Changes in the Conception of Nationalism in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Analysis of ZAPU and ZANU Liberation Movements 1977-1990

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Abstract

No serious study into the contemporary politics of Zimbabwe can ignore the celebrated influence of nationalism and the attendant role of elite leaders as a 'social force' in the making of the nation-state of Zimbabwe. This study analyses the role played by nationalism as an instrument for political mobilisation against the white settler regime in Rhodesia by the Zimbabwe African People Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Therefore, of particular importance is the manner in which the evolution and comprehensive analysis of these former liberation movements, in the political history of Zimbabwe have been viewed through the dominant lenses of nationalism. Nationalism can be regarded as the best set of beliefs and the worst set of beliefs. Being an exhilarating force that led to the emergence of these nationalist movements to dismantle white minority rule, nationalism was also the same force that was responsible for dashing the dreams and hopes associated with an independent Zimbabwe. At the centre of this thesis is the argument that there is a fault line in the manner in which nationalism is understood as such it continued to be constructed and contested. In the study, nationalism has been propagated as contending political narratives, and the nationalist elite leaders are presented as a social force that sought to construct the nation-state of Zimbabwe. Thus, the study is particularly interested in a comparative analysis of the competing narratives of nationalism between ZAPU and ZANU between the period of 1977 and 1990. This period is a very important time frame in the turning points on the nationalist political history of Zimbabwe. Firstly, the beginning of this period saw the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe climax because of concerted efforts by both ZAPU and ZANU. Secondly, the conclusion of this period saw the death of ZAPU as an alternative to multi-party democracy within the nationalist sense and the subsequent emergence of a dominant socialist one-party state. Methodologically, a qualitative approach has been employed where the researcher analysed documents.

Keywords: Narratives; Nationalism; Patriotic Front, Rhodesia; Zimbabwe African National Union; Zimbabwe African Peoples Union; Zimbabwe

Declaration

I *Dylan Yanano Mangani*, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for any degree at any other university or institution. The thesis does not contain other persons' writing unless specifically acknowledged and referenced accordingly.

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Dedication

I dedicate this study to the memory of my grandfather Mr. D. Mangani, a foreigner, who was welcomed among the Zimbabwean people.

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ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLS	Front Line States
FP	Foreign Policy
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
GNU	Government of National Unity
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Partido do Trabalho *(the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)*
NDP	National Democratic Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PCC	Peoples Caretaker Council
RF	Rhodesian Front
PF	Patriotic Front
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
RSF	Rhodesia Security Force
SRANC	Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
SWAPO	South West African Peoples' Organisation
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN	United Nations
US	United States
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZIPA	Zimbabwe Peoples' Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army
ZLA	Zimbabwe Liberation Army
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

FIGURE

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CHAPTER ONE:

CONCEPTUALISING AND RECONCEPTUALISING THE NATION AND NATIONALISM IN ZIMBABWE

1. Introduction to the Study

No serious study on Africa with Zimbabwe included can ignore the celebrated influence of nationalism and the resultant role of elite leaders as a 'social force' in the making of the continent, specifically, Zimbabwe. In Africa and Zimbabwe[1], nationalism was that exhilarating force for progress that stimulated reactions to the oppressive system of colonialism. In Zimbabwe it precipitated wars of resistance, namely, the Ndebele Uprising of 1893-94, First Chimurenga/ Umvukela of 1896-97 (spearheaded by iconic leaders such as Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi), Second Chimurenga (sparked by the rise of the second generation of nationalist leaders under liberation movements, notably the Zimbabwe African People Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)). The latter movements became the locomotives, by which amongst others, the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith was confronted, resulting in the independence of the country in 1980 (Chung, 2006: 60; Maxey, 1985: 5). Nationalist influences, although marred with controversy, were also exerted during the fundamental agrarian reform program dubbed 'The Third Chimurenga or Jambanja'; this resulted in the invasion of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe in 1998.[2]

We can trace the earliest recorded manifestations of nationalism back to the 15th-century writings of Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli, writing to Lorenzo de' Medici, in the concluding chapter of his book *The Prince* calls on the latter to free Italian lands from German, French and Spanish control. The philosopher was calling on Medici to free Italy from foreign invaders and occupation, thus, Machiavelli writes "…. she prays to God to send someone to redeem her from this barbarous cruelty and insolence" (Ricci, 1921:104). Accordingly, foreign occupation is

[1] Zimbabwe is used to describe the land between the Limpopo and Zambezi River which over the course of its history assumed different names such as Southern Rhodesia, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia then Zimbabwe after independence on the 18th of April in 1980.

[2] The fast track land reform though started in 1998 seems to be an ongoing process, as it is often revisited

regarded as an anti-thesis for the liberty and self-determination of a nation and this is central to the concept and ideology of nationalism (Easley, 2012: 97).

With time, this force for liberty and self- determination grew in logic and experience to become one of the most potent and yet ambiguous ideologies in 19th-century European international relations. In the late 19th Europe, nationalism became a combative ideology that altered the status quo[3] to pave the way for the rise of Germany and Italy (Thomson, 1966: 300). It is this same combative force that led to the fall of notable civilisations, such as the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern bloc of the Soviet Union in 1923 and 1989 respectively (Gingeras, 2016: 263). In Africa and the Third World, it was that exhilarating force for progress that stimulated response to the political, economic and social oppression of European colonialism in these regions. In Zimbabwe it is this same force that precipitated the emergence of liberation movements to confront the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith, resulting in the independence of the country in 1980 (Chung, 2006: 60; Maxey, 1985:5). The conceptual parameters of nationalism in the European sense are based on the rejection of foreign intervention and the emergence of nation-states that did not exist such as Germany and Italy. In the words of Anderson (2006:3), the idea of nation-ness was an essential feature in the development of nationalism in Europe. Comparatively, in the African sense, nationalism was seen as a

> "modernist response of Africans to the political, social, economic and cultural depredations of (particularly) Western over lordship … It is modernist in the sense that it is a reaction which has benefited from the leadership of Western-educated Africans and advised by a contemporary, universally subscribed, ideas of freedom and emancipation" (Prah 2009:2).

A striking feature of this definition is the role played by the educated elite, and the modernity of African nationalism.

For the purpose of this study, nationalism will be defined as the process of identity-making (Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:9). The observation is that the 'process' is a series of political actions or steps taken in order to achieve a political end. Tellingly, this definition indicates that nationalism is an idea that is constructed. The definition also indicates that political elites are regarded as a social force that constructs and contests this idea. Ndlovu-Gatsheni amplifies this assertion by

[3] For example, the Austria-Hungary might and French dominance under the Second Empire of Napoleon and the religious force of the Roman Catholic Church

citing Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins that nationalism can be regarded as 'the best of beliefs and … the worst of beliefs'. Reicher and Hopkins (2001:56-57) state:

> Nationalism can be an exhilarating revolutionary force for progress … But we only have to open our newspapers today to areas where nationalism becomes, in the wrong hands, a primaeval force of darkness and reaction.

It is based on the above scholarly definitions that this study makes a strong case for changes in nationalism based on the case of Zimbabwe's nationalist political history. The presumption above resonates with the intention of the study to locate the logic and experience of nationalism as a force that can be instrumental for good or bad purposes. Based on the above scholarly discussions, this study investigates changes in the conception of nationalism within the two prominent liberation movement, ZAPU and ZANU. The main argument is that, contrary to the basic Marxists tenets that see revolutions as mass-based movements, what is presented in the histories of both ZAPU and ZANU is a self-described 'revolution from above' determined by the ideology of the elite, thus, the thesis deviates from the general understanding of an ethnie as the motivating factor for the development of nationalism in Zimbabwe. Smiths (2000:65) elucidates an 'ethnie' as "a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories … one or more memories of shared culture". Rising from this departure point is the role played by elite nationalist and political leadership in the execution of the struggle for Zimbabwe. The leadership builds on the notions of land and Africanness as the foundations for nationalism to a more nuanced construction of a Zimbabwean identity that is a multi-dimensional. This identity is multi-dimensional in the sense that it encompasses tenets of cultural nationalism, such as land and Africanness and at the same time finds expression in neo-liberal principles such as political democracy and civil rights. This became a focal point of contestation and avenues for identity politics, between those that viewed the struggle in conservative and nativist terms and those that believed in a progressive and neo-liberal approach to the struggle.

Consequently, the research identifies several fissures within the liberation struggle that have come to characterise failed trajectories in nationalism between the period of 1977-1990. This period is a very important transitional period in the nationalist political history of Zimbabwe as it focuses on the role of the nationalist leadership in the formative years of Zimbabwe's independence. This role has been selected as a focus for analysis because of the period's effect

on the nationalist leadership, on the transformation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe. In order to comprehend the mutation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics, this period provides the opportunity to analyse political trajectories that led to the independence of Zimbabwe. In particular, the period reflects a mismatch between what appeared as the 'original objectives' of the struggle and what came about. An analysis of the Lancaster House agreement is undertaken against political fundamentalism with specific reference to the role played by various interest-based actors in the outcome of an internationally-accepted Zimbabwe. In doing so, the study focuses on the British foreign policy, the role played by African diplomacy and the interests of the Patriotic Front. These actors have been selected because they represent a social force whose interests, by default or design, dovetailed into what appeared to be a departure from socialism. Lastly, the 1980s saw the polarisation between ZAPU and ZANU escalating into a tragic genocide which culminated in ZAPU merging with ZANU in 1987. In terms of post-independent politics, the specific focus is on how ZANU sought to re-construct itself as a 'representative of the nation' through a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy. Central to this discussion is whether a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy mirrored exclusive patriotic politics, in post-independent Zimbabwe. These developments marked what some commentators saw as the death of multi-party democracy and nationalist politics in Zimbabwe.

1.2 Problem Statement

Scholars have written extensively on the genesis and evolution of nationalism in Zimbabwe's political history. Previous studies have been devoted to explaining the phenomena mainly on the question of race and its political, economic and social implications. Added to that is ZANU's[4] monopoly of the liberation struggle and a purely socialist agenda that was being pursued by African national liberation movements in the fight against white-settler colonialism (Mhanda, 1978; Chung, 2006; Nyagumbo; 1980 and Riley, 1982). What has come out of the bulk of scholarly opinionated 'praise texts' is the less theorised theme of the attendant role of white-settler colonialism in perpetuating the emergence of a black, political-bourgeoisie elite. The emergence of a black elite and its role in attempting to define and shape nationalism within

[4] Before 1987 it was a movement and party that rivaled ZAPU before and after independence

ZAPU and ZANU manifested itself in the period of 1977 and 1990 as a social-political force that continued to transform postcolonial Zimbabwe.

Consequently, the Zimbabwe People Army (ZIPA) emerged and its significance seemed to deconstruct this hegemonic narrative, as a determining factor in the rise of Robert Mugabe to the echelons of power. This decisive role, by ZIPA, became a visible expression of the long-standing ideological contradiction inherent in Zimbabwean nationalism. As a result, until this role played by ZIPA is given a platform to be thoroughly interrogated, the concept of the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe will remain incomplete. During the early years of Zimbabwe's independence, 'critical moments' such as the Lancaster House agreement, the genocide in Matabeleland and the policy of reconciliation, which fostered different political trajectories in the country, have largely been produced through a single narrative that disowns any other. That kind of approach has deliberately excluded memories of fundamentalism that manifested in the British foreign policy, the ambiguous support rendered by African leaders at the Lancaster House agreement. Furthermore, this narrative is inconclusive in detailing ZANU's pursuit of a coherent socialist ideology and the effect of factions within the party as well as how these contributed to the civil war in Matabeleland. Previous studies on these 'critical moments' tended to be accepting because there is an assumption that any critical analysis would render the liberation struggle false and invalid. In view of the aforementioned, this study attempts to problematise the changes in the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe through a critical in-depth analysis of the political history of the country between 1977 and 1990.

1.3 Aim of the Study

The aim of the study is to gain an understanding of the concept of nationalism as a force that was used by ZAPU and ZANU to dismantle colonialism in Zimbabwe. The broader aim is to shed more light on the changes and dynamism of nationalism in these movements between 1977 and 1990 since that period is seen as a turning point in the political history of the country.

1.4 Objectives

- To examine the emergence of a constructed and contested nationalism in Zimbabwe;
- To analyse differences in the conceptualisation of nationalism within and between ZAPU and ZANU during the struggles in Zimbabwe; and

- To explore the mutation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe.

1.5 Research Questions and Assumption of the Study

- How did a constructed and contested nationalism emerge in Zimbabwe?
- How has nationalism been understood and interpreted by ZAPU and ZANU in both pre- and post-independent Zimbabwe?
- What challenges have resulted in post-independent Zimbabwe due to the mutation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics?

The assumption of the Study

For Zimbabwe, nationalism has been both a positive and a negative force. In a generic sense, it helped to dismantle white-minority rule in Zimbabwe, however, it quickly mutated into a monolithic and exclusive force that has continued to plague the politics of post-independent Zimbabwe.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study seeks to contribute to an understanding of nationalism in the history of Zimbabwe as embodied in ZAPU and ZANU movements. The study details nationalism as a phenomenon grounded in elitism that has led to competition, issues of inclusion and exclusion, authenticity and legitimacy contrary to the dominant narratives of a generic success story.

1.7 Definitions of Concepts

Nation-Scholarship on the ‘nation’ has evolved in discourses on nationalism. The fundamental idea is that the nation's identity is homogenously fixed, but rather subject to scholarly analysis. Even though in some instances patriotic discourses present the ‘nation’ in a singular narrative that disavows any other, the identity of the nation is continuously constructed and contested. As such cultural theorists such as Bhabha points to the ‘'the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force [in spite of] the attempt by nationalist discourses persistently to produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of national progress’. This is based on the understanding that key facets of the nation such as sense of belonging, national identity and culture are constantly refuted within the nation by other independent factors. In Zimbabwe, the idea of a

'nation' has been constructed along contested racial, ethnic, political and ideological lines. In terms of colonial politics, the specific focus is on how the nation was constructed in a face-off between whites and Africans, leading to the emergence of African resistance movements. In post independent Zimbabwe, the nation was understood through an ethnic exclusive coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy that mirrored exclusive patriotic politics. After 2000, the notion of the nation was shaped after ZANU-PF's intolerant politics that profiled the opposition MDC as an outpost of European imperialism. With the intent of projecting itself as the true representative of the nation, ZANU-PF presented the MDC as an anti-national movement that was not committed to national progress. In a nutshell, in Zimbabwe, the nation has been presented in a hegemonic, forceful and intolerant narrative that disavows any other.

Nationalism - is a phenomenon and ideology that is ambiguous in logic and experience. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:9) defines 'nationalism' as the process of identity-making with the underlying factor being the construction of identity usually for a previously-oppressed people. The study adopts this definition in the discussions.

Identity politics - is an emerging phenomenon that is understood against the background of a tendency for particular people differentiated by features, such as religion, race, social background, to form exclusive political alliances, hence, moving away from traditional broad-based party politics. Kowert and Lergro (1996: 435) are of the position that political identities are "perspective representation of political actors themselves and evolving of their relationship to each other". In the context of the study, it is discrediting one's political foe as a traitor or unpatriotic for a certain intended cause; strategies exploited include the demonization of political opponents and slandering to pursue an agenda that is manufactured and not real. The history of the liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU, is awash with incidents and examples of how identity politics were used as tools to attain authenticity and legitimacy in the eyes of the masses and the rest of the world. Identity politics manifested in peddling myths and propaganda against each other. This was successfully done sometimes through the use of the media.

A ZAPU perspective opines that the emergence of ZANU, arguing that its formation was the first setback to the struggle of Zimbabwe. ZAPU (2012:10) argues: "[A] monumental and criminal betrayal of the people's struggle for self-determination on the African continent, on August 8, 1963, ZANU was founded". Consequently, ZAPU viewed ZANU as a separatist move, labelling those who formed ZANU as 'rebels' - a derogatory term to discredit one's opponent. In addition, ZAPU argued about a meeting that transpired between one Stuart Gore Brown, a white farmer and 'dissidents' in ZANU to conclude that ZANU was formed as a movement that sought to keep the interests of whites instead of Africans.

On the other hand, the ZANU perspective accused ZAPU of lethargy and dictatorial tendencies. The narrative by ZANU was that Nkomo had monopolised the presidency from the SRANC, NDP and ZAPU where he was eventually made a life president. By castigating Nkomo as a dictator and likening him to leaders with a questionable reputation, such as Hitler and Mussolini, ZANU was delegitimatizing ZAPU and its leader Nkomo. In May 1964, speaking at ZANU's inaugural congress, Sithole boasted that ZAPU had tried to liquidate ZANU, and he further spoke of the militancy ZANU had adopted as a 'clarion call to war'. With the intention of projecting itself as a more militant party, ZANU pre-emptied ZAPU's contribution to the struggle and this became the dominant narrative in Zimbabwean historiography that ZAPU's role in freeing Zimbabwe was minimal.

Chimurenga - a Shona term translated to mean a revolutionary armed struggle. It is usually referred to the wars fought by Zimbabwean freedom fighters during the First and Second Chimurenga, for the total independence of the country from white-minority rule. The ideology has gained resonance in the popular notion of a Third Chimurenga and fundamental issues, such as nationalism in which the land has become a focal point of contestation. Chimurenga is located in the philosophy of the first generation of nationalists like Chief Murenga whose ideology spoke to the symbolism of resisting the encroachment of whites as a way of preserving a true African identity. However with the passage of time the basic tenets of this ideology have been refined to accommodate issues such as the fight for land. For example nationalism emerged as an identity because of the encroachment of the British in 1890; this led to the First Chimurenga wars that sought to repossess land that the British had expropriated. Alexander (2006:185) says: "Nationalism was exclusively about fighting men and land, about British perfidy and national sovereignty, it was not about democracy or rights". Mugabe, (2001:92-93) corroborates this view saying:

> We knew and still know that land was the prime goal of King Lobengula as he fought British encroachment in 1893; we knew and still know that land was the principal grievance for our heroes of the First Chimurenga led by Nehanda and Kaguvi Hence land became the banner of African identity and nationalism.

The land was a key feature in the construction of African identity, thus Alexander (2006) and Mugabe (2001) invoked cultural nationalism in their understanding and tied land, nationalism

and identity together. Cultural nationalists, such as Hutchinson (1994) view the nation and nationalism as a product of history and culture and key to this history and culture are sacrosanct features, such as land. The land is not just seen in the material sense but in the psychological and spiritual dimensions of identity and it is in this particularism and uniqueness of culture that identity can be understood (Hutchinson 1994 cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni &Willems, 2009).

Pan African/ism - is an ideology centred on the progress and unity of all Africans. This started as an ideology-turned movement by Africans in the diaspora and has led to the birth of African nationalism and the subsequent political decolonization of the African continent. Maimela (2013:34) observes "Pan-Africanism emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, as an idea and later an action program by Africans in colonial territories – a response to slavery, imperialism, colonialism and racism. From the onset, pan-Africanism became an anti-thesis to European imperialism, domination and racism.

Neo-liberal approaches/ideals - are ideals promoted, such as good governance, capitalism, democracy and respect for human rights, following the post-Cold War era.

Cold War - is a period of ideological rivalry between the US and the former Soviet Union (which formally ended in 1990). In the context of the research, the Cold War is understood to have caused the destabilisation of the Southern African region.

Social force - refers to a constituency of highly esteemed leaders in ZAPU and ZANU who were political and nationalist figures and they were responsible for directing the liberation struggle.

Narratives - can be defined as the manner in which "we story the world" (Mishler 1995:117 cited in Shenhave 2006). Narratives are ways of formulating knowledge in the most intelligent and comprehensible way. As such, the study defines 'narratives' in the political sense, as being the manner in which nationalist politicians constructed and contested nationalism and nationalist politics.

Fundamentalism - can be defined as a belief in an idea to be absolute and true, hence, is exclusive of other ideas.

Nativism - is an idea that speaks to the safeguarding of the interests of the indigenous people.

1.8 Delimitations of the Study

The study examines the development and changes in the concept of nationalism between 1977 and 1990 in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. A study of nationalism is very pivotal and sensitive within a restrictive political environment in Zimbabwe, particularly in ZAPU and ZANU. As a result, the information gathered was either motivated by ideological convictions or party line affiliation. The limitations of the study will be presented in three sections: chronology, study units and geography. The research identifies several fissures within the liberation struggle that have come to characterise failed trajectories in nationalism between the periods of 1977-1990. This period is a very important transitional period in the nationalist political history of Zimbabwe as it focuses on the role of the nationalist leadership in the formative years of Zimbabwe's independence. This role has been selected as a focus for analysis because of the period's effect on the nationalist leadership, on the transformation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe. In order to comprehend the mutation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics, this period provides the opportunity to analyse political trajectories that led to the independence of Zimbabwe. In particular, the period reflects a mismatch between what appeared as the 'original objectives' of the struggle and what came about. An analysis of the Lancaster House agreement is undertaken against political fundamentalism with specific reference to the role played by various interest-based actors in the outcome of an internationally-accepted Zimbabwe. In doing so, the study focuses on the British foreign policy, the role played by African diplomacy and the interests of the Patriotic Front. These actors have been selected because they represent a social force whose interests, by default or design, dovetailed into what appeared to be a departure from socialism. Lastly, the 1980s saw the polarisation between ZAPU and ZANU escalating into a tragic genocide which culminated in ZAPU merging with ZANU in 1987. In terms of post-independent politics, the specific focus is on how ZANU sought to re-construct itself as a 'representative of the nation' through a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy. Central to this discussion is whether a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy mirrored exclusive patriotic politics, in post-independent Zimbabwe. These developments marked what some commentators saw as the death of multi-party democracy and nationalist politics in Zimbabwe

With regards to the geographical demarcation of the study, the study on ZAPU and ZANU liberation movements in Zimbabwe formerly Rhodesia was selected given the changes and continuities in the conceptualisation of nationalist politics in the country. The ever worsening political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe lead scholars to search for meanings and future destinations by conceptualising this important time frame in the history of the country.

1.9 Ethical Considerations

Ethics can be defined as the general responsibility of researchers to be truthful and respectful to all individual participants who may be affected by research studies or the outcome of these studies. Any research project, thus, should conform to moral, ethical and legal standards of a socio-scientific inquiry. Against this background, the study was guided by the following ethical considerations:

i. Avoiding bias

The aim of the study was to produce findings that conformed to thorough research inquiry to minimise the possibility of the findings being misleading. Cognisant of this, the researcher as an interested party, as a Zimbabwean, realized that there was a strong temptation to be biased towards certain interpretations and understanding of nationalism in Zimbabwe. The data collection, analysis and interpretation processes, therefore, were very objective and academic so as to produce well-argued and constructive academic outcomes.

i. Respect for confidentiality

The principle of beneficence includes ensuring participants' freedom from harm, freedom from exploitation and maintain an acceptable risk-benefit ratio. Regarding the freedom from harm, there was no physical harm for those participating in the study, although, some psychological discomfort may result from the nature of the questions asked. In this regard, an opportunity was provided for participants to ask questions and to air their feelings in an attempt to provide some relief for them. This study undertook to respect the confidentiality of participants by protecting the names and identity of those involved. Additionally, the research guaranteed the confidentiality of information given through interviews, as issues relating to party politics may be sensitive as it involves different opinions and narratives from politicians, academics, scholars and government officials.

2. Methodology

This study relied on the analysis of literature on nationalism and nationalist trajectories. A qualitative research methodology was used in an effort to construct a better understanding of the changes in nationalism in both ZAPU and ZANU. The qualitative research methodology was exploited because of its interpretive nature dealing with words rather than numbers. This methodology is also inclusive as it allows participants and researcher involvement, thus, its "privileging of subjectivity is […] seen in the way that the interpretation of the data is influenced by the researcher's own biography together with their involvement with people in the study" (Daymon & Holloway, 2002: 6).

Qualitative research is also appropriate in explaining how social meanings and realities are constructed and as such the study embraced the use of discourse analysis. With discourse analysis, the study uses Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's discourse theory and critical discourse analysis. Jørgensen & Phillips (2002: 24) argue that Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's discourse theory is drawn from the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) work where the overall idea behind discourse theory is that

> social phenomena are never finished or total. Meaning can never be ultimately fixed, and this opens up the way for constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting social effects.

Accordingly, the discourse theory is very significant in the study of nationalism as a concept whose meaning is constantly shifting, according to time and political circumstances. Careful analysis of the existing and dominating meanings attached to nationalism uncovered unargued assumptions and contradictions, therefore, new ways of thinking are exposed and contradictions identified can be used as tools for new meaning and understanding of nationalism. There is, thus, always the need to refute and critically challenge hegemonic praise texts on nationalism.

i. Document Analysis

There are some documents that are relevant to construct a strong argument for any study. Document analysis, for this study, involves analysing speeches, policies and legal documents in order to get an in-depth knowledge of nationalism and the nationalist discourse in Zimbabwe. Notable documents which deliberate on issues of nationalism are Wilfred Mhanda's Treatise of 1978, the Mgagao declaration of 1975, ZANU-PF's election manifestos, the constitution and Jonathan Moyo's Gukurahundi Draft Bill. These documents are not conclusive but do offer some understanding of the trajectories of nationalism in Zimbabwe.

Information from, treatises, documents and newspapers in an attempt to verify narratives that have been deconstructed through the extensive use of dominant historiographies in the academic world. Secondary sources of data on the changes of nationalism were also used to gain a broader understanding of the themes that were relevant in achieving the objectives of the study. All secondary data sources are available in the public domain.

2.1 Data Analysis Methods

Data was sorted and coded during the analysis; qualitative data analysis was done through an inductive approach where data was analysed carefully to develop and categories themes that were deemed appropriate for the objectives of the research.

3. Structure of the Study

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter one is the introduction to the study. This was done through an outline of the background to the study, formulation of the research problem and assumption. There are justification and significance for the study because of the importance placed on the nationalist struggle in shaping politics in Zimbabwe. Methodologically, the study is approached from an inductive content analysis that seeks to probe social discourses such as nationalism by interviewing participants and studying documents to develop themes. The study's literature is based on an analysis of nationalism between the periods 1977 to 1990. This introductory chapter also expounds on the definition of key terms that informed the study and the demarcation of the study, 1977 to 1990 as a very significant timeline of turning points in the nationalist political history of Zimbabwe.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Chapter two explores scholarly debates that contribute to the conception of nationalism as it is impossible to come up with a universal conception of nationalism. This debate includes the conception of nationalism from the traditional and contemporary points of views (Easley 2012; Prah 2009). Confluences and divergences in scholarship are explored with the aim of drawing critical themes that would inform the study. The chapter examines the history, philosophy and challenges of nationalism. Chapter two also focuses on the application of the Primordalist and Constructivist theories in the study. Within the Primordalist discourse, historical and cultural factors are the primary focus from which nationalism emerge. Factors such as land, kinsmanship, religion and symbols are the primary tools for the development of nationalism. Constructivist is also used to examine nationalism from a different perspective. The theory departs from the traditional and historical view of nationalism and centralizes the role played by elites in the construction of nationalism hence, nations and nationalism are concepts that are weaved together to create a sense of identity.

Chapter Three: Constructed and Contested Nationalism by ZAPU and ZANU (1965-1975)

Chapter three evaluates the role played by the nationalist political leadership in constructing and contesting nationalism in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Of note is their innovative efforts in problematising the political crisis in Rhodesia. Their innovative efforts took on various forms - the use of political narratives, media, and transnational alliances. These innovative efforts transformed the nationalist political leadership into powerful political and social forces because of their ability to self-organise and propel changes in the conception of politics in Rhodesia. Despite efforts to give thrust to the liberation struggle by the elites, the chapter indicates that factional politics, political violence, identity politics and tension between the educated and uneducated elites emerged. This attests to the fact that there is a 'fault-line' in the conception of nationalism, hence it was continuously (de)constructed and (re)contested. One way this was expressed was in the internecine violence in townships between ZAPU and ZANU, the split in ZAPU in 1962 and the movement of March 11, 1971.

Chapter Four: The Mutation of Nationalism into Exclusive Patriotic Politics in Post-Independent Zimbabwe

Chapter four provides a synopsis of the role played by educated nationalists. This is done through an evaluation of the rise of Robert Mugabe to the echelons of power in ZANU. The study on Mugabe is encapsulated in the understanding that nationalist political leaders were significant is as far as they were presumed to be spreading new ideas and their ability to redefine the national question. Chapter four focuses on tracing the origins of the newly-independent state of Zimbabwe espousing diverging scholarly perspectives on the outcomes of the Lancaster House agreement of 1979. Themes that emerged where the Marxist and nativist argument proffered by Mhanda (cited in Moore, 2012); views of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) that contextualised the Lancaster House agreement from the view of the Cold War. Multiple perspectives were applied to understand the outcomes of the Lancaster House agreement, including an analysis of the British foreign policy, the support offered to the Patriotic Front by African leaders and the interest-based motives of the Patriotic Front. These examinations are relevant as they narrate the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe from multiple views. Also proffered in the chapter, is the mutation of nationalism into exclusive and patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe and how ZANU demonstrated representing the nation through coercion and not consent. The coercive approach took on various forms, such as the criminalization of political opponents, attempting to create a coherent socialist ideology, the pursuit of one party state and use of political violence; despite these strategies, the chapter shows that ZAPU contested ZANU's view of representing the nation. Lastly, the chapter captures the Gukurahundi massacres from a different viewpoint; that it was an attempt at one party state, factional politics in ZANU contributed to the deployment of the 5th Brigade in southwestern Zimbabwe that led to the death of 20 000 civilians.

Chapter Five: Summative Evaluation of Changes in the Conception of Nationalism in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Analysis of ZAPU and ZANU Liberation Movements

Chapter five provides a summative evaluation of the changes in the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe. A thematic approach is adopted in order to establish the key objectives of the study. The chapter concludes that nationalism is constructed and contested as political narratives by the political elites in Zimbabwe. This approach is effective because it captures nationalism in various forms, instrumental use of political violence and criminalization of political opponents, to cite a few examples. Emerging from the chapter is the innovative dimension of the nationalist

leadership in redefining the political crisis in Rhodesia. In the chapter is also discussed the extent to which the media and transnational alliances became effective tools in the transition from a passive to militant nationalism. There are also interactions to the Lancaster House agreement from various points of departure by interest-based actors - Britain, African leadership and the Patriotic Front. The chapter also evaluates key findings on the post-independent political trajectories in Zimbabwe which indicates that nationalist leaders failed to come up with robust post-crisis initiatives crucial for nation-building.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

In this section, the key findings of each chapter of the study are assessed and synthesised. The methodological framework of the study is revisited bringing out some of the limitations of the approach. In addition, the chapter explains the study's contribution to the body of knowledge and it then suggests themes for further studies.

TWO:

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the research problem, study objectives, methods and methodology as well as the fundamental questions to be explored by the study. The study will examine the dynamism of understanding nationalism in Zimbabwe through identifying information gaps in what exists already in the study of Zimbabwean nationalism. To achieve the objective of this chapter, broad and extensive review of literature is conducted thematically on aspects such as- nationalism in the historical context, problematisation of the concept nationalism, nationalism in the traditional global context focusing insights from Machiavelli and the French Revolution, characterization of nationalism in Africa, Nationalism in Zimbabwe, and a comparative analysis of ZAPU and ZANU approaches to nationalism.

Pertinently the chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the study paying special attention to Primordalist and Constructivist theories. Adopting a dual theoretical approach helped to reveal alternative perspectives on the subject matter, in line with the fact that theories are analytical lenses through which we analyse and make sense of contentious political issues. The next section proffers historical profiling of nationalism covering its core philosophical underpinnings.

Conceptualisation of Nationalism

2.1 History, Philosophy and Problematising Nationalism

2.1.1 Historicising and Philosophising Nationalism

Scholars have been divided in trying to trace the traditional foundation of the concept of ‘nationalism’. Some scholars (Anderson1991; Hobsbawm 1992) who have come to be known as

'modernists' contend that nationalism is a modern phenomenon that has its origins in the post-French Revolution. In fact, Anderson (1991:11) argues: "Western Europe eighteenth-century marks … the dawn of the age of nationalism". On the other hand, Hobsbawm believes that the period prior to the 18th century was marked by flawed reasoning in the understanding of nationalism. Hobsbawm suggests that problems that emanated from this period were marked by scholars motivated by racism and nativism in advancing that nationalism is a Western European phenomenon, however, if nationalism can be defined in terms of social and cultural perspectives, then one can trace the phenomenon to ancient Greece. The history of plundering, wars of conquest, resource accumulation and cultural hegemony of the Greek and Roman Empire can be useful lenses through which one can understand nationalism. Heit (2005), hence, does not agree that nationalism is a modern phenomenon but rather traces the origin of traditional nationalism to the Ancient Greece world and to the philosophical texts of Homes and Aristotle. According to Hiet, the language in ancient times became the determinant through which nationalism grew to distinguish social groups. It is through the author's narration of the Hellenes, Greeks, who viewed other social groups, such as the Trojans and the Achaians as '*Barbara*' (barbarians) because they did not speak Greek. It is also in this context that the ancient Roman Empire was founded through cultural assimilation and social acclimation to 'Romaness'. Cultural subjugation often resulted in the clash of civilisations and a call to reject foreign interference. One is reminded of the epic battles between Hannibal the Great, of Carthage and the Roman Empire and Spartacus the Thracian, against Rome.

What is particularly interesting about these debates are the points at which they converge for whilst modernists believe that nationalism can be understood within the prisms of historical materialism as explained by Marxists, traditionalists also maintain that cultural assimilation and social acclimation were pivotal in the development of nationalism. Heit (2005) maintains that cultural assimilation dovetailed into the needs of states such as Rome and these needs ensured the survival of the state. Ancient Rome was known for assimilating cultures and using people who were not Romans as slaves to boost the Roman economy and image.

Some of the earliest recorded manifestations of nationalism have been traced back to Niccolò Machiavelli. As indicated earlier Machiavelli writes to Lorenzo de' Medici, in the concluding chapter in his book *The Prince* and calls on Medici to free Italian lands from German, French

and Spanish control (Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 2000:284). In short, the philosopher called on Medici to free Italy from foreign invaders and occupation, thus, foreign occupation is seen as an antithesis to collective liberty and self-determination and this forms the foundation and our understanding of the concept of nationalism (Easley, 2012: 97). Included in the philosophical tenets of Machiavellian nationalism is the role played by the people and the 'elite' leadership; the people were a source of continuity that had to rally behind elite leaders. What is interesting about the Machiavellian discourse is the central role of elite leadership as a force for social organisation. To Machiavelli, elite leadership was the driver of change and determinant of virtue; responsible for introducing "new modes and orders" in society (Mansfield, 1998:20, 33). These new modes and orders entailed the application of nationalism as a sophisticated tool for instrumental purposes. (Easley, 2012: 111). To Machiavelli, elite nationalist leaders had to play an initiating role in the development of nationalism. This brings to mind the political thoughts of Kwame Nkrumah (1964) who emphasised the role played by elite public intellectuals in the development of nationalism. Machiavelli calls on the elite to be "masters at playing the nationalism card-making use of political theatre and manipulating the passions of the people". This realist approach to nationalism has been well captured by Easley (2012:111) who sums up Machiavelli's views thus:

> Machiavelli had a sophisticated understanding of exploiting nationalism for instrumental purposes. He understood the utility of a national myth, having discussed national founding and heroes at length. He understood the rally around the flag effect and prescribed nationalism as a way to fool and control the people.

Machiavelli's philosophical and realist approach to nationalism seems to converge with Ndlovu-Gatsheni's views on nationalism - a process of identity-making (2011:9). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) views nationalism as a force that produces nativism and uses Mbembe's (2002) philosophical understanding of nativism as a revival of an African identity in the wake of forces of globalisation. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006), hence, uses Mbembe (2002) to examine the role played by the elites in ZANU-PF in what is known as the Third Chimurenga's fight for cultural and political revival in the wake of formidable opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change. The idea behind the Nativist Revolution is to identify the leadership in the ruling party of ZANU-PF as decisive elements in the construction of a new pan-Africanist discourse and identity in Zimbabwe. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, the idea of exploring nationalism is for

instrumental purposes; this is done through a careful selection of myths and historical memories, such as the struggle for independence, which can be summed up as an identity-making process for self-serving survival purposes. Whilst Ndlovu-Gatsheni's views converge with those of Machiavelli on the role played by the elite in the construction of an identity as instruments for propaganda purposes, the idea behind Machiavelli's thoughts were for the glory and unity of the state. On the other hand, Ndlovu-Gatsheni's Nativist Revolution does not seek to explain unity as the ultimate end of nativism but instead as a philosophy that causes divisions while manufacturing political identity between patriotic citizens and those who are ultimately regarded as sell-outs, such as the opposition political parties.

A number of scholars give credence to the French Revolution as influential in shaping nationalism in Europe (Dann & Dinwiddy 1988; Anderson 1991, Hobsbawn 1992). This is so because with the French Revolution, the status of the 'people' who constitute the majority of the nation, changed from being 'subjects' under monarchs to 'participative citizens'. Heater (2004) maintains that until the 1700s, people had not been emotionally, socially and politically attached to the nation because of the divine rights of monarchs and the power of the Roman Catholic Church. The idea of the nation rested on the King and the Church, as the King was the nation and the will of the nation. In this case, the people became subjects of the King through consistent affirmations such as 'God save the King'. Philosophers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau became "highly self-conscious, purposive individuals attempting to elaborate or enact blueprints for change" (Szporluk, 1988:80). Under the doctrine of popular sovereignty, these philosophers appear to have pushed for active participation of citizens in the day-to-day activities of the nation. In *The Rights of Man* of 1791 published by Hitchens (2008), Thomas Paine speaks of democracy and nationalism in states governed by the general will of the people.

In accounting for the significance of the people during the French Revolution, Easley (2012) examines Rousseau's understanding of the link between the people and nationalism. To Rousseau, the 'nation' was the 'sovereign people' which was a departure from the view that 'the King was the nation'. It seems to Rousseau that nationalism had a communitarian purpose, therefore, the individual had to understand and take pride in serving the interest of the community, a social contract that had disappeared because of the divine rights of the monarchy. This social contract emerges with the French Revolution where Rousseau suggests that it is the

natural law for the people to have an attachment to the nation through serving it. Rousseau wanted people to avoid corruption, improve their characters, and focus on a giving of self to the country and fellow citizen. (Easley, 2012: 104). This desire informed Rousseau's concept of national unity. The concept of national unity rested on one of the three founding principles of the French Revolution: fraternity; he saw national unity as an end to prevent civil war.

A study on Rousseau's philosophy on nationalism and its impact on the French Revolution is of note, for, from his works, the philosopher sought a new blueprint for the society that would accelerate people's participation and attachment to the nation and be proud to be called 'French'. It is from this understanding that patriotism would emerge as it appears that until the French Revolution, a conservative political and socio-economic organisation that rested on the nobility, the church and monarchy had prevented patriotism. The Workers Socialist Party (2015) theorises that these conservative modes of social organisation vested the distribution of wealth and power into the hands of a few, particularly, the nobility. A growing sense of nationalism, thus, emerged with liberty, equality, and fraternity as the basic tenets to the understanding of the French Revolution (Workers Socialist Party, 2015:3). This conception set a precedence that saw the emergence of governments whose power was based on the popular will, throughout the world up to this date.

In so much as in Europe, the French Revolution became the popular model of nationalism rooted in the popular will, debates have also emerged to critique the French Revolution and the emergence of positive nationalism. The French Revolution put an end to monarchs and divine rule, however, it also saw the emergence of authoritarian rule under notable figures, such as Napoleon Bonaparte. Rowe (2013) is one of the leading scholars that critique the French Revolution as heralding 'the worst set of beliefs'. The author chronicles Napoleon's foreign policy as characterised by conquests and imperialism from 1799 until 1812. This is done with the aid of examples such as in Poland where the French helped support local nationalists who were sympathetic to France in removing a monarch. In other instances, like in Germany, France pursued a policy of cultural assimilation and socio-political acclimation that sought to impose the ideals of the French Revolution.

It appears from Rowe(2013)'s analysis of France's foreign policy that Napoleon promoted French nationalism based upon the Revolution's ideals - liberty, equality and fraternity- as a

justification for French expansionism and military campaigns. To Napoleon, it appeared that France had the right to export these ideas throughout Europe, even at the expense of the sovereignty of the people of Poland, Germany and Austria to name but a few states that were put under French domination. In conclusion, true to what Reicher and Hopkins observed, nationalism by its very nature, can be a good or bad force.

Some scholars have argued that nationalism can only be traced back to the late 19th-century in Europe with the unification of Italy and Germany (Thomson, 1966, Jacquin, 1999; Gingeras, 2016). These scholars give credence to the effect of the French Revolution as a precursor to European nationalism, they, however, stress the emergence of these two states as case studies into self-determination and the construction of political identity. To these scholars, nationalism, therefore, is a force for liberty and self-determination that grows to become one of the most potent and yet ambiguous ideologies in 19thcentury European international relations. This understanding makes sense when one considers that the emergence of Germany and Italy had been against the imagination that diverse and fragmented German and Italian states could be formed into united political entities. Accordingly, this ultra-nationalism led to the fall of the Prussian Empire and the Papal States. This altered the map of Europe through disintegration and in the process weakened the power of the Roman Catholic Church that had infringed upon the sovereignty and rights to statehood of most European states.

Hans Morgenthau cited in Clinton, Thompson and Morgenthau (2005) observes that nationalism is a force that had been responsible for the disintegration of Europe through the Napoleonic wars, the emergence of Italy and Germany, and to the European campaigns led by Adolf Hitler. It is also the author's argument that nationalism saw the fall of great civilisations such as the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the Soviet bloc. Clearly, there is a wide range of literature that seeks to understand the emergence of nationalism in a European context and that nationalism brought significant changes in the political system in Europe. The departure from traditional forms of governance and the monarchy, to the active government of the people by the people, is of note because it signified the advent of popular political democracy. As studies show, nationalism was also responsible for remapping Europe and other historical trajectories such as wars of conquests by the Roman Empire and the French empire under Napoleon Bonaparte. The next section examines studies that chronicle the emergence of nationalism in the African context.

i. *The Philosophy and Development of Nationalism in Africa*

Having examined the evolution and development of the concept of nationalism in Europe this section examines the concept in the African context paying attention to scholarly debates on the emergence and meaning of this concept. Philosophical thoughts on the development of African nationalism emerged with the first generation of African leaders. Nkrumah (1963, 1964 and 1965) devoted a great deal of time in trying to understand some dimensions around the meaning of 'African nationalism'; Nkrumah (1964) spoke of the freedoms Africans require to exercise independent thinking. In this regard, the scholar spoke of the need to psychologically reconfigure one's identity within "the original humanist principles underlying African society". Nkrumah (1964) coins the philosophy 'Consciencism' which advocates that African public intellectuals need to play a pivotal role in the development of a re-evaluated African identity. To Nkrumah identity was closely tied to African nationalism, hence, public intellectuals must carry the burden and play the role that was synonymous to political leaders. The role of intellectuals is seen by Nkrumah as an elitist project in which all patriotic citizens could participate and African nationalism is the responsibility of public intellectuals; it is also relevant here to stress the role that had been played by education in nationalism.

Nkrumah's idea of African nationalism mirrored Pan Africanism as advanced by its founding fathers, such as Henry Sylvester-Williams, W.E. B DuBois and Marcus Garvey. These scholars had an immense interest in the unity of all African descents spread across the globe. Philosophically, Pan Africanism rested on two thoughts - the common heritage of African descent and pushing for the interests of African people globally as a way of breaking off from capitalist influence. Nkrumah, hence, called for unity and the total decolonization of the African continent. This decolonization was political and economic in nature, suggesting that capitalism was anathema to African unity as espoused by Garvey, Du Bois and Williams. To Nkrumah, the independence of Ghana was closely tied with the independence of the whole of Africa. It is easy to fathom that the language spoken by Nkrumah suggested regional security complexities. Borrowing from the political theory of Buzan and Weaver (2003), one can locate colonialism as a threat to the stability of Africa. As long as most African states were not independent, Ghanaian nationalism was threatened as it was politically, economically and historically tied to the rest of Africa, hence African nationalism was understood as continental unity. This was done through Nkrumah's support for the formation of the organisation for African Unity and liberation

movements across the continent. According to Nkrumah, African nationalism was more of a developmental concept that involved intellectuals, citizens and political leadership in building the continent.

Ibhawoh & Dibua (2003) discusses the philosophy of Julius Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania, and its link to African nationalism. They tie Nyerere's political thought of *'Ujamaa',* loosely translated as 'African socialism', to model development for the continent in line with historical circumstances (Boesen, Madsen, & Moody, 1977). The historical circumstances in Tanzania, formerly Tanganyika, where of semi-commoditized peasant societies that Nyerere weaved together to create an identity in the process by the concept of Ujamaa. Ujamaa is a Swahili term for the traditional kingship and communalism that characterise most African societies in Africa. Its core values are not as a political system but instead as ethical values that touched on the day-to-day conduct of communities in working together towards the development of the continent's political, economic and social trajectories. Ujamaa is a model of development that emphasised on the right of all humans to equality and dignity. In addition, society was central and key to preserving the dignity of humans through mutual cooperation which replaced exploitation. Through working together as communities for economic and social production African nationalism emerged. To Nyerere, hence, in so much as the Soviet Union's ideology and political thoughts were drawn from Lenin's works, the same can be said of African nationalism or socialism that it is from traditional African societal values.

The dominant narrative from scholarship has been that African nationalism is a by-product of historical trajectories such as the Second World War. Scholars, Davidson (1994) and Khapoya (1998), posit that the Second World War evoked consciousness amongst African soldiers in that "The Africans noticed that, in war, the white man bled, cried, was scared, and, when shot, died just like anyone else" (Khapoya, 1998: 159). The observed vulnerability and mortality of whites on the battlefield began to demystify old myths and perception about white racial superiority. Such observations placed the roots of African nationalism as an externally-oriented development and at the same time misplace pre-colonial African history[5] and African organised labour

[5] For instance, when the great African king, Mansa Musa of Mali, was on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324–1325, the Wolof people— who had been forcibly brought to the Mali kingdom—seized the opportunity to rebel against the Mali kingdom. The Wolof people were expressing a nationalism, a separate national identity and a desire to govern themselves in their own land.

movements[6] as focal points in tracing and understanding trajectories in understanding African nationalism (Southall, 2013: 30, 35). On the other hand, a number of scholars, Webster; Boahen and Idowu, 1967, Bhebhe 2000 and Ranger 2013, refute this dominant narrative of the Second World War and its impact on the rise of African nationalism and place significance on the endeavors made by pre-colonial kingdoms and the role played by notable African figures in Africa at the time, as the animating force in the emergence of African nationalism. For example, Boahen (1967) narrates the diplomatic resistance of the Asante king, Prempeh, in the wake of British encroachment and how he fought to preserve the ways and life of the Asante peoples. At the same time, Ranger (1967) and Bhebhe (2013) traces the origins of nationalism in Africa through the first organized armed resistance by pre-colonial kingdoms with the examples in Zimbabwe of the First Chimurenga of 1896-7 between the Ndebele and Shona against the British South Africa Company. This suggests that in as much as pre-colonial African kingdoms were defeated resulting in colonialism, their resistance laid foundations to a second armed resistance that became known as modern African nationalism. It is arguable that, like in the case of Machiavelli, who called on Lorenzo Medici to save Italy from foreign invaders, African nationalism grew in response to foreign invasion.

Prah (2009) maintains that African nationalism is a modernist response of Africans to the political, social, economic and cultural depredations of (particularly) Western lordship. This modernist dimension focuses on the role played by Western and missionary education system in producing African intellectuals, such as Jomo Kenyatta, Robert Mugabe, Nelson Mandela, Eduardo Mondlane and Kwame Nkrumah who became very influential in the development of African nationalism. Bhabha, (1994) and Fray (2009), however, note some paradoxes that emerge from a modern African nationalism. To these authors, this nationalism possesses a primordial nature as it seeks to preserve the African identity, however, through Western education and its production of African intellectuals, these became vehicles of Western modernity in Africa. In this regard, Chatterjee (1986:30) maintains that modern African nationalism accepted the very intellectual premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination was based. In conclusion, it appeared that the net effect of modern African nationalism was not

[6] As early as 1918, industrialization in South Africa resulted in numerous movements such as the Industrial Workers of Africa and International Socialist League. Similarly, in Rhodesia, as early as 1944 the Rhodesian Railways African Association laid the basis for African nationalism.

the complete annihilation of colonialism through returning to the old ways of doing things in Africa, but to reproduce Western culture in Africa. African nationalism, thus, was seen as replicating Western nationalism, even though African nationalists had fought very hard to break the chains of colonialism.

ii. Development of Nationalism in Zimbabwe

This section seeks to understand the emergence of nationalism and nationalist politics in Rhodesia through a review of the literature on the subject. The section has four primary objectives - first, it will provide a historical analysis of the genesis of early nationalists' attempts paying special attention to white settler colonialism and the emergence of labour movements; second, it will deal with the emergence of the elite bourgeoisie politicians and their understanding of African nationalism; third, an attempt will be made to understand the emergence of nationalist' movements and the trajectories that came to characterise them and lastly, the section will discuss the immediate post-independent Zimbabwe political situation.

Silundika & Ngwenya (1973), Riley (1983), Bhebhe & Ranger (1991) and Bonello (2010), are some leading scholars on the emergence of nationalism in Zimbabwe. Bhebhe & Ranger (1991) argue that there is no serious study into the emergence of Zimbabwean nationalism that can ignore the role played by Cecil John Rhodes in the establishment of British imperial interests in South Africa and later in Rhodesia in the 1880s. As such the history of the latter is located in the imperialist and triumphalist efforts of the British to establish a foothold in Africa through the British South Africa Company (BSAC). Tellingly Nyambi and Mangena (2016:5) say '"as former governor of the Cape Colony and champion of the British Empire in Africa, Rhodes is arguably synonymous with the history of Africans' debasement and the abrupt disconnection of native systems of culture, philosophy and politics. Arguably Rhodes is known in history for exporting British imperialist nationalism and at the same time subjugating Africans.

Rhodes' expansionist ambitions led to nationalist sentiments amongst the Africans that found expression in what became known as the First Chimurenga. The First Chimurenga is one of the 'critical moments' in Zimbabwe's history from which nationalism draws its inspiration. Bonello (2010) also states that nationalism in Zimbabwe was a result of the defeat of the veterans of the First Chimurenga and the promulgation of what became known as 'The Responsible' government led by Sir Charles Coughlan. To Bonello, myths, such as the creation of

'Britishness' and an imagined white community led to white settler nationalism and colonialism that were seen as 'mission civilisatrice' on backward African people; these myths had been very essential in propping up the image of white superiority. Accordingly, Bonello (2010) makes the assertion that the British's desire to establish a 'Britishness' idea in Rhodesia at the time was purely based on the need to colonise and establish white superiority.

Marxism shows the relationship between socio-psychological inclinations of white superiority, as manifested in the pursuit of 'Britishness', and materialism, as factors that explain British colonialism in Rhodesia. Peet & Heetwick (1999) have written on the material dimensions of colonialism in Africa suggesting that industrial capitalism with its tremendous demands developed into imperialism. John Hobson (1858-1940) also argues that industrial capitalism necessitated expansionist policies in search of markets and resources. For Hobson and Peet and Heetwick (1999), the need to establish a 'Britishness' in Rhodesia had been out of socio-psychological compulsion that involved the promotion of 'Britishness' to avoid extinction in the wake of competition in capitalist industrialised Europe. Miliband (1977) says that any attempt to understand the historical development of political, economic and social organisations can only be understood within the prism of class struggle which results in historical developments such as colonialism.

Shamuyarira (1965), the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (1979), Mothibe (1996), Sibanda (2003) and Moore (2012) have chronicled the development of nationalism from passive resistance that manifested in strikes, boycotts and petitions, to a more carefully planned resistance. This development saw an alliance between the black middle class and the trade unions which housed the proletariat or working class. This alliance gave birth to the SRANC, the City Youth League (CYL) and the National Democratic Party (NDP). The transformation from trade unions into political movements seemed to suggest an era of militant nationalism. Mothibe explains that this alliance had been to mobilise African support that gradually turned into a mass movement encompassing the workers and the peasants, both at the leadership and rank and file levels. Nationalist movements adopted a Marxist political thought that emphasised the position of the masses as the vanguard of the struggle. Sibanda (2003) and Moore (1991) stress the emergence of intellectuals in the Rhodesian movement, such as Herbert Chitepo (the first African lawyer), Tichafa Parirenyatwa, (the first African medical doctor), George Silundika (an

African teacher), and Robert Mugabe. The backgrounds of these people reflect Kwesi Prah's emphasis on the need for intellectuals in modern African nationalism. Moore (1991) had also observed that intellectuals must play a vital role in the development of society, in this case, the decolonisation of Rhodesia. Similarly, Gramsci's political thinking highlights that intellectuals are social agents in the sense that they have a moral burden to shape a society where they enjoy the hegemonic status and preside over the non-intellectuals as the peasants. In Rhodesia, intellectuals such as Mugabe and Chitepo were social agents of change in the development of nationalism. Martin and Johnson (1985) detail the role that Chitepo played in the development of nationalism in Zimbabwe from the NDP to ZAPU and ZANU. Chitepo earned himself the title 'Black Napoleon' because of his militancy in advocating for an armed struggle. Shamuyarira (1965) and Holland (2008) also write about Mugabe's political skills when he was the Publicity Secretary in the NDP and ZAPU, therefore, these scholars argue that these two educated nationalists changed the face of nationalist politics in Zimbabwe; their important role is the transformation of nationalism from a passive one to armed resistance.

2.1.2 Problematising Nationalism

The understanding of nationalism is not homogenous since it has attracted different meanings and scholarly interpretations. Nationalism is a universal phenomenon, however, the circumstances under which it emerged in Europe were not the same in the Third World: Asia, Latin America and Africa. For example, in Europe, scholarly insights into nationalism emerged in the 16th century after the Italian philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli wrote to Lorenzo Medici, the principal leader of Florence, in his famous book *The Prince.* According to Ebenstein & Ebenstein, (2000), Machiavelli calls on Medici to free Italy from the foreign invasion by the Germans, French and Spanish. The presence of foreign colonialists appears to have been the grounds necessary for nationalism to emerge, hence, *The Prince* became a clarion call by Machiavelli, for stakeholders to be patriotic to Italy. Prah (2009:2) defines nationalism in an African context saying: "African nationalism is a modernist response of Africans to the political, social, economic and cultural depredations of (particularly) Western overlordship". What is significant about Prah's understanding of nationalism is the modernity of African nationalism that included a role to be played by intellectuals as nationalist politicians, in the pursuit of universally-accepted ideas of freedom and emancipation. The role played by these intellectuals

should be assessed in line with the objectives of the study - to investigate the role these intellectuals played in giving African nationalism new names and new meanings. These new names and meanings are crucial in detailing the nature of African nationalisms in contrast with the European version.

To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011), nationalism is the process of identity-making, which brought out the role-played by citizens, such as nationalist political leaders, the peasantry and at times veterans of the struggle in the context of Africa and Europe. This definition can be linked to the process of identity formation in Italy and Germany, pointing out the immense role played by Count von Bismarck in forging a German identity and the role played by Cavour in the unification of Italy. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni, nationalism is part of a broader nationalist project emphasizing how African states under colonial regimes began the project of identity-making through wars of liberations. The author uses the case study of Rhodesia to point out how the struggle of liberation ushered in a new identity for the people, later to be called 'Zimbabweans' in 1980, hence, nationalism becomes the force that enables identities to emerge in circumstances where people are suppressed or considered nonexistent. Anderson (1983), Llobera (1999) and Snyder (2000) also define 'nationalism' as a process of construction. Anderson (1983) contends that nationalism and nation-states are concepts that are imagined, constructed, celebrated and otherwise contested; Snyder (2000) sees the notion as a belief of a people who do not share a common history, perhaps religion and culture and try to use self-governance under a political system which protects such characteristics. Similarly, Llobera (1999:n.p) also makes use of the constructionist theory, noting that national identities are "flexible and variable; [with] both content and boundaries" of the nation changing according to circumstances. This standpoint is worth noting as it seeks to move away from the celebrated and praise texts on the understanding of African nationalism as espoused by authors, such as Ranger (2010) who suggest that nationalism is a homogenous and rigid affair. This indicates that the process of identity-making is subject to manipulation through political myths and memories during nation-building and state cohesion. Historical truths, however, often become causalities as those responsible for amplifying these myths have certain political agendas.

The study explores Reicher & Hopkins (2001:53) assessment of nationalism as "the best of beliefs and … the worst of beliefs". Reicher and Hopkins see nationalism as a force that can

serve either a good or bad purpose and liken nationalism to electricity that can provide energy and at the same time can electrocute. This definition explains the mutation of nationalism in most African states where it started as a good force during the pre-independence period only to mutate into a dictatorship and bad governance in the post-independence period. Contrary to the basic Marxists tenets that see revolutions as mass-based movements, what is presented in the histories of both ZAPU and ZANU is a self-described 'revolution from above' determined by the ideology of the elite. A gross misinterpretation of nationalism that manifested in narrowed interests that always competed in the construction of nationalism help to explain why there is a fault line in the understanding of nationalism and hence its continued mutation.

Beresford (2015) and Manjonga (2004) explore the concept of exhausted nationalism in accounting for liberation movements, such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe that started off well with benevolent nationalism as a guiding philosophy; Beresford and Manjonga use governance indicators, such as elections, to prove how these movements' approval ratings dropped in the 2002 and 2014 elections, respectively, and the aftermath of such outcomes. The ANC and ZANU-PF usually resort to narrowing the political space for the opposition in response to the threats to their power base. In the case of the ANC, Beresford notes how the movement has projected itself as the only authentic executor of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR)[7] to accelerate the radical economic transformation of the majority of the people.

Rising from this departure point is the role played by elite nationalist and political leadership in the development of a nascent nationalism in Zimbabwe. The leadership builds on the notions of land and Africanness as the foundations for nationalism to a more nuanced construction of a Zimbabwean identity that is a multi-dimensional. This identity is multi-dimensional in the sense that it encompasses tenets of cultural nationalism, such as land and Africanness and at the same time finds expression in neo-liberal principles such as political democracy and civil rights. In 1980, it did not come as a surprise that both ZAPU and ZANU sought to use the elections as the 'rite de passage' to political office (Southall, 2013:97). This served to indicate how nationalists sought to present Zimbabwean nationalism as a mature one through the use of democratic avenues.

[7] Socialist programme that seeks to deal with the political, economic and social effects of apartheid colonialism.

It should be noted that in the 1980s, democratic tools such as elections and non-military means had come to characterise the legitimate means of transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. This confirms the argument developed by Samuel Huntington that as the Cold War drew to an end and the advent of the 'third wave' of democracy, most African states had been socialised back into international norms and standards of statehood (Huntington, 1991). Elections are seen as a vehicle for legitimacy in constitutional and liberal terms, hence, it is from this point of view that both ZAPU and ZANU viewed the elections of 1980 as symbolic to authenticate their claims as the sole representatives of the people. Generally, Mugabe spoke of national unity and reconciliation as ingredients for a 'forward-looking policy'; this gave room for social transformation and a healthy political climate (Dzimiri 2016). Mugabe puts this as:

> If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest … It could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks oppress them because they have the power (The Chronicle 1980 cited in Mlambo, 2014: 195).

The elements of national unity were felt in every public and private sphere. This was evidenced by the inclusion of ZAPU and former Rhodesians in the government; notable examples were Nkomo; General Peter Walls who had commanded the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF); Ken Flower who had been the Director of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and Dennis Norman who was the leader of the Commercials Farmers Union (Chung, 2006; Holland, 2008 & Doran 2017). The idea was normative as it was instrumental for while Mugabe and ZANU purported to be socialist, these appointments would allay the fears of the white community in the country through promoting free enterprise and protection of private property rights. Such empowerment initiatives, translated into former guerillas participating in the mainstay political-economy of the country and in the process built some sense of belonging among them. Dzimiri (2016) indicates that these were some of the first signs of success of the First Republic thereby making Mugabe a powerful and respected statesman. Furthermore, through this focused political and economic frameworks, Zimbabwe earned the title of the 'breadbasket' of Africa.

It was not until a few years into independence that nationalism mirrored sings of toxicity. Its in efforts to 'preserve the gains of the revolution' the ruling party ZANU sought to use methods such as coercion and conformity. History is awash with examples of failed revolutions with the

most infamous being the French Revolution of 1789 and its negative Reign of Terror and the Bolsheviks Revolution that led to the Stalinist purges. In Africa, revolutions in Angola and Mozambique failed to usher in dreams and hopes associated with independence, instead, these revolutions developed into civil wars shortly after independence. In these cases, the common denominator was the unleashing of violence against those that did not agree with the new rulers; it became exclusive politics that loathed political differences and alternatives (Southhall, 2013). This can be termed as 'a revolution that devours its children' because the same liberators become oppressors as they assume the role of the former oppressors in the pursuit of the preservation of revolutionary goals (Chisaira, 2016). In the praxis of Zimbabwean politics, ZANU believed that it had an ideological duty to inculcate a coherent and socialist ideology as part of the political development of the country.

A more democratic approach to the traditional understanding of nationalism, however, has been advanced and defined as the sense of political self that makes people feel patriotic about their country; connect to a 'we group', and thus separate from 'they group'. According to Druckman (1994:44), for nationalism to thrive there has to be a nation to which people should be attached to so as to have a sense of identity and self-esteem through this national identification; this nation is not just geographically defined but is predicated on a sense of belonging to a certain community. The perception that a certain community shares common and unique similarities that bind its members together, become a key feature. The power of memory and sometimes myths are essential in shaping these similarities, hence, cultivating a sense of 'we group' against 'they group'. Druckman contends that it is in this process of identity-making that nations are imagined and the desire to be self-autonomous takes hold. The author amplifies this discussion by distinguishing between ethnic groups and nations; perceptions are necessary for drawing such a dichotomy. Druckman distinguishes between ethnic groups and nations in the sense that whilst ethnic groups perceive themselves as unique from others, they do not have separatist tendencies rather feel a sense of self-autonomy. Examples, such as Italian Americans living in the US suffice to understand the author's approach towards an understanding of nationalism; Italian Americans perceive themselves as different, although, they do not have a sense of separating from the rest of the Americans.

Clearly, studies show that there is no universal definition of nationalism. Marxism, for example, gives a special template from which to understand the subject of nationalism as a force that reacts to social forces. An understanding of Marxism and its role in the conceptualisation of nationalism - as a reactionary force - should be understood from conflicts that arise from class struggles. Colonialism, in the case of Africa, rose as a result of the needs of capitalism - the needs for markets and resources, for the survival of industrial Europe. In this light, Miliband (1977) suggests that the humankind's historical epochs - the American Revolution, the French Revolution, slavery and slave trade, colonialism and the development of ideologies such as racism, nationalism and fundamentalism - need to be assessed against domination and subjection. In the biography of Frederick Engels, Karl Kautsky (1887) makes observations about the "materialist conception of history". He states that nations, empires, religions and phenomena, such as nationalism are secondary forces that need to be properly situated in class relations and the struggle between the bourgeoises and the proletariat on a global scale. If the history of humankind has been explained through class struggles, it is easy to understand that colonialism in Africa was a result of economic demands. These demands saw the rise of the proletariat, Africans, against the bourgeoisie, who were represented by imperialism and international capital, in general. This rise saw the need to restructure economic relations through the redistribution of land as material demands of African nationalism.

To Marxists, the proletariat, peasants or the working class, is the central driving force for social change and that becomes a nationalist revolution. This revolution is forced by the machinations of globalisation, as a result of capitalism; this resistance becomes a proletarian revolution. Szporluk, (1988) suggests that the proletariat which "of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today … alone is a really revolutionary class". The author believes that the interests of the proletariate transcend national geographical boundaries and that "the working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got". The philosophical nature of the peasants cutting across national boundaries assist in explaining the proliferation of liberation movements across Africa, particularly in Southern Africa. Examples of are the African National Congress, the Pan- Africanist Congress in South Africa, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress, the National Democratic Party, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union , the Zimbabwe African National Union in Zimbabwe. In addition are the Front for the Liberation of Angola, Chama Chamapinduzi in

Tanzania and the South West African Peoples Organisation in Namibia. What is nationalistic about Marxism is how capitalism fosters colonialism and the reaction thereof in the form of armed resistance by the proletariate or peasants.

These aforementioned movements became Marxist in orientation and their ideological convictions sought to denounce the dominance of capitalism as a structuring force of human relations that fostered racism and colonialism. These ideological convictions, thus saw most of these movements incorporating the 'African-ness' in their name and ideological stand, that the fight was against bourgeoisie capitalism with the working class and peasants at the centre. The modus operandi also saw these movements establishing joint operations within Southern Africa to confront white settler capitalism. It is from this explanation of the Marxist school of thought that the study will use the ideology as a template to examine the emergence and development of nationalism in Zimbabwe.

2.2 Characterising Nationalism in Africa

2.2.1 Nativism in Africa

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) treats African nationalism as a dominant discourse that sought to celebrate a confirmed heroic story of the decolonisation of the continent that facilitated democracy. The author continues that African nationalism became nativist in the sense that it appealed to historical myths and memories of the indigenous people and the necessity of reviving these through the exclusions of outsiders and that the determinant factor in the understanding of nativism is in the belief of primordialism and the use of it in circumstances where there is alien encroachment. Nativism rests on the historical rights of the locals to preserve their posterity through acts that could be politically, economically and culturally exclusive. Nativism can be understood through Marcus Garvey's ideological convictions of an African revolutionary project that would redeem Africans from centuries of exploitation and subjugation. The basic tenets of Garveyism were 'Africa for the Africans' (Garvey, 2011: ix).

Guibernau (2007) sees nativism as an appendage or otherwise an offshoot of African nationalism that can be assessed within the ambit of 'national identity' which is constituted by a set of attributes shared by those who belong to a nation. Central to this argument is Primordalist tenets

that include a common past, culture and history that authenticate a bid for the right to self-determination. The psychological dimension to nativism dictates that consciousness of forming a group is based on the 'felt' closeness uniting those that belong to the nation. What is important is that this closeness can remain quiescent for some years and only to surface whenever the 'nation' is confronted by an internal or external enemy, whether real or imagined.

Smith (2002) posits that if the primordial nation is confronted with an enemy,[8] nativism surfaces as a subjective component behind which the people rally. Nativism can be understood as the desire of the African people to return to indigenous practices, cultural forms and the recovery of the pre-colonial ways of life. The problem with this approach is that it attracts notions of inclusion and exclusion and the politics of belonging as noted by Dorman, *et al.*, (2007: 4). He notes: "It is arguably in the nature of nationalism to distinguish insiders from outsiders". Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010:281) concludes:

> One of the paradoxes of the making of African nations and African identities is the recent metamorphoses and mutations of African nationalism from civic principles founded on the slogan of 'diverse people unite' to narrow, autochthonous, nativist and xenophobic forms that breed violence.

Clearly, nativism is a form of ultra-nationalism that, at best internally grounds the people and at worst, exhibits forms of xenophobia. It is through nativism that sinister concepts, such as Afro-based racism and extreme populism can be understood.

Guibernau (2007) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) seem to suggest that some sinister attributes - xenophobia, racism and populism - emanating from African nativism have their roots in the psychological yet non-rational nature of nativism. In the face of danger and threat to the nation, it seems members of the nation are prepared to do the unthinkable, that is, to die for the nation, for example. This psychological persuasion of nativism can be justified through Mbembe's (2006) description of the Nongqawuse prophetic syndrome of the Xhosa in the 19th-century. The Nongqawuse prophecy ordered that the Xhosa people of South Africa kill all their cattle to appease the ancestral spirits and in turn, the ancestral spirits would drive away all the white settlers into the sea and restore the Xhosa kingdom to the good old days. Boahen (1990), Martin & Johnson, (1981) write about the effect of millenarian nativist prophecy on the First

[8] In this discussion, enemy would be the advent of European encroachment and colonialism in Africa.

Chimurenga fight against white encroachment in Zimbabwe. The roles played by spirit mediums, such as Mukwati, Nehanda and Kaguvi were very persuasive on the emotions of the indigenous people. These spirit mediums told the people that, Mwari, the Shona God or Mlimo in Ndebele, having been convinced by the injustices of the white man, was on their side and would turn the white man's bullets into water. Mbembe (2006) argues that these prophecies were portending political and economic suicide for Africans. This was supported by Shamuyarira (1965:67) who maintained : "Nationalism is basically emotional… At times-particularly in early years-it should be blind and blinkered if it is to establish its principles and begin to transform or reform a decadent society". This explanation appears to follow the political events around the period of the National Democratic Party in December 1962 in Highfields Harare then Salisbury where leaders of the movement, such as Robert Mugabe, who was Publicity Secretary at the time, was responsible for the use of nativism and the emotional dimension of belonging to challenge the colonial regime. On that occasion, 15 000 to 20 000 Africans removed their shoes, ties and jackets as one of the first signs of rejecting European civilisation. Water served in traditional water-pots replaced Coca-Cola and other soft drinks that had come to be associated with Western civilisation (Shamuyarira 1965).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) and Johnston (2014) have written on the problems that nativism caused to the development of the nationalist struggle in Africa, thus allowing the concept to become the focal point of debates on the discourse of African nationalism. The authors maintain that it was nativism that had produced sell-outs as well as patriots within the struggle for decolonisation. Johnston (2014) states that in South Africa, this ambiguity lay at the heart of the ideological dichotomies between the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) led by Robert Sobukwe and the African National Congress (ANC). The PAC's modus operandi can be regarded as a mixture of African radicalism and anti-white racism, thus, pursuing radical Garveyism for Africans. On the other hand, the ANC espoused diversity as enshrined in the Freedom Charter of 1955 that smothered nativism and embraced multiracialism. It seems this pragmatic approach espoused by the ANC appeared to be accommodative of the complicated ideological twists of the Cold War. The ANC was inconsistent in telling the capitalist United States of America's Congress that, it was on a mission to realise the goals of the American dream and at the same time tell the Soviet Union that it was at the forefront of the revolution.

Zeilig (2016) exposes the dark side of nativism with the case study of the Maghreb African region in Algeria. Nativism came to be regarded as a tool for exclusive nationalism and xenophobia, one that sought to include and exclude notable figures in the fight against colonialism in Algeria. Zeilig (2016) gives the case of Fanon, a French-born, who came to regard Algeria as home ideologically and politically. Fanon immensely contributed to providing scholarly insights on African nationalism and served as a diplomat for Algeria in independent Ghana for two years. His work on African colonial political thought earned him the title of 'the militant philosopher of the Third World Revolution'. The Algerian government used Fanon to advance its case for the liberation of the country but failed to acknowledge his efforts after his death because he was a foreigner. This is an example where nationalism at times collides with nativism to produce xenophobic tendencies.

In conclusion whilst nativism is an important force that helps in the development of nationalism in Africa, through an appeal to myths and memories, it produces sinister attributes such as populism, xenophobia and racism. These are detrimental to the development of the continent. In the next section is a discussion of what led to the emergence of nationalism and the effects of white-settler colonialism on the development of African nationalism.

2.2.2 White Settler colonialism in Africa

White-settler colonialism is relevant in the study of nationalism in Africa, particularly, because in some instances, like in Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, it mutated into white nationalism that had to be confronted with African nationalism. Southall (2013) narrates that white-settler colonialism produced political and economic consequences in post-colonial Africa. Good (1976), claims that, whilst white-settler colonialism had followed the same trajectories of colonialism, it represented a unique feature of the "capacity for an independent capitalist development" that subsequently led to "relatively advanced class formations" (Good, 1976:597). It seems the formation of a class inevitably led to questions, as to who and what constituted to be called 'African' since white settler nationalism developed white monopoly capital, African nationalism was in a dilemma whether to follow democratic or dialectic materialism.[9] As white capitalism had led to the class formation, this exposed the ingenuity of colonialism and led to the

[9] The Marxist theory (adopted as the official philosophy of the Soviet communists) that political and historical events result from the conflict of social forces and are interpretable as a series of contradictions and their solutions. The conflict is seen as caused by material needs.

emergence of both white and African nationalism, thus, as Southall (2013) would have it, white settler colonialism had come to assume an ambivalent position in relation to imperialism, which subsequently proved resistant to decolonisation. The focus on white settler colonialism and its impact on the emergence of nationalism in Africa is relevant to the study of ZAPU and ZANU movements as Rhodesia experienced white-settler colonialism, hence, white settler colonialism constitutes the starting point for any historical understanding of the liberation movements today.

Southall (2013) discusses another dimension of white settler colonialism that reflects on issues of citizenship. Southall posits that the term 'settler' in Africa refers to whites who sought autonomy from their mother imperial states, such as Britain, Netherlands, Germany and Portugal to regard Africa as their new home. There was, therefore, ambiguity around 'race' identity and citizenship. The political consequence of this naturalisation was an interface between a colonial system that privileged whites on the grounds of race and Africans who did not benefit on the same grounds of race. African nationalism, thus, found itself in an awkward position in defining who qualified to be an 'African' and also, to strike a balance between the pursuits of democracy for the majority and risking being labelled as 'racist', thus, Joshua Nkomo one of the leading nationalists in the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe supported the decision that was made by Idi Amin, former leader of Uganda, to expel Asians from Uganda. Nkomo told a German journalist, Hans Germani 'Amin is a great man, what he did to the Asians was right'. Additionally, Tanzania's nationalist and founding father, Julius Nyerere, was also accused of using racists' remarks stating that there was no future for the white man under socialism in Tanzania.

Good (1976) and Southall (2013) show that white-settler colonialism promoted capitalism that sought separate development by preserving white interests. The rationale for a discussion of this concept in a study of nationalism is that it led to the emergence of African nationalism that sought to address white monopoly capital and privileges through the overthrowing of the colonial system.

2.3 Comparing ZAPU and ZANU Approaches

Theme 1: Authenticity and legitimacy

The characterisation of authenticity and legitimacy in politics speaks to the ability of political actors to have substance, maintain originality and in the context of the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe represent the masses. Some scholarly opinions on the genesis of ZAPU suggest that it did not bring any changes to passive nationalism that had characterised the struggle for Zimbabwe before 1963 (Mhanda, 1978; Riley, 1982; Chimhanda, 2003). ZAPU, if anything, became an ideologically metamorphosed entity of the SRANC and the NDP as observed by Moyo quoted in Gjestard, (1974:71):

> ZAPU was simply a continuation of the NDP. The structure and most of the officials including President Joshua Nkomo, who was outside the country at the time was the same. Only the name was different.

Nyangoni (1977) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), however, have different views about ZAPU. They suggest that the party was more organised and militant than its predecessors. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) supports this point with ZAPU's 1968 Confidential Draft that included Pan Africanism, nativism and democratic ideals which were a departure from the rhetoric of the previous movement based on negotiations and talks with the Rhodesian government. The introduction of radical concepts, such as Pan Africanism and nativism, made the Rhodesian government label ZAPU a 'terrorist organisation'.

On the other hand, Mazarire (2017) argues that the environment in which ZANU emerged in 1963 was very contentious, both politically and ideologically. Having been under the influence of ZAPU, Mazarire (2017) is of the view that the African Rhodesians did not take ZANU seriously. Mazarire, hence, points out the questions of authenticity and legitimacy that ZANU had to contend with in a rough ZAPU neighbourhood at local, regional and international levels. Mazire claims that ZANU had been regarded as a 'separatist movement' seen by its isolation from regional and international organisations, such as the OAU and the UN. Mazarire (2017) contends that when ZANU was formed after its leadership had split from ZAPU, Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU, was quick to label the incident as an American plot led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. Nkomo's perceptions are significant because they subsequently became part of Zimbabwe's political culture of labelling opposition parties, agents of US capitalism. In the post-2000 era, ZANU-PF perfected this sellout logic to discredit the Movement for Democratic Change, as an agent of the US.

Doran (2017) chronicles events leading to the split in ZAPU and the consequences thereof. According to Doran (2017), in the months following the emergence of ZAPU, Nkomo increasingly became indecisive in terms of a conceptual analysis of the Rhodesian problem. This had come about from his failure to define the national question and the methods to be used to address it. To Doran (2017), this failure created a division between moderates, Joshua Nkomo, Jason Moyo, Morton Malianga and Joseph Msika on one hand and the militants, Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole on the other hand. If that had been the case, this analysis falls into the simplistic narrative of ethnic politics in the split in ZAPU as suggested by Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Williams (2010). This analysis is simplistic in the sense that it does not take into account that, regardless of Nkomo being a Ndebele his leadership style had resonated amongst the Shona-speaking people. This view was buttressed by Baltrop (1963) a secretary to the British High Commissioner in Rhodesia, who argued that the leaders within ZAPU who sought to oust Nkomo had to contend with his popularity amongst the Africans. From the observations of Baltrop (1963) and Doran (2017), ZANU emerged out of some elements within ZAPU who had failed to dislodge Nkomo from power and had no other alternative than to form their own political party.

ZAPU's Department of Information, Publicity and Marketing (2012) published a damning document, titled *ZAPU: A Brief History 1961-2010*, that does not only chronicle the history of ZAPU as a movement with a nationalist appearance but also seeks to reinvent ZAPU's image within the nationalist history of Zimbabwe. The document does so through identifying key epochs in the history of Zimbabwe - the formation of the party, the 1963 split, the Gukurahundi era, the 1987 Unity Accord and its crucial role in the Government of National Unity from 1980-1983. To the reader, it appears ZAPU (2012) is taking a swipe at ZANU as a movement that sold the struggle and its meaning to the highest bidder. For example, ZAPU (2012) begins by dismissing the emergence of ZANU, arguing that its formation was the first setback to the struggle of Zimbabwe. ZAPU (2012:10) argues: "[A] monumental and criminal betrayal of the people's struggle for self-determination on the African continent, on August 8, 1963, ZANU was founded". ZAPU (2012) labels this a separatist move, labelling those who formed ZANU as 'rebels' - a derogatory term to discredit one's opponent. This narrative by ZAPU (2012) is similar to Mazarire's (2017) claim that the leadership of ZANU is linked to white monopoly capital. ZAPU (2012) gives as an example a meeting that transpired between one Stuart Gore

Brown, a white farmer and 'dissidents' in ZANU. According to this story, ZANU leaders sought to squash the popularity of Nkomo, through assassination. It is probable that ZAPU's account of the incident is nothing more than an attempt to discredit ZANU through demonising its leader.

Theme 2: Competing claims about which party started the struggle in Zimbabwe

Musindo (2012) notes that ZAPU became the first primodarlist party in Rhodesia because of the inclusion of the word 'Zimbabwe' in its name. The name has a nationalist appeal; it is borrowed from the Shona term 'Zimbabwe' meaning 'the house of stones', symbolising the ancient city of Great Zimbabwe. The usage of the term 'Zimbabwe' indicated a desire of making a nation-state that eventually came into being in 1980. The term 'Zimbabwe' is Shona and whilst it is celebrated from a broader sense of national appeal, the name borders on a discourse of ethnicity and ethnic politics. Musindo (2012) claims that there is a tendency to reinvent Shona culture and civilisation at the expense of other groups such as the Kalanga and Ndebele. This assumed divergence resulted in an attempt by the Ndebeles suggesting the use of 'Matopos' instead of 'Zimbabwe', as the former appealed more to the Ndebele audience than Zimbabwe. Various perennial and historical reasons were invoked to justify this but this advocacy for Matopo was unsuccessful and Zimbabwe was adopted.

Extensive literature points to ZANU as the initiator of the struggle as it had an appealing political programme of action. According to ZANU (1979:65), the party was formed to a nationalist, democratic, socialist and pan-Africanist republic within the fraternity of African states and the British Commonwealth of Nations. In the same breath, the party would promote democratic principles, such as one man one vote and the pursuit of non-racialism. ZANU's objectives were not different in form and content from those of ZAPU and this observation puts to rest the question of ideological differences between the parties. Mhanda (1978) points out that there is no evidence to suggest that the 1963 split in ZAPU was as a result of serious ideological considerations, rather it was a reflection of a failure of elite leaders who purported to be Marxist yet they were merely power-hungry petit-bourgeoisie, in a broader capitalist framework.

Shamuyarira (1965), Mhanda (1978) and Scarnecchia (2008) chronicle the evolution of ZANU under strenuous circumstances, from the 1963 split to the decision to engage in an armed struggle. Shamuyarira (1965) notes that on the 22nd of August 1963, whilst addressing the first ZANU press conference, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the leader of the party, spoke about the

party's policy position, once it was in government. Two fundamental issues appear to have emerged from the conference that characterised ZANU as a party of action - Sithole highlighted ZANU's position on land and franchised civil rights for the African; showing that once in power, it would be ZANU's prerogative to repeal the segregatory Land Apportionment Act and Land Husbandry Acts and replace these with a more appropriate land reform acts. The continual focus on land issues was an indication that ZANU had resorted to responding to the material demands of the struggle for the land had been a contentious issue in Rhodesia. In the same manner, the party leader spoke about a 'Bill of Rights' enshrined in a new constitution in which "the rights and freedoms of every citizen would be guaranteed".

Scarnecchia (2008) also relates how ZAPU responded to ZANU's action plan; he claims that ZAPU used political myths as a strategy to silence or contain ZANU and also responded with character assassination and propaganda accusing the ZANU leadership of being in an unholy partnership with the United States of America, with the aim of unseating Nkomo.

Theme 3: Perceptions and use of political violence

Moore (1990) states that inter-party violence between ZAPU and ZANU deserves scholarly attention. In his discussions, he pays attention to the dichotomy between the educated and uneducated, bourgeoisie and those who espoused to be Marxism and between the old guard politicians and the young military cadres. Moore (1990), Chimhanda (2003) and Chongo (2016) point to the events of March 11, 1971, and the aftermath where about 130 young ZAPU combatants were summarily deported from Zambia by the Zambian government working in cahoots with the ZAPU political leadership and executed by the Rhodesian authorities for not towing the party line. The events surrounding the execution of these young combatants speak of exclusive nationalism and entitlement exhibited by ZAPU's founders, for these young cadres had challenged the political leadership in ZAPU over the political crisis within the party and the ineffciency of the leadership of Nkomo in executing the struggle. This account shows a culture of violence as a means of silencing perceived opponents. The execution of these people also weakened ZAPU as most surviving young combatants, like Rex Nhongo, defected to ZANU.

Chidyausiku (1964), Nyagumbo (1980) and Chimhanda (2003) concur that inter-party violence rocked the nationalist movement following the split in 1963. Chimhanda (2003) claims that ZAPU was the instigator of violence in the townships of Harare, citing incidents; for example, a

group known as 'Zhande' that carried out attacks on Africans accused of either supporting the government or ZANU. On 13 February 1964, Ernest Veli was stabbed to death because he was a ZANU supporter; David Dodo was beaten to death in September because he had given evidence in court at a criminal trial of a member of the PCC (Doran 2017). Another example of the gruesome attacks on ZANU members was the case of Mr B. Manda who was beaten up and set alight with petrol in his house by suspected PCC members. PCC supporters also killed Anthony Kandodzinya, a member of ZANU who had just returned from detention at Hwa Hwa prison. In highlighting these issues readers have accused Chimhanda (2003) of bias against ZAPU because his account fails to show how ZANU responded to the attacks purportedly instigated by ZAPU. Doran (2017) gives an alternative view suggesting that ZANU also began to respond with acts of violence and intimidation of ZAPU and its supporters, thus, rendering African townships ungovernable.

Toxicity is an emerging concept in the study of leaders in business management, psychology and political science. Founded in the work of Goldman (2006; 2009), Kellerman (2004) and Glad (2002) toxicity seeks to uncover issues such as violence in politics as a manifestation of the dark side of leadership. A study in the dark side of leadership is a recent phenomenon because in the past the common approach to leadership was that 'if it [leadership] is unethical or immoral it is not leadership' (MacGregor Burns, 2003:48). This was a minimalist approach to the study of leadership that had tended to ignore controversial yet influential figures in history. The study of nationalist leadership in Zimbabwe has been punctuated by this exclusionary approach. The study seeks to glorify leadership in ZANU yet deliberately ignoring some of the violence metted by highly profiled individuals in leadership in ZANU. Examples such as the Nhari-Badza executions in 1974, the death of Chitepo in 1975 and the arrest of members of ZIPA in 1976 are such dark chapters in the history of ZANU that speak to the instrumentalisation of violence.

Following on this Heppell, (2011:243) argues that toxic leaders are defined as those individuals whose leadership generates a violent and enduring negative, even poisonous, effect upon the individuals, families, organisations, communities and societies exposed to their methods. The study borrows from this conceptual departure to analyse how Tongogara's leadership skills were a characterisation of the instrumentalisation of violence in ZANU. This is crucial to the study of nationalism because Tongogara, as we understand him in contemporary history, is a product of

dominant narratives. Hence the theme of toxicity seeks to find new ways of approaching a study on Tongogara. In familiar texts and literature Tongogara is a product of willing scribes who have projected him as one of the most successful military veteran yet doing 'epistemic violence' to his victims who have been castigated as the 'other side' (Moyo 2017). The Nhari-Badza incident has been well documented in the history of Zimbabwe's struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, Sadomba 2011, Chung 2006). The most striking feature about the Nhari-Badza incident is the manner in which it has been represented in the history of Zimbabwe. Tellingly, like the March 11, 1971, movement in ZAPU, the Nhari-Badza incident has been a victim of a dominant and exclusive narrative. The political leadership in ZANU simply chose to brand this group as the 'rebels of 1974' (Mugabe 1977:37 cited in Sadomba, 2011:46). Addressing a press conference in November 2017, then Commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) Constantino Chiwenga reiterated what is in the public domain that the Nhari-Badza group was not only a rebellion but counter-revolutionary elements that were bent on hijacking the revolution (Zim Stones, 2017).

Theme 4: Educated elites and the emergence of exclusive nationalism

Musindo (2012) offers interesting perspectives on how exclusive nationalism came to be a prominent feature within the liberation history of Zimbabwe. Musindo (2012) points to how the use of traditional African religion and ancestral spirits were used to authenticate and legitimise Joshua Nkomo's bid to be the saviour of Zimbabwe. Musindo refers to the use of the millenarian prophecy and the subsequent visit by Nkomo to the Dula ancestral shrine as quests to legitimatize his godfather status in Zimbabwe's nationalism. This created personality cults, exclusive nationalism, silenced contenders and prevented leaders from being removed even in circumstances where they were not performing well.

According to Riley (1983), Moore (1991), Southall (2013), this elitist tenor continued unabated within nationalist politics with Nkomo taking the ZAPU's presidency again from the SRANC, the NDP, then ZAPU. The understanding drawn from these accounts is that Nkomo had been a skilful organiser as a trade unionist, thus, his experience in the early attempts to decolonise

Rhodesia had remarkably earned him the respect of the African people. As such, some scholars, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, and Willems (2009) see Nkomo as the godfather of Zimbabwean nationalism. They claim that Nkomo's leadership was legitimatized by First Chimurenga's traditional leaders, such as Chief Nyamasoka Chinamora and Chief Sigombe Mathema[10]. This led to exclusive monolithic nationalism that loathed political differences and elevated few individuals to deity status. The challenge this posed became visible in the differences between Nkomo and Herbert Chitepo[11] a Shona, who by all accounts had been regarded as a Marxist / Leninist; he espoused socialism and became increasingly militant. His vision was to create a Zimbabwean state that was socialist through the inclusion of the middle class in mass mobilisation (White, 2003: 4).

Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU said the following about the ethos of the party:

> There is a talk by some people that 'majority rule' means rule by Africans only; that Africanization will deprive Europeans of their jobs and that there will be a general lowering of standards. To us, majority rule means the extension of political rights to all people so that they are able to elect a Government of their own choice, irrespective of race, colour or creed of the individual forming such a government. All that matters is that a Government must consist of the majority party elected by a majority of the country's voters' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008: 118).

Nkomo's words indicate contradictions within Zimbabwe nationalists. Nationalism had emerged because of material and ideological needs, however, Nkomo's view was seen to be in contradiction with the essence of the struggle of the African, by extremists, such as Chitepo. For Chitepo, the struggle was nativist and any attempt to be inclusive was a betrayal of the people. This is one of the factors that led to the split in ZAPU in 1963.

Moore (1991), Mhanda (2005), Holland (2008) and Prah (2009), devote time to explaining the role played by intellectuals in the formation of ZAPU. According to Prah (2009), the emergence of modern African nationalism was prompted by western education[12] provided by missionaries.

[10] These were veteran leaders of the First Chimurenga, the first uprising of the Africans against white colonial rule in 1896-97.
[11] Herbert Chitepo was a Shona nationalist who later became ZANU chair and was murdered in Zambia in 1975 in a car bomb, an act believed to be the work of the Rhodesian intelligence agency.
[12] Throughout most parts of Africa, western education created black elites that were revered and seen as spokespersons of the African people. In 1929, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya was chosen by his people to go to Britain to present grievances on behalf of the Africans to British authorities. Leopold Senghor of Senegal rose to high ranks

Moore (1991:18) quotes the black intellectuals as saying: "(If we) desert our people, who will teach and uplift them? Only if all educated Africans do their bit to improve their small corner and each unites with the others, fighting the same battle, will we attain the expected goal"? This suggests that Western education provided the necessary consciousness to some black people who then used it as a basis for their entrance and role in the struggle for Zimbabwe. This explains the rise of Tichafa Parirenyatwa, the first African medical doctor, Jason Moyo, a lawyer and George Silundika, an African teacher to the echelons of power in ZAPU. On the other hand this also explains the rise and influence of Herbert Chitepo, the first African lawyer, Eddison Zvogbo, a lawyer and Robert Mugabe a teacher in ZANU.

Mhanda (2005) and Holland (2008), however, deconstruct these praise texts arguing that educated nationalists were actually an impediment to the development of nationalism. For example, one of the members of the executive of ZAPU, Robert Mugabe, who later became a key figure in the construction of the Zimbabwean nation-state, is a classic example when it comes to the role of the intellectuals in Zimbabwean history. Holland (2008:118) in an interview with Jonathan Moyo[13] advances a strong case against the educated nationalists and their understanding of nationalism at this stage in the struggle for Zimbabwe. To Moyo, Mugabe like any other educated nationalist, rose to prominence not necessarily motivated by generational politics of the time but at the behest of fissures in the colonial system that had come to accommodate only a few black educated nationalists. Moyo states:

> You need to go right back to the very beginning of Mugabe's political career if you are looking for a nuanced view of what went wrong. You would expect to find a foundation of politics in his disposition, his humanity and his general orientation in the early years. But you do not find a self-driven nationalist. Mugabe was never a leader by virtue of generational political consciousness and his reactions to the issues of the day, even though he was exposed to all of it as an educated person and, indeed, as one of the very few black Rhodesians who had attained university level … No, where in his record prior to becoming the leader of ZANU do you see Robert Mugabe driven by political passion or a vision for a better future for Zimbabweans? (Holland, 2008:118).

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within the French ruled Senegal political system because he became an educated black elite. The same is true of Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

[13] Jonathan Moyo has been seen as a shrewd politician in Zimbabwe, an academic who rose to prominence as a critique of ZANU-PF and became a Minister in the early 2000s and has been very important in shaping ZANU-PF's politics to date. At the time of this interview, Moyo had been sacked by President Mugabe for insubordination.

At the time of the interview, Moyo had been expelled from ZANU-PF following a fall out with Mugabe and it is possible that he may have developed reservations about Mugabe's credentials as a nationalist. Similarly, Mhanda (2005:2) claims that the educated elites lacked a genuine commitment to developing an appropriate nationalism that would eventually lead to the freedom of Zimbabwe. Mugabe, like other educated nationalists, is presented as unique and stood apart from the rest and at a rally for the NDP in July 1960 made a remarkable speech that began his political career. Shamuyarira (1965:59) also notes: "Educated Africans carry a heavy responsibility in the community. Even their parents look up to them for guidance and advice-because 'they know the European, they have read his books". Shamuyarira (1965) is aware of Mugabe's credentials and is of the opinion that he had been left in charge of creating and using the emotional appeal of nationalism. He reports that at the time Mugabe was a member of the NDP, his task was supposedly aimed at using the psychological dimension of nationalism to denounce capitalism and the British queen for the purpose of mobilising people, however, Mlambo (1972) from a different view argues:

> The arrival of the 'intellectuals' on the political scene had a great impact on the nationalist movement; it gave the masses a fillip, bringing courage and hope. The quality of the speeches at the meetings improved, and goals were better defined than before. Mugabe, with his easy oratory and straightforward nature as well as his experience in Ghana, was a gift to the movement … H.W. Chitepo was the last straw that broke the back of the partnership.

This entrance of the educated individuals into the struggle would soon expose the weaknesses of nationalism as shall be indicated in the findings of this study. On 18 May, 2015, Stephen Sucker of the British Broadcasting Corporation, in the programme, Hard Talk, interviewed Moyo[14] on a wide range of issues on Zimbabwe, including democracy and Mugabe. Moyo had this to say:

> We are a country which is a product of revolutionary change and therefore revolution has always been part of our project … [Mugabe] is the one who led the independence struggle, he led the revolution … we are better off as a country with the leadership that understands our revolution and its objectives (Moyo, 2015).

This inconsistent presentations of the role of Mugabe by Moyo and Shamuyarira can best be understood within the context of the former's re-admittance into ZANU-PF and in his capacity as

[14] At the time of the interview, Moyo had been readmitted into ZANU-PF and appointed as Minister of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services.

a cabinet Minister of Mugabe regime. Southall (2017) points out that as much as interviews can be factual, they tend to be misleading as interviewees are more often influenced by events that had happen before.

Theme 5: Political Crises in ZAPU and ZANU

Riley (1983), Moore (1990), Chimhanda (2003) and ZAPU (2012), have differed in terms of the form and content that led to the political crisis in ZAPU in the period from 1969 to 1972. What has come out of this divergence in opinion may have been motivated by an attempt to establish an image that seeks to glorify one group within ZAPU at the expense of the other. For example, Chimhanda's (2003) interview with Dumiso Dabengwa, the leader of ZAPU projects the point that the crisis in ZAPU was caused by James Chikerema and Georges Nyandoro. Moore (1990) acknowledges the roles that were played by Chikerema and Nyandoro in the political crisis but contextualises their role within the confines of factional fights. Chikerema and Nyandoro belonged to a Shona clique and their contenders, Moyo and Silundika belonged to a 'Dengezi' faction that was seen as a Ndebele-based faction. From Moore's account, it is easy to interpret this as a political crisis that was predicated along ethnic lines, however, Chimhanda (2003), Riley (1983), Moore (1990) ZAPU (2012), agree on the general that Chikerema and Moyo differed on strategy and policy and cite the 1969 incident, where Chikerema unilaterally invited a foreign broadcaster to film ZAPU camps along the Zambezi river bank. What these scholars fail to agree on was the intent of Chikerema and the perceptions that were created afterwards from the so-called Dengezi faction. Chimhanda (2003) and ZAPU (2012) indicate that during this period, ZAPU became passive in the execution of the struggle and the departure of Chikerema and Nyandoro saw the party restructuring, with the formation of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Council (ZPRC). These scholars further cite some military and political changes that were brought about by the departure of the Shona 'clique', such as the introduction of the ZIPRA High Command, National Executive and the External Representative of ZAPU. These accounts, however, fail to acknowledge the importance of unity between ZAPU and ZANU in the execution of the struggle as promoted by Chikerema and Nyandoro. It is probable that the Dengezi faction actually hated the idea of unity between ZAPU and ZANU as advocated by Chikerema and Nyandoro.

This is crucial because later in the years, the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), an amalgamation of ZANU and ZAPU military campaigns attested to the urgent need for unity; these accounts also failed to highlight ideology at this stage as ZAPU did not possess any ideology beyond removing the white settler regime (Chimhanda 2003). These accounts also failed to problematise the power of political memories and myths and how they had caused a rift between Moyo and Chikerema. To Moyo, unity between ZANU and ZAPU was problematic because the former was regarded as a splinter organisation. What was visible was the power of memory in causing the political crisis within ZAPU, however, views from Sithole (1979, Martin & Johnson (1981) and Moore (1990) differed from these accounts, suggesting competition amongst the 'old guard political nationalists': Chikerema, Nyandoro, Moyo, Silundika and Nkomo - as to who was responsible for the political crisis. These scholars point to an ideological crisis within the party that led to the emergence of the 11 March 1971 movement. To Sithole (1979) and Martin & Johnson (1981), the organisers of the March 11 movement were rebels and to Nkomo, they were 'a bunch of cowards'. Nkomo viewed them as such because of his maturity and being a political godfather who would not brooke any rivalry, particularly from the younger generation who he perceived as lacking political and military experience. A sense of entitlement, hence, motivated such a hostile attitude because age is vital in African cultures.

Moore (1990:116), however, departs from the traditional tendency of situating the political crisis of this period in the context of factional fights but rather claims it was a "manifestation of the development of a young and idealistic segment of the Zimbabwean state class formation". ZAPU was faced with a serious ideological crisis, although most authors have deliberately chosen not to write about it. Moore's account dwells on how the crisis in ZAPU gave the liberation struggle a new ideological cover, in terms of integrating the Marxist philosophy which became an appendage to the liberation struggle. The problem with Moore's account is its inability to situate traditional African values within the struggle of Zimbabwe. Moore does not take into account the arrogance that these young and idealistic segments of Zimbabwean society exhibited and the perception that emanated afterwards.

ZANU apologists, such as Martin & Johnson (1981), Riley (1983) and Chung (2006), claim that ZANU was more vigilant and militant than ZAPU, however, recent scholars like Mazarire (2011 and Doran (2017) have built on the works of Moore (1990) and Warner (1981) to critique these

dominant narratives with the aim of providing an alternative picture of some pitfalls that culminated into the political crisis in ZANU in 1970 to 1976. To Moore (1990), this period was consequential for ZANU because it became an expression of the deepening ideological divide between the socialist and capitalist tendencies of the liberation movements. Moore suggests that ZANU was divided, ideologically, between the old guard nationalists politicians who were capitalist in orientation on one hand, and the young and educated military individuals who viewed themselves as socialists. Mazarire (2011) claims that the political crisis in the party lay in the structures within ZANU that created tension between politicians and the military. Mazarire continues that the formation of the Dare ReChimurenga (external supreme authority of the party in exile) subjugated the Military High Command, hence causing friction. Warner (1981), however, makes a case of the power of tribal politics between the Manyika, who had previously dominated the party from 1965 to 1973, and the Karangas who eventually took over the military administration of the party. Warner's 1981 account is more appealing because he interviewed some nationalists, such as Rugare Gumbo, who were involved with ZANU during the political crisis, thus, giving the reader first-hand information and an in-depth understanding of the situation. Warner (1981), Moore (1990) and Mazarire (2011) point to the Detente period, the Nhari rebellion and the emergence of ZIPA as epochs that mirror this tension First, as a result of ideological inconsistency, ZANU failed to address the Rhodesian question and according to Moore (1990), it would take regional efforts, in terms of the Détente initiated by the South African leader, John Voster, to release incarcerated nationalists such as Mugabe, Sithole and Nkomo. These leaders were not just nationalists but were moderate individuals who the region hoped would try and negotiate for the independence of Zimbabwe. This was in direct contrast to ZANU's clarion call for militant nationalism. Secondly, because of a lack of a coherent socialist ideology, the Dare ReChimurenga put the Military High Command under the direction of individuals who had no military experience, to lead the armed struggle. As a result, ZANU suffered military defeats and problems that led to disgruntlement within the rank and file, such as the Nhari rebellion of 1974. Chung (2006) and Mazarire (2011) suggest that the Dare ReChimurenga had unnecessary power in the military affairs of the party, in what was referred to as 'the party commands the gun', meaning, politicians had more power than the soldiers. This subjective arrangement made ZANU to get involved in unsuccessful military campaigns, such as the Battle of Chinhoyi in which guerilla fighters perished. It seems it was this friction which led

to serious clashes between Herbert Chitepo, ZANU external leader, and Josiah Tongogara, the ZANU military leader.

Chung (2006), Mangani & Mahosi (2017) and Doran (2017) cite the death of Herbert Chitepo as the peak of the internal crisis in ZANU. They situate various factors leading to the assassination of ZANU's external leader from the involvement of the Rhodesian Secret Service, the tension between the military and politicians and the overly-emphasised tribal politics between the Manyikas and the Karangas for the control of the leadership. These accounts, however, do not emphasise the ideological differences at the time of Chitepo's death. To ZANU, the struggle was to simply remove the Rhodesian government from power and replace it with a majority government as at no point during the struggle had the party been grounded with a socialist or Marxist ideology(Sadomba 2011). The Special Commission and Inquiry (1976) into the death of Chitepo reported that "there were genuine grievances among the fighting cadres in the front lines which gave rise to the Nhari rebellion … there was also a lack of integrity and honesty amongst the ZANU leadership". An analysis of this observation suggests a series of causes that began with lack of ideology to carry the armed struggle forward and infighting; this had cost the life of ZANU's external leader, Chitepo (Sadomba 2011).

Moore (1990) and Chung (2006) celebrate the evolution of the Zimbabwe People Army (ZIPA) led by Rex Nhongo, Dzinashe Machingura and Alfred Nikita Mangena to name a few, as the best example of unity and a clear indication of Marxist ideology. ZIPA became different from ZANLA and ZIPRA because of the support it had from regional Frontline member states, such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Its composition transcended regional and ethnic lines as it housed the Manyikas, Zezurus, Kalangas and Karangas; an indication that these young military cadres sought to break away from politics based on ethnicity. According to Mhanda (1978), ZIPA put an end to the political crisis in ZANU through its adherence to a Marxist ideology that was fully expressed in the resumption of a military armed struggle. ZIPA's internal structures also made it possible to politicise the rural peasantry as expressed by one of the socialist tenets, that the peasantry constitute the bulk of the socialist revolution. Mhanda (1978) and Moore (1978) suggest that ZIPA was an arrogant movement that relied heavily on externally-oriented ideologies such as Marxism without due consideration to African traditional values. African traditional values placed elders and spirit mediums as custodians of the struggle through

conscientising Africans in the pursuit of the struggle. Diplomacy could be another way to attain independence. It is this arrogance that saw members of ZIPA arrested after the Geneva conference by Tongogara; both ZANU and ZAPU did not do anything to save them.

Theme 6: Non-Military Solutions to the struggle for Zimbabwe

Meredith (1979) suggests that some leaders in ZANU, such as Chitepo and Tongogara and most of the exiled members of the party were against non-military solutions to the struggle, however, Holland (2008), Chung (2006) claim that the ZANU leaders that had been imprisoned were willing to compromise the struggle in pursuit of negotiations. This put leaders like Mugabe and Sithole in the same camp with Nkomo who had been widely viewed as having compromised and at worst, a sell-out by various scholars (Warner, 1981, Riley, 1983 and Chimhanda 2003). These scholars point to various epochs in the struggle for Zimbabwe: the Détente period of 1974, the Geneva Conference of 1976 and the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. It seems nationalists politicians favoured negotiations, on one hand, and military individuals saw an armed struggle as a solution to the crisis. Some elements that were reluctant to be part of negotiations, thus, seemed as having been driven by the desire to retain ZANU's organisational independence, a grounded Marxist ideology that dictated militant nationalism and a clarion call to armed struggle. This dichotomy is however too simplistic because it fails to contextualise the reality on the ground. To label those who preferred negotiations as 'anti-Marxists' is problematic because Marxism, at times, could not explain the Rhodesian question and its ramifications to the region. Southern African countries, particularly Mozambique and Zambia, had begun to bear the burden of the Rhodesian bush war in terms of refugees, armed guerillas and the Rhodesian state sabotaging their economies. In this light, Meredith (1979) and Warner (1981) give a regional dimension of how negotiations became an integral part of Zimbabwean nationalist history; regional states such as Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique became very involved in pushing for negotiations. In this pursuit, these states were at loggerheads with ZANU, mainly because of its militant approach that appeared ignorant of the realities on the ground, forcing these states to threaten to expel cadres of Zimbabwe's liberation movements from within their territories.

To Mhanda (1978), the regional leaders were not committed to an armed struggle but a quick solution to the Rhodesian question and this is supported by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) who suggests that this desire of regional leaders resulted in a Lancaster House agreement that saw the

promotion of white settler capital and the continuation of capitalism. Mhanda (1978) claims that, hence, the aims of the nationalist struggle were lost because Marxism had not been fully integrated within the regional countries that purported to be Marxists, such as Mozambique and Tanzania. The Lancaster House became the first litmus test to assess the gains of the liberation struggle. Southall (2013) and Mandaza (1986) critique the methods by which Zimbabwe attained its independence and they devote a great deal of time assessing this against the Marxist concept of the National Democratic Revolution.

2.4 Nationalism in Post-Independent Zimbabwe (1980-1990)

Tendi (2011) maintains that historical and contextual considerations are essential in understanding how ZANU imagined a post-independent Zimbabwean nation-state. He classifies the deeply-flawed Lancaster House Agreement as a false start to the independence of 1980 and as a cause for the ever-increasing intoxicating and draining relations between whites and Africans in shaping the imaginations of a post-independent state by ZANU. These historical considerations have been illuminated by Nyagumbo (1980) and Doran (2017) who chronicle the continuous inter-party violence that rocked the 1960s' nationalist politics, in high-density suburbs in Rhodesia. Doran and Nyagumbo relate how ZANU leaders, who formed the post-1980 Mugabe administration, such as Shamuyarira, Nkala and Muzenda suffered at the hands of ZAPU. It is clear from their accounts that these leaders became very influential in the post-independent formulation of ZANU's domestic policy, especially against ZAPU. Contrary to the repeated calls that ZANU wanted to form one-party state as a means of containing ZAPU's threat, events that happened shortly after independence were a result of the value of unresolved political memories and myths between ZANU and ZAPU; these had roots in the 1963 split in ZAPU and its consequences. Tendi (2011) does not condone what followed independence - the fall out between ZANU and ZAPU and the Matabeleland disturbances. Tendi does not overly criticise the Mugabe regime but rather offers a contextual analysis of the first decade of independence through providing an understanding of the regional and international concerns surrounding the ZANU's understanding of Zimbabwean nationalism at the time. To Tendi, ZANU emerged in a neighbourhood that had previously favoured ZAPU, hence, the party had to compromise on a number of policy positions and ideological considerations in a matter of trying to wade off the idea that it was a splinter organisation. One is reminded of the power of political

memories and myths and how these are useful lenses to view events which can develop into civil wars and genocide.

Similarly, Meredith (2005), Phimister (2009) and Southall (2013) points to the evolvement of patriotic nationalism that sought to celebrate ZANU at the expense of other alternative political movements. The conclusion of this observation is ZANU's quest for dominance and a one-party state political ideology which resulted in undesirable consequences. Phimister (2009) argues that in late August 1981, the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, became uncomfortable with elements that did not wish to profess the same ideology as ZANU and that became the basis for the creation of the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade in the Zimbabwe National Army to deal with this lack of subservience. Phimister terms this a version of authoritarian and intolerant nationalism that came to inform the activities of a post-independent Zimbabwe, by the ruling party. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) sheds more light on this post-independent intolerant nationalism, suggesting that this antagonism had primordial roots. These roots trace the history of raids and plunder on the Shona-speaking people by the Ndebele, prior to colonial rule although, there is a lot of divergence with regards to the root causes of the Matabeleland disturbances.

Mandaza (1986:42) maintain that the post-independent state of Zimbabwe began with a policy of reconciliation that was part of the "delicate task of nation-building." He suggests that this policy was part of the imaginations of a post-colonial Zimbabwe that was, however, born of a compromise between the liberation movement camp, the former colonial power, as well as the settler elite, and constructed within a set of international pressures. He further argues that the policy of reconciliation was never one of accountability and determination but just a cosmetic compromise to keep the nation and state functioning. The years that followed, thus, were soon characterised by hate and a reversal of the policy of co-existence because the whole notion never addressed historical, racial and other ethnic differences. In this regard, Eppel (2004) maintains that the 1980s witnessed state-orchestrated violence and brutality on the Ndebele minority who constituted the opposition. Eppel says this scenario should be understood in the historical violence that has engulfed Zimbabwe over a period of a century. Eppel (2004) continues the point by citing the examples of the 1970s, 1980s and the beginning of the 2000s; drawing a

nexus between Ian Smith -the Rhodesian premier - and Robert Mugabe's use of violence and desire for a one-party state, to silence political diversity.

Nyathi (2004) examines the mutation of nationalism and the place of the veterans of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwean politics. He maintains that ideological bankruptcy plagued the liberation struggle thus making both ZANU and ZAPU not ready for the makings of a Zimbabwean nation-state. He contends that disagreement over the Chinese ideology, North Korean ideology and the Soviet-backed ideology allowed some small educated elite veterans of the war to acquire significant posts in the post-colonial state. Nyathi draws a link between the confusion over the preferred political and economic ideology to shape an independent Zimbabwe and the unpreparedness of the revolution to shape the way forward for the country. Thus, in the post-colonial Zimbabwe, a division emerged between the ZANU and ZAPU camps where the latter's nationalist elite accumulated wealth through capitalism means whilst they exhorted the rest of the ex-combatants to adhere to socialist rhetoric.

Nyathi (2004), continues that selective nationalism became the official means of rewarding loyalists and loathing those that were regarded as a 'sell-outs'. Nyathi uses the term 'hero' and how it came to polarise ZANU-PF and Zimbabwean politics after independence. Kriger (2006) discusses selective nationalism and how it widened the gap between ZANU-PF and war veterans; for example, the ZANU-PF led government instituted 'Heroes' Acres' on the socialist model, at national, provincial and district levels, where 'deserving' ex-combatants were buried and continue to be buried. The process of identifying who should be regarded as a hero, however, has been entirely usurped by ZANU-PF; those who have served the party's interests in the last few years are assured of space at Heroes' Acres, with little concern for their actual contribution to the development of the country.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This section provides a theoretical framework for nationalism. The Primordialist and Constructivist theoretical frameworks will be discussed in detail because they will be used to understand the dynamism of nationalism in Zimbabwe.

2.5.1 Primordialist Theory

Primordialists trace the history of collective groups whose experiences, religion, culture, ancestry and dialectic commonality constitute the foundation of a nation. To Primordialists, the most crucial feature in the understanding of nationalism is based on a certain version of history that connects present generations to their past and ancestors (Breuilly, 1996:149). Primordialism "refers to the core, to a sense of community which focuses on a belief in myths of common ancestry; and on the perception that these myths are validated by contemporary similarities of physiognomy, language or religion" (Brown, 1999: 82). Primordialists emphasise the ethnic origins of the nation and "ancient roots of the nations and the fixity of identity as a quality given by birth" (Madianou, 2005: 8). Historical legitimacy, thus, is derived from common ancestry, land and its sentimental attachment, language, and culture which provide the basis for "claims to authenticity and right of collective national self-determination" (Brown, 1999: 282). The power of memory and myth in cultivating nationalism is relevant to primordialism. In explaining this authoritarian version of cultural nationalism, Hutchinson (1994: 124) argues that "nations are not just political units but organic beings, living personalities, whose individuality must be cherished by their members in all their manifestations". Cultural nationalism is, thus, weary of plurality emphasising the greater reason, that is, the inspiring love of community, engaging in naming rituals, celebrating cultural uniqueness and rejecting foreign practices (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2009:4).

i. Primordialism in the Study of Zimbabwean Nationalism

No serious study of the history of Zimbabwe can ignore the celebrated history of pre-colonial Zimbabwe and how this history became a rallying point in evoking national consciousness which eventually manifested in a protracted struggle against white-settler colonialism. Following the invasion and occupation of the country by the British South Africa Company in the 1880s and the defeat of the nationalist leaders of the First Chimurenga, nationalism in Zimbabwe drew its inspiration from these 'critical moments'. The second generation of nationalist leaders of the 1960s had to tap into this history and imagine a new state called 'Zimbabwe'. The fight against white encroachment that began in 1890, derived from pre-colonial spirit medium Murenga, spilt over into the Second Chimurenga. The Second Chimurenga saw the emergence of two significant liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union. These two movements drew their mandate from 'critical moments' such as the defeat during the First Chimurenga and the significance of land in the

African context, as rallying points to fight for the independence of Zimbabwe. These movements used the terms 'Zimbabwe' and 'African' as a way of seeking legitimacy and authenticity by identifying themselves as indigenous movements. Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe tapped into the history of the first generation of nationalist leaders such as Mbuya Nehanda, Kaguvi and others who had sacrificed their lives for the nation of Zimbabwe. It is this history that developed consciousness and patriotism amongst nationalist leaders in the struggle against white minority rule. Primordialism is, therefore, a fitting theory in trying in understanding the evolution of nationalism in Zimbabwe.

2.5.2 Constructivist theory and nationalism

The constructivists' perspective on nationalism claims that nations are not anything real, objective, or indispensable; they are only 'constructs', contingent and artificial, deliberately created by various elites (Walicki, 1998:611). It is for this reason that national identities become "flexible and variable; [with] both content and boundaries" of the nation changing according to circumstances (Llobera 1999). In this regard, nationalism is not only informed by past historical experiences or the loyalty to one's cultural beliefs but also by the imaginations and visions of what is necessary and right. It is important to note that constructivists such as Benedict Anderson in his famous piece *'Imagined Communities'* stresses the need to reinvent new and imagined identities in situations where the old ones are under threat; in this process, the elites play a decisive role in the manufacturing of new and appropriate identities. Thus, nationalism and nation-states do not exist but are imaginations that are constructed for certain ends, do. Constructivists argue that nationalism rises in response to economic, political and social transformations. This transformation erodes traditional identities through the emergence of industrial economies that disrupt social modes, thereby, creating social tension; hence, the state, the elites and mass education play a role in the construction of a new national identity that mutates into nationalism.

The theory is appropriate in accounting for the change in the social organisation of Zimbabwe as a result of colonialism and the emergence of white-settler colonialism that sought to invent an image of the superiority of Africans. It is for this reason that the elites formed mass movements that became known as 'national liberation movements'. The role played by these elites is crucial as they sought to construct a nation that became known as Zimbabwe, in 1980. Nationalism

emerged against the background of white encroachment and the expropriation of land, however, with the passage of time, the clarion call for an armed struggle became subjective to a different interpretation and constructions from the competition that became rife within the elite political leadership in both ZANU and ZAPU. The theory can also account for an understanding of the development of nationalism in the light of the divisions between the educated politicians and the peasantry, who Marxism claims are the vanguard of any revolution. In the case of Zimbabwean nationalism, this idea was reconstructed to accommodate educated nationalists as the drivers of the revolution. When one looks into the trajectories of a post-1980 Zimbabwe, the immediate observation would be a variety of interpretations about what would constitute 'an independent Zimbabwe'. Elites within ZANU appear to have understood a new Zimbabwe from a one-party state model, whilst the elites from ZAPU envisioned the new Zimbabwe differently. Constructivism, therefore, seems best suited to account for why nationalism mutated, within the liberation movements and in the post-independent Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literature on nationalism. It concentrated on the conceptual understanding of nationalism with emphasis on the traditional and contemporary debates on nationalism. Of note, the Machiavellian's and Kwesi Prah's approaches were discussed to try and understand nationalism in both the traditional and modern senses. Both approaches, traditional and modern, find a common denominator in classifying nationalism as an exhilarating force that seeks to address socio-economic and political subjugation of peoples in a given society, however, they also differ in explaining factors that lead to the development of nationalism in different historical epochs. It emerged that nationalism, like identity, is in a state of mobility. The chapter also provided a detailed analysis of the theoretical settings of the study in which attention was devoted to the Primordialist and constructivist theories, in relation to nationalism.

THREE:

ZAPU AND ZANU'S (1965-1975): CONSTRUCTED AND CONTESTED NATIONALISM

3.0 Introduction

The previous chapter documented key aspects in literature, on nationalism. The chapter began by tracing the emergence of nationalism in Europe, in Africa and in Rhodesia. This chapter examines the role of narratives in the study of nationalism arguing that it is closely related to mobile identity. The discussions dwell also on the role played by the educated nationalists in constructing a political narrative which sought to produce a coherent and unified ideology about the formation of the nation of Zimbabwe. Special attention will be given to different political trajectories such as political myths that found expression in media, the formation of transnational alliances, political factions and the use of political violence in an attempt to achieve a coherent and unified ideology.

3.1 Construction of Nationalism through Narratives

Narratives can be defined as the manner in which "we story the world" (Mishler 1995:117 as cited in Shenhave 2006). A study of psychology shows that human beings think, perceive and imagine using narrative modes to enhance understandings and meanings to their, therefore, political discourse relies on narratives as a way of formulating political knowledge and 'reality' about worlds (Shenhave, 2006: 245; Mudau & Mangani 2018). The manner in which "we story the world" is subjective, hence, political 'reality' is not universal but confined to certain views and descriptions (Cornog, 2004; Shenav, 2004). Mishler (1995:117) maintains that "we do not find stories, we make stories", therefore, the stories that are made, also make them subjective to reconstructions that may, ultimately, be contested.

Nationalism in Zimbabwe was constructed and contested through narratives; for example, the idea by the political elites to use the names 'Zimbabwe' and 'African' is part of narrative construction. These names commanded a nationalist and continental appeal signifying elements of nativism and Pan Africanism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017) showing that these names were a deliberate attempt by political elites to express concerns about the liberation struggle for it to have a wide appeal; the intention was to create a counter-narrative against colonialism. Colonialism displaced Africans politically, economically as well as socially making it essential that those fighting against colonial injustice - from the Southern Rhodesia African National

Congress (SRANC) to the National Democratic Party (NDP) - generate political myths that sought to "conceive and express their resentment and their contents in intelligible terms" (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983: 1 cited in Hall, 1995: 614). Of note is the formation of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) in 1962, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963 and the deliberate use of the names 'Zimbabwe' and 'African' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). These names are symbolic in their representation of what appears to be a manufacturing of a singular and wider identity. With specific focus on colonialism, what emerged was what Mamdani(1996) terms as 'ethnic citizenship' a key feature of white settler colonialism. Ethnic citizenship thrived on the politicisation of different and multicultural ethnic groups such as the Karanga, Manyika, Kalanga, Venda and Zezuru as means to divide and conquer Africans by the colonial regime. The Rhodesian colonial system insisted on politicizing these differences and this culminated in the ideology of tribalism. Accordingly the deliberate use of the names 'Zimbabwe' and 'African' was an invention of a singular political and ideological narrative that natives were no longer viewed as Shonas or Ndebeles but rather Zimbabwean and African which was a nationalist construction of an identity.

ZANU's deliberate use of 'national' in its name warrants an evaluation because it reveals crucial challenges that a national identity suffered because of competing narratives in the struggle for Zimbabwe. ZANU's constructions of the African struggle were exclusionary and hegemonic to suggest that the party had a more national appeal than ZAPU that simply chose to label itself as a 'Peoples' party.

The following subsection deals with nationalism as an identity in a constant state of mobility and this assumption will be interrogated through the work of Stuart Hall (1995). Hall (1995:597) provides two conceptions of identity: the sociological subject and the post-modern subject.

3.1.1 The Sociological Subject on Identity

The sociological subject on identity has its origins in the 20th century Mead and Cooley cited in (Hall 1995) developed this discourse through 'symbolic interactionism'. They argue that society is formed and maintained through intercourse between individuals and culture; in other words, identity is formed through interaction between the 'self' and the outside 'other's' cultural world. The 'self' is metaphoric with various meanings - individuals, societies and ideas - hence, the interaction between cultures, ideologies and perceptions which bring about modernity forms an

integral theme of 'symbolic interactionism'. Logically, the 'self' is not autonomous and self-sufficient but is complemented through changes from time to time. There are intense initiatives intending to integrate outside cultures into one's identity (Carter & Fuller, 2015:1, 2). What can be drawn from this sociology thought is that identities are not static. Blumer 1969 cited in (Carter & Fuller, 2015) builds on the works of Mead and Cooley to explain symbolic interactionism. Blumer says society comprises social 'meaningful' interactions among individuals, hence, in societies, 'meanings' are continuously created and recreated; this observation, however, refutes the underlying notion of structured societies.

The study of nationalism in Zimbabwe supports this latter observation. Nationalism emerged as an identity because of the encroachment of the British in 1890; this led to the First Chimurenga wars that sought to repossess land that the British had expropriated. Alexander (2006:185) says: "Nationalism was exclusively about fighting men and land, about British perfidy and national sovereignty, it was not about democracy or rights". Mugabe, (2001:92-93) corroborates this view saying:

> We knew and still know that land was the prime goal of King Lobengula as he fought British encroachment in 1893; we knew and still know that land was the principal grievance for our heroes of the First Chimurenga led by Nehanda and Kaguvi Hence land became the banner of African identity and nationalism.

The land was a key feature in the construction of African identity, thus Alexander (2006) and Mugabe (2001) invoked cultural nationalism in their understanding and tied land, nationalism and identity together. Cultural nationalists, such as Hutchinson (1994) view the nation and nationalism as a product of history and culture and key to this history and culture are sacrosanct features, such as land. The land is not just seen in the material sense but in the psychological and spiritual dimensions of identity and it is in this particularism and uniqueness of culture that identity can be understood (Hutchinson 1994 cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni &Willems, 2009).

Prah (2009:2) views nationalism as a modern response by educated political elites who sought to attain universally accepted freedoms for Africans, hence, a departure from the cultural approach of linking land to nationalism is clear because it is changed to accommodate other 'meanings' that involve political rights and civil liberties. When ZAPU was formed in 1962 and ZANU in 1963, nationalism focused on Western-centred neo-liberal principles, such as the promotion of

democracy, human rights and political participation; this claim can be examined through 'symbolic interactionism' which modernises Zimbabwean nationalism. In examining modernity, Marx and Engel say "all fixed, fast-frozen relationships, with their train of venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air" (Marx & Engels 1848 cited in Frisby, 2004: 8). This view seems to postulate that interaction between cultures inculcates new meanings, ideas and opinions upon the older ones. We can cite the case of the Mau Mau freedom fighters in the struggle for Kenya as such. Kenyan scholar, Ngugi wa Thiongo became interested in using combative music and folklore as an expression of Kenyan nationalism (Ngugi wa Thiongo 1972:30 cited in Amuta, 2003: 162). With time, the Mau Mau freedom fighters realised the need to change the music and folklore to enhance the struggle for Kenya. This meant that old songs were rediscovered and "they also created new songs and dances with new rhythms where the old ones were found inadequate" (Ngugi wa Thiongo 1972:30 cited in Amuta, 2003: 162). In Zimbabwe, what had been appropriate in identifying nationalism in the formative years around the 1890s, issues of land and rejection of foreign encroachment were changed with the passage of time to incorporate different meanings to suit the different needs of the 1960s. Forces of modernity influenced the educated elites in ZAPU and ZANU to find a more nuanced approach to nationalism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) cites Nkomo as an example that nationalism can take on various forms; at different points in time, nationalism exhibits the philosophy of neoliberal ideas, radical nativism and Marxism to problematize the national question in Rhodesia.

This pragmatic view of cultural nationalism is a departure from the basic features of the nationalism that had its roots in the First Chimurenga, showing that Nkomo's construction of nationalism is informed by the needs of his times. The search for equal political and civil rights are the grounds upon which these parties would build a new and independent Zimbabwean state; consequently, Nkomo's views were contested by those who imagined a nationalist discourse built on particularism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) cites Michael Mawema of NDP who in 1960 said – "I was called a Tshombe because I had not accepted the constitution which the great Nkomo had signed for … We wanted our Zimbabwe land back to us but they signed a constitution without the land provision" (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 114). Mawema's views are part of the competing narratives that seek to deconstruct and construct a representation of nationalist history and an attempt to claim political legitimacy and authority.

By differing on the key themes that constitute nationalism, Nkomo and Mawema's accounts reinforce the theme of this subsection - that nationalism is not a homogenous identity but one that is in a state of mobility. Differences in the understanding of nationalism can be seen as an attempt to understand identity in the most logical manner; one that would challenge the socioeconomic and political status quo of the time. More significantly, the contestation between Nkomo and Mawema indicates the influential role played by the educated elites as a social force that constructed and contested nationalist politics at the time. The following subsection examines the role played by this social force in the construction and contestation of nationalist politics.

3.2 Intellectuals in the Development of Nationalism

Intellectuals played a pivotal role in the construction of nationalism in the struggle for Zimbabwe. The term 'intellectual', according to Tendi (2010:11), is vague because it is subjective and any attempts to define this term has its own difficulties. Subsequently, Tendi (2010) discusses the dichotomy between conventional wisdom and academic qualifications such as one holding higher educational qualifications as a criterion to be labelled an intellectual while a group of people who come together bound by ideology can also be revolutionary, democratic or conservative intellectuals (Raymond, 1983: 169-171 cited in 'Intellectual', n.d.). Equally, a group can be organised by nationality to be called Zimbabwean, Algerian or Saudi Arabia intellectuals. Marxist sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1986:253) states that public intellectuals are members of society who have gained an advantage over other members because of social assets, such as education and intellect. For the sake of this discussion, an intellectual will be defined as one with an educational background and because of this background offers solutions to the problems in society. Amilcar Cabral, an African theoretician and revolutionary wrote on the role played by intellectuals in the development of nationalism and the fight against colonialism. To Cabral, educated Africans were crucial to the development of African nationalism because of their integration into the colonial structures and their exposure to the outside world and cultures (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1997; Shamuyarira 1965).

Shamuyarira (1965) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997) offer the point that educated Africans carried a heavy responsibility which involved the construction of a society envisioned after them because of their education. The feature of a superior social status is elitist and exclusive because it subscribes to the notion of a nationalism constructed only by this group. This speaks to educated elites such as Robert Mugabe, a teacher, Herbert Chitepo, a lawyer, Tichafa Parirenyatwa, a medical doctor and Jason Moyo also a lawyer. Conversely, there are numerous examples of outstanding leaders, such as Josiah Tongogara, Nikita Mangena and Simon Muzenda who did not have any university education but whose political and military principles stood as examples to nationalist leaders. Another striking category is of the clergy led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole clergymen able to usher in a new approach to nationalist politics through religion. There was also a group of traditional leadership such as Chiefs Chirau and Tangwena that contributed to the liberation struggle. Previously, the most pronounced theme has been a superior-educated group that became a central social force in the liberation movement in Rhodesia. This threatened to tear the fabric of the nationalist movement, as those who were not educated enough sought some degree of autonomy from the educated through constructing competing narratives. In seeking autonomy from the intellectuals, anti-intellectual sentiments found expression in print media, such as the African Daily News. An example is a letter to the editor of the African Daily News:

> Rev. Sithole seems only to be interested in the educated camp of Zimbabwe. If he holds such contention of leading the educated group what of the uneducated group? Zimbabwe is for everyone whether educated or uneducated. Such ideas he holds are undesirable (Rich 1983 cited in Moore 1990:105).

This indicates the competing narratives that militated against the development of a common approach to a nationalist identity, between the educated and uneducated. True to the observation in the African Daily News, is the role played by the first nationalists, who possessed no intellectual credentials yet took part in the First Chimurenga of 1896-97. It is now commonly referred to as 'Zimbabwe's First War of Independence'. It is the uneducated elites that promulgated this war as a precursor to nationalism in Zimbabwe. Intellectuals' roles in any given political society are multifold but one role is to seek an audience. In the pursuit of an audience, emotionalism and appeals to nationalism are often used to create political myths as ways to persuade the hearts and minds of their audience (Coser, 1965: 3). Problems may arise that can be

referred to as ‘causes’ that require intellectuals to make sense of. In the end, “causes create public intellectuals, as much as public intellectuals create causes” (Tendi, 2010: 12). These ‘causes’ included problems associated with colonialism and the need to construct a nationalism discourse which would enable most Africans to understand their situation and this was seen as being done by intellectuals who formed the bulk of members of nationalist movements.

Contradictions have emerged in explaining the development of an educated elite within the nationalist struggle of Zimbabwe. They were referred to by many ridiculing names, such as ‘moderates’, ‘tea drinkers’, ‘bourgeoisie class’, ‘stooges or opportunists’ who lacked military training and experience. They were accused of being only interested in skirmishes that would assure them of political power in a post-independent Zimbabwe (Mhanda, 2005: 2), however, alternative historical accounts appear to refute these claims. These accounts categories these intellectuals as ‘a tiny, revered minority’ that carried enormous political capital (Moore, 1990:92). Moore argues that it was only after intellectuals like Enoch Dumbutshena and Herbert Chitepo declined to stand for a position within the organisation that a compromised leader like Joshua Nkomo was chosen to lead the movement (Moore, 1990:90-91). The assumption that had any of the intellectuals, Mugabe, Chitepo or Dumbutshena, led the struggle from the start, the split in ZAPU in 1963 would have been avoided, however, does not have any evidence to support it. This account is a historical construction that became part of the political discourse in the liberation struggle. Recurring in this historical construction and political discourse is the notion of a nationalism constructed devoid of the role played by those who were not educated. Consequently, exclusivism formed an integral part of the political process intended to glorify intellectuals like Chitepo, Dumbutshena and Mugabe at the expense of Nkomo and others.

Bernard Chidzero, a leading intellectual who became part of the political elite, was quoted saying: “It was time for the middle class, to realise that it has a vital role to play in the destiny of the Africans - it is the spearhead and the tool of the masses, and must never lose sight of the fact” (Raftopoulos, 1995:90). This selective approach is not mindful of the uncoordinated yet consequential protests of the early First Chimurenga nationalists and the generations of the 1940s, therefore, these narratives generate political myths. Tismaneanu (2009:9) sees political myths as not “systems of thought but rather as a set of beliefs whose foundations transcend logic; no empirical evidence can shatter their pseudo-cognitive immunity”. Tismaneanu’s says myths

emerge in situations of political and ideological crisis. When the 'centre is no longer holding' myths tend to offer new political and social meanings. Integrated within the discourse of nationalism, political myths began to flourish with the emergence of these intellectuals against the background of failed attempts to address the Rhodesian question. Intellectuals, such as Chidzero and the scholarly account advanced by Moore become part of the efforts to make sense and enhance the role played by intellectuals through the construction of myths. The myth is that educated elites were in a better position to execute the struggle than the uneducated. It is against this background that the contestations around nationalism and the ZAPU split in 1963, should be assessed. These contestations around nationalism and its understanding manifested in what appeared to be politically-related myths. Political myths became an essential component of nationalism through the construction of identity politics and the use of violence as a follow-up to the former. The next section examines how different approaches to the construction of nationalist politics militated against the development of a common approach to the struggle for Zimbabwe. Competing narratives led to the emergence of different groups, also known as factions, which had different interests; this led to the split in ZAPU. Reflecting on this split demonstrates the contention that nationalist politics is an ideal that is largely in the mind since, in reality, it cannot be applied in the form in which it is conceived.

3.2.1 ZAPU's split and its aftermath

ZAPU (2012) contends that ZANU had no ideological basis. In a document entitled '*ZAPU: A Brief History, 1961 -2010'*, ZAPU makes a follow up to this claims suggesting that the formation of ZANU in 1963 amounted to a criminal act and a betrayal of the liberation struggle (ZAPU 2012). It is believed an educated elite that was not motivated by any ideology but was, rather interested in representing itself as a distinguished class had engineered the formation of the party (Mhanda, 2005). Rich (1983) quotes Nkomo, saying: "We all know that the support offered to ZANU is composed of a very tiny group of those arid and dry chaps who still dream that education can rule without the will of the people" (Rich, 1983: 82). Nkomo's views are insightful because they enhance our understanding of how nationalist politics were constructed and contested in the fight against colonialism. These differences emerged from the manner in which different actors expressed different interests. Nkomo's views betray the fact that he had invited the educated 'tea drinkers' to join the struggle because of the influence of their education

on the development of African nationalism (West, 2002). In 1960, Nkomo invited educated elites like Robert Mugabe to join the NDP. In 2008, Heidi Holland conducted an interview with Jonathan Moyo, a former cabinet Minister and member of ZANU-PF, during which he spoke about nationalist politics in the 1960s and the reasons for Nkomo inviting Mugabe to nationalist politics. The language used by Moyo seems to dovetail into the dominant narrative of the social capital that the educated elite possessed at the time. The educated elites constituted a social force used for instrumental purposes but were also viewed as a threat by those who had started nationalist politics in Rhodesia.

White (2003) and Doran (2017) claim that Nkomo was autocratic yet failed to provide an effective plan of action in confronting the Rhodesian regime. The often cited example of this claim is when the party's Publicity Secretary, Robert Mugabe, opposed a proposal put forward by Nkomo to set up a government in exile based on the rationale that remaining in the country would give credence to ZAPU, hence, legitimacy and authenticity among its followers. Nkomo did not see this as a constructive opinion but as an open challenge to his credibility as the leader of the nationalist movement. This can be constructed as a 'big man syndrome' in nationalist politics that manifested itself in a fundamentalist mindset, exclusive of other political opinions. Consequently, at a rally at Chaminuka Square in Salisbury, Nkomo denounced Mugabe and Sithole for 'Nicodemously' plotting to form a new party (Doran 2017:8).

Other narratives suggest that the split was motivated by ethnic politics in ZAPU which threatened to tear the fabric of the nationalist movement and even Sibanda (2005) presents the split along ethnic lines. Before the split, ZAPU had ten Shona-speaking and four Ndebele-speaking members in the executive; after the split, ZAPU maintained ten Shona-speaking members in the executive, while ZANU had fourteen Shona-speakers and one Ndebele in its executive. Interestingly, Chimhanda (2003:60) reports that Joseph Msika, a senior figure in ZAPU came into possession of a document which showed how the Shona in ZAPU had intentions to get rid of 'zimundevere'[15] This argument gains currency based on the observation that ZANU's executive remained dominated by Shona speaking until its merger with ZAPU in 1987 (Sibanda 2005). It is these numerical considerations that make it difficult to dismiss the ethnic factor as a reason for the split. These figures give credence to the notion of a superior

[15] Derogatory tribalist term to refer to Nkomo.

ethnic status that was being pursued by a group in ZAPU, thus, the numerical composition in ZAPU, before and after the split, has certain political connotations. The differences in the composition of the executive in ZANU and ZAPU showed how ethnic differences helped to define the borders of political differences between ZAPU and ZANU. ZANU's ideology was based on a Shona-defined political constituency, therefore, the split in ZAPU was a matter of promoting a Shona political idea. This suggests that ethnic identities serve as a political strategy that is used to consolidate political power.

Alternative perspectives by the British government (cited in Doran 2017) suggest that ZANU was formed as a result of the failure to dislodge Nkomo from power by leaders, such as Sithole, Takawira and Mugabe. The British government observed:

> [The] two factions seem to have been preoccupied with rallying support … the rebels slowness in following up their attempted coup can possibly be attributed to obtaining a walkover victory. There is still a good deal of support for Nkomo over the country as a whole (Central African Office, 1963 cited in Doran 2017).

In order to convince the masses that ZAPU was the only legitimate and authentic movement at the time, the party went on a campaign trail to characterise ZANU as an externally capitalist-funded project. In a publication, '*Did You Know'*, circulated at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation's (AAPSO) fourth conference in May 1965, ZAPU insinuated that ZANU had been "watered, tended by the imperialists till it sprouted like a seedling in a garden" (cited in Moore 1990:107). ZAPU was riding on the perceptions of the ordinary people who generally saw capitalism and whiteness as the hallmark of colonialism; meaning that ZAPU was constructing a sellout narrative against ZANU. It is during this period that Nkomo propounded his understanding of nationalism - it was modern and neo-liberal and included both Europeans (whites) and Africans. Nkomo acknowledged white Rhodesians' right to participate in the formation of a future Zimbabwe nation as long as they renounced their racial superiority and agreed to a one-person, one-vote system.

Africans in the residential areas of Salisbury had come to regard the US and capitalism as an enemy of socialism, with the US being regarded as a sponsor of white minority interests in Rhodesia; any connection with capitalism was regarded as selling out in the struggle (Scarnecchia, 2017). This demonisation of political opponents was a recurring component of the

political myths which suggested that ZANU was an agent of whites. The problem with myths lies in the 'immunity' they have, in that one cannot subject claims to scholarly inquiry (Check 2015). The myth that ZANU was an agent of white capital was significant in the wake of ZANU's challenge of African political space that had been under the control of ZAPU. Interestingly, in post-independent Zimbabwe, the ruling party, ZANU-PF would use the same tactics of generating myths through labelling the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) as an agent of the US (Raftopoulos, 2010: 710). In so much as the logic, behind demonising the MDC as an outpost of the US imperialists interests, was to try and make sense of the unprecedented economic and social meltdown; ZAPU also used the same logic to discredit ZANU's attempts at political autonomy. It is the creating of 'reality' in the minds of Africans that was crucial, hence, it became common for ZAPU supporters to label ZANU and its supporters as 'sellouts' because of the narrative that had been constructed by ZAPU. It seems, then, that the legitimacy and authority of ZAPU lay in the fabrication of identity politics. What can be noted from these discussions is the emergence of a political ritual in Zimbabwe's nationalist politics, in which political groups repeatedly castigated each other as agents of external forces. Rituals are part and parcel of political life and as such the success of political groups is dependent on their effective use of these rituals.

The accusations that ZANU may have been an extension of US interests may have had a rational basis considering that Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Hebert Chitepo and Robert Mugabe, some founding members of ZANU had worked tirelessly to form the party with funding from abroad (Scarnecchia, 2008). According to an American diplomat, Edward W. Mulcahy, Mugabe was of the opinion that African political or labour movements cannot stand on their own, without the financial backing of an external source (Scarnecchia 2008). Similarly, Sithole argued: "Help is being sought from all quarters … a drowning man does not question the character of the man who extends a hand to help him". In buttressing his colleagues' views on the need for the US to fund liberation movements, Chitepo was quoted saying he "would be happy to accept 500 million dollars from the United States and still defy anyone to call him 'an American stooge'" (Scarnecchia, 2008: 231). An established relationship between ZANU and the US is evident; Nkomo may have used this as a tool to proliferate the myth that ZANU was an agent of the US. This accusation was helpful in as far as it increased ZAPU's legitimacy in the townships.

The comments provided by Chitepo and Mugabe indicate the changes in approach towards nationalist politics. These changes can be understood from the lenses of Stuart Hall's notion that identities are in a constant state of mobility. As noted earlier in the study, mobility in identity can be understood as 'symbolic interactionism'. As such, from Mugabe and Chitepo's point of view, the struggle for Zimbabwe was not autonomous but was supplemented with the help of other external forces, such as the US. Marx and Engels (1848) cited in (Frisby, 2004: 8) opine that due to interactions between cultures, all relations, perceptions and ideologies, are constantly being swept away or changed to pave the way for new ones. A further analysis provided by Stuart Hall offers a 'postmodern subject' identity which observes that 'a relatively settled character' centred on race, culture, ideology and other beliefs can be transformed because of modernity, however, the new identity suffers from a lack of a fixed and coherent state (Proctor, 2004:109). Modernity is the locomotive that changes society by replacing old cultural and ideological values with new ones. In Zimbabwe, the nativist idea rested on the belief that colonialism was responsible for political and socio-economic problems in Africa. As such, nationalism emerged to challenge colonialism, however, with time and because of modernity, intellectuals such as Mugabe and Chitepo understood the needs to modify these beliefs to achieve independence; this meant that even courting the West, particularly the maligned US, for funds to execute the struggle for Zimbabwe, was permissible. In Cold War politics, ZANU simply took advantage of the hostility between the US and the Soviet Union to acquire readily available funds to support the party. As ZAPU and ZANU began to denounce each other, the use of media became a potent tool in the construction of political narratives in the public political space in Rhodesia. The following section focuses on the use of media by both ZAPU and ZANU, as an avenue to establish autonomy and legitimacy amongst Africans.

3.2.2 Media in the Construction and Redefinition of Nationalism

The emergence of African media and press (newspapers, magazines and books) can be traced to the activities of Christian missionaries when they arrived in Africa. With the passage of time, African media and press became an integral driver of the democratisation agenda and civil society during the colonial period (Dombo 2017). Civil society is an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in complex non-state activities – economic and cultural production, voluntary associations and household life – and who in this way preserved and

transformed their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions (Sachikonye, 1995). Hence, in any environment that restricted political freedoms, the African press became a key feature of civil society through exerting pressure on the colonial governments. It became the official mouthpiece of liberation movements and the development of African nationalism. The African press became an influential vehicle in the public sphere through which the nationalist elite sought to create a profile and to define its problematic status (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2003). African media emerged in response to the colonial situation and as such was regarded as the mouthpiece of the democratic discourse that had emerged from Europe and had spread across to other regions, like Africa. The African media had a similar instrumental purpose in the ZAPU-ZANU standoff. The following subsection is an examination of the critical role played by the press in the development of nationalist politics after the formation of ZANU in 1963.

Habermas (1989), Switzer (1997) and Dombo (2014), see the public sphere as space in which individuals and groups meet to discuss matters of mutual interest. In this public sphere, the relationships between state and citizens on the one hand and citizens themselves, on the other hand, are very crucial in reactions to public issues. Public issues are scrutinised through the media where the newspaper plays a pivotal role in developing a language about public issues; the press, hence, becomes part of the public institutions through promoting public discussions, however, in colonial Africa, the press was often limited to communications of colonial governments and urban African political elites (Switzer, 1997:11; Dombo, 2014: 19-20). This limited discourse on public issues because where the media is widely seen as part of public institutions it has failed to act on behalf of the citizenry (Ronning, 1997:4). In Rhodesia, ZAPU and ZANU utilised the African press in the development of public issues such as nationalism and nationalist politics. McCombs & Shaw (1972) developed what is known as the ‘agenda-setting theory’ in media. The theory explains that media has the power to generate interest-based issues for particular political groups. This is often referred to as the ‘mediatisation of politics’ (Dombo, 2014: 23). Media’s ability to influence selected issues, persons and topics are regarded as topical is what constitutes agenda-setting. Public discourses and issues are framed within the understanding and construction of the political elites and the agenda of the media always dovetails into the interests of these political elites.

ZAPU political elites relied on the African Daily News to construct a narrative of national politics (Dombo, 2017). In turn, ZANU is said to have contested ZAPU's construction and representation of public issues through the Zimbabwe News. Bourgault (1995) and Dombo (2017), report that the African Daily News was published in Salisbury, Rhodesia by the African Newspapers Limited from the 10th of September 1956. The newspaper stated that its aims were to "put forward the rights and wrongs of our multi-racial system so that the public can judge for themselves and present the African point of view in the best manner possible" (African Daily News, 1958 cited in (Dombo 2014: 67). From this standpoint, it seems the press was founded to develop a common approach to African identity and at the same time to provide an alternative view of Africa, against state-owned newspapers, such as the Rhodesian Herald, the Bulawayo Chronicle and the Sunday Mail. State-owned newspapers had been castigated as being racially-biased and mostly report on propaganda. The press was founded at the time of Garfield Todd's tenure. Todd was the Rhodesian Prime Minister from 1953 to 1958 and it is reported that he left a legacy of pursuing white-liberal ideology and establishing 'acceptable politics' that sought an egalitarian Rhodesian; this was society-based and involved a partnership between whites and Africans (Wood, 2012:14). In essence, the African Daily News promoted moderate and liberal politics across the political divide. The political defeat of Todd in 1958 and the rise of Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front (RF) to power in 1964, are believed to have put an end to liberal politics because of the emergence of a radical and racial Rhodesian nationalism. The emergence of Rhodesian nationalism was caused by Todd's moderate national politics which almost threatened the future of white Rhodesians. Faced with an increasing number of whites migrating, the Rhodesian Front government had to construct a militant and racial nationalist rhetoric as a way of reassuring the white community. Consequently, the African Daily was forced to abandon its acceptable political rhetoric to a more African-based approach that sought to vouch for majority rule through supporting ZAPU (Musindo 2009). Mass media is an instrument of power in which interest-based groups find political and ideological expression. The African Daily News became an arsenal through which ZAPU sought to construct a nationalist narrative which ZANU contested. These competing narratives led to political myths and propaganda.

i. Propaganda Narratives and the Media

Herman and Chomsky (2010) show how populations are manipulated and how consent for social, economic and political issues is generated in the public mind through propaganda. The media becomes an instrument of power "that mobilises support for the special interest that dominate the state and private activity" (Chomsky & Herman, 2010: Ixi). In other words, the media's role is to interpret society and its needs, through defining and shaping what is deemed appropriate and necessary to both the state as well as private and public life. Chomsky & Herman (2008) continue that there are five filters that set the agenda for propaganda narratives - ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak and communism and fear. Of interest to this study are communism and fear. Communism and fear are said to have been generated in the US during the Cold War and was designed specifically to manufacture propaganda narratives against the Soviet Union and communism, as enemies of the American people. Some characteristics of this filter involve generating fear in the public, through demonising one's opponent (Stuart, 2010); examples are found in the US public media's portrayal of Saddam Hussein, the former leader of Iraq as an evil dictator who had to be dealt with. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, the media in that country began to shape public opinion with the suggestions that Saddam Hussein was the mastermind of the attack and that he also possessed weapons of mass destruction (Sanders, 2016). The logic behind the construction of propaganda is to manufacture unity within the public. This appears to have been the case as the US-manufactured propaganda as a pretext to going to war with Iraq in 2003. The media generate special interest, therefore, Chomsky's propaganda model helps to understand the development of media as a tool used by both ZAPU and ZANU with the intent of gaining support in African townships.

When the split in ZAPU occurred in 1963, a division also emerged in the African Daily News with the editors of the press divided between ZAPU and ZANU. For example journalists, Nathan Shamuyarira became sympathetic to ZANU whilst Willie Musarurwa supported ZAPU (Dongo 2014). With Musarurwa in charge, the Daily News became the official mouthpiece of the party with the dual task of denouncing the Rhodesian government and ZANU. James Chikerema who had been elected the party's Vice President for life-threatening that ZANU would "die a natural death like the Zimbabwe National Party". Chikerema said this whilst pamphlets were circulating in Bulawayo that urged people to "put to shame these cowardly brothers" (African Daily News, 1963 cited in Doran 2017:13). Using Chomsky propaganda model what is evident is the arousing of 'fear' and 'interest'. The fear was that ZANU had become a household name in the African

townships following its emergence and this appears to have scared ZAPU which had monopolised the struggle since 1961; the 'interest' had been that ZAPU remains the mother movement for Zimbabwean nationalism. Apart from presenting Nkomo and ZAPU as a party that was non-racial, the press was keen to present ZAPU as a party that represented the hardworking and downtrodden citizenry. This was in stark contrast with ZANU that was presented as a party of the educated 'dry, arid and well-fed chaps'. Doran (2017) suggests that ZAPU tried to present ZANU as being similar to the Zimbabwe National Party, a short-lived movement, to downplay ZANU's ability to provide an alternative narrative to the struggle; this would enable the masses to put their faith in ZAPU only. The idea behind the construction of this narrative was to generate consent within the public to view ZAPU as a party of the downtrodden in contrast to ZANU that was presented as an elitist party. This was populism which operates with a specific kind of rhetoric by suggesting that people have more power than political organisations; the idea that the poor and downtrodden are at the centre of the struggle (Melber, 2018). Populists will argue that the driving force is people-centred democracy and not selfish political ends, yet in reality, this may not be the case because this was only important for ZAPU for constituency building in the African townships.

ZANU responded by accusing ZAPU of lethargy and dictatorial tendencies. The narrative by ZANU was that Nkomo had monopolised the presidency from the SRANC, NDP and ZAPU where he was eventually made a life president (Sibanda 2017). ZANU went into character assassination mode that the implementation of a life presidency was a step towards creating a Duce-like Mussolini or a Führer-like Hitler. This would later be confirmed by Mugabe in 1983:

> Because of disagreements as to the direction the leadership was giving, some of us decided that a change of leadership was desirable … (but) Nkomo quickly suspended those of us who were thinking along those lines, and we had no alternative but to quit and form ZANU. (The Herald, 1983 & White 2003)

By castigating Nkomo as a dictator and likening him to leaders with a questionable reputation, such as Hitler and Mussolini, ZANU was delegitimatizing ZAPU and its leader Nkomo. The careful selection of Hitler and Mussolini at the time was very pertinent because the Second World War was still fresh in the memories of Africans as some of them had fought in the war on behalf of the British government, hence ZANU's use of these leaders was extremely effective in

constructing an unfavourable image of Nkomo. Mugabe's statement and the history of the monopoly Nkomo enjoyed form a political trajectory that became part of Zimbabwe's nationalist politics. This dictatorial and cult-personality politics would later in the years explain the elevation of few elites, such as Nkomo and Mugabe, as the official godfathers of both party and state at the expense of other notable figures. Nkomo would be described by followers, such as Moyo (2017: 115) as a "towering patriarch of the anti-colonial struggle, a decolonial prophet and a redemptive nationalist figure". Mugabe would be revered as one who defied the "rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique" and "one centre of power" in the ruling ZANU-PF years after independence (Mukarati 2016:1; Chung 2006: 343). Apart from this observation, ZANU's profiling of Nkomo as being comparable to Hitler or Mussolini was a means to promote ZANU's authenticity and thereby market itself as the only true alternative for a better future.

ZANU went further and labelled ZAPU an agent of white-settler minority interests. In the Zimbabwe News, an article was published that suggested that the Peoples Caretaker Council, a successor to ZAPU, was formed on a white man's farm and the party's purpose was looking after white settler's "selfish interests" (Zimbabwe News 1966 cited in Moore 1990:110). In May 1964, speaking at ZANU's inaugural congress, Sithole boasted that ZAPU had tried to liquidate ZANU, and he further spoke of the militancy ZANU had adopted as a 'clarion call to war' (Mazarire 2011). Recurring in these press wars were competing narratives where the press became instrumental in publishing interest-based news and not problematizing the African national problem. It appears that the search for autonomy and legitimacy between ZAPU and ZANU rested on the proliferation of identity politics. In the end, identity politics formed an integral part of the construction of nationalist politics and the political process of the nationalist struggle. This argument, however, refutes the notion that ZAPU and ZANU are liberation movements that represented the masses (Southall 2013).

The significance of the masses as the nucleus of a nationalist struggle can be understood in the Marxist sense and in the progressive work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in *'Can the Subaltern Speak?'* (Spivak, 2003). The significance of Spivak's work lies in its ability to question if the lower sections of the society's voices can be integrated as part of a broader political and socio-economic dialogue. Similarly, the case of Hindu women is metaphorical in assessing if voices can be represented factually. There may not be parallels between this work and the Zimbabwean

experience but crucial lessons can be drawn. Both ZAPU and ZANU did not truly represent the ordinary people's interests since, as indicated earlier, both movements were merely interested in using the press for instrumental purposes. This assertion is against the expectations that the press was part of the civil society at the time and its duty was to problematize the national question in Rhodesia. The use of press and media is a stage in the development of the people's resistance against colonialism. While the press was used for instrumental reasons by ZAPU and ZANU, it also raised political consciousness among the Africans in urban areas and in the process solidified urban nationalist politics. A study of political developments in the emergence of urban politics suggests the spillover effect of unresolved press wars between ZAPU and ZANU. The effect is expressed in the form of internecine from politically-motivated violence in the urban areas and the conceptualization of violence as a new way of understanding nationalism and nationalist politics.

3.2.3 Political Violence in the construction of Nationalism

There was internecine violence in African townships as a result of political differences between ZAPU and ZANU. This violent political trajectory laid a foundation for nationalist politics in a post-independent Zimbabwe. There are two conceptual approaches to political violence which seek to justify the action - deontological and consequentialism (O'Boyle, 2002:23). The deontological approach is of the view that certain acts are morally incomprehensible regardless of any beneficial consequences that might be attached to them. Secondly, the consequentialism approach is fixated on consequences, seeing the results as justifying the means; good goals rationalise political violence. This approach falls into the Machiavellian scholarship of situational ethics where it is permissible to do evil for the greater good (Easley, 2012:110).

As urban political consciousness began to surge, so did the proliferation of political violence meted out by ZAPU and ZANU. Both parties understood the implication of the townships as a public space to problematize the national question also as venues for political legitimacy and authenticity. In this regard, legitimacy and authority rested on the proliferation of political violence against the Rhodesian regime and against each other. The consequentialism approach seeks to understand the ZANU and ZAPU 'idea'; this is a figurative term which speaks to political beliefs that motivate political actions to achieve a certain political process. Firstly, ZAPU and ZANU had accused each other at different times of being capitalist, as such, the use

of violence as a means to expose the other as a tool of capitalism with the hope of evoking consciousness amongst the Africans for the masses to rally behind either of the two movements. The ZANU 'idea' rested on the need to end "the reformist ameliorative politics" that had been promulgated by ZAPU (ZANU, 1973: 147; Chimhanda, 2003:68). On the other hand, the ZAPU 'idea' rested on labelling ZANU as an illegitimate movement. It appears these carefully constructed political myths became 'ideal types' of justificatory behaviour to engage in political violence, in the pursuit of what appeared to be in the interests of most Africans (Mazarire, 2011:571). This appeared to be the case when one considers ZANU's decision to conscientise the masses through an armed struggle after the inaugural Congress in Gwelo in May 1964. ZANU's leader, Sithole's 'clarion call to war' became the central message at the Congress which some thought was directed at ZAPU. According to the African Daily News, one letter writer to the editor complained of thugs who operated in daylight singing in Shona that if one followed either Sithole or Nkomo, they would be stabbed to death with knives (cited in Doran (2017). The violence that became central to ZANU's inaugural Congress had far-reaching consequences since it led to the notion of a 'Zanufication' of nationalist politics devoid of the contribution of ZAPU. In doing so, ZANU sought to be exclusive in problematizing the national question in urban politics.

Life in the townships became increasingly unbearable for Africans as they were forced to choose between supporting ZAPU or ZANU. In most instances, Africans had to own membership cards for both ZAPU and ZANU to avoid being attacked for being either a "Sithole Rover or Nkomoist" (Doran, 2017:19). Letters to the African Daily increasingly condemned this violence perpetrated by the two liberation movements. One letter which condemned the "most iniquitous political leprosy spreading these days" remarked that "we begin to think the freedom they are after is worthless if it causes suffering and misery to the innocent" (African Daily News, 1964 cited in Doran 2017). This was a reaction against the proliferation of armed militia who had been terrorising the townships. One such group, 'Zhanda' carried out attacks on ZANU supporters leading to the deaths of Ernest Veli and David Dodo (Chimhanda, 2003:68). The use of petrol bombs became a norm in the townships of Mpopoma, Bulawayo and in Highfields in Harare, however, the use of violence mirrored the contradictions in the construction of narratives around people's understanding of nationalism.

As internecine violence within the townships militated against the development of a common nationalist identity, ZAPU and ZANU began to lose legitimacy in the eyes of most Africans. This effectively aborted the development of nationalism to its fullest expression. A study of political developments in the post-1980 era suggested spillover effects of the unresolved political violence of the 1960s, between ZAPU and ZANU (Nehanda Radio 2012; Palmary, Hamber & Nunez 2014; Doran 2017). For instance, Doran (2017) says personal hatred for Nkomo and ZAPU that developed because of this violence had severe consequences in independent Zimbabwe when ZANU became the ruling party. Doran points out that some original members of ZANU who emerged as senior figures after 1980, suffered the wrath of ZAPU. Shamuyarira was assaulted by ZAPU in 1963 and in post-independent Zimbabwe when he was appointed the Minister of Information began to conduct a campaign of hate speech against ZAPU (Hill 2003). Enos Nkala, Eddison Zvobgo, Simon Muzenda also suffered from violence during this period through attacks on their properties, businesses and families (Nyagumbo, 1980: 183-4; Doran, 2017:14). Nkala became Nkomo's biggest opponent after 1980 calling for the decimation of ZAPU and the creation of a one-party state. Far more than fear and intimidation, political violence created a fractured national identity; it became common for party enthusiasts to view Zimbabwe along a ZAPU-ZANU dichotomy. This became the banner of Zimbabwean nationalist politics for decades to come and not surprisingly, both parties lost credibility in the eyes of the people because of their failure to address the national question. Political violence led to doubts as to whether these 'liberation movements' were truly representing the masses. The use of political violence should, therefore, be assessed from a vantage point of hindsight. First, political elites were a social force that could construct and otherwise contest how nationalism and nationalist politics were understood; subsequently, both the ZANU and ZAPU "ideas' became points of reference in these contestations, this can be seen through ZANU's 'clarion call to war' and the need to end 'reformist ameliorative politics". To this end, political elites in ZANU marketed themselves as a social force that promised an alternative for a better future. The ZANU and ZAPU ideas operated within a specific kind of rhetoric that suggested that the acts of violence meted were intended to achieve the goals of the struggle, thus, better the lives of the people. This, however, was just rhetoric because whilst these movements purported to be fighting for people's freedom, they were, in fact, fighting the very people they were supposed to be setting free.

3.3 Ideological Transformation in the Construction of Nationalism

There is no unanimity as to which party initiated the armed struggle. Freeth (2011) and Sadomba (2011) appeared to write for a ZANU audience at different intervals with the aim of accusing the party as the instigator of militant nationalism. They pointed to the activities of the Crocodile Gang of the early 60s, by focusing on the killing of a white man near Fort Melsetter and the famous battle of Sinoia (Freeth, 2011). Selectively citing of the happenings of the Crocodile Gang and idolising the battle of Sinoia can be seen as an attempt by ZANU to infuse 'critical moments' in constructing a narrative about nationalism. Critical moments affect how people judge the authority and legitimacy of political actors at those periods (Khan, 2013). The idea behind these 'critical moments' was to present ZANU as a formidable movement in the wake of the dominance of white nationalism as expressed by the Rhodesian Front ruling party and the existence of ZAPU. The Rhodesian Front political activities had put African nationalism into question because of the arrests and detention of ZANU's political leadership, hence, a vacuum was naturally created in terms of the direction of the struggle for freedom. It is in this situation that ZANU sought to reinvent an image of the movement as the champion of African nationalism through 'heroic' acts of the Crocodile Gang with the hope that the fragmented African identity would be consolidated. The narrative that ZANU was more politically and military-inclined than ZAPU was meant to shape the perceptions of Africans who were looking forward to a more militant party that would reinvigorate the national question.

On the other hand, ZAPU argues that it became militant first through the PCC resolutions in February 1964. ZAPU claimed that it was the first disciplined and organised a party that decided to send cadres as far as Egypt for military and ideological training before ZANU (Chimhanda, 2003). ZAPU identified a group called, the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) that distributed pamphlets in the townships and that set a tone for a more militant confrontation with the Rhodesian government. Classified Russian documents indicate that the Soviets were keen to provide Nkomo with assistance, hence, in 1962, Nkomo told the Soviets that "ZAPU needs arms, explosives, revolvers, etc. …The party also needs, money to bribe the persons who guard important installations, to carry out sabotage" (Shubin, 2008:153). Initiating an armed struggle was synonymous to attaining legitimacy and authenticity, to both ZAPU and ZANU. An armed struggle had been theorised as the means to genuine political independence and initiating this

would render either ZAPU or ZANU as authentic and legitimate in the eyes of the Zimbabwean people, therefore, it is contentious as to which party initiated the armed struggle.

Contestations around which party instigated the armed struggle led to both parties seeking ways to consolidate authenticity and autonomy. To achieve this, ZANU sought to construct an African experience that was seen as a non-alignment philosophy and, on the other hand, ZAPU sought regional alliances with the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa in an attempt to consolidate its narrative of the struggle. This was intended as a strategy to construct an ideological transformation that the parties were moving away from passive nationalism to a more active one. ZANU was similarly engaged in searching for authenticity and autonomy through what it regarded as an African experience. At the party's inaugural Congress in Gwelo in May 1964, ZANU's leader, Sithole explained the compromises that ZAPU had made in the struggle. ZANU's slogan 'We are our own Liberators' became its founding philosophy, it's reading of international politics of the time and how the party intended to be pragmatic in dealing with international powers. At its Congress, ZANU stressed the urgent need of factoring in home-grown solutions than looking to the United Nations and Britain for a solution. Symbolically and ideologically this was an appropriate decision because it indicated that the party had come to understand the relevance of the masses in legitimising nationalist politics. ZANU adopted nativism for the purposes of presenting itself as the people's party. At this stage, the politics of audience identification was essential in selling the ZANU 'idea' and for the party to be seen as transforming ideologically, hence, Sithole said: "We are not going to be carbon copies of the West or the East. We believe it is impossible to transport what has been perfected in one set of historical circumstances and transplant it in an entirely different new environment" (Sithole, 1974: 9). Despite Sithole claim to authenticity, ZANU sought funds from the US and the Chinese; ZAPU seized this opportunity to castigate the party as an agent of US capitalism. ZANU, however, was trying to ride on the perceptions of the people, that it is an autonomous and nativist movement that did not rely on external assistance. Sithole's statements can be explained in Political Sciences' thoughts on post-truth or post-facts politics. Post-truth politics is a political culture in which issues are framed on appeals to emotion rather than facts and rebuttals (Mangwana, 2018). Post-truth politics usually arise following a catastrophe or a problem, showing that emotionalism helps to make sense of politics at any given time. Drawing upon ideological convergence on Africanism, nativism and non-alignment, Sithole legitimised

ZANU in the eyes of the people. At the time, ZAPU had established external links with the United Nations (UN) and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) because these international organisations had come to regard the movement as the only authentic movement in Rhodesia. The use of post-truth politics which appeared in Sithole's statements was against the backdrop of ZANU being regarded as a splinter organisation by international organisations such as the OAU and UN. ZANU wanted to appear as a legitimate and non-aligned movement with a nativist and African experience. The party insisted that it was not going to be a 'carbon copy' of the Cold War politics, as an emotional appeal.

The ANC-ZAPU alliance sprung from a number of factors. First, the alliance was a response to apartheid in South Africa and to the Rhodesian idea that was based on settler colonialism (Southall 2013; Musindo, 2009). As the ANC and ZAPU emerged as a military alliance, the Rhodesian forces also began to cooperate with the South African Defence Force (Ranilala, Sithole, Houston & Magubane & 2004: 480). The emergence of these alliances attests to how white and African nationalist sentiments can transcend national boundaries. Oliver Tambo, the leader of the ANC at that time, said the alliance was created by common historical ties:

> We are facing a common enemy, fighting for a common purpose, hence a combined force for a common onslaught against the enemy at every point of our encounter as we march down for the liberation of our respective countries (cited in Ranilala, Sithole, Houston & Magubane 2004: 488).

The ANC and ZAPU had been conscious of the machinations of white settler colonialism in both South Africa and Rhodesia. These machinations showed the need to draw up a military alliance as part of the liberation movements' initiatives to confront colonialism. The military alliance between these two parties constituted one of the most publicised and debated transnational alliances in the study of Zimbabwean nationalism. The effect was felt on the Rhodesian government where Aitken Cade (cited in Musindo 2009) argued:

> Unless the Government will take immediate steps to make use of radio and television to get this over, we are going to lose the battle for Southern Rhodesia by default. We are going to lose because we are going to let Mr. Joshua Nkomo and company get away with a pack of the lies year after.

The observation indicated the need for the Rhodesian government to use propaganda and rhetoric to inculcate a coherent white nationalism in the country. The propaganda would create, a constituency that would support the government against the ANC-ZAPU alliance. Tambo's justification of the alliance was refuted by the PAC of South Africa and ZANU in Rhodesia who concluded that the alliance was "an exercise in adventurism and a glaring example of desperation" (Shubin, 1999: 81 cited in Ranilala, Sithole, Houston & Magubane, 2004). Chimhanda (2003) narrates that about seventy guerillas, twenty from Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, and fifty from ZAPU crossed into Rhodesia in 1967. This became a confrontation between a well-equipped Rhodesian state and a poorly-coordinated and inexperienced guerillas and the results were catastrophic for both the ANC and ZAPU. In addition to the loss of life and defeat, this military alliance served to refute any lingering narrative that ZAPU was a passive liberation movement (Nkoana, 1969:69 cited in Ranilala, Sithole, Houston & Magubane, 2004:534). This, was essential, for the party's legitimacy and authority, in the liberation movement rested on the proliferation of an armed struggle. The understanding was that an armed struggle was the rite of passage to genuine national independence and ZAPU had to do something crucial to achieve such a status.

In conclusion, it can be noted that the search for a grounded ideology by both ZAPU and ZANU was of paramount importance in re-assessing the purpose of the liberation struggle. The evolving nationalist and political environment caused a need for both parties to appear either militaristic or Africanist, although, these stances were largely adopted for instrumental purposes and not for ideological reasons. Africanness and the use of violence were political interventions to enhance their images as authentic parties, which with the people's support would have the ability to defeat the Rhodesian regime. This political intervention, however, did not go far in transforming these movements as shall be seen with the crisis in ZAPU in the following subsection. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that these interventions were more of shifts in strategy than a reflection of a larger ideological transformation because in the end, in 1979, as shall be discussed, both ZAPU and ZANU negotiated for the independence of Zimbabwe.

3.3.1 ZAPU's Political Crisis

Between 1969 and 1971, the crisis in ZAPU led to the emergence of factions, the politicisation of ethnicity and the emergence of an ambiguous programme of action against the Rhodesian

regime. In particular, the crisis led to the March 11 movement marked as the darkest moment in the history of ZAPU nationalism (Sibanda 2005; ZAPU 2012). Factions can result in coalitions of individuals in political parties or movements based on the exchange of identifiable political resources; these individuals pursue common interests and goals. Müller-Rommel (1982: 14) says factions are a "group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies. A faction arises in the struggle for power and represents a division on details of application" (cited in Kollner & Basedau, 2005: 8). Power politics between Chikerema and Moyo are said to have been the causative factor that led to the crisis. ZAPU (2012) indicates that as the acting leader of the party, Chikerema sought to assert his authority through the Shonafication of the party, by promoting a faction called the 'Murewa society'. The implication is to view ethnicity as a political resource that had been ritualised in nationalist politics since the split in ZAPU in 1963. The Murewa Society serves as an example of how ethnic differences can translate into political borders and differences. Secondly, Sibanda (2005:142) indicates that the power struggles between Chikerema and Moyo resulted from Chikerema's attempts to unite ZAPU and ZANU. Significantly, there are two issues that are visible as the cause of the crisis. Whilst legitimacy and constituency-building rested on the proliferation of ethnic politics, this contravened the multi-ethnic character of ZAPU as a party. Secondly, unity between ZAPU and ZANU reneged on the ZAPU's 'idea' since this rested on the party being autonomous from ZANU as a matter of establishing autonomy and legitimacy.

To contain Chikerema, Moyo, the party's Treasurer published a document titled '*Observations on Our Struggle'* in February 1970. In it, Moyo criticised Chikerema for failing to lead ZAPU and being a sell-out for attempting to unite with ZANU. To solidify this narrative, Ndebele-speaking members in ZAPU became dependable support bases in the form of a faction known as the 'Dengezi'. The fact that the party now had two centres of power indicated the long-held belief that there was a flaw in the manner nationalist politics were understood. Far from developing a coherent and united force that would liberate the country, nationalism was used for instrumental purposes by Chikerema and with Moyo for political power. Chikerema sought to proliferate ethnic politics and saw uniting ZAPU and ZANU as a way of constructing an image of himself as the epitome of ZAPU nationalism. On the other hand, Moyo understood the symbolism and power in building a constituency amongst the Ndebele-speaking members. This gave him some form of legitimacy and authority amongst these Ndebele followers. It became

common for Ndebele enthusiasts to blame Chikerema for the political crisis because of the politicisation of ethnicity at this stage. The ideology of ZAPU, hence, became increasingly based on the proliferation of ethnic differences.

Far from the creations of factions, the fall out between Chikerema and Moyo led to the resurgence of violence in nationalist politics. As indicated earlier, the consequentialism approach establishes the connection between political beliefs and political actions. Violence retained a meaning as a locomotive used to address problems. The deepening political crisis in ZAPU affected the execution of the struggle and despite public statements by the leaderships professing their unity, there were no signs of this. ZAPU had lost the ideological fabric of the party and although they had an outlined political plan of action against the Rhodesian state, the crisis led to a number of defections from the party. A notable example was Chikerema who went on to form the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI).

Ideologically and intellectually, the reaction of the March 11 movement was for the following reasons: ideological transformation rendered the liberation movements valid and effective and intellectuals carried some sort of social capital in the construction of nationalism in Zimbabwe. The March 11 movement, was a product of dominant historiography. This historiography produces insiders and outsiders; the former who had the intention of inculcating a coherent historical narrative that would glorify the nationalist political elite in ZAPU at the expense of those that were deemed outside the portals of power. Progressive scholarship attempted to revive and portray the actual role of the March 11 movement, in the history of ZAPU, as a struggle within a struggle. This is because, on the broader national level, ZAPU had suffered from dominant historiography that sought to glorify ZANU more. On an intraparty level, the March 11 movement's heroic efforts have been overshadowed by the towering history of Nkomo and other nationalists. Moore 1989:200 (cited in Sadomba 2011:14) observed: "The March 11 movement is the first clear example of … segments of the nascent ruling class to move ideology to the forefront of the Zimbabwean struggle". Mpofu (2014) praised the movement, arguing that had the March 11 group succeeded in changing the leadership in ZAPU in 1971, Marxism would have been grounded as an ideology and made Zimbabwe a truly socialist country. Sibanda (2005:147) reiterates the above observations and says the agenda of the movement "called for a discussion of such issues as codes of behaviour of ZAPU leaders and the cadre, party ideology

and general protocol of the party". The March 11 movement sought to bring a robust ideological grounding to a party that had been subjected to internal political fights and whose ideology remained ambiguous at this stage.

Attempts at reconstructing the significance of this group by the development of a grounded ideology did not happen, as the leadership in ZAPU regrettably chose to label this group "a bunch of cowards". In an interview cited in Sibanda (2005), Dumiso Dabengwa, a high-ranking military personnel in ZIPRA viewed the March 11 movement as a project of the British intelligence and as such, the political and ideological thrust in their attempt at party renewal became an attempt to destabilise ZAPU and the whole liberation struggle. This can be seen as a construction of fundamentalism. In fundamentalism, the truth and views are dichotomized in two distinctions: 'them' versus 'us'; this is because fundamentalists see the truth as absolute and unchallengeable. In ZAPU, the construction of nationalism had been the province of the old guard and any attempt at contesting this was deemed intolerable, therefore, Dabengwa's narrative should be viewed as fundamentalist because it used absolutism to delegitimatise the March 11 movement. More significantly, Dabengwa sought to downplay the ideological shift attempted by the group because it spoke to the inadequacies of the old guard in inculcating a grounded ideology from the time the party was formed in 1962.

Led by Phineas Bapura, Cain Mathema, Matsikidze Gutu, Charles Gwenzi and Joshua Mpofu and others, the group wrote to the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) and at the same time appealed to the host, Zambian government to intervene as a matter of urgency, to discuss the political crisis in ZAPU. Drawing upon ideological convergence of pan Africanism, the March 11 group sought a solution from the OAU and the Zambian government. The OAU and the Zambian government were seen as better suited to handle the matter, than politicians in ZAPU because of their role in fighting the anti-colonial struggle. Ideologically, this put the OAU and Zambian government on a pedestal and as unique stakeholders in matters of conflict resolution, however, the Zambian government's response was appalling because it simply chose to view the movement through the old guard lenses. Far from viewing the movement as a vehicle for a genuine anti-colonial struggle, the Zambian government saw this as a rebellion aimed at unseating Nkomo and the old guard. At the 5th Summit Conference of East and Central African States in 1969, Zambia promulgated the 'Lusaka Manifesto' which outlined the country's foreign

policy towards the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. In the manifesto, the position became clear that Zambia would use diplomacy and public forums as tenets in its foreign policy thrust (cited in Chongo 2015:99). Citing Eriksen and Eriksen, Chongo contends that President Kaunda's choice of Nkomo was born out of the latter's moderate views on nationalist politics (Eriksen & Eriksen 1979:4 cited in Chongo 2015:289). To Zambia, the March 11 movement symbolised a radical socialist ideology that was in contrast to the country's peaceful approach to the liberation struggle. In the end, President Kaunda deported more than 100 followers of the March 11 movement to Rhodesia and the Rhodesian government summarily executed them.

Central to this theme is the observation that African states hosting refugees always exerted power to determine the course of the struggle in Zimbabwe. In exerting this power, these countries established a non-symbiotic relationship, one based on a patron-client understanding. In times of crisis and upheavals in these liberation movements, the host states always exerted their power in favour of a certain faction which could secure their respective interests and not for the normative goal of liberating and in this case, Rhodesia. The following subsection focuses on the rise of Robert Mugabe to the echelons of power in ZANU. Focusing on Mugabe is relevant in the context of the emergence of patriotic and exclusive politics are concerned.

3.4 The Mgagao Declaration of 1975: The Rise of Robert Mugabe

The rise of Robert Mugabe to the echelons of power is crucial in understanding the innovative nature of the nationalist leadership in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. In the context of novelty, Mugabe was able to put an end to the long-standing animosity between the military and politicians in ZANU, re-enforcing the ability of the nationalist leadership in finding robust ways of executing the struggle. Arguably, the rise of Robert Mugabe provides an opportunity to appreciate the Machiavellian philosophy on the use of discipline as a ruse to enhance discipline in movements. In addition, the rise of Mugabe is crucial in the analysis of another political force, ZIPA. An analysis of ZIPA departs from the traditional approach of viewing the liberation struggle through ZANU and ZAPU lenses. The rise of Mugabe is crucial to the study because it is during this period that exclusive and patriotic politics became a perennial feature in ZANU's politics.

Leadership response to the political and ideological crisis that characterised ZANU, between 1974 and 1976, fell largely on the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). From Weber's contribution

to *'Self-interpretation of society'* (Moyo 2018), acknowledges that crises in societies give rise to the spreading of new ideas, and charismatic and innovative leaders. In October 1975, a group of educated and Marxist guerrillas of ZIPA stationed at ZANLA's training camp at Mgagao, Tanzania, convened and issued a communique. The communique that is now commonly referred to as the 'Mgagao Declaration' not only elevated Robert Mugabe to the echelons of power but also heralded exclusive and cult politics (Chung, 2006: 344). Evidence indicates that other nationalists, such as Sithole, Nkomo, Muzorewa and Chikerema liberation credentials were revoked because they did not represent the interests of ZIPA (Moore 2014). In addition, Mugabe was described as the only "outstanding" leader who had "defied the rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique" (Magaisa, 2016:1). Subsequently, Mugabe was revered as 'Comrade', by ZIPA, a title that has symbolic meaning in the annals of nationalist history in Zimbabwe (Tarusarira 2017). The use of this critical moment in history put Mugabe on a higher pedestal than any other nationalist. This was meant to reinterpret the basic needs of the struggle with Mugabe at the helm to address such needs.

The above conception of Mugabe was not generally accepted, as available literature indicates that Mugabe was found wanting in as far as a revolutionary ideology was concerned (Holland 2008). In an interview with Heidi Holland, Jonathan Moyo, a former Cabinet Minister and Politburo Member of ZANU-PF implies that Mugabe's rise to prominence should be contextualised within the framework of Bourdieu's social capital. Bourdieu (1986) identifies resources, such as education as factors that put certain members of the society on a pedestal and not others. A major case levelled against Mugabe by Moyo is his lack of revolutionary ideology as the assumption is that Mugabe rose to prominence as a beneficiary of a colonial system that accommodated few black educated elites. This standpoint, however, did not influence the long-held belief that educated nationalists were the vehicle of the liberation struggle, but rather clarified why Mugabe was chosen to lead ZANU. The following subsection analyses the strategies that were used by Mugabe as the new leader of ZANU. This discussion is necessary because of how these methods led to the emergence of exclusive politics in ZANU.

3.4.1 The Chimoio Congress of 1977: The emergence of Patriotic Nationalism

Congresses are relevant means and avenues for reinvigorating political parties and movements through creating opportunities for the formulation of policy and ideology of the party. It is at

Congresses that coalitions are formed with the intent to meet the immediate needs of a party (Chakelian 2017). In 1977, Chimoio, Mozambique, ZANU held its first Congress with the intent of finding new ways to "effectively prosecute the armed struggle" (Mazarire, (2017: 98). This nationalist language indicated the readiness of the leadership of Mugabe to drive the nationalist agenda in the most effective way. Faced with this task, transformation in ZANU took on various forms - an alliance between the nationalist leadership and the military, the promulgation of discipline and the criminalisation of ZIPA. This may have been informed by what Campbell (2003) described as Mugabe articulating an effective plan for the party.

With a view to project himself as a reformist and innovator, Mugabe went about restructuring the organisation of the party. In this project, Mugabe adopted a 'carrot-and-stick' approach, while appearing to give a new look to the party; this was achieved through selecting 'subalterns' that became agents of his will and interests. Emmerson Mnangagwa, Kumbirayi Kangai, Sydney Sekeramayi and Herbert Ushewokunze were handpicked by Mugabe with the intent of recruiting new members and constituency building (Sadomba 2011). Substantial restructuring requires a break away from the past in the form of appointing individuals to position for rebuilding the party and not consolidation of power. According to Bond (1998), Mugabe's handpicking of those loyal to him left no window of opportunity for Marxism-Leninism but the advent of authoritarian nationalism. In addition, the restructuring of the party took on a different form, when an alliance between the military and nationalist politicians was forged. Arguably, with the elevation of notable figures like Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo, this put an end to the hostility between politicians and the military. The alliance between the military and politicians indicated the uneasiness of Mugabe to allow the military to have a degree of autonomy as it had in the past. Past political developments became key in informing Mugabe's willingness to integrate the military into ZANU's structures. This legitimatized the militarization of politics in ZANU, up to date (Simpson & Hawkins 2018). With the benefit of hindsight, this alliance was strengthened through the willingness of the military to serve the interests of the ruling ZANU-PF (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018) for on several occasions, the military has been deployed against opposition members.

The guiding philosophy for the rise of Mugabe is supported by the Machiavellian discourse on the role played by elites in shaping nationalism (Easley 2012). The philosophy of Machiavelli

states that elite leaders are the drivers of change and are responsible for the establishment of 'new modes and orders' for the greater good (Mansfield and Tavoc, 1996). In the context of Mugabe's leadership, discipline was couched as part of the new modes and orders to effectively execute the liberation struggle (Tendi 2013). This resonates with the fact that at his inaugural speech at the Congress in Chimoio, Mugabe bemoaned of the indiscipline that had characterised the liberation movement (Mugabe 1983, cited in Mazarire, 2011). It is alleged that the conception of discipline took on a different shape when it became tied to criminalising ZIPA as an enemy of the struggle. The criminalization of ZIPA was manipulative as it was aimed at effectively executing the liberation struggle, for it appeared that the effectiveness of the liberation struggle rested on the proliferation of criminalising opposing voices. This fits into the tenets of the Machiavellian philosophy on the use of propaganda and threats of punishment to inspire unity and loyalty in the party (Hobsbawn 1990). This became the trademark for Mugabe's leadership - to criminalise those who held views that did not serve what were interpreted as party interests, showing that ZANU was moulded after exclusive and patriotic politics (Tarusarira 2017).

Conclusion

The aim of the chapter was to show that nationalism, as a construct, is a product of narratives, which are often not only constructed but also contested. The chapter started off with a conceptual framework for the construction of narratives with the argument that narratives are the way in which 'we story our world'. Narrating the story may be done through different forms - the use of political myths, manufacturing of political identity and even the use of political violence as an end to enhancing the story at hand, therefore, nationalism is a discourse that is a product of these narratives. The chapter also examined the role played by educated nationalist politicians in constructing a story of nationalism in Zimbabwe. It emerged that there is a gap in the understanding of nationalism in Zimbabwe, hence, its continued contestation.

The role played by educated nationalists in the construction of nationalism is significant, for it is through these roles that we can assess nationalism within the two main liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU. These parties were in constant competition for authenticity and autonomy between 1965 and 1975. This shows that there is a link between the construction of nationalism

and its contestation. The role played by political elites in the split in ZAPU in 1963, the formation of ZANU, the use of media as an extension of both ZAPU's and ZANU's different version of narratives also prove the above. In searching for autonomy and legitimacy, both parties employed different tactics aimed at riding on the perceptions of other Africans, therefore, ZAPU formed a regional alliance with the ANC of South Africa and ZANU constructed an African experience with the aim to counter ZAPU's move. The chapter argued that these deliberate overtures were the manner in which both movements tried to appropriate the story of nationalism. The chapter also conceptualised the use of violence in nationalist politics in Zimbabwe as in line with sociological thoughts. Violence attracts different meanings at different times in the history of the struggle for Zimbabwe and has been used often to silence rebellions and as a measure to force conformity. Lastly, the chapter examined the political crisis that manifested in ZAPU in 1971 and in ZANU in 1974 and concluded that a false political consciousness that had been constructed by political elites in both movements, caused these crises.

FOUR:

NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTIC POLITICS IN POST-INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE

4. 0 Introduction

This chapter examines how nationalism has been used as an instrument of exclusive patriotism in post-independent Zimbabwe with specifically, the role played by nationalist leaders in the early years of Zimbabwe's independence being examined. The chapter will also analyse the political trajectories that led to the independence of Zimbabwe as this will shed light on how ZAPU and ZANU conceptualised and operationalised nationalism. The analysis also delves into the outcomes of the Lancaster House Agreement since these provide insights about the leadership of post-independence Zimbabwe and the reasons why it failed to usher in a socialist state. Analysed also are conflicting scholarly perspectives on the extent to which the Lancaster House Agreement fulfilled the objectives of the liberation struggle. Furthermore, the analysis of the Lancaster House agreement will include the context of political fundamentalism, among various interested actors, such as the British government, African leadership, ZANU and ZAPU. These actors represent social-political forces whose interests, both by default or design, merged and contributed to the failure of the socialist state envisioned during the liberation struggle. The chapter concludes by analysing post-independent politics in Zimbabwe with a specific focus on how ZANU sought to project itself as 'representative of the nation' through a carefully-orchestrated socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy. Central to this discussion is

whether or not a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy mirrored exclusive patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe.

4.1 Problematising the Lancaster House Agreement

An examination of the Lancaster negotiations proffered by Mhanda (1978:29) cited in Moore (2012: 129) shows some fractures within the negotiations suggesting that it was a coalition of forces that were not committed to achieving a National Democratic Revolution (NDR) in independent Zimbabwe. The National Democratic Revolution is a socialist concept that was developed by the Russian revolutionary, Vladimir Lenin in 1917. The concept is grounded on the belief that the privileged of society (bourgeoisie) thrive on the exploitation of the proletariat. This was applied contextually in Zimbabwe to imply that white privileges are byproducts of colonialism and as such, the NDR was adopted to end white domination through correcting the socio-economic and political injustices. A coalition of the British, the US and the Rhodesian government, was intended in ensuring minority and capitalist interests while the African political elites were promised political power in exchange for guarantees of international free market and the protection of minority interests (Southall 2013:64). Mhanda, however, accuses nationalist leaders of upholding the existing socio-economic order with its attendant structures and institutions of perpetuating black people's oppression. The Lancaster House Agreement was a negotiated settlement which did not do much to achieve the goals of the liberation struggle. Similarly, Tarusarira (2017) also claims that whilst the Lancaster negotiations paved way for the First Republic under majority rule in 1980, they left the economy aligned to international capitalism because of 'instrumentalist nationalism' and the effects of international relations. Instrumentalist nationalism emerges when nationalism is used as a tool to attain political power (Tarusarira 2017). Drawing some interesting parallels in Southern Africa, it has become common for ultra-conservatives and nativists, particularly South Africa, to label the ruling ANC and the country's first democratic president, Nelson Mandela as 'sell-outs'. For instance, under Mandela, the ANC adopted a similar negotiated settlement under the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in the early 1990s (Mda, 2013:2; Lawson 2005:141). The argument is that Mandela and the ANC were merely interested in acquiring political power and as such reneged on the promises of the liberation struggle. Years into democracy in South Africa, the ideology and legacy of apartheid remains intact. The problem with this linear approach to nationalist

politics is in the way revolutions are subjected to rigid analysis. This kind of analysis ties a revolution to certain unchallengeable features - a complete overhaul of the system, a committed revolutionary class, the use of violence to remove a system and a utopian system based on the principles of national democratic discourse. Without these criteria, revolutions are viewed as unsuccessful, however, this is a limited approach that excludes other considerations such as history and socio-political contexts.

Other contrasting analyses locate the Lancaster House Agreement within the framework of international relations. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) situates the Lancaster House negotiations in the Cold War matrix as he is interested in the time frame within which the Lancaster House negotiations unfolded. This view recognizes that the formation of Zimbabwe happened in the waning years of the Soviet Union's influence in international relations. To this end, Zimbabwe was left at the mercy of structural violence by international free-market fundamentalism and neoliberalism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) further argues that different historical periods in Africa such as slave trade, colonialism, and neo-colonialism have been shaped by fundamentalism. Like religious fundamentalism which is exclusive of other beliefs and views, market fundamentalism seeks to impose free market doctrine and at the same time rejects any forms of resistance particularly, socialism and nativism. These are regarded as 'ultra-conservatives' ideologies that are seen as backward (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). The rejection of ultra-conservative ideas makes market fundamentalism to be regarded as anarcho-capitalism; a form of market fundamentalism that rejects the role of the state and at the same time promotes self-ownership, private property, and free markets. Some proponents of this line of thought, Murray Rothbard and David Friedman, believe that in the absence of a state to impose laws, free markets are able to promote societal development (Morris, 2008). For example, in the absence of the state as an entity that prevents social intercourse through expropriation, a willing buyer and willing seller approach lead to a prosperous society. It can be said that the principal in the Lancaster House, the British government, was very interested in ensuring that the role of the new state in Zimbabwe would be properly defined in a manner that would not upset such neo-liberal principles as - the promotion of free marker capital, protection of private property rights and the curtailment of state intervention in a liberal economy.

Following ZAPU and ZANU's clarion call for an armed struggle and the militancy that ensued from 1974 to 1979, a revolution can be said to have taken shape which led to the involvement of the British and the US through Kissinger. Kissinger's involvement was meant to ensure the containment of communism which was guiding revolutions in most African states. Former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kennan once said that "if you go out and light a fire in the field, it begins to spread a little bit, but it has died out where you lit it. It burns only on the edges and so it is with Russian communism" (Lawson 2006:68). By saying this, US authorities were acknowledging the existence of revolutionary movements that had emerged from communism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that the Lancaster House negotiations were made possible because of the waning relevance of the Soviet Union and communism that allowed the West, particularly, the US and Britain to contain the political transition in Zimbabwe from being moulded along Soviet lines of governance. Whilst the liberation struggle had been able to destabilise white settler and international capital interests in Rhodesia, the struggle was not able to displace existing market fundamentalism principles to a socialist-centred Zimbabwe.

There is a divergence in opinion over the progressions and outcomes of the Lancaster House agreement and this has necessitated an examination of the Lancaster House agreement against a conceptual framework of political fundamentalism. The following subsection seeks to understand how political fundamentalism was intrinsically tied to Britain's foreign policy towards Rhodesia during the Lancaster House meeting. The subsection examines whether political fundamentalism influenced Britain's interpretation of the Rhodesian problem and views about the political actors in the Patriotic Front.

4.2 Britain's Foreign Policy vis-a-vis the Lancaster House Negotiations

A look at the British foreign policy during the Lancaster negations helps to understand elements of fundamentalism that the British government pursued during that time. Speaking in the British Parliament in 1979, the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher outlined the country's foreign policy objectives in its attempt to resolve the Rhodesian problem. The Prime Minister indicated that it was in the interest of Britain to consider wider international implications that would result from the Rhodesian problem (Renwick 1997:3 cited in Doran, 2017: 51). Another statement by the British diplomat, Evetts, (who had been interacting with members of ZANU's Central Committee in Maputo, Mozambique) was "the view from Maputo is much as it was:

more war, keep the Patriotic Front as a front, avoid negotiations where possible without being blamed" (cited in Doran 2017:53). From an FP perspective, Thatcher was aware of the potential role that can be played by a liberation struggle in transforming the country from white settler Rhodesia to a more socialist-centred the First Republic of Zimbabwe. As had been the case with the Bolsheviks revolution in Russia and other African revolutions in Angola and Mozambique, the wider international implications highlighted by Thatcher lay in the spread of communism, therefore, it was in the interest of Britain to proceed with 'vigour' and settle for negotiation with the Patriotic Front. This meant that the reinforcement of free-market fundamentalism and neo-liberal democracy was an attempt to keep Zimbabwe in the international capitalist order.

Britain's foreign policy was built within the confines of the Cold War politics and also around the personality and ideological convictions of Thatcher. Thatcher has been described as "a distinctive and forceful individual" who would ally with Ronald Reagan, the former President of the US, in a concerted effort to shape the world along neoliberal views (Dyson, 2009). Thatcher's vision was made possible because of Reagan's personality which was rooted in an 'archetypal black and white thinking' (Dyson, 2009: 41). Reagan had been known for a dichotomized approach to politics that divided the world between good and evil and Thatcher is said to have been an 'Iron Lady' because she was an adamant anti-communist who regarded it as a backward and anti-global ideology that had no place in the future of international relations (Gauthier & Martikainen, 2016). Subsequently, the British's foreign policy was constructed in the wake of the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan and involvement in Ethiopian's Ogden Dessert war of 1979 (Moyo 2017). It is in these countries that the Soviets gained a foothold in international politics through providing military logistics, artillery and personnel. The implication was that an increase in the presence and influence of Soviet communism in the Middle East and Africa would mean failure of the Cold War allies' containment policy. It is with this understanding that Thatcher's black and white, victory or defeat politics became more pronounced in the crisis in Rhodesia.

Another perspective is that the whole idea [of the Lancaster House agreement] was to avert a situation where "the guerillas would march from the bush to government offices armed with communist ideology and possibly with direct Cuban military involvement" (Moyo 2017:131). To prevent this scenario, the British had to rely on Lord Carrington whose astute diplomacy was

able to manipulate regional and domestic politics in Southern Africa and in Rhodesia in 1979. Regional politics at this time indicated that South Africa was getting fed up with propping up the Smith-Muzorewa regime financially and as such, Pretoria was urgently looking for a political solution. In addition, sources had indicated to the British and Zambians that Nkomo was interested in becoming the leader of a new Zimbabwe, and was a moderate who would accept a political settlement (DeRoche, 2016). Economic sanctions that had been imposed on the Rhodesian state were causing a lot of discomfort to the white Rhodesians, hence, that constituency was also looking for a settlement. Lastly, the Front Line States (FLS) were becoming weary of a prolonged war in Rhodesia and they also prioritized negotiations to put an end to the Rhodesian crisis (Holland 2008). With these in mind, the British took advantage and began the mammoth task of engaging various political actors at the Lancaster House negotiations.

A striking feature of the conduct of the British in the Lancaster negotiations resonates with the parameters of strong-arm diplomacy; this entails championing a path to negation without giving your opponents, room for alternative paths. Britain had the determination to see a pro-Western outcome through force and threats, motivating one of the key participants during the so-called ‘negotiations’, Joshua Nkomo to likened the British’s strong-arm diplomacy to delivering “the law of Moses from high” where there was no room for questioning (Doran 2017:73; Holland 2008).

Holland (2008) further explains some of the key tenets of fundamentalism that could be found in the British approach. In an interview with Heidi Holland, Sir Carrington reveals that Britain’s motives were to ensure that a socialist-centred outcome would not see the light of the day at the negotiations. This was made possible through Carrington’s castigation of Mugabe, giving preferences to Nkomo as a possible leader that could lead a future Zimbabwe in a reasonable way (Holland 2008). In the words of Carrington, Mugabe “played very little role in the negotiations except for being rather disruptive”. The fear from Carrington was that being a Marxist, Mugabe was going to be very difficult for Britain to have post-war cordial relations with Zimbabwe (Holland, 2008:65)

Compensation for white Rhodesians became a central issue in the negotiations at Lancaster House since the view was that the Rhodesian system had benefitted white people, while the

majority of Africans had suffered economically. Providing pensions to white Rhodesians was, logically, symbolically different to the British and the Patriotic Front. Carrington proposed for a constitutional provision which would guarantee that white Rhodesians get pensions from the new Zimbabwean government. This was a way of encouraging them to stay in a new Zimbabwe and this was in line with British philosophy to see that its former colonies would be success stories. To tie the interests of whites to the success of the new state, however, is an illustration of the hegemonic and imperialistic ambitions than goodwill on the part of the British.

On the other hand, compensating the white Rhodesians with pensions was interpreted as rewarding them for promoting a racist society by the PF. This culminated into a number of populists' ideas by Mugabe that the PF had to deny whites compensation. Mugabe believed that denying whites' compensation was an ideology as it would be part of genuine political development of the new state. Further, to Mugabe, a retributive approach, would be the best form of deconstructing the hegemonic and imperialistic ambitions of the British. While this may have been a populism couched injustice for the majority, this also demonstrated Mugabe's lack of a clear understanding of politics at the time. White Rhodesian nationalism had been a powerful factor in the politics of the time, thereby making it difficult for the PF to push for an independent African majority agenda. This, therefore, informed the PF to negotiate and preserve the interests of whites in order to build the nation. In addition, the will of the nation was contested between Africans and whites and it is in this context that the PF had to be inclusive of the significance of whites through providing pensions for them.

In another yet illustrative case of hegemonic and imperialistic ambitions, a proposal was put forward by Carrington to reserve seats for whites in parliament. The proposal was that twenty seats would be explicitly reserved for white people to be elected on a separate voters roll. Obviously, this provision spoke to the protection of minority rights and interests in a post-conflict situation. In doing so the constitutional provision appeared to maintain colonial practices instead of changing them. Reserving seats for former Rhodesian whites gave an impetus to the proliferation of racial stereotypes than the intended purposes of nation-building (Southall 2013; White, 2012). A major shortcoming of this provision, given the complexities of race relations in Rhodesia, reserving white seats had to be contextualized politically as a potential vehicle for perpetuating opposition political agendas. Strategically, this was also sufficient to hold a balance

of power in a hung parliament thereby ensuring no political party enjoyed an outright majority (Chan, 2003). With the benefit of hindsight, this proved to be the case because the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian Smith, formed the Republican Front, a party that was aimed at protecting the rights of the minority and not for nation building purposes. Opinions, in reaction, suggested that the promotion of neoliberalism was fundamentally tied to the protection of white minority interests. This is also evident when Mugabe who had been elected as the first Prime Minister for Zimbabwe, called for peace and unity and Smith retorted that Mugabe "behaved like a balanced, civilized Westerner, the antithesis of the communist gangster I had expected" (Smith, 2001:9). With the passage of time, this perception changed and in an interview with Holland in 2005, Smith castigated Mugabe because he decided to embark on a Marxist programme in Zimbabwe that irked the white people and made them less confident; Smith and his party also did not take it well. The impression created by Smith was that neoliberalism was the only true reflection of nation-building and when Mugabe sought to introduce Marxism it became a threat to the interests of whites who were subsequently irked (Meredith, 2009). Such views were similar to those on nation-building and politics in binary opposites that is, between neoliberalism and Marxism. Such thinking justified the development of an in-group versus out-group political and ideological distinctions.

The standoff between Carrington as representing the British and the PF revealed the complexities of race politics that were central to the Lancaster House negotiations. The proposals made by the British appeared to reinforce the preservations of the status quo, not minding the effects, in terms of nation-building and social integration in the First Republic. This brings to mind the basic tenets of fundamentalism, that conformity to certain views is absolute and unchallengeable (Herriot, 2009:2). Consequently, the reaction by the PF in rejecting such proposals also symbolised how the PF sought to create an identity built on racial exclusion. Reinforcing white privileges by Carrington on the one hand and the rejection of such on the other by the PF indicated how the proliferation of racial politics became a strategic tool in defining political and ideological distinctions at the Lancaster House negotiations.

4.2.1 African Leadership Support at the Lancaster House Negotiations

A shared approach to the study of revolutionary politics in Southern Africa is to locate these within the context of regional solidarity which finds expression in a transnational history of a

fight against colonialism. Scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011); Miles Tendi (2010) and Adolfo (2009) talk about a common unity of purpose among the region's liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, Chama Chamapinduzi of Tanzania, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) of Angola, South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. Rising economic and political crises in Southern Africa led to the formation of the Front Line States (FLS) whose political and ideological thrusts were aimed at putting an end to colonialism (Chingono & Nakana, 2009). In the fight against colonialism, a common history of regional solidarity and integration emerged and this manifested in the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. SADCC's mandate was to safeguard the gains of political independence in Southern Africa through the integration of its economies and the promotion of shared historical and cultural affinities amongst member states (SADC Treaty, 1992). In the course of time, similar economic, historical and political interests have generated into regional solidarity amongst the aforementioned liberation movements.

The support rendered by Mozambique and Zambia falls into the orbit of political goodwill that was informed by the FLS framework on conflict resolution in the region of Southern Africa. The first official FLS response to the crisis in Rhodesia was a precursor to the Lancaster House agreement, known as the Commonwealth Lusaka Declaration in August 1979, in Lusaka, Zambia. To achieve this objective, a summit took place of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) where "important resolutions were made and these helped to inform the kind of constitution that the delegates at the Lancaster Conference would adopt later on in the same year" (Rwodzi & Mubonderi, (2015:217). The summit, amongst other things, insisted on the constitutional guarantee of minority rights and at the same time deliberately excluded the belligerent parties (PF and Smith-Muzorewa party) from the summit. This approach, however, avoided articulating the Rhodesian problem in the most effective way and this said a lot about the FLS commitment to safeguarding the interests of the majority of Africans in Rhodesia. Rwodzi & Mubonderi (2015:217) state: "The Lusaka Agreement was a dress rehearsal to the Lancaster House Conference" in the sense that the belligerent parties would only attend the Lancaster House agreement to rubber stamp imposing decisions that had been made by their African peers with the support of Britain, at the Lusaka Declaration. The FLS failed to

muster robust approaches to solve the Rhodesian crisis despite the bloc's founding political and ideological objectives. Such discrepancies necessitate some evaluation of African member states such as Mozambique's and Zambia's stand in the context of Africa's international relations

i. The role played by Mozambique

Mozambique's role in solving the Rhodesian crisis was characterised by a lack of understanding of the Rhodesian problem. The Mozambican government did not approach the matter in line with the FLS political and ideological framework, instead, its approach showed trajectories in Africa's international relations. Notably, as part of the FLS, Mozambique insisted that the PF should participate in the Lancaster House negotiations to present a united front. This was a superficial approach because uniting the PF was an absolutely, impossible dream. The FLS had attempted to unite the PF under Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) in 1976 but had dismally failed because fundamental issues that had led to the failure of ZIPA and unity between ZAPU and ZANU, had not been resolved. Fundamental differences within the PF spoke to the contestations around which nationalist politics had been understood, therefore, the proliferation of these differences gave credence to ZAPU and ZANU autonomy from each other, respectively. These movements were in competition with each other and an attempt to unite them was an attempt for them to lose their political identities. Secondly, it is further alleged that President Machel made it clear that his country would be willing to accept and work with any African nationalist who would have emerged as the new leader of Zimbabwe. This meant that Frelimo was willing to work with any government led by either Muzorewa, Mugabe or Nkomo as long as it was a black majority government. This position warrants some evaluation because it is a departure from Mozambique's professed Marxist-Leninist dispositions and most importantly the over-emphasised legacy of liberation movements' solidarity in the shaping of the nation-state of Zimbabwe. It is believed that Muzorewa's political preferences were neo-liberal in principle and as such one would not understand why a Marxist-Leninist government would work with such an individual. This necessitates an examination of Mozambique's political, economic and foreign policy drives at the time to gain a more nuanced insight.

In 1977 at the party's Third Conference, Frelimo reviewed its foreign policy objectives. Amongst other things, the ruling party resolved to pursue democracy, human rights and the "primacy of a negotiated settlement of conflicts" presumably in the region of Southern Africa

and Africa in general. In a separate white paper on foreign policy, the government of Mozambique insisted on the need to make a 'modest contribution towards achieving peace and stability in Southern African region' (Lalbahadur & Otto, 2013: 6). After 1977, the political thrust in Mozambique's foreign policy was seemingly a departure from its socialist rhetoric which had been centred on promoting armed struggles in Rhodesia and South Africa, to a more moderate approach that involved diplomacy and the use of public forums to settle political conflicts. As indicated earlier in the study, wider international implications such as the waning relevance of the Soviet Union in Africa had necessitated the socialisation of most states back into an international order marshalled by market fundamentalism. The Soviet Union had been the traditional sponsor of Marxism-Leninism in Southern Africa and without accruing positive dividends from Marxist-command economics, Mozambique was suffering economically. Politically, the Frelimo government was dealing with an insurgency turned civil war from the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), therefore, there was an extreme dependency on donor support with at least seventy per cent (75%) of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Mozambique relying on donor support (Saul, 2016). This influenced the manner in which the country's foreign policy was shaped in the region and the rest of the world (Lalbahadur & Otto, 2013: 5; Doran 2017:54).

It is with this understanding that Mozambique sought to make a 'modest contribution' towards achieving a settlement in Rhodesia with the hope of getting a much-needed economic lifeline from the British and the Americans for its part in using brinkmanship to keep ZANU in line. To this end, The Conversation (2015) observes that the eleventh-hour intervention by President Machel at the Lancaster House negotiations was remarkable. The Conversation (2015:1) observes: "Without Machel's intervention at Lancaster House, the FCO would not have achieved an independence settlement for Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in 1979". Through his emissaries, President Machel used brinkmanship to coerce Mugabe and Nkomo to accept resolutions that had been made earlier at the CHOGM Declaration in Lusaka in August 1979. Consequently, Lord Carrington, the British official noted Mozambique's position by saying: "It seems clear that Mozambique has had enough of the war and that Machel is now exerting very strong pressures on ZANU" (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 1979 cited in Doran 2017:89). The British's observations had been totally in line with Mozambique's desire to build on an alliance with the British to put an end to the war in Rhodesia by using threats, for ZANU to agree to the Lancaster

House negotiations. A striking feature that can be gleaned from Mozambique's approach was its lack of understanding of the crisis. While strong-arm diplomacy is evident in Mozambique's approach to the crisis in Rhodesia, this also indicated the limitations of African states in the practice of international relations. The case of Mozambique can be understood in the context of the Cold War in which the country was forced to abandon its socialist rhetoric and open up to neoliberalism in order to deal with socio-economic and political issues, locally. This has been the hallmark of Africa's international relations in which most states are incapacitated to execute their foreign policy objectives independently.

ii. The role played by Zambia

Key to Zambia's foreign policy objectives was the principle of non-confrontation in dealing with hostile minority regimes in Southern Africa. At the 5th Summit Conference of East and Central African States in 1969, the 'Lusaka Manifesto' was promulgated by Zambia which outlined the country's foreign policy towards the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. In the manifesto, the position became clear that Zambia would use diplomacy and public forums as strategies in its foreign policy thrust (cited in Chongo 2015:99). Ideologically, this is so because of the belief that Zambia was in a better position to understand the crisis in Rhodesia because of its own experience in fighting an anti-colonial situation. Symbolically, this was supposed to put Zambia on a pedestal and as an experienced stakeholder in matters of conflict resolution. Zambia had been involved in efforts to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe for a long time and it did not come as a surprise when the country hosted the CHOGM summit in August 1979. The fact that Zambia hosted the Lusaka conference gives credence to the notion that negotiations and public forums are an integral part of Zambia's policy thrust. The summit, however, was just a 'dress rehearsal' for the Lancaster House agreement because of the manner in which African states including Zambia failed to holistically identify and address the Rhodesian crisis (Rwodzi & Mubonderi, 2015: 217). This picture does not inspire confidence in Zambia as having been committed to a genuine and socialist outcome for nationalism and a revolution in Zimbabwe. If anything, it reinforces the authoritative nature of the role played by Zambia in the study of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

Through media and press conferences on the development of the Lancaster House agreement, the most visible political and ideological thrust of Zambia's policy was evidenced through President

Kaunda's support for ZAPU and Nkomo. In examining Zambia's position on the developments of the Lancaster House agreement, it is necessary to note the relationship that existed between President Kaunda and ZAPU. Chongo (2015) contends that President Kaunda's choice of Nkomo was born out of the latter's moderate views on nationalist politics (Eriksen & Eriksen 1979:4 cited in Chongo 2015:289). In Nkomo, President Kaunda saw a possible ally who would lead the First Republic in Zimbabwe, thus, at the CHOGM summit in Lusaka 1979, President Kaunda reiterated President Machel's insistence that the PF negotiate in an effort to end the crisis in Rhodesia. A further consideration of the decision lay in the imperatives of the Cold War matrix, in which Zambia sought to preempt the presence of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Southern Africa; mindful of the Cuban and Soviet Union presence in Angola and Mozambique, Zambia was aware of the possible spread of communism.

As with Mozambique, Zambia was galvanised into the success of the CHOGM summit and Lancaster House agreement so as to forestall any possible Cuban and the Soviet Union intervention. Zambia's role was also premised on the deteriorating economic climate in the country. The country's economic crisis had multifaceted causes - the failure of a socialist economic model that was adopted by the government in 1964, Zambia's support and hosting of liberation movements from South Africa and Rhodesia and the fall out between Zambia and minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (Sardanis, 2014:27). Being the only socialist and independent state in the region, Zambia was subjected to military raids and economic sabotaged by the Rhodesian government, causing a crippling of the economy of Zambia which had relied heavily on Rhodesia. Realistically, for Zambia and other Southern African states in international relationships, the most immediate security concerns were to improve their relations with Rhodesia and their economies. In international relations, realists argue that interests are primary in the study of the behaviour of states (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2014). This is a theme that runs through in an analysis of Africa's international relations. Khadiagala & Lyons (2001) claim that preservation of state sovereignty and the gains of independence were at the heart of foreign policies of most African states, including Zambia.

When the Lancaster House negotiations took place, Zambia's role was fixated on propping up the image of ZAPU. This was achieved by isolating the Smith-Muzorewa regime as a pariah and through its diplomats, Zambian sought to discourage the relations between the Smith-Muzorewa

regime and the British government. Having been put on a pedestal as the first decoloniser in Southern Africa, Zambia's views carried much weight. To this effect, Zambia was able to manipulate its image and use propaganda against the Smith-Muzorewa delegation. It was Zambia's position that the British's support of the Smith-Muzorewa delegation would amount to "total ignorance of African Affairs" and in doing so, Thatcher would have "tended to view international issues only in relation to British interests" (Bishop, 2012: 178,190). By doing so the Zambians sought to delegitimatise the Smith-Muzorewa regime as well as Zambia's diplomatic efforts to internationalise Nkomo's image as the political alternative to solving the Rhodesian problem. To achieve this, Zambia tied the interests of ZAPU to those of the CHOGM summit earlier in August 1979. This entailed that Britain would warm up to ZAPU during the Lancaster House Agreement as the party is said to have been prepared to negotiate and this was in line with the British policy.

Zambia proceeded to draw parallel lines between Nkomo and Mugabe which resonated well with the Cold War language. To all intents and purposes, Zambia's position was that Nkomo was best positioned to lead the new Zimbabwe as he was different from Mugabe because the latter professed Marxist-Leninist credentials which inclined him to seek retribution over nation-building. Analysts broadly agree that the Zambians did not profess Marxist-Leninist ideas. This is evidenced by a Zambian diplomat, Mark Chona's views that "you can trust Africa to resist communism but not to resist Soviet military power. Nowadays military aid precedes ideology" (Scarnecchia, 2017:111). These views indicate the duplicity and low commitment on the part of most African states in embracing communism as an idea but not embracing the material dimension of it, however, there was little evidence to suggest that Nkomo was different from Mugabe based on ideology. Just like Mugabe, Nkomo spoke in a Marxist sense with the intention that the Lancaster House agreement would be built on the merits of the revolutionary struggle. Nkomo said the "war in Zimbabwe was basically about land" and it is for this reason that the PF expected the British "to come up with something" in line with the goals of the revolutionary struggle. It is further alleged that it was only after the US promised developmental assistance for Zimbabwe, that Zambia was elated. Zambia's solidarity with the US confounded the PF because President Kaunda had instructed his representatives at Lancaster House to put 'the heat' on Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate towards a settlement. In doing so, the Zambians showed their indifference towards a holistic approach to the Rhodesian crisis.

It is further alleged that President Kaunda said: "Zambia has taken all the punishment that it can on behalf of ZAPU; it is time ZAPU came to a settlement and moved back to their own country" (Telegram, Leonard Allinson to FCO, 1979 cited in Bishop, 2012: 216). It should be noted that like in the case of Mozambique, Zambia used strong-arm diplomacy with the aim of putting a quick end to the Rhodesian crisis; this approach, thus, did not reflect the political and ideological thrust of the objectives of the FLS, instead, it mirrored the limitations and trajectories of Africa's international relations. Drawing upon themes that emerged in the previous subsection, Zambia's position was not limited to achieving the objectives of the FLS in the crisis in Rhodesia, rather Zambia was more concerned about the end to the crisis with the hope that this would eventually lead to its own economic recovery.

4.3 Role of the Patriotic Front at the Lancaster House Agreement

In Zimbabwe, narratives in the public political space speak of the role played by nationalist leaders in dismantling colonialism. These narratives have been packaged in a way that centres the role played by both ZAPU and ZANU as the torchbearers in the fight for the independence of Zimbabwe. The Lancaster House negotiations indicate where the diplomatic efforts of Mugabe and Nkomo are said to have ushered in a new dispensation in the form of the First Republic of Zimbabwe (Riley (1982); Chung (2006) and ZAPU (2012). Subsequently, in Zimbabwe, during the month of August, the public relives memories through Heroes' Day celebration where the national broadcaster, Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) show images of Nkomo and Mugabe at the Lancaster House conference (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009). This is repeated every year with the intent of cultivating an understanding in the public space of the more significant role played by the PF than any other political actor (Chakawa, 2015). Be that as it may, a number of scholarly works have attempted to revisit some of the crucial aspects of Zimbabwean history with the intention of querying what is already known. Dominant narratives in the public domain present an elitist standpoint in accounting for the role played by the nationalist political leadership. The use of Mugabe and Nkomo on such an occasion serves as an example of the partial narration by the political elite as they glorify only some of the leading politicians' development of Zimbabwean nationalism. Bhebhe and Ranger (1995a) refute these claims with an indication that there are other political actors in the struggle of Zimbabwe's liberation other than Mugabe or Nkomo. Mhanda (2011) and Sadomba (2016) reinforce the account of Bhebhe

and Ranger (1995a) in contesting the elitist chronicle by focusing on the role played by the military wings within ZAPU and ZANU. For example, Bhebhe and Ranger pay attention to the critical moments in the struggle for Zimbabwe by treating ZIPA as a point of reference, since the role played by ZIPA amount to the infusion of a genuine Marxist ideology that was missing in the liberation struggle since its inception in the early 1960s. In doing so, the military was able to overcome ethnic overtones and factional legacies of the past which had caused infighting between ZANU and ZAPU (Saul, 2016:150). Infighting is a major issue that militated against the values and reasons for waging an armed struggle and both political wings had struggled to get rid of it.

In addition, Wilfred Mhanda (2011) also speaks about the same challenges. His work appears to demystify contestations about - the role played by the military in the development of a militant ideology, the rise of Mugabe and why Zimbabwe did not develop into a socialist state in 1980. A striking feature in this work is the identifiable role played by military figures such as Tongogara, Nhongo, Mhanda and others in giving a military dimension to the struggle that eventually brought the Rhodesian regime, the British and Americans to the negotiation table. Of significance, is how the military was a defining factors in the rise of Mugabe through what is now known as the 'Mgagao Declaration of 1975' Lastly, Mhanda's account proffers a revised biography centred on deconstructing an elitist and praise text version of Mugabe as a leader who rose to prominence against the backdrop of persecution (Saul 2016). External interference of Mugabe from the Mozambican leader, Samora Machel, thwarted chances for a genuine socialist struggle. While this account is an attempt to bring new trajectories to deconstructing the elitist version of Zimbabwean history, there is little evidence to dismiss this version as historiography. This account may be a self-serving memoir that Mhanda as a former guerilla who had a dislike for nationalist politicians, had used to settle his unresolved differences with Mugabe.

Another perspective is offered by Sadomba (2016), that is, the theme of betrayal of the military by the nationalist leadership; this seems to run through in some of these revisionist accounts. The impression created is that the nationalist leaders, such as Mugabe and Nkomo were not committed to a truly socialist state. As a former ZANLA military guerilla, it would seem Sadomba seeks to use his personal experience of the revolution to reinforce the idea that what is in the public domain about the role played by the nationalist leadership, is not a true reflection of

what transpired at that time. To some extent, Sadomba's vilification of Mugabe, Nkomo and Sithole as the hub of the revolution, may have currency if one adopts a critical analysis of how the US through its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had to rely on the three for the Geneva and the Lancaster House. For the West, it is an undeniable fact that they aimed to ensure that the new government in Zimbabwe would not assume power while guided by socialist ideology, however, the shortcomings of these revisionists' versions lie on the time they were published. Mhanda (2011) and Sadomba (2016) were published at a time where former fighters of the struggle for Zimbabwe felt the nationalist leadership in ZANU-PF had betrayed them. A sense of being sidelined and marginalised in the post-independence Zimbabwe may inform the basis of their critique of Nkomo, Mugabe and Sithole. Fundamentally, it can be argued that Mugabe's leadership may have also downplayed the vital role played by the adversaries in the revolution, hence, the lamentations by Mhanda and Sadomba among others

4.3.1 Patriotic Front and Instrumentalist Nationalism

Nationalism is a discourse that shapes our consciousness and the way we formulate meanings in the world of politics. Political meanings include different interpretations of being 'national' and what constitutes being a 'national'. In the context of 'national', nationalism is an idea that energises political actions and other shared ways of political life (Ozikrimili, 2000). Nationalism is instrumental in bringing about political goals, the formulation of policy and ideology and importantly, assist in landing into a political office. This can be construed as instrumentalist nationalism. Tarusarira (2017:6) citing Brass (1991:8) argues that when "cultures are fabricated by elites whose aims are ensuring economic or political advantages for themselves", it is instrumentalist nationalism. Accordingly, the following subsection seeks to understand the role played by the PF at the Lancaster House negotiations and how the nationalist idea manifested as a tool which the PF used with the hope of attaining political agendas.

At the Lancaster House, the British focused on a proposal of a provision in the constitution that would address the powers of the President and Prime Minister. To achieve this objective, the British facilitated talks with the PF with the hope that a Westminster-style ceremonial president and an executive prime minister provision would be accepted. This approach, however, was not reflective of political patterns in Africa. Nkomo said: "The trend in Africa, and in particular, in all the countries around Rhodesia, except South Africa, was to have an Executive Presidents; in

African communities, a head of state had to have power" (Doran, 2017:64) Mugabe weighed in and argued against the provision suggested by the British, in which the man at the top would not have active control of the machinery of government. Background information alluded to the fact that the legacies of infighting between members of the PF had created tensions between Nkomo and Mugabe (Doran 2017:64). At the political and ideological levels, the infighting between ZAPU and ZANU had caused fractures in the fabric of the nationalist movement, in particular, the period after 1963 saw ZAPU and ZANU divided, more than united. At this juncture, what united Mugabe and Nkomo was an idea that sought to deny other contenders such as Muzorewa or Sithole from taking office in the First Republic. Fear and anxiety of a spillover of the infighting and a resurgence of white-settler nationalism in post-independent Zimbabwe compelled Mugabe and Nkomo to advocate a constitution that gave power to the incumbent leader. It can be argued that the aim was to gain power under the guise of defending the gains of the nationalist struggle. The fear and anxiety caused the PF not to have faith in constitutional or parliamentary democracy as a source of legitimacy and power of the incumbent, instead, the PF was interested in getting power in an asymmetrical fashion - in contrast to democratic practices where power is not a preserve of the president. As noted by Alao (2012:73), the idea of concentrating power in the leader of the country became a focal point in Mugabe's administration during the first years of independence.

Mugabe's insatiable appetite for power may explain his excessive use of force that characterised the post-independence phase, especially in situations like riots and strikes that were perceived to be threats to power. It can be argued that the legacy of political party fighting between ZAPU and ZANU, racial politics and the overall power contest with other political heavyweights such as Sithole and Muzorewa culminated in fear and anxiety among the citizenry. Fear and anxiety, thus, became the basis upon which the PF construed its meaning of political power in post-independent Zimbabwe.

As captured in the discussion, the question of citizenship that surfaced during the Lancaster House talks generated a lot of debate. Specifically, in Africa, citizenship reflects a number of issues such as state security, belonging and participative democracy. Proponents of the discourse of citizenship Holland & Blackburn (1998); Cornwall & Gaventa (2000); Jones & Gaventa, (2002) define citizenship as the right of individuals to participate in decision-making processes.

In politics, this is the right accorded by the state to individuals to participate in legitimising and delegitimising governments through elections and other constitutional means. Liberal theories on citizenship focus on the status that is given by the state to individuals for political and social participation. For one not to belong, the state should revoke this power. It is important to note that there is a connection between belonging and the status that is accorded to citizens by the state. In this context, citizenship can be a powerful tool for political mobilisation against an incumbent (Masunungure & Koga, 2013).

At the Lancaster House negotiations, Lord Carrington proposed a provision in the new constitution that would address issues around belonging and social cohesion. To achieve this objective, the proposal sought to grant automatic citizenship to whites that had been Rhodesians. The PF in their assessment of the proposal argued against the inclusion of white Rhodesians who had entered the country after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 (Doran 2017). The UDI was symbolic to the PF because it is during this period that the state and ideology of Rhodesia emerged. As such, this exclusionary approach by the PF was exclusively directed at containing the racism and racist ideology that had been the bedrock of Rhodesia since 1965. Accordingly, the PF sought to deny citizenship to 'subversive elements in the newly independent state' who may want to sabotage the new government because of white nationalist sentiments. Consequently, the PF rejected the notion of dual citizenship with the argument that "people should commit themselves to the new state and not retain divided loyalties" (Doran 2017). In the eyes of the PF, most whites still had an emotional attachment to their country of origin, Britain, which was an embodiment of colonialism and imperialism. This argument is true when one considers that at this stage the country did not possess a national identity, therefore, there was nothing which bound whites and blacks together. White (2015), views granting dual citizenship to former Rhodesians, those who were perceived to have internalised white nationalist sentiments, would be detrimental to both ZAPU and ZANU, once in office. The fear was that these white nationalist sentiments would be translated into a political ideology and subsequently vote either ZAPU or ZANU out of power.

Fear and anxiety of these two races were the most visible expression and this would be one of the political thrust of the Mugabe administration after the year 2000. The question of dual citizenship was understood in different ways - state sovereignty and security on the one hand and

belonging and participative democracy on the other hand. Following the emergence of the MDC and its electoral challenge to the Mugabe regime, the problem of citizenship came to dominate the political landscape again as it was a matter of political security. Various people whose grandparents had migrated from neighbouring countries (for example, Mozambique and Malawi) in search of work in Zimbabwe were targeted by the government as most were supporters of the MDC (Masunungure & Koga, 2013). These people were referred to by the government as 'totem-less aliens' and the government deliberately excluded from voting in the elections and at the same time denied them access to public programmes, such as the land reform (Masunungure and Koga, 2013). The government tried to downplay such institutionalised xenophobia by maintaining that dual citizenship had its own problems which included cases of tax evasion, evasion from justice, and involvement in cases of human trafficking, international terrorism and problems in immigration control (The Chronicle, 2017).

There is no doubt that this may have been the case in some instances but there is little evidence to suggest that the government did not actually use the issue of citizenship to block this constituency from becoming a political resource that could remove an incumbent from power. This is so when one considers that following the economic crisis in Zimbabwe after 2000, most Zimbabweans left the country to seek greener pastures in Europe, the US and in neighbouring states. A large number of these people were seen as a constituency that would potentially vote ZANU PF out of power. It can then be argued that the PF politicised the memory of the UDI, as a recollection of the past, to fathom the future in terms of how citizenship and belonging would be understood in post-independent Zimbabwe. In politics, recollections of the past energise political meanings, policy formulation and political agendas, making it easy to understand why the PF was cautious in granting dual citizenship to Rhodesians (Check, 2015). The insinuation in the desire for this democratic dispensation was that the PF intended to be racist. To deny citizenship was synonymous to denying whites a sense of belonging because they could not participate in national activities, such as voting.

The main shortcomings of the Lancaster House negotiations lay in its inability to address issues of social transformation. The struggle had been predicated on the need to transform the Zimbabwean society and part of this transformation involved an equal distribution of the land and the economy (Kagoro, 2004). Land reform falls into the orbit of social transformation and

social justice as articulated by the Marxist dictum, the NDR and Hernando de Soto in his book, *'The Mystery of Capital'* (2000). The argument is that social transformation is essential for human development and in circumstances where the poor are unable to secure property rights, such as land, there should be reforms as a measure to reduce poverty (de Soto, 2000). In addition, as indicated earlier in the study, the NDR is a socialist concept that was developed by the Russian revolutionary, Vladimir Lenin in 1917. The concept is grounded in the belief that the privileged of society (bourgeoisie) thrive on the exploitation of the proletariat. This was applied contextually in Zimbabwe to imply that white privileges are a byproduct of colonialism and as such, the NDR was crafted as a plan of action that seeks to end white domination through correcting its socio-economic and political injustices. Expectations where that the PF would pursue a Marxist-Leninist approach as a departure from a capitalist approach. This thinking had been motivated by the ideological identity the PF professed and a United Nations report commissioned by the PF in 1978 where it was indicated the need to nationalise the key sectors of the economy and the greater role the state would play in the private sector (ACR, 1980 cited in Southall 2013:78). At the Lancaster House negotiations, the British and the PF focused on addressing socio-economic transformation. To attain this objective, the British insisted on a provision in the proposed constitution that would protect the constitutional affirmation of existing property rights. Furthermore, the British proposed that in the case of expropriation of private property, compensation of such would be required. This proposal was not reflective of the socio-economic realities of the past and most importantly the objectives of the liberation struggle. Mugabe in that regard said the PF:

> did not agree that compensation should be guaranteed. The distribution of land in Rhodesia was thoroughly inequitable. Africans had been deprived of property by arbitrary Government actions without compensation over a period of many years-why should the 'owners' receive compensation if the Government wanted to restore it? (cited in Doran 2017:69)

One can argue that Mugabe presented a mythical-historical narrative that was centred on the interests of Africans. Bottici (2014) postulates that mythical-historical narratives have philosophical underpinnings, in the sense that they are a process that continues to insist on a particular account that responds to a need for significance. In other words, the author maintains that myths are accounts through which people, in this case, political actors, orient themselves and justify the political world in which they find themselves in. In the Zimbabwean case,

redistribution of land, without compensation, was very significant for the political realm of the PF given that the majority of Africans had been historically disadvantaged through land dispossession. As such drawing upon an ideological convergence of Africanness by Mugabe perceived retributive justice was a way to actualise the ideals of the liberation struggle.

On the other hand, it could be said that insisting on taking land without compensation was instrumental for Mugabe. Authenticity for and the need to legitimatise ZANU as the vanguard party necessitated that Mugabe appeared to be nativist, thus, arguing for the expropriation of land without compensation would give credence to Mugabe as a committed pan-Africanist leader in the eyes of the Africans. In response, the British established some degree of success with assurances of funding agricultural development and land settlement schemes, with the help of the US who pledged an unofficial US$ 2,5 billion (Kagoro, 2004). This meant that the British were prepared to fund a programme that was based on market principles in which white farmers would remain on their land and in other key sectors of the economy; in essence, this meant perpetuating the uneven distribution of the means of production.

Success of the British's strategy lay in its ability to establish a compromise as a way to avoid the proliferation of racial politics. This conciliatory approach by Britain through its willingness to fund a moderate economic reform programme had some initial success as it resulted in some members of the FLS and Muzorewa-Smith delegations warming up to the proposal. A compromise on the land reform was politically symbolic mechanism that focused on mending race relations in Zimbabwe. It can also be said this is the foundation upon which newly-independent states would be understood. With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to assess whether this mechanism was a genuine initiative or a ruse for the maintenance of the status quo because the British and the US never developed this into policy. The issue of whether this was an official policy or ruse emerges when one considers debates around the diplomatic fall-out between the British and Zimbabwe which ensued after 1997. Through a letter between Claire Short, a British Minister to Kumbirayi Kangai, a Zimbabwean Minister, the contentious issue of land distribution emerged and led to the fall out between the two countries (Tendi 2010; Mlambo 2014).

It can be noted that, even if the Lancaster House agreement focused on ensuring social transformation, the question of land had a lot of ideological and historical underpinnings.

Significantly, the land was tied to the notion of racial identity that divided the PF and the British, with the former appearing nativist and exclusive and the latter appearing moderate and accommodating the interests of the whites. It became unclear as to whether both parties' interests were genuine or a ruse to maintain the status quo in the case of Britain, and for political legitimacy and power in the case of the PF. This ambiguity has led to the emergence of an alternative memorialisation of the Lancaster House negotiations that warrant an explanation. Moyo (2017) exonerates Nkomo and Mugabe with the narrative that they were victims of international relations such as the Cold War and that had caused Britain's manoeuvres. Karl Marx views this victimhood as "people making history under the circumstances they have not chosen". There is no doubt that Nkomo and Mugabe's political choices were influenced by the Cold War, however, there is little evidence to dismiss that their political choices were also not motivated by instrumentalist nationalism (Check, 2015).

The British and the FLS were forceful in their approach, although, the manner in which the PF argued its case and how its times converged with the British's, do suggest that both were merely interested in using issues of social transformation as a ruse for political office. This is compounded by the fact that the military wing of ZAPU had spoken against participating in the Lancaster House negotiations. Speaking at a memorial lecture for Lookout Masuku on the 5th of April, 2016, ZAPU leader and former ZIPRA commander, Dumiso Dabengwa indicated that the military leadership had shown its disinterest in any negotiations in favour of a military solution (cited in Moyo 2017; Bishop, 2012). The idea created seeks to put a military approach in resolving the Rhodesian question, on a pedestal; as such, Dabengwa's account should be assessed with other ideas in mind. It is possible that as the new leader of ZAPU he may have wanted to construct a revolutionary image of himself, therefore, exonerating himself from the negotiations at Lancaster in favour of an armed struggle would make Dabengwa appear more militant than Nkomo and hence remain politically authentic in nationalist politics. This would resonate well within the politics of the nationalist discourse. Having discussed the Lancaster House negotiations, the following subsection focuses on how exclusive patriotic politics manifested in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1990.

4.4 Exclusive Patriotic Politics, 1980-1990

Patriotism and exclusive politics have characterised much of Zimbabwe's political and socio-economic character, especially in the post-2000 crisis. Tendi (2010) and Ranger (2004) have described a narrowed nationalist and self-serving version of history that has been promulgated by the ruling ZANU-PF. The basic tenets of this monolithic and patriotic history seek to - reject any other versions of the liberation struggle, create subjects and conformity to a certain political idea, use the history of the liberation struggle to create enemies and friends and particularly, energise political action and formulate policy in the face of a credible opposition (Mujere, Sagiya & Fontein, 2017). An enduring theme running through the nationalist discourse is that both ZAPU and ZANU always viewed themselves as the authentic representatives of the masses and since the advent of nationalist politics in the early 1960s, this view had been consistently pursued and manifested in factional infighting and party-sponsored violence in the townships. In 1980, it did not come as a surprise that both parties sought to use the elections as the 'rite de passage' to political office (Southall, 2013:97). It should be noted that in the 1980s, democratic tools such as elections and non-military means had come to characterise the legitimate means of transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. This confirms the argument developed by Samuel Huntington that as the Cold War drew to an end and the advent of the 'third wave' of democracy, most African states had been socialised back into international norms and standards of statehood (Huntington, 1991). Elections are seen as a vehicle for legitimacy in constitutional and liberal terms, hence, it is from this point of view that both ZAPU and ZANU viewed the elections of 1980 as symbolic to authenticate their claims as the sole representatives of the people.

As its policy position on the outcome of the 1980 elections in Zimbabwe, the British demonstrated their dislike for Mugabe in many different ways. Before the elections, the British sought to use propaganda as a means to discredit Mugabe's possible victory. As indicated earlier in the study, Herman & Chomsky (2010) address how populations are manipulated and how consent for social, economic and political issues can be generated in the public's mind from propaganda (Gonzalez, 2013; Chomsky, 2010). By saying this, the media becomes an instrument of power "that mobilise support for the special interest that dominate the state and private activity" (Chomsky & Herman, 2010: Ixi). In other words, the media's role is to interpret society and its needs, through defining and shaping what is deemed appropriate and necessary to both the state and private and public life. Elsewhere in this study, Chomsky & Herman (2008) have been used in proffering five filters that set the agenda for propaganda narratives. Of interest in

this context is the fifth filter, communism and fear. Communism and fear are said to have been generated as propaganda by the US during the Cold War. Such propaganda was designed specifically to manufacture political identities against the Soviet Union and communism, as enemies of the American people. In the context of Zimbabwe, Carrington said "the outcome most likely to achieve stability in Rhodesia and an adequate measure of international recognition is a coalition between Muzorewa, Nkomo and whites" cited in (Doran 2017:161). This suggests that Mugabe and communism would bring about instability in the country. This can be construed as fundamentalism because Carrington's observations created boundaries which in turn formed political identities. Communism had been viewed through retributive lenses and the fear was that once in power Mugabe would cause a massive exodus of white people from Zimbabwe, hence, an alliance between Nkomo, Muzorewa and the whites would allay these fears and at the same time gain international recognition for the country's moderatism. An analysis of this trajectory would indicate that identity politics form an integral part of political fundamentalism. As such, the proliferation of dichotomised political terrain, with Mugabe on the one hand and a coalition of Muzorewa and Nkomo on the other dovetailed into the British's interests in the coming elections. Of some significance, however, is the fact that this laid the ground for toxic electoral politics that have become recurrent in the history of elections in Zimbabwe - name branding, labelling and identity politics have become household terms during politics; this can be traced to this period when the British labelled Mugabe 'a communist' to bolster the chances of Muzorewa and Nkomo.

Another striking feature of these elections was the use of violence and intimidation in a bid to secure the 'rite de passage' by ZANU. Earlier, the study established the basic tenets of exclusive and patriotic politics which include tendencies to seek and produce conformity to a certain idea and also to create enemies (Mujere, Sagiya, & Fontein, 2017). Conscious of the importance of elections as the vehicle for legitimacy, ZANU established election tactics and employed electoral spies known as '*mujibhas*'[16] (collaborators). The *mujibhas* became the link between the party and the people in an effort to 'encourage' an acceptable voting pattern in the rural areas with the use of coercive means in certain circumstances of defiance by the citizens (Moorcroft, 2012:85). This can be construed as the emergence of patriotic and exclusive politics in Zimbabwe. This

[16] During the liberation struggle, these were messengers, spies, and used for all sorts of work. After independence they were used instrumentalist by the ruling party to spy on opposition parties

strategy became the defining tool for ZANU conduct in electoral politics as was evidenced by the excessive use of violence in 2008. Those who refused to comply were labelled sell-outs, hence the popularisation of the sell-out identity (Dzimiri, Runhare, & Mazorodze, 2014). Earlier on the study noted that patriotic history seeks - to create subjects and conformity to a certain political idea, create enemies and friends, energise political action and lastly, formulate policy in the face of a credible opposition (Mujere, Sagiya, & Fontein, 2017). Labelling those that refused to comply as 'sell-outs' was intended to create enemies and friends and also energise political action in the form of violence on those so labelled, thus the sell-out notion became a political identity that resonated with patriotic and exclusive politics.

An observation by Southall (2013) indicates that whilst ZANU emerged victorious in these elections with 63% of the votes and 57 of the seats in Parliament, the victory did not inspire confidence in the electoral system in Zimbabwe. By saying this, Southall seems to indicate that the 1980 elections appeared to have been introductory for electoral violence in Zimbabwe. In 1976 Mugabe said: "Our votes must go together with our guns … The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer-its guarantor" (Meredith, 2002: i). Mugabe with this comment was highlighting the violent dimension of elections practice in Zimbabwe which is centred on the role played by the military as a decisive factor in securing an outcome. With the benefit of hindsight, the elections of 2002, 2008 and 2018 attest to this trend. It is in this understanding, that whilst ZANU claims to be an authentic and a representative of the masses, it is through coercion and not consent that the party can attest to these claims.

As indicated above, in the elections of 1980, ZANU garnered 63% of the votes and 57 seats in Parliament; ZAPU got 24% of the votes and was able to secure 20 seats in the house of assembly. Muzorewa was third with 8% of the national vote and 3 seats in Parliament (Southall, 2013:108). Effectively this meant that ZANU became the winner of the elections and Mugabe would be the leader of the First Republic. There is no doubt that the elections of 1980 produced interesting dimensions, such as an anti-Mugabe coalition to ensure a Nkomo-Muzorewa win. The anti-Mugabe coalition can be classified as a political thrust of democracy where political opponents campaign against each other and also an indication of the spillover effects of unresolved differences in the nationalist struggle. These can be construed as explanations as to why ZANU resorted to the use of violence and intimidation to ensure an outright victory. There

is little evidence to suggest that efforts were made to repair the ideological differences that existed between ZANU and ZAPU as far as uniting the aims of the liberation was concerned. What is more evident from this disunity was that both parties were striving to outdo each other in the coming elections either through coalitions or the use of violence.

The use of violence and intimidation subscribed to ZANU's attempt to shape Zimbabwe in accordance with its own preferred political practices; this can be construed as exclusive and patriotic politics. Among the myriad of issues that emerged from violent electoral conduct, one that appears strongly is the winner-takes-it-all electoral practice. This perpetuates a zero-sum approach that negatively views the losing contender; the winner criminalises the losing opposition and in the process, can heighten political and ethnic tensions and propaganda (Atta-Asamoah, 2010). It is alleged that members of ZAPU were criminalised for their political association. The ruling, ZANU, condemned Nkomo and ZAPU as a party of dissidents, meaning that the latter was effectively relegated to a smaller and insignificant role in the development of the nation (Dzimiri, Runhare, and Mazorodze, 2014).

There are several reasons the Lancaster House negotiations were vital. One reason is that the negotiations were a litmus test to forging a national identity in Zimbabwe through blending former white settler sentiments and African distinctiveness into a broader and unitary Zimbabwean identity (Southhall 2013). A historical explanation indicates that white settler identity did not only manifest in a constituency of people but also as a racially and potentially dangerous ideology that could sabotage the new government of Mugabe. Secondly, despite an electoral win, ZANU had not fully transcended into a multiracial and ethnic party like the ANC in South Africa that began as a Nguni-dominated party but was able to house other Bantu speaking tribes with time. Numerically and ideologically, ZANU's legitimacy was disputed in the eyes of the former white Rhodesians and members of ZAPU (Doran, 2017). Tarusarira (2017) opines that national unity became the buzz word in the political discourse characterising Zimbabwe. Advocating national unity was instrumental in as far as dealing with a possible threat from the whites and ZAPU concerns. Generally, Mugabe spoke of national unity and reconciliation as ingredients for a 'forward-looking policy'; this gave room for social transformation and a healthy political climate (Dzimiri 2016). Mugabe puts this as:

> If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest … It could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks oppress them because they have the power (The Chronicle 1980 cited in Mlambo, 2014: 195).

The elements of national unity were felt in every public and private sphere. This was evidenced by the inclusion of ZAPU and former Rhodesians in the government; notable examples were Nkomo; General Peter Walls who had commanded the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF); Ken Flower who had been the Director of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and Dennis Norman who was the leader of the Commercials Farmers Union (Chung, 2006; Holland, 2008 & Doran 2017). The idea was normative as it was instrumental for while Mugabe and ZANU purported to be socialist, these appointments would allay the fears of the white community in the country through promoting free enterprise and protection of private property rights (Hill, 2003); in addition, with the idea, the government began the process of post-conflict peace-building under the framework of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) (Knight, 2008). The DDR sought to avoid the recurrence of conflict by transforming and empowering former ZIPRA and ZANLA forces. The government identified four elements that were vital for the success of DDR - further education, technical training, business advice, and demobilization package (Alao, 2013:20).

Such empowerment initiatives, translated into former guerillas participating in the mainstay political-economy of the country and in the process built some sense of belonging among them. Dzimiri (2016) indicates that these were some of the first signs of success of the First Republic thereby making Mugabe a powerful and respected statesman. Furthermore, through this focused political and economic frameworks, Zimbabwe earned the title of the 'breadbasket' of Africa. Observing this, a writer acknowledged in the daily newspaper, *The Herald,* that "As whites, we were conned for years by the Rhodesian Front into believing that hell and damnation would follow if we embrace real change. And what a waste of life there was because of this" cited in (Hill, 2003:72). This conciliatory approach, however, overshadowed growing concerns about the emergence of intolerant and patriotic politics that were underway against ZAPU by the Mugabe's administration. These intolerant and patriotic politics manifested in the pursuit of a socialist ideology by ZANU.

4.4.1 ZANU's attempts at constructing a socialist ideology

A socialist ideology is an offshoot of Marxism-Leninism philosophy which seeks to preserve the gains and achievements of the revolutionary struggle. Marxist-Leninists (Karl Kautsky and Vladimir Lenin) believe that a revolution does not end with the defeat of a capitalist class but that a revolution develops from this stage to achieve social transformation. The period between the end of a capitalist class and the beginning of social transformation is crucial for Marxists-Leninists to develop a coherent socialist ideology which would preserve the gains of a revolution and achieve a complete and genuine social transformation. For this to be achieved, the 'vanguard party' emerges and plays an active and beginners' role in achieving this idea. The vanguard party is a political idea that was developed by Vladimir Lenin in his work '*What is to be done'* (Nimtz, 2014: 56). The key tenets of this thought rest on the ability of a group of individuals or a political party to raise political consciousness in the ordinary people on how to preserve the revolution and its gains. Trying to preserve the gains of the revolution consequences emerges as a result of methods used, such as coercion and conformity. History is awash with examples of failed revolutions with the most infamous being the French Revolution of 1789 and its negative Reign of Terror and the Bolsheviks Revolution that led to the Stalinist purges. In Africa, revolutions in Angola and Mozambique failed to usher in dreams and hopes associated with independence, instead, these revolutions developed into civil wars shortly after independence. In these cases, the common denominator was the unleashing of violence against those that did not agree with the new rulers; it became exclusive politics that loathed political differences and alternatives (Southhall,2013). This can be termed as 'a revolution that devours its children' because the same liberators become oppressors as they assume the role of the former oppressors in the pursuit of the preservation of revolutionary goals (Chisaira, 2016). In the praxis of Zimbabwean politics, ZANU believed that it had an ideological duty to inculcate a coherent and socialist ideology as part of the political development of the country.

Speaking in 1982 to students of the Political Science Students Association at the University of Zimbabwe, the then ZANU Secretary for the Commisariate and Culture, Herbert Ushewokunze spoke of the need to construct a 'coherent socialist ideology' developed out of Zimbabwe's historical reality. Ushewokunze claimed that ZANU was "the most progressive and social force in the country" (Ushewokunze 1984:33-4 cited in Moore 1990:12). Ushewokunze's views are

part of a consistent and dominant thread that runs in the discourse of nationalist politics that seek to explain exclusive and patriotic politics. The views indicate a deep sense of responsibility on the part of ZANU as the 'vanguard party' to construct a narrative that is conforming and at the same time appropriate and representative of the norms and values of Zimbabwe. The linear approach that ZANU "is the most progressive and social force in the country" was fundamental in the formulation of a political idea intended to legitimatise the party and a pretext to establish a one-party state. The descriptive theory sees legitimacy as the 'right to rule' (Kruger 2016). The focus is on the generation of positive beliefs and perceptions or other 'favourable orientations' attitudes developed towards regimes (Simmons 1999: 749 cited in Kruger, 2016: 16). Such beliefs can be historical as in the case of dynasties and monarchs and at the same time, they can be ideological as in the case of liberation movements, like ZANU. ZANU claimed its right to rule was both historical and ideological. Having brought independence to the people of Zimbabwe, through a protracted struggle, the party also believed it has an ideological right to safeguard the philosophy and values of socialism and the Africaness of the people of Zimbabwe, therefore, historical and ideological claims form the basis for political legitimacy (Southhall 2013; Tarusarira 2017). This often gives credence and legitimacy to political actions by political actors. It can also be said that historical and ideological claims can be exclusive of other key tenets of legitimacy, such as democracy and constitutionalism. ZANU's 'right to rule' informed the need to establish a coherent socialist ideology, although, this was in stark contrast with the 'forward-looking policy' that had been a key feature of the democratic dispensation of the First Republic. Further, it appears that these historical claims superseded constitutionalism in Zimbabwe that favoured alternative political trajectories.

Having discussed the dimensions of a coherent socialist ideology, the assumption would be that the 'looking forward' policy initiated by Mugabe may have been a ruse to internationalise the new Zimbabwean state that was a genuine initiative towards nation building. At another level, an analysis of the ideological dimension of the policy of reconciliation indicated what can be profiled as a client-patron relationship between ZANU and ZAPU. Divergences in the conception of reconciliation by the two political parties spoke to the failure of nationalist leaders to come up with a robust post-war reconstruction mechanism. Recent studies (Mesfiu 2008; Mukoma, 2008; Chigora & Gazura, 2011 and Eaglestone, 2013) in Africa have tried to capture political and normative dimensions of governments of national unity (GNUs). Studies on GNUs

have gained prominence over the years because of the never-ending disputes in the outcomes of elections, strong-man regimes that do not concede to electoral defeats, impacts of ethnic conflicts and the unavailability of robust post-crisis mechanisms. As such, lessons from GNUs, in Sudan in 2005; Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 2009 indicate similar political trends. These case studies show that GNUs are a way to harness protagonists to work together as the key to addressing political and economic turmoil and rather towards a developmental trajectory (Mukoma, 2008). Another view proffered by Chigora & Guzura, (2011) is that GNUs are peacebuilding strategies that are devised after a protracted and violent environment and gross human-rights abuses. It also follows that GNUs emerge when countries are in a state of war or are riven with ethnic conflicts (Mesfin, 2008). For GNUs to prevail, there should be political, economic and social reforms. Notable reforms should involve citizenship participation, opening up the country for democratic space and the recognition and respect for each partner in the power-sharing arrangement. This gives legitimacy and credibility to parties to the GNUs to contribute to national and developmental trajectories. In the context of Zimbabwe, the GNU between ZAPU and ZANU failed to muster some of the merits of power-sharing arrangements. In particular, the GNU failed to embark on political reforms that have been alluded to above. As indicated earlier, it is believed that Mugabe's intention was to form a GNU in which Nkomo would have assumed the position of president (Doran 2017). Nkomo's biography *Story of My Life* indicates that he turned down such an offer on the basis that he would have been 'obliged to sign documents and make public speeches composed by ZANU'. Further, Nkomo felt he would be "deprived of the right to speak" his mind and contribute to the development of a nationalist discourse (Nkomo 1984:212-213; Msipa, 2015: 96).

This effectively meant that both ZANU and ZAPU interpreted the policy of reconciliation differently. On the surface, ZANU acknowledged this as an opportunity to mend relations with ZAPU, however, ZAPU saw this as a strategy of furthering ZANU's exclusive and patriotic politics. In hindsight, this is true because Nkomo and Mugabe had argued against a provision that would allow for a ceremonial president at the Lancaster House negotiations. Nkomo had been the 'godfather' of Zimbabwean nationalism; he started the nationalist politics in the country, thus, Nkomo may have felt insulted at the prospect of being a ceremonial president under the tutelage of ZANU. More significantly, it seems Nkomo was interested in the autonomy of ZAPU's identity and this autonomy would be translated in ZAPU's ability to write an

independent narrative through contributing in the shaping of national discourse and 'the right to speak' his mind. In nationalist politics, an autonomous identity is attached to authenticity and legitimacy and by rejecting ZANU's overtures Nkomo reinforced the idea that ZAPU was not a collaborator but instead a competitor. Nkomo refuted the idea of a coherent socialist ideology because of the need to promote a robust and democratic dispensation in the First Republic. Leadership in ZANU radically differed from Nkomo's conception in the two's interpretation of a robust and democratic dispensation. Tekere and Nkala saw this as lack of subservience to the ruling party and castigated Nkomo in the name of defending national unity.

In line with innovative propaganda, the Mugabe administration appointed Nathan Shamuyarira as Minister of Information as a means to formulate the idea of a coherent socialist ideology. Doran (2017: 233) says Shamuyarira became "the symbol and author of anti-ZAPU vitriol on ZBC". Hill (2003:72) also notes that Shamuyarira "quickly turned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation[ZBC] into a ZANU mouthpiece". Shamuyarira said, "the world should see this as a natural development in the consolidation of our independence" (ibid: 74). ZBC and the media became avenues to develop and foster a national character, fuel division between ZAPU and ZANU and to create enemies and friends. Tarusarira (2017) explains the control of Shamuyarira in the framework of political fundamentalism. Fundamentalists use media houses and state broadcasters to inculcate a certain political agenda, therefore, through the media, ZANU began the political process of promoting in-group and out-group political differences through the manufacturing of political identity. This was demonstrated at a rally for ZANU at White City Stadium in Bulawayo when a Politburo member, Enos Nkala, said the party's objective was to "crush Joshua Nkomo, self-appointed Ndebele king". Similarly, Edgar Tekere, then ZANU Secretary-General said: "Nkomo's group leads me to begin to wonder whether a one-party state is not desirable at some stage" (The Herald 7 and 24 July 1980 cited in Doran 2017: 204 and 208). Prime Minister Mugabe also said on television he did not "understand the intentions of people who refuse to join the party that was responsible for the independence and freedom of Zimbabwe" (Phimister 2009:473). These comments contrasted sharply with the key principles of the GNU between ZAPU and ZANU. The observations by Nkala, Tekere and Mugabe indicated ZANU's unwillingness to allow diverse political opinions as part of the developmental trajectory of a democratic dispensation; they also indicated the notion that ZANU sought a hegemonic interpretation of the national character in which Nkomo and ZAPU would be subjected to.

In the previous chapter, the study noted political violence that ensued following ZAPU's split in 1962. During this violence, most of the leadership in ZANU, such as Shamuyarira and Nkala became victims of ZAPU-sponsored violence. It is not a surprise that this memory induced attitudes that were a replica of ZANU's castigation of ZAPU in a post-independent Zimbabwe. As with characteristics of fundamentalism, a dichotomized approach emerged that viewed ZAPU as an enemy towards national unity. Themes and events which were not in synchrony with ZANU interests were downplayed in the media. This is demonstrated through the media's reference to Nkomo as 'Mr Nkomo' or sometimes simply referring to him as 'Joshua Nkomo' or the 'ZAPU leader' instead of the popular title of 'Comrade'. This title is symbolic in Zimbabwean politics for it speaks to the role played by an individual in the struggle against white settler colonialism (Thornycroft, 2015).

In conclusion, in the first years, Mugabe sought to extend an olive branch to whites, this was a forward-looking policy that would address racial politics in Zimbabwe. In doing so, he created the impression that ZANU was interested in the development of the country. The relations between ZAPU and ZANU culminated into a GNU that was not reflective of a forward-looking policy; this led to the assumption that the policy of reconciliation was a ruse intended for international acceptance of the new state of Zimbabwe. Normalising relations with the white community earned Mugabe some sort of credence as a statesman; this was also symbolic to the capitalist world, therefore, Mugabe had used the policy of reconciliation for instrumental purposes. Another pertinent observation was how the GNU between ZAPU and ZANU grossly misinterpreted a forward-looking policy. The modus operandi was a patron-client relationship in which ZAPU was supposed to conform to a coherent socialist ideology and in doing so, this was construed as exclusive and patriotic politics; the GNU, therefore, failed to come up with a robust national unity initiative. Having discussed the various dimensions to the policy of reconciliation, the following subsection looks at efforts to establish a one-party state philosophy as ZANU's response to the refusal by ZAPU to conform.

4.4.2 Factionalism in ZANU

Müller-Rommel (1982: 14) says factions are a "group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies. A faction arises in the struggle for power and represents a division on details of application" (cited in Kollner & Basedau, 2005: 8). The GNU

between Mugabe and Nkomo generated a lot of debate in ZANU because the government had reversed the idea of exclusivity and the monolithic tendencies that were being pushed by conservatives in ZANU. The indication was that that divisions on details of application and policy direction had begun to emerge in ZANU; the most visible cause of the division was the forward-looking policy that Mugabe had 'chosen' towards whites and Nkomo. This culminated into a number of populist ideas outlined by Tekere showing that ZANU had to abandon a forward-looking policy to a more retributive that was couched in socialism. Mugabe responded by labelling these views as "meaningless hot air" that was not reflective of government policy (cited in Doran 2017:207). The use of populist language by Tekere and Mugabe's response demonstrated the problems with democratic centralism. Masipula Sithole argues that democratic centralism produces undesirable consequences if a certain faction in an organisation or alliance is conservative, defensive or reactionary (Sithole 1999: 103 cited in Mazarire, 2011:575). Further, this demonstrated Mugabe's inability to instil discipline in the party, to the point that Tekere and Nkala could openly challenge the party's policy through promoting leftist politics. Leftist politics were seen as instrumental for constituency building and clientelism for Tekere and Nkala who were positioned to challenge Mugabe as the leader of the party and state. As a result, two centres of power emerged in which issues around a forward-looking policy focused on onTekere and Mugabe. To indicate the two centres of power, posters circulated in Harare drawing a dichotomy between 'Comrade Tekere the defender of the revolution' and 'puppet Mugabe the sell-out'(Doran 2017).

In an interview with Holland (2008), Tekere demonstrated how together with Nkala, they had deposed Sithole as the leader of ZANU without the support of Mugabe. The impression created was that Mugabe was and had always been afraid of taking decisions. This is a theme which is repeated after independence when Tekere and Nkala were reported as wanting to form another party, to be called 'Super ZANU' whose aim was to be more "radical than the moderate direction Mugabe takes, including with regards to whites" (cited in Doran 2017:225). Tekere sought to infuse 'critical moments' that elevated himself and Nkala as more inclined to the liberation struggle than Mugabe. This forms part of the commemoration of Zimbabwe's nationalist history where political actors put themselves on a pedestal and castigate others. Representation in politics is a currency that is useful for constituency building and clientelism. The populist politics encouraged by Tekere and Nkala lacked a clear understanding of the domestic and

international politics of the time. The Lancaster House agreement had been capitalist-oriented thereby making it difficult for Mugabe to push for a socialist agenda. This cautioned Mugabe to be more pragmatic at home and abroad in an effort to get international support to build the nation (Southhall, 2013) Secondly, Tekere and Nkala failed to understand Nkomo and ZAPU's significance to a developmental trajectory in Zimbabwe. ZANU had not fully developed into representing the will of the people as the will of the people were being contested between ZAPU and ZANU and it was in this political context that Mugabe became inclusive of the stand of Nkomo. This analysis forms an observation of ZANU-PF's post-2000 hegemonic politics. In this period, ZANU-PF attempted to be indifferent towards the opposition, MDC, although, this undermined the fact that the MDC was a post-independence and urban-based movement whilst ZANU-PF had been reduced to the status of a rural party in every election after 2000.

Nevertheless, amidst the infighting in the party, Mugabe responded by attacking Nkomo and ZAPU. Even though Mugabe had extended an olive branch to ZAPU through a GNU, his response to Nkomo's decline seems to have been influenced by factional politics within the party. To make sense of this, a discourse was constructed which sought to invalidate ZAPU as a bitter opponent who had lost an election. Mugabe said: "If those who have suffered defeat adopt the unfortunate and indefensible attitude that defies and rejects the verdict of the people, then reconciliation between the victor and the vanquished is impossible" (Moorcroft, 2012:98). Repeating this position Nkala said: "Joshua Nkomo and his group are in the Government by the grace of ZANU(PF). They contributed in their own small way and we have given them a share proportional to their contribution" (cited in Doran 2017:204). This attitude left no opportunity to accord ZAPU a national status due to its role in liberating Zimbabwe. These statements were psyching the country into viewing ZAPU's role in the country from a minimalist point of view; this was used to justify the formation of a one-party state.

One of the most worrying consequences of this socialist ideology was manifested in a contested and militarised political terrain. This is evidenced by the full-scale fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers in eNtumbane suburb in Bulawayo in November 1980. The military skirmishes between ZIPRA and ZANLA forces indicated that the security apparatus of the state had become political tools to advance either ZAPU's or ZANU's political agenda. Significantly, the situation reinforced the notion that the GNU had failed to muster robust nation-building initiatives as

shown by the politicisation of the military. Consequently, Mugabe took the opportunity to label ZAPU and ZIPRA as the enemies of national unity (Chan, 2003: 29 & Sibanda, 2005). This accusation reached a frenzy when an arms cache was apparently discovered on farms belonging to ZAPU. This might also explain why the senior leadership in ZANU found it hard to stomach ZAPU as a partner in the GNU. The reluctance to embrace ZAPU emanated from fear of the legacy of the infighting during the liberation struggle between ZAPU and ZANU.

The constant rising and widening cracks in the GNU produced, as can be expected, negative results. Among these was the dismissal of Nkomo from the government in January 1981 and the refusal by some ZIPRA guerillas to be integrated as part of the DDR project (Dzimiri, Runhare & Mazorodze, 2014). The GNU also failed to curb Mugabe's unilateral decisions that led to the hiring of 100 North Korean instructors to train the Fifth Brigade of the national army (Moorcroft, 2012 & Meredith, 2002). The brigade was allegedly at the service of Mugabe as an army "to have a political orientation which stems from our philosophy as ZANU(PF)" (Meredith 2002; 66). In hindsight, it was obvious that ZANU's philosophy had been to create a one-party state and a "coherent socialist ideology". This was supported by Nkomo who indicated that the Fifth Brigade was a political and tribal army that wanted to wipe out the Ndebele people. In January 1983, the Fifth Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland and Midlands Province in an operation known as 'Gukurahundi' which resulted in the loss of more than 20 000 lives (Chan, 2011 & Southhall 2013). Apart from the loss of lives and the failure to build a nation as the immediate tragedies of Gukurahundi, the international community was silent, particularly Britain, as the guarantor of the Lancaster House agreement. Britain was only interested in the apparent success of the Lancaster House agreement that ensured that a pro-Western government remained in Zimbabwe after independence, therefore, the British were more interested in containing communism than in the welfare of the people of Zimbabwe. In the eyes of the British, the case of Zimbabwe had been a foreign policy success for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the aftermath of the Cold War. Unabated and unmonitored the crisis in Zimbabwe went on because

> No British government wanted a couple of hundred thousand British citizens appearing with cardboard suitcases at Heathrow, the sudden expulsion of whites if we had pulled the rug on the aid [to Zimbabwe] and as it were denounced, Mugabe. This was the real threat (cited in (Tendi, 2010:195)

As far as the British were concerned, the real threat to Zimbabwe was not black on black violence but non-reconciliation between whites and blacks. This was the backbone of the British's foreign policy, to maintain the protection of whites interests at the expense of nation-building in Zimbabwe.

The Gukurahundi civil war ended with the political amalgamation of PF ZAPU and ZANU into ZANU-PF through a Unity Accord signed in December 1987 between Prime Minister Mugabe and Nkomo. In this arrangement, Mugabe became the President of Zimbabwe and deputised by Nkomo. Having secured an election victory in 1985 against Nkomo, Mugabe seemed to have also won the war against ZAPU and against contenders within his own party (Moorcroft, 2012). Ordinary people from all walks of life in Zimbabwe and politicians in ZANU-PF celebrated this 'unity from above' settlement as a breath of peace and fresh air (Sibanda, 2008:48). The same could not be said about soldiers in ZIPRA and politicians in ZAPU. Hill interviewed Canaan Banana who had been the first president of Zimbabwe in 1980, and Banana revealed that the idea to unify ZAPU and ZANU under the name ZANU-PF was symbolic and resonated with ZANU's policy of a one-party state. Banana reported that he had asked Mugabe why ZANU could not compromise on this and Mugabe responded saying: "We are in power, and if we lose our name we become irrelevant" (Hill, 2003:85). This confrontational tone was an integral part of the political process intended to wipe out ZAPU from Zimbabwe. As such, the rank and file and ex-combatants felt the Unity Accord just papered over cracks and was more of 'a marriage of convenience' (Tofa, 2013: 82). It was understandable for these ex-combatants to feel this way because ZANU had achieved its goal of a one-party state and Nkomo would now, certainly, be obliged to sign documents and make public speeches composed by ZANU as he had feared in the beginning. In a similar fashion, Mugabe and ZANU-PF entered into 'a marriage of convenience' with the opposition MDC in 2009 in a Government of National Unity (GNU). In this GNU, interaction was a problem because ZANU-PF would not commit itself to the principles of unity by refusing to appoint MDC ambassadors and initiate other necessary political reforms. The intention here also was for ZANU-PF to claim dominance, this time, at the expense of the MDC.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the end of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe focusing on the Lancaster House negotiations. The focus has been to make sense of the negotiations by examining different approaches and interest-based motives. A look at the key tenets in fundamentalism revealed the formidable role played by Britain as a broker to these negotiations. The chapter also examined the role played by African diplomacy, namely, by countries like Mozambique and Zambia, in shaping the outcome and the decisions made by both ZAPU and ZANU. True to foreign policy practice, domestic factors have a bearing on the outcome of foreign policy and this was the case with Mozambique and Zambia's decision to favour negotiations instead of an armed struggle in solving the Rhodesian question. An analysis of Mozambique and Zambia served as a departure point from the overly-emphasised narrative of solidarity among the liberation movements in Southern Africa. There is no doubt that these movements were united based on their shared history, however, the study demonstrated that there is little evidence that during the Lancaster House negotiations that this history was a determining factor in international relations. The study also explained how nationalism was constructed by the Mugabe regime after independence. Whilst Zimbabwe basked in international recognition because of the policy of reconciliation between blacks and whites, the same could not be said about the relations between ZAPU and ZANU. If anything, the relations between these two movements mirrored legacies of the 1960s - a pursuit of militant nationalism and the failure of nation-building. ZANU sought to construct a nation-state of Zimbabwe that was devoid of ZAPU or any other opposition political party. This became politics in Zimbabwe where the use of violence became an integral part of the political process intended for the political survival of the ruling party. The chapter also explored factionalism in ZANU and how this impacted on Mugabe's handling of political opponents. What is visible in the politics of factionalism in ZANU is a thread that continued unabated and had the effects of ushering in different political trajectories in Zimbabwe. The lesson learnt is that Mugabe did not handle factionalism well in ZANU. In dealing with Tekere and Nkala, the leader of ZANU chose to wage a campaign in Matabeleland which resulted in the loss of lives. This became the modus operandi whereby at the closing of the millennium, Mugabe embarked on land reform to silence contenders who felt he had not observed some of the pre-independence policies. This can also be seen in the manner in which he dealt with the MDC. Violence was used as an instrument to deal with factions within ZANU-PF.

FIVE:

SUMMATIVE EVALUATION OF CHANGES IN THE CONCEPTION OF NATIONALISM IN ZIMBABWE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ZAPU AND ZANU LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

5.0 Introduction

This study was literature based and examined the conceptualization of nationalism and nationalist politics in Zimbabwe between the period from 1977 to 1990. Fundamentally, the contestations surrounding the conception of nationalism between ZAPU and ZANU informed the quest to examine changes during the liberation struggle to 1990. The study adopted an interpretive research methodology that sought to probe social phenomenon and discourses such as nationalism from a multi-dimensional approach. The two key theories that guided the study were Primordialism and Constructivism. Key questions in the conceptualization of nationalism were investigated through inductive content analysis.

Chapter Two provided a comprehensive review of the literature covering key thematic aspects such as historicising, philosophising and problematising the underpinnings of nationalism. The study utilised insights from Machiavelli's book, *The Prince* to account for some components of nationalism in the traditional sense. Machiavelli regards the rejection of foreign interference as a

form of patriotism and nationalism. A contemporary approach to nationalism exploited the definition of Kwesi Prah which focused on the rejection of foreign domination in Africa. Prah broadens this conception of modern nationalism by highlighting the role played by the educated nationalist leadership in developing nationalism.

Chapter Three departs from this traditional view to premise nationalism from a broader standpoint of political narratives. This was essential in understanding nationalism in Zimbabwe from multiple perspectives. The general view is that narratives are the way people construct facts and connect them to make sense of reality (Shenhave 2006). In doing so, perceptions, identities and political values emerge, hence, the chapter revealed that nationalism is a political identity that is construed from various departure points during the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The chapter also discussed the role played by the educated nationalist elite in constructing competing political narratives. These narratives sought to produce a coherent and unified ideology about the formation of the future nation of Zimbabwe. The development of nationalism was discussed paying special attention to different political trajectories. Political myths that were expressed through media, the formation of transnational alliances and political factions were fully examined. This evaluation indicated that the way nationalism was construed had serious socio-political repercussions such as the criminalization of political opponents and the use of political violence to deal with such opponents (Dzimiri *et al.*, 2014).

Chapter Four discussed the composition of nationalist leadership. The nationalist leadership had a profound effect in the transformation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe. First, the chapter analysed the way an independent Zimbabwe was founded. To do this, a comparative analysis of scholarly debates on the Lancaster House negotiations was proffered. Mhanda (1978) cited in Moore (2012) views the Lancaster House negotiations from multiple perspectives; this reasoning is informed by Mhanda adopting a nativist approach to argue that the Lancaster House agreement was inadequate in as far as the goals and objectives of the liberation struggle were concerned. In the context of the National Democratic Revolution and the Marxist theory, the Lancaster House agreement served as a platform to ensure minority and capitalist interests and African political elites enjoyed political power (Southall 2013). Mhanda's views are a departure from the traditional and patriotic representation proffered by both ZAPU and ZANU; this helped to provide an alternative analysis

of the foundation of Zimbabwe that exposed fractures in existing hegemonic accounts that sought to praise ZANU. Another analysis provided by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) broadened the conception of the Lancaster House agreement to include international relations and epochs, such as the Cold War, as factors that shaped nationalism in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was established when the Soviet Union's influence in international relations was waning. This resulted in the failure to establish a socialist state in Zimbabwe as had been envisaged by many nationalist leaders.

Discussed also was the aspect of fundamentalism in the context of interest-based actors. The British foreign policy and the role of African leaders and the interests of the Patriotic Front were also explored. These actors represented a political force whose interests prevented the implementation of a socialist ideology in the founding of Zimbabwe (Moore 2012). The chapter also examined how post-independent politics were constructed by the ruling ZANU and subsequently contested by ZAPU. Specific focus was on how ZANU sought to construct itself as 'representative of the nation' through a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy (Southall 2013; Moore 1990). This raised the question of whether a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy mirrored exclusive patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe.

5.1 Evaluation of the Theoretical Framework of the Study

The Primordialist and Constructivist theories were used to examine the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe. The Primordialist theory seeks to explain nationalism in a historical context. Proponents of this theory, Brown (1999) and Breuilly (1996) claim that nationalism is derived from a common and shared history of people who compose a 'nation'. Common ancestry, language, religion, myths, symbols and practices are the factors that lead to the construction of an identity and, subsequently, the emergence of nationalism to protect such an identity. As such, these factors are symbolic because they are "claims to authenticity and a right of collective national self-determination" (Brown, 1999: 282). Chapter Three indicated that these factors partially account for the emergence of nationalism in Zimbabwe. The encroachment of the British settlers in the late 1880s disrupted the Rhodesian identity that had been created over the years. This became a rallying point for the emergence of nationalism in the form of the First Chimurenga and Second Chimurenga with a specific focus on issues of the revival of the

Africans' shared loss of land. The second generation of nationalists' leaders of the 1960s had to tap into history and imagine a new state called Zimbabwe and this was symbolic in commanding a nationalist and continental appeal signifying elements of nativism and Pan Africanism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017).

Alternative analysis shows that Primordialism enables exclusivism, xenophobia and racism. In the search for shared aims - ancestry, language and religion - particularism emerges, thereby creating in-group and out-group strategies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009; Tarusarira, 2017). The Primordalist theory accounted for the emergence of nationalism in Zimbabwe by helping uncover anomalies that emerged when nationalism was conceptualised between nationalists who sought a neo-liberal approach and those who professed a more radical and nativist approach. Divergence in opinion not only fractured the nationalist movement but those divergent views were criminalized and stigmatised. In 1962, the split in ZAPU polarized nationalist leadership between moderates and radicals demonstrated this point (Doran 2017).

The constructivist theory was also used in the analysis of nationalism. Constructivists, Llobera (1999) and Walicki (1998) postulate that nations do not exist, they are only 'constructs', that are deliberately created by elites. Anderson (2006) in *Imagined Communities* builds on this argument asserting that nations and nationalism are concepts that are weaved together to create a sense of identity. This departs from the traditional Primordalists theory that views nationalism from a cultural and historical view. The Constructivist theory broadens the conception of nationalism because it includes the role played by the elites as a force that constructs and develops nationalism. In addition, nationalism is constantly undergoing a transformation. Prah (2009) focuses on the role played by the educated political elites in fighting for the rights of Africans as a means to an end. Consequently, Prah moves away from a cultural approach of linking the land to nationalism, through accommodating other factors, such as political rights and civil liberties. When ZAPU was formed in 1962, conceptualisations of nationalism was changing to a Western-centred neo-liberal principle, the promotion of democracy, human rights and political participation. This also had an influence on the development of Zimbabwean nationalism. In examining the dimensions of modernity, the study used Marx and Engel conception of changes in societies. These thinkers reinforce the idea that modernity is a powerful force that breaks down old ideas and replaces them with new ones; these are continuously in a

state of mobility (Marx and Engels 1848 cited in Frisby, 2004). This suggests that interaction between cultures promote new ideas over older ones. In Zimbabwe what had been influential in identifying nationalism in the formative years around the 1890s; issues of land and rejection of foreign encroachment had changed with the passage of time to incorporate different meanings. By the 1960s, forces of modernity had influenced the educated elites in ZAPU and ZANU to engage with different approaches to nationalism.

5.2 Summary of the Study Findings

Study Objective One: How did a constructed and contested nationalism emerge in Zimbabwe?

i. Nationalism as political narratives

In its developmental stages, nationalism emerged as a product constructed by political elites. The way nationalism unfolded was consistent with the basic tenets of narratives in politics. Political narratives are the way political facts, values and identities are shaped and weaved together to make sense of political reality. The consensus is that narratives are the manner in which we 'story the world' (Mishler 1995:117 cited in Shenhave 2006). In studies in psychology, human beings think, perceive and imagine, using narrative modes to enhance understandings and create meaning in their worlds (Shenhave, 2006: 245; Mudau & Mangani 2018). Political discourse, therefore, relies on narratives as a way of formulating political knowledge and 'reality'. The way in which 'we story the world' is a subjective political 'reality' that is not universal but narrowed to certain views and descriptions (Cornog, 2004; Shenav, 2004). Within the framework of narratives, subjective 'reality' can be questioned from multiple perspectives, hence, the results of the study showed that nationalism, in its various manifestations, emerged as a constructed and contested phenomenon in Zimbabwe. The conception of nationalism took on various forms. At different points in time, nationalism reflected the philosophies of neoliberal ideas, radical nativism and Marxism to problematize the national question in Rhodesia. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) sees Joshua Nkomo's conception of nationalism as a departure from the radical nativist conception. Nkomo sought to promote the national question in Rhodesia from a democratic, non-racial and liberal point of view. The pursuit for human rights and democracy in the form of one-man, one-vote can be understood as a pragmatic approach that was used by Nkomo to internationalise the Rhodesian problem, however, his views were contested by those who

imagined a nationalist discourse built on particularism. Conversely, Alexander (2006) and Mugabe (2001), exploited radical nativism to portray the emergence of nationalism. To Alexander and Mugabe, the land was a key feature in the construction of African identity, hence, these scholars tie the loss of land by Africans to whites as a basis to confront colonialism. Faced with a racist and white-settler nationalism, some political nationalists embraced a radical and nativist approach that had an African experience appeal. By differing on the forms that characterised nationalism, these different accounts reinforced the theme of this study - that nationalism is a product of political narratives that are constructed and contested. The study, however, also noted that differences in the conception of nationalism indicate the multiple perspectives the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe, could be addressed.

ii. Nationalist leadership as a socio-political force

Chapter Three examined the role played by the educated nationalists in confronting the national question in Rhodesia. This included their innovative efforts in confronting colonialism through the formation of ZAPU and ZANU. The idea from political elites to add the names 'Zimbabwe' and 'African' to these movements commanded a nationalist and continental appeal to signify, nativism and Pan Africanism to these activities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). These names were a deliberate attempt by the political elites to express concerns in the struggle for the liberation in an appealing, transnational manner. The term 'socio-political force' is premised on the ability of the nationalist leadership to usher in different political trajectories as a response to colonialism. The ability to self-organise and propel changes in the conception of politics in Rhodesia falls into the orbit of Weber's 'self-interpretation of society' (Moyo, 2018). These views are premised on the spreading of new ideas and the ability of charismatic leaders to problematize national questions. Discussions around the importance of intellectuals in society indicate that intellectuals are people who have gained an advantage over others, due to their education (Bourdieu, 1986; Cabral, 1997; Prah, 2009 and Tendi, 2011). The consensus is that intellectuals or the educated individuals are in a better position to make sense of political, economic and social crises in society.

Despite their innovative ability in problematising the national question, educated nationalists failed to develop an acceptable concept of nationalism. The political factions, ethnic politics and political violence that ensued validated that there were glaring fundamental differences in the

way nationalism was constructed by the political elites. This was seen by how the notion was continuously contested between 1977 and 1990. At different periods, the split in ZAPU in 1962 had been understood from either an ethnic point of view, or from the autocratic tendencies of Nkomo, or from the competition between the educated and uneducated party leaders (West, 2002; White 2003; ZANU, 2012 and Doran, 2017). A closer analysis of the political trends in Zimbabwe indicates that these factors feature prominently in the country's political trajectories (Hill 2003). In post-independent Zimbabwe, politics has been characterised by ethnicity and autocracy in an attempt to construct a coherent and unified state. This has resulted in the criminalization of other ethnic groups, such as the Ndebele which brought about the Gukurahundi disturbances of the early 1980s. In the post-2000 period, members of the opposition were criminalized due to their views that were not aligned with those of the ruling ZANU-PF.

iii. The Use of Media and Alliances as Tools in the Reconstruction and Redefinition of Nationalism

The media also became an innovative tool in the reconstruction and redefinition of nationalism. Sachikonye (1995) observes that the media is part of the civil society whose political and socio-economic activities are intended to regulate the state and its institutions, thus, the media is a major driver of a democratisation agenda. In a restrictive political environment, such as colonial Rhodesia, the African press became a key feature of civil society through identifying and exerting pressure on the colonial government. The African media became the official mouthpiece of liberation movements and the development of African nationalism. Available studies under-emphasise the media as a factor that contributed to violent politics in Zimbabwe. This practice undermines the power of propaganda in the media and how it has energized violent political actions as revealed in this study. The press wars between ZAPU and ZANU became instrumental in constructing perceptions, identities and political values which led to legitimising the use of violence. Political trends showed that there was a nexus between the criminalization of political opponents in the press (African Daily and Zimbabwe News) and the actual violence that followed in urban areas (Doran 2017; Dombo 2014). The press wars were an indication that ZAPU and ZANU did not truly represent the ordinary people's interests; both movements were merely interested in using the press for instrumental purposes. This was against the expectations that the press was part of the civil society at the time and its duty was to communicate the

Rhodesian political problems. Politics trends in post-independent Zimbabwe followed the same trajectories, where propaganda and censorship were employed in the media to further the interests of the ruling ZANU-PF against the opposition, MDC. Clearly, the media is a tool that has been instrumental in the development of nationalist politics in Zimbabwe.

There was also the influences of diplomatic and political alliances in redefining nationalism. The question of which party instigated the armed struggle remains an issue of debate in the scholarship of nationalism in Zimbabwe. Significantly, initiating an armed struggle was synonymous with attaining legitimacy and authenticity for both ZAPU and ZANU (Chimhanda 2003). An armed struggle had been theorised as the means to genuine political independence and initiating this would render either ZAPU or ZANU as authentic and legitimate in the eyes of the black masses. ZAPU established a transnational diplomatic and political alliance with the ANC of South Africa as a means of ideological transformation and extending the support base for the struggle. This alliance, therefore, included an expression of ideological solidarity between the ANC and ZAPU, however, the alliance's greatest achievement was in launching a joint-military operation in South Western Rhodesia in 1967 (Ranilala, Sithole, Houston & Magubane, 2004). This was seen as a success story of ideological transformation through inculcating a transnational military dimension to confronting the Rhodesian regime.

Study Objective Two: What challenges have resulted in post-independent Zimbabwe due to the transformation of nationalism into exclusive patriotic politics?

i. Critical Reflections On The Lancaster House Negotiations

Chapter Four analysed conflicting scholarly perspectives on how the Lancaster House Agreement fulfilled the objectives of the liberation struggle. The analysis of the agreement was examined in the context of political fundamentalism, among various interest-based actors such as the British and American governments, African leadership, ZANU and ZAPU. These actors represented a social-political force whose interests, either by default or design, influenced what appeared to be a departure from socialism. Fundamentalism is strict adherence to beliefs that are regarded to be absolute and true. This belief does not consider alternatives, such as differences in political ideologies or opinions (Tarusarira 2017). A cursory glance at the British foreign policy during the Lancaster negotiations showed elements of fundamentalism that the British

government pursued during the meetings. British foreign policy demonstrated that the Lancaster House negotiations were shaped by the prevailing Cold War matrix.

The British Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, was very opposed to the proliferation of communist ideals (Dyson 2009); the deployment of Lord Carrington to lead the negotiations confirmed that the British sought to prevent ideas of socialism from emerging in an independent Zimbabwe. Discussions around the outcomes of the Lancaster House negotiations have not fully exhausted the impact of international relations as a catalyst to the political fundamentalism in Britain's interests. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Cuban involvement in Southern Africa shaped the fundamentalism in Britain's foreign policy (Sibanda 2017). The Cold War dimension helped in understanding why a socialist state was not attained in Zimbabwe. In addition, the British sought to ensure white minority and capitalist interests, through the protection of property rights, citizenship and offering of compensations for lost land and properties.

ii. A Reflection of African Leadership Support at The Lancaster House Negotiations

A shared approach to the study of revolutionary politics in Southern Africa means locating any analysis within the contexts of regional solidarity creates a transnational history of the fight against colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Colonialism in Southern Africa led to the formation of the Front-Line States (FLS) in the 1970s whose political and ideological thrusts were aimed at putting an end to colonialism (Chingono & Nakana, 2009). The formation of the FLS was premised on the understanding that the region of Southern Africa was finding new ways to participate on the global stage through a regional solidarity and security framework. Ideologically, a long-held belief was that the FLS was in a better position to understand the crisis in Rhodesia because of its own experience in fighting anti-colonial wars (SADC Treaty, 1992). This experience was supposed to put the bloc on a pedestal as unique stakeholders in matters of conflict resolution. Within the anti-colonial ideological framework of the FLS, member states, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia gave their support to the Lancaster House negotiations.

The support rendered by the African leadership at the Lancaster House demonstrated that Mozambique and Zambia were not interested in attaining a socialist state in Zimbabwe. Traditional Realists, in the practice of foreign policy, rather pointed at the dilemma that national interests have primacy over cooperation as well as regional and international solidarity (Baylis,

Smith, and Owens, 2014). Khadiagala & Lyons (2001) observe that external factors such as colonialism and the Cold War compromised African states' ability to cooperate and led them to pursue selfish national interests to safeguard their national sovereignties. The discussions and support from African leadership on the question of nationalism took various forms. At different times, the leadership pushed for an armed struggle, negotiations or for a socialist outcome in Zimbabwe. These inconsistencies were due to the Cold War matrix and also the trajectories that informed political and economic demands in Mozambique and Zambia at the time.

Mozambique and Zambia were suffering economically due to the war in Rhodesia. Politically, the Frelimo government was dealing with an insurgency turned civil war from the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), hence, there was an extreme dependency on donor support with at least seventy five per cent (75%) of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Mozambique relying on donor support (Saul, 2016). This influenced the way that the country's foreign policy was shaped and its relationship with the rest of the world (Lalbahadur and Otto, 2013: 5; Doran 2017:54). In Zambia, there was also an economic crisis caused by a socialist economic model that was adopted by the government in 1964. Furthermore, Zambia's support and hosting of liberation movements from South Africa and Rhodesia had led to a fall-out between Zambia and minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (Sardanis, 2014:27). These background happenings helped to understand Mozambique and Zambia's stand during the negotiations at Lancaster House.

Mozambique and Zambia used strong-arm diplomacy during the Lancaster House negotiations, to force Mugabe and Nkomo to negotiate with the British (Doran 2017). This indicated the limitations of African states in the practice of international relations. Mozambique and Zambia were forced to abandon their socialist rhetoric and open to neoliberalism in order to deal with their domestic socio-economic and political issues. This has been the hallmark of Africa's international relations in which most states are incapacitated to independently execute their foreign policy objectives. Mozambique and Zambia's approach did not reflect the political and ideological thrust of the objectives of the FLS, instead, it mirrored the limitations and trajectories of Africa's international relations. Drawing upon regional and ideological solidarity, an analysis of Mozambique and Zambia, refutes the historical claim that former liberation movements have always stood in solidarity to confront colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017). At different times,

national interests were prioritised over regional issues; African states, such as Mozambique and Zambia have always issued threats and exerted pressure on liberation movements, such as ZAPU and ZANU (The Conversation, 2015). During the negotiations, Mozambique and Zambia threats to cut off ideological and political support forced both ZAPU and ZANU to abandon an armed struggle strategy and rather take the negotiation route.

iii. Post-Independent Political Trajectories: Emergence of Exclusive Patriotic Politics

Chapter Four explored the emergence of exclusive and patriotic politics as a trajectory that characterised post-independent Zimbabwe. Frameworks developed by Tendi (2010) and Ranger (2004) were used to analyse political developments between 1980 and 1990. The ruling party rejected any other version of the liberation struggle, created subjection and conformity and used the history of the liberation struggle as an alternative discourse. Violence was used as a tool to achieve certain political objectives (Mujere, Sagiya & Fontein, 2017). Tendi and Ranger showed that there was extensive use of patriotic history by the ruling party in the post-2000 crisis period. In the 1960s, urban violence had also been prevalent between ZAPU and ZANU's supporters. Through political memory, a link was established between pre-independence and post-independence exclusive and patriotic politics. At three different timelines, the 1960s, 1980s and the post-2000 period, exclusive and patriotic politics were an integral part of Zimbabwean politics

Exclusive and patriotic politics emerged in post-independent Zimbabwe because of the failure of the Lancaster House negotiations to fully appreciate the Rhodesian question. The negotiations were an attempt at forging a national identity in Zimbabwe through blending former white settler sentiments and African distinctiveness into a broader and unitary Zimbabwean identity (Southall 2013). There is a consensus among scholars (Tarusarira, 2017; Dzimiri 2016) that a post-conflict initiative was put in place as a 'forward-looking policy' by the Mugabe administration. The consensus was that national unity should be achieved in every public and private sphere through a focused political and economic framework; this resulted in Zimbabwe earning the title of the 'breadbasket' of Africa (Dzimiri 2016). The apparently 'looking forward' policy initiated by Mugabe was, however, a ruse to internationalise the new Zimbabwean state.

Uniting ZAPU and ZANU was one of the most immediate post-conflict concerns, however, despite an electoral win in 1980, ZANU did not transform into a multi-racial and multi-ethnic

party. This was unlike the ANC in South Africa that began as a Nguni-dominated party but was able to incorporate other Bantu-speaking tribes with time. Numerically and ideologically, ZANU's legitimacy was disputed in the eyes of ZAPU (Doran, 2017). Both ZAPU and ZANU had inadequacies in terms of nation-building and instead of these parties working together towards nation-building, certain political elites in ZANU - Shamuyarira, Nkala and Tekere - used the GNU to seek retribution. The political violence meted against ZANU by ZAPU in the early 1960s became the pillar for Shamuyarira's anti-ZAPU propaganda in the Ministry of Information (Hill 2003).

The study went on to discuss the state-sponsored military campaign that was waged in Zimbabwe after independence. The fact that state-sponsored violence was used in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces indicated that nationalist political leaders had failed to come up with a robust nation-building policy. This also indicated that ZANU's representation of the nation was largely built on coercion rather than on consent (Southall, 2013). The killing of more than 20 000 civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces showed the lengths to which ZANU would go to create a hegemonic one-party state (Moore 1990). The study also sought to understand the causes of the Gukurahundi disturbances through an analysis of internal factional politics in ZANU. Müller-Rommel (1982) says factions are a "group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies. A faction arises in the struggle for power and represents a division on details of application" (cited in Kollner & Basedau, 2005). An analysis of the views expressed by Tekere indicated that policy-related divisions began to emerge in ZANU and the most visible cause of the division was the forward-looking policy that Mugabe had 'chosen' towards whites and ZAPU. This culminated into several populist ideas outlined by Tekere showing that ZANU had to abandon a forward-looking policy for a retributive one that was premised on socialism (Doran 2017). Tekere's views represented a conservative and alternative centre of power in ZANU which also questioned the authenticity of the incumbent, Mugabe, and led the party and state towards social transformation.

Even though Mugabe had extended an olive branch to ZAPU through a GNU, Nkomo's response seems to have been influenced by factional politics within the party (Moorcroft 2008). A discourse was constructed which sought to discredit ZAPU as a bitter opponent that had lost an election and had an insatiable appetite for power (Doran 2017). This illustrated that political

narratives may have serious socio-political repercussions, such as the criminalization of opponents and legitimising political violence. The Lancaster House agreement had been capitalist-oriented thereby making it difficult for Mugabe to push for a socialist agenda. This pressured Mugabe to be more pragmatic at home and abroad in order to get the needed international support to build the nation (Southall, 2013). Tekere and Nkala had failed to understand Nkomo and ZAPU's contribution to Zimbabwe history. The will of the people was contested between ZAPU and ZANU and it is in this political context that Mugabe acknowledged the significance of Nkomo. Similarly, in the post-2000 period, ZANU-PF attempted to be less indifferent towards the opposition, MDC. ZANU-PF's indifference had undermined the fact that the MDC was a post-independence creation and an urban-based movement whilst ZANU-PF had been reduced to the status of a rural party in every election from 2000 onwards. Analysing politics in this period from the point of view of factionalism in ZANU was necessary to shows how events culminated into state-sponsored violence. Traditionally, the Gukurahundi disturbances have been classified as ZANU's attempt at creating a one-party state, however, this analysis does not fully recognize how factional and populist politics in ZANU had led to the criminalization of ZAPU and the tragic military campaign of Gukurahundi.

iv. A Comparative Evaluation of Chapter Three and Four

Emerging outcomes in Chapter Three established that nationalism is a construct and just like identity, is always in a state of mobility; rising from this is the sociological subject on identity to support this assertion. Points from Blumer (1969) cited in (Carter & Fuller, 2015) was used to analyse the mobility of identity through a concept called 'symbolic interactionism'. Societies derive meanings through interactions among individuals. In addition, these 'meanings' are continuously created and recreated. This observation, which according to Chapter Three is the dominant view, refutes the underlying notion of structured societies, hence, nationalism was not explored from a structured point of view in the chapter. Nationalism emerged as an identity because of the encroachment of the British in 1890 which had led to the First Chimurenga war that sought to repossess land the British had expropriated. This builds on the issues of land and Africanness as the foundation for nationalism to a more nuanced construction of a multi-dimensional Zimbabwean identity. This identity is multi-dimensional in the sense that it encompasses tenets of cultural nationalism, such as land and Africanness and at the same time finds expression in neo-liberal principles, such as political democracy and civil rights. This

became a focal point of contestation and avenues for identity politics between those that viewed the struggle in conservative and nativist terms and those that believed in a progressive and neo-liberal approach to the struggle.

Chapter Four also deviated from the argument above to analyse nationalism in exclusive and absolute terms. What we call 'nationalism' in Zimbabwe betrays the basic goals of the revolutionary struggle whose interests were mass-based. What was presented in Chapter Four was a self-described absolute and exclusive nationalism, determined by the ideology of elite collusion in ZANU. The chapter identifies several fissures in the notion of nationalism that came to characterise failed trajectories of post-independent politics in Zimbabwe. In the context of post-independent politics, the specific focus was how ZANU sought to construct itself as 'representative of the nation' through a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy. Central to this discussion was the evaluation that a coherent socialist ideology and a one-party state philosophy mirrored absolute patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe. These developments marked what some commentators saw as the death of multi-party democracy and nationalist politics in Zimbabwe. In addition, the 1980s saw the polarisation between ZAPU and ZANU escalating into a tragic civil war which became a clear expression of the failure of the nationalist leadership to come up with a robust post-independence nation-building initiatives.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a summative evaluation of the key findings of the study in the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe. Nationalism was a product of political narratives which were constructed and contested by nationalist political leaders. Nationalist political leaders played an innovative role that confronted colonialism from multiple perspectives, however, this also led to problems, such as the emergence of violent politics as well as, exclusive and patriotic politics in pre- and post-independent Zimbabwe. The chapter also evaluated the emergence of the independent Zimbabwean state following the Lancaster House negotiations. Methodologically, the study used inductive content analysis and probed social discourses, such as nationalism, through the use of Primordialist and Constructivist theories.

SIX:

WITHER NATIONALISM: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

This study examined the fundamental issues surrounding nationalism in Zimbabwe. The research questions that guided the study were - *How did a constructed and contested nationalism emerge in Zimbabwe? In what ways was nationalism understood and interpreted by ZAPU and ZANU in both pre- and post-independent Zimbabwe?* The above questions were explored to understand changes in the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe between 1977 and 1990. Studies on the emergence and development of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe have been a product of elitist narratives, and these narratives have competed over the years to produce multiple perspectives. The discussions have established that there is no scholarly unanimity regarding ways in which nationalism was conceptualised by both ZAPU and ZANU. In light of the above, this chapter provides the conclusion of the study. In addition, the chapter focuses on an overview of the research findings, methodological contribution and challenges, the contribution of the study to the body of knowledge and recommendations for further studies.

6.1 Overview of the Research and Key Findings

Chapter one presented the research problem being investigated as well as the fundamental research questions substantiating the problem. Provided also were the justification and significance of the study and the methodological context. Methodologically, the study was approached from an inductive content analysis that sought to probe political discourses, such as nationalism by conducting an extensive review of secondary and primary data sources, relevant to the study. A literature-based approach helped to analysis various manifestation of nationalism between the period 1977 to 1990. This introductory chapter also expounded on the key definition of terms that informed the study. In addition, this chapter also outlined the demarcation of the study - 1977 to 1990 - as a very significant timeline in the nationalist political history of Zimbabwe.

Chapter two explored scholarly debates relevant to the conception of nationalism. As revealed by the study, coming up with a universal conception of nationalism proved a mammoth task. This

debate included a conception of nationalism from the traditional and contemporary points of views (Easley 2012; Prah 2009). The idea was to explore the confluences and divergences in scholarship with the aim of drawing critical themes that would inform the topic of the study. The chapter also put into historical perspective and problematised the concept 'nationalism'; this examination served to substantiate the claim that the circumstances in which nationalism emerged in Europe were not necessarily the same in Africa and in Zimbabwe. Theoretical expositions deployed in Chapter two focused on the application of the Primordalist and Constructivist theories as analytical tools. As demonstrated within the Primordalist discourse, historical and cultural factors are the primary contexts in which nationalism emerges. This took into consideration factors such as land, kinsmanship, religion and symbols as the primary tools for the development of nationalism. Fundamentally, the constructivist theory looks at nationalism as a social construct by the political elites and this position departs from the dominant traditional and historical conceptions of nationalism. Advanced is the position that nations and nationalism are concepts that are weaved together to create a sense of identity.

Chapter three evaluated the role played by the nationalist political leadership in constructing and contesting nationalism in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Worth noting is their innovative efforts in problematising the political crisis in Rhodesia and it emerged that these efforts took on various forms, such as using political narratives, media, and transnational alliances. As presented, political narratives were utilised by political elites as avenues to present the political crisis in Rhodesia in the most intelligent way. Evidence, thus far, demonstrates that these innovative efforts projected the nationalist political leadership as political and social forces because of their ability to self organise and propel changes in the conception of politics in Rhodesia. Despite efforts to give thrust to the liberation struggle by the elites, the chapter indicated that factional politics, political violence, identity politics and tension between the educated and uneducated elites emerged. This attested to the fact that there is a gap in the conception of nationalism, hence it is being continuously constructed and contested. This perspective found expression in the internecine violence between ZAPU and ZANU in townships, the split in ZAPU in 1962 and the movement of March 11, 1971.

Chapter four provided a synopsis of the role played by educated nationalists in the liberation war. This was done through an evaluation of the rise of Robert Mugabe to the echelons of power in

ZANU. The study on Mugabe is encapsulated in the understanding that nationalist political leaders were important in as far as they were prominent in the spreading of new ideas and their ability to articulate the national question. Chapter four provided a discussion on diverging perspectives on the outcomes of the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 which culminated in the birth of the newly-independent state of Zimbabwe. Themes that emerged where the Marxist and nativist argument proffered by Mhanda (cited in Moore, 2012). Other diverging views as presented by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) contextualised the Lancaster House agreement from a Cold War point of view. It emerged that multiple perspectives can be applied to understand the outcomes of the Lancaster House agreement. These perspectives include an analysis of British's foreign policy, the support offered to the Patriotic Front by African leaders and the interest-based motives of the Patriotic Front. This was very pertinent to the study in as far as examining the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe from multiple perspectives, is concerned. Also proffered in the chapter is the mutation of nationalism into exclusive and patriotic politics in post-independent Zimbabwe. Analysed in the chapter was how ZANU demonstrated that it represented the nation through coercion and not consent. The coercive approach took on various forms, such as the criminalization of political opponents, an attempt at creating a coherent socialist ideology, the pursuit of one party state and use of political violence. Despite these attempts, the chapter showed that ZAPU contested ZANU's view of representing the nation. This was significant in as far as viewing ZAPU as a political alternative was concerned and helped dismissed the long-held notion that ZAPU was a victim of ZANU's monopoly of the nationalist and political narratives. Lastly, the chapter sought to capture the Gukurahundi massacres from a different viewpoint; it was established that apart from an attempt at one party state, factional politics in ZANU contributed to the deployment of the 5th Brigade in southwestern Zimbabwe that led to the death of 20000 civilians in a clean-up operation called 'Operation Gukurahundi'. Apart from the humanitarian catastrophe, the Gukurahundi killings in Zimbabwe indicated the failure of nationalist leaders to come up with a robust post-independent reconstruction initiative.

Chapter five provided a summative evaluation of the changes in the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe. To achieve the chapter's objectives, a thematic approach was deployed to establish key outcomes. This approach helped to capture nationalism in its various forms, namely, instrumental use of political violence and criminalization of political opponents, to cite a few examples. Emerging from the chapter is the innovative dimensions of the nationalist leadership

in articulating the political crisis in Rhodesia; this was necessary to explain these new dimensions relevance to the liberation struggle. The chapter also evaluated the extent to which the media and transnational alliances became effective tools in the transition from a passive to militant nationalism. Chapter five also examined the Lancaster House agreement from various departure points. Proffered in the chapter was an examination of interest-based actors, Britain, African leadership and the Patriotic Front. This analysis was critical to understand how each actors' interests became an impediment to the attainment of a socialist state in Zimbabwe. The chapter also evaluated key findings on the post-independent political trajectories in Zimbabwe. The evaluation indicated that nationalist leaders failed to come up with a robust post-liberation initiative appropriate for nation-building.

6.2 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

A qualitative nature of the study involved extensive literature review relevant to the subject of nationalism and its varying conceptions by ZAPU and ZANU as liberation movements. This approach offered an opportunity to understand concepts such as nationalism from multiple perspectives. With limited resources, however, the researcher could not visit various libraries and other relevant archival sources. Accessing Zimbabwe's national archives was another mammoth task given delays in security clearance. This limitation was, however, addressed through extensive internet searches as well as visiting various libraries in South Africa which had relevant information. Methodologically, the use of interviews was not feasible given that research on sensitive topics like nationalism is not permissible in Zimbabwe. Fear of being labelled a 'state agent' prevented goodwill from people who might have provided facts. A literature-based study, therefore, was found consistent with the study objectives. Interviews with nationalist leadership, policy makers and academics on the topic, in Zimbabwe, would, however, have given a more nuanced approach to the study.

6.3 Major Study findings

i. Nationalism as a product of political narratives

One of the main findings is that nationalism can be conceptualised as political constructs. In its developmental stages, nationalism emerged as a product constructed by political elites and that the way nationalism unfolded was consistent with the basic tenets of narratives in politics.

Political narratives are the way political facts, values and identities are shaped and weaved together to make sense of political reality. Within the framework of narratives, subjective 'reality' can be questioned from multiple perspectives. This expanded the conception of nationalism by refuting the claim that nationalism follows a singular narrative. Suffice to say, in the study, at different points in time nationalism took on various forms. Nationalism was shaped by the philosophies of neoliberal ideas, radical nativism and Marxism to problematize its status in Rhodesia. This is well captured in the differences in the conception of nationalism as proffered by those that sought a liberal and democratic approach and those that opted for a radical and nativist approach. This study established that such inconsistencies have not received enough scholarly and conceptual clarity. By differing on the forms that characterised nationalism, these accounts reinforced the theme of this study - that nationalism is a product of political narratives that are constantly being constructed and contested.

ii. New Perspectives on the Lancaster House Negotiations

An analysis of the Lancaster House negotiations revealed that the motives of the interest-based actors - Britain, Mozambique and Zambia - through an examination of trajectories informing their foreign policies. Building on political fundamentalism and the personality of the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, the study is the first of its kind in proffering multiple perspectives on the outcomes of the Lancaster House negotiations. In addition, a broader analysis of the foreign policy objectives of Mozambique and Zambia provided by the study revealed that these states were found wanting in as far as attaining a socialist state in Zimbabwe was concerned. What is unique in this study, is its ability to refute the long-held belief that Mozambique and Zambia were in a better position to understand the crisis in Rhodesia because of their own experience in fighting colonialism. Traditional Realists, in the practice of foreign policy, point to this dilemma that national interests have primacy over cooperation as well as, regional and international solidarity. This indicated the limitations of African states in the practice of international relations. Mozambique and Zambia were forced to abandon their socialist rhetoric and open for neoliberalism in order to deal with their domestic socio-economic and political issues. This has been the hallmark of Africa's international relations in which most states are incapacitated to independently execute their foreign policy objectives. Mozambique and Zambia's approach did not reflect the political and ideological thrust of the objectives of the

FLS, instead, it mirrored the limitations and trajectories of Africa's international relations. Drawing upon regional and ideological solidarity, an analysis of Mozambique and Zambia, refutes the historical claim that former liberation movements have always stood in solidarity to confront colonialism. Locating the study in the confines of foreign policy perspectives broadens the understanding of the political trajectories of the Lancaster House. These had not been thoroughly exhausted and in doing so, this study has been able to offer contributions to the body of knowledge.

iii. Factionalism in ZANU and its contribution to Political Trajectories in Post Independent Zimbabwe

One of the main critical engagements of the study was a focus on the post-independence political trajectories. Apart from the pursuit of a coherent socialist ideology, post-1980 politics were characterised by a self-described absolute and exclusive nationalism determined by the ideology of the elite in ZANU. Several studies have been undertaken to explain nationalism in Zimbabwe, and the central argument in these studies is that ZANU was merely interested in establishing a one-party state, However, this study's critical engagement with factional politics within the ruling party succeeded in refuting this dominant narrative. Building on the works of Müller-Rommel (1982) and Kollner and Basedau, (2005) on political factions, the study was able to provide conceptual clarity on the internal politics in ZANU. Factions arise in the struggle for power, they represent a division on details of application in political parties. The government of national unity between Mugabe and Nkomo generated a lot of debate because the government had reversed the idea of exclusivity and the monolithic tendencies that were being pushed by conservatives in ZANU. The study, therefore, was able to conceptualise different reactions that were proffered by different political actors within ZANU. To this end, the study analysed these reactions within the parameters of democratic centralism. The use of populist language by Tekere and Mugabe's response demonstrated the problems with democratic centralism. Masipula Sithole argues that democratic centralism produces undesirable consequences if a certain faction in an organisation or alliance is conservative, defensive or reactionary (Sithole 1999: 103 cited in Mazarire, 2011:575). Through democratic centralism and analysis of factionalism, the study refuted the claims that Mugabe was in charge of ZANU, to the point that Tekere and Nkala could openly challenge the party's policy through promoting leftist politics. Leftist politics were seen

as instrumental for constituency building and clientelism for Tekere and Nkala who were positioned to challenge Mugabe as the leader of the party and state. As a result, two centres of power emerged in which issues around a forward-looking policy either revolved around Tekere or Mugabe. What is unique about the study of factionalism in ZANU is the researcher's ability to refute the claims that ZANU had always been a coherent and disciplined movement. In addition, the study of factionalism refutes the long-held claims that as the leader of ZANU, Mugabe's leadership was absolute and final.

iv. An Appraisal of ZAPU's Conception of Nationalism

Further analysis of ZAPU's conception of nationalism revealed a monolithic and self-glorification tendencies of political elites within ZAPU. The ZAPU conception of nationalism sought to deconstruct the hegemonic narrative that places ZANU at the nucleus of Zimbabwe's nationalist history. In doing so, ZAPU propelled its iconic status as a bastion of nationalism in Zimbabwe. These contestations between ZANU and ZANU are reminiscent of the philosophy of 'me first', that is to say, 'mine is right' and 'yours is wrong'. Despite efforts to present a self-serving narrative that is shaped after the elites' contribution, the study also outlined factional politics, political violence, identity politics and most importantly, the criminalisation of the younger segment in ZAPU by the old guard. Rising from this point of departure is the instrumental use of violence by ZAPU political leadership. From this, the study addressed some partial scholarly analysis that represents ZAPU as a victim of ZANU's hegemonic politics. These gaps in ZAPU's history reinforce one of the main arguments of the study - that nationalism can be used for good and bad purposes.

An analysis of nationalism conception by ZAPU makes it necessary also to examine leadership qualities focusing especially on Joshua Nkomo's political shrewdness that manifested in various forms. This has been done through analysing Nkomo's personal and ideological interests at the Lancaster House negotiations as well as political alliances he forged in the 1980 elections in an effort to out-maneuver Mugabe. The study contextualised these political acts within the confines of politics of representation and monumentalisation. Representation in politics is a notion that is useful for constituency building and authenticity. It further demonstrated Nkomo's insatiable interest in maintaining an autonomous ZAPU identity. This autonomy was translated into ZAPU's ability to define an independent narrative through contributing to the shaping of the

national discourse. In nationalist politics, an autonomous identity is attached to authenticity and legitimacy and by rejecting ZANU's overtures Nkomo reinforced the idea that ZAPU was not a victim but instead a competitor.

6.4 Study contributions to the body of Knowledge

This study provided some nuances to the body of knowledge by formulating key pillars to the conception of nationalism. Significant to this study is the deductive analysis that helped to formulate a conceptual model for understanding nationalism (see Figure 1). In the propounded framework four pillars - elite leadership, political ideological imperatives, critical moments and national interests - have been identified and are discussed below.



Figure 1: Key Pillars to the Conception of Nationalism

Pillar 1: Elite leadership.

In the analysis, the role played by the elite leadership indicates it as a force of social organisation and driver of change, responsible for the introducing modes and orders in society. These new modes and orders entail the application of nationalism as a sophisticated tool for instrumental purposes; consequently, the model identifies a gap in the analysis of the liberation struggle. What we call 'nationalism' in Zimbabwe is a self-described 'revolution from above'

determined by the ideology of an elite. The conceptual model deviates from the general approach of history as a motivating factor for the development of nationalism. The pillar of elite leadership refutes the claims that the liberation struggle was anchored on the masses. This is an acknowledgement of the assumption of the study, that what is appropriated as nationalism in Zimbabwe is an anti-thesis of the Marxist principles that the masses are the nuclei of any struggle. Focusing the discussion of nationalism on the pillar of elite leadership brings a more nuanced approach in explaining some of the deficiencies in the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe.

Pillar 2: Critical moments

The idea of exploring critical moments is for instrumental purposes. This is done through the careful selection of historical memories, symbolic wars and epochs, which can be summed up as an identity-making process.

In Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe and other countries where wars of liberation were fought to end colonialism, the first wars of liberation, such as the First Chimurenga are very symbolic in providing a platform upon which nationalism can be understood. Following the invasion and occupation of the country by the British South Africa Company in the 1880s and the defeat of the nationalist leaders of the First Chimurenga, nationalism in Zimbabwe drew its inspiration from these 'critical moments'. From the study's crafted framework, it is illustrated that critical moments do not seek to inspire a unified and glorified conception of nationalism but rather they are the source of division and manufacturing of political identity. This is so when one considers that the ruling ZANU rejected any other version of the liberation struggle, created subjection and conformity and used critical moments in the history of the liberation struggle to delegitimatise ZAPU.

In post-2000 Zimbabwe, the use of critical moments has been more pronounced. Instances of these critical moments include outlining the role played by the elites in ZANU-PF, in what is known as the 'Third Chimurenga', the fight for cultural and political revival in the wake of formidable opposition and the Movement for Democratic Change. The idea behind the Third Chimurenga was to place the leadership in the ruling party ZANU-PF as a decisive element in the construction of a new pan-Africanist discourse and identity in Zimbabwe. Critical moments do not seek to inspire unity as their ultimate end, but instead, as a tool that causes division while

manufacturing political identity between those that are connected to them and those who are ultimately regarded as outsiders or sell-outs.

Pillar 3: National Interests

As shown through the lenses of the framework, national interests are pertinent to shaping nationalism, however, understanding national interests is not homogenous because they attract different meanings and different interpretations. Post-independence political trajectories in Zimbabwe shows that national interests are not static but are shaped by various critical moments and the nature of leadership at a particular time, in this case, the political elite. In addition, while national interests are usually understood in a defined geographical context, the circumstances under which they emerged, for example in Europe were not necessarily the same in the case of the Third World - Asia, Latin America and Africa. For example, the history of plundering, wars of conquest, resource accumulation and cultural hegemony of the Greek and Roman Empire can be useful lenses to understanding national interests. Worth noting is that before colonialism, national interests did not exist in Zimbabwe since there was no common language nor identity as a nation, rather, it is through experiences of shared loss of land and the oppression by the colonizer which gave common recognition to ZANU and ZAPU as leading revolutionary political wings.

Pillar 4: Political Ideological Imperatives

One of the main critical engagements of this framework is to understand nationalism from political ideological imperatives points of view. Like many revolutions globally, nationalism has been shaped around political ideologies. Some of the political ideologies include Marxism and its notion of the masses as the vanguard of the struggle; Kwame Nkrumah in 'Consciencism' and Julius Nyerere concept of 'Ujamaa'. From the framework, there is a fusion between ideological propagation and elite influence. For nationalism to be moulded around a certain ideology, there is a need for a powerful elite. This resonates with the Machiavellian dictum as well as the Nkrumah's classical thinking that the elite leadership are the fulcrum that determines change and the political path that the nation has to follow. This expressely demonstrates the notion of

instrumental nationalism. In the context of Zimbabwe, it can be inferred that despite their innovative ability in problematising the national question, educated nationalists failed to develop an appropriate concept of nationalism. The political factions, ethnic politics and political violence that ensued validate the point that there was a breakdown in the way nationalism was constructed by the political elites. In fact, nationalism is understood in monolithic and exclusive terms in Zimbabwe. The framework constructs the Zimbabwe experience to refute Marxists position that the proletariat, peasants or the working class, are central, are the driving force for social change that becomes a nationalist revolution.

6.5 Recommendations for further Research

i. *Changes and continuities in the conception of nationalism post-1990*

The study utilised 1977 as the take-off period while 1990 was the cut-off period. While the study provided various factors shaping the understanding of nationalism in Zimbabwe, further research should be devoted to understanding changes in the manifestation of nationalism in post-1990. This is in view of the fact that various critical moments have occurred in Zimbabwe since 1990.

ii. An Analysis of the role played by the Communist bloc in the Lancaster House Agreement

Analysts tend to neglect the role played by the communist bloc (Russia, China and Cuba), if any, at the Lancaster House negotiations. The study premised the negotiations on the role played by Britain and the United States of America. The role played by the communist bloc in the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe cannot be denied, hence, research should also examine why a socialist state was unattainable in post-independence Zimbabwe. This is pertinent if one considers the ideological and military support rendered to military and political groups in Zimbabwe by the communist bloc.

iii. Study on the changes and continuities of nationalism in the post-2000 era

Since the millennium, Zimbabwe has ceased to be a defacto one-party-state as evidenced by the formation of strong political opposition in the name of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This study, therefore recommends further research on the opposition‘s conception of nationalism. This will be in light with the position that nationalism has been understood from

monolithic narratives of liberation movements. A study of post-independent movements' conception of nationalism, on issues, such as land reform, identity and Africanness, is crucial in understanding changes in the application of nationalism in a post-2000 era.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a conclusion of the study on the conception of nationalism in Zimbabwe; nationalism was a product of political narratives. In addition, the chapter focused on detailing the findings, limitations and delimitations of the study. The chapter also evaluated a conceptual framework on nationalism as a key contribution to the study. In recommendation, the study identified three significant areas that could be of interest in researching on.

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