more migrants for increase in crimes in Johannesburg.

> *With Herman Mashaba, it's also a miseducation, he's not informed so, when violence is happening in South Africa according to him its foreign nationals and that statement cannot be 100% true. So, basically, he's saying in South Africa, we don't have criminals and at the same time, we say majority of Black South Africans are unemployed. How are they surviving? (AC 6)*

Herman Mashaba as the Mayor of Johannesburg, ought to have provided substantial statistics or facts to validate his claims. The city of Johannesburg plays host to many migrants from Africa and other parts of the world and that criminality cannot be tied to one country alone. The assertion that many African migrants are criminals was dismissed by President Jacob Zuma, who contended that not all African migrants are criminals (The New Age 2017). Instead, they have to a large degree impacted significantly upon the economy especially in the informal and sectors. In the same vein, the then Home Affairs Minister, Malusi Gigaba, also refuted the claim that all black African migrants are criminals. "We do not talk about crimes perpetrated by blacks, Zulus or Sothos; let issues of immigrant crime be excluded. The fact that a car snatcher is Zulu does not imply that all Zulus are criminals, also if a drug baron incidentally is Nigerian, it does not translate to all Nigerians being criminals" (eNCA 2017). The frustration on the part of locals' inability to secure employment gives rise to exclusionist tendencies; thus seeing African migrants as competitors and as the 'other' who does not belong to South Africa. On this basis, African migrants are demonised, labelled in derogatory terms and often excluded in the rainbow nation (Valji 2003; Solomon and Kosaka 2013; Dube 2019). Villiers (2017) affirmed that President Zuma whilst referring to the migration influx explained that the state cannot turn a blind eye to crimes seemingly being executed by African migrants across many South African cities. These crimes include drug peddling, prostitution and human trafficking. President Zuma was quoted as saying: "We cannot allow crime to thrive in our society. Crime has no nationality, irrespective of being South African or African citizen, they must be handled ruthlessly in accordance to legal standard".

Holscher and Bozalek (2012) contend that the inability of the South African state is failing to educate its citizens and the public at large on the reason why migrants are here in the country and how to relate with them. This has stimulated the propaganda fuelling the belief that employment opportunities and socioeconomic rights have become keenly contested. The constant struggle for limited economic resources between locals and African migrants is the causal reason for the recurring xenophobic attacks as seen in contemporary South Africa. The country is currently embroiled in a socio-economic crisis manifesting through poverty and unemployment. Mamabolo (2015) asserts that increasing poverty and unemployment levels could be adduced as factors responsible for xenophobic behaviour and violence. The unofficial unemployment rate increased from 21.5% in 2008 to about 28% in 2018 while poverty level increased from 53.2% in 2011 to 55.5% in 2015. This put the figures of South Africans living in poverty at about 30.4 million during that period (Statistics South Africa 2018).

Words uttered by politicians and how they convey it can promote xenophobia in a country. Politicians are seen as leaders and they need to be careful when they make statements. South African politicians have made careless statements that has sparked off violent attacks against migrants.

> *The communication and body language of politicians reinforces xenophobia. Malusi Gigaba in 2017 took up the DA government in Gauteng that political elites must be careful with their utterances (**AC 9**)*

Beyond rebuking politicians for their misguided communication, the South African government should take bold steps to sanction erring politicians who make statements that incite violence. Institutional xenophobia plays out in South African practices through the violent exclusion and bias against foreigners in various institutions like banks, hospitals, the Department of Home Affairs, police, and social service providers (Landau 2010). In 2002, the Director General of Home Affairs stated that of the immigrant population in South Africa, about 90 per cent of them were in possession of fake documents and indulge in related criminal activities (Neocosmos 2010: 85). Mangu (2019) traces animosity against African migrants in South Africa in political circles to the

utterance made by the National Party (NP) representative on Home Affairs Frik van Deventer who established a connection between immigration and crime, stating that Nigerians had accessed the country "in droves" since 1994 and that eighty per cent of all suspects charged in court in Johannesburg for drug related crimes were those originating from Nigeria. The NP spokesperson blamed the situation on the ANC's condoning of her allies during the years of struggle as the major reason for the sudden increase in the number of undocumented migrants residing in South Africa. The absence of tight immigration policies and lack of political will on the part of the ANC government to mitigate these problems would culminate to a loss in the war against drugs in South Africa hence becoming a haven for drug lords, criminals and thousands of aliens.

Obnoxious statements without verifiable facts is toxic and can spark off violence in any given situation. The alleged statement that 90% of the immigrant population in South Africa possess fake documents and indulge in crime is yet to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Acrimonious speeches and labelling particular citizens of a country as drug lords or sex traffickers are totally unacceptable. The way and manner some immigrants accessed the country is also questionable because the police and immigration officials seems to have corrupt tendencies at the border post, hence the increase in illegal migration into South Africa. There are also organs of government that can deal decisively with the issue of enrolment.

EWN (2018) and Mangu (2019) both averred that indigent South Africans and those who work in government offices have always connected migration with crime. Although, the ANC denied the existence of xenophobia, but now, the party acknowledged its existence and cautioned Mashaba for making inflammatory statements and decided to inform the South African Human Rights Commission for inciting violence against African migrants. In response to Mashaba's comment the Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba advised that government officials should desist from making comments that instigate the public "to adopt xenophobic attitudes". The Mayor declined to apologise saying that he did not make any xenophobic statement (Jacobs 2016; Mail and Guardian 2016; Mangu 2019).

5.3.11 The Problematic of Service Delivery
Rickert (2001) defined service delivery as that which concerns itself with the provision of a product or service by a government or government agency to a community that it was promised to, or

which is expected by that community. Lack of proper administration skills by public office holders through corruption, mismanagement of public funds, and other abuses has created a loophole in service delivery in South Africa. Locals tend to be at the receiving end of this malaise, resulting to violence against migrants and vandalisation of public property.

> *Poor governance has led to service delivery strikes, causing foreigners to be scapegoated for economic woes (AC 1)*

As long as masses are being deprived of their rights to social services, they tend to vent their anger on migrants' resident in their communities. Many countries have gone through economic recession and after a while bounced back stronger. The state which ought to protect lives and properties seems to have assumed a quiet or position. The scapegoating of African foreign nationals by locals for economic crisis facing South Africa does not solve the problem, rather it worsens it and cause disunity among African nations.

Masuku and Jili (2019) hold that service delivery in South Africa is often characterised by financial impropriety, corruption and malfeasance. The violent nature of service delivery protests are outcomes of soaring levels of inefficiency and ineptitude from local government. Booysen (2009) and Habib (2010) argue that locals have also used these 'strikes' to show their displeasure against the state because, as they claim, the state has reneged upon its promise to provide the masses a better life upon independence through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) embarked upon by the government in 1994. As a result, foreigners, mainly those coming from other African states are being victimised and oppressed in many informal settlements across South Africa because of the poor state of the economy. Locals are locked in a battle for survival as they compete with African migrants for jobs in the informal sector of the economy. This has made the former carry out attacks on the latter, culminating into loss of lives, businesses and properties and the displacement of thousands (Yakusho 2008; Landau 2010; Everatt 2011; Matsinhe 2011; Crush 2014)

The use of violence to locals press home the demand for quality service delivery from the government is on-going as there are many cases of service delivery strikes on an annual basis.

> *So, violence between citizens and the state assumes what is called service delivery violence. But it is still violence (AC 5)*

Service delivery violence is being executed by locals and in many instances, government properties are vandalised in the process. The state has to engage the citizens especially at the grassroots by assuring them that service delivery issues will be resolved. Grassroots protests have been a common feature in South Africa since the 1970s (Ballard et al., 2006). As a result, violence has been adopted as a tool to distinguish between locals and foreigners in post-apartheid South Africa (Jason 2014). Current service delivery protests are a carryover from the apartheid era because the demands are homogeneous; songs, symbols and other things are still reminiscent of the apartheid regime (Ngwane, 2011:84). Violence was used by blacks to express their displeasure at the apartheid administration on how they were being treated, but this should cease because the conditions that existed during that era have changed. This protracted history of violent protest culture (Netswera and Kgalane, 2014:264) suggests that the course charted by demonstrators is in the utilisation of available spaces as social and political theatres (Bozzoli, 2004).

In comparison to the apartheid regime, contemporary protests were not executed by those politically excluded but those who are politically active. Former political styles or methods are organized and repackaged so as to fill the political yearnings of our time (Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper 2012). The violence in the apartheid years was motivated by the racist culture put in place by the colonial masters; now, black-on-black violence has no justification because many African states supported South Africa and it led to the demise of apartheid. Active politicians in South Africa should use their wealth of knowledge and education to promote peace and harmony instead of promoting populism. Economic issues ought to be addressed by the government and immigrants should be seen as burden on the state.

Housing has been a major source of conflict between economically disadvantaged locals and impoverished immigrants. This normally takes place in informal settlements located in townships in many cities across South Africa.

> *There are issues to grapple with when it comes to service delivery. The biggest issue that emanated from the discourse was that of housing in the service delivery issue (AC 10)*

Provision of houses for the indigent in South Africa has been priority on government's list after the 1994 period. The RDP housing scheme has been fraught with many inconsistencies and allegations of bribery and corruption. Locals have used this to deal harshly with African foreign nationals. Proper monitoring and evaluation needs to be done by the government to address the

situation. Service delivery has become very pertinent in the current dispensation in South Africa. It is rooted in the micropolitics of informal settlements. Nyamnjoh (2006) and Cronje (2009) explains the rationale behind the provision of RDP houses was to improve the quality of lives of black South Africans who were economically, socially and politically excluded by apartheid racist structure put in place in order to make the black populace perpetually disempowered. The ruling ANC introduced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994 in order to undo the imbalances of the past and promote economic development. The plan was to have a properly structured and consistent socio-economic policy that would see to challenges posed by underdevelopment during the apartheid regime.

The programme was envisioned to assist all the inhabitants of the country by utilising its resources to wipe-out apartheid standards and nurturing a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist society. The RDP concerned itself with critical issues like socio-economic constraints which include poverty, unemployment, health, the provision of clean and potable water and electricity, qualitative education, transport and more importantly, the building of houses for millions of teeming citizens who, were unable to afford decent accommodation because of exclusionist apartheid policy (Habib 2010: Pointer 2015: Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference 2017). Burger (2009) and Cronje (2014) contend that locals often believe that the South African government has disappointed them through their failure or inability in providing affordable homes to majority of the 'downtrodden', which has led to the complaint that foreigners are the primary beneficiaries of most of the RDP houses, thus leading to a 'theory of rising expectations'.

5.3.12 RDP Housing

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was premised on the basis of the 1955 Freedom Charter typically based on six principles namely: an integrated and sustainable programme, a people-driven process, peace and security for all, nation-building, link reconstruction and development and democratisation of South Africa. It was adopted to make up for the inequality created by the apartheid system (ANC 1994; Karriem and Hoskins 2016).

The level of government sector corruption has grown over the years and many government officials are benefitting from this unethical behaviour. The skirmishes generated by RDP housing is enormous as it keeps changing from time to time. There is no reason why a South African who

qualifies for RDP housing is bypassed and an African foreign national get such accommodation because such fellow is financially capable to afford it.

> *There is a connivance between the employees of the Department of Human Settlement, because many African nationals are entrepreneurs and because they have cash, they are able to buy these RDP houses from the South Africans. We must not generalize, but some fraud is going on. Housing meant for South Africans are now occupied by foreigners, courtesy of corrupt politicians* **(AC 10)**

The government of South Africa is aware of this ugly trend of corruption in the housing sector, there is no justifiable reason why the government cannot address corruption in the public sector despite having a constitution that totally condemns such behaviour. Housing is a major source of conflict and if the state continues to turn a blind eye, South Africa will have to bear the consequences of such actions. This research outcome reveals that shortage of housing has further exacerbated socio-economic violence in South Africa. Misago, Landau and Monson (2009) posit that xenophobia was due to the existence of similar socio-economic conditions in ghettos. Harris et al,. (2018) argue that xenophobia is economically perpetrated as they sought to explain the reasons behind economic roots of anti-immigrant prejudice in South Africa. The likelihood of unemployed South Africans to resent migrants is very high. Using economic threat theory to substantiate their research, they discovered that anti-immigrant violence which occurs in South Africa is best explained by economic threat due to competition over scarce economic resources of which jobs or employment opportunities are most pronounced. The study also noted that socio-economic conditions like relative deprivation are major factors that promotes animosity against immigrants. These findings are similar to those by Landau (2011) and Pineteh (2017) which depict the state's failure to fulfil her obligations to the citizenry by bridging the inequality gap created by the pre-1994 apartheid regime. This has further strengthened social inequality between locals and migrant communities. The two respondents voiced out that some RDP houses meant for locals are being occupied non-South African citizens. Joubert (2008) cited in Mosselson (2010) reports that the sale of RDP houses to African migrants was a major reason why the attacks broke out in Alexandra in 2008. Also, Dodson (2010) asserts that some individuals of South African nationality

174

have engaged in corrupt practices through lease or outright sale of RDP housing to foreign migrants causing further tensions between locals and migrant communities. Misago, Landau and Monson (2009) further argue that the leaders of the Community Policing Forum (CPF) and the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) in places like Alexandra were sentimental and this encouraged violence against African migrants.

5.4 Victims of Xenophobia

Police brutality against migrants is common in post-apartheid South Africa. African immigrants are usually being profiled on the basis of skin colour and language. Accusations range from criminality to taking of jobs and women. Some of scenarios are even displayed on social media and the police fails to distinguish between those who have valid documents and those who are not in possession of such.

In 2012, I was arrested on a Friday by 3 policemen (2 blacks and 1 Indian) in Pietermaritzburg on the basis of rumour making rounds that my neighbours, who were non-South Africans were involved in criminal activities. The policeman of Indian descent physically assaulted me. My television set was confiscated, and I was accused of being a criminal. Upon the disclosure of my Zimbabwean nationality and my status as a university student, they said, 'you are taking our women, jobs and bringing HIV' and taking spaces meant for black South African students. I got a bail through the courts on Monday morning and couldn't find help from the law clinic or the international office on my campus (FN 4)

The level of police cruelty against migrant by the police is alarming. The justice system has also not done well to bring culprits to book. In many cities of South Africa, immigrants and even locals have been rough handled by the police. This is an abuse and denial of their fundamental human rights. Neocosmos (2012) contends that in spite of the reality of xenophobia, some locals love foreigners while other dislike them. Many South Africans are either xenophobic or Afrophobic, but those with high xenophobic tendencies are located in the midst of politicians, government functionaries and state units like the army, police secret services and officials of the Department

of Home Affairs (Tafira 2011; Amit and Kriger 2014; Mngxitama 2015). Khumalo and Obioha (2017 assert that the cruelty meted out on Clement Emekeneh a Nigerian national in March 2014 in Cape Town is an example of highhandedness of the SAPS. Incidences of police brutality or aiding of locals in attacking migrant communities in South Africa have been underreported as a result, migrants have become denigrated or killed in some instances and this has contributed to the perceived notion of ineffectiveness in curbing xenophobic violence. Landau (2004) explains migrant vulnerability in the hands of the police who stop, arrest and even detain them in some instances irrespective of their immigration status. In a survey carried out at Wits, 71 percent of non-South Africans stated that they were halted by police, mainly to check their papers, as compared to 47 percent of South Africans (Landau 2004: 11). Landau posits that police derive joy in apprehending migrants for various reasons which include meeting specific monthly targets, giving an avenue for extortion and alluding to the general view of the people on immigration and crime, lending credence and authenticity amongst locals seemingly trying to tackle "crime and grime" (Landau 2004: 12).

In the post-apartheid era, the South African Police Service demonstrated xenophobic attitudes towards African migrants. Adjai and Laziridis (2013) indicate that Africans from elsewhere are stopped more habitually by police than South African citizens. They contend that the seemingly identification method employed by the Internal Tracing Unit of the SAPS in the quest to confirm the illegality or otherwise of a suspect, by testing the language skills, intonation and the pronunciation of certain words (Adjai and Laziridis 2013: 199). The authors were also of the view that the police often target black non-South Africans because they are of the opinion that they are drug lords and criminals. The immigration papers of African migrants are regularly destroyed by the police in a bid to render them paperless and effect their arrest as illegal migrants (Adjai and Laziridis, 2013).

Artisans also are not spared in the violence. Locals are of the opinion that every migrant is a criminal engaged in shady deals. The police too have not been able to play their role effectively. Locals have taken the laws into their hands in which they kill migrants from time to time.

> *A close friend of mine who was an auto mechanic was killed in April 2017 by taxi men in Polokwane who alleged that that he was a drug seller. The next day, I and my friends were*

attacked. Subsequently, we ran to the police station at Seshego and the Station Commander told us to leave because he could not guarantee our safety (FN 5)

The police which ought to protect the inhabitants of South Africa seem to have abandoned their call to duty. Human lives are important and it should be the responsibility of the state through its security agencies to secure human lives. The allegation that foreign nationals are drug sellers are also unfounded because some foreign nationals have actually contributed to the development of the South African economy. However, Harris (2001) posits that in 1998, police records revealed that 98% of all arrests made, those involved were South Africans while foreigners did not go beyond the 1 % category. As Lizeka and Etheridge (2017) posit that a major cause of the 2017 xenophobic violence in South Africa was the supposed involvement of foreigners, particularly Nigerians in drug peddling. The authors added that President Zuma emphasized the need to beam a searchlight on drug barons and handle them stating that hose gaps ought to be closed. Nyamnjoh and Mususa (2012:216) asserted that during Thabo Mbeki's reign as the head of the armed forces, the police, secret services and the paramilitary government agencies was aware of happenings in the South African polity. The President was aware of police harassing migrants as evidenced in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report, alluding that xenophobia against Africans from elsewhere has increased and it should be mitigated. Khumalo and Obioha (2017) asserted that the eruption of xenophobic violence in Tshwane region has created anxiety about the safety and security of the migrant community residing in the country. Constant outbursts of xenophobia have questioned the integrity of Tshwane Metropolitan Police in preventing and combating xenophobic violence in the area. Lately, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has been criticised because of violating provisions made in the 1996 South Africa Constitution and South African Police Service Act (1995) by failing to protect foreign nationals residing in the country. This could be attributed to the rise in number of instances in which foreign migrants have been battered or even killed by the police.

5.5 Profiling of African Immigrants by Locals or Government Security Agencies

African immigrants are being harassed and hounded by immigration and police personnel across South Africa. They identify those who cannot speak local languages, who have vaccination or are very dark and on that basis they discriminate against them.

177

The year 2008 was the turning point of things where I realised for the first time that being a foreigner was not something to be proud of in South Africa because I remember I was at the University here and we were even scared to go back to town where I rented an apartment with my friends. I was afraid, so the safest place was the campus as foreigners were beaten for real and whenever you cannot speak Zulu, you will be practically beaten up (**FN 4**)

The inability of an African foreign national to speak one of the local languages in South Africa is regarded as an anomaly by locals here and they use it to resent or incite violence whenever such opportunities are available. It is common place in the banks, markets and even on campuses that if a migrant cannot speak the local language, such is being called names like *Amakwerekwere*. Adjai and Lazaridis (2013) discuss the means of identification seemingly employed by the Internal Tracing Units of the South African Police Service to ascertain if a suspect is an alien or not, are language, intonation, the pronouncement of certain words (such as Zulu for 'elbow', or 'buttonhole' or the name of a meerkat). Mozambicans are identified when they refer to South as 'Sud', and Malawians cannot properly pronounce 'r' they end up saying 'errow'. Hairdo, and attire worn are other distinguishing features. The Basotho speak a tweaked version of Sesotho often wear gumboots, blankets or are in possession of walking sticks. On the other hand, Mozambicans are vaccinated on the forearm around the lower left portion (Minaar and Hough 1996). These bio-cultural characteristics of hairdos, immunisation marks, dressing and biological-cultural features of hairstyles, accents, vaccination marks, dress and bodily appearance all motivate racist tendencies. They also cause xenophobia because targets are easily identified through this method. In many instances, universities or the police are unable to provide the much needed security for international students, hence the vulnerability to attacks in the hands of economically disadvantaged locals.

African foreign nationals who run spaza shops or own businesses are often targeted during crisis periods. They often scamper to safety for fear of being attacked or necklaced by rampaging youths. Since the safety of lives during xenophobic crisis is not guaranteed, African foreign nationals stay back at home and their businesses are either looted or burnt down by irate youths.

During crises periods I close my shop for safety reasons (**FN 2**)

178

Many shops are vandalised during xenophobic attacks and many migrants are beaten for not being foreigners. Some minority ethnic groups like Pedis', Vendas' and Tsongas' are even attacked because they are not regarded as full-blooded South Africans. Misago (2017) argues that in spite of the state's resolve to address resentment towards foreign nationals, it seems the government has accepted violence against African migrants and few Asians as a norm. This is supposedly obvious because murders, bodily harm, mob justice, necropolitics, looting, armed banditry wanton destruction of homes and businesses and perpetual displacement abound in South Africa. Many South Africans, especially those residing in informal settlements across the nation have mobilised, organised and led protests in the form of service delivery strikes and anti-illegal immigrant marches. Instances like these have seen locals loot foreign owned businesses, causing displacement and in some instances inflicting injuries on the owners of such businesses. The police are helpless a times as they watch locals embark on looting sprees without challenging them. But they provide cover by rescuing migrants in such environments. (Akinola 2014; Pineteh 2017; Beetar 2019).

5.6 The Contentions on Minimum Wage

There are some dark clouds surrounding the minimum wage issue in South Africa. Migrants often accept meagre wages for jobs mainly in the inform sector and hospitality industry. This has become a major source of hatred because locals are not willing to accept lower wages.

> *There is a minimum wage, but it is not enforced. We have extant policies but none of them are implemented. This is serious crises of implementation (**CS 1**)*

The non-implementation of the minimum wage does not call for violence. The government ought to query its agency in charge of implementation why it has not been able to execute the responsibility saddled with it. On November 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the national minimum wage bill into law. This sets an historic example as it protects workers who earn low wages and tends to reduce inequality in the country. It will also minimise huge income differentials in the nation's labour market. The national minimum wage was put at R20 per hour for many workers across the nation, it is expected that this move will increase the incomes of about 6 million South Africans who make up half of the labour force whose wages are below this R 20 per hour

threshold. The R 20 per hour rate amounts to R 3500 on a monthly basis, based on the hours of work and it gives workers in the domestic, forestry, farm and welfare sectors a new lease of life with options to choose from (Mail and Guardian 2018).

5.7 Role of the Church

Apart from providing spiritual leadership, advice and help for the country, the church also intervenes in the state's affairs when necessary so as to avoid precarious situations or avert bloodshed. The church was of great help even during the apartheid era, she denounced colonial rule and fought for the emancipation of blacks alongside all other NGOs. The church has not abandoned its role of helping the vulnerable in society especially in the advent of xenophobic orchestrated violence in South African cities.

> *The church in downtown Johannesburg certainly became a beacon of hope for foreign nationals' right across the board and offered sanctuary and did all sort of things to try and facilitate the integration of foreign nationals' into South African society, which is in actual fact what our constitution encourages. We had over 3500 people in the building in the centre of Johannesburg, there must have been at least 30 unaccompanied minors that arrived at the church (CL 1)*

The church has assisted many victims of xenophobia in South Africa. Although, humanitarian organisations waded in on several occasions but the church has done a lot in terms of providing shelter, relief and counselling to those who were affected during the violence. The Minister of Home Affairs in 2008, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula addressed the Committee on Home Affairs in parliament. On 14 May 2008, a Ministerial Task Team was established to unravel the immediate and remote causes of attacks in Gauteng, the minister told the committee that 18 000 people had sought refuge and were being protected at police stations, and that a number of church groups and civil society organisations had given assistance to the displaced people willingly. Temporary shelters were erected although it negated integration principles (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2008). Beyond setting up a Ministerial Task Team, the state ought to be more proactive in dealing with the scourge. Many lives have been lost to xenophobia; properties and livelihoods affected and thousands displaced. The intelligence gathering network seemed docile because they hardly act on vital information gathered during surveillance activities. Apparently, culprits often walk away

without being challenged and this has given locals the effrontery to normalise and perpetuate violence.

Phakathi (2015:13-16) submits that it is remarkable to say that the churches were guided on theological and humanitarian basis in response to the xenophobic violence. The church got informed about xenophobia through the new and print media and by the voice of people. Radio stations like 702 Talk and Radio Pulpit connected churches and those migrants who were affected by the violence. The churches served as places where donors handed in relief materials which were passed on to those who were affected by the xenophobic violence. Churches having huge congregants used their storage facilities to keep items that were donated before disbursements were made. Donations were made in cash and kind. They included clothes, toiletries, food and vegetables, canned food, milk, baby food, medical supplies, blankets, sanitary towels, plastic cutlery, first aid kits and cups. Pastor Moodley talked about the tremendous help rendered by His People Church and how the welfare of the refugees was being threatened. Some agencies and individuals assisted through meaningful donations via bank lodgements (Phakathi 2015:13-16). The alliance between the church and media can be stronger so that the occurrence of xenophobic violence will be reduced. However, if the church continues to occupy the space, other FBOs and NGOs may feel slighted. Government policies or legislation can also hinder the operations of the church and limit the influence of the civil society fraternity.

Randburg Methodist church got a financial assistance of R50, 000 from a locally-based entrepreneur. This disclosure was made by Reverend Moloi of the church. Rhema Church was even approached by the Australian Embassy, despite not having any form of relationship with the embassy the church was advised to apply for some funds and the outcome was positive. Pastor Alan McCauley of the church said the money gotten from the Australian Embassy was used to assist the victims.

5.8 Any Resurgence of Xenophobia in the Nearest Future?

In South Africa, xenophobia has been subtle after 1994, but became largely pronounced during the 2008 episode and since then it has been happening from time to time. It is has attracted a lot of scholarship and at the same time made screaming headlines in the media. Apparently, it is an on-going issue that takes assumes different dimensions based on the prevailing situation.

With the current economic situation, there will be a recurrence of xenophobic attacks because the way and manner it happened in 2008 it was due to the economic instability rocking the nation (AC 4)

The causes of xenophobia in South Africa transcend the economic instability thesis. There are also social, political and cultural factors embedded in the explanations for migrant resentment in the country. Even if the government fixes the economy, anti-immigrant sentiments will still pervade the air. Morris (1998) posit that research has validated violence against migrants especially if locals in such climes are disadvantaged economically. There is a tendency to harbour ill feelings towards minorities, particularly if they are foreign. Since most of these attacks are mainly confined to informal settlements, foreigners who reside and work in townships are highly susceptible to attacks because they are easily recognisable and are prime targets during crisis periods (Cele, 2015). The centrality of proximity highly influences the vulnerability of African migrants to attacks. African immigrants from Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, Malawi and other African states engage in small or medium scale businesses like running spaza shops, and other business concerns in the informal economy, predominantly located in townships, are the most prone to xenophobic attacks. On the other hand, white migrants are not victimised in any way (Tshabalala, 2015).

Xenophobia could happen at any time because anything as little as an argument can trigger it. It is an unpredictable phenomenon that inflates violence as the slightest provocation. Xenophobia has been ingrained into the South African system as locals are being made to believe that immigrants are responsible for the woes plaguing the economy.

We shouldn't always anticipate the re-emergence of it, but it is always there. It lies low and it explodes (AC 5)

The recurrent nature of xenophobia in South Africa has become a nightmare of some sort on the government, civil society, academics, other stakeholders and non-state actors. The inability of different administrations to curb this trend in the democratic era is a huge disappointment. It seems the state has run out of ideas to bring the menace of xenophobia under control despite the influence of South Africa in the SADC region and on the African continent. Mangu (2019) explains government stance on the issue of xenophobia. Migrants are mostly affected during crises periods. Xenophobia quietly degenerates into Afrophobia as African migrants are attacked by locals. The

182

political class in South Africa, government representatives, policy makers and research institutes are more concerned with painting their nation as a migrant friendly country. Thabo Mbeki, who operated a South African foreign policy premised on "denialism" which was a part of his popular "Quiet diplomacy" that did not challenge despots who had committed gross human rights abuses. Instead of berating or reproving such undemocratic leaders, the South African government choose to keep silent. Denialism has also been used do downgrade xenophobia to acts of criminality. Neocosmos (2012) suggests that denialism has supported xenophobia and hindered the government from mitigating future occurrences. Suttner (2015) explains how Ruth Bhengu an ANC member of parliament and committee chairperson castigated pressmen who used the word 'xenophobia', the politician directed the media to report it as mere attacks and not xenophobic attacks.

The chances of xenophobia happening is very high because there is pervasive unemployment, crime, drug peddling, populism and other ills in society. The government has not resolved most of these issues that caused xenophobia, hence the unabating nature of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa.

> *Very likely because it has been occurring and it is very likely in the context that the underlying conditions that caused the initial ones are still present. Political miscommunication, economic exclusion and social vices (AC 9)*

The demise of apartheid implied hopes of a brighter future for many South Africans. The plan was to liberate black South Africans who were economically disadvantaged, poverty stricken downtrodden and ostracised. Research shows that xenophobic attacks are rife in townships and squalor settlements due to unemployment, pervasive poverty and struggle for scarce economic resources. Dodson (2010); Akinola (2014); Tella (2016) and Pineteh (2017) all these authors have clearly spelt out underlying causes of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The view that migrants are job stealers amongst all South Africans increased from 56% in 1999 to 62% in 2006 (Crush, 2008) and this overlaps with the increase in unemployment. Tshitereke (1999) submits that in the post-apartheid era, the promise of a better life promised by the ANC-led government became a mirage, thus creating illusion in the hearts of the indigent populace. A delay in the fulfilment of

these promises implied dissatisfaction, frustration and anger building a solid foundation for xenophobia to be planted and succeed.

The impact of these socio-economic challenges fans and heighten the opinion that migrants are causing a strain on the available limited resources. This assertion is relevant in the international studies terrain which shows that migration causes the receiving nation huge costs economically and also affects state services like education, housing, transport and welfare agencies (Terrif 1999). South Africa is faced with the challenge of catering for the needs of its citizens, let alone providing for foreigners in the country. On this wise, Tshitereke (1999) observes that many times people make a "frustration-scapegoat" by faulting them for unending deprivation and poverty. Locals resent migrants because the latter are perceived as hindrance to employment opportunities, housing, education and health care (Morris 1998). The economic crisis and failure to attain full citizenship rights automatically produces a defenceless class in the polity.

Tshitereke (1999) argues that the language used by high-ranking government officials, like the minister of Home Affairs who supposedly said that "with unemployment running at above 34 per cent, and millions of immigrants making a living in South Africa, it can be postulated that if all the illegal aliens were removed, the unemployment problem would come to an end." This minister's comment is substantiated by Mwakikagile (2008), also contends that the media and government officials often fault African migrants by accusing them of being responsible for problems confronting the South African state, thereby exposing the migrant community to violence. The author further strengthens the argument saying that poor and failed leadership by heads of African states has culminated into mass migration; and that African leaders should improve living conditions and create employment for their nationals. Blaming migrants for soaring unemployment and the repatriation of illegal migrants by government will solve the problem of unemployment is a charade. To date, there are no statistics that indicate the actual number of immigrants resident in South Africa.

Pilane (2015) discusses the comments made by the minister for small business development Lindiwe Zulu in the wake of the 2015 xenophobic violence. The minister said that foreign spaza shop owners whose businesses were looted and attacked in Soweto and neighbouring townships should be willing to share their business secrets with locals if they intend to live and ply their trade in South Africa without any fear of disturbance, molestation or violence. Foreign spaza shop

owners are concealing any trade secrets. The statement made by the minister was not in the interest of Pan-Africanism which promotes and encourage Ubuntu. It also encourages jealously between locals and migrants. Jamal (2017) explains the comments made by the Johannesburg mayor, Herman Mashaba, during the February 2017 xenophobic attacks. The mayor made pronouncements inflaming xenophobia, with the promise that all criminals in the city would be fished out. Locals were of the opinion that foreigners are in charge of several criminal rackets like drugs, prostitution and abductions in the country.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter dealt with discussion, analysis and presentation of study findings. Having examined the manifestation of belonging or its expression in different forms. Belonging is at the centre of deliberations at various fora which constitutes disorder, leading to a surge in the level of challenges bedevilling our contemporary society. Arguably, the bond existing between identity and belonging seemed strong, hence migrants may not have a sense of belonging anywhere they travel to because of existing conditions at the place of destination. Migrant influx into South Africa after 1994 has caused resentment towards African foreign nationals and few Asians in the polity.

South Africa's history is built on an age long history of migration which dates back to the 1880s when minerals were discovered at Kimberley and Witwatersrand. This created the avenue for migrant workers to provide the much needed labour in the mining and agricultural sectors. Legislations by the apartheid administration were put in place to restrict the movements of migrant workers who were mainly recruited from the neighbouring Southern African states. These migrant workers were hired on contractual basis and are expected to return to their respective countries at the expiration of their contracts.

Violence had been the result of animosity in which lives, properties and businesses were destroyed; scores of migrants and even locals were displaced in the ensuing melee. Politicisation of belonging has led to the emanation of South Africanness from this discourse. This implies a state of exception in which non-South Africans are regarded as the unwanted persons in contemporary South Africa. The years of apartheid made South Africans especially blacks isolated from the rest of the world, this disconnect made them feel different from the rest of Africa. Other Africans are viewed as

outsiders coming from war-ravaged countries, who are not exposed and are freeloaders who constitute a burden on the South African government.

The reasons for migration are built on push and pull factors. Migration into South Africa could be alluded to several reasons and research has indicated Zimbabweans accounts for the highest number of immigrants in South Africa based on its proximity to South Africa. Zimbabwean nationals migrated into South Africa because of socio-economic and political crisis. Nigerians also migrated to South Africa under conditions similar to that of Zimbabweans. For Malawians, it was economic reasons. Ethiopians migrated because of socio-economic crisis and they are mainly migrant entrepreneurs in many South African townships. However, those who migrated from the DRC to South Africa fled from the lingering civil war and the *ebola* virus amongst other challenges.

The apartheid system is being repeated in the post-apartheid era. The way apartheid treated blacks is the same way in which blacks in South Africa are treating other African nationals. Thoughts of nationalism is in the heart of the average South Africa; hence the view that African migrants do not belong here. Migrants are also scared in mingling with locals as the former are referred to as *makwerekwere* and excluded from the fabric of society. The behaviour, language, government policies and activities all point to the fact that migrants are foreigners in South Africa and this has triggered the debate of politics of belonging. It seems as if Ubuntu has diminished in post-1994 South Africa because the 'Rainbow Nation' as projected by Desmond Tutu, was that in which a just and equitable society would emerge from apartheid. However, the ideals of Ubuntu have not been adhered to.

African migrants in South Africa endure resentment in the hands of locals because they are perceived as likely threats to the available job opportunities. The former are repeatedly blamed for spread of HIV/AIDS as the nation grapples with the evils of unemployment, poverty and increasing levels of inequality. The informal sector like agriculture employs a lot of African nationals who accept lower wages and this confirms the jealousy theory. Drug trafficking and the sale of contaminated and expired products pose a threat to the health of those who reside the republic of South Africa as many youths have become addicted to hard drugs allegedly sold by non-South Africans. The shift in the staging of xenophobic attacks from informal settlements to urban areas

has changed the nature of such attacks. The implication is that government will have to boost its security architecture and increase budgetary allocation for defence and security purposes annually.

The stealing of wives and jobs meant for locals by migrants is also involved in the belonging discourse in post-colonial South Africa. The destruction and looting of spaza shops owned by migrant entrepreneurs is common in many rural communities and townships in South Africa; as locals have often accused migrant entrepreneurs of using witchcraft and lowering prices of goods and services in order to attract clients to patronise their businesses.

Migrants from other African states are being harassed because of the soaring unemployment rate in the country. It is noteworthy that many African migrants possess skills that locals do not have and these skills are required for the development of the South African economy. These migrants have also contributed to the growth of the economy through the provision of jobs for jobless citizens and the payment taxes to the government. They have also opened up other local economies, through investments in businesses in many rural arears in South Africa.

Inter-African migration which is being orchestrated by corruption, economic recession and poor governance has tremendously increased in the 21st century. South Africa happens to be Africa's most industrialised economy, that is a prime reason why migrants troop in on a daily basis. South Africa's migration history is rooted in colonialism with Dutch and English arrival into the country. The discovery of solid minerals attracted Europeans, Asians and other Africans into South Africa. Migration increased agricultural and mining outputs due to the contribution which migrants made by bringing much skills into South Africa. Failure on the part of the government to provide the masses with jobs further affected the South African economy.

The international civil society, UN, A.U and other non-state actors berated South Africa in the light of xenophobia and pleaded with the government to restore law and order. Some citizens of other African states reacted to the 2019 xenophobic attacks by protesting at various South African embassies and vandalised South African owned investments and businesses. President Cyril Ramaphosa adopted shuttle diplomacy to restore South Africa's diplomatic relationship with the affected African nations.

During xenophobic outbursts, the police have been able to protect African migrants and at other times, they have failed to do so. The protection of human lives and property lies in the hands of

the police as embedded in the South African constitution. Operational challenges have hindered the effectiveness of the police because, security and surveillance in arears where xenophobia is rampant. The police have also denied xenophobic attacks against African migrants by calling it ordinary crime. Officials of the DHA have also ill-treated African migrants by giving them a sense of (un) belonging. The delay in processing permits for different classes of migrants could make them paperless. These migrants are rendered vulnerable and become victims of extortion in the hands of SAPS and DHA officials; they are threatened with repatriation to their own countries. The Immigration Act of 2002 as enshrined in the constitution, clearly explains the duties of immigration control according to best human rights standard globally. Illegal migration has increased due to porous borders which allows non-South Africans to access South Africa illegally. This has affected the population of undocumented migrants and could lead to globalisation of infectious diseases.

Unguarded comments by government officials have made locals attack African migrants in South Africa. Operation *Fiela* which was launched by the state to weed out crime was now used to chase after foreign nationals and deport them. The statement made by the Zulu monarch also motivated locals to launch xenophobic attacks against migrants. Inflammatory statements have the ability to trigger violence because king Zwelithini called other Africans *amazeze* (lies or fleas). The paramount ruler of the Zulus' blamed migrant presence for proliferation in crime rate and diseases, decline in job opportunities for locals, enjoying government services for free and other ills confronting the South African state.

 Apart from conquering apartheid, the civil society has been effective by filling the vacuum created by the indifferent posture of the government. In many cities across South Africa, the civil society was vocal and up to task as they not only provided food, clothing and other relief material but also provided services like counselling those who were victims of xenophobia.

Service delivery strikes has become a norm in post-colonial South Africa. Poor management skills by government sector employees through corruption and siphoning public funds has led to poor service delivery. Low quality service delivery has affected those who reside in the interior and in the townships where bucket-system, lack of potable water and proper housing abounds. Locals have reacted to this trend by destroying state-owned properties. Violent demonstrations especially at local level has been a common feature in South Africa since the 1970s. As a result, locals have

used violence to distinguish between them and African migrants since the post-1994 period in South Africa. Service delivery strikes are part of the apartheid legacy because the songs, demands and signs are reminiscent of the apartheid era. Protracted history of violent demonstration suggests that social and political channels are used to maintain the borders of belonging. The issue of RDP housing has generated a lot of contention in post-1994 South Africa. Locals have repeatedly fingered corrupt politicians, especially municipal councillors in the allocation of RDP housing units. Corruption in government circles has gained momentum over the years as public office holders have benefitted from this racketeering. The debates engendered by RDP housing is so overwhelming, in that it has featured prominently in the public domain, causing violent strikes across South African cities. The presence of high level corruption in the allocation of RDP houses is undeniable by the government because non-South Africans buy RDP housing from corrupt councillors. Housing shortage has stimulated socio-economic violence in South Africa. The sale of RDP housing to African migrants was the major source of the xenophobic violence in informal settlements such as Alexandra. The final chapter will discuss the study findings, recommendations and conclusion.

Chapter 6 Study Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the discussion, analysis and presentation of study findings was explained. The thesis examined how African migrants were being treated in post-apartheid South Africa. This final chapter deals with the study findings, recommendations and conclusion.

6.2 Study Findings

The reasons for migration are sandwiched in between push and pull factors. Migration into South Africa could be alluded to several reasons. It should be noted that Zimbabweans constitute the highest number of immigrants in South Africa based on its proximity to South Africa. Factors that motivated Zimbabwean migration into South Africa was due to the economic crisis that hit the country in the early 2000s; hyperinflation, soaring unemployment and political oppression of the opposition by the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF ruling party in Zimbabwe. Many Malawians were pushed out of their country because of the unpleasant economic situation. Nigerians who choose to relocate to South Africa decided to do so because of severe economic conditions, insecurity, constant kidnappings and abductions, new wave of Islamic terrorism, gross human rights violations and a highly tensed political terrain. However, those who migrated from the DRC to South Africa did so because of the protracted civil war which was the result of political differences and the struggle for the control of and possession of mine fields and other mineral resources in the country. The scourge of the *ebola* virus also motivated and enhanced Congolese migration into South Africa.

Ethiopians migrated majorly because of economic depression and political persecution which was becoming more prevalent in Ethiopia. Many Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa are highly involved in the retail sector of the informal economy where they operate spaza shops in many townships and rural areas in South Africa. Push factors are those which induce a person or group of persons to relocate to another country. If they choose to stay behind in their home country, the possibility of their lives being in danger if high. Factors like conflict, drought, famine, poverty, extreme religious violence, weak and ailing economy, high unemployment levels, racism, cultural

bias, political rivalry and continued victimisation of citizens who challenge the existing political structures in their countries of origin. Pull factors are those which attract people to new places. Institution of proper democratic principles, economic improvement, higher remuneration, better employment opportunities, enhanced welfare systems are some of the pull factors which motivate migrants to move to other countries.

The apartheid legacy has been transferred to contemporary times, in that the way and manner in which blacks were treated with humiliation during the apartheid era is being repeated to African foreign nationals in South Africa. Many locals are nationalist in their thinking; hence they are of the opinion that African migrants to not belong to South Africa. Migrants are also sceptical in associating with locals because they are labelled as *makwerekwere* and excluded from the fabric of society. The behaviour, language, government policies and activities all relate the fact that migrants are foreigners in South Africa and this has evoked triggers to the debate of politics of belonging. Ubuntu is gradually losing its worth in post-apartheid South Africa because the 'Rainbow Nation' as projected by Desmond Tutu, was that in which a just and equitable society would emerge from apartheid. However, the multicultural South African society has not been able to live a life of communalism because of the rampant violence against migrant communities in spite of preaching the gospel of Ubuntu.

In South Africa migrants are being resented due to the fact they are viewed as potential threats to employment opportunities meant for locals, hence they compete with locals for the available jobs in the economy. Migrants do accept lower wages in a country experiencing pervasive unemployment, poverty and increasing levels of inequality. Also, migrants who own small businesses have been blamed by locals for loss of clients because they allegedly use magic and give price cuts to woo customers. The prevalence and spread of HIV/AIDS has also been blamed on migrant presence in the country. Though, the jealousy theory exists, some immigrants engage in sharp practices like selling drugs or adulterated and expired products. Situations of this nature has consequences on the health of all and sundry in the republic of South Africa. There seems to be a shift in the location of xenophobia from informal settlements to the metropolitan areas in South Africa. This will call for more vigilance on the part of the state and the upgrade of the security architecture in the country. The implication of this is that in the annual budget, more allocations would be committed to defence and security purposes. The challenge of poor

governance in Africa has promoted tyranny who have clung on tenaciously to power. The likes of Paul Biya and Yoweri Museveni are few examples of despots which indicates Africa's willingness to encourage dictatorship.

Corruption, civil wars, economic recession and bad governance which is replete on African soil has encouraged inter-African migration. Migration into South Africa is explained in economic terms because the country is the most industrialised on the African continent. The history of migration in South Africa is inseparable from colonialism as the Dutch arrived in South Africa before the British. The commercial quantity of mineral resources was the major attraction for the Europeans and subsequently Asians and other Africans trooped. Migration brought about increase in production especially in the agricultural and mining sectors of the economy. This growth could be attributed to the contribution made by migrants who brought the much needed skills into the country. However, the failure of the government to provide jobs for the teeming masses after apartheid combined with the increase in inequality gap, neo-patrimonial tendencies and corruption by the politicians have significantly contributed to the ailing nature of the South African economy.

The U.N, A.U, international civil society and other non-state actors berated condemned the attacks and beckoned on South Africa to restore normalcy. The xenophobic violence in 2019 attracted swift reactions from other African states. Many African citizens protested at various South African embassies and high commissions, showing their discontent at the way African migrants were being denigrated and oppressed in South Africa. Retaliatory attacks on South African owned businesses and investments in Zambia, D.R.C, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and some other countries were executed by disillusioned citizens of respective countries. President Cyril Ramaphosa had to use shuttle diplomacy to appeal to affected African states and he ended up in sending special envoys to Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, D.R.C and Zambia. The image of South Africa was battered due to the attacks and the then A.U Commission chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma called for an end to hostilities against migrants and did not bother to recontest for the A.U Commission chairperson position. The UNSC showed great displeasure and condemned the attacks in strong terms. The Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe all castigated the South African authorities in the way the situation was handled while the Nigerian ambassador to South Africa was recalled.

The protection of citizens and non-citizens residing in South Africa from all forms of violence and oppression as stipulated in the constitution, lies in the hand of the police. The police have been able to control violence but in some other cases, failed to bring the situation under control. Many African migrants have become victims of xenophobia attacks while some have lost their lives in the process. The police also have challenges which are mainly operational, because surveillance in xenophobic prone areas are poor and to bring such situations under control has tested the strength and level of preparedness of the SAPS. The police have also been quick to dismiss attacks on foreign nationals as xenophobia by calling it mere crime. The terrain at informal settlements like Alexandra, where there are no accessible roads, street lights, and other amenities may be too unsafe for the police to maintain law and order.

The role played by civil society during the apartheid was massive as they fought apartheid to a standstill. In the post-apartheid era, they have also mediated by deescalating tensions during the outbreak of xenophobia in South Africa. Civil society has filled the vacuum created by the government's indifferent attitude towards the plight of indigent locals and African foreign nationals who inhabit in the same informal settlements. In cities like Cape Town and Durban, civil society has intervened in the situation through the provision of food, clothing and other relief items for the victims of the crisis.

Unguarded statements made by traditional authorities who are major pillars of government at grassroots has affected South Africa as disillusioned locals carried out attacks against defenceless migrants based on the comment they heard. Inflammatory language has the tendency to cause increase in conflict levels. Such language was utilised by the Zulu monarch to incite violence against African immigrants in South Africa. He referred to foreigners as *"amazeze"* (lice or fleas) and this sparked off xenophobic attacks against African foreign nationals. The paramount ruler of the Zulus' blamed migrant presence for increase in crime rate and diseases, decrease in job opportunities for locals, enjoying government services for free and other ills threatening the South African state. Once cannot rule out the possibility of migrants. Some of the allegations made by the king was unfounded because foreign nationals have made a huge impact on the development of the South African economy. They have provided locals with jobs in rural areas, payment of rents and the provision of goods and services to communities in many rural areas across the country. Many immigrants also pay taxes to the government through their businesses.

Based on plethora of research in South Africa, the government has been seemingly insensitive to the spate of violent atrocities perpetrated against foreign nationals in South Africa. Africans from elsewhere have lost their lives to the SAPS who ought to protect peoples' lives as enmeshed in the constitution. The Department of Home Affairs officials maltreat foreign nationals by ill-treating them, hence giving them a sense of (un) belonging. These officials also delay in processing of the permit applications for different categories of migrants and in some instances are rendered paperless. The paperless migrants become vulnerable as police and immigration officers take undue advantage of them either by extortion, indiscriminate arrest, unlawful detention and the threat of deportation to their respective countries. The 2002 South African Immigration Act vividly defines and stipulates the role of immigration control with accepted standards conformable to best human rights practices globally. Porous borders have also contributed to the burden of illegal migration; as African migrants access South Africa illegally through these land borders, it increases the number of undocumented migrants and it could also result into the globalization of infectious diseases. Government officials have also made pronouncements that vilify migrants in the country. Based on such careless pronouncements, locals go on rampage by attacking and destroying anything owned by foreigners. The government established Operation *Fiela* in response to the soaring crime rate in the country. However, instead of getting rid of criminals in the society, the outfit has been in the business of witch hunting foreign nationals.

The use of denialism by the state to minimise xenophobia in South Africa to mere criminality despite the loss of human since hostilities began is alarming. The depiction of xenophobia attacks as criminality by former President, Thabo Mbeki is an example that shows the degree of denialism in government circles. The media is replete with pictures and tales of woe emanating from violent scenes of attacks launched against migrants and their livelihoods. Some top government functionaries had made statements to support the government's position on xenophobia, while other politicians have consented to the existence of xenophobia as a problem confronting the former apartheid colony. South Africa is a signatory to many human rights agreements internationally which automatically puts the country into conformity to such agreements. However, a breach of these agreements questions the integrity the of the South African state and it will surely affect her image regionally and internationally. Fictitious estimates of immigrants and their statuses in South Africa continue to change from time to time. The DHA and the government have been accused of complicity in handling illegal immigration into the country.

Politicians have adopted populism to respond to the menace of xenophobia which has engulfed South Africa. Politicians migrants have incited locals against migrants by alleging that the latter were the ones responsible for the economic crisis plaguing South Africa as a nation. Politicians have embraced propaganda as an escape route rather than addressing poverty, inequality, unemployment and other social evils confronting the South African state. Politicians have used the current economic situation cash in on the passive nature of the indigent and majority of the voters, who happen to be illiterate as they embrace violence as a means of unleashing terror against defenceless migrants. Arguably, South Africa is not the only country going through the phase of economic turmoil, but despite the good plans of the state to alleviate the suffering of the masses; corruption, ethnicity and neo-patrimonialism are used to deprive the economically disadvantaged from accessing the benefits derivable from democracy. The unfounded rumours that migrants are to be held responsible for the current downturn in South Africa's economy has made them soft targets who are being exploited by the DHA officials, police and military forces in the country. The distinct features of refugees and asylum seekers has made them easily identifiable and as such are persecuted by locals and other South Africans.

Service delivery strikes have become common place in post-apartheid South Africa. Poor administration skills on the part of government sector employees through corrupt tendencies, mismanagement of public funds and other forms of abuse has led to poor service delivery in South Africa. Locals have been suffering from the effects of poor service delivery especially in rural areas and informal settlements where there has been a dearth in water supply, proper sanitary facilities and housing. The outcome of this deprivation is vandalisation of public property and attacks against migrants. Grassroots protests have been a regular occurrence in South Africa since the in 1970s and seemingly, violence has been adopted as a tool of distinction between locals and migrants in post-1994 South Africa. Contemporary service delivery protests are part of apartheid legacy because the songs, demands and signs are very much evocative of the apartheid era. This prolonged history of violent demonstration proposes the course followed the use of social and political avenues to maintain the borders of belonging.

Issues of housing, especially RDP housing units has become a source of conflict after 1994 in South Africa. Government sector corruption has tremendously increased over the years with many government officials making illicit gains from fraudulent practices. The controversies generated

by RDP housing is so overwhelming that it has been at the centre of many public debates, leading to violent strikes across South African cities. The government cannot deny the existence of high level corruption in the allocation of RDP houses because non-South Africans purchase the housing units from corrupt councillors. Housing shortage has promoted socio-economic violence in South Africa. The sale of RDP housing to African migrants was the major cause of the xenophobic violence in Alexandra.

The highhandedness of the police in the handling of migrant related cases in South Africa is alarming. Although some migrants engage in anti-social vices, this does not warrant their being treated in a dehumanising manner by the SAPS officials. Several migrants have either been killed or died in police custody; this is an abuse of their fundamental human rights regardless of their countries of origin. Some brutal scenes shown on social media indicated that the police have failed to differentiate between those who are paperless and those who have valid papers. The police can even stop, arrest unlawfully and keep migrants in their custody irrespective of their immigration status. The harassment encountered by African migrants in the hands of the police has even led to the destruction of their valid immigration papers so as to make them paperless and effect their arrest as illegal migrants.

The incompetence of a migrant in speaking any of the local South African languages is seen as an aberration. This can be used to recent or provoke violence against migrants in the country. In banks, market place and campuses, the inability of a migrant to speak the local language earns such migrant names like *Amakwerekwere* or *Girigamba*. Bio-cultural features such as hairdos, vaccination marks, accents and bodily appearance are also used to identify non-South Africans. Some minority ethnic groups like Pedis', Vendas' and Tsongas' are attacked because they are regarded as non-South Africans.

The minimum wage has also been another source of conflict in South Africa. African foreign nationals often accept meagre wages for jobs especially in the informal sector and the hospitality industry while locals hardly accept lower wages.

The church has been a source of help during xenophobic crises. They have opened their doors to accommodate stranded migrants fleeing from attacks. Apart from assisting migrants with shelter, relief materials and counselling sessions were provided to victims of xenophobia in South Africa.

6.3 Recommendations

In the light of the study the following recommendations are made:

6.3.1 To the Government

- On the issue of porous borders, especially land borders, the government of South Africa should beef up security and fortify these borders.

- Nepotism and ethnic gerrymandering among ethnic groups in South Africa should be discouraged.

- Politicians who incite violence against migrants through inflammatory language should be told the consequences of such pronouncements.

- As a signatory to human rights conventions, the South African government ought to honour these agreements by enforcing them in the country.

- Traditional leadership should be educated on the benefits of migrant presence in South Africa.

- Corruption should be classified as a crime against humanity, whereby those who perpetrate fraud be prosecuted accordingly.

- The government of South Africa should provide job opportunities for its citizens and also address issues of poverty and inequality among the masses.

- Professionalism of SAPS by meeting their demands for better effectiveness.

- The promotion of Pan-Africanism and Ubuntu amongst the inhabitants of South Africa.

- Sanitise the DHA and SAPS of corruption.

- The promotion of social cohesion amongst locals and migrant communities in South Africa.

- Xenophobia ought to be criminalised and perpetrators of violence against foreign nationals be prosecuted accordingly.

197

- Irrespective of nationality, criminals in South Africa must be exposed and made to face the full wrath of the law.

6.3.2 To the Church and Civil Society Fraternity

- Alternative sources of funding be sought for so as to function effectively.

- Erection of permanent structures that will accommodate African migrants during xenophobic attacks.

- Educate the locals on the benefits of migrant population and the gains of tolerance.

6.3.3 To the Academics

- Engage the government in healthy and fruitful discourses on the issues of belonging. Findings from such engagement should be documented and policy recommendation be made to the state for implementation.

- Designing a curriculum which historicizes the liberation struggle and the role played by other African states in the emancipation of South Africa from apartheid rule.

6.3.4 To Other African States

- Making their states conducive by embracing democratic values and creating an enabling environment for law abiding citizens to go about their businesses daily without fear, hindrance, victimisation, persecution or any form of harassment by the government of the day.

- The establishment of antigraft agencies to fight the menace of corruption. Government should grant such agencies autonomy, disapprove the guilty ones by allowing impartiality to reign so that justice will be served with offenders having to face the full arm of the law.

- African states should enforce legislations in curtailing the activities of human trafficking syndicates by seeing this as a crime against humanity.

- Immigrants from sending countries must be educated on the need to respect the laws in host countries and be told the consequences that await offenders or violators of such laws.

6.3.5 To the African Union

- Xenophobia should not be viewed as a South African problem, but as an African problem. It is an internal problem in Africa that has been exported to South Africa. The host nation is now being taken as an area for that particular problem. Now that xenophobia is affecting many African countries especially in South Africa. There is need for the African Union or research as an African problem located in South Africa. This emanates from the fact that most of the people who are victims of xenophobia are economic fugitives from their own countries, so as they come to South Africa they are considered as burdens. There is need to look at this from a perspective of an African problem.

- Address the issue of governance and protracted civil wars in Africa.

- Assist unstable economies to attain stability through disbursement of grants to aid development.

- Strengthen democracy in autocratic African states.

- Enable the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to prosecute despots on the African continent.

- Encourage African states to commit more funds to education.

6.3.6 Department of Human Settlements

- Transparency in the allocation of RDP houses.

- Zero tolerance for corrupt government officials.

- Locals who deserve RDP housing should be allocated accordingly.

- Re-allocation of RDP houses initially given to African migrants should now be given to deserving South African nationals.

199

6.3.7 International Relations Offices on University Campuses

- International students with legal study permits should be assisted when having issues with SAPS or DHA officials.

- International relations offices should liaise with the DHA for prompt renewal and issuance of study permits for international students registered in South African universities.

6.3.8 South African Police Services

- The police should be trained professionally to attend to African migrants in a professional manner.

- Extortion or harassment of any form should be discouraged.

- The police should make good use of intelligence gathered to forestall impending xenophobic violence.

- Citizens and non-citizens caught in crime irrespective of status in society should be prosecuted by the police.

6.3.9 Conclusion

This study explored the concept of politics of belonging as a response to socio-economic challenges plaguing post-1994 South Africa. It sought to identify the reasons behind the recurrent anti-immigrant violence in contemporary South Africa, noticing the way migrants are being stereotyped in the country. While a lot of research on xenophobia exists, while envisioning what a peaceful South Africa could look like and how it can come to fruition. Efforts need to be geared up to resolve these identity conflicts which results in migrant demonization, violent exclusion, bias and deprivation of fundamental human rights of migrants' resident in South Africa.

The notion of belonging in South Africa has been politicised and redefined through the execution of xenophobia by locals towards African foreign nationals and Asians who live and operate in townships and informal settlements. This thesis posits that violent xenophobia in South Africa is

rooted in class dimension. That is why it is poor black African migrants and Asians living and operating in townships and informal settlements who have been the main targets and victims of violent xenophobia. Xenophobia in South Africa indicates high levels of intolerance and resentment of foreign migrants by locals. This thesis further explained politics of belonging through social identity, identity politics and framing theories. Xenophobia is ubiquitous in South Africa, from the indigents at grassroots level, to the top government functionaries, traditional authorities, politicians, police, immigration, media and even government policies which is most likely depicted by attitudes and responses exhibited through unguarded statements, violence (internal displacements, forced removals, looting and destruction of foreign-owned businesses, spaza shops and necklacing), populism and nationalism. Xenophobia is prevalent in different sectors and communities of South Africa although it does not always manifest itself in violent ways all the time. In townships, poor inner city neighbourhoods and in informal settlements, xenophobia tends to take a violent form. This is largely because the competition for scarce resources is much more intense in such places.

Xenophobia becomes toxic when locals embark on rampage, looting, destroying and killing African and Asian migrants. However, subtle forms of xenophobia practised say by immigration officials may not lead to death, but humiliate migrants in the way and manner they are being treated or profiled. Medical xenophobia also occurs when migrants are being treated unfairly in health institutions located in different provinces across South Africa. These varied forms of xenophobia impact differently on notions or politics of belonging by strengthening the 'we' and 'them' narrative or 'insider' and 'outsider' discourse. These forms of treatment still point to the fact that African migrants do not have a sense of belonging in contemporary South Africa.

Any plan to mitigate the menace of xenophobia must take into account how it manifests in class dimension. It is important to meticulously engage and enlighten South African nationals on ideologies of Pan-Africanism and Ubuntu and the positive roles played by African states in the bid to emancipate South Africa from the grip of bondage and oppression of the apartheid regime. Additionally, top government functionaries, politicians and traditional leadership should desist from making unguarded and obnoxious utterances that may trigger xenophobic violence. The media ought to exercise restraint in bad reportage of migrants by disseminating balanced and fair news according to the ethics of their profession. The DHA and SAPS officials should not denigrate

201

migrants especially those from Africa and Asia, but rather apply courtesy and humanity when relating with them. South Africa needs to boost her image on the international scene by showing greater political will by ensuring the practice of democracy and also uphold the values of *Ujamaa* (African Brotherhood) and reflect a true rainbow nation. Eliminating xenophobia will cement democratic tenets in South Africa, restore hope and confidence and portray South Africa as a true ambassador of Africa in the international community.

The government should be commended in the handling of the current wave of xenophobia which occurred in parts of Gauteng in September 2019. Noting that South Africa is a migrant receiving country which advocates for migrant integration, the number of refugees and asylum seekers flooding the country almost on a daily basis has placed huge financial burdens on the state. It is noteworthy that the country also has its own domestic problems that it is grappling with. So the answer to violent xenophobia lies in addressing the economic disparities that currently exist in South Africa. Also, African and Asia countries must address the economic, political and social conditions that make their citizens desperate migrants who end up trying to establish themselves in already poor and crime infested townships of South Africa.

I submit that the culture of ubuntu would promote peace and harmony between insiders and outsiders. However, the diverse issues raised in this thesis if not addressed will cost South Africa a lot politically and economically.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbink, J. (2011) 'Land to the foreigners': economic, legal, and socio-cultural aspects of new land acquisition schemes in Ethiopia, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:4, 513-535, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2011.603213.

Abdi, C (2013) "Xenophobia and its Discontents in South Africa". Aljazeera News Bulletin. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201361895126526626.html. Accessed 5 May 2019.

Abrams, D., and Hogg, M. A. 1988. Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem in social Identity and intergroup discrimination. European Journal of Social Psychology, 18, 317-334.

Abrahams, D 2010. A Synopsis of Urban Violence in South Africa. International Review of the Red Cross 92,878:495 - 520.

Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa Annual Report. 2006. South Africa.

Adam, H. and Moodley, K. 2013. Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Citizenship and Identity in South Africa, Germany and Canada. Stellenbosch: Sun Press.

Adebajo, A., and Landsberg, C. 2003. South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons, in Mwesiga, B. and Landsberg, C. (Eds). From Cape to Congo: South Africa's Evolving Security Challenges. London: Lynne Rienner.

Adeleke, B.O., Omitola, A. A., and Olukole, T.O. 2008. *Impacts of Xenophobia Attacks on Tourism.* IFE PsychologIA.

Adeogun, T., & Faluyi, O. 2018. Xenophobia, racism and the travails of black immigrants in South Africa. In A. O. Akinola (Ed.), The political economy of xenophobia in Africa (pp. 125 134). Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.

Adepoju, A. 2005. Migration in West Africa. A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme. Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM).

Adjai, C. and Lazaridis, G. 2013. Migration, xenophobia and the new racism in post-apartheid South Africa. International Journal of Social Sciences, 1(1): 192-205.

African National Congress (ANC).1994, The Reconstruction and Development Programme. A Policy Framework Umanyano Johannesburg. 1-147.

203

African National Congress (ANC). 2008. "Extracts from 2007 (ANC) Conference Documents: Rural Development, Land Reform and Agrarian Change." In Wealth Doesn't Trickle Down: The Case for a Developmental State, edited by Ben Turok, 12–35. Cape Town: New Agenda.

Agyeno, O. 2019. Xenophobic Violence and the African Philosophy of Ubuntu in South Africa. African Journal of Democracy and Governance. Vol 6 (1).

Ajala, A. 1983. The Nature of African Boundaries in African Spectrum, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1983: pp. 177-189.

Ajulu, E. (2010). Introduction: A region in transition: Towards a new integration agenda in East Africa. In R. Ajulu (Ed.), *A region in transition: Towards a new integration agenda in East Africa*. Trust Africa and Institute for Global Dialogue: Midrand.

Akande, D.O, Musarurwa, H.J and Kaye, S.B. 2018. Students' Attitudes and Perceptions on Xenophobia: A Study of a University in Durban. Journal of Student Affairs in Africa. Volume 6(2) 2018, 1–17.

Akin, J. 2003. Escalation-Limiting Language. Available at https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/escalation-limiting_language%20. Accessed 26 February 2020.

Akindès, F. 2004. Les Racines de La Crise Militaro-Politique En Côte d'Ivoire. Abidjan and Dakar: CODESRIA.

Akindès F. 2009. 'South African mediation in the Ivorian crisis', in Shillinger K (ed.), Africa's peacemaker? Lessons from South African conflict mediation, Johannesburg: Fanele.

Akinola, A.O., 2014, 'South Africa and the two faces of xenophobia: A critical reflection', Africa Peace & Conflict Journal 7(1), 56–67.

Akinola, A.O. 2018 (a). The South African Xenophobic Question: A Reflection on the Complicity of State Actors Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. Vol. 7, (Number 1), June 2018 pp 53-79.

Akinola, A.O 2018 (b). The Scourge of Xenophobia from Zambia to Botswana: In A.O. Akinola (ed) The Political Economy of Xenophobia in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, Springer International Publishing AG 2018.

Akokpari, J.K. 1999 (a). International Migration, Xenophobia and the Dilemma of the South African State. Unpublished Paper.

Akokpari, J.K .1999 (b). The Political Economy of Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. African Sociological Review 3 (1):75-93.

Akuki, A. 2012. Xenophobia: Threat to Nigeria-South Africa Trade Relationship. The Independent Newspaper. Available at http://www.independent.ng/xenophobia-threat-to-nigeria-southafrica-trade-relationship/ accessed March 12 , 2019.

Albahari, M. 2018. "From Right to Permission: Asylum, Mediterranean Migrations, and Europe's War on Smuggling", Journal on Migration and Human Security 20 (10): 1–10.

Alexander, P. 2010. Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests – A Preliminary Analysis. Review of African Political Economy, 37:123.

Allen, K. A., and Kern, M. L. 2017. School Belonging in Adolescents: Theory, Research, and Practice. Singapore: Springer.

Alston, M. and Bowles, W. 2003. Research for Caring Professionals: An Introduction to Methods. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.

Amisi, P., Bond, P. , Cele N. and Ngwane, T. 2011. Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban's Structured Social Divisions. Politikon, 38: 1, 59-83.

Amit, R. 2015. Queue Here for Corruption – Measuring Irregularities in South Africa's Asylum System. Lawyers for Human Rights and The African Centre for Migration & Society Research Report. Available at < http://www.lhr.org.za/publications/queue-here-corruption-measuringirregularities-south-africa%E2%80%99s-asylum-system>. Accessed May 2, 2019.

Amit, R., and Kriger, N. 2014. Making Migrants' Illegible: The Policies and Practices of Documentation in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Kronos, 40 (1), 269-290.

Amusan, L. and Mchunu, S. 2017. An Assessment of Xenophobic/Afrophobic Attacks in South Africa (2008–2015): Whither *Batho Pele* and *Ubuntu* Principles? South African Review of Sociology, 48:4, 1-18.

Anene, J. C. 1971. *The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1885-1960: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation.* London: Longman Group Limited.

Anthias. F and Lazaridis, G. 2000. Gender and Migration in Southern Europe: Women on the Move. Oxford: Berg.

Antonsich M .2010. Searching for belonging: An Analytical Framework. Geography Compass 4(6): 644–659.

Appiah, K. 2005. The Ethics of Identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Asakitikpi, A. O., and Gadzikwa, J. 2015. Reactions and actions to xenophobia in South Africa. An Analysis of the Herald and The Guardian Online Newspapers. Global Media Journal Edition, 9(2), 216–247.

Asiwaju, A. I. 1983.The Concept of Frontier in the Setting of States in Pre-colonial Africa Présence Africaine. Nos 127/128.

Asiwaju, A. I. 1985. The conceptual framework. In A. I. Asiwaju (Ed.), Partitioned Africans. 1-18. New York: St. Martin's.

A.U Constitutive Act Available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf. Accessed May 2, 2019.

Babbie, E. 2007. The Practice of Social Research. 11th ed. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.

Babbie, E. 2010. The Practice of Social Research. Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Babbie, E. 2013. The Practice of Social Research. London: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2001. The Practice of Social Research. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Babbie, E., and Mouton, J. 2012. The practice of social research. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Baisley, E. 2014. Genocide and constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda. *Race and Class*, *55*(3), 38–59.

Ballard, R. Habib, and A. Valodia, I. 2006. Voices of protest: Social movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Basok, T. 2004. Post-National Citizenship, Social Exclusion, and Migrants' Rights: Mexican Seasonal Workers in Canada. Citizenship Studies 8,1: 47-64.

Baubock, R. 2019. Mare Nostrum: The Political Ethics of Migration in the Mediterranean. Comparative Migration Studies. 7 (4):1 – 15.

Bauer, N 2013. Diepsloot: Crime, Xenophobia - or Both? Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-05-28- 38 diepsloot-crime-xenophobia-or-both. Accessed March 12 2019.

Baxter, P., and Jack, S. 2008. Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers. The Qualitative Report, 13(4), 544-559. Available at https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol13/iss4/2. Accessed March 10 2019.

Bearak, B. 2011. *Watching the Murder of an Innocent Man*. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/magazine/watching-the-murder-of-an-innocent-man.html?mcubz=3. Accessed March 10 2019.

Beetar, M. 2019. A Contextualisation of the 2008 and 2015 Xenophobic Attacks: Tracing South African Necropolitics. Current Sociology, 67(1), 122-140.

Bekker, S. 2015. Violent Xenophobic Episodes in South Africa, 2008 and 2015. *African Human Mobility Review* Vol 1 No 3.

Bekker, S., Eigelaar-Meets, I., Eva, G. and Poole, C., 2008. Xenophobia and Violence in South Africa: A Desktop Study of the Trends and a Scan of Explanations Offered. University of Stellenbosch.

Benedict, A. 1983. Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Bénit-Gbaffou, C. and Piper, L. 2012. Party Politics, the Poor and the City: Reflections from the South African Case. Geoforum, SI - Party Politics, the Poor and the City: Reflections from South Africa, 43(2),173–177.

Bennett, B. 2017. "America First," A Phrase with a Loaded Anti-Semitic and Isolationist History. Los Angeles Times, January 20. Available http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-poltrump-america-first-20170120-story.html. Accessed February 10 2020.

Benson, P. 2008. El Campo: Faciality and Structural Violence in Farm Labour Camps. Cultural Anthropology (Wiley-Blackwell), 23(4), 589-629.

Berg, B.L. 2007. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Boston Allyn and Bacon.

Bezuidenhout, A and Buhlungu, S, 2011. From Compounded to Fragmented Labour: Mineworkers and the Demise of Compounds in South Africa. Antipode 43(2), 237–63.

Bhardwaj, V. 2016. Are There 30 Service Delivery Protest a Day in South Africa? Africacheck. 8 June. Available at: https://africacheck.org/reports/are-there30-service-delivery-protests-a-day-in-south-africa-2/ Accessed March 15 2019.

Biekpe, N. 2008. The Economics of Xenophobia. Africa Growth Agenda, July-September. pp 45.

Biersteker, T.J. and Weber, C. 1996. The Social Construction of State Sovereignty, in T. J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds) State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Billig, M. 2002. Henri Tajfel's 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' and the Psychology of Bigotry. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41: 171–188.

Bisrat, W.K. 2014. International Migration and its Socio-Economic Impact on Migrant Sending Households Evidence from Irob Woreda, Eastern Zone of Tigray. Regional State College of Business and Economics, Mekelle University, Ethiopia.

Bless, C. and Higson-Smith. 1995. Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective Cape Town.

Bloch, A. 2008. Gaps in Protection: Undocumented Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa. *Migration Studies Working Paper Series*. No 38. Forced Migration Studies Programme University of the Witswatersrand.

Bloor, M. and Bloor, T. 2007. The Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis. An Introduction. London: Hodder Arnold.

Bobb, S. 2010. Poverty, Inequality Blamed for 2008 Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa. Available at http://www.voanews.com/articleprientview/160358.html. Accessed 25 May 2019.

Bogdan, R.C. and Biklen, S.K. 2007. Qualitative Research for Education: An Introduction to Theory and Methods. 5th Edition, Allyn and Bacon, Boston.

Bollig, M., 1990, 'Ethnic conflicts in North West Kenya: Pokot-Turkana raiding 1969-1984.' Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 115: 73-90

Bond, P., Ngwane, T., and Amisi, B. 2010. *Synthesis Report: Xenophobia and Civil Society: Why Did It Happen?* University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society.

Booysen, S. 2007. With the Ballot and the Brick; The Politics of Attaining Service Delivery. *Progress in Development Studies* 7 (123): 21-32.

Booysen, S. 2009. Public Participation in Democratic South Africa: From Popular Mobilization to Structural Cooptation and Protest. *Politeia* 28(1):1-27.

Bouillon, A. 2001 African Francophone Migrants to South Africa: Languages, Images and Relationships. In A Morris and A Bouillon (eds). African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone Migration of the 1990s, Pretoria: Protea and IFAS. 112-49

Bozzoli, B. 2004. Theatres of struggle and the end of apartheid, Johannesburg, Wits University Press.

Bracking, S and Sachikonye, L. 2006. Remittances, Poverty Reduction and the Information of the Household Well-Being in Zimbabwe, Working Paper, No. 45, Global Poverty Research Group, Oxford.

Brand South Africa, 2015. African Union Statement on Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa. Available at https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/south-africa-fast-facts/news-facts/african-union-statement-on-xenophobic-attacks-in-south-africa accessed March 12 , 2019.

Brand South Africa. 2015. Zuma Condemns Xenophobic Attacks. Available at https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/south-africa-fast-facts/news-facts/zuma-condemns xenophobia. Accessed April 10 2019.

Brewer, P. R., and Gross, K. .2005. Values, Framing and Citizens Thoughts About Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quality. Political Psychology, 26(6), 926–968.

Brochmann G. 1999. Mechanism of Immigration Control in Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies G. Brochmann and T. Hammer (eds.), New York: Berg.

Brown, W. 1995. State of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Bruner, J. 1990. Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brunt, R. 1989. "The Politics of Identity" in S. Hall and M. Jacques, New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s, London, Lawrence & Wishart. 150-159.

Bulbulia, M. I. 2015. 'Who's saying what about Xenophobia, from the Zulu King to the eThekwini Mayor, *Daily Vox,* 15 April; Available online at: http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/ whos-saying-what-about-xenophobia-from-the-zulu-king-to-the-ethekwini-mayor/. Accessed on 9 April 2019.
Burger, J. 2009.The reasons Behind Service Delivery Protests in South Africa. Available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-reasons-behind-service-delivery-protests-insouth-africa-2009-08-05. Accessed April 9 2019.

Buthelezi, M. 1997. Minister of home affairs: Introductory speech-budget debate. National Assembly

Calamur, K. 2017. A short history of "America First." The Atlantic, January 21. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-america-first/514037/ Accessed 10 January 2020.
Calhoun, C. 1991. "The Problem of Identity in Collective Action." In Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology, ed. Joan Huber. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Calhoun, C. 2003. "Belonging" in the cosmopolitan imaginary. Ethnicities, 3, 531–568.

Campbell, Eugene. 2006. Reflections on Illegal Immigration in Botswana and South Africa, *African Population Studies*, 21, 23-44.

Carlsson, M and Eriksson, S (2017). Do attitudes expressed in surveys predict ethnic discrimination?, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40:10, 1739-1757, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2016.1201580

Castelli,F. 2018. Drivers of migration: why do people move?, *Journal of Travel Medicine*, Volume 25, Issue 1, 2018, tay040, https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/tay040.

Castles, S., and Miller, M. J. 1993. The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world. London: Macmillan.

Castles, S 2000 "International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century: Global Trends and Issues," International Social Science Journal, No. 165:269-281.

Cele, S. 2015. Why are foreigners under attack in SA? City Press. Available at http://www.citypress.co.za/news/why-are-foreigners-under-attack-in-south-africa/. Accessed April 09, 2019,

Chabal, P. 2009. Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling. London: Zed Books.

Chaj, S.M. 2008. Nigerians and Dividends of Democracy. In Guest Article, 27 August,2008.

Charman, A. and Piper, L., 2013, 'Xenophobia, criminality and violent entrepreneurship: Violence against Somali shopkeepers in Delft South, Cape Town, South Africa', *South African Review of Sociology* 43, 81-105.

Charmaz, K., 2006. Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis, Sage, Thousand Oaks.

Cheek, J. 2008. 'Research Design', in: Given, L.M. (ed.). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. London, SAGE, pp. 761-733.

Chenali, R. 2012. Research Methods Categorisation. In L. Given (Ed), The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Chibuzor, O., Ajah, B. O., Onyedikachi, M., and Chukwuma, Q. 2017. Xenophobia and Nigeria – South Africa Relations. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 22(10), 61–69..

Chinweizu, I. 1987. Decolonising the African Mind. Lagos: Pero Press.

Chong, D., and Druckman, J. N. 2007. Framing theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 103–126.

Chirwa, W, C. 1998. Aliens and AIDS in Southern Africa: The Malawi-South Africa Debate. Africa Affairs. Available at: http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/97/386/53.short. Accessed July 28 2019.

Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI), 2009. Tolerating Intolerance: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. Available online at http://goo.gl/yQgJ7m Accessed May 28 2019.

Clarke, M and Bassett, C. 2016. The struggle for transformation in South Africa: unrealised dreams, persistent hopes, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 34:2, 183-189.

Claassen, C. 2017. Explaining South African Xenophobia. Afro Barometer Working Paper No. 173.

Coburn, D. 2004. Beyond the Income Inequality Hypothesis: Class, Neo-liberalism, and Health Inequalities. Social Science and Medicine, 58(1), 41.

Cohen, A.P. 1982. 'Belonging: The experience of culture', in Cohen, Anthony P. (ed.) Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Communities, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Cohen, R., 1997, Global diasporas: An introduction, University of Washington Press, Seattle.

Coleman, J.S. 1954. "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," The American Political Science Review, 48: 404–26.

Coliver, S. 1992. *Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination.* London: Article 19; Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.

Comaroff, L., and Comaroff, J. 1997. Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 2, The Dialectics of Modernity of a South African Frontier. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. 2001. Narrating the nation: Aliens, apocalypse and the postcolonial state. Journal of Southern African Studies, 27(1), 627–651. https://doi.org/10.1080/13632430120074626.

Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. 2002. Alien-nation: Zombies, Immigrants, and Millennial Capitalism. South Atlantic Quarterly, 101(4), 779–805. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-101-4-779.

Connolly, L. (2014) 'Fragility and the State: Post-apartheid South Africa and the State-Society Contract in the 21 st Century', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 13(2), pp. 87–112.

Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CORMSA), 2011. Protecting refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in South Africa during 2010. Johannesburg: CORMSA.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1996. [O]. Available: http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf Accessed 0n 2020/01/29

Corder, C. K. 1997. "The Reconstruction and Development Programme: Success or Failure?" *Social Indicators Research*, vol. 41, no. 1/3, 1, pp. 183–203. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/27522262.

Cornish, J.J. 2015. Xenophobic attacks erupt in South Africa's Limpopo province. Available at http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20150305-xenophobic-attacks-south-africa-limpopo. Accessed April 9 2019.

COSATU. 2005. "A Developmental State for South Africa?" Discussion Paper for the 2005 Central Committee Meeting, Johannesburg.

Cozby, P. C. 2007. Methods in behavioral research. 9th edition. McGrawHill, New York

Cressida, H. 2009. "Identity Politics". The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Creswell, J.W.2007. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. London: SAGE.

Creswell, J. W. 2009. Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approach. (3rd ed). London: SAGE Publication.

Creswell, J. W. 2013. Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cronje, F. 2009. Democracy Does not Allow this, The Star, Letters, 19 October.

213

University of Venda

Cronje, F., van Wyk, D and Botha, D. 2010. The FIFA World Cup-Service Delivery, 'Afrophobia' and Brand Imperialism: Through the Eyes of Frantz Fanon. *Alternation*, 17, 2.

Cronje, F. 2014. Behind the Rise of Protest action in South Africa. Available at http://www.politicsweb.co.za/new-and-analysis/behind-the-rise-of-protest-action-in-south-africa. Accessed on 9th May 2016

Croucher, S. 1998. South Africa's Illegal Aliens: Constructing National Boundaries in a Post-Apartheid State. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21.

Crowe, S., Cresswell, K., Robertson, A., Huby, G., Avery, A., and Sheikh, A. 2011. The case study approach. BMC Medical Research Methodology, 11(1), 100-109. doi:10.1186/1471-2288-11-100.

Crowther, J. and Martin, I. 2005. Learning Democracy and Activating Citizens: A Role for Universities. In Wildemeersch, D., Stroobants, V. & Bron Jr, M. (eds.). Active Citizenship and Multiple Identities in Europe: A Learning Outlook. Berlin/New York: Peter Lang.

Crush, J., Jeeves, A and. Yudelman, D. 1991. South Africa's Labour Empire: A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines. Boulder and Cape Town: Westview Press and David Philip

Crush, J. 2000. "Migration Past: An Historical Overview of Cross-Border Movement in Southern Africa." Pp. 12-24 in On Borders: Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa, edited by David A. McDonald. New York: St. Martin's Press, Southern African Migration Project.

Crush, J .2001. The dark side of democracy: Migration, xenophobia and human rights in South Africa. International Migration, 38(6), 103-133.

Crush, J. and McDonald, D. 2001. Introduction to Special Issue: Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid. Africa Today, 48(3), pp.1–13.

Crush, J. and Tshitereke, C., 2001, 'Contesting Migrancy: The Foreign Labour Debate in Post-apartheid South Africa', Africa Today 48(3), 115–137. https://doi. org/10.2979/AFT.2001.48.3.48

Crush, J. and McDonald, D. 2002. Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid, *Africa Today*, 48, 1-14.

Crush, J., and Pendleton, W. 2004. Regionalizing xenophobia? Citizen attitudes to immigration and refugee policy in Southern Africa. Canada: Southern African Migration Project.

Crush, J. 2005 (a). Migration in Southern Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 27(1),

Crush, J .2005 (b). Breaking with Isolation: Johannesburg, South Africa, In Marcello Balbo, ed., *International Migrants and the City* (Nairobi: UNHABITAT).

Crush, J. 2008. The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa. Southern African Migration Project, Migration Policy Series, 50, Cape Town: Southern African Research Centre.

Crush, J., Ramachandran, S. and Pendleton, W. 2013. Soft Targets: Xenophobia, Public Violence and Changing Attitudes to Migrants in South Africa After May 2008. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 64, Cape Town.

Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. 2014. Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, Realism. SAMP Migration Policy Series No 66, Cape Town and Waterloo.
Crush J and Tawodzera G. 2014. Medical xenophobia and Zimbabwean migrant access to public health services in South Africa. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40(4):655–670.

Crush, J., and S. Ramachandran. 2015. "Doing Business with Xenophobia." In Mean Streets: Migration, Xenophobia and Informality in South Africa, edited by J. Crush, A. Chikanda and C. Skinner, 25–59. Ontario: SAMP.

Crush, J. 2017. Mythologies of Migration and the Informal Sector. Special Issue of Africa Human Mobility Review 3(2).

Crush, J., Tawodzera, G,. Chikanda, A and Tevera, D. 2017. Living with Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Informal Enterprise in South Africa. Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP). Migration Policy Series NO. 77.

Dachs, B. 2015. Migrant entrepreneurs and inclusive growth in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In: South Africa Conference Report, Cape Town, 2015. Cape Town: ACC.

Dahrendorf, R et al. 1995. Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in a Free Society. London.

Danso, R and McDonald, D.A 2000. Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Press in Post-Apartheid South Africa. SAMP Migration Policy Series Paper No 17.

Davenport, R. and Saunders, C. 2002. South Africa: A modern history. London: Great Britain Publishers

David, W. 2009. *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Davids, I., Theron, F. and Maphunye, K. J. 2005. Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers

Davidson, N. 2000 The Origins of Scottish Nationhood. Pluto Press, London.

Davies, W.M. and Beaumont, T.J. 2007. Literature Reviews, Business, Melbourne

De Blij, H. 1993. Human Geography: Culture, Society and Space. New York: Willey.

de Coninck, L .2018. The uneasy boundary work of 'coconuts' and 'black diamonds': middle-class labelling in post-apartheid South Africa, Critical African Studies.

De Villiers, Rian, and Weda, Zenzele. 2017. Zimbabwean teachers in South Africa: A transient greener pasture. *South African Journal of Education*, *37*(3).

De Vos, A.S. Strydom, C.B. & Fouche, C.L.S. 2011. Research at Grass Roots: For the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions, Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.

Deng, F. 1995. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Denscombe, M. (2002). Ground rules for good research: A Ten Point Guide. Milton Keynes: The Open University Press.

Denzin, NK & Lincoln, YS. 1994. Introduction: Entering the Field of Qualitative Research. In NK Denzin and YS Lincoln (Eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 1-17). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. 2011. The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (5th Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Department of Finance (DOF), 1996. Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy (Gear). Pretoria: Ministry of Finance.

Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 2016. "Green Paper on International Migration", Government Gazette, No. 40088, Department of Home Affairs, Government of South Africa, Pretoria.

Department of Home Affairs (DHA). 2017. White Paper on International Migration in South Africa. Policy Report.

DePoy, E., & Gilson, S. 2008. Evaluation practice: How to do Good Evaluation Research in Work Settings. New York: Taylor and Francis.

Desai, A. 2010. After the Rainbow: Following the Footprints of the May 2008 Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 37(1), 99–105.

Dinbabo, M.F. and Nyasulu, T. 2015. Macroeconomic determinants: Analysis of Pull Factors of International Migration in South Africa. African Human Mobility Review (AHMR). 1(1): 27-52.

Dodson, B and Oelofse, C. 2000. Shades of Xenophobia: InMigrants and Immigrants in Mizamoyethu, Cape Town. Canadian Journal of African Studies 34,1: 124 - 148.

Dodson, B., 2010. Locating Xenophobia: Debate, discourse, and everyday experience in Cape Town, South Africa', Africa Today 56(3), 2–22.

Dorman, S., D. Hammett, and P. Nugent .2007. Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa, Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Doxtader, E., and Salazar P., 2007. *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation*, Claremont,

Druckman, J. N. 2001. The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence. Political Behaviour, 23(3), 225–256.

Druckman, D. 2005. Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis. London: SAGE.

Dube, G. 2019. Black South Africans' Attitudes Toward African Immigrants between 2008 and 2016, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 25:2, 191-210.

Duncan, J. 2003. To Say or Not to Say: The Dilemma of Radio Broadcasting in the Light of South Africa's Constitution. Presentation to the Association for Christian Broadcasters conference. 11-12 February. Johannesburg.

Duncan, N. 2005. Understanding Collective Violence in Collective Violence in Apartheid and Post-Apartheid South Africa. **:** African Safety Promotion, Volume 3, Issue 1, 5 – 22.

Duncan, N. 2012. Reaping the Whirlwind: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, 3(1), 104–112.

Durokifa, A and Ijeoma, E. 2017. The Post-Apartheid Xenophobic. Attacks in South Africa: A Reflection on Government Interference. African Population Studies. VOL 31 (1).

Dzimiri, P., Runhare, T., Dzimiri, C. and Mazorodze, W. 2014. Naming, Identity, Politics and Violence in Zimbabwe. Studies of Tribes and Tribals 12(2), 227–238.

Ebenstein, W. and Ebenstein A. 2013. Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present. Cengage Learning.

Economic Development Department (EDD). 2010. The New Growth Path: The Framework. Pretoria: Economic Development Department.

Elbourne, E., 2003. The Sin of the Settler: The 1835 – 36 Select Committee on Aborigines and Debates over Virtue and Conquest in the Early Nineteenth-Century British White Settler Empire, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 4, 3 , 1 – 49.

Eliastam, J.L.B., 2015. Exploring Ubuntu Discourse in South Africa: Loss, Liminality and Hope, Verbum et Ecclesia 36(2), Art. #1427.

Eliseev A and Mkhize V .2015. KZN xenophobia: 14-year-old boy shot dead. Eyewitness News. Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2015/04/15/KZN-Xenophobia-14-year-old-boy-shot-dead. Accessed 9, April 2019.

ENCA 2015. Gigaba Apologises to Foreigners Following Isipingo Attacks. Available at https://www.enca.com/south-africa/gigaba-apologises-foreigners-after-attacks-isipingo Accessed on 12 April 2019.

ENCA. 2017. "WATCH: Gigaba Addresses Xenophobic Attacks." eNCA news, 23 February. http://www.enca.com/south-africa/catch-it-livegigaba-addresses-xenophobic-attacks. Accessed 9 April 2019.

Endoh, F.T 2015. Democratic constitutionalism in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Interim Constitution Revisited, Africa Review, 7:1, 67-79.

Everatt, D. 2010. Overview and prospects. In D. Everatt (Ed.), South African Civil Society and Xenophobia. Johannesburg: Strategy and Tactics.

Everatt, D. 2011. Xenophobia, Civil Society and South Africa, Politikon, 38:1, 1-5.

Eye Witness News (EWN) 2018. Home Affairs Still Faces Security Challenges at Various Borders. Available at https://ewn.co.za/2018/03/29/home-affairs-still-faces-security-challenges-at-various-borders. Accessed April 10 2019. Fabricious, P. 2014. Is Xenophobia Becoming Part of the SA Way of Life? Politicsweb. Available at http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71616/page71619. Accessed April 10 2019.

Fairclough, N and Wodak, R. 1997. "Critical Discourse Analysis." Teun A. van Dijk, ed. Discourse as Social Interaction, Vol 2. London: Sage.

Fairlie, W. 2012. Immigrant entrepreneurs and small business owners, and their access to financial capital. SBA Office of Advocacy. Available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs396tot.pdf; Accessed 9 April 2019.

Fanon, F. 1952. *Black Skin, White Masks.* Trans. Richard Philcox, New York: Grove

Farmer, P. 2004. An Anthropology of Structural Violence. *Current Anthropology* 45 (3): 305–317. Favell, A. 1999. To Belong or Not to Belong: The Postnational Question. The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Contemporary Europe. A. Geddes and A. Favell. Aldershot, Ashgate: 209–227.

Fayomi, O. O., Chidozie, F., and Ayo, C. K. 2015. A Retrospective Study of the Effects of Xenophobia on South Africa-Nigeria Relations. Available at http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/4666/1/Xenophobia%20andx%20NigeriaSouth%20Africa%20%20revised%20version%20for%20submission%202015.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2019

Fearon, J. 1999. Why Ethnic Politics and Pork Tend to Go Together. Mimeo, Stanford University.

Ferreira, L. 2015. Factsheet: Social grants in South Africa – Separating Myth from Reality. Africa Check. A project of the AFP Foundation.

Finn, C. E. 1991. What Ails Education Research? In D. S. Anderson and B. J. Biddle (eds) Knowledge for Policy: Improving Education Through Research. London: Falmer, 39–42.

Fiore T & Lalongo, E. 2018. Introduction: Italy and the Euro–Mediterranean 'Migrant Crisis': National Reception, Lived Experiences, E.U. pressures, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 23:4, 481-489.

Flick, U. 2006. An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London: Sage Publications

Flockermann, M., Ngara, K., Roberts, W. and Castle, A. 2010. 'The Everyday Experience of Xenophobia: Performing The Crossing from Zimbabwe to South Africa', Critical Arts: South North Cultural and Media Studies, 24(2), pp.245-259.

Foreigners Must go Home – King Zwelithini 2015. The Citizen. Available at https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/349347/foreigners-must-go-home-king-zwelithini/. Accessed on12 April 2019.

Forgas, J. P., and Williams, K. D. 2002. The Social Self: Cognitive, Interpersonal, and Intergroup Perspectives. New York: Psychology Press.

Forrest, J. and Dunn, K.M. 2007, 'Constructing Racism in Sydney, Australia's Largest Ethnic City' Urban Studies, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 699–721.

Foucault, M. 2002. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge.

Freemantle, I. 2012. "The Dangerous Others." *Digital Development Debates*, Prejudice Issue 9 November 2012. Available at http://www.digital-development-debates.org/issue-09-prejudice--people--the-dangerous-others.html. Accessed on12 April 2019.

Friese, H. 2002. Identities. Time, Difference and Boundaries. New York and Oxford: Berghahn.

Fu, M., Exeter, D. J., and Anderson, A. 2015. The Politics of Relative Deprivation: A Transdisciplinary Social Justice Perspective. Social Science & Medicine, VOL 133, 223-232.

Gagiano, J. 1990. Ruling group cohesion. In The Elusive Search for Peace-South Africa, Israel, Northern Ireland, edited by H. Giliomee and J. Gagiano, 191-208. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press.

Game, A .2001. Belonging: Experience in Sacred Time and Space. In: May J and Thrift N (eds) Timespace:

Gammeltoft, T. 2014. Haunting Images: A Cultural Account of Selective Reproduction in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Garland, D. 2001. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gastrow, V. and Amit, R. 2013 Somalinomics: A case study on the economics of Somali trade in the Western Cape. ACMS Research Report 42. Available at < h t t p : / / b i t . l y / 2 a d k Z y h > Accessed April 9 2019.

Gbenenye, E. 2016. African Colonial Boundaries and Nation-Building *Inkanyiso: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol. 8 No. 2*

Geischiere , P. 2009. The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. University of Chicago Press.

Gellner, E. 1964. Thought and Change. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Gevisser M. 2009. Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

Gibson, N. C. 2011. Fanonian Practices in South Africa. Durban: University of KwaZulu- Natal Press.

Glasser, W. 1998. Choice theory: A New Psychology of Personal Freedom. New York: Harper Collins.

Gleason, P. 1983. "Identifying Identity: A Semantic History." Journal of American History 6:910–931.

Goffman E. 1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall.

Gomo, T. 2010. Analysis of Media Reporting and Xenophobia Violence Among Youth in South Africa. MA Thesis. Malmo. Malmo University, Sweden.

Gonzalez-Garcia, J., Hitaj, E., Mlachila, M., Viseth, A., and Yenice, M. 2016. *Sub-Saharan African migration: Patterns and spillovers.* Washington, DC: Spillover Task Force, International Monetary Fund.

Gordon, S. 2010. Migrants in a 'State of Exception': Xenophobia and the Role of the Post-Apartheid State. In Mapadimeng, MS & S Khan (eds): Contemporary Social Issues in Africa: Cases in Gaborone, Kampala and Durban. Pretoria: AISA.

Gordon, S. 2020. Understanding Xenophobic Hate Crime in South Africa. Journal of Public Affairs.

Gqola, P. 2001. Defining People: Analysing Power, Language and Representation in Metaphors of the New South Africa. Transformation, 47, 94–106.

Grant, L. 2014. Research shows sharp increase in service delivery protests. Mail and Guardian. 2014. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-increase-in-service-delivery-protests. Accessed on 19 February 2020.

Green Paper on International Migration in South Africa 2016. South African Department of Home Affairs Government Gazette. No. 40088. Pretoria: Department of Home Affairs; 2016.

Greenstein, R., 2006. Social rights, essential services, and political mobilization in post-apartheid South Africa. Journal of Consumer Policy 29, 17-33.

Grinnell R. M. Jr., & Unrau Y. A. 2005. *Social work research and evaluation: Quantitative and qualitative approaches* (7th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Grinnell, R.M. and Unrau, Y.A. 2008. Social Work Research and Evaluation: Foundations of Evidence-Based Practice. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gui, X. 2017. Which Path the World Might Take: When Trump Asserts "America First" but Xi Advocates Global Cooperation. Chinese Sociological Dialogue Vol 2(1-2) 67 -74.

Gumede, W. 2005. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. London: Zed Books.

Gumede, W. 2017. The Democracy Deficit of Africa's Liberation Movements Turned Governments, Politikon, 44:1, 27-48.

Gupte, J and Mehta, L 2007. 'Disjunctures in Labelling Refugees and Oustees', in Joy Moncrieffe and Rosalind Eyben, eds, The Power of Labelling, p. 66.

Habib, A. 2010. The State of the Nation and Its Public Service in Contemporary South Africa: A Critical Reflection. *Adminitratio Publica* 18 (3): 2-14

Habib, A. 2013. South Africa's Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Hadland, A. , Kondlo, K. , Shisana, O. and Chiroro, P. 2008. Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African Communities. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).

Hadland, A. 2010. Shooting the messenger: Mediating the public and the role of the media in South Africa's xenophobic violence. Africa Development, 35(3), 119–143.

Hagensen, L. 2014. Understanding the Causes and Nature of Xenophobia in South Africa: A Case Study of De Doorns. Unpublished Master's Thesis. University of Stellenbosch.

Hamilton, L., and Bax, D. 2018. Addressing Social Cohesion and Xenophobia in South Africa. Policy Brief, No 2, South Africa. https:// www.saferplaces.org.za/uploads/files/ALPS_-_ social_ cohesion_ and _xenophobia.pdf. Accessed 12 February 2020.

Hampton, M., 2014, 'Will New Land Claims build or destroy South Africa?', *News24*, 06 March, 2014, Available at www,news24.com. Accessed 02 March 2019.

Harris, B. 2001. A Foreign Experience: Violence, Crime and Xenophobia during South Africa's Transition. CSVR. *Violence and Transition Series*, Vol. 5.

Harris, B. 2002. "Xenophobia: A New Pathology for a New South Africa?" In Hook, D and Eagle, G (Eds.) Psychopathology and Social Prejudice. University of Cape Town Press 168-184.

Harris, B. 2003. Spaces of violence, places of fear: Urban conflict in post-apartheid South Africa. Paper presented on the Conflict and Urban Violence Panel, Foro Social Mundial Tematico, Cartagena, Colombia, 16–20 June 2003.

Harris, S, A. Findley, G.M., Nielson, L.D. and Noyes, L.K. 2018. The Economic Roots of Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in the Global South: Evidence from South Africa. Political Research Quarterly2018, Vol. 71(1) 228–24.

Hayem, J. 2013. From May 2008 to 2011: Xenophobic violence and national subjectivity in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 39(1), 77–97.

Hemson, D. & Owusu-Ampomah, K. 2004. A Better Life for All? Service Delivery and Poverty Alleviation. In: Daniel, J., Southall, R. & Lutchman, J. (eds). State of the Nation: South Africa 2004-2005. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 511-537.

Herbst, J. 2000. 'The Politics of Migration and Citizenship' (Chapter Eight) in States and Power in Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 227-248.

Herring, E. and Rangwala G. 2006. Iraq in Fragments, London, Hurst & Company. Hill, D. Jonathan and Wilson, M. Thomas. 2003. "Identity Politics and Politics of Identities", Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 2003, Vol. 10, pp. 1-8.

Hesse-Biber, S.N. and Leavy, P. L. 2011. The Practice of Qualitative Research. Sage publications.

Hickel, J. 2014. 'Xenophobia' in South Africa: Order, chaos, and the moral economy of witchcraft. Cultural Anthropology, 29(1), 103–27.

Hickel, J. 2015. Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa. London: University of California Press.

Hicks, F. 1999. The Constitution, Aliens Control Act, and Xenophobia: The Struggle to Protect South Africa's Pariah—The Undocumented Immigrant. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, Symposium: Globalization at the Margins: Perspectives on Globalization from Developing States, pp. 393-417.

Hiropoulos, A 2017 (a). Migration and Detention in South Africa: A Review of the Applicability and Impact of the Legislative Framework On Foreign Nationals. African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum. Policy Paper NO 18. African Centre for Migration and Society. University of The Witwatersrand.

Hiropoulus, A. 2017 (b). Special Report: Gauteng Xenophobic Attacks. February 2017; Available at: http://www.migration.org.za/uploads/docs/feb-2017_xenowatch-special-report.pdf. Accessed 02 March 2019.

Hobson, C. 2015. *The Rise of Democracy: Revolution, War and Transformations in International Politics since 1776*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hocutt, M 2003. Compassion Without Charity, Freedom Without Liberty: The Political Fantasies of Jean-Jacques Roussaeu. The Independent Review, V, VIII, N.2. 165-191.

Hofmeyr, J., and Govender, R. 2015. National Reconciliation, Race Relations and Social Inclusion. SARB 2015 Briefing Paper 1. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

Holscher, D. and Bozalek, V. 2012. 'Encountering the Other across the Divides: Re-grounding Social Justice as a Guiding Principle for Social Work with Refugees and other Vulnerable Groups', British Journal of Social Work, Vol. 42, no. 6, pp. 1093-112.

Honneth, A.1995. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Horowitz, D.1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Human Rights Watch Report .1998. Refugees and Asylum Seekers with Distinctive Features from far-away Countries Especially Targeted for Abuse. Available http/www/human rights watchreport1998. Accessed 20 February 2020.

Huntington, S. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49.

Hussein, A. 2009. The Use of Triangulation in Social Sciences Research: Can Qualitative and Quantitative Methods be Combined? Journal of Comparative Social Work, 1, 1-12.

Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. 1996. Ethnicity. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Idemudia E.S. 2013. Migration Challenges Among Zimbabwean Refugees before, During and Post Arrival in South Africa. Journal of Injury and Violence Research 2013;5(1):17–27.

Ilesanmi, O.O. 2004. Xenophobic Attacks and Other Violence in South Africa: A Challenge to World Peace. Xenophobia - A Contemporary Issue in psychology. IFE Psychologia, 16(2): 274-295.

Independent News Online. 2000. Xenophobic Attacks: Seven Die in One Month. Available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/xenophobic-attacks-seven-die-in-one-month-45733. Accessed April 10 2019.

International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2009. 'ONE' movement launched to combat xenophobia and racism in South Africa as new study is released. Available at: https://www.iom.int/news/one-movement-launched-combat-xenophobia-and-racism-south africa-new-study-released Accessed 9 August 2019.

International Organisation for Migration. (IOM) 2011. Glossary on Migration, 2nd Edition. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. Available at publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Glossary%202nd%20ed%20web.pdf. Accessed 6th June 2018.

Institute for Security Studies. 2009. The reasons behind service delivery protests in South Africa. Available @ https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-reasons-behind-service-delivery-protests-in-south-africa. Accessed on 5 April 2019.

Iroanya, R., Dzimiri, P. and Phaswana, E. 2018. Human Rights-Based Service Delivery: Assessing the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Democracy and Development in Ghana and Uganda. Regions and Cohesion. Volume 8, Issue 2. 1-26.

Irobi, E., 2005. Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Consortium, University of Colorado, Denver, CO.

Isike, C., and Isike, E. 2012. A Socio-Cultural Analysis of African Immigration to South Africa. Alternation, 19(1), 93–116.

Iyengar, S. 1991. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Jacobs, J. 2016. The Trauma of Home and (non)Belonging in Zimbabwe and its Diaspora: 'Conversion Disorder' in *Shadows* by Novuyo Rosa Tshuma. *Literator, 37*(1).

226

Jäger, S. and Maier, F. 2009. "Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Foucaldian Critical Discourse Analysis and Dispositive Analysis." Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage.

Jamal, S. 2017. "Home Affairs Hits back at Mashaba over Xenophobia Barb." Times Live, 28 February. Available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/02/28/Home-Affairshits-back-at-Mashaba-over-xenophobia-barb1. Accessed 4 May 20019.

Jenkins, R. 1996. *Social Identity*. Routledge, London.

Jenkins, R. 1997. Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations. London: Sage.

Jenkins, R. 2000. Categorization: Identity, Social Process and Epistemology. *Current Sociology*, *48*(3), 7–25.

Jensen, J. 1998. 'Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research.'. SRA-321, Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate, Department of Canadian Heritage, Ottawa.

Johnson, R. B. (1997). Examining the validity structure of qualitative research. Education, 118(2), 282-292.

Joubert, P., 2008. 'The Signs Were There in 2004', Mail & Guardian, 6–12 June 2008, p. 9.

Juran, S. and Broer, N.P . 2017. "A Profile of Germany's Refugee Populations". Population and Development Review, 43(1): 149-157

Jureidini, R. 2003. Migrant workers and xenophobia in the Middle East. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Kajee, A. 2015. Leave or Die: Choice facing Immigrants to South Africa. Aljazeera. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/04/leave-diechoice-facing-immigrants-south-africa-150420103040830.html. Accessed on 5 April 2019.

Kamwimbi, T., Banaszak, K., Khan, S., Morgan, J., Nadori, A. and Ives, A. 2010, "Violation of Human Rights of Disadvantaged and Vulnerable Refugees",

Kanayo, O., Anjofui,P and Stiegler N. 2019. Push and Pull Factors of International Migration: Evidence from Migrants in South Africa. Journal of African Union Studies.

Kang'ethe, S. and Duma, V. 2013. Exploring Dimensions of Post-Apartheid Xenophobic Sentiments Towards African Immigrants in South Africa. Insight on Africa, 5(2), 157–168.

Kannabiran, K., Yuval-Davis. N., and Vieten, U. 20006. The Situated Politics of Belonging. London: Sage Publications.

Karim, Q. 2009. Local leaders behind xenophobic attacks. *Mail and Guardian*, Available from: <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-03-11-local-leaders-behind-xenophobic-attacks> Accessed April 9 2019.

Karriem, A. and Hoskins, M. 2016. From the RDP to the NDP: A Critical Appraisal of the Developmental State, Land Reform, and Rural Development in South Africa. Politikon, 43(3): 325-343.

Kaseeram, I. and Mahadea, D. 2018. Examining the relationship between entrepreneurship, unemployment and education in South Africa using a VECM approach. International Journal of Education Economics and Development (IJEED), Vol. 9, No. 3, 2018.

Kavuro, C. .2015. Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Barriers to Accessing South Africa's Labour Market. Law, Democracy and Development, 19 (1), 2015.

Kawulich, B. B. 2004. Muscogee Women's Identity Development. In Mark Hutter (Ed.), The Family Experience: A Reader in Cultural Diversity (83-93). Boston: Pearson Education.

Keeton G. 2014 Inequality in South Africa. Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation. 74:26-31.

Kellas, G. 1998. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. Palgrave Macmillian.

Keohane M.L.J.and Maphunye K.J. 2015. Afrophobia, Moral and Political Disguises: Sepa leholo ke a moeti. The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 11(4), 83–98.

Kerr, S. P., and Kerr, W.R. 2011. Economic Impacts of Immigration. A Survey. National Bureau of Economic Research (NEBR) Working Paper 16736M.A: Cambridge.

Kgatla, S.T., 2013. Forced Removals and Migration: A Theology of Resistance and Liberation in South Africa. Southern African Journal of Missiology 41(2), 120–132.

Kgatle, M.S., 2017. A Practical Theological Approach to the Challenge of Poverty in Post-1994 South Africa: Apostolic Faith Mission as a Case Study. HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies 73(3).

Khotso, D.E. 2016. Is South Africa Ready to be a Developmental State? Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review. Emerging Issues in Public Sector Reforms in Africa: An Assessment of Ghana and Nigeria.

Khumalo, M.J. 2015. The Role of Tshwane Metropolitan Police in the Prevention and Control of Xenophobia Related Crimes. Masters Dissertation. Pretoria: Tshwane University of Technology.

Khumalo, J.M. and Obioha, E.E 2017. Metropolitan Police Role in the Control of Xenophobia Related Crimes in South Africa: The Case of City of Tshwane. International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies Vol 9, No 1.

Kickert, .M. 2002. Public governance in small continental European states. International Journal of Public Administration. Vol. 25 No. 12.

Kim, J.K. 2012. "Delivering on Development: Harnessing Knowledge to Build Prosperity and End Poverty." World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim, Keynote Speech to World Knowledge Forum, Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 9, 2012. Available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2012/10/08/delivering-development-harnessing-knowledge-build-prosperity-end-poverty. Accessed April 9 2019.

King, R. 2012. Theories and Typologies of Migration: An Overview and a Primer. Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations 3/12, Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare.

Klaaren, Jonathan. 2010. Constitutional Citizenship in South Africa', International Journal of Constitutional Law 94(8) pp 94 -110.

Knight Abowitz, K., and J. Harnish. 2006. Contemporary Discourses of Citizenship. Review of Educational Research 76: 653–690.

Kobe, S. 2017. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Gender: The Testimony of Mrs

Koenane, M.L.J. and Olatunji, C.M.P., 2017. Is it the End or Just the Beginning of Ubuntu?

Response to Matolino and Kwindingwi in View of Metz's Rebuttal. South African Journal of Philosophy 36(2), 263–277.

Koenane, M.L.J., 2018, 'Ubuntu and Philoxenia: Ubuntu and Christian Worldviews as Responses to Xenophobia', HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 74(1).

Kohnert, D. 2009. New Nationalism and Development in Africa. *Africa Spectrum*, *44*(1), 111–123.

Kok, P. 1999. The Definition of Migration and its Application: Making Sense of Recent South African Census and Data. South African Journal of Demography 7 (1).

Kobe, S,L. 2017. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Gender. The Testimony of Mrs Konile revisited. *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies, 73*(3).

Koopman, N. 2015. Citizenship in South Africa Today: Some Insights from Christian Ecclesiology. Southern African Journal of Missiology Missionalia 43:3 ,425–437.

Kotze, J.S. 2012. Non-Racialism, Nation-Building and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa. Politeia Vol 31 (2) 89-108.

Kretzschmar, L., 2014. An Ethical Analysis of the Implementation of Poverty reduction policies in South Africa and Chile and their Implications for the Church', HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 70(1).

Krishnakumar, P.2014. Pull and Push Factors of Migration. Sona Global Management Review 8 (4).

Krog A. 1998. Country of my skull. London: Jonathan Cape.

Kynoch, G. 2008. 'Urban violence colonial Africa: A Case for South African Exceptionalism', Journal of South African Studies 34 (3): 629–45.

Landau, L, B. 2007. Discrimination and development? Immigration, urbanisation and sustainable livelihoods in Johannesburg, Development Southern Africa, 24:1, 61-76.

Laher, H 2009. Explaining Xenophobic Violence. Information Sheet from MRC and UNISA. Lenasia: Unisa.

Lahiff, E., 2007. "Willing buyer, willing seller': South Africa's Failed Experiment in Market Led Agrarian Reform', Third World Quarterly, 28: 8, 1577-1597.

Lalloo, K. 1998. Arenas of Contested Citizenship: Housing Policy in South Africa. Great Britain: Elsevier Science Limited.

Landau, L.B. 2004 (a). Forced Migrants in the New Johannesburg: Towards a Local Government Response. Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand Forced Migration Studies Program.

Landau, L, B. 2004 (b). The Laws of (In) Hospitality: Black Africans in South Africa Forced Migration Working Paper Series No.7, Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.

Landau, L.B. and Freemantle, I .2010. Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: Insertion and Self-Exclusion in Johannesburg, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36:3, 375-390.

Landau, M. J., Meier, B. P., and Keefer, L. A. 2010. A Metaphor-Enriched Social Cognition. *Psychological Bulletin, 136*(6), 1045–1067.

Landau, L.B., 2011: Introducing the Demons, in L. B. Landau (ed), Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 1-25.

Lau, U., Seedat, M. and Suffla, S. 2010. Collective Violence in South Africa: Explaining the Explanations: Research and Theory', African Safety Promotion, 8(2), pp. 1–19.

Lawler, S. 2008. Identity: Sociological Perspectives. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Leach, N. 2002. 'Belonging: Towards a Theory of Identification with Space' in Hillier, J. and Rooksby, E. (Eds.) Habitus: A Sense of Place, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Lebone, K. 2014. *Crime and Security, 2014-2015*. South Africa Survey: Institute of Race Relations.

Lee, E.S. 1996. A Theory of Migration, in Demography, 3(1):47-57.

Lefko-Everett, K. 2008. Aliens, Migrants, Refugees and Interlopers: Perceptions of Foreigners in South Africa. 1st ed. ePoliticsSA. Available at www.idasa.org/index.asp?page=outputs .asp%3fpiD%3D44%26otiD%3D5. Accessed 09 February 2019.

Lephakga, T. 2013. "The History of Theologised Politics in South Africa, The 1913 Land Act and its Impact on the Flight from the Black Self." *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae* 39 (2), 379-100.

Lephakga, T. 2017. Colonial institutionalisation of poverty among blacks in South Africa. *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae*, *43*(2), 1-15.

Leslie, R., Johnston, S., Bernstein, A., de Villiers, R (Eds.) 2008. Migration from Zimbabwe. Number, needs and policy options. The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE).

Lewis, J. D. 2001. Policies to promote growth and employment in South Africa: Discussion paper number 16, July. World Bank Southern Africa Department.

Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Newbury Park. CA: SAGE.

Lister, R. 1997. Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Lizeka, T and Etheridge, J. 2017. South Africans Fed up with Crime, Not Xenophobic – Zuma." news24. Available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/south-africans-fed-upwith-crime-not-xenophobic-zuma-20170224. Accessed 9 April 2019.

Longari, M. 2015. A Flash of Xenophobic Rage. AFP. Available at http://blogs.afp.com/correspondent/?post/south-africa-immigration-a-brief-scene-of-xenophobic-rage#.VTn2tSGeDGc. Accessed 9 April 2019.

Lues, L. 2014. Citizen Participation as a Contributor to Sustainable Democracy in South Africa. International Review of Administrative Sciences. 80 (4), 789-807.

Mabugu, R., Chitiga, M., Fofana, I., Abidoye, B. AND Mbanda, V., 2014. Assessing the General Equilibrium Effects of Social Grants in South Africa. 17th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis New Challenges in Food Policy, Trade and Economic Vulnerability, Dakar, Senegal.

MacCracken, M. 1998. Social Cohesion and Macroeconomic Performance.' Paper Presented at the Conference 'The State of Living Standards and the Quality of Life', Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS), Ottawa, Canada.

Mafukata, M.A., 2015. Xenophobia – The Evil Story of the Beginning of Fascism in Post-Apartheid South Africa. The International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies 3(3), 30–44.

Maharaj, B, 2002. Economic Refugees in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Assets or Liabilities. Implications for Progressive Migration Polices. GeoJournal, vol 56, p.47-57.

Mail and Guardian. 2013. Zuma: Don't Think Like an African-Pay Up for e-tolls. Available at https://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-22-zuma-dont-think-like-an-african-pay-up-for-e-tolls. accessed 10 January 2020.

Mail and Guardian. 2015. Zuma: South Africans are not Generally Xenophobic and Must Promote Social Cohesion. Available at https://beta.mg.co.za/article/2015-04-16-zuma-do-not-turn-xenophobia-into-a-political-football/. Accessed 10 January 2020.

Mail and Guardian 2016. Herman Mashaba Defends His Comments Stating Illegal Immigrants are Criminals. Available at https://mg.co.za/article/2016-12-07-herman-mashaba-defends-his-comments-that-illegal-immigrants-are-criminals. Accessed 9 April 2019.

Mail and Guardian 2018. Ramaphosa: 'Historic' Minimum Wage to Come into Effect on January 1 2019. Available at https://mg.co.za/article/2018-12-07-ramaphosa-historic-minimum-wage-to-come-into-effect-on-january-1-2019. Accessed 8 April 2019.

Mail and Guardian. 2019. Xenophobia and Party Politics in South Africa. Available at https://mg.co.za/article/2019-09-03-00-xenophobia-and-party-politics-in-south-africa/. Accessed 18 February 2019.

Maina, G., Mathansi, N., Williams, G., and McConnell, C. 2011. It's not Just Xenopobia: Factors that Lead to Violent Attacks in South Africa and the Role of the Government, ACCORD Issue # 005. Available at www.accord.org.za/pulications/its-not-just-xenophobia. Accessed 20 May 2019

Makgetla, N. 2008. A Developmental State for South Africa? In Wealth Doesn't Trickle Down: The Case for a Developmental State in South Africa, edited by Ben Turok, 140–158. Cape Town: New Agenda.

Makina, D 2009. The Impact of Regional Migration and Remittances of Development. Available at http://www.idasa.org.za. Accessed 08 February 2020.

Malan, P.M. 2007. Civil Society and the Transformation of Social Security: Towards a Performative Conception of the Right to Have Access to Social Security in South Africa. PhD Thesis. University of Johannesburg.

Mamabolo, M.A., 2015. Drivers of community xenophobic attacks in South Africa: Poverty and unemployment. *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* 11(4), 143–150.

Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. London. James Currey

Mamdani, M. 2001 When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mamdani, M. 2002. Amnesty or impunity? A preliminary critique of the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC). Diacritics, 32(3), 33–59.

Mamdani, M. 2011. An African Reflection on Tahrir Square, Globalizations, 8:5, 559-566.

Mananga A. 2012. Unfulfilled Promises and their Consequences: A Reflection on Local Government Performance and the Critical Issue of Poor Service Delivery in South Africa Policy Brief No.76 May 2012. Pretoria: Africa Institute.

Mangu. A.M. 2019. Xenophobia and Migration in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Myths and Realities. African Journal of Democracy and Governance. Vol 6 NO1 .45-72.

Manyaka, R. 2018. Making Sense of Community Protests in South Africa: Issues for Consideration. Journal of Public Administration. Volume 53, NO1.

Maree, J., 2007. Strategies for Reducing Unemployment in South Africa and the Role of Organised Labour, Global Labour University Conference on Labour and the Challenges of Development, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Markus, H., and Cross, S. 1990. The interpersonal self. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research. 576- 608. New York: Guilford Press.

Markus, H.R., Kitayama,S., and Heiman, R.J. 1996. Culture and "Basic" Psychological Principles in E.T. Higgins and A.W. Kruglanski (Eds.) *Social Psychology:* Handbook of Basic Principles 857-913. New York: Guilford.

Marshall, T. H. 1964. *Class, citizenship, and social development: Essays of T. H. Marshall.* Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Masango, M. 2004. Aggression, anger and violence in South Africa. *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies, 60*(3), 993-1006.

Massey, D.S., 2006. Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21st Century: Lessons for South Africa. Pp. 38-70 in Marta Tienda, Sally Findley, Steve Tollman, and Eleanor Preston Whyte, eds. African Migration and Urbanization in Comparative Perspective. Johannesburg: Witts University Press.

Masuku, T. 2006. Targeting Foreigners: Xenophobia among Johannesburg's Police. *South Africa Crime Quarterly* NO.15.

Masuku, M.M and Jili, N.N. 2019. Public Service Delivery in South Africa: The Political Influence at Local Government Level. Journal of Public Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1935

Mate, R. 2005. Making Ends Meet at the Margins? Grappling with Identity, Poverty, Marginality and Economic Crisis in Beithridge Town, Zimbabwe, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Mathekga, R. and Buccus, I. 2006. The challenge of local government structures in South Africa: securing community participation, Critical Dialogue: Public Participation in Review, Durban, Centre for Public Participation.

Matlala,   A.   2011.   *Foreigner   stoned   to   death*.   Available   at: http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011/07/27/foreigner-stoned-to-death. Accessed 02 August 2019.

Matolino, B., and W. Kwindingwi. 2013. "The End of Ubuntu." South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 197–205.

Matsinhe, D. 2011. Africa's Fear of Itself: The Ideology of Makwerekwere in South Africa: *Third World Quarterly* Vol.32, NO. 2.

Matunhu, J. 2011. Re-visiting the May 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 5(1/2), 95–108.

May, V. 2011.Self, Belonging and Social Change Sociology. Vol 45, Issue 3, pp. 363 – 378.

May V. 2013. Connecting Self to Society: Belonging in a Changing World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mbembe, A., 2015. Decolonizing knowledge and the question of the archive. Available at http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20 the%20Archive.pdf. Accessed 02 August 2019.

McDonald, D and Jacobs, S. 2005. (Re)writing xenophobia: Understanding press coverage of cross-border migration in Southern Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 23(3), 295-325.

McGinn, Michell K. 2008. Secondary Data. In Given, Lisa M. 2008 (eds). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods Volumes 1 and 2. USA.

McGregor, A. 2017. The Fulani Crisis: Communal Violence and Radicalism in the Sahel, Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point, New York vol. 10 No. 2

Mckinley, D. T. 2018. Umkhonto We Sizwe: A Critical Analysis of the Armed Struggle of the African National Congress. *South African Historical Journal*, 70, 27-41.

McLennan, A. & Munslow, B. 2009. The Politics of Service Delivery. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Metz, T. 2007. Ubuntu as a Moral Theory: Reply to Four Critics. *South African Journal of Philosophy* 26: 369-87.

Metz, T. 2011. Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa. *African Human Rights Law Journal*, *11*(2), 532-559.

Metz, T. 2014 Harmonizing Global Ethics in the Future: A Proposal to Add South and East to West. Journal of Global Ethics, 10 (2), 146-155.

Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, L. 2003. Belonging to country – a philosophical anthropology. Journal of Australian Studies, 27, 215–223.

Mills, J., Bonner, A., and Francis, K. 2006. Adopting a constructivist approach to grounded theory: Implications for research design. International Journal of Nursing Practice, 12, 8-13.

Minnaar, A and Hough, M. 1996. Who Goes There? Perspectives on Clandestine Migration and Illegal Aliens in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council.

© University of Venda

Misago, J.P. 2009. Xenophobic violence in South Africa: reflections on causal factors and implications. Centre for Policy Studies, 10(3), 3–8.

Misago, J.P., Landau, L. and Monson, T. 2009. Towards Tolerance, Law and Dignity: Addressing Violence against Foreign Nationals in South Africa. Pretoria: IOM.

Misago, J. P., Monson, T., Polzer, T., and Landau, L. B. 2010. May 2008 violence against foreign nationals in South Africa: Understanding causes and evaluating responses. Johannesburg: Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa and University of the Witwatersrand.

Misago, J., Freemantle, I., and Landau, B. 2015. Protection from Xenophobia: An Evaluation of UNHCR's Southern Africa's Xenophobia Related Programmes. *The African Centre for Migration and Society.* University of Witwatersrand.

Misago J. P. 2016. Responding to xenophobic violence in post-Apartheid South Africa: Barking up the wrong tree? African Human Mobility Review, 2(2), 443-467.

Misago, J.P 2017. Politics by Other Means? The Political Economy of Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa, The Black Scholar, 47:2, 40-53.

Mitchell, C.R. 1981. The Structure of International Conflict. London: Macmillan Press

Mouton, J. 2009. Understanding Social Research. Van Schaik. Pretoria

Mkandawire, H. 2016. Media Retaliation against the 2015 Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa: The Case of the QFM Radio in Zambia. *Global Media Journal: African Edition, 9*(2).

Mngxitama A. 2008. We are not all like that: Race, class and nation after Apartheid. In: Hassim S, Kupe Y and Worby E (eds) Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, pp. 189–208.

Modiba, I. 2005. Fifteen shot at during service delivery protest in Hopetown. Diamond Fields Advertiser, Kimberley, 27th May.

Modiri, J. 2015 *Law's Poverty*, 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal.

Modise, L. and Mtshiselwa, N. 2013. 'The Natives Land Act of 1913 Engineered the Poverty of Black South Africans: A Historico-Ecclesiastical Perspective', *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae* 39(2), 359–378.

Mogekwu, M. 2005. 'African Union: Xenophobia as poor intercultural information', Ecquid Novi 26(1): 5-20.

Moll, T, 1991. Did the apartheid economy 'fail'? Journal of Southern African Studies 17 (2), 271–291.

Molla, M., Mitiku, I., Worku, A., and Yamin, A.E. 2015. Impacts of Maternal Mortality on Living Children and Families: A Qualitative Study from Butajira, Ethiopia. Reproductive Health 12 (Supplementary 1): S6. https://doi.org/10.1186/1742-4755-12-S1-S6

Monson, T .2011. Making the law, breaking the law, taking the law into our own hands: Sovereignty and territorial control in three South African settlements. In: Landau, LB (ed.) Exorcising the Demons within: Xenophobia, Violence, and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa. Johannesburg, South Africa: Witwatersrand University Press, pp.172–199.

Montenegro M, Pujol J and Posocco S. 2017. Bordering, Exclusions and Necropolitics. Qualitative Research Journal 17(3): 142–154.

Moosa, V.M. 2008. Celebrating the 75th Anniversary of the ANC. Speech by Mohammed Valli Moosa on 08 January 2008, Soweto.

Morgan, M. 2018. Performance and Power in Social Movements: Biko's Role as a Witness in the SASO/BPC Trial. Cultural Sociology 2018, Vol. 12(4) 456 –477.

Morris, A. 2001a. Introduction, in Alan Morris, Antoine Bouillon (eds), African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone Migration of the 1990s, Pretoria: Protea and IFAS, 9-18.

Morris, A. 2001b. Our Fellow Africans Make Our Lives Hell": The Lives of Congolese and Nigerians Living in Johannesburg, in Alan Morris, Antoine Bouillon (eds.), African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone Migration of the 1990s, Pretoria: Protea and IFAS, 68-89.

Morris, A, and Bouillon, A. 2001. African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone Migration of the 1990s. Pretoria: Protea and IFAS.

Morris E. 2013. The National Development Plan (NDP): the current state of play. Available at: http://hsf.org. za/resource-centre/hsf-briefs/the-national-development-plan-ndp-the-current-state-of-play. Accessed 6 June 2019.

Morudu, H.D. 2017. Service Delivery Protests in South African Municipalities: An Exploration Using Principal Component Regression and Data. Cogent Social Sciences.

Mosala, S. J., Venter, J. C. M., and Bain, E. G. (2017). South Africa's Economic Transformation since 1994: What Influence has the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) Had? The Review of Black Political Economy, 44(3–4), 327–340.

Mosselson, A. 2010. "There is no difference between citizens and non-citizens anymore": Violent xenophobia, citizenship and the politics of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 36(3), 641-655.

Moustakas, C. 1994. Phenomenological Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Moya P.M.L. 2006. What's Identity Got to Do with It? Mobilizing Identities in the Multicultural Classroom. In ALcoff, L.M., Hames-GarciaM., Mohanty S.P., Moya P.M.L. (eds) Identity Politics Reconsidered. The Future of Minority Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Moyo, T. and Mamabolo, M. 2014. "The National Development Programme (NDP): a comparative analysis with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme and Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA)." Journal of Public Administration, 49(3):946- 959.

Moyo, I. 2018. Zimbabwean dispensation, special and exemption permits in South Africa: On humanitarian logic, depoliticisation and invisibilisation of migrants. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 53(8), 1141–1157. doi:10.1177/0021909618776413.

Mpe, P. 2001. Welcome to Our Hillbrow. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.

Mudzanani, T.E. 2016. A Thematic Analysis of Newspaper Articles on Xenophobia and Tourism in South Africa. African Journal for Physical Activity and Health Sciences. Vol 22 No. 1:2

Mukwena, D. 2012, Types of explanations given by foreign African women for xenophobic violence: a De-Doorns case study.

Munyeka, W. 2014. An In-Depth Look at Economic Growth and Employment in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Analysis and Policy Implications. Journal of Educational and Social Research. Vol 4 (3).

Murithi, T, 2005. The African Union, Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development, Hampshire: Ashgate publishing company.

Murray, M. J. 2003. Alien strangers in our midst: The dreaded foreign invasion and "fortress South Africa". Canadian Journal of African Studies, 37(2/3), 440-466.

Musuva, C. 2014. The politics of xenophobia in South Africa: Marginalisation of African migrants by the state. In Ewusi, S. K. and Butera, J. B. (eds.) Beyond state-building: confronting Africa's government and socio-economic challenges in the 21st century. Addis Ababa: University for Peace Africa Programme.

Mwakikagile, G. 2008. *African immigrants in South Africa* . Pretoria: New Africa Press.

Nagar, D., and Peterson, M. (2012). The Eagle and Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria-South Africa Relation. South Africa: Cape Town Centre for Conflict Resolution.

Naidoo,V. and Maré, A. 2015. Implementing the National Development Plan? Lessons from Co-ordinating Grand Economic Policies in South Africa, Politikon, 42:3, 407-427.

Nasson, Bill. 2012. Sharp-nosed at Sharpeville. *South African Journal of Science*, *108*(1-2), 01-02. Available at http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0038-23532012000100005&lng=en&tlng=en. Accessed 05 August 2019.

National Geographic Society. 2005. *What is Human Migration?* Available at http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/lessons/09/g68/migrationguidestudent.pdf. Accessed 05 September 2016.

Nattrass, N. 1994. Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy, *African Affairs*, Volume 93, Issue 372, Pages 343–359.

Ncube, T. 2015. The Social Implications of Xenophobic Violence. Available at https://ewn.co.za/2015/05/11/The-social-implications-of-xenophobic-violence. Accessed 03 February 2021.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. 2009. 'Africa for Africans or Africa for "Natives" Only? "New Nationalism" and Nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa', *Africa Spectrum*, 44(1), pp. 61–78.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2012. Fiftieth Anniversary of Decolonisation in Africa: A Moment of Celebration or Critical Reflection? Third World Quarterly, 33(1), pp.71-89.

Ndujihe, C., Umoru, H., Ovuakporie, J. A., Ojeme, V., and Nwabughiogu, L. 2017. Xenophobia attacks on Nigerians: FG warns S-Africa of dire consequences. The Vanguard Newspaper, Retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/xenophobic-attacks-nigerians-fg-warns-safrica-dire-consequences/ accessed March 12 , 2019.

Nell, I. 2009 'The Tears of Xenophobia: Preaching and Violence from a South African Perspective,' Practical Theology in South Africa, vol. 24(2), pp. 229-247.

Neocosmos, M. 2006. From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'. Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics *CODESRIA*: Senegal.

Neocosmos M. 2010. From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners': Explaining Xenophobia in Post-apartheid South Africa, Dakar: Codesria.

Neocosmos, M. 2012. Political Subjectivity and the Subject of Politics: Thinking Beyond Identity from the South of Africa. Journal of Asian and African Studies 47(5) 465 –481.

Netswera, F.G. and Kgalane, T.S. 2014. The underlying factors behind violent municipal service delivery protests in South Africa. Journal of Public Administration, 49:261–273.

Neuman W. 2006. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches, 6th ed, Pearson, Boston.

Neuman, W. 2011. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. USA: Allyn and Bacon.

Neves, D., and Du Toit, A. 2012. Money and sociality in south Africa's informal economy. Africa, 82(1), 131–149.

News 24. 2015. "Looters Target Foreign-Owned Shops in Joburg." News24.com, 17 April, 2015. Available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Looters-target-foreign-owned-shops-in-Joburg-20150417. Accessed 19 April 2016.

News 24. 2015. Xenophobic Attacks Impede Business and Tourism. Available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local/Maritzburg-Fever/Xenophobic-attacks-impede-business-and-tourism-20150430 accessed on March 12 , 2019.

News 24. 2015. Lindiwe Zulu Should Resign. 2015. Available at https://www.news24.com/xArchive/Voices/lindiwe-zulu-should-resign-20180719 Accessed on 12 April 2019.

News 24. 2017. Attacking Immigrants Not Patriotic or Revolutionary-Mbeki. Availabile at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/attacking-immigrants-not-patriotic-or revolutionary-mbeki-20170227. Accessed April 10 2019. Newswire24. 2015. Zuma Briefs SADC Summit on Measures to Deal with Xenophobia. Available http://m.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zuma-briefs-sadc-summit-on-measures-to-deal-with xenophobia-2015-04-30/rep_id:4136. Accessed 26 February 2020. Ngcamu, B., & Mantzaris, E. 2019. Xenophobic violence and criminality in the KwaZulu-Natal townships. *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 15*(1).

Ngwane, T. 2011. Ideology and agency in protest politics: service delivery struggles in post-apartheid South Africa. Unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. Available at http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/ files/Ngwane%202012%20masters%20-thesis%20at%20UKZN%20CCS.pdf. Accessed April 9 2019.

Nieburg, H L 1969. *Political violence.* New York: St Martin's Press. Nieuwenhuis, J. 2017 Introducing Qualitative Research in Maree, K. First Steps in Research 2nd Edition. Pretoria. Van Schaik.

Nkama, I. 2015. Lessons for South Africa: How Zambia prevented xenophobia. City Press. Accessed 9 April 2019. Available at http://www.citypress.co.za/opinion/lessons-for-south-africa-howzambia-prevented-xenophobia/. Accessed 02 March 2019.

Nkomo, M. 2014. The New Immigration Amendment Act of 2011 and Regulations. Craig Smith and Associates (blog) Available at http://www.migrationlawyers.co.za/news/uncategorized/the-new-immigrationamendment-act-of-2011-and-regulations/ accessed on 6 April 2019

Nkurunziza, J.D., 2008. Civil War and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa. Paper Presented at the Ninth Annual Global Development Conference on Security for Development: *Confronting Threats to Safety and Survival*, 26 January-2 February 2008, Brisbane Australia.

Nnoli, O, 1998. Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Northcote, M.A., 2015. Enterprising Outsiders: Livelihood Strategies of Cape Town's forced migrants. Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository Paper.

National Planning Commission (NPC). 2011. National Development Plan: Vision 2030. Pretoria: National Planning Commission.

Nshimbi, C. C. and Fioramonti, L. 2014: The Will to Integrate: South Africa's Responses to Regional Migration from the SADC Region, in: African Development Review, 26, pp. 52–63.

Nunn, N .2008. "The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades", *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 123: 139-176.

Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2005. Africa's Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging, London: Zed Books.

Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2006. Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa, Dakar/London: CODESRIA/Zed Books.

Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2010. Racism, Ethnicity and the Media in Africa: Reflections Inspired by Studies of Xenophobia in Cameroon and South Africa. *Africa Spectrum*, 45, 1, 57-93.

Nyamnjoh F & Mususa P. 2012. "Migration and xenophobia". In Saunders C, Dzinesa GA & Nagar D (eds). *Region-Building Southern Africa. Progress, problems and prospects.* London & New York: Zed Books.

Obademi, O.E. & Uadiale, O. M. 2004 'Xenophobic Killings in South Africa and Economic Globalization: Emerging Issues,' & Nyamnjoh, F.B. (eds.) Xenophobia: A Contemporary Issue in Psychology, London, Zed Books.

Obi, C. 2007. Perspectives on Côte d'Ivoire: Between Political Breakdown and Post-Conflict Peace. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Obiezu, K. 2017. Opinion- Xenophobia's Eerie Xylophone. Des Courrier Afriques. Available at www.courrierdesafriques.net/2017/03/opinion-xenophobias-eerie-xylophone. Accessed April 9 2019.

Odiaka, N. 2017. The Face of Violence: Rethinking The Concept of Xenophobia, Immigration Laws and the Rights of Non-Citizens in South Africa. Brics Law Journal Volume 4. Issue 2

Odorige, C.E. 2016. The Dark Side of Migration Remittances and Development: The Case of Edo Sex Trade In Europe. Pecs Journal of International and European Law.

Odunayo, A,M. , Asuelime, E,L. and Okem, E,A. 2017. South African Policy on Migration and its Alignment with the UNO Charter on Refugee and Asylum-seekers. Journal of African Union Studies Volume 6, Issue 1, Pp 81-96.

Okyere-Manu, B. 2016. Ethical Implications of Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa: A Challenge to the Christian Church. *Cross Currents, 66*(2), 227–238.

Oloruntoba, S. 2018.Crisis of Identity and Xenophobia in Africa: The Imperative of a Pan-African Thought Liberation in Akinola A.O (ed.), The Political Economy of Xenophobia in Africa. Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Springer International Publishing AG 2018.

Olukoshi, A. 2004. Changing Patterns of Politics in Africa. Cadernos de Estudos Africanos.

Onuoha, J. (2008). Beyond Diplomacy: Contemporary Issues in International Relations. Nsukka: Great AP.

Oucho, J. 2006. "Cross-Border Migration and Regional Initiatives in Managing Migration in Southern Africa." In Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants, ed. Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, John Oucho, and Johan van Zyl, 47–70. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council Press.

Oyeniyi, B. A. 2010. Greed–Grievance Debate and the Ife–Modakeke Conflict. Social History, 35(3), 308– 29. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071022.2010.495470.

Oyserman, D. 2007. Social Identity and Self-regulation. In A.W. Kruglanski & E.T. Higgins (Eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (second edition). New York: Guilford Press.

Padayachee, A and Desai, A 2007. Post-apartheid South Africa and the crisis of expectation. Rozenberg Quarterly: The Magazine 2007.

Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) 2008. Xenophobia Attacks: Ministerial Briefing. Available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/9162/. Accessed March 12 2019.

Patel, L. 2012. Developmental Social Policy. Social Welfare Services and the non-Profit Sector in South Africa. Journal of Social Policy and Administration. Vol 46:6, 99.; 603- 618.

Patel, K., & Essa, A. (2015). No place like home. *Aljazeera*. Available at http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2015/xenophobiasouthafrica/index.html. Accessed March 12, 2019

Peberdy, S. 1999. Selecting lmmigrants: Nationalism and National Identity in South Africa's Immigration Policies, 1910-1998. Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, Canada

Peberdy, S., 2001, 'Imagining immigration inclusive identities and exclusive policies in post-1994 south Africa', Africa Today 48(3), 14–32.

Peberdy,S and Jara, K.M .2011. Humanitarian and Social Mobilization in Cape Town: Civil Society and the May 2008 Xenophobic Violence, Politikon, 38:1.

Phakathi , S. 2015. The Response of Churches to the May 2008 Xenophobic Violence. Gauteng City- Region Observation.

Pierce, R. 2008. Analyzing Qualitative Information: Classifying, Coding and Interpreting Information. In R. Pierce (Ed.), Research Methods in Politics. 171-197 London: Sage

Pilane, P. (2015). Small business minister wants Spaza-shop trade secrets', *The Daily Vox,* 28 January; Available online at: https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/small-business-minister-wants-spazashop- trade-secrets/. Accessed April 9 2019.

Pillay, S. 2004. Corruption - the challenge to good governance: A South African Perspective. The International Journal of Public Sector Management. Emerald. 17(7): 587-605.

Pillay, D. 2007. "The Stunted Growth of South Africa's Developmental State Discourse." Africanus 37 (2): 198–215.

Pillay, D .2008. Relative deprivation, social instability and cultures of entitlement, in Hassim, S, Kupe, T, & Worby, E (eds) Go home or die here: Violence, xenophobia and the reinvention of difference in South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Pineteh, E.A. 2017. Illegal aliens and demons that must be exorcised from South Africa: Framing African migrants and xenophobia in post-apartheid narratives. Cogent Social Sciences, 3(1), 139–158.

Pinson, H., Arnot, M., & Candappa, M. (2010). *Education, asylum and the "non-citizen" child: The politics of compassion and belonging*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Piper, L., and Yu, D. 2016. The Limits of citizenship for explaining price competition in the spaza sector in South Africa. Development Southern Africa, 33(5).

Plus 94 Research. 2008. Executive Summary Research Report on the Causes and Immediate Impact of Xenophobic Unrest in Gauteng.

Policy Research Initiative (PRI), Government of Canada 1999. Sustaining Growth, Human Development, and Social Cohesion in a Global World. Ottawa.

Polzer, T. 2008. "Responding to Zimbabwean migration in South Africa: evaluating options." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 15(1): 1- 28.

Polzer, T. 2009. Regularising Zimbabwean Migration to South Africa. Migration Policy Brief South Africa.

Ponterotto, J.G. 2006. Brief note on the origins, evolution, and meaning of the qualitative research concept "thick description." Qualitative Report, 11, 538-549.

Pool, R., and Geissler. W. 2005. Medical anthropology. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Posel, D. 2003 (a). Have Migration Patterns in Post-Apartheid South Africa Changed? University of Natal. Paper Prepared for Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 4-7 June, 2003.

Posel, D. 2003 (b). 'The collection of national household survey data in South Africa (1993–1999): rendering labour migration invisible', Development Southern Africa, 20(3), 361–368.

Praeg, L. 2017. Essential Building Blocks of the Ubuntu Debate; or: I Write What I Must. South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (2) 292-304.

Prah, K. 2010. *Soundings, studies on African transformation*, *CASAS book series, no. 79*. CapeTown: Centre for Advanced Study of African Society.

Puar, J K. 2007. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Pugh, S.A. 2014. Advocacy in the Time of Xenophobia: Civil Society, the State, and the Politics of Migration in South Africa, Politikon, 41:2.

Qwabe, B.R .2013. Realising South Africa's Vision 2030: A Capacity-Building Perspective. Administratio Publica Vol 21 NO 2.

Rabkin, F. 2015. Alexandra, South Africa: Frustration Boils Over into Violence. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Available at www.ritecodev.co.za/.../2256-alexandrasouth-africa-frustration-boils-over-into-violence . Accessed: 26 May 2019.

Radkiewicz, P. 2003. The National Values as a Concept Helpful in Explaining the Development of Nationalistic Attitudes and Xenophobia. Polish Psychological Bulletin. N0 34.

Ramdani, N. 2010. Too Many French Willing to Fit the Xenophobia Cliché. The Guardian.

Ramphele, M. 2008. Laying Ghosts to Rest: Dilemmas of the Transformation in South Africa. Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Reddy, T. 2012. The Cabbage and the Goat': Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. Historical Review. (44) 1:3–28.

Reddy, P. 2016. The politics of service delivery in South Africa: The local government sphere in context. *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 12*(1).

Reed-Danahay, D and Brettel, C. 2008. Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Republic of South Africa. 1997. Draft Green Paper on International Migration. Government Printer, Pretoria.

Republic of South Africa. 1999. White Paper on International Migration Available at www.gov.za/whitepaper/1999/migrate.htm. Accessed 09 February 2020.

Republican Nomination Acceptance Speech. Donald Trump, 21 July 2016. Available at https://assets.donaldjtrump. com/DJT_Acceptance_Speech.pdf. Accessed 10 January 2020.

Rex, J. 1974. The Compound, the Reserve and the Urban Location. South African Labour Bulletin, 1 (4):4-17.

Richard, E.R. and Sabine, J.F. 2012. The use of survey data to study migration–environment relationships in developing countries: alternative approaches to data collection. Population Environment 34: 113.

Rickert, D. 2001. Batho Pele/Customer Care Course in Effective Service Delivery: Enhancing the Capacity of Existing and Emerging Public Service Managers for Effective Service Delivery.

Roche, M. 1992. *Rethinking Citizenship: Welfare, Ideology and Change in Modern Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Rockquemore, K.A., and Laszloffy, T. 2005. Raising biracial children. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Rose, T 1970. *How violence occurs in violence in America.* New York: Vintage Press.

Rubin, A. and Babbie, E. 2005. Research Methods for Social Work. 5th Edition. Australia Thomson Brookes/Cole.

Rummens, J. 2000. Canadian Identities an Interdisciplinary Overview of Canadian Research on Identity.

Rukema, J., and Khan, S. 2013.Chronicling the Effects of the 2008 Xenophobic Attacks Amongst a Select Group of Congolese and Burundian Women in the City of Durban. *Alternation Special Edition* 7 176-196.

Ruitenberg, C. 2015. The Practice of Equality: A Critical Understanding of Democratic Citizenship Education. Democracy and Education, 23(1), Article 2. Available at http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/val23/iss1/2. Accessed April 10 2019.

Rutinwa, B. 2002. Document. The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa. Refugee Survey Quarterly. Vol. 21. Issue 1 & 2, 12-41.

Sahin, M., Baycan, T, and Nijkkamp, P. 2012. The economic importance of migrant entrepreneurship: An application of data envelopment analysis in The Netherlands. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. Available at http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/ 1871/38161/ 2012- 8.pdf?sequence=1; Accessed: 9 April 2019.

Saleh, I. 2015. Is it Really Xenophobia in South Africa or an Intentional Act of Prejudice? *Global Media Journal African Edition* Vol.9. 2

Samson, M., U. Lee, A. Ndlebe, K. MacQuene, I. van Niekerk, V. Gandhi and T. Harigaya. 2004. "The Social and Economic Impact of South Africa's Social Security System". Commissioned by the Economics and Finance Directorate, Ministry of Social Development.

Samuelson, R. J. 2016. Trump's Risky Nationalism. The Washington Post, December 4. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-riskynationalism/2016/12/04/dabc8f66-b8bd-11e6-a677 b608fbb3aaf6_story.html?utm_term¼.e33702af442d. Accessed 10 January 2020.

Sanchez, G. 2006. The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation Among Latinos in The United States. American Politics Research. 2006; 34(4):427–451.

Sandelowski, M. 2000. Whatever happened to qualitative description? Research in Nursing & Health,23, 334–340.

Sandwith, C. 2010. Postcolonial violence: Narrating South Africa, May 2008. Current Writing, 22(2), 60–82.

Sarantakos, S. 2013. Social Research 4th ed. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire.

Saumure, K., & Given, L.M. (2008). *Convenience sample*. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. Available at http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/sage-encyc-qualitative-research-methods/n68.xml. Accessed 09 February 2020.

Sawyer, K.R. 2006. Explaining creativity: The science of human innovation. New York: Oxford University Press.

Scheufele, D. A. 1999. Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication, 49, 103–122.

Seekings, J., 2014, 'South Africa: Democracy, poverty and inclusive growth since 1994', in Democracy Works–Conference Paper. Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE). Available at http://www.cde.org.Za. Accessed 20 January 2020.

Segal, L. 1991. "The Human Face of Violence: Hostel dwellers speak." In the *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1.

Segatti A. 2011. Reforming South African immigration policy in the postapartheid period (1990–2010). In: Segatti A and Landau LB (eds) Contemporary Migration to South Africa: A Regional Development Issue. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

249

Segatti, A and Landau, B. 2011. "Contemporary Migration to South Africa : A Regional Development Issue," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, NO 2349.

Seidman, I. 1998. *Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education and the social sciences.* New York: Teachers College Press.

Sen, A. 2008. Violence, Identity and Poverty. Journal of Peace Research. Vol 45 NO1. 5 -15.

Sergio, R. 1998. International Migration in Africa: Legal and Administrative Aspects. Geneva. International Labour Organisation.

Shava, E and Maramura, T.C. 2016. A Descriptive Analysis of the Causes, Challenges and Effects of Skills Deficit on Youth Empowerment in South Africa. Journal of Social Sciences, 49(1,2): 93-100.

Shenton, A.K 2004. Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects. Education for Information, 22: 63-7.

Sibanda, N. 2008. The Impact of Immigration on the Labour Market: Evidence from South Africa. Masters Thesis. University of Fort Hare, Alice.

Sidiropoulos, E. 2008. South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki period, South African Journal of International Affairs.

Silverman, D. 2014. Doing Qualitative Research. Sage. London

Simbao R.K. 2007. The thirtieth anniversary of the Soweto uprisings: Reading the shadow in Sam Nzima's iconic photograph of Hector Pieterson. African Arts 40(2): 52–69.

Simpson, B. 2010. Outcomes-Based Education: Is It Right for Social Work? Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2010:46(3).

Simpson, N.B. 2017. Demographic and Economic Determinants of Migration. IZA World of Labour. Available at https://wol.iza.org/articles/demographic-and-economic-determinants-of-migration/long. Accessed April 10 2019.

Sinwell, L, Kirshner, J, Khumalo, K, and Manda, O 2009. Service delivery protests: findings from quick response research on four 'hot spots' – Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza, Diepsloot. Centre for Sociological Research, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, with support from

Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Available at http://www.uj.ac.za/Portals/159/docs/CSR. Accessed 05 April 2019.

Sklar, R. 1998. Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies. Skrbis Z, Baldassar L, Poynting S, 2007, "Introduction—negotiating belonging: migration and generations" Journal of Intercultural Studies 28 261–269.

Smit, J.A., Harre, R. & Van Langenhoven, L. 1995. Rethinking Methods in Psychology. London: Sage. Van Manen, M. (2007). Phenomenology of practice. *Phenomenology and Practice,* 1(1), 11-30.

Solomon, H. and Kosaka, H. 2014. Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, narratives and recommendations. South African Peace and Security Studies, 2(2): 5-29.

Southall, R. 2007. Introduction: the ANC state, more dysfunctional than developmental? In Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. (eds.), State of the Nation: South Africa 2007, (pp. 1-24). HSRC, Pretoria: Pretoria.

Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference 2017. Briefing Paper 430.

Southern African Migration Programme. 2017. Competition or Cooperation? South African and migrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg: South Africa.

South African Police Service (SAPS).1995. South African Police Service Act. 1995. Act Number 68 of 1995. Pretoria: SAPS.

South China Morning Post 2018. Zimbabwe President Blast Assassination Attempt as a Cowardly Act After Bombing Rocks Rally. Available at https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2152197/zimbabwe-president-blasts-assassination-attempt-cowardly-act-after. Accessed April 10 2019.

Special Reference Group (SRG) on Migration and Community Integration in KZN. 2015. *Report of the special reference group on migration and community integration in KZN*, 31 October. Availableat:https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Special%20ref%20group%20on%20Migration%20and%20Community%20Intergration%20in%20KZN.pdf Accessed 11 April 2019.

Spencer, P. & H. Wollman. 2002. Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. London, Sage.

Standing, G., J. Sender and J. Weeks. 1996. Restructuring the Labour Market: The South African Challenge. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Stangor, C., 2011, *Research methods for the behavioural sciences*, 4th edn., Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, Belmont, CA.

Statssa 2018. Who is Most Likely to be Affected by Long-Term Employment. Available at www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11688. Accessed April 9 2019.

Steenkamp, C. 2009. Xenophobia in South Africa: what does it say about trust? The Round Table, 98(403): 439-447.

Steinberg, J. 2012. Security and Disappointment: Policing, Freedom and Xenophobia in South Africa. British Journal of Criminology 52: 345-360.

Stets, J. E., and Burke, P. J. (2003). A sociological approach to self and identity. In M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity. New York: Guilford Press.

Stewart, P. 2012. Intensified Exploitation: Rock Drill Operators' PostStrike Productivity Deal in a South African Platinum Mine. Labour, Capital and Society, 45(2): 33-57.

Steyn, L., Mataboge, M., De Wet, P., Zwane, T. 2015. Spazas: It's not just the economy, stupid, *Mail and Guardian*, 30 January; Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2015- 01-29-spazas-its-not-just-the-economy-stupid. Accessed April 9 2019.

Strydom H 2016 Ethical aspects in the social sciences and human service professions in De Vos et al Research at Grassroots for the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions.

Stryker, S. 1980. Symbolic interactionism: A social structural version. Caldwell, NJ: Blackburn Press.

Sunday Times. 2017. You are Fuelling Xenophobia, SAHRC Warns Deputy Police Minister. Available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-17-you-are-fuelling-xenophobia-sahrc-warns-deputy-police-minister/. Accessed 18 February 2020.

Suttner, R. 2015. Xenophobia: The Power of Naming. Daily Maverick. Available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-07-15-xenophobia-the-power-of-naming/. Accessed 10 April 2019.

Swart, I. 2013. "South Africa's Service-Delivery Crisis: From Contextual Understanding to Diaconial Response." HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 69 (2): 1–46.

Swartz, S. 2009. *The Moral Ecology of South Africa's Township Youth.* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Synder, J. 2000 From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton.

Tafira, K.M. 2011. Is xenophobia racism? Anthropology Southern Africa. 34(3&4):.114-121.

Tajfel, H. 1978. Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Academic Press, Salt Lake City.

Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. 1979. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In S. Worchel, and W. G. Austin (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H. 1981. Human groups and social identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tapela, B. N. 2012. Social water scarcity and water use, WRC Research Report, Research Report, Pretoria, Water Research Commission, [online] Available at : http://www.wrc.org.za/Pages/DisplayItem.aspx?ItemID=9577&FromURL=%2fPages %2fKH_ResearchReport.aspx%3fdt%3d1%26ms%3d4%253b . Accessed 05 April 2019.

Tati, G., 2008. 'The immigration issues in the post-Apartheid South Africa: Discourses, policies and social repercussions. Space populations' *Societies* 3(1), 423–440.

Tella, O. 2016. Understanding Xenophobia in South Africa: The Individual, the State and the International System. Insight on Africa, 8(2), 142-158.

Terreblanche, S.J. 2012. Lost in transformation: South Africa's search for a new future since 1986. Johannesburg: KMM Review Pub. Co.

Terrif, T. 1999. Security Studies Today. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Tharpe, W. 2015. Immigrants help chart Georgia's course to prosperity. Available at: https://gbpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ImmigrantsHelp-Chart-Course-to-Prosperity.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2019.

The Citizen. 2008. Two Killed in Attacks on Aliens. 13 May: 4

The National Interest, 27 April 2016, Trump on Foreign Policy" *Available at* http://nationalinterest.org/feature/trumpforeign-policy-15960. Accessed 10 January 2020.

Thompson, L. 2000. The history of South Africa. United States of America: Yale University Press.

Thompson, L. 2011. 'Forms of citizen participation in local governance and links to service delivery protests : editorial', Africanus, 41(1), pp. 1–2.

Thurman, S. 1997. "Umzamo: Improving Hostel Dwellers' Accommodation in South Africa." Environment and Urbanization 9 (2): 43–62.

Tilley, C. 1994. A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments, Oxford: Berg.

Todes, A., and Turok, I. 2018. Spatial Inequalities and Policies in South Africa: Place-Based or People-Centred? Progress in Planning, 123. 1-31.

Trujano, C. Y. A. 2008. Indigenous Routes: A framework for understanding indigenous migration. London: Hammersmith Press.

Tshabalala, S. 2015. Why black South Africans are attacking foreign Africans but not foreign whites. Quartz. Available at http://qz.com/384041/why-black-south-africans-areonly-attacking-foreign-africans-but-not-foreign-whites/. Accessed 10 April 2019.

Tsheola, J.P., Ramonyai, N.P. and Segae, M. 2014.Twenty years of faltering "democracy": Service delivery planning and public participation in South Africa. Journal of Public Administration, 49(1):393–403.

Tshishonga,N and de Vries,M.S. 2011. The Potential of South Africa as a Developmental State: A Political Economy Critique. African Journal of Public Affairs. Vol (4) No 1.

Tshishonga, N., 2015 (a). 'The increased politicisation of human resources recruitment', in P.S. Reddy & M. De Vries (eds.), *Quo Vadis?: Local governance and development in South Africa post 1994*, pp. 129–146, Bruylant: Belgium.

Tshishonga, N., 2015 (b). 'The impact of xenophobia-Afrophobia on the informal economy in Durban CBD, South Africa', The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 11(4), 163–179.

Tutu, D.M., 1999, No future without forgiveness, Rider, London

Twala, C. 2014. 'The Causes and Socio-political Impact of the Service Delivery Protests to the South African Citizenry: A Real Public Discourse', Journal of Social Sciences, 39(2), pp. 159–167.

Ukeje, C., Boukhars, A., and Toga, D. 2019. State of Peace and Security in Africa 2019. Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

Umezurike, S., and Isike, C. 2013. An analysis of the opinions of African immigrants on service delivery by the Department of Home Affairs, South Africa. Inkanyiso: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 5(1), 53–63.

United Nations Charter 2020. Article 24 Available at http://legal.un.org/repertory/art24.shtml accessed 10 April 2019.

UNHCR 2015. UNHCR Statement on the Future of Kenya's Dadaab Refugee Camps. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2015/4/552d0a8a9/unhcr-statement-future-kenyas-dadaab-refugee-camps.html accessed 10 April 2019

Unrau, YA., Gabor, P.A, and Grinnell, R.M. 2007. Evaluation in Social Work: he Art and Science of Practice. London: Oxford University Press

Vale, P. (2002). Migration, xenophobia and security-making in post-apartheid South Africa. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 29(1), 7–29.

Valji, N. 2003. Creating the Nation: The Rise of Violent Xenophobia in the New South Africa. Centre *for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation*.

van Beek, I. 2001. Prima Facie Asylum Determination in South Africa. In Perspectives on Refugee Protection in South Africa, edited by Jeff Handmaker, Lee Anne de la Hunt, and Jonathan Klaaren. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights

van den Hoonaard, D. & van den Hoonaard, E. (2008). Data analysis. In L. M. Given (Ed.), *The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative research methods* (pp. 187-188). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. doi: 10.4135/9781412963909.n94.

Van Dijk, T. 1997. "Discourse as Interaction in Society." Discourse as Social Interaction, Vol 2. Ed. Teun A. van Dijk. London: Sage.

VanDyck, C., K. 2017. Concept and definition of civil society sustainability. Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available at https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/170630_VanDyck_CivilSocietySustainability_Web.pdf?QfxMIeHr9U8aeV1kOjF o.FBTsLG76HPX 24. Accessed 24 February 2020

Van Leeuwen, T. 2009. "Discourse as the Recontextualization of Social Practice: A Guide." Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage.

Van Manen, M. 2007. Phenomenology of Practice. Phenomenology and Practice. Vol 1 (1); 11-30.

Van Zyl, A. 2014. How CSOs Close the Gap between Transparency and Accountability. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions Vol 27:2 347-356.

Vasta, E. 2013. Do we need social cohesion in the 21st century? Multiple languages of belonging in the metropolis. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(2), 196–213.

Veriava, A. (2014) 'The South African diagram: the governmental machine and the struggles of the poor', Thesis, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University, [online] Available from: http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/13545 (Accessed 05 April 2019).

Velazquez, F.C 2000. Approaches to the Study of International Migration: A Review. Estudious Fronteriozos 1 (1).

Vincent, L. 2011. Seducing the People: Populism and the Challenge to Democracy in South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies.* Vol 29 (1) 1-4.

Vora, V. J. A and Vora, E. (2004). Effectiveness of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans. Journal of Black Studies, 34(3), 301-322.

Vorster, J.M. 2002. Racism, Xenophobia and Human Rights. The Ecumenical Review 54 (3), 296-312. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-6623.2002.tb00155.x

Vromen, A. 2010. Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches.

Wa Kabwe-Segatti, A. 2006. "Reformulating Immigration Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: From the Aliens Control Act of 1991 to the Immigration Act of 2002." IFAS Working Paper Series 8: 171–185.

Walliman, N. 2006. Social Research Methods. London: SAGE.

Weber, L. and Bowling, B. (2004) Policing Migration: A Framework for Investigating the Regulation of Global Mobility, Policing and Society, 14:3, 195-212.

Weideman, M. 2015. The Changing Status of Civil Society Organisations in South Africa. Hanns Seidel Foundation.

Welman, C., Kruger, F. and Mitchell, B. 2005. Research Methodology, 3rd Edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Welman, J.C, Kruger, F. and Mitchell, B. 2012. Research Methodology. Oxford University Press. Cape Town.

Welsh, D. 1996. 'Ethnicity in Ssub-Saharan Africa,' International Affairs 72 (3) 477–91.

Wendt, A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Werbner P .2004. Theorising complex diasporas: Purity and hybridity in the South Asian public sphere in Britain. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30(5): 895–911.

Wessels, D. 1999. South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Better Life for All. Journal of Social Sciences. Vol 3 Issue 4.

Whitaker, B.E. 2005. "Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion in Africa." African Studies Review 48 (1): 109–126. doi:10.1353/arw.2005.0047.

White Paper on International Migration for South Africa 2017. Department of Home Affairs Government Gazette, Department of Home Affairs, Government of South Africa, Pretoria. Available at https://www.gov. za/sites/default/files/41009_gon750.pdf. Accessed on 19 February 2020.

Wilkinson, K. 2015. Analysis: Are foreign nationals stealing jobs in South Africa? Mail and Guardian, 2015. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-17-analysis-are-foreigners-stealing-jobs-in-south-africa. Accessed on 19 February 2020.

Wodak, R., and Meyer, M. 2009. "Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology." Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage. 1- 33.

Woolley, F. 1998. Social Cohesion and Voluntary Activity: Making Connections. Paper presented at the CSLS Conference on the State of Living Standards and the Quality of Life in Canada. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.3440&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed on 19 February 2020.

World Bank. 1992. Governance and Development. Washington: D.C.

World Economic Forum. 2013. The Future Role of Civil Society. World Economic Forum in collaboration with KPMG International. Available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FutureRoleCivilSociety_Report_2013.pdf. Accessed 24 February 2020

Xulu, N. 2014. From hostels to CRUs: Spaces of perpetual perplexity, South African Review of Sociology.

Yakusho, O. 2009. Xenophobia: Understanding the roots and consequences of negative attitudes towards immigrants. The Counselling Psychologist, 37(1):36-66.

Yin, R.K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd Edition Newbury Park: SAGE.

Yin, R.K. 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage. Thousand Oaks, California.

Yin, R.K. 2009. Case Study Research. Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: CA. Sage

Young, I. M. 1989. Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship. Ethics, 99, January, 250–74.

Young, I.M. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Yuval-Davis, N. 2006. Intersectionality and Feminist Politics. *European Journal of Women's Studies*. 13 (3): 193-209.

Yuval-Davis, N., Kannabiran, K. and Vieten, U.M. 2006 Introduction: situating contemporary politics of belonging, in N. Yuval-Davies, K. Kannabiran and U.M. Vieten (Eds) The Situated Politics of Belonging, pp. 1-14. London: Sage.

Yuval-Davis, N. 2011. The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations. London: Sage.

Zetter, R. 1991. 'Labelling refugees: forming and transforming a bureaucratic identity', Journal of Refugee Studies 4, NO1. 39–62.

Zhou, J. 2010.Africa week focus for xenophobia. The Zimbabwean.

Zondi, S. 2008 'Xenophobia Attacks: Towards Understanding of Violence against African Immigrants in South Africa,' African Insight, vol. 38(2) September 2008, Africa Institute of South Africa.

ANNEXURE 1

ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

ANNEXURE 2

CONSENT FORM

I, Ekanade Israel Kehinde a PhD Candidate in the Department of Development Studies at the University of Venda majoring in Political Science is carrying out a research on the topic: "Politics of Belonging in South Africa Since 2008". I am inviting you as informants to voluntarily participate in this study and you are free to opt out at any stage with no consequences. The information collected from you would be for study purposes only and it will be private and confidential according to research ethics at the University of Venda according to research ethics at the University of Venda.

Name

Signature

Date

ANNEXURE 3

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ACADEMICIANS

Institutional affiliation.

(1) What are the triggers of the debate of Politics of Belonging?

(2) What is the current state of Politics of Belonging in 21st century South Africa with regards to relationship between locals and African foreign nationals in contemporary South Africa?

(3) How are identities (class, race and ethnicity) formed and maintained on post-apartheid of South Africa?

(4) In what ways has migration contributed to this discourse?

(5) What are the causes of animosity?

(6) Who does the labelling and in what ways are African nationals labelled and targeted in contemporary South Africa?

(7) What effects does the above scenario have on South Africa's image with regards to the international community?

(8) During crises periods, how have the police been able to bring such situations under control?

(9) Which peace-building methods have been adopted by the South African state during crises periods?

(10) What is your assessment of the role of civil society during xenophobic crises periods?

(11) What are the chances of a resurgence of violence on diasporic African nationals in South Africa?

(12) What role is being played by the political elite in all of these?

ANNEXURE 4

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHURCH LEADERS

(1) Name of church

(2) What is the stand of your church on the issue of xenophobic/Afrophobic orchestrated violence?

(3) What role has your church played in assisting victims of xenophobic violence?

(4) How has the situation affected the community in which your church is situated?

(5) How did your church handle censures (criticism) from locals during crises periods?

(6) How did other churches join you in the crusade against discrimination?

(7) What is your rating on government intervention during crises periods?

(8) What was the role played by police in shielding the vulnerable ones housed by your church?

(9) How has your church collaborated with other organizations on issues like xenophobia?

(10) What other humanitarian project is your church involved in?

(11) What are the chances of the violence recurring again?

(12) Closing remarks (advice to government and all stake holders)

ANNEXURE 5

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DIPLOMATS

(1) What is your country's position on violence perpetrated against her citizens in South Africa?

(2) What were the allegations levelled against your nationals?

(3) To what extent were they attacked?

(4) What was your embassy's response to the plight of the victims?

(5) In what ways has your country, through your embassy, engaged the South African state on the issue?

(6) Has the civil society come to the rescue of your citizens during crises periods?

(7) How has the South African Police Services assisted your citizens during such periods?

(8) Do you see xenophobia happening again?

(9) What measures are being adopted by your country to forestall future attacks?

ANNEXURE 6

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS

(1) Name, age and year of arrival in South Africa

(2) What were the reasons for your migration?

(3) Has your identity affected you in any way since you arrived in South Africa?

(4) Have you been accepted by locals in the community which you reside?

(5) Do you belong to any South African association or social club?

(6) Have you ever been discriminated against on the basis of nationality?

(7) Has the government or any other organization assisted you during xenophobic violence periods?

(8) What has your national organization or country done to assist you during such periods?

(9) What role has the police played?

(10) What are the possibilities of a recurrence of violence in the nearest future?

ANNEXURE 7

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS

(1) What is the current state of relationship between insiders and outsiders in contemporary South Africa?

(2) What has been the impact of insider-outsider relationship on the image of the South African state in the international community?

(3) How would you rate the response and effectiveness of the police during crises periods?

(4) What are the challenges facing your organization in the light of xenophobic orchestrated crises periods?

(5) What are the tactics being utilised by your organization in locating hotspots that breed xenophobes?

(6) What are the methods being used by your organization in exposing perpetrators of xenophobic violence?

(7) In what ways is your organization working in concert with government or other organizations in maintaining peace and harmony between locals and foreigners in South Africa?

(8) What is the role of migration in the politics of belonging debate in the present day South Africa?

ANNEXURE 8

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LOCALS

(1) What are your views about the presence of Africans from countries residing in South Africa?

(2) What crimes have they been accused of perpetrating?

(3) What are the perceived causes of service delivery strikes?

(4) What role has RDP housing got to do with service delivery strikes?

(5) How has the South African government responded to the issues of service delivery?

(6) How has the police handled the issue of service delivery strikes?

(7) How can the issue of service delivery be best attended to?

ANNEXURE 9

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POLITICAL LEADERS/ REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES

(1) How do you think the presence of foreigners affect the locals?

(2) Why is housing a major area of animosity between locals and foreigners in South Africa?

(3) It is rumoured that councillors engage in sharp practices like allocating RDP houses to non-South Africans at a fee. What is your response to this?

(4) What is the stand of your party as regards xenophobic violence?

(5) What are the chances of the recurrence of xenophobic violence in the country?

(6) What role has your political party played during crises periods?

(7) How has these scenarios affected your political party?

(8) In your view, what has been the response of the government to this boiling issue?

(9) In what ways have your members discriminated against foreign African nationals?

(10) In the media, it has often been reported that political parties hijack protests carried out by locals, inciting them against foreigners by telling them that foreigners are responsible for socio-economic crises plaguing the state thereby resulting to escalating violence against foreign African nationals. What is your response to this allegation?

(11) What is the stand of your party on migration into South Africa?

(12) Do you foresee a resurgence of xenophobic violence in South Africa?